

CHAP. IX. followed by the allies ; and on the second of July, the cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, succeeded in coming up with the rear-guard of the enemy, which they instantly attacked and drove in confusion across the Douro. On the night following, both armies halted in position on opposite sides of the river. That of Marmont occupied a range of high ground, stretching from Pollos to Simancas on the Pisuerga, with the centre posted at Tordesillas, to defend the passage of the Douro. The British took up a line, extending from La Seca to Pollos, and head-quarters were established at Rueda.

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Both Toro and Zamora had been strongly fortified by the French ; and the few other points at which the river could be crossed had likewise been put in a state of defence. Lord Wellington, therefore, considered the enemy's position on the Douro too strong for attack, and both armies remained inactive for about a fortnight, during which period Marmont was joined by General Bonnet, from the Asturias, with a division of eight thousand men.

The march of that General had not been unopposed. The Spanish Generals, Mahy, Barcena, and Porlier, had drawn together a force of from

fifteen to twenty thousand men, with which it was determined to attack him on the march. To avoid this, Bonnet threw himself into the mountains, and by roads of great difficulty, succeeded in reaching Reynosa without encounter, and, afterwards, in joining Marmont on the Douro.

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We shall here take leave to offer a few cursory observations on the manœuvres of the hostile armies. The object of Marmont in his advance to the neighbourhood of the position of St. Christoval, was to relieve the forts, which he was well aware could not hold out much longer without assistance, and to take the chances of Lord Wellington's retiring, in case he should think it prudent to decline a general engagement. There can be little doubt that this movement was made under a false notion of the strength of his opponent, for at the period in question, it was in no respect the policy of Marmont to fight a battle. He was in daily expectation of being joined by the division of General Bonnet, and the possession of the northern bank of the Douro, and of all the bridges on that river, gave him a decided advantage over his opponent.

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But in proportion as a battle was against the interest of Marmont, was it desirable to the British General. By tacticians of no mean order, therefore, Lord Wellington has been held guilty of an error, in not attacking his opponent on the twenty-third or twenty-fourth of June, when it was certainly in his power to have done so. That the forts of Salamanca had not yet been reduced, cannot be gravely urged as an objection to the measure. A garrison of eight hundred men could be held in check by a battalion; and the whole army were thus disposable for battle. That Lord Wellington could expect a more favourable opportunity of striking a decisive blow, can scarcely be established by any general reasoning on the subject; yet in a few days we find him marching to the Douro, in search of that very adversary who had already been within his grasp on the Tormes.

Once, on the Douro, the advantages of Marmont were very great. He had everywhere formidable positions at command, and the whole bridges and fords were in his possession, and guarded by strong defences. The river, bending in its course, encircled the flanks of the allied army, and it was impossible for Lord Wellington

to anticipate the quarter from which the enemy might direct his attack. He might be deluded by a false demonstration at one point, while the real danger was approaching from another. By a single injudicious movement, he was continually liable to be cut off from Salamanca, by the French army being suddenly thrown across the Douro, at some of the numerous salient points formed by the windings of the river on either flank. On the other hand, Marmont, when pressed by the allies, had always a secure retreat open to him by crossing the Douro.

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Had Marmont remained in his strong line on the Douro, in all probability the campaign would have terminated without any important result. But Lord Wellington knew it to be impossible that so large an army could long procure subsistence in any one position; and aware that in his rear the Guerilla parties were in constant activity, he waited the moment when the increasing necessities of his army should compel him to a decisive movement.

Marmont, however, having received the expected reinforcements, was little disposed to remain inactive. The army he commanded was

CHAP. IX. composed of veterans, inured to the warfare of
 1812. the country, and full of confidence in their own
 July. discipline and prowess. In manœuvre the French
 had uniformly proved themselves superior to the
 troops of every other nation ; while the English
 were proverbially deficient in that alacrity of
 movement, on which the success of a contest
 of tactic must generally depend. Marmont,
 therefore, calculated with confidence on the nu-
 merous advantages he enjoyed ; and relied on
 his own skill, and the activity of his troops, to
 compel Lord Wellington to retreat on Ciudad
 Rodrigo, or fight a battle under circumstances
 of disadvantage.

