

conciliated.* Yet to prevent wanton abuses of power, he fixed the exact sum which each person, from the general governors down to the lowest subaltern, was to receive, and he ordered every person violating this regulation to be dismissed upon the spot, and a report of the circumstance sent to Paris within twenty hours after. Before this, Bessières, acknowledged by all to be a just and mild man, had been sent to remedy the mischief said to have been done by Kellermann and others in the northern provinces. And in respect of conciliation, the Emperor remarked that he had himself, at first, intended to open secret negotiations with the Cortes, but on finding what an obscure rabble they were, he had desisted. He therefore recommended Joseph to assemble at Madrid a counter-cortes, composed of men of influence and reputation, wherein (adverting to the insane insolence of the Spaniards towards their colonies) he might by the discussion of really liberal institutions, and by exposing the bad faith with which the English encouraged the Americans, improve public opinion, and conciliate the Spaniards with hopes of preserving the integrity of the empire, so rudely shaken by the revolt of the colonies.

An additional subsidy was peremptorily refused, but the Emperor finally consented to furnish Joseph with half a million of francs monthly, for the particular support of his court; and it is worthy of notice, as illustrating the character of Napoleon, that in the course of these disputes, Joseph's friends at Paris repeatedly advised him that the diplomatic style of his letters incensed and hardened the Emperor, whereas his familiar style as a brother always softened and disposed him to concede what was demanded. Joseph, however, could not endure the decree for establishing the military governments by which the administration was placed entirely in the hands of the generals, and their reports upon the civil and judicial administration referred entirely to the Emperor. It was a measure assailing at once his pride, his power, and his purse. His mind, therefore, became daily more embittered, and his prefects and commissaries, emboldened by his opinions, absolutely refused to act under the French marshals' orders. Many of these complaints, founded on the reports of his Spanish servants, were untrue, and others distorted. We have seen how the habitual exaggerations, and even the downright falsehoods of the juntas and the Regency, thwarted the English General's operations, and the King, as well as the French generals, must have encountered a like disposition in the Spanish ministers. Nevertheless, the nature of the war rendered it impossible but that much ground of complaint should exist.

Joseph's personal sentiments, abstractly viewed, were high-

* Appendix 6, § 3.

mind and benevolent; but they sorted ill with his situation as an usurper. He had neither patience nor profundity in his policy, and at last such was his irritation, that having drawn up a private but formal renunciation of the crown, he took an escort of five thousand men, and about the period of the battle of Fuentes Onoro, passed out of Spain and reached Paris; there Ney, Massena, Junot, St. Cyr, Kellermann, Augereau, Loison, and Sebastiani, were also assembled, and all discontented with the war and with each other.

By this rash and ill-timed proceeding, the intrusive government was left without a head, and the army of the centre was rendered nearly useless at the critical moment when Soult, engaged in the Albuera operations, had a right to expect support from Madrid. The northern army also was in a great measure paralyzed, and the army of Portugal, besides having just failed at Fuentes, was in all the disorganization attendant upon the retreat from Santarem, and upon a change of commanders. This was the principal cause why Bessières abandoned the Asturias and concentrated his forces in Leon and Castile on the communications with France, for it behoved the French generals everywhere to hold their troops in hand, and to be on the defensive, until the Emperor's resolution in this extraordinary conjuncture should be known.

Napoleon, astounded at this precipitate action of the King, complained with reason that having promised not to quit the country without due notice, Joseph had failed to him both as a monarch and as a general, and that he should at least have better chosen his time; for if he had retired in January, when the armies were all inactive, the evil would have been less, as the Emperor might then have abandoned Andalusia, and concentrated Soult's and Massena's troops on the Tagus, which would have been in accord with the policy fitting for the occasion. But now, when the armies had suffered reverses, when they were widely separated, and in pursuit of different objects, the mischief was great, and the King's conduct not to be justified.

Joseph replied that he had taken good measures to prevent confusion during his absence, and then reiterating his complaints, and declaring his resolution to retire into obscurity, he finished by observing, with equal truth and simplicity of mind, that it would be better for the Emperor that he should do so, inasmuch as in France he would be a good subject, but in Spain a bad king.

The Emperor had, however, too powerful an intellect for his brother to contend with. Partly by reason, partly by authority, partly by concession, he obliged him to return again in July, furnished with a species of private treaty, by which the army of the

centre was placed entirely at his disposal. He was also empowered to punish delinquents, to change the organization, and to remove officers who were offensive to him, even the chief of the staff, General Billiard, who had been represented by Orquijo as inimical to his system. And if any of the other armies should, by the chances of war, arrive within the district of the centre army, they also, while there, were to be under the King; and at all times, even in their own districts, when he placed himself at their head. The army of the north was to remain with its actual organization and under a marshal, but Joseph had liberty to change Bessières for Jourdan.

To prevent the oppression of the people, especially in the north, Napoleon required the French military authorities to send daily reports to the King of all requisitions and contributions exacted. And he advised his brother to keep a Spanish commissary at the head-quarters of each army, to watch over Spanish interests, promising that whenever a province should have the means and the will to resist the incursions of the guerillas, it should revert entirely to the government of the King, and be subjected to no charges save those made by the Spanish civil authorities for general purposes. The armies of the south and of Aragon were placed in a like situation on the same terms, and meanwhile Joseph was to receive a quarter of the contributions from each, for the support of his court and of the central army.*

The entire command of the forces in Spain the Emperor would not grant, observing that the Marshal directing from Madrid, as Major-General, would naturally claim the glory as well as the responsibility of arranging the operations; and hence the other marshals, finding themselves in reality under his instead of the King's command, would obey badly or not at all. All their reports and the intelligence necessary to the understanding of affairs were therefore to be addressed directly to Berthier, for the Emperor's information. Finally, the half million of francs hitherto given monthly to the King, was to be increased to a million for the year 1811; and it was expected that Joseph would immediately reorganize the army of the centre, restore its discipline, and make it, what it had not yet been, of weight in the contest.

The King afterwards obtained some further concessions, the most important of which related to the employment and assembling of Spaniards according to his own directions and plans. This final arrangement and the importance given to Joseph's return—for by the Emperor's orders, he was received as if he had only been to Paris to concert a great plan—produced a good effect for a short time; but after the fall of Figueras, Napoleon, fearing to trust

* Appendix 5, § 3.

Spanish civilians, extended the plan hitherto confined to Catalonia, of employing French intendants in all the provinces on the left of the Ebro. Then the King's jealousy was again excited, and the old bickerings between him and the marshals were revived.

POLITICAL SITUATION OF FRANCE.

In 1811 the Emperor's power over the continent, as far as the frontier of Russia, was, in fact, absolute; and in France internal prosperity was enjoyed with external glory. But the Emperor of Russia, stimulated by English diplomacy and by a personal discontent; in dread also of his nobles, who were impatient under the losses which the continental system inflicted upon them, was plainly in opposition to the ascendancy of France, and Napoleon, although wishing to avoid a rupture, was too long-sighted not to perceive that it was time to prepare for a more gigantic contest than any he had hitherto engaged in. He therefore husbanded his money and soldiers, and would no longer lavish them upon the Spanish war. He had poured men, indeed, continually into that country, but these were generally conscripts, while in the north of France he was forming a reserve of two hundred thousand old soldiers; but with that art that it was doubtful whether they were intended for the Peninsula or for ulterior objects, being ready for either, according to circumstances.

Such an uncertain state of affairs prevented him from taking more decided steps, in person, with relation to Spain, which he would undoubtedly have done if the war there had been the only great matter on his hands, and therefore the aspect of French politics, both in Spain and other places, was favorable to Lord Wellington's views. A Russian war, sooner or later, was one of the principal chances upon which he rested his hopes of final success; yet his anticipations were dashed with fear, for the situation of the Spanish and Portuguese governments, and of their armies, and the condition of the English government, were by no means so favorable to his plans, as shall be shown in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II.

Political state of England with reference to the war—Retrospective view of affairs—Enormous subsidies granted to Spain—The arrogance and rapacity of the Juntas encouraged by Mr. Canning—His strange proceedings—Mr. Stuart's abilities and true judgment of affairs shown—He proceeds to Vienna—State of politics in Germany—He is recalled—The misfortunes of the Spaniards principally owing to Mr. Canning's incapacity—The evil genius of the Peninsula—His conduct at Lisbon—Lord Wellesley's policy totally different from Mr. Canning's—Parties in the Cabinet—Lord Wellesley and Mr. Perceval—Character of the latter—His narrow policy—Letters describing the imbecility of the Cabinet in 1810 and 1811.

