

force, and the valor of the thirteenth dragoons at Campo Mayor, rendered the movement by Merida a sure operation.

4. Beresford, unable to judge rightly of the real state of affairs, thought Badajos would be evacuated, whenever the allies passed the Guadiana.

5. Up to the 21st of April at least, Lord Wellington did not think well of the marshal's operations.

The first of these facts scarcely requires authority, seeing that Badajos must necessarily have been ill-prepared for a siege, yet I have abundant proof.

Colonel Jones, in his *Sieges*, page 3, writes thus: "At this time (26th March), the French had been in possession of Badajos only a fortnight, and the works and batteries of their recent siege still afforded considerable cover. *The breach was open*, and the garrison ill-supplied with provisions, ammunition, stores; the re-capture, therefore, not only seemed inevitable, but easy if speedily invested; but the river Guadiana interfered, and there was neither a pontoon-train nor other means with the army for crossing the river."

The last passage of this quotation proves that Merida was the true line, because there was a bridge there. It is foolish to plead in bar Lord Wellington's instructions to pass at Jerumenha. They were given in the notion that all things for an *immediate passage* were in readiness; but it was not so, and Beresford, following the letter, neglected the spirit of his instruction, which was to recover Badajos as speedily as possible. The denuded state of Badajos does not rest on Colonel Jones's single testimony. Colonel Lamarre, the commander of the French engineers in that town, says: "The English committed a great fault in wasting eight days before Olivenza, which must have fallen after the taking of Badajos, and *with a little more boldness and penetration Badajos might have been attacked with success in the beginning of April*. From the 12th of March, the French had been working to fill up the trenches, to repair the breach, and to make other restorations, especially the l'ardaleras, which was a heap of ruins. But materials were rare, and masons scarce. It was not until the 21st of April that the breach was closed, and the state of the said breach had been a source of great uneasiness, because if five or six thousand men had appeared before Badajos at the end of March, that place, in a bad state and feebly garrisoned, must have fallen in a short time."

This last paragraph also proves that Merida would have been the best line. But to proceed with Lamarre.

"The armament of the place was augmented by the guns brought from Campo Mayor." (Those very guns which the thirteenth dragoons took and Marshal Beresford lost again.) "The former

siege and the preparations for defence had, however, exhausted all the resources of the town and the neighboring country, and yet so pressed were the engineers for wood, that so late as the 22d of April," (fourteen days after Beresford had crossed the Guadiana,) "a strong detachment was sent out to fetch timber." This detachment, as may be seen in the body of my work, was nearly cut off by Lord Wellington, who lost no time after he arrived in ascertaining the real state of the garrison. There is, however, other and even better proof of the denuded state of Badajos, namely, the original register-book of the French governor's orders and correspondence, from which I extract the following passages:—

1. *To the royal commissary of the province, 10th April, 1811.*—"The place of Badajos being unfurnished of timber, it is proper to fix upon some place to cut it," &c., &c. "I pray you to make all diligence on this subject, and to employ all means in your power."

12th April. *To the same.*—"I send you two states of the articles wanting in Badajos to complete us for three months' consumption of 4630 rations of food, and 300 of forage per day, besides the objects necessary for the sick." "I pray you, in consequence, to make immediate requisitions on the villages of the province for the quick supply of the same." "The paymaster-general has no funds to pay for the works of the place."

Order of the day, 10th April.—"From to-morrow, the troops of the garrison will receive only three quarters ration of bread daily."

14th April.—"Our mills can make no more flour for want of charcoal,"—*à faire battre les meulles.* "The engineers also are much embarrassed for want of this article, which is, however, indispensable."

26th April. *To the royal commissary, &c.*—"No brandy can be given to the workmen; there is none in the magazines, except that which I have reserved for the gunners in case of a siege."

These extracts show the state of Badajos to the end of April. But I have said: "General Imas, when he surrendered to Soult, had plenty of provisions," and it is asked how that agrees with the French being in want.

Lord Wellington, writing to Lord Liverpool, proves the fact as to Imas. "*Louzao, March 16th.*—The garrison (that is the Spanish) wanted neither ammunition nor provisions." But after Imas surrendered, not only his garrison but the other prisoners, and the French army were fed from the resources of Badajos, and the French garrison also lived for a fortnight in the town. Imas might therefore have had plenty, and the French garrison very little. Captain Malet, the English agent living with Mer-dizabel at the period of Soult's siege, writes thus:—

“Badajos, 8th February. There are sufficient provisions for several months for a garrison of 6000 men, but if the present number of troops are kept here, amounting to nearly *sixteen thousand men*, the place cannot hold out long.”

I now come to the other four facts, namely, the practicability of the road to Merida, the impression of terror made upon the French, the false notions of Beresford relative to the enemy, and Lord Wellington's opinion of the operations.

The proof of the three first will be found in the extract from a letter addressed by Marshal Beresford to the plenipotentiary, Mr. C. Stuart. For it is not a little curious, that the writer of the *Strictures*, who pretends to have direct authority from the marshal to contradict my statement, and who accuses me of ignorance, should yet be so ignorant himself, that I am able to rebut his charges by the testimony of the very man whose cause he espouses. Meanwhile, I make little account of his argument about the army of the centre advancing, and the dangerous position beyond the Guadiana; the latter would have been the same as it was after passing at Jerumenha; and it is evident from the marshal's letter, that the army of the centre, if its existence was even known by him, did not enter into his calculations: it is only introduced to mystify the subject. The notion that Latour Maubourg, for Mortier was not, as this ill-informed writer supposes, then with the army, could by passing through Badajos cut off the retreat, is also unsustainable. My proposition was to place the allies between Badajos and the French army; because the latter was feeble, surprised by the former, and astounded by the charge of the thirteenth dragoons. Moreover, Beresford in his public despatch calls Latour Maubourg's army only five thousand; he could therefore have had no fear of it; and with the allied army on both sides of the Guadiana it would have been easier to throw a bridge than when possessing only the right bank. But the danger of having the line by Merida, is thus disproved; Lord Wellington ordered Beresford, when the bridge at Jerumenha was swept away, to occupy Merida, establish his communications by that very line, and alter his cantonments accordingly.

Authorities—*Marshal Beresford to Mr. C. Stuart, Elvas, April 1, 1811.*

“I scarcely think the French will remain in Badajos, as I cannot believe they will let so considerable a force as will be necessary for its defence be isolated from their field army, which of itself is not very great, and cannot relieve that part so isolated but by abandoning Andalusia, and then perhaps not equal to it. I hope to be able to pass the Guadiana at all events the 4th; but most

vexatiously a vagabond officer of the drivers' corps, in conducting the five Spanish boats saved from Badajos, absolutely overset two in as fair a road as any in England; and which, with the present swell of the river, will give me some difficulty. The pontoons sent from Lisbon (English) were only fit for infantry."—"I have got the Spaniards at Albuquerque, at least all the armed; and the sooner the arms are sent for the others the better, that we may send them to their own country, that I have now opened for them. I propose, in passing the Guadiana, that they march to Merida; and, if the enemy remain in Badajos, I shall bring them on my right to Lobau or Talavera. The chase which my countrymen of the thirteenth dragoons gave on the 25th was literally a fox-chase of two leagues without drawing bit; and which, though it lost me three battalions of infantry that must else have been surrounded, has given a terror to the French that is, perhaps, equal to the capture of the infantry. The Portuguese joined very handsomely, and appear equally to have enjoyed the chase."

