

ness, he was in like manner capable of any folly. But with what was France to purchase the services of one whose greediest desires were gratified? If Godoy had not felt and thought like his sovereign, he could not so entirely have obtained his confidence; now the disposition of the King could not be doubtful. Charles had been compelled to abandon the coalition, and ally himself with France, but he acted from his heart when he entered into that coalition, not when he withdrew from it. For the example of the French revolution could not but be regarded with fear by all crowned heads, and especially by those who were conscious that the state of their own kingdoms cried aloud for reform; and even when the frenzy fit of that revolution subsided, and anarchy in natural progress had ended in military despotism, it was not possible that princes who reigned by hereditary right should behold without secret apprehensions the establishment of a new dynasty upon an ancient throne. At the first gleam of hope the court of Spain ventured to indicate its disposition: when Prussia began that war which the peace of Tilsit terminated, a rash proclamation was issued at Madrid, exhorting the nation not to be dismayed, for it yet possessed great resources, and a powerful armament was about to be formed. This proclamation Buonaparte received upon the field of battle at Jena, and from that hour, as he afterwards declared, swore in his heart that the Spaniards should dearly abide it. That deep determination was, however, carefully dissembled. The French ambassador presented a strong remonstrance upon the occasion, in reply to which, Godoy made the sorry excuse that the preparations were intended against an apprehended attack from the Emperor of Morocco. Shallow as this pretence was, it was allowed to pass, and no other immediate consequence ensued.

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Disposition to join with the allies before the peace of Tilsit.

De Praat. Memoires sur la Revolution d'Espagne, p. 15.

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*The Prince
of Astu-
rias inimical
to Godoy.*

*Parties in
favour of
the French.*

While Charles and his favourite were vainly wishing to free themselves from the yoke of France, that very disposition on their part induced the Prince of Asturias to regard Buonaparte with complacency and hope. The father's favourite has seldom been the minister of the son. Those Spaniards who were excluded from any share in public affairs under the administration of Godoy, looked naturally to the Prince, and formed a party round him, in which men of the most opposite elements were combined. When the French revolution began, the young and the ardent in Spain, as in the rest of Europe, eagerly adopted principles which promised a new and happier order of things: they were comparatively far less numerous than in any other country, partly because of the state of the press, still more because of the feeling and devotion with which this nation is attached to its religion and all its forms. There were, however, many, and those of the best of the Spaniards, who hoped to obtain that reformation in their government by the assistance of France, which without such assistance they knew it would not only be hopeless, but fatal to attempt. The attachment which they had formed to the French republic, many of these men transferred to the French empire, with an inconsistency so gross and monstrous, that it might seem impossible, if we had not seen it exemplified among ourselves: having, because of their principles, at first acquired a party feeling, they deluded themselves by supposing that in serving their party they promoted their principles, till at last they had no other principle than the mere party interest itself. Another class of Spaniards had been hostile to the French revolution till its character was changed by Buonaparte: they felt no dislike to the system of his government, because they were accustomed to despotism, and the acts of personal atrocity which he had committed did not

sufficiently alarm them. The unhappy circumstance with which the English war had commenced, irritated them against Great Britain, and that sentiment of indignation naturally biassed them toward France. There were some of a third description, who had neither heart nor understanding to feel for the honour, or to wish for any improvement in the state of their native land, but who desired a change for the mere sake of acquiring authority: these men were enemies to the Prince of the Peace, not for his vices, his injustice, and his political misconduct; they hated him because they envied him, and wished to exercise a like tyranny themselves.

The people felt the degradation of Spain, and imputed to Godoy not only their present difficulties, but the whole train of inveterate evils under which the country was groaning. Never had any former favourite been so universally detested. His administration would have been instantly at an end, if the Prince's party could have appealed to public opinion; but being precluded by the nature of a despotic government from any other means of attempting his overthrow than those of intrigue*, and

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Unpopularity of Godoy.

