

CHAP. not known. They retired in the greatest disorder, cavalry,
 XXXV. artillery, infantry, and baggage, all mixed. A fog favoured
 1811. them, otherwise a good account would have been given of half
 April. their corps. Lord Wellington described this action, though the
 unavoidable accidents of weather had materially interfered with
 the operations, and impeded their success, as one of the most
 glorious that British troops were ever engaged in.

Regnier joined the sixth corps at Rendo; for it had broken
 up from its position at Ruvina as soon as the firing began; they
 retreated to Alfayates, followed by our cavalry; that night they
 continued their retreat, and entered the Spanish frontier on the
 fourth. On the following day the advance of the allied army
 pushed on, and occupied Albergaria, the first village on the
 Spanish border. An inhabited village was what they had not
 seen before since their retreat in the autumn, those excepted
 which were within the lines of Torres Vedras. The villages in
 Spain had not been injured; it seemed as if the French wished
 to make the Spaniards on this frontier compare their own con-
 dition with that of the Portugueze, that they might become con-
 tented with subjection. Massena's soldiers even paid here for
 bread; and arriving not only hungry, but with a longing desire
 for that which is to them the most necessary article of food, they
 paid any price for it: the peasants seeing that they were rich in
 plunder, and finding them in the paying mood, made their
 charges accordingly. This sudden transition from a devastated
 country to one which had been exempted from the ravages of
 war, where the villages were clean, and the cottages reminded
 Englishmen of those in their own land, was not less striking than
 was the passing at once from a wild mountainous region to a fine
 and well-wooded plain.

Some hope was entertained that the appearance of Trant
 and Wilson's force before Almeida might make the French ap-

prehend a serious attack, and induce them to evacuate it. But throughout the war they never committed any error of this kind. It rarely happened in their service that any person was appointed to a situation for which he was not well qualified; and the commander of this fortress, General Brenier, was a man of more than common qualifications. The Coa, after these divisions crossed it at Cinco Villas, rose; and the governor concerted with General Regnier an attack upon them, which, their retreat being thus cut off, must have ended in their destruction; if Lord Wellington, apprehending the danger, had not pushed forward a small corps, which arrived just in time to divert the enemy's attention, and save them. On the eighth the last of Massena's army crossed the Aguada, not a Frenchman remaining in Portugal, except the garrison of Almeida, which Lord Wellington immediately prepared to blockade. The allies took up that position upon the Duas Casas, which General Craufurd had occupied with the advanced guard during the latter part of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, having their advanced posts upon Galegos and the Aguada. Thus terminated the invasion of Portugal, in which Massena, with 110,000 men, had boasted that he would drive the English into the sea. A general of the highest reputation, and of abilities no ways inferior to his celebrity, at the head of the largest force which France could send against that country, was thus in all his plans baffled by a British general, and in every engagement beaten by British troops. An enemy the most presumptuous and insolent that ever disgraced the profession of arms, the most cruel that ever outraged human nature, had been humbled and exposed in the face of Europe; . . . it was in vain for the French Government to call their retreat a change of position, . . . however they might disguise and misrepresent the transactions in Portugal, however they might claim victories where they had sustained de-

CHAP.
XXXV.
1811.
April.

*The French
cross the
frontier.*

CHAP. feats, the map discovered here their undeniable discomfiture ;
 XXXV. and the smallest kingdom in Europe, a kingdom too which
 1811. long misgovernment had reduced to the most deplorable
 state of disorganization, had, by the help of England and the
 spirit of its inhabitants, defied and defeated that tyrant before
 whom the whole continent was humbled. Russia had been
 so foiled in arms and dressed in negotiation so as to become
 the ally of France, to co-operate in her barbarous warfare
 against commerce, and to recognise her extravagant usurpa-
 tions. Prussia had been beaten and reduced to vassalage.
 Austria was still farther degraded by being compelled to give
 a daughter of its emperor in marriage to one whose crimes that
 emperor himself had proclaimed to the world. Poles and
 Italians, Dutch and Germans, from every part of divided and
 subjected Germany, filled up the armies of this barbarian ; and
 the Portugueze, . . the poor, degraded, and despised Portugueze,
 . . the vilified, the injured, the insulted Portugueze, . . were the
 first people who drove this formidable enemy out of their coun-
 try, and delivered themselves from the yoke.

