

ment and organization, and officered by men ignorant of the first rudiments of their profession.

CHAP. X.

 1812.
 September.
 Sep. 19.

On the nineteenth, the allied army entered Burgos; and the French, under General Souham, who, with a reinforcement of nine thousand men, had arrived on the day previous, to assume the command, fell back to Briviesca, leaving in the castle a garrison of two thousand men, under General Dubreton.

The castle of Burgos is situated on an eminence, and strongly defended by its outworks. The enemy had encircled the acclivity, by two lines of formidable field-works, armed at all points with cannon, and the base of the hill was surrounded by an uncovered scarpwall of very difficult access. Lord Wellington considered the reduction of this fortress to be essential to the success of his operations, for the French had collected in it large stores of ammunition and provisions, and the allied army required it as a point of support, in the insecure position which it was boldly intended to assume.

Lord Wellington, therefore, immediately directed the investment of the place, though the whole of his artillery consisted of three eighteen

CHAP. X. pounders, and five twenty-four pounder iron
1812. howitzers, and the supply of ammunition was
September. very deficient. The siege was allotted to the
first and sixth divisions, under Generals Campbell and Clinton, while the main body of the army advanced to the neighbourhood of Quintanapala, to hold Souham in check.

Sep. 19. On the evening of the nineteenth, a formidable horn-work on the hill of St. Michael, which commanded several of the works of the castle, was carried by assault. The troops employed on this service, under command of General Pack, suffered very severely. The assault lasted above an hour; but a detachment, led by the Honourable Major Cocks, having at length effected an entrance by the gorge, the work was carried. The loss of the assailants, owing to the gallant resistance of the garrison, and the warm fire to which they were subjected from the place, was very great. It amounted to about four hundred in killed and wounded. In the work were found three guns. One captain and sixty-two men, the sole survivors of a strong battalion, were made prisoners.

On the day following, the guns were drawn up and planted in battery on the hill of St:

Michael; but the enemy kept up so strong a fire from the castle, that two of the guns were, after a few days, dismounted. On the night of the twenty-second, an attempt on the exterior line of works unfortunately failed. The storming party succeeded in escalading the outer wall; but after many gallant efforts to maintain their ground, were driven back with great loss. Two of his guns being disabled, Lord Wellington abandoned the ordinary method of attack, and had recourse to the slower and more uncertain process of sapping.

CHAP. X.

 1812.
 September.

On the twenty-ninth, a breach having been effected in the outer wall by the explosion of a mine, a party of the first division attempted to storm it. The enemy, however, had placed such obstacles at the mouth of the breach as it was found impossible to surmount, and the attack failed, with considerable loss on the part of the assailants.

Sep. 29.

Another mine exploded on the evening of the fourth October, and made a second breach. The exterior line of the enemy's works was at length carried, and the twenty-fourth regiment effected a lodgment on the space between the outer wall and the first line of field-works. The

Oct. 4.

CHAP. X. garrison, however, on the day following, made
 1812. a spirited sortie, and driving back the British
 October. troops at the point of the bayonet, gained possession of the lodgment, which was immediately destroyed. Fresh troops were then sent on to retrieve this disaster; and under a desperate and most destructive fire from the place, the works were again carried, and the enemy driven behind their interior defences.

Oct. 8. The progress of the besiegers was slow, for at every step they were encountered by obstacles, which the deficiency of means at their disposal rendered almost insuperable. Before day-break on the eighth, the enemy made another sortie, and overpowering the guard in the trenches, succeeded in destroying all the work of the besiegers within the outer wall. In this affair, the Honourable Major Cocks, commanding the seventy-ninth regiment, was killed. The zeal and gallantry of this officer, had on all occasions been conspicuous.

Oct. 11. The perseverance of the besiegers, however, was not to be overcome. They continued their labours, and established themselves within one hundred yards of the enemy's second line. On the eleventh, a mine was successfully sprung,

and another breach being formed, the assault was given on the same evening, and the second line carried after a severe struggle. On the eighteenth, preparations for the assault of the castle being completed, the Guards and German Legion in the first division attempted to carry it by escalade, and succeeded in effecting an entrance; but the fire from the garrison was so heavy, that the assailants found it impossible to maintain their ground.

