hundred men. These last, apparently the garrison of the large fort on the extreme right of the Bayonette crest, were captured by Colborne in a remarkable manner. Accompanied by only one of his staff and half-a-dozen riflemen, he crossed their march unexpectedly, and with great presence of mind ordered them to lay down their arms; an order which they, thinking themselves entirely cut off, obeyed! And all the French skirmishers, in the deep ravine between the two lines of attack were likewise taken; for being feebly pushed by Longa's troops they retreated too slowly, got entangled in the rocks and surrendered to Kempt's brigade. Taupin's right and centre being thus completely beaten fled down the mountain towards Olette pursued by a part of the allies, but they rallied on Villatte, who was in order of battle between Urogne and Ascain. The Bayonette and Commissari, with the Puerto de Vera, were won in this manner after five hours' incessant fighting and toiling up their craggy sides; nevertheless the battle was still maintained by the French on the Rhune.

Giron, after driving Conroux's advanced post out of the gorge leading from Vera to Sarre, had pushed a battalion towards the head of the great Rhune, and placed a reserve in the gorge to cover his rear from any counter-attack. But when the taking of the Boar's back freed his left wing he fought his way up abreast with the British line until near the saddle-ridge, a little to the right of the Puerto. There he was arrested by a strong line of abattis and the heavy fire of two French regiments. The Spaniards stopped, and though the adventurer Downie, now a Spanish general, encouraged them and they kept their ranks, they seemed irresolute and did not advance; but it happened that an officer of the forty-third regiment, named Havelock, attached to Alten's staff, had been sent to ascertain Giron's progress, and his fiery temper could not brook the check. Taking off his hat he called upon the Spaniards to follow him, and putting spurs to his horse at one bound cleared the abattis, and went headlong amongst the enemy. Then the soldiers, shouting for "*El chico blanco*," "*the fair boy*," so they called him, for he was very young and had light hair, with one shock broke through the French; and this at the very moment when their centre was flying under the fire of Kempt's skirmishers from the Puerto de Vera.

The defeated troops retired by their left along the saddle-ridge to the flanks of the Rhune. Clausel had thus eight regiments concentrated on this great mountain. Two occupied the crest and the rock called the Hermitage; four were on the flanks, descending towards Ascain on one hand, and Sarre on the other; the remaining two occupied a lower and parallel crest behind called the small

Rhune. Giron's right wing first dislodged a small body from a detached pile of crags about musket-shot below the summit, and then assailed the bald staring rocks of the Hermitage itself; endeavoring at the same time to turn it by the right, but the attempt was quite defeated; the Hermitage was impregnable; the French rolled down stones large enough to sweep away a whole column at once, and the Spaniards resorted to a distant musketry which lasted until night. Taupin had two generals and four hundred men killed and wounded, and five hundred prisoners. The loss of the allies was nearly a thousand, of which five hundred were Spaniards, and the success was not complete; for while the French kept possession of the summit of the Rhune, the allies' new position was insecure. The front and right flank of that mountain were impregnable; but Wellington observing that the left flank descending towards Sarre was less inaccessible, concentrated the Spaniards on that side the 8th; designing a combined attack against the mountain itself, and against the camp of Sarre. The rocks studding the lower slopes were assailed by the Spaniards, and detachments of the seventh division descended from the Puerto de Echallar upon the fort of San Barbe, and other outworks covering the French camp of Sarre.

The Andalusians then won the rocks and an entrenched height commanding the camp; for Clausel, alarmed at some demonstrations now made by the sixth division towards the bridge of Amotz, thought he should be cut off from his great camp, and suddenly abandoned not only the slope of the Rhune, but all his advanced works in the basin below, including the fort of San Barbe. His troops were thus concentrated on the height behind Sarre, still holding with their right the smaller Rhune, but the consequences of his error were soon made apparent. Wellington established a strong body of Spaniards close to the Hermitage; and the French regiments there, seeing the lower slopes and San Barbe given up, imagined they also would be cut off and without orders abandoned their impregnable rocks in the night, retiring to the smaller Rhune. Next morning some of the seventh division rashly pushed into the village of Sarre, but were quickly repulsed and would have lost the camp and works taken the day before, if the Spaniards had not succored them.

In the three days' fighting, fourteen hundred French and sixteen hundred of the allies, one half being Spaniards, were killed or wounded, but many of the latter were not brought in until the third day; and several perished miserably where they fell, it being impossible to discover them in those vast solitudes; some men also were lost from want of discipline; for, having descended into the

French villages, they got drunk, and were taken next day by the enemy. Nor was the number small of those who plundered in defiance of Wellington's proclamation. He arrested and sent to England several officers, and renewed his proclamation, saying, if he had five times as many men, he could not venture to invade France, unless marauding was prevented; and it is remarkable that the French troops, on the same day, acted towards their own countrymen in the same manner. But Soult also checked the mischief with a vigorous hand, causing a captain of some reputation to be shot as an example, for having suffered his men to plunder a house in Sarre during the action.

These operations had been eminently successful, and the bravery of troops who assailed and carried such stupendous positions must be admired. To them, the unfinished state of the French works was not visible. Day after day, for more than a month, entrenchment had risen over entrenchment, covering the vast slopes of mountains which were scarcely accessible from their natural steepness and asperity. This they could see, yet cared neither for the growing strength of the works, the height of the mountains, nor the breadth of the river with its heavy sands and its mighty rushing tide; all were despised; and while they assailed with confident valor, the French fought in defence of their dizzy steeps with less fierceness than, when striving against insurmountable obstacles, they attempted to storm the lofty rocks of Sauroren. Continual defeat had lowered their spirit, but the feebleness of the defence, on this occasion, may be traced to another cause. It was a general's not a soldier's battle. Wellington had, with overmastering combinations, overwhelmed each point of attack. Taupin's and Maucune's divisions, each less than five thousand strong, were separately assailed, the first by eighteen the second by fifteen thousand men; and at neither point were Reille and Clausel able to bring their reserves into action before the positions were won.

Soult complained that he had repeatedly told his lieutenants an attack was to be expected, and recommended extreme vigilance;* yet they were quite unprepared, although they heard the noise of the guns and pontoons about Irun on the night of the 5th, and again on the night of the 6th. The passage of the river, he said, had commenced at seven o'clock, long after daylight; the allies' masses were then clearly seen forming on the banks, and there was time for Boyer to arrive before the Croix des Bouquets was lost. Thus, the battle was fought in disorder, with less than five thousand men, instead of with ten thousand in good order, and supported by a part of Villatte's reserve. To this negligence, the generals

* Soult's MSS.

also added great despondency. They had so little confidence in the strength of their positions, that if the allies had pushed vigorously forward before the marshal's arrival from Espelette, they would have entered St. Jean de Luz, turned the right of the second position, and forced the French army back upon the Nive and Adour. This was true, but the stroke did not belong to Wellington's system. He could not go beyond the Adour, he doubted whether he could even maintain his army during the winter in the position he had already gained; and he was averse to the experiment, while Pampeluna held out and the war in Germany bore an undecided aspect.

CHAPTER V.

Soult retakes the redoubt of Sarre—Wellington organizes the army in three great divisions under Sir Rowland Hill, marshal Beresford, and Sir John Hope—Disinterested conduct of the last-named officer—Soult's immense entrenchments described—His correspondence with Suchet—Proposes to retake the offensive, and unite their armies in Aragon—Suchet will not accede to his views, and makes inaccurate statements—Lord Wellington, hearing of advantages gained by the allied sovereigns in Germany, resolves to invade France—Blockade and fall of Pampeluna—Lord Wellington organizes a brigade under Lord Aylmer to besiege Santona, but afterwards changes his design.

