

The sixth corps, wanting its third division, was appointed to hold Galicia.

The seventh corps continued always in Catalonia.

The imperial guards, directed on Vittoria, contributed to the security of the great communication with France until Zaragoza should fall, and were yet ready to march when wanted for the Austrian war.

General Dessolles, with the third division of the sixth corps, returned to Madrid. General Bonnet, with the fifth division of the second corps, remained in the Montaña Santander.

General Lapisse, with the second division of the first corps, was sent to Salamanca, where he was joined by Maupetit's brigade of cavalry, which had crossed the Sierra de Bejar.

The reserve of heavy cavalry, being broken up, was distributed by divisions, in the following order:—

Latour Maubourg's joined the first corps. Lorge's and La Hous-saye's were attached to the second corps. Lassalle's was sent to the fourth corps. The sixth corps was reinforced with two brigades. Milhaud's division remained at Madrid, and Kellermann's guarded the lines of communication between Tudela, Burgos, and Palencia.

Thus, Madrid being still the centre of operations, the French were so distributed, that by a concentric movement on that capital, they could crush every insurrection within the circle of their positions; and the great masses, being kept upon the principal roads diverging from Madrid to the extremities of the Peninsula, intercepted all communication between the provinces; while the second corps, thrust out, as it were, beyond the circumference, and destined, as the fourth corps had been, to sweep round from point to point, was sure of finding a supporting army, and a good line of retreat, at every great route leading from Madrid to the yet unsubdued provinces of the Peninsula. The communication with France was, at the same time, secured by the fortresses of Burgos, Pampeluna, and St. Sebastian, and by the divisions posted at Santander, Burgos, Bilbao, and Vittoria; it was also supported by a reserve at Bayonne.

The northern provinces were parcelled out into military governments, the chiefs of which corresponded with each other, and by the means of movable columns, repressed every petty insurrection. The third and fifth corps, having their base at Pampeluna, and their line of operations directed against Zaragoza, served as an additional covering force to the communication with France, and were themselves exposed to no flank attacks, except from the side of Cuença,

where the Duke of Infantado commanded; but that general was himself watched by the first corps.

All the lines of correspondence, not only from France but between the different corps, were maintained by fortified posts, having greater or lesser garrisons, according to their importance. Between Bayonne and Burgos there were eleven military stations. Between Burgos and Madrid, by the road of Aranda and Somosierra, there were eight; and eleven others protected the more circuitous route to the capital, by Valladolid, Segovia, and the Guadarama.\* Between Valladolid and Zaragoza, the line was secured by fifteen intermediate points. The communication between Valladolid and Santander contained eight posts; and nine others connected the former town with Villa Franca del Bierzo, by the route of Benevente and Astorga; finally, two were established between Benevente and Leon.

At this period, the force of the army, exclusive of Joseph's French guards, was three hundred and twenty-four thousand four hundred and eleven men, about thirty-nine thousand being cavalry.

Fifty-eight thousand men were in hospital.†

The dépôts, governments, garrisons, posts of correspondence, prisoners, and "*battalions of march*," composed of stragglers, absorbed about twenty-five thousand men.

The remainder were under arms, with their regiments, and consequently more than two hundred and forty thousand men were in the field; while the great line of communication with France (the military reader will do well to mark this, the key-stone of Napoleon's system) was protected by above fifty thousand men, whose positions were strengthened by three fortresses and sixty-four posts of correspondence, each more or less fortified.

Having thus shown the military state of the French, I shall now proceed with the narrative of their operations, following, as heretofore, a local rather than a chronological arrangement of events.

#### OPERATIONS IN ESTREMADURA AND LA MANCHA.

The defeat of Galluzzo has been incidentally touched upon before. The Duke of Dantzic, having observed that the Spanish general pretended with six thousand raw levies to defend a river line of forty miles, made a feint of crossing the Tagus at Arzobispo, and then suddenly descending to Almaraz, forced a passage over that bridge on the 24th of December, killing and wounding many Spaniards and capturing four guns; and so complete was the dispersion, that for a long time after, not a man was to be found in

\* Muster-rolls of the French army, MSS.

† Appendix, No. 30.

arms throughout Estremadura.\* The French cavalry followed the fugitives, but intelligence of Sir John Moore's advance to Sahagun being received, the pursuit ceased at Merida, and the fourth corps, which had left eight hundred men in garrison at Segovia, then occupied Talavera and Placentia; the Duke of Dantzic was recalled to France, and Sebastiani succeeded to his command. At this period also, the first corps (of which Lapisse's division only had followed the Emperor to Astorga) entered Toledo without opposition, and the French outposts were pushed towards Cuença, and towards the Sierra Morena.

Meanwhile, the Central Junta, changing its first design, retired to Seville instead of Badajos, and being continually urged, both by Mr. Stuart and Mr. Frere, to make some effort to lighten the pressure on the English army, ordered Palafox and the Duke of Infantado to advance; the one from Zaragoza towards Tudela, the other from Cuença towards Madrid. The Marquis of Palacios, who had been removed from Catalonia, and was now at the head of five or six thousand levies in the Sierra Morena, was also directed to advance into La Mancha; and Galluzzo, deprived of his command, was constituted a prisoner, along with Cuesta, Castaños, and a number of other culpable or unfortunate officers, who, vainly demanding a judgment on their cases, were dragged from place to place by the government.

Cuesta was, however, so popular in Estremadura, that the Central Junta, although fearing and detesting him, were forced to place him at the head of Galluzzo's fugitives, part of whom had, when the pursuit ceased, rallied behind the Guadiana, and were now, with the aid of fresh levies, again taking the form, rather than the consistence of an army. This appointment was an act of deplorable incapacity; the moral effect was to degrade the government by exposing its fears and weakness, and, in a military view, it was destructive, because Cuesta was physically and mentally incapable of command. Obstinate, jealous, and stricken in years, he was heedless of time, circumstances, dispositions or fitness; to punish with a barbarous severity, and to rush headlong into battle, constituted, in his mind, all the functions of a general.

The President, Florida Blanca, eighty-one years of age, died at Seville, and the Marquis of Astorga succeeded him, but the character of the Junta was in no manner affected by the change. Some fleeting indications of vigor had been produced by the imminence of the danger during the flight from Aranjuez, but a large remittance of silver from South America having arrived at Cadiz, the attention of the members was absorbed by this object, and the public weal was blotted from their remembrance; even Mr. Frere,

\* Appendix, No. 31.

ashamed of their conduct, appeared to acquiesce in the justness of Sir John Moore's estimate of the value of Spanish co-operation.

The number of men to be enrolled for the defence of the country had been early fixed at five hundred thousand, but scarcely one third had joined their colors; nevertheless, considerable bodies were assembling at different points, because the people, especially those of the southern provinces, although dismayed, were obedient, and the local authorities, at a distance from the actual scene of war, rigorously enforcing the law of enrolment, sent the recruits to the armies; hoping thereby either to stave the war off from their own districts, or to have the excuse of being without fighting men, to plead for quiet submission. The fugitive troops also readily collected again at any given point, partly from patriotism, partly because the French were in possession of their native provinces, partly that they attributed their defeats to the treachery of their generals, and partly that, being deceived by the gross falsehoods and boasting of the government, they, with ready vanity, imagined that the enemy had invariably suffered enormous losses. In fine, for the reasons mentioned in the commencement of this history, men were to be had in abundance, but, beyond assembling them and appointing some incapable person to command, nothing was done for defence. The officers, who were not deceived, had no confidence either in their own troops or in the government, nor were they themselves confided in or respected by their men: the latter, starved, misused, ill-handled, possessed neither the compact strength of discipline nor the daring of enthusiasm. Under such a system, the peasantry could not be rendered energetic soldiers, nor were they active supporters of the cause; but with a wonderful constancy they endured for it fatigue, sickness, nakedness and famine, displaying in all their actions, and in all their sentiments, a distinct and powerful national character. This constancy, although rendered nugatory by the vices and follies of the juntas and leading men, hallowed the people's efforts, and the flagitious violence of the invasion almost justified their ferocity.