Both armies remained quiet in their positions
 Jul. 16. till the sixteenth of July, when Marmont moved
 his army to St. Roman, and passed two divi-
 sions across the Douro at Toro. Lord Welling-
 ton was not deceived by this manœuvre. Mak-
 ing a feint of moving on Toro with part of his
 army, he took up a strong position on the Gua-
 rena, occupying Villaescusa, Fuente la Pena, and
 Castrejon.

On the night of the sixteenth, the French re-
 crossed the river at Toro, and having blown up

the bridge, marched about ten leagues higher up to Tordesillas. Here, in the course of the day, Marmont passed the Douro with his whole army, and made a forced march on Rueda, Nava del Rey, and Castrejon, of which places he took possession on the morning of the eighteenth, the allies falling back on his approach. During this movement, the right of the army, consisting of General Cole's, and the light division, were for some time in very imminent peril. The enemy attempted to cut off their communication with the centre and left, and it was only by a resolute and successful charge of cavalry, that they were at length extricated from their difficulties.

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Jul. 18.

By a brilliant manœuvre, therefore, Marmont succeeded in establishing his communication with the army of the centre, which was then advancing from Madrid to his support. The position of the allies now extended along the banks of the Guarena, a stream tributary to the Douro, which, near Canizal, separates into four branches, and again unites its waters about a league below it. By thus posting his army, Lord Wellington kept his communications un-

CHAP. IX. broken; and in case of attack, the advantages
1812. of ground were decidedly in his favour. Mar-
July. mont likewise halted his army in position on the
opposite bank of the Guarena.

Shortly afterwards he pushed a considerable
column across the river below the junction of
the streams, which attempted to turn the left of
the allies, and gain possession of the valley of
Canizal, by which it would have been enabled to
command the Salamanca road. This attempt
was repulsed by the cavalry and General Cole's
Jul. 18. division. The twenty-seventh and fortieth re-
giments, supported by a brigade of Portuguese,
advanced to the charge with bayonets; and the
enemy retreated in confusion, leaving two hun-
dred and forty prisoners in the hands of the vic-
tors. In this affair about four hundred of the
enemy were killed and wounded. The loss of the
allies was more considerable, amounting in all
to five hundred and fifty men.

Jul. 19. On the day following, Marmont withdrew his
right, and moved his left forward, making de-
monstrations against the right of his opponent.
Lord Wellington made an instant counter move-
ment. He crossed the upper Guarena at Val-
lesa and El Olmo, with his whole army, and

every preparation was made for the engagement on the following morning. CHAP. IX.

On the twentieth, however, the enemy were observed still moving to their left along the heights of the Guarena, which they crossed without opposition, and halted for the night with their left at Babilafuente, and their right at Villamula. Lord Wellington, who, during the day, had closely followed the enemy in all his motions, encamped his army at Cabeça Velosa, placing a corps of observation at Aldea Lengua on the Tormes.

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Nothing could be finer or more striking than the spectacle of the hostile armies during the greater part of the march on the twentieth. They moved in parallel lines within half cannon-shot of each other, in the most imposing order and regularity. As the diversities of ground gave either party a temporary advantage, the artillery opened fire; but though both armies were prepared in a moment to form line of battle, no collision took place.

Jul. 20.

On the morning of the twenty-first, the two armies again moved forward in lines nearly parallel towards Huerta, between which place and Alba de Tormes the French army crossed

Jul. 21.

CHAP. IX. the river, leaving only a small body in occupation of the heights of Babilafuente. Marmont then directed his march to the left, threatening the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. Lord Wellington immediately moved his army on the bridge of Salamanca, by which it crossed the Tormes in the evening, with the exception of the third division, and the Portuguese cavalry, under General D'Urban, which were left to observe the motions of the body of the enemy still remaining at Babilafuente.

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Jul. 22.

Before daylight on the morning of the twenty-second, both armies moved into position. That of the allies extended from the Tormes to two steep and rugged heights, which, from their similarity, the natives generally distinguished by the name of the sister Arapiles. The position of the French was covered by a thick wood, and embraced the heights of La Pena, and the hamlets of Calvarasso de Ariba, and Calvarasso de Abaxo. In the morning a good deal of skirmishing took place. Detachments from both armies endeavoured to seize the Arapiles heights, and the French succeeded in gaining possession of the external and more distant one.