SOULT was apprehensive for some days that Wellington would push his operations further; but when he knew from Foy, and by the numbers assembled on his right, there was no design to attack his left, he resumed his labors on the works covering St. Jean de Luz*. He also kept a vigilant watch from his centre, holding his troops in readiness to concentrate towards Sarre; and when he saw the heavy masses in his front disperse by degrees into different camps, he directed Clausel to recover the San Barbe. This work, constructed on a comparatively low ridge, barred issue from the gorge leading from Vera to Sarre; and it defended the narrow ground between the Rhunes and the Nivelle river. Abandoned on the 8th without reason by the French, since it did not naturally belong to the position of the allies, it was now occupied by a Spanish piquet of forty men; some battalions were encamped in a small wood close behind, and many officers and men slept in the fort. On the night of the 12th, three of Conroux's battalions reached the platform on which the fort stood, without being perceived and escaladed; the troops behind it went off in confusion at the first alarm, and two hundred soldiers with fifteen officers were made prisoners. The Spaniards made a vigorous effort to

* Soult, MSS.

recover the fort at daylight, were repulsed, and repeated the attempt with five battalions; Clausel then brought up two guns and a sharp skirmish took place in the wood for several hours, the French endeavoring to regain the whole of their old entrenchments, the Spaniards to recover the fort. Neither succeeded, and San Barbe, too near the enemy's position to be safely held, was resigned, with a loss of two hundred men by the French and five hundred by the Spaniards. Soon after this isolated action, a French sloop freighted with stores for Santona attempted to run from St. Jean de Luz, and being chased by three English brigs and cut off from the open sea, her crew, after exchanging a few distant shots with one of the brigs, set her on fire, and escaped in their boats to the Adour.

Head-quarters were now fixed in Vera, and the allied army was organized in three grand divisions. The right, having Mina and Morillo attached to it, was commanded by Hill, and extended from Roncevalles to the Bastan. The centre, occupying Maya, the Echallar, Rhune and Bayonette mountains, was given to Beresford The left, extending from the Mandale mountain to the sea, was under Sir John Hope. This officer succeeded Graham, who had returned to England. Commanding in chief at Coruña, after Sir John Moore's death, he was superior in rank to Lord Wellington during the early part of the peninsular war; but when the latter obtained the baton of field-marshal at Vittoria, Hope, with a patriotism and modesty worthy of the pupil of Abercrombie, the friend of Moore, offered to serve as second in command; and Wellington joyfully accepted him, saying he was the "*ablest officer in the army.*"

On the right and centre the positions were offensive, but the left was still defensive; and the Bidassoa, impassable at high water below the bridge, was close behind. The ridges were, however, strong, and powerful batteries established on the right bank; field-works were constructed; and though the fords below Behobia were dangerous for retreat, even at low water, those above were secure, and there was a pontoon-bridge. The front run along the heights of Croix des Bouquets, facing Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes; the reserve was entrenched above Andaya; the right rested on the Mandale, and from that mountain and the Bayonette the allies could flank an attacking army. Soult, however, looked only to defence. He had not more than seventy-nine thousand old soldiers under arms, including officers and artillery-men. His garrisons absorbed thirteen thousand, leaving sixty-six thousand in the field; whereas the allies, counting Mina's and Del Parque's troops, now at Tudela, Pampeluna and the Val de Irati, exceeded one hundred thousand; seventy-three thousand, including

officers, sergeants and artillerymen, being British and Portuguese.* The French marshal thought there were more; for exaggerated reports made Del Parque twenty thousand strong, and gave Wellington one hundred and forty thousand combatants. But it was not so, and as good conscripts were joining the French army rapidly, and the national guards of the Pyrenees were many, it was in the number of soldiers, rather than of men, the English general had the advantage.

Soult's policy was to maintain a strict defensive, under cover of which the spirit of the troops might be revived, the country in rear organized, and the conscripts hardened to war. The loss of the lower Bidassoa had an injurious effect upon the spirit of the frontier departments, and gave encouragement to the secret partisans of the Bourbons, but in a military view it was a relief. For the great development of the mountains bordering the Bidassoa had rendered their defence difficult, the line could always be pierced, and the army suddenly driven beyond the Adour. The position was now more concentrated. The right, under Reille, was on two lines. One across the royal road on the fortified heights of Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes;† the other in the entrenched camps of Bourdegain and Belchena, covering St. Jean de Luz and barring the gorges of Olhette and Jollimont. The centre under Clausel, was on the ridges between Ascain and Amotz, holding the smaller Rhune in advance; one division was however retained in the camp of Serres on the right of the Nivelle, overhanging Ascain; to replace it, one of D'Erlon's divisions was on the left of that river, reinforcing Clausel's left above Sarre. Villatte's reserve was about St. Jean de Luz, having the Italian brigade in the camp of Serres. D'Erlon's remaining divisions continued in their old position, the right connected with Clausel's line by the bridge of Amotz; the left held the Choupera and Mondarin mountains bordering on the Nive.

Behind Clausel and D'Erlon Soult had commenced a second chain of entrenched camps, prolonged from the camp of Serres up the right bank of the Nivelle to San Pé; thence by Suraide to the double bridge-head of Cambo on the Nive; and beyond that river to the Ursouia mountain, covering the great road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port. He called Paris from Oleron to the defence of the latter fortress and its entrenched camp; and drew Foy down the Nive to Bidarray, half-way between St. Jean Pied de Port and Cambo. Foy thus watched the issues from the Val de Baygorry, and could occupy the Ursouia mountain on the right of

* Appendix 29, § 2.
† Plan 12, p. 418, and 1, p. 13, Vol. V.

the Nive, or, moving by Cambo, reinforce the position on the left of that river.

To complete these immense entrenchments, and between the Nive and the sea they were double, on an opening of sixteen miles, the whole army labored incessantly; and all the resources of the country in materials or workmen were called out by requisition. This defensive warfare was however justly regarded by Soult as unsuitable to the general state of affairs; the offensive was most consonant to the character of the French soldiers, and also to the exigencies of the time. Experience had indeed shown the impregnable nature of the allies' position, and he was too weak singly to change the theatre of operations; but when he considered how strong the armies appropriated to the Spanish contest were, he thought France would be ill-served if her generals could not resume the offensive successfully. Suchet had proved his power at Ordal. Lord William's successor, of inferior rank and power, having an army unpaid, and feeding on salt meat from the ships, and Spanish colleagues unwilling to act cordially or upon a fixed plan, was in no condition to menace the French seriously. And that he was permitted to paralyze fifty or sixty thousand excellent French troops possessing all the strong places of the country, was one of the most singular errors of the war.

Exclusive of national guards and detachments of the line, disposed along the frontier to guard France against marauding excursions, there were available one hundred and seventy thousand men and seventeen thousand horses.* One hundred and thirty-eight thousand were present under arms, and thirty thousand conscripts were in march to join them; they held all the fortresses of Valencia and Catalonia, and most of those in Aragon, Navarre, and Guipuscoa; and they could all unite behind the Pyrenees for a combined effort. Wellington could not, including the Anglo-Sicilians and the Spaniards on the eastern coast, bring into line one hundred and fifty thousand men; he had several sieges on his hands; and to unite his forces at any point required skilful dispositions to cover flank marches. Suchet had thirty thousand disposable men and could make them forty thousand by relinquishing some unimportant posts; and as his artillery means were immense, and distributed in all his strong places, he could furnish himself from almost any point. Ninety thousand old soldiers and two hundred guns might therefore have been united on Wellington's flank; thirty thousand conscripts and the frontier national guards would have remained. These based on the fortresses and camps of Bayonne and of St. Jean Pied de Port, and on the castles of Jaca and

* Appendix 30, § 2.

Navarens, would recover the northern parts while the numerous fortresses of Catalonia would protect France on the south.

To make this great power bear in a right direction was Soult's object, but he could never persuade Suchet to adopt his projects; and that marshal's resistance would appear to have sprung from personal dislike contracted during Soult's sojourn near Valencia, in 1812. It has been shown how lightly he abandoned Aragon after quitting Valencia; he did not, indeed, then know that Soult commanded, and was preparing his great effort to relieve Pampeluna; but he knew Clausel and Paris were on the side of Jaca, and that to menace Wellington's flank would palliate the defeat at Vittoria. At Zaragoza, he had a large garrison and an immense artillery dépôt; from thence, he could, by Jaca, have communicated quickly and surely with Soult; and thus acting in concert, they would have succored Pampeluna.