Palacios, on the receipt of the orders above mentioned, advanced with five thousand men to Vilharta, in La Mancha; and the Duke of Infantado, anticipating the instructions of the Junta, was already in motion from Cuenca, his army, reinforced by the divisions of Cartoajal and Lilli, and by fresh levies, being about twenty thousand men, of which two thousand were cavalry. To check the incursions of the French horsemen, he had, a few days after the departure of Napoleon from Madrid, detached General Senra and General Venegas, with eight thousand infantry and all the horse, to scour the country around Tarazona and Aranjuez; and the former

entered Horcajada, while the latter endeavored to cut off a French detachment, but was himself surprised and beaten by a very inferior force. Marshal Victor, nevertheless, withdrew his advanced posts, and, concentrating Ruffin's and Villatte's divisions of infantry and Latour Maubourg's cavalry at Villa de Alorna, in the vicinity of Toledo, left Venegas in possession of Tarancon. But, among the Spanish generals, mutual recriminations succeeded their failure. The Duke of Infantado possessed neither authority nor talents to repress their disputes, and in this untoward state of affairs, receiving the orders of the Junta, he projected a movement on Toledo, intending to seize that place and Aranjuez, break down the bridges, and maintain the line of the Tagus.

The 10th he quitted Cuença with ten thousand men, intending to join Venegas, who, with the rest of the army, was at Tarancon.

The 13th, he met a crowd of fugitives near Carascosa, and heard, with equal surprise and consternation, that the division under Venegas was beaten, and the pursuers close at hand.

#### ROUT OF UCLES.

It appeared that Victor, ignorant of the exact situation and intention of the Spanish generals, and yet uneasy at their movements, had marched from Toledo to Ocaña the 10th, and that Venegas then abandoned Tarancon and took post at Ucles. The French again advanced on the 12th in two columns, of which one, composed of Ruffin's division and a brigade of cavalry, lost its way, and arrived at Alcazar; the other, led by Victor in person, arrived in front of the Spanish position at Ucles early in the morning of the 13th. This meeting was unexpected by either party, but the French attacked without hesitation, and the Spaniards, making towards Alcazar, were cut off by Ruffin, and totally discomfited. Several thousand were taken, others fled across the fields, and one body, preserving some order, marched towards Ocaña, where, meeting the French parc, it received a heavy discharge of grape, and dispersed. Of the whole force, only one small detachment, under General Giron, forced a passage by the road of Carascosa, and so reached the Duke of Infantado, who immediately retreated safely to Cuença, as the French cavalry was too much fatigued to pursue him briskly.

From Cuença he sent his guns towards Valencia by the road of Tortola, but marched his infantry and cavalry by Chinchilla to Tobarra on the frontiers of Murcia, and then to Santa Cruz de Mudela, a town situated near the entrance to the defiles of the Sierra Morena. This place he reached in the beginning of February, having made a painful and circuitous retreat of more than

two hundred miles, in a bad season; his artillery had been captured at Tortola, and his force was reduced by desertion and straggling to a handful of discontented officers and a few thousand men, worn out with fatigue and misery. Meanwhile, Victor, after scouring a part of the province of Cuença and disposing of his prisoners, made a sudden march upon Vilharta, intending to surprise Palacios, but that officer, aware of Infantado's retreat, had already effected a junction with the latter at Santa Cruz de Mudela; wherefore the French Marshal relinquished the attempt, and re-occupied his former position at Toledo.

The captives taken at Ucles were marched to Madrid; those who were weak and unable to walk, being, says Mr. Rocca, shot by order of Victor, because the Spaniards had hanged some French prisoners.\* If so, it was a barbarous and a shameful retaliation, unworthy of a soldier; for what justice or propriety is shown in revenging the death of one innocent person by the murder of another?

After the French had thus withdrawn, Infantado and Palacios proceeded to re-organize their forces, under the name of the Carolina Army, and when the levies in Granada and other parts came up, the Duke of Albuquerque, at the head of the cavalry, endeavored to surprise a French regiment of dragoons at Mora, but the latter rallied quickly, fought stoutly, and effected a retreat with scarcely any loss. Albuquerque then retired to Consuegra, where he was attacked the next day by superior numbers, and got off with difficulty. The Duke of Infantado was now displaced by the Junta, and General Urbina, Conde de Cartoajal, the new commander, having restored some discipline, advanced to Ciudad Real, and took post on the left bank of the upper Guadina. From thence he opened a communication with Cuesta, whose army had been increased to sixteen thousand men, of which three thousand were cavalry; for the Spaniards suffered more in flight than in action, and the horsemen, escaping with little damage, were more easily rallied, and in greater relative numbers than the infantry. With these forces, Cuesta had advanced to the Tagus, when Moore's march upon Sahagun had drawn the fourth corps across that river; the latter, however, by fortifying an old tower, still held the bridge of Arzobispo. Cuesta extended his line from the mountains in front of that place, to the Puerto de Mirabete, and broke down the bridge of Almaraz, a magnificent structure, the centre arch of which was above one hundred and fifty feet high.

In these positions both sides remained tranquil in La Mancha and in Estremadura, and so ended the Spanish exertions to lighten

\* Rocca's Memoirs.

the pressure upon the British army. Two French divisions of infantry, and as many brigades of cavalry, had more than sufficed to baffle them; and thus the imminent danger of the southern provinces, when Sir John Moore's vigorous operations drew the Emperor to the north, may be justly estimated.

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## CHAPTER II.

Operations in Aragon—Confusion in Zaragoza—The third and fifth corps invest that city—Fortification described—Monte Torrero taken—Attack on the suburb repulsed—Mortier takes post at Calatayud—The convent of San Joseph taken—The bridge-head carried—Huerba passed—Device of the Spanish leaders to encourage the besieged—Marquis of Lazan takes post on the Sierra de Alcubierre—Lasnes arrives in the French camp—Recalls Mortier—Lazan defeated—Gallant exploit of Mariano Galindo—The walls of the town taken by assault—General Lacoste and Colonel San Genis slain.

### CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS IN ARAGON.

FROM the field of battle at Tudela, all the fugitives from O'Neil's, and a great part of those from Castaños' army, fled to Zaragoza, and with such speed as to bring the first news of their own disaster. With the troops, also, came an immense number of carriages, and the military chests, for the roads were wide and excellent, and the pursuit was slack. The citizens and the neighboring peasantry were astounded at this quick and unexpected calamity. They had, with a natural credulity, relied on the boasting promises of their chiefs, and being necessarily ignorant of the true state of affairs, never doubted that their vengeance would be sated by a speedy and complete destruction of the French. When their hopes were thus suddenly blasted, when they beheld troops from whom they expected nothing but victory, come pouring into the town with all the tumult of panic; when the peasants of all the villages through which the fugitives passed, came rushing into the city along with the scared multitude of flying soldiers and camp followers, every heart was filled with consternation, and the date of Zaragoza's glory would have ended with the first siege, if the success at Tudela had been followed up by the French with that celerity and vigor which the occasion required.

Napoleon, foreseeing that this moment of confusion and terror would arrive, had, with his usual prudence, provided the means, and given directions for such an instantaneous and powerful attack as would inevitably have overthrown the bulwark of the eastern prov-

inces: but the sickness of Marshal Lasnes, the difficulty of communication, the consequent false movements of Monecy and Ney—in fine, the intervention of fortune, omnipotent as she is in war, baffled the Emperor's long-sighted calculations.\* The leaders had time to restore order amongst the multitude, to provide stores, to complete the defensive works, and, by a ferocious exercise of power, to insure implicit obedience: the danger of resisting the enemy appeared light, when a suspicious word or gesture was instantly punished by death.