POLITICAL STATE OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE WAR.

It was very clear that merely to defend Portugal, with enormous loss of treasure and of blood, would be a ruinous policy; and that to redeem the Peninsula, the Spaniards must be brought to act more reasonably than they had hitherto done. But this the national character and the extreme ignorance of public business, whether military or civil, which distinguished the generals and statesmen, rendered a very difficult task.

Lord Wellington, finding the English power weak to control, and its influence as weak to sway the councils of Spain, could only hope by industry, patience, and the glory of his successes in Portugal, to acquire that personal ascendancy which would enable him to direct the resources of the whole Peninsula in a vigorous manner, and towards a common object. And the difficulty of attaining that ascendancy can only be made clear by a review of the intercourse between the British government and the Spanish authorities, from the first bursting out of the insurrection to the period now treated of; a review which will disclose the utter unfitness of Mr. Canning to conduct great affairs. Heaping treasures, stores, arms, and flattery, upon those who were unable to bear the latter, or use the former beneficially, he neglected all those persons who were capable of forwarding the cause; and neither in the choice of his agents, nor in his instructions to them, nor in his estimation of the value of events, did he discover wisdom or diligence, although he covered his misconduct, at the moment, by his glittering oratory.

Soon after the Spanish deputies had first applied for the assistance of England, Mr. Charles Stuart, who was the only regular diplomatist sent to Spain, carried to Coruña such a sum as, with previous subsidies, made up one million of dollars for Galicia alone. The deputies from Asturias had at the same time demanded five

millions of dollars, and one was paid in part of their demand; but when this was known, two millions more were demanded for Galicia, which were not refused; and yet the first point in Mr. Canning's instructions to Mr. Stuart, was, *to enter into "no political engagements."**

Mr. Duff, the Consul for Cadiz, carried out a million of dollars for Andalusia; the Junta asked for three or four millions more, and the demands of Portugal, although less extravagant, were very great. Thus above sixteen millions of dollars were craved, and more than four millions, including the gift to Portugal, had been sent; the remainder was not denied; and the amount of arms and other stores given, may be estimated by the fact that eighty-two pieces of artillery, ninety-six thousand muskets, eight hundred thousand flints, six millions and a half of ball-cartridges, seven thousand five hundred barrels of powder, and thirty thousand swords and belts had been sent to Coruña and Cadiz; and the supply to the Asturias was in proportion. But Mr. Canning's instructions to Mr. Duff and to the other agents were still the same as to Mr. Stuart, "*His Majesty had no desire to annex any conditions to the pecuniary assistance which he furnished to Spain.*"

Mr. Canning observed that he considered the amount of money as nothing! but acknowledged that *specie* was at this time so scarce that it was only by a direct and secret understanding with the former government of Spain, under the connivance of France, that any considerable amount of dollars had been collected in England. And "each province of Spain," he said, "had made its own particular application, and the whole occasioned a call for specie such as had never before been made upon England at any period of its existence. There was a rivalry between the provinces with reference to the amount of sums demanded which rendered the greatest caution necessary." And the more so, "that the deputies were incompetent to furnish either information or advice upon the state of affairs in Spain;" yet Mr. Duff was commanded, while representing these astounding things to the Junta of Seville, "*to avoid any appearance of a desire to overrate the merit and value of the exertions then making by Great Britain in favor of the Spanish nation, or to lay the grounds for restraining or limiting those exertions within any other bounds than those which were prescribed by the limits of the actual means of the country.*" In proof of Mr. Canning's sincerity upon this head, he afterwards sent two millions of dollars by Mr. Frere, while the British army was left without any funds at all! Moreover the supplies, so recklessly granted, being transmitted through subordinates and irresponsible persons, were absurdly and unequally distributed.

* Appendix 32, § 1, Vol. I.

This obsequious extravagance produced the utmost arrogance on the part of the Spanish leaders, who treated the English minister's humble policy with the insolence it courted. When Mr. Stuart reached Madrid, after the establishment of the Supreme Junta, that body, raising its demands upon England in proportion to its superior importance, required, and in the most peremptory language, additional succors so enormous as to startle even the prodigality of the English government.

Ten millions of dollars instantly, five hundred thousand yards of cloth, four million yards of linen for shirts and for the hospitals, three hundred thousand pair of shoes, thirty thousand pair of boots, twelve millions of cartridges, two hundred thousand muskets, twelve thousand pair of pistols, fifty thousand swords, one hundred thousand arrobas of flour, besides salt meat and fish! These were their demands! and when Mr. Stuart's remonstrance obliged them to alter the insulting language of their note, they insisted the more strenuously upon having the succors; observing that England had as yet only done enough to set their force afloat, and that she might *naturally expect demands like the present to follow the first*. They desired also that the money should be furnished at once, by bills on the British treasury, and at the same time required the confiscation of Godoy's property in the English funds!

Such was Mr. Canning's opening policy, and the sequel was worthy of the commencement. His proceedings with respect to the Erfurth proposals for peace, his injudicious choice of Mr. Frere, his leaving of Mr. Stuart without instructions for three months at the most critical period of the insurrection, and his management of affairs in Portugal and at Cadiz, during Sir John Cradock's command, have been already noticed; and that he was not misled by any curious accordance in the reports of his agents, is certain, for he was early and constantly informed of the real state of affairs by Mr. Stuart. That gentleman was the accredited diplomatist, and in all important points his reports were very exactly corroborated by the letters of Sir John Moore, and by the running course of events; yet Mr. Canning neither acted upon them nor published them, but he received all the idle, vaunting accounts of the subordinate civil and military agents, with complacency, and published them with ostentation; thus encouraging the misrepresentations of ignorant men, increasing the arrogance of the Spaniards, deceiving the English nation, and as far as he was able misleading the English General.

Mr. Stuart reached Coruña in July, 1808, and on the 22d of that month informed Mr. Canning that the reports of the successes in the south were not to be depended upon, seeing that they increased

exactly in proportion to the difficulty of communicating with the alleged scenes of action, and with the dearth of events, or the recurrence of disasters in the northern parts. He also assured him, that the numbers of the Spanish armies, within his knowledge, were by no means so great as they were represented.

On the 26th of July he gave a detailed history of the Gallician insurrection, by which he plainly showed that every species of violence, disorder, intrigue, and deceit were to be expected from the leading people; that the Junta's object was to separate Galicia from Spain; and that so inappropriate was the affected delicacy of abstaining from conditions, while furnishing succors, that the Junta of Galicia was only kept in power by the countenance of England, evinced in her lavish supplies, and the residence of her envoy at Coruña. The interference of the British naval officers to quell a political tumult had even been asked for, and had been successful; and Mr. Stuart himself had been entreated to meddle in the appointments of the governing members, and in other contests for power, which were daily taking place. In fine, before the end of August the system of folly, speculation, waste, and improvidence which characterized Spanish proceedings, was completely detected by Mr. Stuart, and laid before Mr. Canning, without in the slightest degree altering the latter's egregious system, or even attracting his notice; nay, he even intimated to the ambitious Junta of Seville, that England would willingly acknowledge its supremacy, if the consent of the other provinces could be obtained; thus holding out a premium for the continuation of that anarchy, which it should have been his first object to suppress.

Mr. Stuart was kept in a corner of the Peninsula, whence he could not communicate freely with any other province, and where his presence materially contributed to cherish the project of separating Galicia; and this without the shadow of a pretence, because there was also a British admiral and consul, and a military mission at Coruña, all capable of transmitting the necessary local intelligence. But so little did Mr. Canning care to receive his envoy's reports, that the packet, conveying his despatches, was ordered to touch at Gihon to receive the consul's letters, which caused the delay of a week when every moment was big with important events; a delay not to be remedied by the admiral on the station, because he had not even been officially informed that Mr. Stuart was an accredited person!

When the latter, thinking it time to look to the public affairs, on his own responsibility, proceeded to Madrid, and finally to Andalusia, he found the evils springing from Mr. Canning's inconsiderate conduct everywhere prominent. In the capital the Supreme

Junta had regarded England as a bonded debtor ; and the influence of her diplomatist at Seville may be estimated from the following note, written by Mr. Stuart to Mr. Frere, upon the subject of permitting British troops to enter Cadiz :

“ When the Junta refused to admit General Mackenzie's detachment, you tell me it was merely from alarm respecting the disposition of the inhabitants of Seville and Cadiz. I am not aware of the feelings which prevail in Seville, but with respect to this town, whatever the navy or the English travellers may assert to the contrary, I am perfectly convinced that there exists only a wish to receive them, and general regret and surprise at their continuance on board.”