The occupation of one of the Arapiles by the

enemy, occasioned some changes in the position of the allied army. The right was extended *en potence* to the heights behind the village of Arapiles, which was occupied by light infantry; and General Pakenham, with the third division, and Portuguese cavalry, was directed to cross the Tormes, and take post at Aldea Tejada, to lend still farther support to the right flank.

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The morning passed in a series of manœuvres on the part of Marmont, from which no conclusion could be drawn with regard to his ultimate intentions. Lord Wellington, therefore, contented himself with keeping an accurate observation on all the movements of his adversary, ready at any moment to assume the offensive, and equally so, should sound policy require it, to retreat.

There can be no doubt that Lord Wellington considered the latter alternative as by far the more probable; and every preparation had been made to carry it into effect. It was unquestionably in Marmont's power, by turning the right of the allied army, to have rendered its position untenable. The baggage and commissariat, therefore, had already quitted Sa-

CHAP. IX. lamanca ; and even some of the divisions had commenced a retrogressive movement.


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About two o'clock, however, a sudden and decisive change took place in the character of the enemy's demonstrations. Under cover of a heavy cannonade, and a skirmish along the whole front of his line, Marmont advanced his centre, making at the same time a movement to his left, as if intending to encircle the position of the allied army, and cut them off from the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. His line, thus unduly extended, was necessarily weakened, and the favourable opportunity of attack, thus presented, was immediately seized by Lord Wellington. The following was the disposition of the army at the moment of attack. The first and light divisions were on the left of the Arapiles, and formed the extreme left of the line. The fourth and fifth divisions were posted in a double line, in rear of the village of Arapiles, with the sixth and seventh divisions, and the division of Don Carlos d'España in reserve. On the left of the fourth division was the Portuguese brigade of General Pack ; on the right of the fifth was that of General Bradford. The third division, with the main body of the cavalry, formed the



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extreme right. While these arrangements were in progress, the enemy made repeated attempts to gain possession of the village of Arapiles, occupied by a detachment of the Guards; but no important change took place in their general dispositions. The third division was then ordered to advance obliquely to its right, to turn the left of the position, while General Cole's and General Leith's divisions should attack it in front.

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The arrangements being completed, the third division, led by General Pakenham, moved on to the attack. The division advanced in column of battalions, and was in the act of ascending the ridge occupied by the enemy, when the skirmishers were driven in by a large body of cavalry, who in a moment came sweeping along the brow of the ascent, on the right flank of the division. Fortunately the retreat of the light troops had given intelligence of their approach; and Colonel Campbell of the ninety-fourth, who commanded the brigade, had time to throw back the fifth regiment *en potence*, which, by a well-directed volley, caused them to retreat in disorder.

General Pakenham no sooner crowned the heights on the extreme left of the French, than

CHAP. IX. he formed line across their flank, and supported
1812. by General D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, and
July. some squadrons of the fourteenth, advanced to-
wards the centre, carrying every thing before
him. On every favourable point where they at-
tempted to make a stand, they were charged
with the bayonet; and with such vigour did
General Pakenham follow up his success, that
even the colours of the British regiments were
often seen waving over battalions of the ene-
my. Sir Stapleton Cotton with the cavalry
charged the enemy in front, and cut to pieces
a brigade of French infantry, though not with-
out sustaining a severe loss in General Le Mar-
chant, who was killed at the head of his bri-
gade. The whole left wing of the enemy was
now retreating in confusion, and above three
thousand prisoners had been made by the al-
lies.

While the events just narrated were passing
on the right of the army, the tide of success had
not flowed with equal rapidity in the centre.
The repeated attempts of General Pack to gain
possession of the Arapiles height occupied by
the enemy, were unsuccessful. On the retreat of
the Portuguese, a body advanced from the height,

and made a gallant and very vehement attack on the flank of the fourth division, while warmly engaged with the enemy in its front. General Cole had been already wounded, and his division, disconcerted by this sudden attack, was compelled to retire in some confusion. The misfortune, however, was immediately repaired by the advance of a brigade of the fifth division, which, by a change of front, took the enemy in flank, and subjecting them to a cross fire, forced them instantly to retreat. The fourth and fifth divisions then continued to advance, uninterrupted by any further reverse, and gained complete possession of the crest of the position.