The third corps having missed the favorable moment for a sudden assault, and being reduced by sickness, by losses in battle, and by detachments, to seventeen thousand four hundred men, including the engineers and artillery,† was too weak to invest the city in form, and therefore remained in observation on the Xalon river, while a battering train of sixty guns, with well-furnished parcs, which had been by Napoleon's orders previously collected in Pampeluna, was carried to Tudela and embarked upon the canal leading to Zaragoza. Marshal Mortier, with the fifth corps, was directed to assist in the siege, and he was in march to join Monecy, when his progress also was arrested by Sir John Moore's advance towards Burgos; but the scope of that General's operation being determined by Napoleon's counter movement, Mortier resumed his march to reinforce Monecy, and, on the 20th of December, 1808, their united corps, forming an army of thirty-five thousand men of all arms, advanced against Zaragoza. At this time, however, confidence had been restored in the town, and all the preparations necessary for a vigorous defence were completed.

The nature of the plain in which Zaragoza is situated, the course of the rivers, the peculiar construction of the houses, and the multitude of convents have been already described, but the difficulties to be encountered by the French troops were no longer the same as in the first siege. At that time little assistance had been derived from science; now, instructed by experience, and inspired as it were by the greatness of their resolution, neither the rules of art nor the resources of genius were neglected by the defenders.

Zaragoza offered four irregular fronts. The first, reckoning from the right of the town, extended from the Ebro to a convent of bare-footed Carmelites, and was about three hundred yards wide.

The second, twelve hundred yards in extent, reached from the Carmelites to a bridge over the Huerba.

The third, likewise of twelve hundred yards, stretched from this bridge to an oil manufactory built beyond the walls.

\* Appendix, No. 5.

† Muster-roll of the French army, MS.

The fourth, being on an opening of four hundred yards, reached from the oil manufactory to the Ebro.

The first front, fortified by an ancient wall and flanked by the guns on the Carmelite, was strengthened by new batteries and ramparts, and by the Castle of Aljaferia, commonly called the Castle of the Inquisition, which, standing a little in advance, was a square fort, having a bastion and tower at each corner, and a good stone ditch, and it was connected with the body of the place by certain walls loop-holed for musketry.\*

The second front was defended by a double wall, the exterior one of recent erection, faced with sun-dried bricks, and covered by a ditch, with perpendicular sides, fifteen feet deep and twenty feet wide. The flanks of this front were formed from the convent of the Carmelites, by a large circular battery standing in the centre of the line, by a fortified convent of the Capuchins, called the Trinity, and by some earthen works protecting the head of the bridge over the Huerba.

The third front was covered by the river Huerba, the deep bed of which was close to the foot of the ramparts. Behind this stream a double intrenchment was carried from the bridge head to a large projecting convent of Santa Engracia, a distance of two hundred yards. Santa Engracia itself was very strongly fortified and armed, and from thence to the oil manufactory the line of defence was prolonged by an ancient Moorish wall, on which several terraced batteries were raised, to sweep all the space between the rampart and the Huerba. These batteries, and the guns in the convent of Santa Engracia, likewise overlooked some works raised to protect a second bridge that crossed the river about cannot-shot below the first.

Upon the right bank of the Huerba, and a little below the second bridge, stood the convent of San Joseph, the walls of which had been strengthened and protected by a deep ditch with a covered way and palisade. It was well placed, as an advanced work, to impede the enemy's approach, and to facilitate sallies on the right bank of the river, and it was open in the rear, to the fire from the works at the second bridge, both being overlooked by the terraced batteries, and by the guns of Santa Engracia.

The fourth front was protected by the Huerba, by the continuation of the old city wall, by new batteries and intrenchments, and by several armed convents and large houses.

Beyond the walls, the Monte Torrero, which commanded all the plain of Zaragoza, was crowned by a large ill-constructed fort, raised at the distance of eighteen hundred yards from the convent of San Joseph. This work was covered by the royal canal, the

\* Rogniat's Siege of Zaragoza. Cavallero's Siege of Zaragoza

sluices of which were defended by some field-works open to the fire of the fort itself.

On the left bank of the Ebro, the suburb, built in a low marshy plain, was protected by a chain of redoubts and fortified houses, and some gun-boats, manned by seamen from the naval arsenal of Carthagena, completed the circuit of defence. The artillery of the place was, however, of too small a calibre.\* There were only sixty guns carrying more than twelve-pound balls, and there were but eight large mortars. There was, however, no want of small arms, and Colonel Doyle had furnished many English muskets.

These were the regular external defences of Zaragoza, most of which were constructed at the time, according to the skill and means of the engineers; but the experience of the former siege had taught the people not to trust to the ordinary resources of art, and, with equal genius and resolution, they had prepared an internal system of defence infinitely more efficacious.

It has already been observed that the houses of Zaragoza were fire-proof, and generally of only two stories; that in all the quarters of the city, the massive convents and churches rose like castles above the low buildings, and that the greater streets, running into the broad-way called the Cosso, divided the town into a variety of districts, unequal in size, but each containing one or more large structures. Now, the citizens, sacrificing all personal convenience, and resigning all idea of private property, gave up their goods, their bodies, and their houses to the war, and being promiscuously mingled with the peasantry and the regular soldiers, the whole formed one mighty garrison, well suited to the vast fortress into which Zaragoza was transformed: for the doors and windows of the houses were built up, their fronts loop-holed, internal communications broken through the party walls, the streets trenched and crossed by earthen ramparts mounted with cannon, and every strong building turned into a separate fortification. There was no weak point, because there could be none in a town which was all fortress, and where the space covered by the city was the measurement for the thickness of the ramparts.

Nor in this emergency were the leaders unmindful of moral force. The people were cheered by a constant reference to the former successful resistance; their confidence was raised by the contemplation of the vast works that had been executed, and it was recalled to their recollection that the wet, usual at that season of the year, would spread disease among the enemy's ranks, impairing, if not entirely frustrating, his efforts. Neither was the aid of superstition neglected; processions imposed upon the sight, false

\* Cavallero.

miracles bewildered the imagination, and terrible denunciations of the divine wrath shook the minds of men whose former habits and present situation rendered them peculiarly susceptible of such impressions. Finally, the leaders were themselves so prompt and terrible in their punishments, that the greatest cowards were likely to show the boldest bearing in their wish to escape suspicion.

To avoid the danger of any great explosion, the powder was made as occasion required, which was the more easily effected, because Zaragoza contained a royal dépôt and refinery for saltpetre, and there were powder-mills in the neighborhood which furnished workmen familiar with the process. The houses and trees beyond the walls were all demolished and cut down, and the materials carried into the town. The public magazines contained six months' provisions, the convents were well stocked, the inhabitants had laid up their own stores for several months, and General Doyle sent a convoy into the town from the side of Catalonia; and there was abundance of money, because, in addition to the resources of the town, the military chest of Castaños' army, which had been filled only the night before the battle of Tudela, was, in the flight, carried to Zaragoza.\* Some companies of women were enrolled to attend the hospitals and to carry provisions and ammunition to the combatants; they were commanded by the Countess of Burita, a lady of an heroic disposition, who is said to have displayed the greatest intelligence and the noblest character during both sieges.

There were thirteen engineer officers, eight hundred sappers and miners, composed of excavators formerly employed on the canal, and from fifteen hundred to two thousand cannoners.† The regular troops that fled from Tudela, being joined by two small divisions which retreated, at the same time, from Sanguessa and Caparosa, formed a garrison of thirty thousand men, and, with the inhabitants and peasantry, presented a mass of fifty thousand combatants, who, with passions excited almost to phrensy, awaited an assault amidst those mighty intrenchments, where each man's home was a fortress and his family a garrison. To besiege, with only thirty-five thousand men, a city so prepared, was truly a gigantic undertaking!

#### SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.

The 20th of December, the two Marshals, Moncey and Mortier, having established their hospitals and magazines at Alagon on the Xalon, advanced in three columns against Zaragoza.‡

\* Doyle's Correspondence, MS.

† Cavallero, Siege of Zaragoza.

‡ Rogniat.





The first, composed of the infantry of the third corps, marched by the right bank of the canal.

The second, composed of General Suchet's division of the fifth corps, marched between the canal and the Ebro.

The third, composed of General Gazan's division of infantry, crossed the Ebro opposite to Tauste, and from thence made an oblique march to the Gallego river.

The right and centre columns arrived in front of the town that evening. The latter, after driving back the Spanish advanced guards, halted at a distance of a league from the Capuchin convent of the Trinity; the former took post on both sides of the Huerba, and, having seized the aqueduct by which the canal is carried over that river, proceeded, in pursuance of Napoleon's orders, to raise batteries and make dispositions for an immediate assault on Monte Torrero. Meanwhile General Gazan, with the left column, marching by Cartejon and Zuera, reached Villa Nueva, on the Gallego river, without encountering an enemy.

The Monte Torrero was defended by five thousand Spaniards, under the command of General St. Marc; but at daybreak on the 21st, the French opened their fire against the fort, and one column of infantry having attracted the attention of the Spaniards, a second, unseen, crossed the canal under the aqueduct, and penetrating between the fort and the city, entered the former by the rear; at the same time a third column stormed the works protecting the great sluices. These sudden attacks, and the loss of the fort,\* threw the Spaniards into confusion, and they hastily retired to the town, which so enraged the blebeian leaders that the life of St. Marc was with difficulty saved by Palafox.

It had been concerted among the French that General Gazan should assault the suburb, simultaneously with the attack on the Torrero, and that officer, having encountered a body of Spanish and Swiss troops placed somewhat in advance, drove the former back so quickly that the Swiss, unable to make good their retreat, were, to the number of three or four hundred, killed or taken.† But notwithstanding this fortunate commencement, Gazan did not attack the suburb itself until after the affair at Monte Torrero was over, and then only upon a single point, without any previous examination of the works; hence the Spaniards, recovering from their first alarm, reinforced this point, and Gazan was forced to desist, with the loss of four hundred men. This important failure more than balanced the success against Monte Torrero; it restored the shaken confidence of the Spaniards at a most critical moment,

\* Cavallero.

† Rogniat.

and checking in the French, at the outset, that impetuous spirit, that impulse of victory which great generals so carefully watch and improve, threw them back upon the tedious and chilling process of the engineer.

The 24th of December the investment of Zaragoza was completed on both sides of the Ebro. Gazan occupied the bridge over the Gallego with his left, and covered his front from sorties by inundations and cuts, that the low marshy plain where he was posted enabled him to make without difficulty.

General Suchet occupied the space between the upper Ebro and the Huerba.

Morlot's division of the 3d corps encamped in the broken hollow that formed the bed of that stream.

Méunier's division crowned the Monte Torrero, and General Grandjean, continuing the circuit to the lower Ebro, communicated with Gazan's post on the other side. Several Spanish detachments that had been sent out to forage were thus cut off, and could never re-enter the town, and a bridge of boats constructed on the upper Ebro completed the circle of investments, insuring a free intercourse between the different quarters of the army.

General Lacoste, an engineer of reputation and aid-de-camp to the Emperor, directed the siege. His plan was, that one false and two real attacks should be conducted by regular approaches on the right bank of the Ebro; and he still hoped to take the suburb by a sudden assault. The trenches were opened the night of the 29th; the 30th the place was summoned, and the terms dictated by Napoleon when he was at Aranda de Duero being offered, the example of Madrid was cited to induce a surrender. Palafox replied, that if Madrid had surrendered, Madrid had been sold: Zaragoza would neither be sold nor surrender! On the receipt of this haughty answer the attacks were commenced, the right being directed against the convent of San Joseph, the centre against the upper bridge over the Huerba, the left, which was the false one, against the castle of Aljaferia.

The 31st Palafox made sorties against all the three attacks. From the right and centre he was beaten back with loss, and he was likewise repulsed on the left at the trenches; but some of his cavalry, gliding between the French parallel and the Ebro, surprised and cut down a post of infantry, stationed behind some ditches that intersected the low ground on the bank of that river. This trifling success exalted the enthusiasm of the besieged, and Palafox gratified his personal vanity by boasting proclamations, some of which bore the marks of genius, but the greater part were ridiculous.

The 1st of January the second parallels of the true attacks were commenced, and the next day Palafox caused the attention of the besiegers to be occupied on the right bank of the Ebro by slight skirmishes, while he made a serious attack from the side of the suburb on Gazan's lines of contravallation. This sally was repulsed with loss, but, on the right bank, the Spaniards obtained some success.

Marshal Monecy being called to Madrid, Junot now assumed the command of the third corps, and, about the same time, Marshal Mortier was directed to take post at Calatayud, with Suchet's division, for the purpose of securing the communication with Madrid. The gap in the circle of investment left by this draft of eight thousand men, being but scantily stopped by extending Morlot's division, a line of contravallation was constructed at that part to supply the place of numbers. Meanwhile the besieged, hoping and expecting each day that the usual falls of rain would render the besiegers' situation intolerable, continued their fire briskly, and worked counter approaches to the right of the French attacks; but the season was unusually dry, and a thick fog rising each morning covered the besiegers' advances and protected their workmen, both from the fire and from the sorties of the Spaniards.

The 10th of January, thirty-two pieces of French artillery battered in breach both the convent of San Joseph and the head of the second bridge on the Huerba, and the town also was bombarded. San Joseph was so much injured by this fire that the Spaniards, resolving to evacuate it, withdrew their guns; nevertheless, two hundred of their men, making a vigorous sally at midnight, pushed close up to the French batteries, but being taken in flank with a discharge of grape, retired, with loss of half their number.

The 11th, the besiegers' batteries having continued to play on San Joseph, the breach became practicable, and, at four o'clock in the evening, some companies of infantry with two field-pieces attacked by the right, while a column was kept in readiness to assail the front, when this attack should have shaken the defence, and two other companies of chosen men were directed to search for an entrance by the rear, between the fort and the river.

The defences of the convent were now reduced to a ditch eighteen feet deep, and a covered way, which, falling back on both flanks to the Huerba, extended along the bank for some distance, and was occupied by a considerable number of men; but when some French guns raked it from the right, the Spaniards, crossing the bed of the river in confusion, took refuge in the town, and at that moment the front of the convent was assaulted. The depth of the ditch and the Spanish fire checked the assailants a moment,

yet the chosen companies, passing round the works, found a small bridge, crossed it, and entered by the rear, and the next instant the front was stormed, and the defenders were all killed or taken.

The French, who had suffered but little in this assault, immediately lodged themselves in the convent, raised a rampart along the edge of the Huerba, and commenced batteries against the body of the place and against the works at the head of the upper bridge, from whence, as well as from the town, they were incommoded by the fire that played into the convent.

The 15th, the bridge-head in front of Santa Engracia was carried with the loss of only three men; the Spaniards cut the bridge itself, and sprung a mine under the works, but the explosion occasioned no mischief, and the third parallels being soon completed, the trenches of the two attacks were united, and the defences of the besieged were confined to the town itself; they could no longer make sallies on the right bank of the Huerba, without overcoming the greatest difficulties. The passage of the Huerba was then effected by the French, and breaching and counter-batteries, mounting fifty pieces of artillery, were constructed against the body of the place, and as the fire also reached the bridge over the Ebro, the communication between the suburb and the town was interrupted.