Nor was the mischief confined to Spain. Mr. Frere, apparently tired of the presence of a man whose energy and talent were a continued reflection upon his own imbecile diplomacy, ordered Mr. Stuart either to join Cuesta's army or to go by Trieste to Vienna ; he chose the latter, because there was not even a subordinate political agent there, although this was the critical period which preceded the Austrian declaration of war against France in 1809. He was without formal powers as an envoy, but his knowledge of the affairs of Spain, and his intimate personal acquaintance with many of the leading statesmen at Vienna, enabled him at once to send home the most exact information of the proceedings, the wants, the wishes, and intentions of the Austrian government, in respect to the impending war.

That great diversion for Spain, which with infinite pains had been brought to maturity by Count Stadion, was on the point of being abandoned because of Mr. Canning's conduct. He had sent no minister to Vienna, and while he was lavishing millions upon the Spaniards, without conditions, refused in the most haughty and repulsive terms the prayers of Austria for a subsidy or even a loan, without which she could not pass her own frontier. And when Mr. Stuart suggested the resource of borrowing some of the twenty-five millions of dollars which were then accumulated at Cadiz, it was rejected because Mr. Frere said it would alarm the Spaniards. Thus, the aid of a great empire with four hundred thousand good troops, was in a manner rejected in favor of a few miserable self-conceited juntas in the Peninsula, while one-half the succors which they received and misused would have sent the whole Austrian nation headlong upon France ; for all their landwehr was in arms, and where the Emperor had only calculated upon one hundred and fifty battalions three hundred had come forward, voluntarily, besides the Hungarian insurrection. In this way Mr. Canning proved his narrow capacity for business, and how little he

knew either the strength of France, the value of Austria, the weakness of Spain, or the true interests of England at the moment; although he had not scrupled by his petulant answers to the proposals of Erfurth to confirm a war which he was so incapable of conducting. Instead of improving the great occasion thus offered, he angrily recalled Mr. Stuart, for having proceeded to Vienna without his permission. In his eyes the breach of form was of much higher importance than the success of the object. Yet it is capable of proof, that had Mr. Stuart remained, the Austrians would have been slower to negotiate after the battle of Wagram; and the Walcheren expedition would have been turned towards Germany, where a great northern confederation was then ready to take arms against France. The Prussian cabinet, in defiance of the King, or rather of the Queen, whose fears influenced the King's resolutions, only waited for these troops, to declare war and there was every reason to believe that Russia would then also have adopted that side. The misfortunes of Moore's campaign, the folly and arrogance of the Spaniards, the loss of the great British army which perished in Walcheren, the exhausting of England both of troops and specie, when she most needed both; finally, the throwing of Austria entirely into the hands of France, may thus be distinctly traced to Mr. Canning's incapacity as a statesman.

But through the whole of the Napoleonic wars this man was the evil genius of the Peninsula; for passing over the misplaced military powers which he gave to Mr. Villiers' legation in Portugal, while he neglected the political affairs in that country, it was he who sent Lord Strangford to Rio Janeiro whence all manner of mischief flowed. And when Mr. Stuart succeeded Mr. Villiers at Lisbon, Mr. Canning insisted upon having the enormous mass of intelligence, received from different parts of the Peninsula, translated before it was sent home; an act of undisguised indolence, which retarded the real business of the embassy, prevented important information from being transmitted rapidly, and exposed the secrets of the hour to the activity of the enemy's emissaries at Lisbon. In after times, when by a notorious abuse of government he was himself sent ambassador to Lisbon, he complained that there were no archives of the former embassies, and he obliged Mr. Stuart, then minister at the Hague, to employ several hundred soldiers, as clerks, to copy all his papers relating to the previous war; these, at a great public expense, were sent to Lisbon; and there they were to be seen unexamined and unpacked in the year 1826! And while this folly was passing, the interests of Europe in general were neglected, and the particular warfare of Portugal seriously injured by another display of official importance still more culpable.

It had been arranged that a Portuguese auxiliary force was to have joined the Duke of Wellington's army, previous to the battle of Waterloo; and to have this agreement executed, was the only business of real importance which Mr. Canning had to transact during his embassy. Marshal Beresford, well acquainted with the characters of the members of the Portuguese Regency, had assembled fifteen thousand men, the flower of the old troops, perfectly equipped, with artillery, baggage, and all things needful to take the field; the ships were ready, the men willing to embark, and the Marshal informed the English ambassador, that he had only to give the order, and in a few hours the whole would be on board, warning him at the same time, that in no other way could the thing be effected. But as this summary proceeding did not give Mr. Canning an opportunity to record his own talents for negotiation, he replied that it must be done by diplomacy; the Souza faction eagerly seized the opportunity of displaying their talents in the same line, and being more expert, beat Mr. Canning at his own weapons, and, as Beresford had foreseen, no troops were embarked at all. Lord Wellington was thus deprived of important reinforcements; the Portuguese were deprived of the advantage of supporting their army, for several years, on the resources of France, and of their share of the contributions from that country; last and worst, those veterans of the Peninsular war, the strength of the country, were sent to the Brazils, where they all perished by disease or by the sword in the obscure wars of Don Pedro! If such errors may be redeemed by an eloquence always used in defence of public corruption, and a wit that made human sufferings its sport, Mr. Canning was an English statesman, and wisdom has little to do with the affairs of nations.

When the issue of the Walcheren expedition caused a change of ministry, Lord Wellesley obtained the foreign office. Mr. Henry Wellesley then replaced Mr. Frere at Cadiz, and he and Mr. Stuart received orders to make conditions to demand guarantees for the due application of the British succors; those succors were more sparingly granted, and the envoys were directed to interfere with advice and remonstrances, in all the proceedings of the respective governments to which they were accredited: Mr. Stuart was even desired to meddle with the internal administration of the Portuguese nation,—the exertions and sacrifices of Great Britain, far from being kept out of sight, were magnified, and the system adopted was in everything a contrast to that of Mr. Canning.*

But there was in England a powerful, and as recent events have proved, a most unprincipled parliamentary opposition, and there were two parties in the cabinet—the one headed by Lord Wel-

* Appendix 8, § 2.

lesley, who was anxious to push the war vigorously in the Peninsula, without much regard to the ultimate pressure upon the people of his own country; the other, headed by Mr. Perceval, who sought only to maintain himself in power. Narrow, harsh, factious, and illiberal, in everything relating to public matters, this man's career was one of unmixed evil. His bigotry taught him to oppress Ireland, but his religion did not deter him from passing a law to prevent the introduction of medicines into France during a pestilence. He lived by faction; he had neither the wisdom to support, nor the manliness to put an end to, the war in the Peninsula, and his crooked, contemptible policy was shown, by withholding what was necessary to sustain the contest, and throwing on the general the responsibility of failure.

With all the fears of little minds, he and his coadjutors awaited the result of Lord Wellington's operations in 1810. They affected to dread his rashness, yet could give no reasonable ground for their alarm; and their private letters were at variance with their public instructions, that they might be prepared for either event. They deprived him, without notice, of his command over the troops at Cadiz; they gave Graham power to furnish pecuniary succors to the Spaniards at that place, which threw another difficulty in the way of obtaining money for Portugal; and when Wellington complained of the attention paid to the unfounded apprehensions of some superior officers more immediately about him, he was plainly told that those officers were better generals than himself. At the same time he was, from a pitiful economy, ordered to dismiss the transports on which the safety of the army depended in the event of failure.