CHAP. X.

1812.

October.

This was the last effort to gain possession of the fortress, the advance of the enemy rendering it necessary to desist from further operations. The failure is attributable to the deficiency of means, not to any deficiency of ardour or devotion in the troops. Never were the boldness and intrepidity of British soldiers more admirably displayed than in those unfortunate attacks, the unsuccessful termination of which was attributable to causes beyond their control. The loss of the allied army during the siege was very severe. It exceeded two thousand men, a number nearly equal to that of the brave garrison, whose efforts were at length crowned by merited success.

In the meantime, the army under Souham,

CHAP. X. having been joined by the whole disposable
 1812. force in the north, advanced through Monas-
 terio, with the apparent intention of fight-
 October. ing a general action for the relief of Burgos.

Oct. 20. On the evening of the twentieth, the enemy
 came on in force, and drove in the outposts
 of the allied army; but Sir Edward Paget, who
 was directed to move the first and fifth divisions
 upon their right flank, promptly executed this
 manœuvre, and the French immediately fell
 back.

Sep. 15. While these events were passing in the north
 of Spain, Marshal Soult, on the fifteenth of Sep-
 tember, had commenced his march from Granada,
 and having effected a junction with the army of
 the centre, advanced along the line of the Xucar
 towards Madrid. Ballasteros, influenced by petty
 jealousy of Lord Wellington, on whom the Cortes
 had wisely conferred the chief command of
 the Spanish armies, offered no annoyance to the
 enemy during this movement. He was in con-
 sequence removed from all military command,
 and imprisoned in the fortress of Ceuta on the
 coast of Barbary. The small force of General
 Maitland, cooped up in Alicante, without support
 of any kind from the native armies, could effect

nothing; and a trifling detachment of about six hundred men, with some artillery, which, under General Donkin, had landed near Denia, were defeated in their object of carrying that post, and forced to re-embark.

CHAP. X.

1812.

October.

The armies of Soult and Jourdan then approached Madrid, and arrived at Aranjuez on the twenty-third of October. Sir Rowland Hill immediately placed his forces in position, covering the capital, and preparations were made for a general engagement. On the night of the twenty-seventh, however, an express from Lord Wellington arrived, directing Sir Rowland to fall back on the Adejo, unless an opportunity should occur of bringing the enemy to battle under circumstances of great advantage.

Oct. 23.

Oct. 27.

The position chosen by General Hill was highly favourable; but Soult, whose movements were combined with those of Souham, avoided a general engagement; and marching to Toledo, crossed the Tagus, and thus threatened the rear of the allies. Under these circumstances, independently of the orders of Lord Wellington, immediate retreat became necessary. Madrid was in consequence evacuated,—the magazines in the Retiro were blown up, the guns spiked, and,

CHAP. X. agreeably to his instructions, Sir Rowland Hill
 1812. put his corps in motion, and slowly retired to-
 October. wards Salamanca.

Nothing can be more admirable than the whole arrangements of Lord Wellington at this period of difficulty, nor more nicely balanced than his manœuvres.

Oct. 21. On the twenty-first of October, the siege of Burgos was raised. During the night, Lord Wellington filed his whole army under the walls of the castle, and across the bridge of the Arlanzon, closely enfiladed by the guns of the place. This bold measure was productive of little loss; and Lord Wellington thus succeeded in gaining a march on his opponent, who did not overtake him till the
 Oct. 23. twenty-third. On that day, the enemy's cavalry made a sharp attack on the rear-guard, which was gallantly repulsed by a light infantry battalion of the German legion.

On the twenty-fourth, the army was joined by a reinforcement from England, under Lord Dalhousie, consisting chiefly of the Guards, which had disembarked at Corunna, and Lord Wellington took up a position behind the Carrion, the left at Villa Muriel, the right at Duenas.