* In the year 1796 Godoy was denounced to the Inquisition by three friars, as being suspected of atheism, he not having confessed or communicated in his proper church for eight years, as having two wives living, and leading a scandalous life with many other women. This was a court intrigue, planned by D. Antonio Despuig, Archbishop of Seville, and afterwards cardinal, and by D. Rafael de Murquez, queen's confessor, and titular archbishop of Seleucia. The inquisitor-general, Lorenzana (archbishop of Toledo), was afraid to interfere; they assured him that the king would consent to the proceedings when it was shown him that Godoy was an atheist; and Despuig applied to the pope through the nuncio, that Lorenzana might be reprovved for his timidity, and enjoined to act. The pope accordingly wrote to the inquisitor-general; his courier was intercepted at Genoa by the French, and Buonaparte sent the letters to Godoy, as a means of consolidating the recent friendship between the Directory and the court of Spain. The two archbishops in consequence were sent out of the kingdom

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*The French
ambassador
advises the
prince to so-
licit an al-
liance with
Buona-
parte's
family.*

knowing that all intrigues against him at their own court would be dangerous, as well as ineffectual, they hoped to accomplish this object by help of a foreign power. The Prince being a widower, Beauharnois, the French ambassador at Madrid, seeing the disposition of the government to shake off its subjection to France, and that of Ferdinand and his friends to get the administration of affairs into their hands through the influence of France, hinted to him how advantageous it would be to connect himself by marriage with the new imperial family. Whether he was instructed to invite a proposal to this effect or not, it is believed that he acted with perfect good faith, and indeed he might well have imagined that in so doing he acted for the interest of both countries. It was at this time generally believed in Spain that Buonaparte, being justly offended with Godoy for the intention which he had manifested before the battle of Jena, would insist upon his dismissal from the government. The friends of Ferdinand therefore never doubted but that he would gladly contract the proposed alliance with the heir of the Spanish monarchy, a connection which would at once gratify his pride, strengthen his power, and secure a wavering ally. The better men of this party seem also to have been persuaded, that under the protection of Buonaparte they might relieve the country from some of its manifold grievances; nor would this persuasion have been unreasonable, if any ties could have restrained the merciless ambition of the man in whom they confided. For though it might be his policy now to keep Spain in her present weakness,

under a pretext of paying a visit of condolence to the pope. These facts are stated by Llorente in his History of the Inquisition (chap. 39). Llorente had been secretary to that abominable tribunal, and in writing its history, had none of those motives for perverting the truth which influenced him when writing under the name of M. Nellereto.

and consequent dependence, yet when his own blood acquired an interest in the prosperity of that kingdom, it might fairly be expected that those salutary changes which were essential to its welfare would be promoted by him, and peaceably effected under his auspices.

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Influenced by such considerations, the Prince addressed a secret letter to Buonaparte. It had long, he said, been his most earnest desire to express, at least by writing, the sentiments of respect, of esteem, and of attachment which he had vowed to a hero who eclipsed all those that preceded him, and whom Providence had sent to preserve Europe from the total subversion with which it was threatened, to secure her shaken thrones, and to restore peace and happiness to the nations. He was unhappy enough to be compelled by circumstances to conceal so just and laudable an action as if it were a crime, . . . such were the fatal consequences of the excessive goodness of the best of kings. His father was endowed with the most upright and generous heart; but artful and wicked persons too often took advantage of such a disposition to disguise the truth from their sovereigns, and none but the Emperor Napoleon could detect the schemes of such perfidious counsellors, open the eyes of his dearly beloved parents, render them happy, and provide at the same time for his happiness, and for that of the Spaniards. "Therefore," said the Prince, "I implore with the utmost confidence your majesty's paternal protection, to the end that you will not only deign to accord me the honour of allying me with your family, but that you will smooth all the difficulties, and remove all the obstacles which might oppose this object of my wishes." When Buonaparte was thus entreated by the Prince to lend his influence for the removal of Godoy, he was carrying on secret negotiations with that favourite. Long before he received this letter, he had determined upon seizing Spain; his measures for

11 Oct.

*The prince
applies se-
cretly to
Buona-
parte.*

*Buonaparte
intends to
seize the
Peninsula.*

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Spanish troops sent to the North of Europe, and to Tuscany.