Between these factions there was a constant struggle, and Lord Wellington's successes in the field only furthered the views of Mr. Perceval, because they furnished ground for asserting that due support had been given him. Indeed, such a result is to be always apprehended by English commanders. The slightest movement in war requires a great effort, and is attended with many vexations, which the general feels acutely and unceasingly; but the politician, believing in no difficulties because he feels none, neglects the supplies, charges disaster on the general, and covers his misdeeds with words. The inefficient state of the cabinet under both Mr. Canning and Mr. Perceval may however be judged of by the following extracts, the writers of which, as it is easy to perceive, were in official situations:

"I hope by next mail will be sent something more satisfactory and useful than we have yet done in the way of instructions. But I am afraid the late O. P. riots have occupied all the thoughts of

our great men here, so as to make them, or at least some of them, forget more distant but not less interesting concerns.”*

“With respect to the evils you allude to as arising from the inefficiency of the Portuguese government, the people here are by no means so satisfied of their existence (to a great degree) as you who are on the spot. Here we judge only of the results; the details we read over, but being unable to remedy, forget them the next day; and in the mean time the tools you have to work with good or bad, so it is that you have produced results so far beyond the most sanguine expectations entertained here by all who have not been in Portugal within the last eight months, that none inquire the causes which prevented more being done in a shorter time; of which indeed there seems to have been a great probability, if the government could have stepped forward at an earlier period with one hand in their pockets, and in the other strong energetic declarations of the indispensable necessity of a change of measures and principles in the government.”†

“I have done everything in my power to get people here to attend to their real interests in Portugal, and I have clamored for money! money! money! in every office to which I have had access. To all my clamor and all my arguments I have invariably received the same answer, ‘*that the thing is impossible.*’ The Prince himself certainly appears to be *à la hauteur des circonstances*, and has expressed his determination to make every exertion to promote the good cause in the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley has a perfect comprehension of the subject in its fullest extent, and is fully aware of the several measures which Great Britain ought and could adopt. But such is the state of parties and such the condition of the present government, that I really despair of witnessing any decided and adequate effort, on our part, to save the Peninsula. The present feeling appears to be that we have done mighty things, and all that is in our power, that the rest must be left to all-bounteous Providence, and that if we do not succeed we must console ourselves by the reflection that Providence has not been so propitious to us as we deserved. This feeling you must allow is wonderfully moral and Christian-like, but still nothing will be done until we have a more vigorous military system and a ministry capable of directing the resources of the nation to something nobler than a war of descents and embarkations.”‡

A more perfect picture of an imbecile administration could scarcely be exhibited, and it was not wonderful that Lord Welling-

* A. April, 1810.

† A. April, 1811.

‡ B. September, 1811.

ton, oppressed with the folly of the peninsular governments, should have often resolved to relinquish a contest that was one of constant risks, difficulties, and cares, when he had no better support from England. In the next chapter shall be shown the ultimate effects of Canning's policy in the Spanish and Portuguese affairs.

CHAPTER III.

Political state of Spain—Disputes among the leaders—Sir J. Moore's early and just perception of the state of affairs confirmed by Lord Wellington's experience—Points of interest affecting England—The reinforcement of the military force—The claims of the Princess Carlotta—The prevention of a war with Portugal—The question of the colonies—Cisneros's conduct at Buenos Ayres—Duke of Infantado demanded by Mexico—Proceedings of the English Ministers—Governor of Curaçoa—Lord Wellesley proposes a mediation—Mr. Bardaxi's strange assertion—Lord Wellington's judgment on the question—His discernment, sagacity, and wisdom shown.

POLITICAL STATE OF SPAIN.

As the military operations were, by the defeat of the regular armies, broken into a multitude of petty and disconnected actions, so the political affairs were, by the species of anarchy which prevailed, rendered exceedingly diversified and incongruous. Notwithstanding the restoration of the captain-generals, the provincial Juntas remained very powerful; and while nominally responsible to the Cortes and the Regency, acted independently of either, except when interested views urged them to a seeming obedience. The disputes that arose between them and the generals, who were, for the most part, the creatures of the Regency, or of the Cortes, were constant. In Galicia, in the Asturias, in Catalonia, in Valencia, and in Murcia, disputes were increasing. Mahi, Abadia, Moscoso, Campo Verde, Lacy, Sarsfield, Milans, Bassecour, Coupigny, Castaños, and Blake, were always in controversy with each other or with the Juntas. Palacios, dismissed from the Regency for his high monarchical opinions, was made Captain-General of Valencia, where he immediately joined the church-party against the Cortes. In the Condado de Niebla the Junta of Seville claimed superior authority, and Ballesteros of his own motion placed the country under martial law. The Junta, strangely enough, then appealed to Colonel Austin, the British governor of the Algarves, but he refused to interfere.

The Cortes often annulled the decrees of the Regency, and the latter, of whomsoever composed, always hating and fearing the

Cortes, were only intent upon increasing their own power, and entirely neglected the general cause; their conduct was at once haughty and mean, violent and intriguing, and it was impossible ever to satisfy them. Thus confusion was everywhere perpetuated, and it is proved by the intercepted papers of Joseph, as well as by the testimony of the British officers and diplomatists, that with the Spaniards, the only moral resource left for keeping up the war was their personal hatred of the French, partially called into action by particular oppression. Sir John Moore, with that keen and sure judgment which marked all his views, had early described Spain as being "*without armies, generals, or government.*" And in 1811, after three years of war, Lord Wellington complained that "*there was no head in Spain, neither generals, nor officers, nor disciplined troops, and no cavalry; that the government had commenced the war without a magazine or military resource of any kind, without money or financial resource, and that the people at the head of affairs were as feeble as their resources were small.*"* But the miserable state of the armies and the unquenchable vanity of the officers, have been too frequently exposed to need further illustration. They hated and ill-used the peasantry, while their own want of discipline and subordination rendered them odious to their country. The poorer people, much as they detested the French, almost wished for the establishment of Joseph, and all spirit and enthusiasm had long been extinct.

The real points of interest affecting England in her prosecution of the contest were, therefore, 1. The improvement and the better guidance of the military power; 2. The preventing a war between Portugal and Spain; 3. The pretensions of the Princess Carlotta of Portugal; 4. The dispute with the American colonies.

With respect to the first, Lord Wellington had made strenuous efforts, and his advice and remonstrances had at times saved the armies in the field from destruction; some partial attempts were also made to form troops under British officers in the Spanish service, but to a system like that which England exercised in Portugal, the leading Spaniards would never listen. This was one result of Mr. Canning's impolitic fostering of the Spanish pride, for it was by no means apparent that the people would have objected to such an arrangement, if it had been prudently urged, before the republican party in the Cortes, and the popular press, had filled their minds with alarm upon the subject. The Catalans openly and repeatedly desired to have an English general, and in 1812 Colonel Greene did organize a small corps there, while Whittingham and Roche formed in the Balearic isles large

* Letter to General Dumouriez, 1811, MS.

divisions; Colonel Cox had before proposed a like scheme for the north, but it was rejected by Lord Wellington, and I have been unable to trace any important service rendered by those officers with their divisions. Their reputation was however quite eclipsed by one Downie, who had passed from the British commissariat into the Spanish service, and the English ministers, taken with his boasting manner, supplied him with uniforms and equipments for a body of cavalry, called the Estremadura Legion, of such an expensive and absurd nature, as to induce a general officer to exclaim, on seeing them, that "he blushed for the folly of his government."

When the British ministers found themselves unable to deal with the Spanish regulars, they endeavored to prop the war by the irregulars. But the increase of this force, which however never exceeded thirty thousand men in arms, gave offence to the regular officers, and amid these distractions, the soldiers, ill-organized, ill-fed, and quite incapable of moving in the field in large bodies, lost all confidence in their generals. The latter, as in the case of Freire with the Murcian army, generally expected to be beaten in every action, and cared very little about it, because the Regency were sure to affirm that they were victorious; and another of those wandering, starved, naked bands, which they called armies, could be formed from new levies in a month.*

The chances of a war with Portugal were by no means slight. The early ravages of the Spanish insurgent forces when Junot was in Lisbon, the violence of Romana's soldiers, and the burning of the village of San Fernando, together with the disputes between the people of Algarves and the Andalusians, had revived all the national hatred on both sides. The two governments indeed entered into a treaty for recruiting in their respective territories; but it was with the utmost difficulty that the united exertions of Mr. Stuart and Lord Wellington could prevent the Portuguese Regency first, and afterwards the Court of Brazils, from provoking a war by re-annexing Olivenza to Portugal, when it was taken from the French by Marshal Beresford. And so little were the passions of these people subordinate to their policy, that this design was formed at the very moment when the Princess Carlotta was strenuously, and with good prospect of success, pushing her claim to the regency of Spain.

The intrigues of this Princess were constant sources of evil; she labored against the influence of the British at Cadiz, and her agent Pedro Souza, proffering gold to vulgar baseness, diamonds to delicate consciences, and promises to all, was adroit and persevering. In August, 1810, a paper signed by only one member, but with an intimation that it contained the sentiments of the whole

* Appendix 4, § 4.

Cortes, was secretly given to Mr. Wellesley, as a guide for his conduct. It purported that the impossibility of releasing Ferdinand and his brother from their captivity being apparent, the Princess Carlotta should be called to the throne, and it was proposed to marry her eldest son Pedro to the Princess of Wales, or some other Princess of the House of Brunswick, that a "sudden and mortal blow might be given to the French empire."* Mr. Wellesley was also told that a note of the same tendency would in the first session of the Cortes be transmitted to the English legation. This, however, did not happen, chiefly because Arguelles openly and eloquently expressed his reasons against the appointment of a royal person as regent, and some months later procured a decree, rendering such persons ineligible, to pass in the Cortes. This seemed to quash Carlotta's intrigue; nevertheless, her pretensions, although continually overborne by the English influence, were as continually renewed, and often on the point of being publicly admitted.