*March 18.
 Opinions of
 the Whigs
 at this time.*

While Massena was retreating, and before the intelligence arrived in England, a debate took place in both houses, upon a motion, that two millions should be granted for the Portugueze troops in British pay. The opposition did not let pass this opportunity of repeating their opinions and their prophecies, . . in happy hour! Mr. Ponsonby said, that our success consisted in having lost almost the whole of Portugal, and having our army hemmed in between Lisbon and Cartaxo ; except that intermediate space, we had abandoned all Portugal. Mr. Freemantle, after a panegyric upon Sir John Moore's retreat, said that the present campaign left Lord Wellington incapable of quitting his intrenchments, and only waiting the result of such movements as the enemy might be disposed to make. " It rests with the enemy," said he, " to

*Mr. Pon-
 sonby.*

*Mr. Free-
 mantle.*

choose his day, to make his own dispositions, to wait for his reinforcements, to choose whether he will continue to blockade you, or whether he will give you a fair opportunity of contending with him in the field. If we are to judge by the publications in France, he will decide upon the former; and in this he will judge wisely. The result of all your victories, of all your expenditure in men and money, of all your exertions, and of all your waste of the military resources of this country, is . . . the position of your army at Lisbon, insulated and incapable of acting, but at the discretion of the enemy: your allies in every other part of the peninsula overwhelmed, and only manifesting partial and unavailable hostility; your own resources exhausted, and your hopes of ultimate success, to every mind which is not blinded by enthusiasm, completely annihilated! Such is the result of a system founded upon the principle of attempting to subdue Buonaparte by the force of your armies on the continent! Will any man say that this has been a wise system? Will any man, who is not determined, under any circumstances, to support the measures of a weak and misguided government, contend that it has been successful? that it has answered either the promises to your allies, or the hopes to your country? that it has either contributed to their security, or to your own benefit?"

General Tarleton also delivered it as his opinion, that we had lost the whole of the peninsula, except the spot between Cartaxo and Lisbon; that the Portugueze troops had never been of any actual service; that we could not maintain ourselves in the country, for the fatal truth must at length be told; and that when our army was to get out of it, he was afraid it would be found a difficult matter. Lord Grenville, in the Upper House, spoke to the same purport, affirming that the British army in Portugal did not possess more of the country than the ground which it actually occupied, and that while we were vainly drain-

CHAP.
XXXV.
1811.

*General
Tarleton.*

*Lord Gren-
ville.*

CHAP. ing our own resources, and hazarding our best means, we did
 XXXV. not essentially contribute to help Portugal, or to save it. It was, he
 1811. added, because he had the cause of Spain and Portugal sincerely
 and warmly at heart, that he felt anxious we should pause in this
 wild and mad career of thoughtless prodigality, look our own
 situation in the face, and learn the necessity of economising our
 resources, that we might be able, at a period more favourable
 than the present, to lend to the cause of the nations of the Pe-
 ninsula, or to that of any other country similarly situated, that
 support and those exertions which, when made under all the
 circumstances of our present situation, must be found not only
 wholly unavailing to our allies, but highly injurious to ourselves.
 Two days after these opinions were delivered, the telegraph
 announced the news of Massena's retreat.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

CADIZ. BATTLE OF BARROSA. DEATH OF ALBURQUERQUE.

ABOUT the same time that the tide had thus turned in Portugal, came tidings of a victory in Spain, which, if it led to no other result, tended to raise the character of the British army and the spirits of the nation. When Soult marched against Badajoz, hoping to co-operate with Massena in the conquest of Portugal, he made such large drafts from the army before Cadiz, that it was thought possible, by a well-concerted attack, to raise the blockade. The plan was, that an expedition should sail from Cadiz, and force a landing between Cape Trafalgar and Cape de Plata, or at Tarifa, or at Algeciras. The Spanish force at St. Roques was then to join, and a combined attack to be made upon the rear of the enemy's line; while, in the mean time, an attempt should be made from the Isle of Leon to open a communication with them. D. Manuel de Lapeña was appointed to the command. He had conducted the wreck of the central army during the latter part of its retreat, under circumstances in which no military skill could be displayed, but in which his patriotism and moderation had been fully proved. Lieutenant-General Graham, who commanded the British troops at Cadiz, consented to act under him. This officer was now in his sixty-first year. The former part of his life he had past in the enjoyments of domestic comfort, amusing himself with rural

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1811.