How the thirteenth dragoons by beating the cavalry, taking the convoy, and interposing between the infantry and Badajos, while the heavy dragoons, the artillery and infantry of the allies were on the flank and rear of the French infantry; how this prevented the latter from being surrounded, does not very clearly appear; but it is clear, 1. That the road to Merida was practicable, or he would not have sent the Spaniards that way; 2. That "he anticipated little or no opposition from the French after the Campo Mayor affair," seeing "he had then opened the Spaniards' country for them; 3. That the enemy were struck with terror; 4. That their field-army was not great." Finally, that he was unable to judge of the true state of affairs, inasmuch as his expectations were all signally frustrated by the course of events. Badajos was not evacuated; it would have been strange if it had. The French did suffer its garrison to be isolated, and they did also relieve it, and without abandoning Andalusia. This letter confirms also my assertion that Marshal Beresford thought Soult would act entirely on the defensive; and that no doubt may exist on that head, I will give an extract from another of his own letters, supporting it by one from Lord Wellington, which I transpose from my Appendix to this place.

Marshal Beresford to Mr. C. Stuart, 27th of April, 1811.
Extract.

"It is said Soult is assembling a force on our side of Seville; his number is, however, I think, much exaggerated, but I cannot speak certain about it."

Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Elvas, May 2, 1811.

“On the night of the 15th instant, I received from Marshal Sir William Beresford letters of the 12th and 13th instant, which reported that Marshal Soult had broke up from Seville about the 10th, and had advanced towards Estremadura, notwithstanding the reports which had been previously received, that he was busily occupied in strengthening Seville and the approaches to that city by works, and that all his measures indicated an intention to remain on the defensive in Andalusia; I therefore set out on the following morning!”

The last paragraph indicates that Wellington had not much confidence in Beresford when opposed to Soult; but the following extract from another letter more fully discloses the cause of his repairing in person to Estremadura.

Elvas, April 21st, Lord Wellington to Mr. C. Stuart.

“I am afraid that we have lost some valuable time here, and I am come to put matters in the right road; and to come to an understanding with Castaños and if possible with Blake, respecting our future operations.”

6. *Want of guns, stores, provisions, and pontoons.*—My charge against the Portuguese government was perhaps put too broadly; yet it is untrue to say, as this writer has done, that the government had not to do with these matters; they had a great deal to do with them, and also with the storing of the fortresses, the food of the Portuguese troops, and the means of transport for everything. If the writer of the *Strictures* has really received any information from the Marshal upon this subject, he must know that on all those points the negligence of the government, and of their “Junta de Viveres,” and the false reports and assertions by which they endeavored to cover that negligence, were sources of continual and most serious distress to Lord Wellington, who could not until the end of the year procure even a decree for the abolition of the “Junta de Viveres;” and could at no time get delinquents punished. He must know also, that after the battle of Fuentes, the Portuguese troops were without any ammunition because of the negligence of the government; that one of the principal reforms in the administration sought for by Lord Wellington was the consolidation of the branches of the arsenal under one head; and that it was not till February, 1812, one year after this period, that Mr. D. Lemós returned from the Brazils, with full authority for Beresford to control the administration in all that regarded the Portuguese army. This writer should also have known that the engineers’ stores ordered up to Elvas for Beresford’s siege were not, as Colonel Jones in his journal supposes, kept back because *the*

exhausted state of the country would not afford carriages, but because government would not enforce the requisitions for them.

Lord Wellington's operations depended much upon the Portuguese government, and that government almost always failed to do its duty. I am unwilling therefore, on this pamphleteer's authority, to diminish the censure. I am unwilling to suppose Lord Wellington relied not upon the government but upon Beresford; because if the guns and ammunition were under the control of the Marshal, he alone would be answerable for deficiencies of that kind, which would be a most serious charge. Let us now hear Colonel Jones upon the extent of those deficiencies.

"The strength of Badajoz had not been duly appreciated, and the means prepared for its reduction in artillery, ammunition, and stores, were altogether too inconsiderable." "It may be considered fortunate that the approach of Marshal Soult's army caused the siege to be raised, as otherwise, after a further sacrifice of men in other feeble attempts, it would have brought itself to a conclusion, from *inability to proceed*."*

I might here leave Marshal Beresford to the care of his kind friend; but as I am desirous of clearing myself from the charge of unjustly blaming the Portuguese government, I will insert some extracts from Lord Wellington's correspondence which bear more directly on the question; and which show that if Beresford had nominally the control of the arsenals, the government through the junta of the arsenal, had in reality the charge of supplying the guns, ammunition, and provisions.

Wellington to Mr. Stuart, Celorico, March 31, 1811.

"I also beg you to draw the attention of the government to the operations on the frontiers of Alemtejo; these are becoming of the utmost importance not only to Portugal, but to the allies in general. It is obvious they cannot be carried on without a constant communication with the magazines, as well at Abrantes as with those at Lisbon; for the inhabitants of Alemtejo supply nothing to the troops. I now request you will give notice to the government that they must either enforce their own law strictly, and oblige the inhabitants of Alemtejo to give the commissaries of the army the use of their carriages for the payment of hire, or the operations upon that frontier must be discontinued, and I must draw the army back to its magazines. That province has been untouched by the enemy, the carriages must be in it, and yet I have been able to procure only thirty-four, to remove the articles necessary to establish an hospital for Marshal Beresford's corps at Estremos. If the government are tired of the war, and do not choose to exert

* Journal of Sieges, by Colonel J. Jones.

themselves to oblige the people to bring forward the means which are required to enable the army to carry on its operations at a distance from its magazines, it is necessary that it should be known to the British government, that they may adopt such measures as they may think proper."

Elvas, May 20, 1811.

"I enclose the copy of a memorial which has been put into my hands by Major Dickson of the artillery, regarding the march of certain guns demanded for the service of this garrison from Lisbon. I trust that the movement of the guns has not been suspended, as their early arrival is very important; and I shall be obliged to you if you will make inquiry upon the subject."

"It is perfectly true that Major Arentschild left the reserve of his artillery, that is, his spare ammunition, at Sorogoza between Celorico and Ponte Murcella. Why? Because his mules and cattle had been starved on the Rio Mayor, and could not draw it any farther; and because the magistrates of the country would supply no means of transport to draw it on."

Elvas, May 27.

"I hear from Colonel Le Mesurier that, notwithstanding the breeze which Colonel Rosa has made about Arentschild, there is no ammunition for the Portuguese troops and artillery, even at Coimbra!?"