The assumption that it was hopeless to expect Ferdinand's release was founded partly on the great influence which it was known Napoleon had acquired over his mind, and partly on his extreme personal timidity, which rendered any attempt to release him hopeless. Otherwise there were at Lisbon one Francisco Segas, and his brother, daring men, who were only deterred from undertaking the enterprise by a previous experiment made at Bayonne, where they had for an hour implored Ferdinand to escape, all things being ready, yet in vain, because Escoiquez who ruled the Prince, and was as timid as himself, opposed it. To prevent ill effects from this well known weakness, the Cortes passed a decree to render null every act of Ferdinand while in captivity.

These intrigues of Carlotta were, however, of minor consequence compared to the conduct of the American colonies, which was one of the highest interest and importance. The causes and the nature of their revolt have been already touched upon, and the violence and injustice of the Juntas, the Regency, and the Cortes, with relation to them, having been also exposed in a general way, need not be repeated here. When the Spanish insurrection first commenced, the leading men of Mexico signed a paper which was sent to the Peninsula in November, 1808, urging the immediate appointment of the Duke of Infantado to the vice-royalty. He was averse to quitting Spain, but his wife persuaded him to consent, provided the Central Junta, just then established, was not opposed to it. Mr. Stuart, foreseeing great advantage from this appointment, labored to persuade Mr. Frere to support it; but the latter,

* Mr. Stuart's Papers, MS.

always narrow in his views, refused, because Infantado was personally disliked in England! and this, joined to the Duke's own reluctance, seemed to end the matter. Meanwhile the disturbances in the colonies went on, and Carlotta of Portugal urged her claim to be regent, and ultimately, queen of that country, as well as of Spain; and her interests were strongly supported there, until May, 1809, when Cisneros, the Spanish viceroy, arrived at Montevideo, and spoiled her schemes.

The cry for a free trade with England was then raised by the colonists, and Cisneros assented, but under conditions, presenting a curious contrast to the affected generosity of Mr. Canning, and affording an additional proof how little the latter knew the temper of the people he was dealing with. After detailing the dangers of his situation from the disposition of the colonists to revolt, and the impoverishment of the royal treasury in consequence of the disturbances which had already taken place, Cisneros observed that the only mode of relief was a temporary permission to trade with England for the sake of the duties. Necessity, he said, drove him to this measure; he regretted it, and directed that the ordinary laws relative to the residence of foreigners, most rigorous in themselves, should be most rigorously executed; and he added others of such a nature, that at first sight they appear to be directed against some common enemy of mankind, rather than against the subjects and vessels of a nation which was then supporting the mother-country with troops and treasure in the most prodigal manner. Englishmen were not to be suffered to possess property, to have a residence, to keep an hotel, or even to remain on shore except for a fixed period. Any property already acquired by them was to be confiscated, and when the goods by which he hoped to raise his revenue were landed, the owners were not to be permitted to have them carried to the warehouses by their own sailors!

In April, 1810, the disposition to revolt spread; the Caraccas and Porto Rico declared for independence, and the British governor of Curaçoa expressed his approval of their proceedings. This naturally gave great jealousy and alarm to the Spaniards, who looked upon it as a secret continuation of Miranda's affair. Lord Liverpool, indeed, immediately disavowed the governor's manifesto, but being very desirous to retain the trade, to conciliate the Spaniards, and to oblige the colonists to acknowledge Ferdinand and oppose France—three things incompatible—his policy produced no good result. Mexico indeed still remained obedient in outward appearance, but the desire to have Infantado existed, and a strong party of the Mexicans even purposed raising him to the throne, if Napoleon's success should separate the two countries; but the Spanish

Regency, with characteristic folly, chose this moment to appoint Venegas, who was the avowed enemy of Infantado, Viceroy of Mexico, and thus the revolt was forced on in that country also.

This state of affairs had a bad effect upon the war in Spain in many ways. The Spaniards, thinking to retain the colonies by violence, sent out a small squadron at first, and at a later period employed the succors received from England, in fitting out large expeditions of their best troops; and that, when the enemy were most closely pressing them in the Peninsula. The remonstrances of the British on this head were considered as indications of a faithless policy; and Carlotta also wrote to Elio, the governor of Buenos Ayres, and to the Cortes, warning both to beware of the English as "a people capable of any baseness where their own interests were concerned." Hence there was a prevalent suspicion, that England had a design of connecting itself with the colonies independently of Spain, which greatly diminished the English influence at Cadiz.

By this dispute with America the supply of specie for the Peninsula was endangered, which involved the very existence of the war; all things therefore conduced to make Lord Wellesley desire his brother, Mr. Wellesley, to offer the mediation of England, and to please the Spaniards he also removed the governor of Curaçoa; but his plans, like Lord Liverpool's, were based upon the desire to preserve the trade with the colonies, and this feeling pervaded and vitiated his instructions to Mr. Wellesley. That gentleman was directed to enter into a full discussion of the subject, on principles founded on cordial amity and good faith; and to endeavor to convince the Regency that the British course of proceeding had hitherto been the best for all parties.* For the primary object being to keep France from forming a party in America, the revolted colonies had been by England received into an amicable intercourse of trade, a measure not inconsistent with good faith to Spain, inasmuch as the colonists would otherwise have had recourse to France, whereas now England was considered by them as a safe and honorable channel of reconciliation with the mother-country. There had been, it was said, no formal recognition of the self-constituted governments, or if any had taken place by subordinate officers they would be disavowed. Protection and mediation had indeed been offered, but the rights of Ferdinand had been supported, and as war between Spain and America would only injure the great cause, a mediatory policy was pressed upon the latter. The blockade of Buenos Ayres and the Caraccas had already diverted money and forces from Spain, and driven the Americans to seek for French

* Lord Wellesley's despatch to Mr. H. Wellesley, May, 1811, MS.

officers to assist them. The trade was essential to enable England to continue her assistance to Spain, and although this had been frequently represented to the Regency, the latter had sent ships (which had been fitted out in English ports and stored at the expense of Great Britain for the war with France) to blockade the colonies and to cut off the English trade; and it was done also at a moment when the Regency was unable to transport Blake's army from Cadiz to the Condado de Niebla without the assistance of British vessels. "It was difficult," Lord Wellesley said, "to state an instance in which the prejudices and jealousy of individuals had occasioned so much confusion of every maxim of discretion and good policy, and so much danger to the acknowledged mutual interests of two great states engaged in a defensive alliance against the assaults of a foreign foe."—"Spain could not expect England to concur in a continuance of a system by which, at her own expense, her trade was injured, and by which Spain was making efforts not against the French, but against the main sources of her own strength."

After these instructions, which were given before the constitution of Spain was arranged by the Cortes, Mr. Wellesley pressed the mediation upon Mr. Bardaxi, the Spanish minister, who agreed to accept it upon condition that Mexico, which had not yet declared a form of government, should be excepted,—that England should immediately break off all intercourse with the colonies, and, if the mediation failed, should assist Spain to reconquer them. When the injustice and bad policy of this proposition was objected to, Mr. Bardaxi maintained that it was just and politic, and pressed it as a secret article; he however finally offered to accept the mediation, if Mr. Wellesley would only pledge England to break off the intercourse of trade. This was refused, and the negotiation continued, but as Bardaxi asserted that Lord Wellington had before agreed to the propriety of England going to war with the colonies, Mr. Wellesley referred to the latter, and that extraordinary man, while actually engaged with the enemy, under most critical circumstances, was thus called upon to discuss so grave and extensive a subject. But it was on such occasions that all his power of mind was displayed, and his manner of treating this question proved, that in political, and even in commercial affairs, his reach of thought and enlarged conceptions immeasurably surpassed the cabinet he served. And when we consider that his opinions, stated in 1811, have been since verified in all points to the very letter, it is impossible not to be filled with admiration of his foresight and judgment.

"He denied that he had ever given grounds for Bardaxi's observation. His opinion had always been that Great Britain should

follow, as he hoped she had, liberal counsels towards Spain, by laying aside, at least during the existence of the war, all consideration of merchants' profits. He felt certain that such a policy would equally suit her commercial interests and her warlike policy, as well as add greatly to her character. The immediate advantages extorted from an open trade with the colonies he had always considered ideal. Profit was undoubtedly to be made there, and eventually the commerce would be very great; but its value must arise from the increasing riches of the colonies and the growth of luxury there, and the period at which this would happen was more likely to be checked than forwarded by the extravagant speculation of English traders. Whatever might be the final particular relations established between Spain and her colonies, the general result must be, the relaxation, if not the annihilation of their colonial commercial system, and Great Britain was then sure to be the greatest gainer.