In the meanwhile the Arapiles was carried by General Clinton; and the third division had advanced from the left, along the centre of the French position, attacking and dispersing the enemy in every encounter. Marshal Marmont had been wounded, and the command of the army devolved on General Clausel, who, with great skill and promptitude, now endeavoured to rally his defeated troops in a new position, running nearly at right angles with the original front. The ground was admirably chosen. Either flank of the position was supported by masses of cavalry; and the artillery was so

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CHAP. IX. posted as not only to sweep the whole face of
1812. the height, but to command all the ground in
July. the vicinity.

The assumption of so strong a position caused a pause in the movements of the allies. Lord Wellington having examined it, at length directed the fourth division to dislodge the enemy by a flank movement on the left, while General Clinton's division, supported by the third and fifth, should attack it in front. It was in this part of the action that the loss on the part of the allies was most severe. General Clinton's division, during the whole of its advance, was exposed to a most destructive fire of artillery and musquetry, which it sustained with the greatest steadiness, till reaching the summit of the height, it at once charged with the bayonet, and the fourth division coming up, the enemy abandoned the position in great confusion, and fled towards Alba, where he crossed the Tormes. The allied troops continued the pursuit with great vigour till the approach of night, when the darkness and extreme fatigue of the troops, rendered it necessary to halt.*

* But for an unforeseen circumstance, the victory of Salamanca must have been attended with even greater results.

The immediate results of this most splendid victory, were the capture of eleven pieces of artillery, two eagles, and of seven thousand prisoners. Three French Generals (Ferey, Thomieres, and Desgraviers) were killed ; Marshal Marmont, Generals Bonnet, Clausel, and Menne, were wounded. The total loss of the enemy cannot be calculated at less than fourteen thousand men.

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The number of killed and wounded on the part of the victors, was about five thousand two hundred, including six General officers, one of whom (Le Marchant) was killed, the others (Beresford, Leith, Cotton, Cole, and Alten) were wounded.

The enemy, taking advantage of the darkness, continued his flight during the night ; and, at day-dawn, the pursuit was renewed on the part of the allies. The advanced-guard, consisting of Major-General Baron Bock's and General Anson's brigades of cavalry, which joined during the

Jul. 23.

When the enemy took up his second position, the light division was directed to march to Huerta, and the first division to Alba de Tormes, to cut off their retreat. These orders, so far as concerned the first division, were *not* executed, and the Spaniards having abandoned the Castle of Alba on the approach of the French, the latter were enabled to effect their retreat across the Tormes without impediment.

CHAP. IX. night, succeeded in coming up with the enemy's rear division, strongly posted behind the village of La Serna. The two brigades instantly charged; and the French cavalry, panic-stricken by their recent defeat, fled in great confusion, leaving the infantry to their fate. The whole of the latter, consisting of three battalions, were made prisoners.

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After this disaster, Clausel continued his retreat, by forced marches and in great disorder, towards Valladolid. Being joined, however, by a considerable body of cavalry and horse artillery from the north, he succeeded in crossing the Douro, with little further annoyance from the allies, whose march was delayed by the difficulty of bringing up the supplies. Lord Wellington reached Valladolid on the thirtieth, but finding Clausel continued his retreat on Burgos in a state of great disorganization, on the day following he recrossed the Douro, and halted at Cuellar.

August 7.

Lord Wellington then determined to march against the army of the centre, which, in order to favour the escape of the defeated force, had approached the flank of the allies. Preparations for this purpose were immediately set on foot,

and on the seventh of August the army com- CHAP. IX.
 menced its movement on Madrid, by the route of
 Segovia, leaving a force under General Paget on
 the Douro to observe the motions of the enemy.

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Joseph Bonaparte could muster, for the defence of the capital, about twenty thousand men,—a force altogether inadequate to offer any serious impediment to the march of the allies. In Madrid all was confusion. So decisive a movement on the part of Lord Wellington had been altogether unforeseen, and no arrangements had been made for the defence of the capital. Joseph had left Madrid on the twenty-first of July, and marched by the Escorial to join Marmont. In the neighbourhood of Arevalo he received intelligence of Marmont's defeat. He then marched by his right to Segovia, with the intention of drawing Lord Wellington's attention from the army of Clausel. No sooner, however, did he learn that Lord Wellington was advancing against him, than he fell back rapidly on Madrid.