Let me now close this part of the subject by a conclusive extract from Marshal Beresford's own correspondence. In a letter to Lord Wellington, dated January 25, 1811, he says:—

"Their difficulties were increasing fast; matters, in his opinion, were coming to a crisis; he was in the greatest alarm about them, and was afraid to look at the state of things, as far as any Portuguese authority was concerned."

Siege of Badajos.—On this head, the main fact disputed is *the want of due concert in the double attack*. In my History I give ample authority, and this writer's cavils merely prove that he is angry, and does not know the meaning of the word concert, which he thinks to be synonymous with simultaneous.

I am also accused of having, from inadvertence, marked the investment on the 5th instead of the 4th of May. So nice a critic should himself have avoided marking the Campo Mayor affair on the 26th instead of the 25th. Yet did I not commit the error, if error it be, from "*inadvertence*:" I find my authority, as usual, in the author's own Appendix. Colonel D'Urban says, "On the morning of the 4th, General Stewart was put in movement," &c., and "on the morning of the 5th invested Badajos."

In like manner this writer, curiously exact, asserts that the

army "was not over the Guadiana until the 8th." By his Appendix, however, it appears, that on the 7th only one brigade of guns was left on the other side. He says, also, "no Spaniards joined the marshal from Montijo," and two of the ten days assigned to his operations by me are to be deducted; yet in the next page he himself assigns the same term of ten days! and with reason, because it was not till the 18th Latour Maubourg retired to Guadalcanal, and ten and eight make eighteen. Moreover, the operations were begun the 7th, for on that day the piquet of cavalry was surprised.

As to the Spaniards from Montijo, *I did not say they joined the marshal*, I said he commanded 25,000 men including them, for which I adduce D'Urban's Memoir, given in this writer's own Appendix—viz., "On the 10th, General Castaños (at Sir William Beresford's desire) had caused Count Penne Villemur with the Spanish cavalry from the side of Montejo, followed by General Morillo with his division of infantry, to occupy Merida, from which the French garrison had withdrawn, and the count pushed on his advanced posts to Almendralejo." These men acting in concert with the marshal, and by his desire, were certainly under his command. Let these trifles pass. I will now give another extract from Captain Squire, who, notwithstanding this writer's displeasure, is good authority for what fell under his own observation; and not the less so that he supports my opinion as to the marshal's want of skill at the siege, corroborates the account of his blunder at Campo Mayor, and attests the fact, that the army did generally hold his talents in scorn, and were tired of his command.

"17th May, 1811. Thank God! they say Lord Wellington or General Hill may be soon expected in the neighborhood; *this will be a revival to our spirits*, for we have lost our character on this part of the frontier. On the night of the 12th the real attack on the east side of the town was begun, but suspended by the marshal after one hour's work; the soil was excellent. Had we begun there on the 9th, Badajos would have been our own on the morning of the 15th. But after the affair of Campo Mayor, &c., &c.!!! what can be expected?"

Battle of Albuera.—1. "Thus the youngest officer commanded."
—*History.*

This is true. Blake's appointment as Captain-general of Valencia and Murcia took place indeed after the battle of Albuera, but he had been created Captain-general of the Coronilla in March, 1809, and as one of the Spanish regents was of a higher rank than Beresford.

2. "The position was about four miles long."—*History.*

It was so, from the extreme left where the Portuguese cavalry were placed, to the extreme right where the battle ceased. My plan is carped at by this author; it was only given as an explanatory sketch, but it was taken from the same source as his, and does not, as he asserts, extend the wood over the tongue of land to the banks of the Albuera, although some plans of the position that I have seen do so. Moreover, in describing the ground, this writer, as usual, forgets to make his Appendix agree with his text. At page 113 he says, "the rear of the position was only practicable for infantry;" but D'Urban's memoir says, "it was easy for cavalry throughout." Which is right?

3. "The position was occupied by 30,000 infantry, above 2,000 cavalry, and 38 guns."—*History*.

This author's disingenuous manner of bolstering up a bad cause is here evident. Having printed a running commentary upon my pages, written by somebody who is not named, he makes this anonymous critic state that the allies had only 34 pieces of artillery, thus leaving out four Spanish guns; and at the end of D Urban's memoir there is also the same false detail; and yet these persons, who cannot, in so small a matter attain any correctness, are brought forward to censure my inaccuracy! The official returns of Sir Alexander Dickson, the commanding officer of artillery in the battle, make the numbers amount, as I have stated, to 38—viz.:

British horse artillery	4
Ditto foot ditto	6
King's German Legion, ditto	12
Portuguese, ditto	12
Spanish artillery	4
	38

Detail of Troops.

Beresford's corps.		Spaniards.			
Infantry,	{ British	7,500	4th	{ Infantry	11,000
	{ Germans	1,500	army	{ Cavalry	1,100
	{ Portuguese	10,000	5th	army	{ Infantry
Cavalry,	{ British	700	army	{ Cavalry	500
	{ Portuguese	300			
Total		20,000	Deduct for stragglers and deserters from the 4th army. } Total		14,600 1,100 13,500
					20,000
			Grand total		33,500

Authorities.—1. Lord Londonderry, who was adjutant-general, rates the British at 7,500
 2. Two battalions of Germans I estimate at 1,500
 3. General D'Urban, who rates the Portuguese at 10,000
 4. General Harvey's journal, in which the British cavalry are rated at 700
 And the Portuguese cavalry at 300

20,000

I find, also, in a very accurate journal kept by Colonel Thorne, a staff officer, that the heavy British cavalry on the 20th of March, only twenty days previous to the battle, amounted to 752 men under arms—viz.:

3d dragoon guards	379
4th do. do.	373

752

Wherefore, taking the 13th dragoons at a low rate, the British cavalry alone had a thousand troopers in the field. But the reader will observe here, a greater number of men than I allowed in*my work. The fact is, that being in doubt whether Lord Londonderry included Alten's Germans under the general head of British, I deducted the latter from the gross number. I have never been able to procure an official return of the whole army in the field; probably none was made, and my belief is, that I have understated the number by nearly two thousand men.

Since writing the above, I have obtained the weekly states of General Long's division of cavalry for the 8th and for the 29th of May, that is, one week before and a little more than a week after the battle of Albuera, and unless it can be shown that in the fight there were fewer men in the ranks than at other periods, they will be found conclusive as to the numbers of cavalry.

On the 8th of May, the present under arms at Villa Franca, in front of Albuera, were, exclusive of 230 officers and sergeants, 1429 Portuguese and British troopers, the latter having 1109 men and 1076 horses.

On the 29th of May, there were 1587 men and 225 officers and sergeants, and 1489 horses, the increase arising from the junction of men who had been detached. The allied cavalry, including the thirteenth dragoons, and the Portuguese and Spanish horsemen, was therefore nearly three thousand strong.