Soult had not time to communicate with Suchet He quitted Dresden the 4th of July, reached Bayonne the 12th, and on the 20th, he was in march towards St. Jean Pied de Port; and it was during this rapid journey Suchet abandoned Valencia. Soult therefore knew nothing of Suchet's plans, of his forces, of his movements, of his actual positions. However, between the 6th and 16th of August, immediatly after the retreat from Sauroren, he urged Suchet to march upon Zaragoza, open a communication by Jaca, and thus aid the effort to relieve San Sebastian. As an inducement, he stated that his recent operations had caused troops actually in march under Hill towards Catalonia to be recalled; this was an error; his emissaries were deceived by the movements and counter-movements in pursuit of Clausel after the battle of Vittoria, and by the change in Wellington's plans as to the siege of Pampeluna. No troops were sent towards Catalonia; but it is remarkable that Picton, Hill, Graham and O'Donnel were all mentioned in this correspondence between Soult and Suchet as being actually in Catalonia, or on the march; the three first having been really sounded as to taking the command in that quarter, and the last having demanded it himself.

Suchet treated the proposal as chimerical. His movable troops did not, he said, exceed eleven thousand, and a march upon Zaragoza with so few men would be to renew the disaster of Baylen; unless he could fly into France by Venasque, where he had a garrison. This extraordinary view of affairs he supported by statements still more extraordinary. "*Hill had joined Lord William Bentinck with twenty-four thousand men.*"—"*La Bispal had arrived with fifteen thousand.*"—"*There were more than two hundred thousand men on the lower Ebro.*"—"*The Spanish insurrection was*

general and strongly organized."—"*He had recovered the garrison of Tarragona and destroyed the works, and he must revictual Barcelona, and then withdraw to the vicinity of Gerona and remain on the defensive!*"

This letter was written the 23d of August. Lord William had then retreated from the Gaya to the mountains above Hospitalet; the imperial muster-rolls prove that the two armies of Catalonia and Aragon, both under Suchet's command, exceeded sixty-five thousand men, fifty-six thousand being present under arms.* Thirty thousand were united in the field when he received Soult's letter; there was nothing to prevent him marching by Tortoza, except Lord William's army, which had just acknowledged, by a retreat, its inability to cope with him; there was nothing at all to prevent him marching by Lerida. O'Donnel had thrown up his command from bad health, leaving his troops under Giron on the Echallar mountains; Hill was at Roncevalles, and not a man had moved from Wellington's army. Elio and Roche were near Valencia in a starving condition; the Anglo-Sicilians, only fourteen thousand strong, including Whittingham's division, were on the barren mountains above Hospitalet, where no Spanish army could remain; Del Parque and Sarsfield had gone over the Ebro, Copons had taken refuge in the mountains of Cervera. In fine, not two hundred thousand, but less than thirty-five thousand men, half-organized, ill-fed and scattered from Vich to Vinaros, were opposed to Suchet; and their generals had different views and different lines of operations—the Anglo-Sicilians could not abandon the coast, Copons could not abandon the mountains. Del Parque soon afterwards marched to Navarre, and, to use Wellington's phrase, there was nothing to prevent Suchet "*tumbling Lord William Bentinck back even to the Xucar.*" The nature of the insurrection which Suchet pretended to dread shall be shown when the political condition of Spain is treated of.

Suchet's errors respecting the allies were easily detected by Soult. Those touching the French in Catalonia he could not suspect, and acquiesced in the objections to his first plan; but fertile of resource, he immediately proposed another, akin to that which he had urged Joseph to adopt in 1812, after the battle of Salamanca; namely, to change the theatre of war. The fortresses in Spain would, he said, inevitably fall before the allies in succession, if the French armies remained on the defensive, and the only mode of rendering offensive operations successful was a general concentration of means and unity of action. The levy of conscripts under an imperial decree issued in August, would furnish, in conjunction

* Appendix 30, § 2.

with the dépôts of the interior, a reinforcement of forty thousand men; ten thousand would form a sufficient corps of observation about Gerona; and he hoped that, by sacrificing some posts, Suchet could bring twenty thousand infantry to the field. He could have produced forty thousand; but Soult, misled by his erroneous statements, assumed only twenty thousand; and he calculated that he could himself bring thirty-five or forty thousand good infantry and all his cavalry to a given point of junction for the two bodies between Tarbes and Pau. Fifteen thousand of the remaining conscripts were also to go there; and thus seventy or seventy-five thousand infantry, all the cavalry of both armies, and one hundred guns, would be suddenly assembled to thread the narrow pass of Jaca, and descend upon Aragon. Once in that kingdom, they could attack the allied troops in Navarre if the latter were dispersed; and if they were united, retire upon Zaragoza, there to fix a solid base and deliver a general battle upon the new line of operations. Meanwhile, the fifteen thousand unappropriated conscripts might reinforce twenty or twenty-five thousand old soldiers left to cover Bayonne.

An army so great and strongly constituted appearing in Aragon would, Soult argued, necessarily raise the blockades of Pampeluna, Jaca, Fraga, and Monzon, and it was probable Tortoza and even Saguntum would be relieved; the great difficulty was to pass the guns by Jaca; yet he was resolved to try, even though he should convey them upon trucks to be made in Paris and sent by post to Pau. He anticipated no serious inconvenience from the union of the troops in France, since Suchet had already declared his intention of retiring towards Gerona; and on the Bayonne side, the army to be left there could dispute the entrenched line between Cambo and St. Jean de Luz. If driven from thence, it could take a flanking position behind the Nive; the right resting upon the entrenched camp of Bayonne, the left upon the works at Cambo, and holding communication by the fortified mountain of Ursouia with St. Jean Pied de Port. There could be little fear for this secondary force when the great army was once in Aragon; but what he dreaded was delay, because a fall of snow, always to be expected after the middle of October, would entirely close the pass of Jaca.

This proposition, written the 2d of September, immediately after the battle of San Marcial, reached Suchet the 11th, and was peremptorily rejected. If he withdrew from Catalonia, discouragement, he said, would spread, desertion would commence, and France be immediately invaded by Lord William Bentinck, at the head of fifty thousand men. The pass of Jaca was impracticable, and the power of man could not open it for carriages under a year's labor.

His wish was to act on the defensive, but if an offensive movement was absolutely necessary, he offered a counter-project; that is, he would first make the English in his front re-embark at Tarragona, or he would drive them over the Ebro, and then march with one hundred guns and thirty thousand men by Lerida to the Gallego river near Zaragoza; Soult's army, coming by Jaca without guns, might there meet him, and the united forces could then do what was fitting. But to effect this, he required a reinforcement of conscripts, and to have Paris's division and the artillerymen and draft horses of Soult's army sent to Catalonia; he demanded also that two thousand bullocks for the subsistence of his troops should be provided to meet him on the Gallego. Then, touching upon the difficulties of the road from Sanguessa to Pampeluna, he declared, that after forcing Wellington across the Ebro, he would return to Catalonia to revictual his fortresses and prevent an invasion of France. This plan he judged far less dangerous than Soult's; yet he enlarged upon its difficulties and its dangers if the combined movements were not exactly executed. In fine, he continued, "The French armies are entangled amongst rocks, and the emperor should direct a third army upon Spain to act between the Pyrenees and the Ebro in the centre, while the army of Spain, sixty thousand strong, and that of Aragon, thirty thousand strong, operate on the flanks. Thus, *the reputation of the English army, too easily acquired at Salamanca and Vittoria, will be abated.*"

This illiberal remark, combined with the defects of his project, proves that the Duke of Albufera was far below the Duke of Dalmatia's standard, both in magnanimity and capacity: the one giving his adversary just praise, thought the force already supplied by the emperor sufficient to dispute for victory; the other with an unseemly boast, desired overwhelming numbers. Soult's letter reached Suchet the day before the combat of Ordal, and in pursuance of his own plan, the latter should have driven Lord William over the Ebro; as he could well have done, because the Catalan troops had then separated from the Anglo-Sicilians. In his former letters he had estimated his enemies at two hundred thousand fighting men and his own disposable force at eleven thousand, giving that as a reason why he could not march to Aragon. Now, forgetful of his previous objections and estimates, he admitted that he had thirty thousand disposable troops, and proposed the very movement which he had rejected as madness when suggested by Soult. And the futility of his arguments, relative to the general discouragement, the desertion, and the temptation to an invasion of France if he adopted Soult's plan, is apparent; for these things could only happen on the supposition that he was retreating from

weakness; a notion which would, if entertained, have effectually covered the real design, until the great movement in advance should change the public opinion.