Unshaken by this aspect of affairs, the Spanish leaders, with great readiness of mind, immediately forged intelligence of the defeat of the Emperor, and, with the sound of music, and amidst the shouts of the populace, proclaimed the names of the marshals who had been killed; asserting, also, that Palafox's brother, the Marquis of Lazan, was already wasting France. This intelligence, extravagant as it was, met with implicit credence; for such was the disposition of the Spaniards throughout this war, that the imaginations of the chiefs were taxed to produce absurdities proportionable to the credulity of their followers; hence the boasting of the leaders and the confidence of the besieged augmented as the danger increased, and their anticipations of victory seemed realized when the night-fires of a succoring force were discerned, blazing on the hills behind Gazan's troops.

The difficulties of the French were indeed fast increasing; for while inclosing Zaragoza, they were themselves encircled by insurrections, and their supplies so straitened that famine was felt in their camp. Disputes among the generals also diminished the vigor of the operations, and the bonds of discipline being relaxed, the military ardor of the troops naturally became depressed. The soldiers reasoned openly upon the chances of success, which in times of danger is only one degree removed from mutiny.

The nature of the country about Zaragoza was exceedingly favorable to the Spaniards. The town, although situated in a plain, is surrounded at some miles' distance by high mountains, and to the south, the fortresses of Mequinenza and Lerida afforded a double base of operations for any forces that might come from Catalonia and Valencia. The besiegers drew their supplies from Pampeluna, and their line of operation, running through Alagon, Tudela, and Caparosa, was harassed by the insurgents, who were in considerable numbers, on the side of Epila and in the Sierra de Muela, threatening Alagon; while others, descending from the mountains of Soria, menaced the important point of Tudela. The Marquis of Lazan also, anxious to assist his brother, had drafted five thousand men from the Catalonian army, and taking post in the Sierra de Liciñena, or Alcubierre, on the left of the Ebro, drew together all the armed peasantry of the valleys as high as Sangüessa. Extending his line from Villa Franca on the Ebro to Zuera on the Gallego, he hemmed in the division of Gazan, and sent detachments as far as Caparosa, to harass the French convoys coming from Pampeluna.

To maintain their communications and to procure provisions, the besiegers had placed between two and three thousand men in Tudela, Caparosa, and Tafalla, and some hundreds in Alagon and at Montalbarra. Between the latter town and the investing army, six hundred and fifty cavalry were stationed; a like number were posted at Santa Fé to watch the openings of the Sierra de Muela; finally, sixteen hundred cavalry and twelve hundred infantry, under the command of General Wathier, were pushed towards the south as far as Fuentes. Wathier, falling suddenly upon an assemblage of four or five thousand insurgents at Belchite, dispersed them, and then taking the town of Alcanitz, established himself there, in observation, for the rest of the siege. Lazan, however, still maintained himself in the Alcubierre.

In this state of affairs Marshal Lannes, having recovered from his long sickness, arrived before Zaragoza, and took the supreme command of both corps on the 22d of January. The influence of his firm and vigorous character was immediately perceptible. Recalling Suchet's division from Calatayud, where it had been lingering without necessity, he sent it across the Ebro, ordered Mortier to attack Lazan, and at the same time directed a smaller detachment against the insurgents in Zuera;\* meanwhile, repressing all disputes, he restored discipline in the army, and pressed the siege with infinite resolution.

The detachment sent to Zuera defeated the insurgents, and took

\* Rogniat.

possession of that place and of the bridge over the Gallego. Mortier encountered the Spanish advanced guard at Perdeguera, and pushed it back to Nuestra Señora de Vagallar, where the main body, several thousand strong, was posted, and where, after a short fight, he defeated it, took four guns, and then spreading his troops in a half circle, extending from Huesca to Pina on the Ebro, awed the country between those places and Zaragoza, and checked further insurrection.

Before Lannes arrived, the besieged had been much galled by a mortar battery, situated behind the second parallel of the centre attack, and one Mariano Galindo undertook, with eighty volunteers, to silence it. He surprised the guard of the trenches, and entered the battery, but the French reserve arrived in his front, the guard of the trenches rallied, and, thus surrounded, Galindo, fighting bravely, was wounded and taken, and his comrades perished, with as much glory as simple soldiers can attain to. After this, the armed vessels in the river attempted to flank the batteries raised against the Aljaferia, but the French guns obliged them to retire, and the besiegers' works being carried over the Huerba, in the nights between the 21st and 26th of January, the third parallels of the true attack were completed. The oil manufactory, and other advantageous posts on the left bank of that river, were then incorporated with the lines of approach, and the second parallel of the false attack was commenced at one hundred and fifty yards from the Aljaferia. These advantages were, however, not obtained without pain; for the Spaniards frequently sallied, spiked two guns, and burnt a post on the right of the besiegers' line.

The French fire now broke the walls rapidly; two practicable breaches were opened in front of the San Joseph, a third was commenced in the San Augustin, facing the oil manufactory, a broad way was made into the Santa Engracia, and at twelve o'clock on the 29th of January, four chosen columns, rushing forth from the trenches, burst upon the ruined walls of Zaragoza.

On the right, the assailants twice stormed an isolated stone house that defended the breach of San Augustin, and twice they were driven back with loss.

In the centre, regardless of two small mines that exploded at the foot of the walls, they carried the breach fronting the oil manufactory, and then endeavored to break into the town; but the Spaniards retrenched within the place opened such a fire of grape and musketry, that the French were finally content to establish themselves on the summit of the breach, and to connect their lodgment with the trenches by new works.

The third column was more successful; the breach was carried, and the neighboring houses also, as far as the first large cross street; beyond that the French could not penetrate, but they were enabled to establish themselves within the walls of the town, and immediately brought forward their trenches, so as to comprehend the lodgment within their works.

The fourth column, composed of the Polish soldiers of the *Vistula*, vigorously stormed the *Santa Engracia* and the convent adjoining it; and then, unchecked by the fire from the houses, and undaunted by the explosion of six small mines planted on their path, swept the ramparts to the left, as far as the first bridge on the *Huerba*. The guards of the trenches, excited by this success, now rushed forward tumultuously, mounted the walls, bayoneted the artillery men at the guns in the *Capuchin*, and then continuing their career, endeavored, some to reach the semicircular battery and the *Misericordia*, others to break into the city.

This wild assault was soon checked, by grape from two guns planted behind a traverse on the ramparts, and by a murderous fire from the houses, and as the ranks of the assailants were thinned, their ardor sunk, while the courage of their adversaries increased. The French were driven back upon the *Capuchins*, and the Spaniards were already breaking into that convent in pursuit, when two battalions, detached by General *Morlot* from the trenches of the false attack, arrived, and secured possession of that point, which was moreover untenable by the Spaniards, inasmuch as the guns of the convent of *Santa Engracia* saw it in reverse. The French lost, on this day, more than six hundred men, but *Lacoste* immediately abandoned the false attack against the castle, fortified the *Capuchin* convent and a house situated at an angle of the wall abutting upon the bridge over the *Huerba*, and then joining them by works to his trenches, the ramparts of the town became the front line of the besiegers.

The walls of *Zaragoza* thus went to the ground, but *Zaragoza* herself remained erect, and as the broken girdle fell from the heroic city, the besiegers started at the view of her naked strength. The regular defences had, indeed, crumbled before the skill of the assailants, but the popular resistance was immediately called, with all its terrors, into action! and, as if *Fortune* had resolved to mark the exact moment when the ordinary calculations of science should cease, the chief engineers on both sides were simultaneously slain. The French General, *Lacoste*, a young man, intrepid, skilful, and endowed with genius, perished like a brave soldier. The Spanish Colonel, *San Genis*, died, not only with the honor of a soldier, but

the glory of a patriot. Falling in the noblest cause, his blood stained the ramparts which he had himself raised for the protection of his native place.