In the meantime the allied army continued its progress. No attempt was made to defend the passage of the Guadarama mountains; but, on the tenth, an engagement took place with a body of the enemy's cavalry, which had been sent for-

CHAP. IX. ward to watch the motions of the allies. This

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force was driven in in the morning by General D'Urban, who moved on to Majalahonda, where he took post with his brigade of Portuguese cavalry, Captain Macdonald's troop of horse artillery, and the cavalry and light infantry of the German legion.

The enemy's cavalry having again approached, General D'Urban ordered the Portuguese brigade to charge the leading squadrons of the enemy, which appeared too far in advance to be supported by the main body. The Portuguese cavalry advanced to the attack, but before they reached the enemy, turned about and fled. By this disgraceful conduct three guns were lost, which owing to the difficulties of the ground could not be removed. The Germans then charged, and succeeded in checking the progress of the enemy; and Colonel Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, and a brigade of the seventh division coming up shortly after, the French burned the carriages of the captured guns and retired.

Aug. 12.

On the twelfth the allies entered Madrid; Joseph having abandoned it on the preceding night, and retired to the left of the Tagus, where he took post with his right at Aranjuez, and his

left in the direction of Toledo. A garrison of CHAP. IX.
seventeen hundred men were left in the Retiro,
in order to check the enthusiasm of the people,
and preserve the convoys from plunder. 1812.
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The appearance of the allied army was hailed with joy and triumph by all ranks in the capital. All business was suspended; and thousands of the inhabitants bearing branches of laurel, came forth to welcome their victorious liberators. On the day following the Retiro surrendered. Don Carlos d'España was appointed governor, and the Constitution was proclaimed amid the enthusiastic *vivas* of the populace.

While these brilliant operations were in progress, Marshal Soult had advanced against Sir Rowland Hill; but that officer retreating on his approach to the position of Albuera, which had been strengthened by entrenchments and redoubts, Soult did not venture to attack him. At Ulna, on the eleventh of June, an unfortunate affair took place between the heavy brigade of cavalry, under General Slade, and a party of the enemy, commanded by General Lallemande. General Slade charged with great spirit, and in a few minutes put the French to flight; but the pursuit being continued Jun. 11.

CHAP. IX. too far, the enemy were reinforced, and became the assailants in turn. After a sanguinary conflict, General Slade's brigade were driven back in great confusion, with the loss of nearly two hundred of their number in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Many other cavalry affairs took place, in one of which Lieutenant Streuwitz succeeded in surprising a party of the enemy, which he attacked and defeated, with the loss of twenty men and horses, besides a great number killed.

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But the aspect of affairs in the whole Peninsula was at once changed by the victory of Salamanca. Soult relaxed his grasp of Andalusia, and determined to concentrate his army in Granada. On the twenty-fifth of August the siege of Cadiz was raised, and the Spaniards took immediate possession of Puerto Real and Chiclana. The enemy's rear-guard was attacked by a detachment sent from Cadiz, under Colonel Skerret and General Cruz Morgeon, which drove it from St. Lucar; and on the twenty-seventh Seville was carried by assault. The French, on the approach of the allied force, evacuated the suburb Triana, and retreated to the town. An attempt was then made to defend the bridge; but

Aug. 25.

Aug. 27.

the grenadiers of the Guards attacked them with the bayonet, when all resistance ceased, and the enemy fled, leaving the streets strewed with their dead. In this affair they lost above two hundred prisoners, besides a considerable quantity of baggage, horses, and money.

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The enemy having withdrawn from Estramadura, the presence of General Hill on the Guadiana was no longer required, and that leader was directed to move to the Tagus, and connect his operations with the main body of the army. On the approach of General Hill's corps, Joseph abandoned Toledo, and fell back to Almanza, on the frontiers of Murcia and Valencia, from which point he could communicate both with Soult and Suchet.

With the exception of one battalion, the whole British troops were withdrawn from Cadiz; and every effort was made by Lord Wellington to excite the Spaniards to new and increased efforts at a crisis so important.

CHAPTER X.

SIEGE OF BURGOS—RETREAT OF THE ALLIED
ARMY.

CHAP. X.

1812.

August.