*Expedition
from Cadiz.*

*Lieutenant-
General
Graham.*

CHAP. sports, with improving his estates, and with literature: after
 XXXVI. eighteen years of happiness his wife died on the way to the
 1811. south of France, and Mr. Graham, seeking for relief in change
 of place and in active occupations, joined Lord Hood as a volunteer when Toulon was taken possession of in 1793. Here he distinguished himself greatly, and on his return to England obtained permission to raise a regiment, but not without great difficulty and express discouragement from the commander-in-chief. He was at Mantua with Wurmser in 1796, and escaped by cutting his way through the besiegers in a night sortie: and he bore a distinguished part at Malta when Sir Alexander Ball, under circumstances the most painful, and with means the most inadequate, by his wisdom and perseverance recovered that island from the enemy. Nevertheless the time of life at which he had entered the army, and the manner, impeded his promotion; and he would probably never have risen in rank if General Moore had not experienced great assistance from him in his retreat, and at the battle of Coruña, and sent home so strong a recommendation that it could not be neglected.

Apprehensions of the enemy.

The expedition, though upon no extensive scale, was yet a great exertion for a government so poor in means as the Regency, so feeble, and with all its branches so miserably disorganized. The bustle in the roads was visible from the enemy's lines, as well as from the city; in Cadiz the highest hopes were excited, and Marshal Victor felt no little degree of alarm. He thought that when Soult had so considerably weakened the blockading force, he ought to have placed Sebastiani's army at his disposal, in case of need: this had not been done, and Victor, seeing the naval preparations, sent to that general, entreating him to manœuvre so as to alarm the allies upon their landing, and to endanger them; but his entreaties were of no

effect, and Victor complained in his public dispatches, that this corps, though numerous, in good condition, and at leisure, had not given him the least assistance.

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1811.

During the latter days of January and great part of the following month, heavy rains delayed the expedition, and rendered all the roads impracticable by which the allies could have approached the enemy. On the 20th of February, the troops were embarked, waiting a favourable opportunity to proceed into the Straits: General Graham had about 4000 British and Portuguese, the Spaniards were 7000. The British got to sea the next day, and not being able to effect a landing near Cape Trafalgar, nor at Tarifa, disembarked at Algeciras, from whence they marched to Tarifa. The roads between the two towns were impassable for carriages, and therefore the artillery, provisions, and stores, were conveyed in boats, by indefatigable exertions of the seamen, against every disadvantage of wind and weather. The Spanish transports were thrice driven back, but reached Tarifa on the evening of the 27th, and the next day they began their march to the Puerto de Facinas, a pass in that chain of mountains which, bounding the plain of Gibraltar on the west, runs to the sea from the Sierras of Ronda. To this point the road was practicable for carriages, some days' labour having been employed in making it so: from thence it descends to those spacious plains which extend from the skirts of the chain to Medina Sidonia, Chiclana, and the river Santi Petri: and the roads below were in a dreadful state, the country being marshy, intersected with a labyrinth of streams; one of which, the Barbate, which receives the waters of the Lake of Janda, is a considerable river. At Veger, about half way between Tarifa and the Isle of Leon, the French had three companies of infantry and 180 horse. They had also a small fort with two pieces of cannon at Casas Viejas, on the road to Medina. These points

February.
The troops
land at Al-
geciras.

They pass
the Puerto
de Facinas.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1811.

February.
*Lapeña's
proclama-
tion.*

it was hoped to surprise, and the troops therefore encamped on the side of the mountain, taking every precaution to conceal their movements from the enemy.

Lapeña, when the troops commenced their march, addressed a proclamation to them, which at once disclosed the extent of his object, and the confidence with which he expected to realize it. "Soldiers of the fourth army," said he, "the moment for which you have a whole year been longing is at length arrived: a second time Andalusia is about to owe to you her liberty, and the laurels of Mengibar and Baylen will revive upon your brows. You have to combat in sight of the whole nation assembled in its Cortes; the Government will see your deeds; the inhabitants of Cadiz, who have made so many sacrifices for you, will be eye-witnesses of your heroism; they will lift up their voices in blessings and in acclamations of praise, which you will hear amid the roar of musketry and cannon. Let us go then to conquer! my cares are directed to this end; implicit obedience, firmness, and discipline, must conduct you to it: if these are wanting, in vain will you seek for fortune! and woe to him who forgets or abandons them: he shall die without remission! The gold, whose weight makes cowards of those who have plundered it from us, the bounties which a generous Government will bestow, and the endless blessings of those who will call you their deliverers, . . . behold in these your reward!" At Facinas the operations were to commence; here, therefore, the order of march was arranged, and the troops formed into three divisions, the van being under General D. Jose Lardizabal, the centre under Camp Marshal the Prince of Anglona, and the reserve under General Graham.

*Advance
against
Veger.*

At night-fall on the first of March, a detachment under Colonel D. José Aymerich with two four-pounders, began its march to surprise Veger. A squadron accompanied it under