### CHAPTER III.

System of terror—The convent of St. Monica taken—Spaniards attempt to retake it, but fail—St. Augustin taken—French change their mode of attack—Spaniards change their mode of defence—Terrible nature of the contest—Convent of Jesus taken on the side of the suburb—Attack of the suburb repulsed—Convent of Francisco taken—Mine exploded under the university fails, and the besieged are repulsed—The Cosso passed—Fresh mines worked under the university, and in six other places—French soldiers dispirited—Lannes encourages them—The houses leading down to the quay carried by storm—An enormous mine under the university being sprung, that building is carried by assault—The suburb is taken—Baron Versage killed, and two thousand Spaniards surrender—Successful attack on the right bank of the Ebro—Palafox demands terms, which are refused—Fire resumed—Miserable condition of the city—Terrible pestilence, and horrible sufferings of the besieged—Zaragoza surrenders—Observations.

THE war being now in the streets of Zaragoza, the sound of the alarm-bell was heard in every quarter; the people crowded into the houses nearest to the lodgments of the enemy, additional barricades were constructed across the principal thoroughfares, mines were prepared in the more open spaces, and the internal communications from house to house were multiplied, until they formed a vast labyrinth, the intricate windings of which were only to be traced by the weapons and the dead bodies of the defenders. The Junta, become more powerful from the cessation of regular warfare, urged the defence with redoubled energy, yet increased the horrors of the siege by a ferocity pushed to the verge of phrensy; every person who excited the suspicions of these furious men, or of those immediately about them, was instantly put to death. Amidst the noble bulwarks of war, a horrid array of gibbets was seen, on which crowds of wretches were each night suspended, because their courage sunk under accumulating dangers, or that some doubtful expression, some gesture of distress, had been misconstrued by their barbarous chiefs.\*

From the height of the walls which he had conquered, Lannes contemplated this terrific scene, and judging that men so passionate and so prepared could not be prudently encountered in open battle, he resolved to proceed by the slow, certain process of the mattock

\* Cavallero.

and the mine;\* this also was in unison with the Emperor's instructions, and hence until the 2d of February, the efforts of the French were only directed to the enlargement of their lodgments on the ramparts. This they effected with severe fighting and by means of explosions, working through the nearest houses, and sustaining many counter-assaults, of which the most noted and furious was made by a friar on the Capuchins' convent.

It has been already observed, that the large streets divided the town into certain small districts, or islands of houses. To gain possession of these, it was necessary not only to mine but to fight for each house; and to cross the great intersecting streets it was indispensable to construct traverses above, or to work by underground galleries; a battery raked each street, and each house was defended by a garrison that, generally speaking, had only the option of repelling the enemy in front or dying on the gibbet erected behind. As long as the convents and churches remained in possession of the Spaniards, the progress of the French among the islands of small houses was of little advantage to them; the strong garrisons in the greater buildings enabled the defenders, not only to make continual and successful sallies, but to countermine their enemies, whose superior skill in that kind of warfare was often frustrated by the numbers and persevering energy of the besieged.

To overcome these obstacles, the batteries opposite the fourth front had breached the convents of Augustin and Santa Monica, and the latter had been taken the 31st of January; for while the attack was hot, a part of the wall in another direction was blown in by a petard, and the besiegers pouring through took the main breach in rear, cleared the convent and several houses behind it. Nevertheless the Spaniards opened a gallery from the Augustins and worked a mine that night under Santa Monica, but the French discovered it and stifled the miners. The next day, the breach in the Augustin becoming practicable, the attention of the defenders was drawn to it, while the French springing a mine, which they had carried under the wall, from the side of Santa Monica, entered by the opening, and the Spaniards, thus again unexpectedly taken in the rear, were easily driven out. Rallying a few hours after, they vainly attempted to retake the structure, and the besiegers then broke into the neighboring houses, and at one push reached the point where the Quemada-street joined the Cosso; but the Spaniards renewed the combat with such a fury, that the French were beaten out of the houses again, and lost more than two hundred men.

On the side of Santa Engracia a contest still more severe took

\* Rogniat.

place; the houses in the vicinity were blown up, yet the Spaniards fought so obstinately for the ruins, that the Polish troops were scarcely able to make good their lodgment—although two successive and powerful explosions had, with the buildings, destroyed a number of the defenders.

The experience of these attacks induced a change in the mode of fighting on both sides. Hitherto the play of the French mines had reduced the houses to ruins, leaving the soldiers exposed to the fire from the next Spanish posts; the engineers, therefore, diminished the quantity of powder, that the interior only might fall and the outward walls stand, and this method was found successful. Whereupon the Spaniards, with ready ingenuity, saturated the timbers of the houses with rosin and pitch, and setting fire to those which could no longer be maintained, interposed a burning barrier, which often delayed the assailants for two days, and always prevented them from pushing their successes during the confusion that necessarily followed the bursting of the mines. The fighting was, however, incessant; a constant bombardment, the explosion of mines, the crash of falling buildings, clamorous shouts, and the continued echo of musketry deafened the ear, while volumes of smoke and dust clouding the atmosphere, lowered continually over the heads of the combatants, as hour by hour the French, with a terrible perseverance, pushed forward their approaches to the heart of the miserable but glorious city.

Their efforts were chiefly directed from two points, namely, Santa Engracia, which may be denominated the left attack, and Saint Augustin, which constituted the right attack. At Santa Engracia they labored on a line perpendicular to the Cosso, from which they were only separated by the large convent of the Daughters of Jerusalem, and by the hospital for madmen, which was intrrenched, although in ruins since the first siege; the line of this attack was protected on the left by the convent of the Capuchins, which Lacoste had fortified to repel the counter-assaults of the Spaniards. The attack from the Augustin was more diffused, because the localities presented less prominent features to determine the direction of the approaches. But the French, having mounted a number of light six-inch mortars, on peculiar carriages, drew them from street to street, and house to house, as occasion offered; on the other hand the Spaniards continually plied their enemies with hand grenades, which seem to have produced a surprising effect. In this manner the never-ceasing combat was prolonged until the 7th of February, when the besiegers, by dint of alternate mines and assaults, had worked their perilous way at either attack to the

Cosso, yet not without several changes of fortune and considerable loss; and they were not able to obtain a footing on that public walk, for the Spaniards still disputed every house with undiminished resolution. Meanwhile, Lannes, having caused trenches to be opened on the left bank of the Ebro, played twenty guns against an isolated structure called the Convent of Jesus, which covered the right of the suburb line; on the 7th of February this convent was carried by storm, with so little difficulty that the French, supposing the Spaniards to be panic-stricken, entered the suburb itself, but were quickly driven back; they, however, made good their lodgment in the convent.

On the town side the 8th, 9th, and 10th were wasted by the besiegers in vain attempts to pass the Cosso. They then extended their flanks; to the right with a view to reach the quay, and so connect this attack with that against the suburb; to the left to obtain possession of the large and strongly built convent of St. Francisco, in which, after exploding an immense mine and making two assaults, they finally established themselves.

The 11th and 12th, mines, in the line of the right attack, were exploded under the university, a large building on the Spanish side of the Cosso, yet their play was insufficient to open the walls, and the storming party was beaten, with the loss of fifty men. Nevertheless, the besiegers continuing their labors during the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th, passed the Cosso by means of traverses, and prepared fresh mines under the university, yet deferred their explosion until a simultaneous effort could be combined on the side of the suburb. At the left attack also, a number of houses, bordering on the Cosso, being gained, a battery was established that raked that great thoroughfare above ground, while under it six galleries were carried, and six mines loaded to explode at the same moment.

But the spirit of the French army was now exhausted. They had labored and fought without intermission for fifty days; they had crumbled the walls with their bullets, burst the convents with their mines, and carried the breaches with their bayonets; fighting above and beneath the surface of the earth, they had spared neither fire nor sword; their bravest men were falling in the obscurity of a subterranean warfare, famine pinched them, and Zaragoza was still unconquered.

