

behaved better than the Spanish ; and General Giron, with a natural and becoming feeling, had been very desirous that this last exploit should fall to their part. The garrison at Passages, 150 in number, surrendered on the same day to Longa, and on the following the garrison of Guetaria, being blockaded by land, evacuated the town and fort, and went by sea to St. Sebastian's. Castro de Urdiales, the scene of General Foy's atrocities, had been abandoned the day after the battle of Vittoria, the British squadron having cut off the garrison from all supplies by sea, and the Spaniards by land. A British vessel heaving opportunely in sight, the commandant withdrew precipitately, without destroying his artillery and powder, or injuring the castle. A few old women were the only survivors in the town, and their tale of the barbarities which the French and Italian troops had committed there is too dreadful for recital ; there is, however, a satisfaction in recording that fourteen of the perpetrators were among the prisoners taken at Bilbao, and were deservedly put to death. The garrison got by sea to Santona, that and St. Sebastian's being the only points which the enemy now occupied upon that coast. The French had left 700 men in Pancorbo, a post commanding a ravine through which the high road from Burgos to Vittoria passes. The Andalusian army of reserve, under the Conde de Abisbal, was on its way to join the main force. Lord Wellington requested him to make himself master of the town and lower works, and blockade, as closely as he could, the castle, which is situated on a high rock. Abisbal assaulted and took the town and the fort of Santa Marta on the 28th ; and cutting off the garrison in the castle from the spring which supplied them with water, compelled them to surrender two days afterwards, when in all other respects they were well provided for a regular defence.

General Clausel's corps, consisting of part of the army of the north, and one division of the army of Portugal, 14,000 in all,

CHAP.  
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*Passages is  
surren-  
dered.*

*Castro  
abandoned  
by the  
enemy.*

*Pancorbo  
taken.*

*Clausel re-  
tires to Za-  
ragoza.*

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June.

had been recalled from its operations against Mina to join the collected force of the Intruder. Coming in a direction which none of the fugitives had taken, he approached Vittoria the day after the battle, and finding that city in possession of Major-General Pakenham's division, which had just arrived there, and having no means of communicating with the routed army, he retired immediately towards Logroño. There he halted, hoping to obtain information whereby to direct his movements; and Lord Wellington thinking there was some prospect of intercepting his retreat, moved three divisions towards Tudela, and the 5th and 6th from Vittoria and Salvatierra towards Logroño. Clausel, who was at this time harassed by the indefatigable Mina, and by Don Julian Sanchez with his regiment of cavalry, left Logroño on the 24th, taking with him the garrison of that place, and marching on the left bank of the Ebro, crossed it by the bridge at Lodosa, and reached Calahorra on the following day. On the next he arrived at Tudela; but the Alcalde of that city informed him that the allies were on the road to meet him, upon which he marched toward Zaragoza, taking with him this garrison also.

*Preparations for the siege of Pamplona.*

Sir Rowland meantime following the main body of the defeated army on their retreat over the Pyrenees, dislodged them from every point which they attempted to hold, and obtained possession of the passes of S. Esteban, Donna Maria, Maya, and Roncesvalles. It was now Lord Wellington's intention to besiege Pamplona; with this intent the heavy guns and stores for the siege were brought from Santander to Deba, a little town to the westward of S. Sebastian's; there they were landed, and cows and bullocks had been collected for transporting them to the trenches: but the intelligence which Lord Wellington received from the Anglo-Sicilian army rendered it necessary to give up this intention, and every thing therefore was reshipped.

## CHAPTER XLIV.

OPERATIONS OF THE ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY. RECOVERY OF  
ZARAGOZA. SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN'S. BATTLES OF THE  
PYRENEES.

IT was part of Lord Wellington's plan that Marshal Suchet should be engaged on the eastern coast by the Anglo-Sicilian army, and thus prevented from sending assistance to the French in Aragon and on the upper Ebro. His position upon the line of the Xucar was too strong to be attacked in front by the force under Sir John Murray's command, or acting in concert with him; and a movement by Requena and Utiel upon their right flank, and by Tortosa and Lerida towards the rear, seemed as hazardous as it would have been circuitous and difficult. A naval expedition remained for consideration: and if a vigorous attack were made either upon Tarragona or Rosas, Suchet's attention must necessarily be drawn thither, so that he could give no aid to the armies in the north, and must leave the open part of the kingdom of Valencia to the Spaniards. Tarragona was preferred as the point of attack, and Sir John was instructed to embark with that view. If he should succeed in his attempt against that place, an establishment would be secured on the coast north of the Ebro, so as to open a communication with the Spanish army in Catalonia; but this was a question of time and means, and if

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*Expedition  
from Ali-  
cante.*

*April 14.*

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Suchet should be strong enough in Catalonia to frustrate the attempt, Sir John was directed in that case to return immediately, and land as far north in the kingdom of Valencia as he could, and there join with the right of the Spanish armies, to assist them in profiting by the opportunity which Suchet's absence and the withdrawal of a considerable part of his force from the Xucar might be expected to afford.