My mode of estimating the numbers of the fifth Spanish army was as follows:

In D'Urban's memoir, Morillo's division of the fifth Spanish army is said to consist of a few weak battalions, and Carlos d'España's brigade of five battalions, is called 2000 strong. One battalion of the latter was sent to Olivenza, the remaining four battalions I therefore took to be 1600 men; to these I added 400, as supposing that Castaños must have brought up some of Morillo's people to the action; Penne Villemur's cavalry I know, from several sources, to have been at least 500 strong.

The number of the fourth army I found in a letter of Lord Wellington, dated Nissa, April 18, 1811:

"From a letter from Mr. Wellesley, of the eleventh, I learn that General Blake was himself about to come into the Condado de Niebla, to take the command of General Ballesteros' division, and of the troops which had been under the command of General Zayas, and which were to return to that quarter. The whole corps will amount to 12,000 men, of which 1100 are cavalry."

I subtracted 1100 men, as stragglers or deserters during the long march from Ayamonte, which I believe was too many, because Lord Wellington, in a letter dated the 4th July, 1811, six weeks after the battle, says Blake's corps was still from 10,000 to 12,000 strong; and in an abstract of the head-quarters returns, made 1st July, Quinta St. Joa, Blake's corps is again set down at 12,000. My estimate is thus borne out; and what does a thousand or two, more or less, signify, when it is plain there were already more than Marshal Beresford was able to handle, seeing that in so bloody and critical a battle one-third of his troops never fired a shot.

4. The French had "above 4000 veteran cavalry, but only 19,000 chosen infantry."—*History*.

The imperial muster-rolls of the 1st of May, the present under arms of the fifth corps, including the garrison of Badajos and 3500 reinforcements in march to join, were 15,885, of which 752 were cavalry and 590 artillery,

Leaving.	14,543	infantry.
Deduct garrison	2,887	
							11,656	—
Total,	11,656	—
Soult drew from the 1st corps one battalion of grenadiers,	500	
Ditto from 4th corps, two regiments of infantry forming Werle's brigade,	4,000	—
From Dessolles' reserve at Cordova, Godinot's brigade,	4,000	—
							20,156	

For officers and non-combatants, who are always included in French returns, I deducted, . . .	1,156	
	<hr/>	
Total infantry, . . .		19,000
The division of heavy dragoons was . . .	3,000	
The light cavalry of the 5th corps, . . .	752	
Drawn from the 4th corps two regiments, . . .	500	
	<hr/>	
Including officers, total cavalry,		4,252
	<hr/>	
Grand total, including a detachment left at Villalba,		23,252
	<hr/>	

Having thus worked out my estimate from authentic documents, I turned to the French authors who have treated of this battle—viz: Jomini, *Vie de Napoleon*; Lamarre, *Relation du Siège de Badajos*; Lapene, *Conquête d'Andalusie*; Bory St. Vincent, one of Sault's staff, *Guide des Voyageurs en Espagne*. They make the French twenty-two thousand men of all arms, while the *Victoires et Conquêtes Français* reduces them much lower. I have, therefore, most probably over-stated the force of the French.

5. "Nearly 7000 of the allies," and "above 8000 of the French were struck down."—*History*.

Authorities.—The official returns make the loss of the Anglo-Portuguese 4547

The loss of the Spaniards I estimated from common report at the time, from the authority of Colonel Jones's *History*, and from the Spanish accounts of the day 2200

Total 6747

The British official return does not include a number of men, who, having been made prisoners, escaped and rejoined their regiments in a few days after the action. The writer of the *Strictures* reduces the British loss, and estimates the Spanish at only 1700; but to effect the first, he strikes out the officers and sergeants, and with respect to the last, he knows well that it is under-rated; indeed, in his own text, there is proof of the inaccuracy of his statement, for he says that before the British came into action, the Spaniards had lost 1500; yet he would have us believe that in all the after-fight, though they were constantly exposed to the fire, they only lost 200 more!

As to the French loss, General Gazan, in an intercepted letter, says he had, a few days after the battle, more than 4000 wounded under his charge, and some had died on the road. By Marshal Beresford's despatches, I found 350 wounded discovered at Al-

men, and 3000 lying killed or mortally wounded on the field. This loose estimation, taken at the highest, accounts for about 8000; taken at the lowest, about 7000. This last number is what French writers admit, and it is confirmed in the official abstract of Lord Wellington's analysis of the numbers opposed to him in July, 1811. He there twice estimates the French loss at 7000 men; but with that liberality which is usually practiced toward enemies on such occasions, Marshal Beresford added 2000, Sir Benjamin D'Urban adds 3000, and the author of the *Strictures* adds 4000 to this number. How far will future writers of this school go?

6. "Already Blake's arrogance was shaking Beresford's authority."—*History*.

This is verified in D'Urban's memoir.

"Although Blake's corps had little more than a league to march from Almendral, by a good road, guided by an officer sent for the purpose, and which the general had engaged should be upon its ground at noon, did not commence arriving till eleven at night, and was not all up till three in the morning of the 16th."—"The posting of the corps was only effected after much delay upon the part of General Blake."

If the exquisitely bad grammar of this extract will permit any meaning to be attached thereto, it is, *that Blake was not acting cordially with the marshal*; but this shall be made clearer. I wrote with allusion to Blake's refusal to change his front: my authority was a staff officer of high rank present. In the first impression of General D'Urban's memoir, I also found written against that part of the memoir, which says, that "Blake only delayed the execution of the order," the following note by Sir H. Hardinge, who carried Blake the order, "He, Blake, positively refused; saying the attack was evidently on the front by the village. When told that the village was sufficiently occupied, he still persisted in his refusal; and when he consented at length to do so, gave such tedious pedantic orders of countermarch, that Beresford was obliged to interfere and direct the movement himself." This is precisely what I have stated.

Here may be noticed another of those absurd charges made in the *Strictures*, but contradicted in Beresford's own correspondence. In a note on D'Urban's memoir, it is said, that by a misprint in the first impression, the words *first* and *second* (referring to the Spanish lines) were reversed, and I adopted the error. Now, without stopping to remark upon the generalship of drawing off the first line when Godinot's attack was commencing in its front, and when from being on the edge of a descent the evolutions must have been cramped, confused, and like a retreat; whereas the second line,

having more room, could have more easily changed its front without offering any advantage or encouragement to Godinot's people;—without stopping, I say, to dilate upon this, I answer that *I did not follow the misprint in Sir B. D'Urban's memoir*, but *I did follow Marshal Beresford's despatches to Lord Wellington and to the Portuguese government*, in both of which he says: "I requested General Blake to form a part of his first line and all his second to that front." And so runs my text.

7. "The narrow ravine of the Aroya," &c.—*History*.

The *Strictures* say there was "no ravine," but if the rear of the position was, as he also asserts, "practicable only for infantry," my expression is just. Nevertheless, I have changed the word to valley. to which he cannot object until he finds two hills together without a valley between them.