The retreat had been so sudden and rapid, CHAP. X.
that the greatest difficulty was experienced in
the conveyance of the sick and wounded, a great
portion of whom had not yet crossed the Douro.
Lord Wellington, therefore, found it necessary
to halt during the whole of the twenty-fifth; and
in order to check the pursuit of the enemy, di-
rected the bridges over the Carrion and Pisu-
erga to be destroyed on their approach.

1812.
October.

In consequence the bridges at Villa Muriel
and Duenas were blown up. At Palencia the
enemy attacked the party posted to cover the
operation, and gained possession of the bridges
in a perfect state. At Tariejo, owing to the
failure of a mine, the bridge was little injured;
and the enemy, having pushed on a considerable
body of cavalry, the covering party, under Cap-
tain Ferguson of the fifty-eighth, were made
prisoners. The enemy then pushed a corps
across the Pisuerga, in contact with the posts
of the allied army. Lord Wellington determin-
ed to force them back; and on the approach
of the columns, they hastily recrossed the river.
On the left, a strong body was thrown across
the river by a ford near Villa Muriel, and
took possession of a village at some distance

CHAP. X. from the bank. The Spaniards were ordered to dislodge them, but failed in the attempt; and the French, pursuing their success, came in contact with the fifth division, and the engagement was for some time very serious. The Spanish General, Don Miguel Alava, observing the discomfiture of his troops, immediately galloped into the plain, and rallying them by dint of great exertion, led them back to the charge. The enemy being also repulsed by the fifth division, were then beaten back across the river with considerable loss.

- Oct. 26. On the twenty-sixth, the army continued its retreat along miserable roads, and exposed to an incessant deluge of rain. The troops, dispirited, began to manifest symptoms of disorder. During the night, the soldiers quitted their bivouacs in search of wine, and were guilty of numerous excesses. A large proportion being intoxicated, were regardless of command; and the utmost exertions of the officers to restore discipline and regularity, were unavailing. General Souham made some attempts to gain possession of the bridge at Cabeçon, which were repulsed. He then marched down the Pisuerga towards the
- Oct. 28. Douro, and endeavoured to pass the river at Siman-

cas, which was found impracticable from the complete destruction of the bridge. A battery was established on some heights near Valladolid, which commanded a part of the road on the left of the river, along which the allied army was retreating; and the hospital waggons and commissariat became occasionally exposed to its fire.

CHAP. X.

1812.

October.

On the twenty-ninth, the army continued its retreat along the left of the Pisuerga, having destroyed the bridges at Cabeçon and Valladolid. The Douro being too high to be fordable at any point, the whole of the divisions crossed at Tudela and the Puente del Douro. The bridges at these places were likewise blown up. In the night, the enemy crossed a party by swimming, who dislodged a German regiment, posted to guard the ruins of the bridge of Tordesillas, and immediately proceeded to re-establish the communication. Lord Wellington in consequence took up a position in which he might give battle, and stationed his army along the banks of the Douro, on nearly the same ground which it occupied in July, before the battle of Salamanca.

Oct. 29.

On the sixth of November, the enemy having repaired the bridges at Toro and Tordesillas,

Nov. 6.

CHAP. X. Lord Wellington recommenced his retreat, and
 1812. fell back to Torrecilla del Orden, the corps of
 November. Sir Rowland Hill having effected a junction on
 the third. On the eighth the divisions from Bur-
 gos occupied the heights of St. Christoval, in front
 of Salamanca; and General Hamilton's Portu-
 guese division held the town of Alba de Tormes.

On reaching the Douro, General Souham de-
 sisted from the pursuit, till being joined by the
 armies of the south and centre, under Sault, their
 whole united force, amounting to seventy-five
 thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry,
 concentrated in position on the Tormes, on the
 Nov. 10. tenth of November. The army of Lord Wellin-
 gton did not exceed forty-eight thousand infantry
 and five thousand cavalry; and with the disadvan-
 tage of so great a disparity of numbers, he felt
 it necessary to continue his retreat, unless a
 favourable opportunity should occur of bringing
 the enemy to action.

On the ninth, the French drove in the cavalry
 piquets in front of Alba; and in the course of
 the day approached the positions on the Tormes,
 and attempted to force the passage of the river.
 They attacked General Hamilton's division in
 Alba with twenty pieces of cannon; but finding

they made no impression, the greater part of the troops were withdrawn during the night.