The expedition was to have been kept secret; but the preparations which were made at Alicante for the embarkation of a considerable corps could not be concealed, and Suchet was speedily informed of them. Already he had apprehended, by a movement of the Spaniards from La Mancha upon Cuenca, and of Villacampa from the frontiers of Aragon upon the upper Guadalaviar, that it was intended by a combined operation to compel him to evacuate Valencia; but as at that time Clausel's activity relieved him from any inquietude with regard to Mina, he was enabled to withdraw a division from Aragon, and to place Pannetier's brigade between Tortosa and Valencia, that he might direct it upon whatever point should be threatened, without leaving the line of the Xucar exposed.

*Col de Balaguertaken by the Anglo-Sicilian army.*

By the end of May the expedition, consisting of 700 cavalry, and 14,600 infantry, including Whittingham's division of 5000, and above 4000 Italians, had embarked, and on the last day of that month the fleet, commanded by Rear-Admiral Hallowell, sailed from Alicante. It was seen from Valencia; and the French troops from the side of Tortosa were instructed to be ready for moving whithersoever the debarkation might call them. After a very favourable passage, the fleet anchored on the evening of the 2d in the port of Salon, within sight of Tarragona. The soldiers who had been ordered to hold themselves in readiness to land were put into the boats, but the surf ran so high that Admiral Hallowell pronounced the attempt too dangerous,

and therefore they returned to the ships. But before the fleet came to anchor, a brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost, was judiciously detached to get possession of the fort at Col de Balaguer, that point commanding the only road by which artillery could be brought to the relief of Tarragona. General Copons, who had been apprized of the expedition, occupied Reus at that time, and sent two battalions, at first, to co-operate in the attack upon this fort, and afterwards two more in consequence of some movements from Tortosa. The attack was vigorously pressed. On the 5th the place was battered in breach; on the 7th a magazine exploded; the garrison, consisting of 80 men, were intimidated by this, and the commandant capitulated. On this side, therefore, no succours could now reach Tarragona, which is about six leagues from Col de Balaguer, except by a circuitous march of three days, through a very difficult country: there was a pass indeed by which the place might be approached, but it was not practicable for artillery.

Meantime the debarkation had been effected on the 3d, in broad day, and with an order, a precision, and a rapidity, peculiar to the English in their naval operations. Having reconnoitred the fortress, Sir John Murray determined upon attacking it on the western side, which was the weakest, and that on which stores might most conveniently be brought up to the batteries. General Bertolotti, who commanded in Tarragona, did not confine himself within the walls; he occupied the Fuerte Real, and the ruins of the bastion of St. Carlos, which, though, like all the external works, it had been demolished, presented still an imposing appearance; and great exertions were made for repairing it. These works were between 350 and 400 yards from the body of the place, to the southward, and nearer the sea, the approach being exceedingly difficult, and covered by

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*The expedition lands near Tarragona.*

*M. Suchet's Mem. 2, 311.*

CHAP. the fire of the town. But they were thought to be the key of  
 XLIV. the place, and that if the besiegers could establish themselves  
 1813. there, Tarragona must fall in three days. Accordingly two bat-  
 teries were begun on the evening of the 4th, and on the morning  
 of the 6th they opened their fire with good effect; another was  
 erected during the night, and on the morning of the 8th, the  
 commanding engineer reported that a practicable breach in the  
 Fuerte Real had been made; but he requested that it might not  
 be stormed, because its immediate possession could be turned  
 to no account, and to retain it would cost the lives of many men.  
 The fire therefore was continued only to prevent its re-establish-  
 ment. Meantime, when the weather would permit, the artillery  
 and engineer horses, and the cavalry and artillery stores, were  
 landed, and the operations of the engineers were so far advanced  
 that two heavy batteries were constructed to enfilade the place.  
 The city was then summoned to surrender; but as none of the  
 batteries were as yet within 500 yards of the place, and the fire  
 of the besieged had been very superior to that of the besiegers,  
 General Bertoletti would not listen to the summons. On the  
 11th, the commanding officer of engineers reported that he was  
 perfectly prepared to push the siege with vigour; and according  
 to Sir John Murray's order, Major-General Sir William Clinton,  
 who had that day been left in temporary command of the siege,  
 resolved to storm the Fuerte Real at nine that night. Accord-  
 ingly a disposition for the assault was made, and arrangements  
 for distracting the enemy's attention by a simultaneous show  
 of attack along the whole of his front, aided from the side of  
 the sea by the bomb-vessels and gun-boats.