Soult's plan was surer, better imagined, grander than his; it was less dangerous in the event of failure, and more conformable to military principles. Suchet's project involved double lines of operation without any sure communications, and consequently without any certainty of just co-operation; his point of junction was within the enemy's power, and the principal army was to be deprived of its artillery—a failure would have left no resource. But in Soult's project the armies were to be united at a point beyond the enemy's reach, and to operate afterwards in mass, with all arms complete, which was conformable to the principles of war. Suchet averred the impracticability of moving the guns by Jaca, yet Soult's counter-opinion claims more respect; Clausel and Paris, who had lately passed with troops through that defile, were in his camp; he had made very exact inquiries of the country people, had caused the civil engineers of roads and bridges on the frontiers to examine the route, and from their reports judged the difficulty to be surmountable.

Neither the inconsistency nor the exaggerations of Suchet's statements escaped Soult's observation; but anxious to effect something while Pampeluna still held out, and the season permitted operations in the mountains, he frankly accepted the other modification, and adopted every stipulation save that of sending the artillerymen and horses of his army to Catalonia, which he considered dangerous. The preparations for this great movement were therefore immediately commenced, and Suchet on his part seemed equally earnest, although he complained of increasing difficulties; pretending Longa and Morillo had arrived in Catalonia, and that Graham was also in march to that quarter. He also deplored the loss of Fraga, from whence the Empecinado had just driven his garrison, as if it were irreparable; but though it commanded a bridge over the Cinca, a river dangerous from its sudden and great floods, he still possessed the bridge of Monzon.

During this correspondence, Napoleon remained silent; yet at a later period, he expressed discontent at Suchet's inactivity; and indirectly approved of Soult's plans by recommending a movement towards Zaragoza, which Suchet, however, did not execute. It would appear, that having given all the reinforcements he could spare, and full powers to both marshals to act as they judged fitting, he would not, at a distance, and while engaged in such vast operations as those he was carrying on at Dresden, decide so important a question. The vigorous execution essential to success

was not to be expected if either marshal acted under constraint and against his own opinion; Soult had adopted Suchet's modification, and it would have been unwise to substitute a new plan, which would have probably displeased both commanders. Meanwhile, Wellington passed the Bidassoa, and Suchet's project was annulled by the approach of winter and the further operations of the allies.

If the plan of uniting the two armies in Aragon had been happily achieved, it would certainly have forced Wellington to repass the Ebro, or fight a great battle with an army less strongly constituted than the French army. If he chose the latter, victory would have profited him little, because his enemy, strong in cavalry, could have easily retired on the fortresses of Catalonia. If he received a check, he must have gone over the Ebro, perhaps back to Portugal, and the French would have recovered Aragon, Navarre and Valencia. It is not probable, however, that such a great operation could have been conducted without being discovered in time by Wellington. It has been already shown, that besides the ordinary spies and modes of gaining intelligence, he had secret emissaries amongst Joseph's courtiers, and even amongst French officers of rank; and Soult vainly endeavored to surprise him the 31st of August, when the combinations were only two days old. Suchet's retreat from Catalonia and junction with Soult in France, when Napoleon was pressed in Germany, together with the known difficulty of passing guns by Jaca, would indeed have made it appear a movement of retreat and fear; nevertheless, the secret must have been known to more than one, and the English general had agents who were little suspected. Soult, however, could still have returned to his old positions, and, reinforced by Suchet's troops, repeated his former attack by the Roncevalles. It might be, his secret design was to involve that marshal in his operations, and that he was not very eager to adopt his modified plan, which the approach of the bad season and the menacing position of Wellington rendered each day less promising. But his own project, hardy and dangerous for the allies, proved Wellington's profound acquaintance with his art; for he had entered France only to please the allied sovereigns, and always watched closely for Suchet; averring that the true military line of operations was towards Aragon and Catalonia. Being now, however, in France, and the war in Germany having taken a favorable turn, he resolved to continue operations on the actual front, awaiting only the

FALL OF PAMPELUNA.

This event was produced by a long blockade, less fertile of incident than the siege of San Sebastian, yet very honorable to the

firmness of the governor, Cassan. The town, containing fifteen thousand inhabitants, stood on a bold table-land, where a number of valleys opened; and where the great roads coming from St. Jean Pied de Port, Sanguessa, Tudela, Estella, Vittoria and Irurzun were concentrated. The northern and eastern fronts were covered by the Arga, the defences being only simple walls, edging the perpendicular rocky bank of the river; the other fronts were regularly fortified with ditches, covered way and half-moons. Two unfinished outworks only were constructed on the south front; but the citadel on the south-west was a regular pentagon with bomb-proofs and magazines, vaulted barracks for a thousand men, and a complete system of mines.

Pampeluna had been partially blockaded by Mina for eighteen months previous to the battle of Vittoria, and when Joseph fled there, it was badly provisioned. The stragglers of his army increased the garrison to more than three thousand five hundred men. Many inhabitants went off during the short interval between the King's arrival and departure, and Cassan, finding his troops too few for action, too many for the food, abandoned the unfinished outworks, demolished everything interfering with his defence outside, and commenced other works inside. Moreover, foreseeing the French army might possibly make a sudden march without guns, to succor the garrison, he prepared a field-train of forty pieces to meet the occasion. When the blockade was established, his chief object was to obtain provisions, and the 28th and 30th of June he fought actions to cover his foragers; the 1st of July, he burned the suburb of Madalina, beyond the river Arga, and forced many inhabitants to quit the place before the blockaders' works were completed. Skirmishes then occurred almost daily, the French always seeking to gather grain and vegetables, which were ripe and abundant beyond the walls; the allies seeking to fire the standing corn within range of the fortress.

On the 14th O'Donnel undertook the blockade, and the next day the garrison made a successful forage south of the town; they repeated it on the east, beyond the Arga the 19th, with a sharp engagement of cavalry, during which the infantry carried away a great deal of corn. The 26th the sound of Soult's artillery reached the place, and Cassan, judging he was coming to succor Pampeluna, made a sally in the night, by the Roncevalles road; he was driven back, but the next morning came out again with eleven hundred men and two guns, overthrew the Spanish outguards, and advanced towards Villalba at the moment when Picton was falling back with the third and fourth divisions. Then O'Donnel, as before related, evacuated some of the entrenchments.

destroyed amunition, spiked guns, and but for the timely arrival of Carlos d'España, and Picton's stand at Huarte, would have abandoned the blockade altogether.

When the battle on the mountains commenced, the smoke rose over the intervening heights of Escava and San Miguel, the French cavalry appeared on the slopes above El Cano, and the allies' baggage was seen filing along the road of Irurzun. Cassan thought deliverance sure, and having reaped much corn during O'Donnel's panic, awaited the result. Soult's bivouac fires could be seen during the night, and in the morning a fresh sally procured more corn, with little loss of men. Some deserters from the foreign British corps also went over with intelligence, exaggerated and colored, after the manner of such men, and the French re-entered the place, elated with hope. In the evening, the sound of conflict ceased, and the silence of the next day told how the battle had gone; but Cassan made another sally, and again obtained provisions from the south side.

On the 30th the battle recommenced, and the retreating fire of the French made sick the spirit of the garrison: nevertheless their indefatigable governor led another sally on the south side, whence they carried off grain and some ammunition, which had been left in one of the abandoned outworks. Next day Carlos d'España came to resume the blockade, with seven thousand men, and maintained it until the middle of September, when the prince of Anglona's division of Del Parque's army relieved the Andalusian portion of the troops, who rejoined their own corps near Echallar. The allies' works of contravallation were then augmented; and when Paris retired into France from Jaca, part of Mina's troops occupied the valleys leading from the side of Sanguessa to Pampeluna, and made entrenchments to bar the escape of the garrison that way.