“In expectation of this ultimate advantage, her policy ought to have been liberal throughout, that is, the colonies themselves should have been checked, and the endeavors of traders and captains of ships to separate them from Spain ought to have been repressed. England should, when the colonies first showed a disposition to revolt, have considered not only what they could do but what Great Britain could assist them to effect. His knowledge of the Spanish government and its means enabled him to say she could not reduce even one of the weakest of her colonies, and to make the attempt would be a gross folly, and misapplication of means. Nay, England could not, in justice to the great object in the Peninsula, give Spain any effectual assistance; for it was but too true that distant colonies could always separate from the mother country when they willed it, and certainly it would be the highest madness in Spain to attempt at that time to prevent such a separation by force, and in England to assist, or even to encourage her in such an attempt.

“The conduct of the latter should then have been by her influence and advice to have prevented the disputes from coming to extremity, and *now* should be to divert Spain from such an absurdity as having recourse to violence. But the reception of the deputies from America, which the Spaniards so much complained of, was useful to the latter. It prevented those deputies from going to France, and if they had gone, the fact that colonies have the power to separate if they have the will, would have been at once verified.

“Great Britain, although late, had at last *offered* that mediation which he wished had been *asked* for, and it remained to consider on what terms it ought to be accepted. It would have been better if Spain had come forward with an explicit declaration of what

her intentions towards the colonies in respect to constitution and commerce were. England could then have had something intelligible to mediate upon; but now Spain only desired her to procure the submission of Buenos Ayres and the Caraccas; and if she failed in that impracticable object she was to aid Spain in forcing them to submission! and he, Lord Wellington, was said to have approved of this! One would really, he exclaimed, believe that Mr. Bardaxi has never adverted to the means and resources of his own country, to the object they have acquired at home, nor to the efforts making by England in the Peninsula; and that he imagines I have considered these facts as little as he appears to have done. Great Britain cannot agree to that condition.

“In respect to constitution” (alluding to the acknowledgment of the civil rights of the Americans by the Cortes)* “the Spaniards had gone a great way, but not so far as some of her colonies would require; they would probably ask her to have separate local representative bodies for their interior concerns, such as the English colonial assemblies, yet this important point had not been considered in the treaty of mediation, and in respect of commerce the Spanish government had said nothing; although it was quite certain her prohibitory system could not continue, and the necessary consequence of the actual state of affairs required that in the treaty of mediation the colonies should be put, with respect to trade, exactly on the same footing as the provinces of Old Spain. If that was not done, it would be useless to talk to the colonists of equal rights and interests; they would feel that their interests were sacrificed to that of the mother country.

“It was true that the latter would lose immediately, though probably not eventually, very largely in revenue and commercial profit, by such a concession—this was the unavoidable result of the circumstances of the times; she had therefore a fair claim to participate in the advantages the colonies would enjoy from it. To this object the treaty of mediation should have adverted. Spain should have confidentially declared to Great Britain her intended course, what system she would follow, what duties impose, and what proportion she would demand for general imperial purposes. Upon such materials England might have worked with a prospect of permanently maintaining the integrity of the Spanish empire on just and fair principles; or at all events have allayed the present disputes and so removed the difficulties they occasioned in the Peninsula, and in either case have insured her own real interests. Spain had however taken a narrow view both of her own and the relative situation of others, and *if she did not enlarge it, matters would grow*

* See page 102.

worse and worse. It would be useless for England to interfere, and after a long contest which would only tend to weaken the mother country and deprive her of the resources which she would otherwise find in the colonies for her war with France, the business would end in the separation of the colonies from Spain."

The mediation was, however, after many discussions, finally accepted by the Cortes, Mexico only being excepted; and an English commission of mediation, of which Mr. Stuart was the head, was even appointed, in September, 1811, but from various causes it never proceeded beyond Cadiz. The Spaniards continued to send out expeditions, Mr. Wellesley's remonstrances were unheeded, and although the Regency afterwards offered to open the trade under certain duties, in return for a subsidy, nothing was concluded.

CHAPTER IV.

Political state of Portugal—Mr. Villiers' mission expensive and inefficient—Mr. Stuart succeeds him—Finds everything in confusion—His efforts to restore order successful at first—Cortes proposed by Lord Wellesley—Opposed by the Regency, by Mr. Stuart, and by Lord Wellington—Observations thereon—Changes in the Regency—Its partial and weak conduct—Lord Strangford's proceedings at Rio Janeiro only productive of mischief—Mr. Stuart's efforts opposed, and successfully, by the Souza faction—Lord Wellington thinks of abandoning the contest—Writes to the Prince Regent of Portugal—The Regency continues to embarrass the English General—Effect of their conduct upon the army—Miserable state of the country—The British Cabinet grants a fresh subsidy to Portugal—Lord Wellington complains that he is supplied with only one-sixth of the money necessary to carry on the contest—Minor follies of the Regency—The cause of Massena's harshness to the people of Portugal explained—Case of Mascarhenas—His execution a foul murder—Lord Wellington reduced to the greatest difficulties—He and Mr. Stuart devise a plan to supply the army by trading in grain—Lord Wellington's embarrassments increase—Reasons why he does not abandon Portugal—His plan of campaign.

POLITICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL.

THE power and crafty projects of the Souzas, their influence over their weak-minded Prince, their cabal to place the Prince of Brunswick at the head of the Portuguese army, the personal violence of the Patriarch, the resignation of Das Minas, and the disputes with Lord Wellington, have been already touched upon; but the extent of the difficulties engendered by these things, cannot be understood without a more detailed exposition.

Mr. Villiers' mission, like all those emanating from Mr. Canning, had been expensive in style, tainted by intrigues, useless in business, and productive of disorders. When Mr. Stuart arrived, he

found everything, except the army under Beresford, in a state of disorganization; and the influence of England was decreasing because of the vacillating system hitherto pursued by the British government. As early as 1808, Lord Wellington had advised the ministers not only to adopt Portugal as the base of operations in the Peninsula, but to assume in reality the whole administration of that country; to draw forth all its resources, both of men and money, and to make up any deficiency, by the power of England. This advice had been neglected, and an entirely different policy pursued, which, in execution, was also feeble and uncertain.

The Portuguese constitution, like most of those springing from the feudal system, was excellent in theory, as far as regarded the defence of the kingdom; but it was overwhelmed with abuses in practice, and it was a favorite maxim with the authorities that it did not become a paternal government to punish neglect in the subordinates. When court intrigues were to be effected, or poor men to be oppressed, there was no want of vigor or of severity; but in all that regarded the administration of affairs, it was considered sufficient to give orders without looking to their execution, and no animadversion, much less punishment, followed disobedience. The character of the government was extreme weakness; the taxes, partially levied, produced only half their just amount; the payments from the treasury were in arrears; the army was neglected in all things dependent on the civil administration, and a bad navy was kept up, at an expense of a quarter of a million, to meet a war with Algiers. This last question was, however, a knife with a double edge, for in peace a tribute paid in coin drained the treasury already too empty, and in war the fleet did nothing; meanwhile the feeding of Cadiz was rendered precarious by it; and of Lisbon also, for the whole produce of Portugal was only equal to four months' consumption. In commercial affairs, the usual peninsular jealousy was displayed; the imports of British goods were prohibited to the advantage of smugglers only, while the government which thus neglected its own resources to the injury of both countries, clamored for subsidies. Finally, the power of the Souzas was so great, and the Regency was so entirely subservient to them, that although Mr. Stuart had been assured by Mr. Canning that a note forbidding Domingo Souza to meddle with affairs at Lisbon, had been procured from the Brazils, all representations to the Regency were met by references to that nobleman, who was in London, and the business of the mission was thus paralyzed.

In March, 1809, the British government had taken ten thousand Portuguese troops into pay. In May they were increased to

twenty thousand, and in June to thirty thousand. The cost of these forces, and the increased pay to Portuguese officers, added to the subsidy, amounted to two millions sterling; but this subsidy, partly from negligence, partly from the exhaustion of England in consequence of Mr. Canning's prodigal donations to Spain, was in arrears. However, as this mode of proceeding was perfectly in unison with their own method, the Regency did not much regard it, but they were eager to obtain a loan from England, in the disposal of which they would have been quite uncontrolled, and for this very reason Lord Wellington strenuously opposed it. In revenge, the Regency, by a wilful misunderstanding of the debates of Parliament, and by the distortion of facts, endeavored to throw a doubt upon the sincerity of England, and this, with the encouragement given to all Portuguese malcontents by the Whigs, whose clamor, just as applied to the ministers, was unjustly extended to the generals, greatly increased the disorder of the times.