The first step toward the accomplishment of his design, was to remove the best troops from Spain; and accordingly, at the requisition of the French government, in conformity to treaty, 16,000 men, the flower of the Spanish army, were marched into the North of Germany, under the Marquis de Romana, and another division into Tuscany, under D. Gonzalo O'Farrill. The next business was to introduce French troops into Spain, and for this the occupation of Portugal afforded a pretext. Buonaparte, who was regardless of all other engagements, however solemnly contracted, was always, as far as his power extended, faithful to his vows of vengeance. Exasperated by the service which the Portugueze ships had rendered in blockading Malta, he had said in one of his Egyptian proclamations, that there would come a time when the Portugueze should pay with tears of blood for the affront which they had offered to the French republic. Heavy payments of a different kind had already been exacted. During many years the Prince of Brazil had submitted to insults which he had no means of resenting, and from time to time had bought off at a heavy price the threat of invasion, in the hope of preserving his kingdom by these expedients till peace should be restored to Europe. So often had these threats been renewed, and these respites purchased, that Portugal incurred the burden and the shame of paying tribute, without obtaining the security

Condition of the Portugueze government.

of a tributary state. Upon this, however, that poor government relied. They thought themselves safe because France obtained greater sums from them in this manner than could be drawn from Portugal as a conquered country; because much of the treasure from Spanish America, so large a portion of which found its way into France, reached Europe in safety by the assistance of the Portugueze; and because they had every reason to suppose that if an attack upon them should at any time be seriously intended, the court of Madrid would use its utmost influence to avert their danger for its own sake. Could any reliance have been placed either upon the understanding or the honour of the Spanish king, upon royal and national faith, the plainest common interest, and the closest ties of alliance, the Portugueze government would have reasoned justly. But Charles IV. was one of the weakest of sovereigns; his favourite had obtained the administration for his vices, not for his talents, which were of the meanest order; and it was easy for Buonaparte to deal with such men, and make them at once the instruments and the victims of his ambition.

A month after the peace of Tilsit had been concluded, the French and Spanish ambassadors jointly informed the court of Lisbon that it must shut its ports to England, arrest the English subjects, and confiscate the English property in Portugal, or expose itself to an immediate war with France and Spain; if these propositions were not complied with, they were instructed to leave the country in three weeks. Without waiting for the reply, Buonaparte seized the Portugueze ships in his harbours. The crisis was now manifestly at hand; there no longer remained a hope of purchasing farther respite, and in the state to which the army had been reduced by long misrule, resistance was not thought of. The court of Portugal was weak even to helplessness, but it had the advantage of perfectly understanding

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August.
Portugal re-
quired to act
against
England.

CHAP. II. 1807. the character of the two powers between which it was compelled to choose; knowing that every forbearance might be expected on the part of England, and on the part of France every thing that was oppressive and iniquitous. In full reliance therefore upon the justice and long tried friendship of Great Britain, the Prince informed the French government that he would consent to shut his ports, but that neither his principles of morality nor of religion would permit him to seize the persons and property of the British subjects, in violation of treaties and of the law of nations. At the same time the English were apprized that they would do well to wind up their affairs as speedily as possible, and leave the kingdom. A Portugueze squadron happened to be cruising against the Algerines, and the necessity of keeping on good terms with England till this should have re-entered the Tagus, was urged as a reason for temporising awhile, to which Buonaparte, eager as he was for ships, was likely to listen more readily than to any other plea. It was held out to him also, that as hostilities must be expected from England in case the rigour of the terms upon which France insisted were enforced, it would be prudent to send out the young Prince of Beira to Brazil, while the seas were still open, that his presence might secure the fidelity of the colonies.