*Suchet's  
 movement  
 for the re-  
 lief of Tar-  
 ragona.*

Marshal Suchet meantime, leaving General Harispe with the  
 command on the Xucar, had made for Tortosa by forced marches  
 with one division, his reserve, and a brigade of cavalry; and before

his arrival he had dispatched orders for the garrison of that place to secure the Col de Balaguer; but the fort there was taken before any attempt to succour it could be made, and he could therefore bring with him no artillery in his attempt to raise the siege of Tarragona. He had directed also Generals Decaen and Maurice Mathieu to march for the relief of the place. On the side of Tortosa all due precautions had been taken, by getting possession of the fort which absolutely commanded that singular pass. On the other side, Sir John Murray had ordered General Whittingham to see if the road could by any means be broken up or impeded, . . . but in an open country this was found impracticable in any part, except at a point near the sea, and within two miles of Tarragona. When Whittingham was at Torre de Embarra upon this investigation, Manso, who had 2000 men at Vendrell, came there to inform him that Decaen, from Hostalric and the country beyond it, would arrive that night at Barcelona, where there would then be a force of 12,000 foot and 400 horse, disposable for the relief of Tarragona. This information General Whittingham communicated to Sir John Murray on the 9th, observing that the enemy might advance to succour that place, in two columns, one by the road along the coast, the other by the heights, upon the left of the besieging army; the Spanish division, which formed the left, would thus be exposed in flank to a superior force, and in a position that was commanded by the heights, and had the fortified city in its rear. And he suggested to Sir John, that he should leave General Copons with the Catalan army to cover the siege, while he, with the British troops and the Majorcan division, marched immediately upon Villa Franca to attack Decaen; that general would have advanced beyond Villa Franca; victory, considering the number and the quality of the allied troops, would

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*June.*

CHAP. not be doubtful, and it would decide the contest in Catalonia ;  
 XLIV. and after driving him from Molins de Rey, and destroying the  
 1813. stone bridge over the Llobregat, by which bridge alone artillery  
 could be brought across that river, there would be time to return  
 and encounter Marshal Suchet.

*June.*

*Sir John  
 Murray  
 raises the  
 siege.*

To this suggestion Sir John paid no regard ; but late in the evening of the 11th, when every thing was ready for an immediate assault upon the Fuerte Real, he received intelligence that Suchet was advancing with 12,000 men from the side of Tortosa, and Decaen with 8000 from Barcelona ; upon which he determined immediately to raise the siege, and with such haste, as to abandon all the heavy artillery, ammunition, and stores that had been landed. He thought it would have been an useless waste of the lives of British soldiers to assault a work, which, if carried, must in his opinion have been abandoned the next day ; he placed no reliance upon the Spaniards under Copons, who had not more than 8500 disposable men, and those without pay, discipline, artillery, or means of subsisting, and whom he considered totally incapable of acting in the field. He distrusted his own foreign troops, who worked slowly at the siege, with great unwillingness, and with so little steadiness, that it had required an additional party of 200 British soldiers to carry to the batteries the ammunition which one of their parties threw away when they came under fire. The French too, he thought, had all advantages ; they had fortresses in every direction to furnish them supplies, to retire upon if they wished to avoid an action till they could bring together more troops, or to cover them if they were defeated ; whereas he was in the open field, without any point of support, or of retreat, except to the ships : and how serious an operation would it be to embark an army in an open bay, and on a beach where he had



learned by experience that it was impossible to disembark in any but the lightest boats! Three days at least would be required to complete this re-embarkation. He decided, therefore, upon beginning it without delay.

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*June.*

Admiral Hallowell strongly remonstrated against abandoning the artillery, and engaged to bring off every thing, if Sir John would only give him the night from the 12th to the 13th; but that commander gave ear to less hopeful counsels, most unfortunately for himself. For public opinion loudly condemned his conduct; it became the subject of a court martial; and though the sentence acquitted him upon all other charges, it pronounced that he had committed an error of judgement in abandoning his artillery, when it might have been brought off. The embarkation was commenced at daybreak. At first some of the valuable stores were sent off, but orders were given to abandon them. Great part of the infantry were put on board during the day in full view of the besieged, who crowded on the ramparts to behold what they were unable to understand. Sir John himself embarked early in the evening; but it was not till near midnight that the 1st division, under Sir William Clinton, who was left in command of the troops on shore, moved to the beach; and so completely were the enemy deceived as to its movements, by the piquets of this division having been kept at their advanced stations till darkness had closed, that not a man ventured without the walls, and not a shot was fired during the night, except from the ramparts, nor did any enemy show himself to molest the embarkation. The cavalry of the Majorcan division were embarked on the morning of the 13th, by means of a mole constructed for the purpose, about two leagues from the town; but the other cavalry and a great part of the field artillery were ordered by land to the Col de Balaguer, whither Sir John