In this state of affairs, Mr. Canning being happily removed from office, Lord Wellesley, who succeeded him, changed the instructions of the diplomatic agents in the Peninsula. They were now directed to make conditions with respect to the succors, and in Portugal they were vigorously to interfere in all civil changes, augmentations of revenue, and military resources; and even to demand monthly reports of the condition of the army, and the expenditures of the subsidy. Lord Wellesley also, thinking that the example of a Cortes in Spain might create a desire for a more temperate government in Portugal, was prepared to forward such a change, provided old forms were preserved, and that all appeared to flow from the Prince Regent, whose consent he undertook to secure. Resistance to the enemy, he said, would be in proportion to the attachment of the people, and hence it was advisable to make timely concessions, giving, however, no more than was absolutely necessary.

The Regency was strongly opposed to this notion of a Cortes, and Mr. Stuart and Lord Wellington affirmed, and truly, that the docility of the people, and their hatred of the French, were motives powerful enough without any other stimulus, to urge them to action. Thus the project fell to the ground, and the time was perhaps inconvenient to effect a revolution of this nature, which the people themselves certainly did not contemplate, and which, as Spain had shown, was not a certain help to the war. Lord Wellington, who only considered what would conduce to the success of the war, was therefore consistent upon this occasion; but it is curious to observe the course of the English Cabinet. The enforcement in France of a military conscription, authorized by the laws,

was an unheard-of oppression on the part of Napoleon; but in Portugal, a conscription, enforced by foreigners, was a wise and vigorous measure; and Lord Wellesley, admitting that the Portuguese government had been harsh and oppressive, as well as weak and capricious, was content to withhold a better system from the people, expressly because they loved their country and were obedient subjects; for he would have readily granted it to them if they had been unruly and of doubtful patriotism.

Mr. Stuart, in concert with Lord Wellington, diligently endeavored to remedy the evils of the hour; but whenever he complained of any particular disorder, he was, by the Regency, offered arbitrary power to punish, which being only an expedient to render the British odious to the people, he refused. The intrigues of the Fidalgos then became apparent, and the first Regency was broken up in 1810. The Marquis of Das Minas retired from it under the pretext of ill-health, but really because he found himself too weak to support Mr. De Mello, a Fidalgo officer, who was thrust forward to oppose the legal authority of Marshal Beresford. Mr. Cypriano Freire was then made minister of finance and of foreign affairs, and Mr. Forjas secretary-at-war, with a vote in the Regency on matters of war. But the former, soon after Mr. Stuart's arrival, resigned his situation in consequence of some disgust, and the Conde Redondo having undertaken the office, commenced, with the advice of Mr. Stuart, a better arrangement of the taxes, especially the "*decima*" or income tax, which was neither impartially nor strictly enforced on the rich towns, nor on the powerful people of the Fidalgo faction. The clergy also evaded the imposts, and the British merchants, although profiting enormously from the war, sought exemption under the factory privileges, not only from the taxes, which in certain cases they could legally do, but from the billets, and from those recruiting laws affecting their servants, which they could not justly demand, and which all other classes of the community were liable to.

The working of the Souzas, in the Brazils, where the minister of finance wished to have the regulation of the Portuguese treasury under his control, soon changed this arrangement. Freire's resignation was not accepted, Redondo was excluded from the government, and Forjas, who was the most efficient member of the government, was deprived of his functions. The remaining members then proposed to fill up Das Minas' vacancy themselves, but this was resisted by Lord Wellington, on the ground that, without the Prince's order, the proceeding would be illegal, and involve the Regency in an indefensible quarrel at the Brazils. The order for removing Redondo, and cramping the utility of Forjas, he, in con-

cert with Mr. Stuart, withstood; and this, for the moment, prevented a change, which would have impeded the amelioration begun. Such however was the disorder in the finances, that Mr. Stuart proposed, as the least difficult mode of arranging them, to take the whole direction himself, England becoming answerable for the expenditure of the country. Lord Wellington thought this could not be done without assuming, at the same time, the whole government of the country, which he had previously proposed to the British Cabinet, but which it was now too late to attempt, and Mr. Stuart's project fell to the ground.

Another spring of mischief soon bubbled up. Lord Strangford, whose diplomatic dexterity, evinced by his Bruton-street despatch, had been rewarded by the situation of minister at the Brazils, was there bestirring himself. It had been the policy of Mr. Stuart and the English General to keep the Regency permanent, and to support the secretariats as they were placed in the hands of Mr. de Forjas and the Condé de Redondo; for these men had been found by experience to be better qualified to co-operate with the British authorities than any other persons, and hence Lord Wellington had resisted the Prince's orders for Cypriano Freire's resumption of office, and had continued the functions of Forjas and Redondo, until his own remonstrances could reach the Brazils. In this state of affairs Lord Strangford informed Mr. Stuart that he had persuaded the Prince to accede to the following propositions:—1. That the British plenipotentiary at Lisbon, the Count Redondo, Doctor Noguerras, and the Principal Souza, should be added to the old Regency. 2. That Admiral Berkeley should be naval commander-in-chief. 3. That all traitorous correspondence should be prevented, and that measures should be taken to limit the exuberant power assumed by subordinates. This last article was directed against Forjas, and the whole went to establish the preponderance of the Souza faction. The only useful part was the appointment of Mr. Stuart to the Regency, but this was arranged before it was known that Mr. Villiers had been recalled, and consequently had the same object of favoring the Souzas in view.

Mr. Stuart and Lord Wellington strongly objected to this change, although they submitted to it as not wishing to appear regardless of the Prince Regent's rights. Mr. Stuart, however, reflecting that a government composed of men having different views and feelings, and without any casting vote, the number being even, could not go on usefully, was at first averse to join the Regency, but was finally persuaded to do so by Lord Wellington, who justly considered that his presence there would give the only chance of success.

Doctor Nogueiras' appointment was described by Lord Strangford as a tribute to democracy, the object being to counteract the power of those very secretariats which Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart were laboring to preserve. But Lord Strangford prided himself chiefly upon the appointment of the Principal Souza, who, he said, had been recommended to him by Mr. Villiers, an avowal of great import, as showing at once the spirit of the new arrangement: for this Souza had, in a subordinate situation, hitherto opposed every proceeding of the British in Portugal; he was the avowed enemy of Beresford, the contriver of all confusion, and the most mischievous person in Portugal; and his absence from that country was so desirable, that intimations to that effect had been formally given to him, by Lord Wellesley, through Mr. Stuart. This factious person was now, however, armed with additional power to thwart the English authorities in Portugal, and thus Lord Strangford's diplomacy tended, in effect, to ruin that cause which he had been sent to the Brazils to support.

In relating these proceedings, I have, following his own letter announcing the change, described Lord Strangford as acting voluntarily; but in a subsequent despatch he affirmed, that it was under Mr. Canning's instructions he had pressed for this incorporating of the British minister in the Regency, and that Nogueiras' appointment sprang entirely from the Prince Regent's own will, which he did not choose to oppose. In like manner, when Lord Wellesley was intent upon assembling a Cortes, Lord Strangford called it "*a great and essential measure strongly and wisely urged by the government,*" and yet afterwards acknowledged that he neglected to press it, because he thought it "*useless and even hurtful,*" which inconsistency renders it difficult to determine on whom these affairs rested. As affecting Mr. Canning's policy, however, it is to be observed that if he originally arranged this change, his object was to put Mr. Villiers in the Regency, not with any view to the more complete control of Portugal for the purposes of war, but, as the instructions to Sir John Cradock prove, to insure a preponderance to the diplomatic department over the military in that country.

The principal reforms in the administration, which had been sought for by Lord Wellington, were, a better arrangement of the financial system—the execution of the laws without favor to the Fidalgos—the suppression of the "*junta de viveres,*" a negligent and fraudulent board, for which he wished to establish a Portuguese commissariat—the due supply of provisions and stores, for the national troops and fortresses—the consolidation of the arsenal department under one head—the formation of a military chest, distinct from the treasury, which was always diverting the funds

to other purposes—the enforcing of the regulations about the means of transport—the repairs of the roads and bridges—the reformation of the hospitals—the succoring of the starving people, and the revival of agriculture in the parts desolated by the war.