Champagny's report, in L. Goldsmith, v. iii. p. 253-255.

Preparation for occupying Portugal.

The Portugueze ministers at Paris and Madrid have been accused of having betrayed their country at this time; more probably they were deceived and perplexed, and knew not how to advise; and thus the Portugueze government was left to act without any other information of the proceedings of the two hostile courts, than what it obtained from common rumour, or through the circuitous channel of England. Buonaparte's intention was to secure the persons of the royal family if possible, but at all events to take possession of Portugal: this point was essential to his ulterior views. For this purpose a force had been collected under the

title of the Army of Observation of the Gironde, . . . a title which may have been intended to intimidate the government of Spain, for it was not even pretended that France could have any danger to apprehend in that quarter. Junot, who had been ambassador at Lisbon, was appointed to the command, and he was on the way to Bayonne before the term expired which had been allowed to Portugal to choose its part. The Prince was prepared to make every sacrifice of interest and of feeling, so he might thereby save the country from an attack: the misery which the expulsion of the English, and the consequent loss of a flourishing and extensive commerce, must bring upon Lisbon and upon the whole kingdom, was yet less dreadful than the horrors of invasion at a time when defence appeared impracticable. He determined therefore, at the last, to comply with the demands of the besotted court of Spain, and of the tyrant who directed its suicidal measures, but not till the last. The French and Spanish legations were suffered to retire, because nothing but the last extremity could induce him, even in appearance, to commit an act of cruelty toward the English. When these legations withdrew, the British residents were at the same time preparing with all speed for their compulsory departure: and so little did the Prince feel assured that he could preserve the country in peace by total submission to the iniquitous terms which were pressed upon it, that circular instructions were dispatched to the bishops and the heads of the religious orders, requiring them to register the plate of the churches, and send it to Lisbon or other places appointed for security.

While the Prince and his ministers were in this state of lamentable suspense, a secret treaty between France and Spain for the partition of Portugal was signed at Fontainebleau. By this extraordinary treaty, the King of Etruria ceding his Italian possessions in full and entire sovereignty to Buonaparte,

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*The French
and Spanish
ambassadors
leave
Lisbon.*

*Secret treaty
of Fontaine-
bleau.*

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was to have the province of Entre Minho e Douro, with the city of Porto for its capital, erected into a kingdom for him, under the title of Northern Lusitania. Alentejo and Algarve were in like manner to be given to Godoy*, in entire property and sovereignty, with the title of Prince of the Algarves; the other Portuguese provinces were to be held in sequestration till a general peace, at which time, if they were restored to the house of Braganza, in exchange for Gibraltar, Trinidad, and other colonies which the English had conquered, the new sovereign was, like the King of Northern Lusitania and the Prince of the Algarves, to hold his dominions by investiture from the King of Spain, to acknowledge him as protector, and never to make peace or war without his consent. The two contracting powers were to agree upon an equal partition of the colonial possessions of Portugal; and Buonaparte engaged to recognize his Catholic Majesty as Emperor of the Two Americas, when every thing should be ready for his assuming that title, which might be either at a general peace, or at farthest within three years therefrom; and he guaranteed to him the possession of his dominions on the continent of Europe south of the Pyrenees.

A secret convention, which was concluded at the same time, agreed upon the means for carrying this nefarious treaty into effect. Twenty-five thousand French infantry and 3000 cavalry were to enter Spain, and march directly for Lisbon; they were to be joined by 8000 Spanish infantry and 3000 cavalry, with

* No additional infamy can possibly be heaped upon Don Manuel Godoy; it ought however to be mentioned, that the minion who thus planned the destruction of the kingdom of Portugal, in order to obtain a new principality for himself, was, at this very time, a noble of that kingdom, by the title of Conde de Evora-Monte, and enjoyed a pension from the crown. This was conferred upon him by an *Alvara* of Feb. 5th, 1797, in which the Queen calls him "My Cousin."