CHAP. X.

1812.

November.

On the fourteenth the French crossed the river in force, at three fords near Lucinas, and took post in a formidable position at Mozarbes. Lord Wellington then moved his army to the Arapiles, the scene of his former victory; but finding the enemy too strongly posted to render it prudent to assume the offensive, and perceiving that detachments of their cavalry were already in motion to intercept his communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, he withdrew the troops from Alba, and put his army in retreat towards the Agueda.

On the sixteenth the allied army encamped on the Valmusa. Soult followed their steps with a strong advanced-guard, but made no attempt to achieve any great and signal success. On the seventeenth the enemy cannonaded the rear-guard on its passage of the Huerba, near Munoz; and, on the same day, Sir Edward Paget was unfortunately made prisoner, almost in the centre of the allied army. A detachment of French light troops were concealed in a wood on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Sir Edward observing an interval between the fifth and seventh divisions of infantry, rode alone to the

Nov. 16.

CHAP. X. rear to inquire into the cause by which the progress of the latter had been delayed. On his return he missed his way, and fell into the hands of the enemy. By this unlucky accident, his country, at a moment of peculiar need, was deprived of the services of one of the bravest and most distinguished of her leaders.

1812.
November.

During the whole of this retreat, though little annoyance was experienced from the enemy, the sufferings of the troops were very great. The weather was cold and inclement; the troops at night were without shelter of any sort, and the rain descended in torrents, which precluded the possibility of lighting fires. The wretched condition of the roads, in many places nearly impassable, occasioned great irregularities in the supply of provisions; and under the pressure of such sufferings, it was found impossible to maintain discipline.

Nov. 18.

On the eighteenth the head-quarters of Lord Wellington were at Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the two following days the army crossed the Agueda. Shortly afterwards, on learning that the enemy had withdrawn from the Tormes, the divisions were distributed in extensive cantonments, the right being thrown forward to Banos

and Bejar to hold the passes, and the left re- CHAP. X.
tired on Lamego. The season of the year no
longer admitted of military movements, and the 1812.
troops were suffered to enjoy the repose neces- November.
sary to prepare them for the toils of the succeed-
ing campaign.*

* On the arrival of the army in quarters, Lord Wellington addressed a letter to the commanding officers of battalions, censuring, in the severest manner, the misconduct of the troops during the retreat from Burgos.—“It must be obvious,” he said, “to every officer, that, from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred.

“Yet the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made in which the troops made such short marches,—none in which they made such long and repeated halts,—and none in which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy. These evils,” continues Lord Wellington, “I have no hesitation in attributing to the habitual inattention of officers of regiments to their duty as prescribed by the regulations of the service, and the orders of this army.

“Unfortunately, the inexperience of officers of the army, has induced many to conceive, that the period during which an army is on active service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which, of all others, every rule for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldier; for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and field-equipments, and his horse and horse-appointments; for the receipt, and issue, and care of his provisions, and the regulation of all that belongs to his

CHAP. X.

1812.

The intelligence of the retreat from Burgos was received in England with clamours of discontent and disappointment. The hopes which the early successes of the campaign had overweeningly excited, were unreasonably depressed by its termination. Within and without the walls of Parliament loud accusations were heard against the Ministry. Even Lord Wellington, who, by a course of splendid achievement, had won his way to a high place in the hearts and hopes of all Englishmen, now ceased to be "gracious in the people's eye." He was accused of compromising the safety of his army by a series of rash miscalculations. The Government were charged, by one class of politicians, with wasting the resources of the country in a hope-

food, and the forage for his horse, should be most strictly attended to by the officer of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army—a British army in particular—shall be brought into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial."