8. "The right of the allies and the left of the French were only divided by a wooded hill, about cannon-shot distance from each. This height, neglected by Beresford, was ably made use of by Soult."—*History*.

The plan given by the writer of the *Strictures* makes the hill, as I have said, "about a cannon-shot from each army?" and my text proves I did never argue, as the writer asserts, that a large corps should have been placed there. But I do maintain, if a small body had been there, Soult could not have united fifteen thousand men and forty guns behind it without Beresford knowing anything of the matter; and if, as is probable, the French had first driven this party away, it would have indicated their intentions, and the right of the army could not have been surprised as it was. Moreover, patrols of cavalry and single mounted officers might have gone across the Albuera higher up, and so have looked behind this hill, which was entirely neglected by Beresford. It was a gross error; and it was more gross to permit the French army to pass over that hill, cross the Albuera, and mount the opposite height without the slightest resistance, the whole movement being within cannon-shot of the right of the allies' position. Why were they not watched? where was the allied cavalry? We shall see anon! But what sort of a general is he who suffers his enemy to move for an hour unmolested within cannon-shot against a position which did not exceed three miles in length? Why Mendizabel himself did not discover greater incapacity at the Gebora! But his troops were not so good! English soldiers can sustain even a Mendizabel.

9. "The French cavalry outflanking the front and charging here and there," &c.—*History*.

The idiomatic expression "here and there," shows I meant not

to say the French cavalry charged home, but that they *menaced* the Spaniards' flank. Nevertheless I have authority for an actual charge. The author of the *Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns*, who I believe served with the 29th regiment in the battle, writes thus: "An endeavor was made to bring up the Spanish troops to the charge. This failed. A heavy fire was kept up by the French artillery, and a charge of cavalry again forced them to retire in confusion."

10. "The Spanish line continued to fire without cessation, although the British were before them."—*History*.

This fact was related to me by a staff officer of high rank present; but the *Strictures* say the *English fired upon the Spaniards*. The confusion on the right in the beginning of the action is thus very clearly shown.

11. "At this critical moment General Stewart arrived at the foot of the height with Colborne's brigade," &c.—*History*.

The author of the *Strictures* says, "there was no hill, only a gradual slope," that the troops did not mount it, they "came up it in the regular manner!" The regular manner of coming up a slope without ascending is, no doubt, very modest and unassuming, but until I know what it is I cannot describe it. However, there was a *height* if there was not a *hill*.

Extract from D'Urban's Memoir. "This *height* was of great importance, inasmuch as it commanded the right of the position; and the second division, under the honorable Major-general William Stewart, which was now rapidly advancing to support the Spaniards, and which arrived just as they had been forced to abandon it, was immediately ordered by Sir William Beresford to attack and recover it." The writer of the *Strictures* says they never lost it!

12. "The 31st still maintained the height."—*History*.

Authority.—D'Urban's Memoirs. Extract. "Favored by this (darkness from smoke and rain) as the first brigade under Colonel Colborne fell upon the enemy with the bayonet, and were driving him before them, some squadrons of Polish lancers, &c., charged." "The 31st regiment, which was on the left of the brigade, &c., &c., extricated itself from the confusion, and continued the attack alone." The word should be defence.

13. "Houghton's regiments soon got footing on the summit." "Dickson placed the artillery in line. The 2d division came up on the left, and two Spanish corps at last moved forward."—*History*.

Authority.—D'Urban's Memoir. Extracts. "The 3d brigade of the 2d division, under Major-general Houghton, following the first with equal intrepidity and better fortune, deployed very

judiciously, and with admirable precision, under cover of the lower falls of the heights, moved on in line to the attack, and supported and followed by the 2d brigade, under the Hon. Colonel Abercromby, and the Spaniards under Generals Ballesteros and Zayas, carried all before it, gained the contested ground and took post upon it. The writer of the *Strictures* says I cannot name the Spanish corps, because none moved forward!

I will now give the version of these attacks which I adopted, copied from a note made by Sir Henry Hardinge in the margin of the original impression of D'Urban's Memoir.

"The 1st brigade, when they had gained the crest of *the hill*, found it so hot that Stewart ordered a charge, which the Buffs and 48th alone made in line against the enemy's column of at least 10,000 men. Fortunately the 31st, being the left regiment, had not had time to deploy when the two other two regiments charged; it therefore held the ground while Houghton's brigade deployed in the rear, and under cover, and moved up to the support of the 31st, holding the position and keeping up a hot fire in line against the close column of the enemy which attempted to advance, and sometimes to deploy; keeping, however, within short musket-shot, both sides firing grape: the destruction being infinitely greater in the dense order of the enemy than in our thin order."

In conjunction with the above, may be taken the following extract of a letter from Major Elliott, of the 29th regiment, an actor in what he describes.

"The attack of the 16th May commenced on the right; *and most correctly is it described by Colonel Napier*. The fate of the 1st brigade, except the 31st regiment, was very soon decided; our brigade moved to the right in open column of companies under a very heavy cannonade, by which we had a captain and a good many men killed. The 29th led the brigade; the deployment was made very steadily under this fire, and we became hotly engaged. At this time a body of Polish lancers appeared on our right, charged, and attempted the attack on us which had proved so successful against the 1st brigade; but Major Way (now Sir Gregory) foiled them by throwing back the grenadiers and 1st battalion company, who with an oblique fire sent them off, and we saw no more of them. We kept at it while our ammunition lasted, then the fourth division came up."

This last passage verifies the fact that *ammunition failed*; a circumstance which is also mentioned in the *Annals of the Peninsular Campaign*. It shows also there were more charges of cavalry made than the writer of the *Strictures* knows of: and here I may

mention a curious example of the impudent falsehood of the Spanish accounts of this war.

That Penne Villemur's cavalry fled in a shameful manner, the following statement by Colonel Light proves.

"After our brigades of infantry first engaged were repulsed, I was desired by General D'Urban to tell the Count de Penne Villemur to charge the lancers, and we all started, as I thought, to do the thing well; but when within a few paces of the enemy, the whole pulled up, there was no getting them farther, and in a few moments after I was left alone to run the gauntlet as well as I could."

The comment of the Spanish government in their official gazette at Cadiz upon this part of the action was, that Penne Villemur, seeing three English regiments broken by the French cavalry, withstood the latter, protected the former, and was fired upon by the very regiments he had saved: finally, that the Spaniards alone defeated the whole French army!!

Having thus established most of the important disputed facts related in my History, truth being my object, I will notice the errors I have really made.

1. I supposed the second charge of the lancers (that against the 29th) took place at a later period, and was that in which the guns were captured; it appears the guns were taken in the charge against Colborne's brigade. Here be it noticed that Beresford's despatch suppresses the fact of more than one gun being taken, although six pieces of artillery and other trophies fell into the lancers' hands. Five of the guns were, indeed, afterwards recovered; but in the first instance they were captured and might have been carried off.