In October Cassan put his fighting men upon rations of horse-flesh, four ounces to each with some rice, and he turned more families out of the town; but this time they were fired upon by their countrymen, and forced to re-enter.

On the 9th of September, Baron Maucane, who had conducted most of the sallies during the blockade, attacked and carried some fortified houses on the east side of the place. He was assailed by the Spanish cavalry, but he beat them, and pursued the fugitives close to Villalba; whereupon Carlos d'España advanced with a greater body, and the French were driven in with the loss of eighty men; yet the Spaniards lost a far greater number, d'España himself was wounded, and the garrison obtained some corn, which was their principal object; for the soldiers were now feeding on rats and other disgusting animals. Many seeking for roots beyond the

walls, were poisoned by eating hemlock in their hunger, and a number deserted. In this state Cassan, designing to break out, made an experimental sally to try the strength of the lines, but after some fighting, was driven back with a loss of seventy men, and his hope of escape vanished. Yet he still spoke of attempting it, and the public manner in which he increased the mines under the citadel, induced Wellington to reinforce the blockade, and bring his cavalry into the vicinity.

Scurvy affected the garrison. One thousand men were sick, eight hundred had been wounded, the deaths by battle and disease exceeded four hundred, one hundred and twenty had deserted, and Cassan, moved by the misery around him, proposed to surrender, if allowed to retire with six pieces of cannon. Being denied, he offered to yield on condition of not serving for a year and a day, which was also denied; then he broke the negotiation, giving out that he would blow up the works of the fortress, and burst through the blockade. To deter him, a menacing letter was thrown to his outposts, and Wellington, denouncing his design as contrary to the laws of war, directed Carlos d'España to put him, his officers, non-commissioned officers, and a tenth of his soldiers to death, when the place should be taken, if any damage were done to the works.

Cassan's object being merely to obtain better terms, this order remained dormant, and happily so, for the execution would never have borne the test of public opinion. To destroy the works of Pampeluna, and break through the blockading force, as Brennier did at Almeida, would have been a very noble exploit, and a useful one, if Soult's plan of changing the theatre of war by descending into Aragon had been followed. There could therefore be nothing contrary to the laws of war in a resolute action of that nature. On the other hand, if the governor, having no chance whatever of success, made a hopeless attempt the pretence for destroying a great fortress belonging to the Spaniards, thus depriving the allies of the fruits of their long blockade and glorious battles, the conquerors might have justly exercised that severe but undoubted right of war, refusing quarter to an enemy. But Wellington's letter to España involved another question, namely, the putting of prisoners to death. For the soldiers could not be decimated until captured, and their crime would have been only obedience to orders in a matter of which they dared not judge; this would have been quite contrary to the usages of civilized nations; hence the threat must be considered as a device to save the works of Pampeluna and avoid the odium of refusing quarter.

A few days longer the governor and garrison endured their distress, and then capitulated, having defended themselves more than

four months with great constancy. The officers and soldiers became prisoners of war; the first to keep their arms and baggage, the second their knapsacks, expressly on the ground that they had treated the inhabitants well during the investment. This compliment was honorable to both sides; but there was another article, enforced by España, without being accepted by the garrison, for which it is difficult to assign any motive save the vindictive ferocity of the Spanish character: no person of either sex was permitted to follow the French troops, and women's affections were thus barbarously brought under the action of the sword.

There was no stronghold now retained by the French in the north of Spain, except Santona. The blockade there had been tedious, and Wellington, whose sea communications were interrupted by the privateers from thence, formed a small British corps, under Lord Aylmer, to attack Laredo, which, on the opposite point of Santona harbor, commanded the anchorage. Accidental circumstances prevented this enterprise, and Santona remained in the enemy's possession; but, with this exception the contest in the nothern parts of Spain was terminated. It is now fitting to show with what great political labor Wellington had brought it to this state; and what contemptible actions and sentiments, what a faithless alliance, what vile governments his dazzling glory hid from the sight of the world.

CHAPTER VI.

Political state of Portugal—Violence, ingratitude, and folly of the government of that country—Political state of Spain—Various factions described, their violence, insolence, and folly—Scandalous scenes at Cadiz—Several Spanish generals desire a revolution—Lord Wellington describes the miserable state of the country—Anticipates the necessity of putting down the Cortes by force—Resigns his command of the Spanish armies—The English ministers propose to remove him to Germany—The new Cortes reinstate him as generalissimo on his own terms—He expresses his fears that the cause will finally fail, and advises the English ministers to withdraw the British army.

Political state of Portugal.—In that country, national jealousy, long compressed by fear, had expanded with violence as danger receded, and England's influence declined in an inverse proportion to her success in removing the peril of invasion. When Wellington crossed the Ebro, the vile Souza faction became elate; and those members of government who had supported the British policy while it sustained them against court intrigues, now sought popularity by an opposite course. Noguera vexatiously resisted or suspended commercial and financial operations,—principal Souza

wrangled fiercely and insolently at the council-board—the patriarch fomented ill-will at Lisbon and in the northern provinces—Forjas, ambitious to command the national troops, became the organ of discontent upon military matters.* The return of the Prince-Regent, the treaty of commerce, the Oporto company, the privileges of the British factory merchants, the mode of paying the subsidy, and the military transport; the convention with Spain relative to the supply of the Portuguese troops in that country; the recruiting, the organization, the command of the national army and the honors due to it; all furnished grounds for factious proceedings, conducted with that ignoble subtlety which invariably characterized Peninsular politics. The expenditure of the British army had been immense; the trade and commerce dependent on it, now removed to the Spanish ports, enormous: Portugal had lived upon England. Her internal taxes, carelessly or partially enforced, were vexatious to the people without being profitable to the government. Nine-tenths of the revenue accrued from duties on British trade. The sudden cessation of markets and of employment, the absence of ready money, the loss of profit, public and private, occasioned by the departure of the army, while the contributions and other exactions remained the same, galled all classes, and the nation was quite ready to shake off the burden of gratitude.

Emissaries promulgated tales, some true, some false, of the disorders perpetrated by the military detachments on the lines of communication, adding that Wellington gave secret orders for this to satisfy his personal hatred of Portugal! Discourses and writings against the British influence abounded in Lisbon and Rio Janeiro, and were re-echoed or surpassed by the London newspapers, whose statements, overflowing of falsehood, could be traced to the Portuguese embassy in that capital. It was asserted that England, designing to retain her power in Portugal, opposed the return of the Prince-Regent; that the war itself being removed, was become wholly a Spanish cause; and it was not for Portugal to levy troops and exhaust her resources, to help a nation whose aggressions she must be called upon sooner or later to resist. Mr. Stuart's diplomatic intercourse, always difficult, became one of continual remonstrance and dispute; his complaints were met with insolence or subterfuge; and illegal violence against the persons and property of British subjects was pushed so far, that Mr. Sloane, an English gentleman upon whom no suspicion rested, was cast into prison for three months, because he had come to Lisbon without a passport. The rights of the English factory were invaded, and the Oporto company, established as its rival in violation of

* Mr. Stuart, MSS.

treaty, was openly cherished. Irresponsible and rapacious, this pernicious company robbed everybody, and the Prince-Regent, promising to reform or totally abolish it, ordered a preparatory investigation; but, in Mr. Stuart's words, the Regency acted no less unfairly by their sovereign than unjustly by their ally.

Especial privileges claimed by the factory merchants were another cause of disquiet. They pretended to exemption from certain taxes and from billets; and that a fixed number of their clerks, domestics and cattle should be exonerated of military service. These pretensions were disputed. The one touching servants and cattle, doubtful at best, had been grossly abused, and that relating to billets unfounded. The taxes were justly resisted, and the merchants offered a voluntary contribution to the same amount. The government rudely refused this offer, seized their property, imprisoned their persons, impressed their cattle to transport supplies that never reached the troops, and made soldiers of their clerks and servants without any intention of reinforcing the army. Mr. Stuart then deducted from the subsidy the amount of the property thus forcibly taken, and repaid the sufferers. The Regency also commenced a dispute upon the fourth article of the treaty of commerce; and the Prince, though he openly ordered it to be executed, secretly permitted Count Funchal, his prime minister, to remain in London as ambassador until the disputes arising upon this treaty were arranged; wherefore Funchal, who liked the English capital, took care to interpose many obstacles to a final decision, advising delay under pretence of rendering ultimate concession of value in other negotiations.