Lord Wellington then proceeds to point out the most effectual means of remedying these evils, by means of greater vigilance and attention on the part of officers commanding regiments and brigades, and notices the superior regularity, in some particulars, of the French army. The letter, altogether, is of the most severe and unsparing character, and produced a powerful effect.

less struggle,—with lavishing the best blood of England in defence of a people whose zeal and patriotism, if such ever existed, were long proved to have subsided into sluggish and imperturbable inertia. The events of the campaign were declared to have spread dejection throughout Spain, and renewed the confidence of her invaders. All hopes had been disappointed,—the allied army had been forced again to abandon the Spanish territory,—and the very name of Englishmen had become hateful to the people. The clever sophistry, it was said, by which the nation had been so long deluded into the belief that we were contending for the independence of Britain and Spain, amid the mountains of the Peninsula, was at length powerless. Thenceforth it must be manifest to all, that the war was solely continued because a powerful faction were benefited by the expenditure it occasioned.

By such base and contemptible clamour it was little probable that Lord Wellington would be moved. No man ever sacrificed less to the acquisition of mere temporary and vulgar popularity; none has ever done more to secure the lasting gratitude of his country. He knew that the campaign, which had thus exposed him to

CHAP. X. contumely and abuse, had shed fresh and unfading
1812. lustre on the British arms. It had been marked by three signal triumphs; the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo, of Badajos, and by the victory of Salamanca. These had been achieved at a time when the military power of the Spanish was at the lowest ebb. With an army whose effective force did not certainly exceed sixty thousand men, he had traversed the interior of Spain—defeated a powerful army—occupied the capital—liberated the southern provinces,—and, by a series of nicely calculated manœuvres, baffled the pursuit of an enemy overpoweringly superior. At the very period when all this had been effected, the enemy had a force of two hundred thousand men in the Peninsula, commanded by leaders of high name and pretension, and whose fame had become familiar to all Europe.

That the consequences of the victory of Salamanca were less brilliant than might have been anticipated from its decisive character, is attributable to causes over which Lord Wellington could exercise no control. He was entitled, nay instructed, to calculate on the co-operation of a strong force in the eastern provinces. He was entitled to calculate on good service from

the armies of O'Donnel and Ballasteros. He was entitled likewise to expect, that the patriotism of the Spaniards would have taken advantage of the liberation of the capital to burst the cearments of its sepulchre, and come forth in renovated strength.

CHAP. X.

1812.

In all these—not vain but reasonable calculations, he was deceived. By the bungling of the Ministry, the force from Sicily was delayed till too late, and was most beggarly in amount. The army of O'Donnel was defeated a few days before its arrival. Ballasteros refused to co-operate with the allied army, and did nothing. In spite of the victory of Salamanca, and the expulsion of the intrusive monarch from the capital, the tree of Spanish patriotism put forth no blossom. What, then, was to be done? The course pursued by Lord Wellington, in the circumstances of difficulty by which he was surrounded, has been vehemently censured; yet there existed no other to which objections of equal magnitude did not apply. One great object—the liberation of the southern provinces—was at least secured by it. The failure before Burgos was unfortunate; but nothing could exceed the skill of the manœuvres by which it was followed, and never was a re-

CHAP. X. treat more imposing than that of Lord Wellington
1812. in face of the combined French armies. It may be fearlessly asserted, that no man of competent judgment can read the details of this most splendid campaign, without perceiving, that in tactic and combination Lord Wellington proved himself throughout superior to his opponents. While he repeatedly belied their calculations, in no one instance was he taken at a disadvantage, or involved in difficulties, which he was unprepared to encounter and surmount.

A general of less nerve would probably have fought a battle to escape the clamour by which he must have known he would be assailed in consequence of the reverse at Burgos. But Lord Wellington was not thus to be moved. He knew that the cause of his country and her allies would more effectually be promoted by a different policy ; and in spite of every personal motive, he avoided battle, and continued his retreat to the frontier of Portugal. In truth, if there is any one quality in Lord Wellington which demands our paramount admiration, it is the self-command with which, under every temptation, he kept the natural boldness of his character in strict subordination to the dictates of the coolest prudence.

CHAPTER XI.

ADVANCE OF LORD WELLINGTON—BATTLE
OF VITTORIA.