"Before this siege, they exclaimed, "was it ever known that twenty thousand men should besiege fifty thousand? Scarcely a fourth of the town is won, and we are already exhausted. We must wait for reinforcements, or we shall all perish among these cursed

ruins, which will become our own tombs, before we can force the last of these fanatics from the last of their dens."\*

Marshal Lannes, unshaken by these murmurs, and obstinate to conquer, endeavored to raise the soldiers' hopes. He told them that the losses of the besieged so far exceeded their own, that the Spaniards' strength would soon be exhausted and their courage sink, that the fierceness of their defence was already abating; and that if, contrary to expectation, they should renew the example of Numantia, their utter destruction must quickly be effected, by the united evils of battle, pestilence, and misery. His exhortations were successful, and on the 18th of February, all combinations being completed, a general assault took place.

The French at the right attack opened a party-wall by the explosion of a petard, made a sudden rush through some burning ruins, and then carried, without a check, the whole island of houses leading down to the quay, with the exception of two buildings; the Spaniards were thus forced to abandon all the external fortifications between St. Augustin and the Ebro, which they had preserved until that day. During this assault the mines under the university containing three thousand pounds of powder were sprung, and the walls tumbling with a terrific crash, a column of the besiegers entered the place, and after one repulse secured a lodgment. Meanwhile fifty pieces of artillery thundered upon the suburb, ploughed up the bridge over the Ebro, and by midday opened a practicable breach in the great convent of Saint Lazar, which was the principal defence on that side. Lannes, observing that the Spaniards seemed to be shaken by this overwhelming fire, ordered an assault there also, and Saint Lazar being carried forthwith, the retreat to the bridge was thus intercepted, and the besieged falling into confusion, and their commander, Baron Versage, being killed, were all destroyed or taken, with the exception of three hundred men, who, braving the terrible fire to which they were exposed, got back into the town. General Gazan immediately occupied the abandoned works, and having thus cut off more than two thousand men that were stationed on the Ebro, above the suburb, forced them also to surrender.

This important success being followed, on the 19th, by another fortunate attack on the right bank of the Ebro, and by the devastating explosion of sixteen hundred pounds of powder, the constancy of the besieged was at last shaken. An aide-de-camp of Palafox came forth to demand certain terms, before offered by the Marshal, adding thereto, that the garrison should be allowed to join the Spanish armies, and that a certain number of covered

\* Rogniat.

carriages should follow them. Lannes rejected these proposals, and the fire continued, but the hour of surrender was come! Fifty pieces of artillery on the left bank of the Ebro laid the houses on the quay in ruins. The church of Our Lady of the Pillar, under whose especial protection the city was supposed to exist, was nearly effaced by the bombardment, and six mines under the Cosso, loaded with many thousand pounds of powder, were ready for a simultaneous explosion, which would have laid a quarter of the remaining houses in dust. In fine, war had done its work, and the misery of Zaragoza could no longer be endured.

The bombardment, which had never ceased since the 10th of January, had forced the women and children to take refuge in the vaults, with which the city abounded; there the constant combustion of oil, the closeness of the atmosphere, unusual diet, and fear and restlessness of mind, had combined to produce a pestilence which soon spread to the garrison. The strong and the weak, the daring soldier and the shrinking child, fell before it alike; and such was the state of the atmosphere and the predisposition to disease, that the slightest wound gangrened and became incurable. In the beginning of February the daily deaths were from four to five hundred; the living were unable to bury the dead; and thousands of carcasses, scattered about the streets and court-yards, or piled in heaps at the doors of the churches, were left to dissolve in their own corruption, or to be licked up by the flames of the burning houses as the defence became contracted. The suburb, the greatest part of the walls, and one fourth of the houses were in the hands of the French; sixteen thousand shells, thrown during the bombardment, and the explosion of forty-five thousand pounds of powder in the mines, had shaken the city to its foundations, and the bones of more than forty thousand persons of every age and sex, bore dreadful testimony to the constancy of the besieged.\*

Palafox was sick, and of the plebeian chiefs, the curate of St. Gil, the lemonade seller of the Cosso, and the Tios, Jorge and Marin, having been slain in battle, or swept away by the pestilence, the obdurate violence of the remaining leaders was so abated, that a fresh junta was formed, and after a stormy consultation, the majority being for a surrender, a deputation waited upon Marshal Lannes on the 20th of February, to negotiate a capitulation. They proposed that the garrison should march out with the honors of war; that the peasantry should not be considered as prisoners; and at the particular request of the clergy, they also demanded that the latter should have their full revenues guaranteed to them, and punctually paid. This article was rejected with indignation, and,

\* Cavallero. Rogniat. Suchet.

according to the French writers, the place surrendered at discretion; but the Spanish writers assert, that Lannes granted certain terms, drawn up by the deputation at the moment, the name of Ferdinand the 7th being purposely omitted in the instrument, which in substance ran thus:—

The garrison to march out with the honors of war; to be constituted prisoners, and marched to France; the officers to retain their swords, baggage, and horses; the men their knapsacks; persons of either class, wishing to serve Joseph, to be immediately enrolled in his ranks; the peasants to be sent to their homes; property and religion to be guaranteed.

With this understanding the deputies returned to the city, where fresh commotions had arisen during their absence. The party for protracting the defence, although the least numerous, were the most energetic; they had before seized all the boats on the Ebro, fearing that Palafox and others, of whom they entertained suspicions, would endeavor to quit the town; and they were still so menacing and so powerful, that the deputies, not daring to pass through the streets, retired outside the walls to the castle of Aljferia, and from thence sent notice to the junta of their proceedings. The dissentient party would, however, have fallen upon the others the next day, if the junta had not taken prompt measures to enforce the surrender; the officer in command of the walls near the castle, by their orders, gave up his post to the French during the night, and on the 21st of February, from twelve to fifteen thousand sickly beings laid down those arms which they were scarcely able to handle, and this cruel and memorable siege was finished.

OBSERVATIONS.—1. When the other events of the Spanish war shall be lost in the obscurity of time, or only traced by disconnected fragments, the story of Zaragoza, like some ancient triumphal pillar standing amidst ruins, will tell a tale of past glory, and already men point to the heroic city, and call her Spain, as if her spirit were common to the whole nation; yet it was not so, nor was the defence of Zaragoza itself the effect of unalloyed virtue. It was not patriotism, nor was it courage, nor skill, nor fortitude, nor a system of terror, but all these combined under peculiar circumstances, that upheld the defence; and this combination, and how it was brought about, should be well considered; for it is not so much by catching at the leading resemblances, as by studying the differences of great affairs, that the exploits of one age can be made to serve as models for another.

2. The defence of Zaragoza may be examined under two points of view—as an isolated event, and as a transaction bearing on the general struggle in the Peninsula. With respect to the

latter, it was a manifest proof, that neither the Spanish people nor the government partook of the Zaragozaan energy. It would be absurd to suppose that, in the midst of eleven millions of people animated by an ardent enthusiasm, fifty thousand armed men could for two months be besieged, shut in, destroyed, they and their works, houses and bodies mingled in one terrible ruin, by less than thirty-five thousand adversaries, without one effort being made to save them! Deprive the transaction of its dazzling colors, and the outline comes to this: Thirty-five thousand French, in the midst of insurrections, did, in despite of a combination of circumstances peculiarly favorable to the defence, reduce fifty thousand of the bravest and most energetic men in Spain. It is true, the latter suffered nobly; but was their example imitated? Gerona, indeed, although less celebrated, rivalled, and perhaps more than rivalled, the glory of Zaragoza; elsewhere her fate spoke, not trumpet-tongued to arouse, but with a wailing voice, that carried dismay to the heart of the nation.