When the battle of Vittoria became known, the Regency proposed to entreat the return of the Prince from the Brazils, hoping thereby to excite the opposition of Mr. Stuart; but when he, contrary to their expectations, approved of the proposal, they deferred the execution. The British Cabinet, which had long neglected Wellington's suggestions on this head, then pressed the matter at Rio Janeiro, and Funchal, at first averse, now urged it warmly, fearing if the Prince remained at the Brazils, he must go there. However, few of the Portuguese nobles desired the return of the royal family, and when the thing was proposed to the Regent, he discovered no inclination for the voyage. But the most important subject of discord was the army. The absence of the sovereign and the intrigues at Rio Janeiro virtually rendered the government at Lisbon an oligarchy without a leader, in other words, a government formed for mischief; and it has been sufficiently shown, that Wellington's energy and ability, aided by Mr. Stuart's sagacity and firmness, and the influence of England's power and riches,

were scarcely able to dry up the evils flowing from this foul source. At the end of 1812, the native military force was, for want of sustenance, on the point of dissolving.

The strenuous interference of the English general and envoy, seconded by the great exertions of the British officers in the Portuguese service, restored indeed the efficiency of the army, and in the campaign of 1813, the spirit of the troops was surpassing; even the militia-men, deprived of their colors and drafted into the line, to punish their bad conduct at Guarda under Trant, nobly regained their standards on the Pyrenees. But this state of affairs, acting upon the naturally sanguine temperament and vanity of the Portuguese, created a very exaggerated notion of their military prowess and importance, and withal a morbid sensitiveness to praise or neglect.* Picton had thrown some slur upon the conduct of a regiment at Vittoria, and Beresford complained that justice had not been done to their merits. The eulogiums passed in the English Parliament, and in the despatches upon the conduct of the British and Spanish troops, but not extended to the Portuguese, galled the whole nation; and the remarks and omissions of the London newspapers were as wormwood.

Meanwhile, the regency, under pretext of a dispute with Spain relative to a breach of the military convention of supply, neglected the subsistence of the army altogether; and so many obstacles to recruiting were raised, that the dépôts, which ought to have furnished twelve thousand men to replace the losses sustained in the campaign, only contained four thousand, without the means of taking the field. This serious matter drew Beresford to Lisbon in October, to propose a new regulation, which should disregard the exemptions claimed by the nobles, the clergy and the English merchants for their servants and followers. On his arrival, Forjas urged the public discontent as to the position of the Portuguese troops. They were, he said, generally incorporated with the British divisions, commanded by British officers, had no distinct recognized existence; their services were unnoticed, and the glory of the country suffered; the world at large knew not how many men Portugal furnished for the war. It was known there were Portuguese soldiers, as it was known there were Brunswickers and Hanoverians, but as a national army, nothing was known of them; their exertions, their courage, only went to swell the general triumph of England, while the Spaniards, inferior in numbers, and far inferior in all military qualities, were flattered, praised, thanked in the public despatches, in the English newspapers, and in the discourses and votes of the British Parliament. He proposed,

* Mr. Stuart, MSS.

therefore, to have the Portuguese formed into a distinct army, acting under Wellington.

It was objected that the brigades incorporated with the British divisions were fed by the British commissariat, the cost being deducted from the subsidy, and the loss of that advantage the Portuguese could not sustain. Forjas rejoined, that they could feed their own troops cheaper if the subsidy was paid in money, but Beresford referred him to the scanty means of transport; so scanty that the few stores they were then bound to furnish for the unattached brigades depending upon the Portuguese commissariat were not forwarded. Forjas then proposed to withdraw gradually the best brigades from the English divisions, to incorporate them with the unattached brigades and so form an auxiliary corps; the same objection of transport applied however to this matter and it dropped for the moment. The regency then agreed to reduce the legal age of men liable to the conscription for the army; but the islands, which ought to have given three hundred men yearly, were exempt from their control; and the governors, supported by the prince-regent, refused to permit levies and granted asylums to those who wished to avoid the levy in Portugal. In the islands also, the persons so unjustly and cruelly imprisoned in 1810 were still kept in durance, although the regency, yielding to the persevering remonstrances of Stuart and Wellington, had released those at Lisbon.

Soon after this, Beresford desired to go to England, and the occasion was seized by Forjas to renew his proposition for a separate army, which he designed to command himself. Silveira's claim to that honor was however supported by the Souzas, to whose faction he belonged; and the only matter in which all agreed was the display of ill-will towards England. Wellington became indignant. The English newspapers, he said, did much mischief by their assertions, but he never suspected they could by their omissions alienate the Portuguese nation and government. The latter complained that their troops were not praised in parliament, nothing could be more different from a debate within the house than the representation of it in the newspapers;—the latter seldom stated an event or transaction as it really occurred, unless when they absolutely copied what was written for them; and even then their observations branched out so far from the text that they appeared absolutely incapable of understanding much less of stating the truth upon any subject. The Portuguese people should therefore be cautious of taking English newspapers as a test of the estimation in which the Portuguese army was held in England, where its character stood high and was rising daily. "Mr. Forjas is," said Wellington, "the ablest man of business I have met with in

the Peninsula, it is to be hoped he will not on such grounds have the folly to alter a successful military system. I understand something of the organization and feeding of troops, and I assure him that, separated from the British, the Portuguese army could not keep the field in a good state although their government were to incur ten times the expense under the actual system; and if they are not in a fitting state for the field they can gain no honor, they must suffer dishonor! The vexatious disputes with Spain are increasing daily, and if the omissions or assertions of newspapers are to be the causes of disagreement with the Portuguese *I will quit the Peninsula for ever!*"

This remonstrance being read to the regency, Forjas replied officially.

"The Portuguese government demanded nothing unreasonable. The happy campaign of 1813 was not to make it heedless of sacrifices beyond its means. It had a right to expect greater exertions from Spain, which was more interested than Portugal in the actual operations since the safety of the latter was obtained. Portugal only wanted a solid peace, she did not expect increase of territory; nor any advantage save the consideration and influence which the services and gallantry of her troops would give her amongst European nations, and which, unhappily, she would probably require in her future intercourse with Spain. The English prince-regent, his ministers and his generals had rendered full justice to her military services in the official reports, but that did not suffice to give them weight in Europe. Official reports did not remove this inconvenience. It was only the public expressions of the English prince and his ministers that could do justice. The Portuguese army was commanded by Marshal Beresford, marquis of Campo Mayor. It ought always to be so considered and thanked accordingly for its exploits, with as much form and solemnity by the English parliament and general as was used towards the Spanish army—the more so, that the Portuguese had sacrificed their national pride to the common good, whereas the Spanish pride had retarded the success of the cause and the liberty of Europe. It was necessary also to form good native generals to be of use after the war; but putting that question aside, it was only demanded to have the divisions separated by degrees and given to Portuguese officers: nevertheless such grave objections being advanced they were willing he said to drop the matter altogether.

The discontent, however, remained, for the argument had weight, and if any native officers' reputation had been sufficient to make the proceedings plausible, the British officers would have been driven from the Portuguese service, the armies separated, and

both ruined. As it was, the regency terminated the discussion from inability to succeed, from fear, not from reason. The persons who pretended to the command were Forjas and Silveira. The English officers, who were well-liked by the troops, would not have served under the former, and Wellington objected strongly to the latter; having, by experience, discovered that he was an incapable officer, seeking a base and pernicious popularity, by encouraging the views of the soldiers. Beresford then relinquished his intention of going to England, and the justice of the complaint relative to the reputation of the Portuguese army being obvious, the general orders became more marked in favor of the troops. Yet the most effectual check to the project was Mr. Stuart's intimation, that England, bound by no conditions as to the subsidy, had a right to withdraw it altogether.