These things he had hoped to accomplish ; but from the moment the change effected by Lord Strangford took place, unceasing acrimonious disputes ensued between the British commander and the Portuguese government, and no species of falsehood or intrigue, not even personal insult, and the writing of anonymous threatening letters, were spared by the Souza faction. In the beginning of 1811 they had organized an anti-English party, and a plot was laid to force the British out of the country, which would have succeeded if less vigilance had been used by Mr. Stuart, or less vigor of control by Lord Wellington. This plot, however, required that the Patriarch should go to the northern provinces, a journey which the envoy always dexterously prevented.

The first complaint of the British authorities, accompanied with a demand for the removal of the Principal Souza, reached the Brazils in February, 1811, and Das Minas died about the same time ; but so strongly was the faction supported at Rio Janeiro, that, in May, the Prince Regent expressed his entire approval of the Souzas' proceedings and his high displeasure with Forjas and Mr. Stuart. His minister, the Conde de Linhares, wrote that the capture of Massena with his whole army, which he expected to hear of each day, would not make amends for the destruction of the country during the retreat of the allies ; and in an official note to Lord Strangford, he declared, that the Prince Regent could not permit Mr. Stuart to vote in matters concerning the internal government of the kingdom, because he was influenced by, and consulted persons suspected of disaffection, which expression, Lord Strangford said, referred solely to Forjas.

The Prince himself also wrote to Lord Wellington, accusing Mr. Stuart of acting separately from the commander-in-chief, and of being the cause of all factions which had sprung up, and he declared that he would not remove Souza, unless Mr. Stuart was recalled. He desired that Forjas, whom he affirmed to be the real author of the opposition complained of by the British, should be sent to the Brazils, to answer for his conduct ; and finally he announced his intention to write in a like strain to the King of England. To this Lord Wellington answered, that, finding his conduct disapproved and Souza's applauded, he proposed to quit Portugal. Forjas immediately sent in his resignation, Admiral Berkeley proposed to do the same, and Mr. Stuart withdrew from the council until the pleasure of his own cabinet should be made known ; the

war was then on the point of finishing, but the crisis was not perceived by the public, because the resolution of the English General was kept secret, to avoid disturbing the public mind, and in the hopes of submission on the part of the Prince.

Meanwhile other embarrassments were superadded, of a nature to leave the English General little hope of being able to continue the contest, should he even defeat the intrigues at Rio Janeiro; for besides the quarrel with the Souza faction, in which he and Mr. Stuart supported Forjas, Noguera, and Redondo, against their enemies in the Brazils, these very persons, although the best that could be found, and men of undoubted ability, influenced partly by national habits, partly by fears of ultimate consequences, continually harassed him in the execution of the details belonging to their offices. No delinquent was ever punished, no fortress ever stored in due time and quantity, the suffering people were uncared-for, disorders were unrepressed, the troops were starved, and the favoring of the Fidalgos constant. The "*junta de viveres*" was supported, the formation of a military chest and commissariat delayed; many wild and foolish schemes daily broached; and the natural weakness of the government was, by instability, increased, because the Prince Regent had, early in 1811, intimated an intention of immediately returning to Europe.

I have said that it was a favorite maxim with the Regency, that a paternal government should not punish delinquents in the public service, and they added to this another, still more absurd, namely, that the Portuguese troops could thrive under privations of food, which would kill men of another nation; with these two follies they excused neglect, whenever the repetition, that there had been no neglect, became fatiguing to them. Besides this, collisions between the British commissariat and the "*junta de viveres*" were frequent, and very hurtful, because the former, able to outbid, and more in fear of failure, overbought the latter; this contracted the already too small sphere of their activity, and Lord Wellington was prevented feeding the whole Portuguese army himself by a curious obstacle. His principal dependence for the support of his own troops was upon the Spanish muleteers attached to the army; they were the very life and sustenance of the war, and their patience, hardiness, and fidelity to the British, were remarkable; but they so abhorred the Portuguese people that they would not carry provisions for their soldiers, and Lord Wellington only obtained their services for those brigades which were attached to the English divisions, by making them think the food was entirely for the latter. Upon such nice management, even in apparently trifling matters, did this war depend. And yet it is not uncommon for

politicians, versed only in the classic puerilities of public schools, and the tricks of parliamentary faction, to hold the rugged experience of Wellington's camp as nothing in the formation of a statesman.

The effects of these complicated affairs were soon and severely felt. Abrantes had like to have been abandoned from want, at the time Massena held Santarem, and the Portuguese troops were starved during that general's retreat; Beresford's operations in the Alemtejo were impeded, and his hospitals were left without succor; at Fuentes Onoro ammunition failed, and the Portuguese artillery were forced to supply themselves by picking up the enemy's bullets; the cavalry of that nation were quite ruined, and out of more than forty thousand regular troops, formed by Beresford, only nineteen thousand were to be found under arms after the battle of Albuera; the rest had deserted or died from extreme want.

When Massena retreated, the provincial organization of the country was restored; and, to encourage the people to sow the devastated districts before the season passed, Mr. Stuart had furnished seed corn, on the credit of the coming subsidy; an amnesty for deserters was also published; the feudal imposts for the year were remitted, and fairs were established to supply tools of husbandry; but notwithstanding these efforts, such was the distress that at Caldas eighty persons died daily, and at Figueras, where twelve thousand people, chiefly from Portuguese Estremadura, had taken refuge, the daily deaths were above a hundred, and the whole would have perished but for the active benevolence of Major Von Linstow, an officer of General Trant's staff. Meanwhile the country was so overrun with robbers, that the detached officers could not travel in safety upon the service of the army, and Wellington was fearful of being obliged to employ his troops against them. British officers were daily insulted at Lisbon, and even assassinated, while on duty, with impunity; the whole army was disgusted, the letters to England were engendering in that country a general dislike to the war, and the British soldiers, when not with their regiments, committed a thousand outrages on the line of operations.

As a climax to these scenes of misery and mischief, the harvest, which had failed in Portugal, failed also in England; and no corn was to be got from the Baltic, because there was no specie to pay for it, and bills were refused. Hence the famine spread in a terrible manner, until Mr. Stuart obtained leave to license fifty American vessels with corn, whose cargoes were paid for out of funds provided partly by the charity of the people of England, and partly by a parliamentary grant, which passed when Massena retreated.

In this crisis the British Cabinet granted an additional subsidy to Portugal, but from the scarcity of specie, the greatest part of it was paid in kind, and the distress of the Regency for money was scarcely lessened; for these supplies merely stood in the place of the plunder which had hitherto prevailed in the country. Thus Mr. Canning's prodigality, Mr. Vansittart's paper system, and Mr. Perceval's economy, all combined to press upon the British General, and, to use his own words, he was supplied with only one-sixth part of the money necessary to keep the great machine going which had been set in motion. Mr. Perceval, however, in answer to his remonstrances, employed a Secretary of the Treasury to prove, in a labored paper, founded entirely upon false data, that the army had been oversupplied, and must have money to spare. But that minister, whose speeches breathed nothing but the final destruction of France, designed to confine the efforts of England to the defence of Portugal alone, without any regard to the rest of the Peninsula.

Amongst the other follies of the Portuguese Regency, was a resolution to issue proclamations, filled with bombastic adulation of themselves, vulgar abuse of the French, and altogether unsuited to the object of raising the public feeling, which flagged under their system. To the English General's remonstrances on this head, Forjas replied, that praise of themselves and abuse of the French was the national custom, and could not be dispensed with! a circumstance which certain English writers who have implicitly followed the accounts of the Portuguese authors, such as Accursio de Neves, and men of his stamp, relative to French enormities, would do well to consider. And here it is right to observe, that so many complaints were made of the cruelty committed by Massena's army while at Santarem, that Lord Wellington had some thoughts of reprisals; but having first caused strict inquiry to be made, it was discovered that, in most cases, the *ordenanza*, after having submitted to the French, and received their protection, took advantage of it to destroy the stragglers and small detachments, and the cruelty complained of was only the infliction of legitimate punishment for such conduct:* the projected retaliation was therefore changed for an injunction to the *ordenanzas* to cease from such a warfare.

The character of the Regency was, however, most openly shown in their proceedings connected with the convention of Cintra. All the advantages which that treaty insured to Portugal they complacently reaped, but overlooked or annulled those points in which the character of England was concerned. In violation of the convention, and in despite of the remonstrances of Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, they cast the French residents at Lisbon into

* Mr. Stuart's Papers, MS.