2. I supposed the mutual firing between a British and Spanish regiment happened when the fusileers were mounting the hill. I had understood Colonel Robert Arbuthnot so, and that he rode between both parties; the writer of the *Strictures* says he has Sir Robert's letter contradicting the fact. Nevertheless, that such an event did take place at one period of this battle, is proved by the contradictory evidence as to which party fired upon the other. Many circumstances may be satisfactorily verified to a historian by conversation and other means, and he may not be allowed to give the chain of evidence in print, but he may claim confidence if he shows he has been diligent in searching for truth. I have, I think shown: 1. That my inquiries were extensive; 2. That my authorities, even for trifling points, were sound and numerous; 3. That the writer of the *Strictures* being a person of no knowledge and very unscrupulous, cannot be Marshal Beresford, but is proba-

bly some expectant, ready to vouch for anything, "if thrift might follow fawning." I leave unnoticed his scurrility, because I despise it. And I have not exposed above one-half of his misrepresentations, thinking it waste of time; and that his arguments are upon a par with his facts, one or two examples will suffice to prove.

1. He says Soult took an hour to execute his movement across the Albuera against the right; and that the Spaniards resisted afterwards for an hour and a half! That is to say, the French general was permitted, for two hours and a half, freely to act against a point of the position on the possession of which depended the safety of the army, to act there unopposed, save by a few thousand Spaniards, who were confused and disordered by a sudden change of front and by this unexpected attack; and yet the second division was within a mile of them, and the rest of the army not two miles distant! And this is meant to prove the skill of Marshal Beresford! Fortunately for the latter the story of the Spanish resistance is a Spanish romance.

2. This writer would have it believed Beresford disapproved and does still blame the advance of the fusileer brigade, because the enemy's cavalry might, he says, have penetrated by the gap thus made, and because he was in no danger of being beaten, and never thought of retreating! Marshal Beresford, then, by bringing up General Collins's Portuguese and the Spanish reserves to the aid of Houghton's brigade, and joining them to Abercromby's troops, expected to have defeated the enemy; in other words to have won, without the assistance of the fusileers, that battle which was so hardly gained with their assistance! Truly he expected much! The regiments of Houghton's brigade, having lost two-thirds of their number, being without ammunition, and having a French column upon their right flank, were to have maintained the height until all the troops above mentioned could be brought into line! and then Spaniards and Portuguese were to do what the fusileers did!

There was no danger of the French cavalry pushing *through the gap* made by the advance of the fusileers. General Cole had provided against that by placing Harvey's Portuguese brigade *in the gap*, and that brigade did actually repulse an attempt made by Latour Maubourg to push his light cavalry through. But if Beresford was so certain of victory, so composed and confident, so little thinking of a retreat, why did he, when the battle was gained, write to Lord Wellington that he anticipated defeat if attacked the next day, and was determined not to survive it? But the whole argument is nought, seeing that Beresford, in his despatch, praised

the attack of the 4th division, saying, "it was judicious and opportune."

There is even a more certain proof that Marshal Beresford did contemplate a retreat, namely, that he gave the order; it was in part obeyed! *The bridge and village of Albuera were actually abandoned in obedience to his orders, by Alten's Germans and by the artillery!* and Beresford in person rebuked Colonel Halket of the Germans for being slow to obey. This fact, often mentioned, I have ascertained to be true since the foregoing pages were written; hence, far from being moved by common reports, or by prejudice, I was even too careful to reject doubtful matters.

The annexed extract is from a narrative of the campaign of 1811, written by Sir Julius Hartman, who commanded the British artillery in the action. It places the fact beyond contradiction, unless Sir Julius be the most imaginative of men; and certainly Marshal Beresford had good reason to call the arrival of the fusiliers *opportune*, for like Bunyan's Pilgrim, he was then in the "Slough of Despond."

"The enemy made repeated and very serious attacks on the bridge, which were unsuccessful until the troops received an order to assemble *to cover the retreat upon Valverde*. The general-in-chief had given this order at a moment, when the result of the struggle for the possession of the heights had appeared to him doubtful. In pursuance of this order, General Von Alten and the commander of the Portuguese artillery, Major Dickson, *abandoned the village and bridge, which was immediately occupied by the enemy*. Directly after, the re-taking of this was most urgently ordered, which by the valor of the troops, with great sacrifice and spilling of blood was accomplished; but, notwithstanding, the possession of the bridge was never completely obtained."

I can now also upon another point show that Marshal Beresford's errors were far greater than I had supposed them to be.

Statement of Captain Arthur Gregory.

"A deserter came in, about one o'clock A. M. on the 16th; he said that an order was issued for an attack at eight A. M.; he was immediately sent in to head-quarters, and I suppose arrived."

"Between seven and eight, orders came for the cavalry, and I believe for the horse-artillery, to go to the rear to forage and make themselves comfortable. As there was a difficulty about watering, one regiment went down to the river at a time. The first was the 4th dragoons, which, after watering, went to the rear; the 3d dragoon guards were going to water and the horses (I believe) were taken off the guns of the horse-artillery for the same purpose, when an orderly of the 13th dragoons came in from a piquet on the right

with the intelligence that the enemy was crossing the river! General Long immediately galloped off and *found half their army across*, under cover of a hollow, which had completely masked the operation. I was despatched to report it to the Marshal, whose head-quarters were in the village of Albuera; after being detained a few minutes at the door he came out, and after questioning me sharply upon my intelligence, was going in, when I took the liberty of mentioning that the cavalry had been ordered to the rear, and that one regiment had already gone; and I asked him if it should be brought up again, and to where? His orders were, "Let them go more to the right than they were before." I galloped off to the spot where the cavalry had been ordered, and found the 4th dragoons with their horses unbridled and linked with collar chains; the men had taken their accoutrements and jackets off, and were going in all directions to cut forage. A few minutes brought them together. Before I could get back, the cannonade had begun. *Had Soult delayed his attack half an hour, all the British cavalry would have been in the rear dispersed over the country.* I do not know if the brigades of foot artillery had the same orders."

Extract of a letter to Captain Gregory from Lieutenant-Colonel Wildman, a lieutenant in the 4th dragoons at Albuera.

"I perfectly recollect the 4th dragoons being ordered to the rear on the morning of the 16th may, 1811, to cut forage for our horses, and I think it was you who came to order us up again, but whether we had begun cutting it or not before you arrived, I cannot remember."

Extract of a letter to Captain Arthur Gregory from Colonel Leighton, who commanded the 4th dragoons at the battle of Albuera.

"In regard to the morning of the 16th, we had, as usual, been under arms for an hour before daybreak, and to the best of my recollection, between seven and eight o'clock received orders to proceed for forage."

Thus it is proved that if Soult had delayed his attack for half an hour, *not a single British cavalry soldier would have been in the field!!!* How was it, then, that Marshal Beresford, with the consciousness of this in his heart, did not spurn the ill-timed sarcasm of Dumouriez? Why did he not reply: "This is not Pharsalia, but Albuera. Here were not Romans, but Englishmen. The Roman soldiers could not save Pompey, but the English soldier, he who 'comes on with such a conquering bravery,' saved me! I am not Cæsar, but Beresford!"