To have this subsidy in specie and supply their own troops was long the cry of the regency, but finally they gave the matter up. Forjas knew well the administration of Portugal was incapable of supporting an army five hundred miles from its own country; the real object was to shake off the British influence, without losing the subsidy. Neither the regency nor the prince had any feelings for the honor of the army or the welfare of the men. The regency, while thus disputing for command, allowed its subordinates to ruin the only asylum in Portugal for mutilated soldiers, and turned the helpless veterans adrift; the prince, while lavishing honors on his intriguing courtiers, placed those officers whose fidelity and hard fighting had preserved his throne in Portugal at the bottom of the list, decorating the menials of the palace with the same ribands! Honor, justice, humanity, were alike despised by the ruling men, and Wellington thus expressed his strong disgust.

"*The British army, which I have the honor to command, has met with nothing but ingratitude from the government and authorities in Portugal for their services; everything that could be done has been done by the civil authorities lately to oppress the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any accident been in their power. I hope, however, that we have seen the last of Portugal!*"

Towards Spain the Portuguese government was not more friendly, for the Portuguese regency dreaded the democratic doctrine promulgated in the Cortes; and the leaders of that assembly were intent to spread those doctrines throughout the Peninsula. Seven Spanish envoys had succeeded each other at Lisbon, within three years, and the only bond of sympathy between the governments, was hatred of the English, who had saved both. On all

other points they differed. The exiled Bishop of Orense, from his asylum in Portugal, excited the Gallicians against the Cortes so vigorously, that his expulsion from Portugal, or at least, his removal from the northern frontier, was especially demanded by the Spanish minister; a long and angry discussion followed; yet the bishop was only civilly requested by the Portuguese government to abstain from acts disagreeable to the Spanish regency. The latter demanded him as a delinquent; the Portuguese quoted a decree of the Cortes which deprived the bishop of his rights as a Spanish citizen, and denaturalized him; finally he was removed twenty leagues from the frontier. Nor was the Portuguese government itself quite free from ecclesiastical troubles. The Bishop of Braganza preached doctrines offensive to the patriarch and the government; he was confined, but soon released, and an ecclesiastical sentence pronounced against him, which only increased his followers and extended the influence of his doctrines.

Another cause of uneasiness, at a later period, was the return of Ballesteros from his exile at Ceuta. He had been permitted towards the end of 1813, and, as Wellington thought with no good intent, to reside at Fregenal; the Portuguese regency, fearing he would gather discontented persons round him there, set agents to watch his proceedings; and under pretence of putting down robbers, established a line of cavalry, and called out the militia—thus making it manifest that but a little was wanting to kindle a war between the two countries.

Political state of Spain.—Wellington's victories had put an end to Joseph's intercourse with the French party in Spain, yet those people, not losing hope, formed a strong anti-English party, watching to profit of the disputes between the two factions at Cadiz, which were now rancorous. The serviles, bigoted in religion and politics, had the whole body of the clergy on their side; they were most numerous in the Cortes, and their views generally accorded with the feelings of the people beyond the Isla de Leon, their doctrines being comprised in two sentences—*An absolute king—An intolerant church.* The liberals, supported and instigated by all ardent innovators, and the commercial body and populace of Cadiz, had also partisans beyond the Isla; and, taking as guides the revolutionary writings of the French philosophers, were hastening onwards to a democracy without regard to ancient usages and without practical ability to carry their theories into execution. There was also a fourth faction in the Cortes, American deputies, who secretly labored for the independence of the colonies; they sometimes joined the liberals, sometimes the serviles, and often produced anomalous results, because they were numerous enough to turn the scale in

favor of the side which they espoused. Jealousy of England was, however, common to all, and "*Inglesismo*" was used as a term of contempt. Even when Wellington was commencing the campaign of 1813, the Cortes was with difficulty, and by threats rather than reason, prevented from passing a law forbidding foreign troops to enter a Spanish fortress! Alicant, Tarifa, Cadiz itself, had been preserved,—Rodrigo, Badajos had been retaken by British valor, —English money had restored their broken walls, replenished their magazines—English and Portuguese blood still smoked from their ramparts, but the men from whose veins that blood flowed were to be denied entrance at gates they could not approach without treading on the bones of slaughtered comrades,—comrades who had sacrificed their lives to procure for this sordid ungrateful assembly the power to offer the insult.

To subdue the bishops and clergy, who in Gallicia openly opposed the abolition of the inquisition, was of prominent interest with a section of the liberals called the Jacobins. They generally ruled the Cortes, because the Americanos leaned towards their doctrines, and the Anti-English or French party, desiring dissension, supported the most violent public men. A fierce and obstinate faction they were, and they compelled the churchmen to submit for the time; yet, not until the dispute became so serious that Wellington expected a civil war on his communications, and thought the clergy and the peasantry would take part with the French. This notion, which gives his measure for the patriotism of both parties, proved unfounded, his extreme discontent with the liberal doctrines somewhat warped his judgment; the people were less attached to the church than he imagined, the clergy of Gallicia finding no solid support, submitted to the Cortes, and the archbishop of Santiago fled to Portugal.

Deep unmitigated hatred of democracy was indeed the moving spring of the English Tories' policy. Napoleon was warred against, not, as they pretended, because he was a tyrant and usurper, for he was neither; not because his invasion of Spain was unjust, but because he was the enemy of aristocratic privileges. The welfare and independence of the Peninsula were words of no meaning in their state-papers and speeches; and their anger and mortification were extreme when they found their success against the emperor fostering that democracy they sought to destroy. They were only prevented by the superior prudence and sagacity of their general, from interfering with the internal government of Spain in so arrogant and injudicious a manner, that an open rupture, wherein the Spaniards would have had the appearance of justice, must have ensued. Wellington stifled this folly; he waited to give

the blow with effect, and was quite willing to deal it himself; and the conduct of the Cortes and executive government was so injurious to Spain, and to his military operations, so unjust and ungrateful to him personally, that the warmest friends of freedom cannot blame his enmity. Rather should his moderation be admired, when we find his aristocratic hatred of the Spanish constitution exacerbated by a state of affairs thus described by Vegas, a considerable member of the Cortes.

Speaking of the "*Afrancesados*" or French party, more numerous than was supposed, and active to increase their numbers, he says, "The thing which they most enforced and which made most progress was the diminution of English influence.* Amongst the serviles they gained proselytes, by objecting the English religion and constitution which restricted the power of the sovereign. With the liberals, they said the same constitution gave the sovereign too much power; and the Spanish constitution having brought the king's authority under that of the Cortes, was an object of jealousy to the English cabinet and aristocracy, who, fearing the example would encourage the reformers of England, were resolved the Spanish constitution should not stand. To the Americans they observed, that Wellington opposed them because he did not help them, and permitted expeditions to be sent from Spain; but to the Europeans who wished to retain the colonies and exclude foreign trade, they represented the English as fomenters and sustainers of the colonial rebellion, because they did not join Spain to put it down. To the honest patriots of all parties they said, that every concession to the English general was an offence against the dignity and independence of the nation. If he was active in the field, he was intent to subjugate Spain rather than defeat the enemy; if he was careful in preparation, his delay was to enable the French to conquer; if he was vigorous in urging the government to useful measures, his design was to impose his own laws; if he neglected the Spanish armies, he desired they should be beaten; if he meddled with them usefully, it was to gain the soldiers, turn the army against the country, and thus render Spain dependent on England. And these perfidious insinuations flattered the national pride, as proving the Spaniards could do every thing for themselves, without the aid of foreigners. Nothing could stop the spread of such doctrines but new victories, which would bring the simple honesty and gratitude of the people at large into activity. Those victories came, and did indeed stifle the French party in Spain, but many of their views were too well founded to be stifled with their party.