JUDGING from the past events of the war, it CHAP. XI.
 has been maintained by many, that had Napo- 1813.
 leon remained at peace with the other nations of
 Europe, the complete subjugation of the Penin-
 sula must at length have been effected. Such
 an inference we hold to be unfounded. The
 whole Peninsula had long been unable to
 support either the armies of its invaders or
 its defenders. Agriculture had almost wholly
 ceased, in provinces subjected to perpetual in-
 roads, in which marauders continually destroyed
 the labours of the peasant. The cattle were
 driven into defiles amid the mountains, and a
 great portion of the population was converted
 into bodies of armed herdsmen, the more active
 and enterprising of which kept up a war of ex-

CHAP. XI. termination on the enemy. They harassed his
1813. march, intercepted his foragers, and plundered his convoys. It was necessary, therefore, from the first, for the French to employ numerous armies in Spain; to maintain a strong yet extended line through the whole country; and, above all, to preserve unbroken the communication with Bayonne. While they were able to do so, the victories achieved by Lord Wellington appeared, from their want of subsequent advantages, as so much waste of blood. The warmest partisans of the cause became, in some degree, disheartened, by that continued alternation of victory and retreat which had marked the arms of the allies; and, to a superficial observer, it might have seemed that little progress had been made by the lavish expenditure of British blood and treasure, towards the attainment of the first great object of the war—the liberation of the Peninsula.

But the extreme diffusion of force thus necessary to the invaders, was pregnant with all the elements of defeat. Every additional province overrun by their arms, was in itself a cause of weakness. While they occupied the south, the north was still in arms: while pursuing their victories in the east, they were defeated in the west.

Present everywhere, they were nowhere strong enough to put down resistance, and the greatest achievements of their arms were in general only followed by the farther extension of a vulnerable front.

CHAP. XI.

1813.

But, independently of other causes, nothing could be more certain, than that the increasing deficiency of the means of sustenance, would ultimately of itself have compelled the French to diminish their forces, and narrow their schemes of conquest. The British army, secure of its supplies, though at an enormous expense, by the ports of Lisbon and Oporto, were better able than their opponents to support a war of deprivation. Lord Wellington, therefore, had only to maintain his footing in the Peninsula, to feel secure that the hour would at length come when the contest would be maintained on equal terms, and he might enter on a wider and more brilliant course of achievement.

The period thus warmly anticipated at length came. It was accelerated not created by the events in the north of Europe. These are well known. By the destruction of his army in the Russian campaign, the throne of Napoleon had been shaken to its base, and it became at length

CHAP. XI. 1813. apparent that the hour of deliverance for the nations of the Peninsula was at hand. At all events an important change had been wrought in the relative position of the belligerents. Hitherto the losses of the French armies had been replaced by a large and almost constant influx of reinforcements. In this mighty power of restoration consisted the great and prominent advantage which the enemy till now had possessed over Lord Wellington. While the whole means of England were unequal to repair the loss which might have flowed from one disastrous battle, the French leaders acted throughout with the conviction that no misfortune was irreparable. In opposing the British, therefore, it was their policy to dare every thing, conscious that in every struggle where the loss of combatants was equal, the game was in their favour. But times were now changed. The necessities of Napoleon had compelled him to withdraw nearly twenty thousand men from the force in the Peninsula; and the movements of the enemy gave indication of an intention to abandon the whole south and centre of the kingdom.

During the long interval in which the allied army remained in Cantonments, no hostile

movement of importance took place. In No-
vember, Longa, the celebrated partisan, suc-
ceeded in surprising a body of the enemy under
General Fremant, who were posted in the town
and valley of Sedano, near Burgos. He defeat-
ed them with the loss of seven hundred in killed
and wounded, five hundred prisoners, two guns,
and the whole of their baggage, plunder, and
provisions.

CHAP. XI.

1813.

In the month of February, General Foy
advanced from Salamanca, with a considerable
force, in hope of surprising the town of Bejar.
The garrison, however, were prepared; and
when General Foy attempted to effect an en-
trance by the gates of the town, his troops en-
countered a spirited repulse.

February.

In the meanwhile every effort was made to
repair the losses which the army had suffered
during the late active campaign, and to restore
the troops to that vigour and discipline which
the sufferings of the retreat from Burgos had
materially impaired. During the winter, large
reinforcements and supplies of every kind were
received from England. Several regiments of
cavalry arrived; others were remounted; and
every corps and department in the army was

CHAP. XI. brought into a state of complete efficiency for
active service.