NOTE.—The errors acknowledged will not be found in this Edition of the History.

A LETTER
TO
GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD.
BEING AN
ANSWER TO HIS LORDSHIP'S ASSUMED REFUTATION
OF
COL. NAPIER'S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME.

MY LORD,—You have at last appeared in print without any disguise. Had you done so at first, it might have spared us both some trouble; I should have paid more deference to your argument, and would willingly have corrected any error fairly pointed out. Now, having virtually acknowledged yourself the author of the two publications entitled *Strictures* and *Further Strictures, &c.*, I will not suffer you to enjoy the advantage of using two kinds of weapons, without making you also feel their inconvenience. I will treat your present publication as a mere continuation of your former two, and then, my lord, how will you stand in this controversy?

Starting anonymously, you wrote with all the scurrility that bad taste and mortified vanity could suggest to damage an opponent, because in the fair exercise of his judgment he had ventured to deny your claim to the title of a great commander; and you coupled this with such fulsome adulation of yourself that even in a dependent's mouth it would have been sickening. Now, when you have suffered defeat, when all the errors, misquotations, and misrepresentations of your anonymous publications have been detected and exposed, you come forward in your own name, as if a new and unexceptionable party had appeared; and you expect to be allowed all the advantage of fresh statements and arguments, and

fresh assertions, without the least reference to your former damaged evidence. You expect that I should have that deference for you, which your age, your rank, your services, and your authority, under other circumstances, might have fairly claimed at my hands; that I should acknowledge by my silence how much I was in error, or that I should defend myself by another tedious dissection and exposition of your production. You will be disappointed. I have neither time nor inclination to enter for the third time upon such a task, and yet I will not suffer you to claim a victory which you have not gained. I deny the strength of your arguments; I will expose some prominent inconsistencies, and in answer to those which I do not notice refer to your former publications to show, that in this controversy, I am now entitled to disregard anything you may choose to advance, and am in justice exonerated from the necessity of producing any more proofs.

You have published above six hundred pages at three different periods, and you have taken above a year to digest and arrange the arguments and evidence contained in your present work: a few lines will suffice for the answer. The object of your literary labors is to convince the world that at Campo Mayor you proved yourself an excellent general, and that at Albuera you were superlatively great! Greater even than Cæsar! My lord, the Duke of Wellington did not take a much longer time to establish his European reputation by driving the French from the Peninsula; and methinks if your exploits vouch not for themselves, your writings will scarcely do it for them. At all events, a plain, simple statement, having your name affixed, would have been more effectual with the public, and would certainly have been more dignified than the anonymous publications with which you endeavored to feel your way. Why should not all the main points contained in the labored pleadings of your *Further Strictures*, and the still more labored pleadings of your present work, have been condensed and published at once with your name? if, indeed, it was necessary to publish at all! Was it that by anonymous abuse of your opponent and anonymous praise of yourself you hoped to create a favorable impression on the public before you appeared in person? This, my lord, seems very like a consciousness of weakness. And then how is it that so few of the arguments and evidences now adduced should have been thought of before? It is a strange thing that in the first defence of your generalship, for one short campaign, you should have neglected proofs and arguments sufficient to form a second defence of two hundred pages.

You tell us, that you disdained to notice my *Reply to various Opponents*, because you knew the good sense of the public would

never be misled by a production containing such numerous contradictions and palpable inconsistencies, and that your friends' advice confirmed you in this view of the matter. There were, nevertheless, some things in that work which required an answer, even though the greatest part of it had been weak; and it is a pity your friends did not tell you that an affected contempt for an adversary who has hit hard, only makes the bystanders laugh. Having condescended to an anonymous attack, it would have been wiser to refute the proofs offered of your own inaccuracy, than to shrink with mock grandeur from a contest which you had yourself provoked. My friends gave me the same advice with respect to your anonymous publications, and with more reason, because they were anonymous; but having proofs of their weakness in my hands, I preferred writing an answer; and if you had been provided in the same manner, you would like me have neglected your friends' advice.

My lord, I shall now proceed with my task in the manner before alluded to. You have indeed left me no room for any refined courtesy with which to soften the asperities of this controversy; but be assured, and it is said in all sincerity, that the errors to which I must revert, are not attributed to any wilful perversion or suppression of facts, but entirely to a natural weakness of memory, and the irritation of a mind confused by the working of wounded vanity: it is a hard trial to have long-settled habits of self-satisfaction suddenly disturbed—

“Cursed be my harp, and broke be every chord,
If I forget thy words, *victorious Béresford.*”

It was thus the flattering muse of poetry lulled you with her sweet strains into a happy dream of glory, and none can wonder at your irritation when the muse of history awakened you with the solemn clangor of her trumpet to the painful reality that you were only an ordinary person. It would, however, have been wiser to have preserved your equanimity; there would have been some greatness in that.

In your first *Strictures*, you began by asserting that I knew nothing whatever of you or your services; and that I was actuated entirely by vulgar political rancor, when I denied your talents as a general. I replied that I was not ignorant of your exploits. Something of your proceedings at Buenos Ayres, at Madeira, and at Coruña, were known to me, and in proof thereof I offered to enter into the details of the first, if you desired it. To this you have given no answer.

You affirmed that your perfect knowledge of the Portuguese language was one of your principal claims to be commander of the

Portuguese army. In reply, I quoted from your own letter to Lord Wellington, your confession, that, such was your ignorance of that language at the time, you could not even read the communication from the regency, relative to your own appointment.

You asserted that no officer, save Sir John Murray, objected at the first moment to your sudden elevation of rank. In answer, I published Sir John Sherbroke's letter to Sir J. Cradock, complaining of it.

You said the stores (which the cabildo of Ciudad Rodrigo refused to let you have in 1809) had not been formed by Lord Wellington. In reply, I published Lord Wellington's declaration that they had been formed by him.

You denied that you had ever written a letter to the junta of Badajos, and this not doubtfully or hastily, but positively and accompanied with much scorn and ridicule of my assertion to that effect. You harped upon the new and surprising information obtained relative to your actions, and were, in truth, very facetious upon the subject. In answer, I published your letter to that junta! So much for your first *Strictures*.

In your second publication (page 42), you asserted that Colonel Colborne was not near the scene of action at Campo Mayor; and now in your third publication (page 48), you show very clearly that he took an active part in those operations.

You called the distance from Campo Mayor to Merida *two marches*, and now you say it is *four marches*.

In your first *Strictures*, you declared that the extent of the intrigues against you in Portugal were exaggerated by me; and you were very indignant that I should have supposed you either needed or had the support and protection of the Duke of Wellington while in command of the Portuguese army. In the volumes of my History published since, I have shown what the extent of those intrigues was: and I have still something in reserve to add, when time shall be fitting. Meanwhile, I will stay your lordship's appetite by two extracts bearing upon this subject, and upon the support which you derived from the Duke of Wellington.