It was hoped the democratic violence of the Cortes would de-

* Original letter, MSS.

cline under the control of the Cardinal Bourbon; but that prince, who was not of true royal blood in the estimation of the Spaniards, because his father had married without the consent of the king, was, from age, infirmity, and ignorance, a nullity. The new regency became, therefore, more the slaves of the Cortes than their predecessors; and the Cadiz newspaper editors, pre-eminent in falsehood and wickedness, even amongst their unprincipled European brotherhood, became the champions of the Jacobins, and directed the city populace as they pleased. And always the serviles yielded, under the dread of personal violence; their own crimes had become their punishment. They had taught the people at the commencement of the contest, that murder was patriotism; and now their spirit sunk and quailed, because, at every step, to use the terribly significant expression of Wellington, "*The ghost of Solano was staring them in the face.*"

In support of their crude constitution, which they considered as perfect as an emanation from the Deity, the Jacobins sought 1. To abolish the inquisition, to arrest and punish the Gallician bishops, and to war with the clergy. 2. To put aside the claim of Carlotta to the regency. 3. To appoint captain-generals and other officers to suit their factious purposes. 4. To obtain money for their necessities, without including therein the nourishment of the armies. 5. To control the election for a new Cortes, and procure an assembly of their own way of thinking, or prevent its assembling at the legal period in October. In the matter of the bishops they nearly caused a war with Portugal and a civil war with Gallicia. Carlotta's affair was less serious; but her pretensions, wisely opposed by the British authorities, while the army was cooped up in Portugal, were, although she was a declared enemy to the English alliance, now rather favored by Sir Henry Wellesley, as a mode of checking the spirit of democracy. Wellington held aloof, observing, that if appointed according to the constitution, she would not be less a slave to the Cortes than her predecessors, and England would have the discredit of giving power to the "worst woman in existence."

To remove the seat of government from the influence of the Cadiz populace, was one mode of abating the power of the democratic party; and the yellow fever, coming immediately after the closing of the general Cortes in September, seemed to furnish an opportunity for the English ambassador to effect its removal; for the regency, dreading the epidemic, resolved to proceed to Madrid; telling Sir Henry Wellesley, who joyfully hastened to offer pecuniary aid, that to avoid the sickness was their sole motive. Having secretly formed this resolution at night, they designed to begin the journey next day; but a disturbance arose in the city; the regents

then convoked the extraordinary Cortes, the ministers were called before it, and bending with fear declared, with scandalous disregard of truth, there was no intention of quitting the Isla without consulting the Cortes. Certain deputies were thereupon appointed to inquire if there was any fever, and a few cases being discovered, the deputation, apparently to shield the regents, recommended they should remove to Port St. Mary.

This did not satisfy the assembly. The government was commanded to remain at Cadiz until the new general Cortes should be installed, and a committee was appointed to probe the whole affair, or rather to pacify the populace, who were so offended with the report of the first deputation, that Augustin Arguelles, on presenting it, was hissed from the galleries, although the most popular member of the Cortes. The more moderate liberals thus discovered that they were equally with the serviles, the slaves of the newspaper writers. Nevertheless, the inherent excellence of freedom, though here presented in such fantastic and ignoble shapes, was involuntarily admitted by Wellington when he declared, that wherever the Cortes and government should fix themselves, the press would follow to control, and the people of Seville, Granada, or Madrid would become as bad as the people of Cadiz.

The composition of the new Cortes was an object of hope and fear to all factions; and the result being uncertain, the existing assembly took such measures to prolong its own power, it was thought two Cortes would be established, one at Cadiz, the other at Seville, each striving for mastery in the nation. However, the new body, after many delays, was installed at Cadiz in November, and the Jacobins, strong in the violence of the populace, still swayed the assembly, and kept the seat of government at Cadiz until the rapid spread of the fever brought a stronger fear into action. Then the resolution to repair to Madrid was adopted, and the sessions in the Isla closed on the 29th of November. Yet not without troubles. For the general belief being that no person could take the sickness twice, and almost every resident family had already suffered from former visitations, the merchants with infamous cupidity declared there was no fever, induced the authorities flagitiously to issue clean bills of health to ships, and endeavored by intimidation to keep the regency and Cortes in the city. An exact and copious account of these factions and disputes, and of the permanent influence which these discussions of the principles of government, this constant collision of opposite doctrines, had upon the character of the people, would, if sagaciously traced, form a lesson of the highest interest for nations. But to treat the subject largely would be to write a political history of the Spanish revolution, and it is

only the effect upon the military operations which properly appertains to a history of the war. That effect was one of unmitigated evil—but this did not necessarily spring from the democratic system, since precisely the same mischiefs were to be traced in Portugal, where arbitrary power, called legitimate government, was prevalent. In both cases, the people and the soldiers suffered for the crimes of factious politicians.

It has been shown that one Spanish Regency contracted an engagement with Wellington, on the faith of which he took the command of their armies in 1813. Scrupulously adhered to by him, it was systematically violated by the new Regency and minister of war, almost as soon as it was concluded. His recommendations for promotion after Vittoria were disregarded, orders were sent direct to the subordinate generals, and changes were made in the commands and in the destinations of the troops without his concurrence, and without passing through him as generalissimo. Scarcely had he crossed the Ebro when Castaños, Captain-General of Gallicia, Estremadura and Castille, was disgracefully removed from his government, under pretence of calling him to assist in the council of state; his nephew, Giron, was at the same time deprived of the Gallician army, although both he and Castaños had been commended for their conduct by Wellington. Freyre, appointed Captain-General of Castille and Estremadura, succeeded Giron, and the infamous Lacy replaced Castaños in Gallicia; chosen, it was believed, as a fitter tool to work out the measures of the Jacobins against the clergy in that kingdom; nor was their sagacity at fault, for Castaños would, according to Wellington, have turned his arms against the Cortes if an opportunity had offered. He and others were now menaced with death, and the Cortes contemplated an attack upon the tithes, upon the feudal and royal tenths, and upon the estates of the grandees; all except the last very fitting to do, if times and circumstances had been favorable; but when the nation was generally averse, and there was an invader in the country to whom the discontented could turn, the attempt was insane. The clergy were at open warfare with the government, many generals were dissatisfied, and menaced the superior civil authorities; the soldiers were starving, the people, tired of their miseries, only desired to get rid of the invaders, and avoid the burthen of supplying the troops of either side. The English cabinet, after having gorged Spain with gold and flattery, was totally without influence. A terrible convulsion was at hand if the French could have maintained the war with any vigor in Spain itself; and the following passages from Wellington's letters to the ministers, prove that

even he contemplated a forcible change in the government and constitution.

"If the mob of Cadiz begin to remove heads from shoulders as the newspapers have threatened Castaños, and the assembly seize upon landed property to supply their necessities, I am afraid we must do something more than discountenance them. It is quite impossible such a system can last, and what I regret is that I am the person that maintains it. If I was out of the way, there are plenty of generals who would overturn it. Ballesteros positively intended it, and I am much mistaken if O'Donnel and even Castaños, and probably others, are not equally ready. If the king should return, he also will overturn the whole fabric if he has any spirit."—"I wish you would let me know whether if I should find a fair opportunity of striking at the democracy, the government would approve of my doing it." And in another letter he thus seriously treated the question of withdrawing from the contest altogether. "The government are the best judges of whether they can or ought to withdraw, but Spain cannot be a useful ally, or at all in alliance with England if the republican system is not put down." Meanwhile, he advised the English government and his brother to take no part either for or against the princess of Brazil, and to discountenance the democratical principles and measures of the Cortes; if their opinion was asked regarding the formation of a new Regency, to recommend an alteration of that part of the constitution which lodged all power with the Cortes, and to give, instead, some authority to the executive government, whether in the hands of King or Regent. To fill the latter office, one of royal blood, uniting the strongest claims of birth with the best capacity, should he thought be selected; but if capacity was wanting in the royal race, then to choose the Spaniard who was most deserving in the public estimation. Thus necessity teaches privilege to bend before merit.

Spain had at this period but one hundred and sixty thousand men in arms, fifty thousand only being available in the field; and those only because they were paid, clothed and armed, and kept together by the English general. He had proposed an arrangement for the civil and political government of the provinces rescued from the French, with a view to the supply of the armies, but his plan was rejected; and his repeated representations of the misery the army and the people endured were unheeded. Certain districts were allotted for the support of each army; yet, with a jealous fear of military domination, the government refused the captain-generals the necessary powers to draw forth the resources of the country, and thus rendered the system a nullity. Each branch of administration was conducted by chiefs independent in their attributes, yet