1813.

In the late campaigns the health of the troops had been found to suffer so severely from want of cover, that it was deemed advisable to remedy this evil by providing tents for the soldiers. A pontoon train was likewise fitted out, an adjunct of the highest utility and importance in a country so intersected by rivers as that which was about to become the theatre of operations.

While the army remained in cantonments, Lord Wellington, who had at length been appointed to the chief command of the Spanish forces, repaired to Cadiz and Lisbon, to concert measures with the authorities. In a conference with the Spanish Regency, it was arranged that a force of fifty thousand native troops should be placed at his disposal, and an order was issued, for a portion of the general staff to remain at head-quarters, to serve as a channel of communication with the Spanish leaders. Having completed these preliminaries on the eleventh of May, Lord Wellington returned to Frenada, and preparations were immediately made for the advance of the army.

It has been already stated, that the allied CHAP. XI.
 forces were distributed in a very extensive line. 1813.
 Sir Rowland Hill, with the second division, and
 a body of Spaniards under General Morillo, was
 in Estramadura, and the remainder of the British
 and Portuguese occupied cantonments, extend-
 ing along the northern frontier of Portugal to
 Lamego. The Duke del Parque, commanded
 an army in La Mancha, and the force of Gener-
 al Elio, was stationed on the frontiers of Murcia
 and Valencia. The recent levies in Andalusia
 were intended to act as an army of reserve, and
 placed under the command of O'Donnel. The
 army of Galicia, was commanded by Castanos,
 and occupied the frontier of that province.

The Spanish armies were generally in a state
 of the most miserable equipment and discipline ;
 but the chief obstacle to their efficiency, lay in
 the petty jealousies of the secondary leaders,
 who, considering the assumption of the chief
 command by a foreigner, as involving a national
 degradation, did much to paralyse the zeal and
 valour of their solders, and frustrate the skilful
 combinations of the campaign. Something, how-
 ever, had been achieved. The government had
 at length adopted a wiser and more reasonable

CHAP. XI. policy, and Lord Wellington received assurances
1813. that a great and determined effort would be made throughout the whole Peninsula, in the approaching campaign.

Notwithstanding, Soult, with a considerable body of troops, had been called to Germany, there were still about one hundred and sixty thousand French in Spain; but of these, a large proportion was dispersed in garrisons; and the force under Suchet in the eastern provinces, may be calculated at thirty-five thousand. The armies of Portugal, the centre, and the south, under command of Joseph, amounting collectively to about seventy thousand men, were spread through Castile and Leon, with the general head-quarters at Madrid. The army of Portugal, under the immediate command of General Reille, had its head-quarters at Valladolid. That of the centre, under Drouet, was distributed around the capital; and the head-quarters of the southern army were in Toledo. Arragon and Biscay were also occupied by independent divisions, under command of Generals Clausel and Foy.

The position of the allies thus formed an extensive semicircle round that occupied by the enemy, and the latter perhaps conceived that by

the rapid movement of their concentrated forces, CHAP. XI.
they would be enabled for a time, at least, to
baffle the manœuvres of an enemy acting on a
line so extended. It was evident, however,
from the preparatory arrangements of the ene-
my during the past winter, that his views were
chiefly directed to the defence of the Douro.
The ground on the northern bank of that river,
naturally strong, had been fortified at every as-
sailable point by works and retrenchments; and
with such advantages of position, with a deep
and rapid river covering its front, little doubt
was entertained that an insuperable barrier
would be opposed to the progress of the allied
army.

1813.

Preparations being at length completed for
the commencement of operations, the army was
put in motion on the sixteenth of May, in three
bodies. Five divisions, with a large force of ca-
valry, under Sir Thomas Graham, who had re-
sumed his station as second in command, crossed
the Douro, by means of boats provided for that
purpose at Lamego, at Torremoncorvo, and St.
Joao de Pesqueira, with orders to move through
the province of Tras Os Montes, on Braganza,

May.