THE situation of Lord Wellington at Madrid, though brilliant, was full of peril. The defeated army of Marmont was still numerous, and had been largely reinforced; and a corps of observation, of ten thousand men, had been sent into Alava. The armies of the south and centre, by forming a junction with that of Suchet, might speedily advance against the capital, with a force at least treble in amount to that of the allies.

Little benefit had resulted from the tardy arrival of the Sicilian force under General Maitland. A few days before its appearance on the coast, General O'Donnel had been defeated at Castalla, and driven into Murcia, with the loss of three thousand of his army. The only Spanish army with which he could co-operate having

thus been beaten from the field, General Maitland remained cooped up in Alicante, and none of those benefits which had been anticipated from the arrival of this force were realized.

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In the north, indeed, Santocildes, with the Gallician army, besides other minor advantages gained over the enemy, succeeded in reducing Astorga; and the garrison, amounting to twelve hundred men, surrendered prisoners of war. A detachment of seven hundred men was captured by the Empecinado in Guadalaxara; and the Guerillas were every where active in their vocation. But in the neighbourhood of Madrid, no active exertions were made against the common enemy. There was no attempt to organize any military system, and it soon became evident to Lord Wellington that he could only calculate with security on his own army, to defeat the projects of the enemy.

To remain in Madrid, therefore, was impossible, and only three other courses presented themselves.

He might advance into the south against Soult; but, in that case, the other armies would immediately combine and act in his rear, and no advantage of any kind could be secured.

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He might unite his whole force, enter Valencia, march directly on Alicante, establish his communications with General Maitland, threaten the armies of Arragon and the centre, and prevent their junction with Soult, leaving a corps of sufficient magnitude to guard the passage of the Douro.

He might, in the third place, advance against the army of the north, which had again assumed a hostile attitude, and compelled General Paget to cross the Douro. This scheme was attended with the evident disadvantage, that it was in the power of Soult, Suchet, and Joseph, to combine their forces, and thus compel him to retreat.

Under more favourable circumstances, the second of these projects, was probably that which Lord Wellington would have followed. Had Ballasteros done his duty in the south, and thrown himself between Soult and the army of the centre—had O'Donnell's army been in condition to join him—and had the force of General Maitland, been of the magnitude which Lord Wellington had been taught to expect, the allied army, by entering the eastern provinces, might probably have secured a more brilliant termination to the campaign. But in all these

things Lord Wellington had been deceived. Balasteros refused to combine his movements with those of the allies. General Maitland's corps barely amounted to six thousand men. The army of O'Donnel had been beaten from the field; and in the whole south and east of Spain there existed not a single force on the assistance of which he could rely.

There were also other reasons to induce Lord Wellington to transfer his operations to the north. The resources of Gallicia had never been called forth since the French were driven out, about three years before, and Lord Wellington was assured, that a force of twenty-five thousand men were ready to act with him from thence, and able to oppose Clausel, if put in possession of Burgos. Considerable reinforcements were expected from England, and in the north only could these effect their junction, in time to influence the success of the campaign. By advancing against the army of Portugal, he would at all events create a strong diversion in favour of the southern provinces, the most wealthy, the most populous, and the most patriotic in the kingdom. He would secure the liberation of Andalusia, which Soult had unwill-

CHAP. X. lingly been driven to abandon, and was again
 1812. prepared to occupy on the first return of success.

September. Thus forced on a choice of difficulties, Lord Wellington, considering it possible to strike a blow against Clausel before the other armies could advance to his support, determined to march in person to the north, with four divisions of his army. Two divisions were left in garrison at Madrid. General Hill moved to Aranjuez, to observe the motions of the army of the south; and Ballasteros was requested to unite his force with the corps of that leader, in case Soult should direct his march on Madrid. In the event of Soult moving into Valencia, he was to take post at Alcazar, and defend the approach to the capital on that side.

Sep. 7. On the first of September, Lord Wellington quitted Madrid, and on the morning of the seventh, the army passed the Douro, and took possession of Valladolid. Clausel fell back on the approach of the allies, destroying the bridges on the Pisuerga. At Palencia, the Gallician army effected its junction, but, instead of an efficient force of twenty-five thousand men, it scarcely mustered above ten thousand undisciplined soldiers, utterly deficient in every thing of equip-