3. As an isolated transaction, the siege of Zaragoza is very remarkable, yet it would be a great error to suppose that any town, the inhabitants of which were equally resolute, might be as well defended. Fortune and bravery will do much, but the combinations of science are not to be defied with impunity. There are no miracles in war! If the houses of Zaragoza had not been nearly incombustible, the bombardment alone would have caused the besieged to surrender, or to perish with their flaming city.

4. That the advantages offered by the peculiar structure of the houses, and the number of convents and churches, were ably seized by the Spaniards, is beyond doubt. General Rogniat, Lacoste's successor, treats his opponents' skill in fortification with contempt; but Colonel San Genis' talents are not to be judged of by the faulty construction of a few out-works, at a time when he was under the control of a disorderly and ferocious mob; he knew how to adapt his system of defence to the circumstances of the moment, and no stronger proof of real genius can be given. "Do not consult me about a capitulation," was his common expression. "*I shall never be of opinion that Zaragoza can make no further defence.*" Yet neither the talents of San Genis nor the construction of the houses would have availed, if the people within had not been of a temper adequate to the occasion; and to trace the passions by which they were animated to their true causes is a proper subject for historical and military research. That they did not possess any superior courage is evident from the facts: the besieged, although twice the number of the besiegers, never made any serious impression by their sallies, and they were unable to

defend the breaches. In large masses, the standard of courage which is established by discipline, may be often inferior to that produced by fanaticism or any other peculiar excitement; but the latter never lasts long, neither is it equitable, because men are of different susceptibility, following their physical and mental conformation; hence a system of terror has always been the resource of those leaders who, being engaged in great undertakings, were unable to recur to discipline. Enthusiasm stalked in front of their bands, but punishment brought up the rear, and Zaragoza was no exception to this practice.

5. It may be said that, the majority of the besieged not being animated by any peculiar fury, a system of terror could not be carried to any great length; a close examination explains this seeming mystery. The defenders were composed of three distinct parties,—the regular troops, the peasantry from the country, and the citizens; the citizens, who had most to lose, were naturally the fiercest, and, accordingly, amongst them the system of terror was generated. The peasantry followed the example, as all ignorant men, under no regular control, will do. The soldiers meddled but little in the interior arrangements, and the division of the town into islands of posts rendered it perfectly feasible for violent persons, already possessed of authority, to follow the bent of their inclinations: there was no want of men, and the garrisons of each island found it their own interest to keep those in front of them to their posts, that the danger might be the longer staved off from themselves.

6. Palafox was only the nominal chief of Zaragoza; the laurels gathered in both sieges should adorn plebeian brows, but those laurels dripped with kindred as well as foreign blood. The energy of the real chiefs, and the cause in which that energy was exerted, may be admired; the acts perpetrated were, in themselves, atrocious, and Palafox, although unable to arrest their savage proceedings, can claim but little credit for his own conduct. For more than a month preceding the surrender, he never came forth of a vaulted building, which was impervious to shells, and in which there is too much reason to believe that he and others, of both sexes, lived in a state of sensuality, forming a disgusting contrast to the wretchedness that surrounded them.

#### OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRENCH OPERATIONS.

1. Before the arrival of Marshal Lannes, these operations were conducted with little vigor. The want of unity, as to time, in the double attack of the Monte Torrero and the suburb, was a flagrant

error, which was not redeemed by any subsequent activity. After the arrival of that Marshal, the siege was pursued with singular intrepidity and firmness; and although General Rogniat appears to disapprove of Suchet's division having been sent to Calatayud, it seems to have been a judicious measure, inasmuch as it was necessary,—1. To protect the line of correspondence with Madrid. 2. To have a corps at hand, lest the Duke of Infantado should quit Cuença, and throw himself into the Guadalaxara district, a movement that would have been extremely embarrassing to the King. Suchet's division, while at Calatayud, fulfilled these objects, without losing the power of succoring Tudela, or of intercepting the Duke of Infantado if he attempted to raise the siege of Zaragoza; but, when the Spanish army at Cuença was directed to Ucles, and that the Marquis of Lazan was gathering strength on the left bank of the Ebro, it was undoubtedly proper to recall Suchet.

2. It may not be misplaced here to point out the errors of Infantado's operations. If, instead of bringing on a battle with the first corps, he had marched to the Ebro, established his *dépôts*, and placed arms at Mequinenza and Lerida, opened a communication with Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and joined the Marquis of Lazan's troops to his own; he might have formed an intrenched camp in the Sierra de Alcubierre, and from thence have carried on a methodical war with, at least, twenty-five thousand regular troops. The insurrections on the French flanks and line of communication with Pampeluna would then have become formidable, and, in this situation, having the fortresses of Catalonia behind him, with activity and prudence he might have raised the siege.

3. From a review of all the circumstances attending the siege of Zaragoza, we may conclude that fortune was extremely favorable to the French. They were brave, persevering, and skilful, and they did not lose above four thousand men; but their success, partly resulting from the errors of their opponents, was principally due to the destruction caused by the pestilence within the town; for, of all that multitude said to have fallen, six thousand Spaniards only were slain in battle; and although thirteen convents and churches had been taken, yet, when the town surrendered, forty remained to be forced!\*

Such were the principal circumstances of this memorable siege. I shall now relate the contemporary operations in Catalonia.

\* Rogniat.

## CHAPTER IV.

Operations in Catalonia—St Cyr commands the seventh corps—Passes the frontier—State of Catalonia—Palacios fixes his head-quarters at Villa Franca—Duhesme forces the line of the Llobregat—Returns to Barcelona—English army from Sicily designed to act in Catalonia—Prevented by Murat—Duhesme forages El Vallés—Action of San Cugat—General Vives supersedes Palacios—Spanish army augments—Blockade of Barcelona—Siege of Rosas—Folly and negligence of the Junta—Intrenchments in the town carried by the besiegers—Marquis of Lazan, with six thousand men, reaches Gerona—Lord Cochrane enters the Trinity—Repulses several assaults—Citadel surrenders 5th December—St. Cyr marches on Barcelona—Crosses the Ter—Deceives Lazan—Turns Hostalrich—Defeats Milans at San Celoni—Battle of Cardadeu—Caldagnes retires behind the Llobregat—Negligence of Duhesme—Battle of Molino del Rey.

## OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

It will be remembered, that when the second siege of Gerona was raised, in August, 1808, General Duhesme returned to Barcelona, and General Reille to Figueras, after which the state of affairs obliged those generals to remain on the defensive. Napoleon's measures to aid them were as prompt as the occasion required; for while the siege of Gerona was yet in progress, he had directed troops to assemble at Perpignan in such numbers as to form, with those already in Catalonia, an army of more than forty thousand men, to be called the "7th corps," and to be commanded by General Gouvion St. Cyr, to whom he gave this short but emphatic order: "*Preserve Barcelona for me. If that place be lost, I cannot retake it with 80,000 men.*"\*

The troops assembled at Perpignan were, the greatest part, raw levies—Neapolitans, Etruscans, Romans, and Swiss, mixed, however, with some old regiments; but as the preparations for the grand army under the Emperor absorbed the principal attention of the administration in France, General St. Cyr was straitened in the means necessary to take the field, and his undisciplined troops, suffering severe privations, were depressed in spirit, and inclined to desert. On the 1st of November, Napoleon, who was at Bayonne, sent orders to the "7th corps" to commence operations; St. Cyr, therefore, put his division in motion on the 3d, and crossing the frontier, established his head-quarters at Figueras on the 5th.

Meanwhile in Catalonia, as in other parts of Spain, lethargic vanity, and abuses of the most fatal kind, had succeeded the first enthusiasm and withered the energy of the people. The local Junta had, indeed, issued abundance of decrees, and despatched agents to the Supreme Junta, and to the English commanders in the

\* St. Cyr's Journal of Operations.