1. Mr. Stuart, writing to Lord Wellesley, in 1810, after noticing the violence of the Souza faction relative to the fall of Almeida, says, "I could have borne all this with patience, if not accompanied by a direct proposal that the fleet and transports should quit the Tagus, and that the regency should send an order to Marshal Beresford to dismiss his quarter-master-general and military secretary; followed by reflections on the persons composing the family of that officer, and by hints to the same purport respecting the Portuguese who are attached to Lord Wellington."

2. Extract from a letter written at Moimenta de Beira by Marshal Beresford, and dated 6th September, 1810.—“However, as I mentioned, I have no great desire to hold my situation beyond the period Lord Wellington retains his situation, or after active operations have ceased in this country, even should things turn out favorably, of which I really at this instant have better hopes than I ever had, though I have been usually sanguine. But in regard to myself, though I do not pretend to say the situation I hold is not at all times desirable to hold, yet I am fully persuaded that if tranquillity is ever restored to this country under its legal government, that I should be too much vexed and thwarted by intrigues of all sorts to reconcile either my temper or my conscience to what would then be my situation.”

For the further exposition of the other numerous errors and failures of your two first publications, I must refer the reader to my *Reply* and *Justification*; but the points above noticed it is necessary to fix attention upon, because they give me the right to call upon the public to disregard your present work, and this right cannot be relinquished. I happened fortunately to have the means of repelling your reckless assaults in the instances above mentioned, but may not always be provided with your own letters to disprove your own assertions: the combat is not equal, the odds would be too much, and I must therefore, although reluctantly, use the advantages which the detection of such errors has already furnished. They are strong proofs of an unsound memory upon essential points, and deprive your present work of all weight as an authority in this controversy. Yet the strangest part of your new book (see page 135) is, that you avow an admiration for what you call the *generous principle* which leads French authors to *misstate facts for the honor of their country*; and not only you do this, but sneer at me very openly for not doing the same! you sneer at me for not falsifying facts to pander to the morbid vanity of my countrymen, and at the same time, with a preposterous inconsistency, condemn me for being an inaccurate historian! I have indeed yet to learn that the *honor* of my country either requires to be or can be supported by deliberate historical falsehoods; your personal experience in the field may perhaps have led you to a different conclusion, but I will not be your historian: and coupling this, your expressed sentiment, with your forgetfulness on the points before noticed, I am undoubtedly entitled to laugh at your mode of attacking others. What, my lord? like Banquo's ghost you rise, “with twenty mortal murders on your crown to push us from our stools.” You have indeed a most awful and ghost-like way of arguing: all your oracular sentences are to be implicitly believed, and all my witnesses

to facts, sound and substantial, are to be discarded for your airy nothings.

Captain Squire! heed him not, he was a dissatisfied, talking, self-sufficient, ignorant officer. The officer of dragoons who charged at Campo Mayor! He is nameless, his narrative teems with misrepresentations, he cannot tell whether he charged or not. Colonel Light! sponge him out, he was only a subaltern. Captain Gregory! believe him not, his statement cannot be correct, he is too minute, and has no diffidence. Sir Julius Hartman, Colonel Wildman, Colonel Leighton! Oh, very honorable men, but they know nothing of the fact they speak of, all their evidence put together is worth nothing! But it is very exactly corroborated by additional evidence contained in Mr. Long's publication. Ay! ay! all are wrong; their eyes, their ears, their recollections, all deceived them. They were not competent to judge. But they speak to single facts! no matter!

Well, then, my lord, I push to you your own despatch! Away with it! It is worthless, bad evidence, not to be trusted! Nothing more likely, but what then, and who is to be trusted? Nobody who contradicts you: everybody who coincides with you; nay, the same person is to be believed or disbelieved exactly as he supports or opposes your assertions, even those French authors whose generous principles lead them to write falsehoods for the *honor of their country*. Such, my lord, after a year's labor of cogitation, is nearly the extent of your *Refutation*.

In your first publication, you said all hearsay evidence should have been excluded, and nothing related but what could be proved in a court of justice; now when testimony is offered which no court of justice could refuse, with a lawyer's coolness you tell the jury that none of it is worthy of credit; that the witnesses, being generally of a low rank in the army, are not to be regarded; that they were not competent to judge. This is a little too much. There would be some show of reason if these subalterns' opinions had been given upon the general dispositions of the campaign, but they are all witnesses to facts which came under their personal observation. What! hath not a subaltern eyes? Hath he not ears? Hath he not understanding? You were once a subaltern yourself, and you cannot blind the world by such arrogant pride of station, such over-weening contempt for men's capacity because they happen to be of lower rank than yourself. Long habits of imperious command may have so vitiated your mind that you cannot dispossess yourself of such injurious feelings, yet, believe me, it would be much more dignified to avoid this indecent display of them.

Let me now remark upon such parts of your new publication as

may be necessary for the further support of my History, that is, where new proofs, or apparent proofs, are brought forward. Your former inaccuracies have exonerated me from noticing any part of your *Refutation* save where new evidence is brought forward, and then only in deference to those gentlemen who, being unmixed with your former works, have a right to my reasons for declining their testimony. I have however on my hands a much more important labor than contending with your lordship, and must therefore leave the greatest part of your book to those who will take the trouble to compare your pretended *Refutation* with my original *Justification*, in combination with this letter, being satisfied that in so doing you will not gain.

1. With respect to the death of the lieutenant-governor of Almeida, you still harp upon the phrase that it was the *only* evidence. The expression is common amongst persons when speaking of trials; it is said the prisoner was condemned by such or such a person's evidence, never meaning that there was no other testimony, but that in default of that particular evidence he would not have been condemned. You say there was other evidence, yet you do not venture to affirm that Cox's letter was not *the testimony* upon which the lieutenant-governor was condemned, while the extract from Lord Stuart's letter, quoted by me, says it was. And his lordship's letter to you, in answer to your inquiry, neither contradicts nor is intended to contradict my statement; nor yet does it in any manner deny the authenticity of my extracts, which indeed were copied verbatim from his letter to Lord Castlereagh.

Lord Stuart says, that extract is the only thing bearing on the question *which he can find*. Were there nothing more it would be quite sufficient, but his papers are very voluminous, more than fifty large volumes, and he would naturally only have looked for his letter of the 25th July, 1812, to which you drew his attention. However, in my notes and extracts taken from his documents, I find, under the date of August, 1812, the following passage:—

“The lieutenant-governor of Almeida was executed by Beresford's order, he, Beresford, having full powers and the government none to interfere. Great interest was made to save him, but in vain. The sentence and trial were published before being carried into execution and were much criticised; both the evidence and the choice of officers were blamed, and moreover the time chosen was one of triumph just after the battle of Salamanca, and the place Lisbon.”

This passage I have not marked in my book of notes as being Lord Stuart's actual words, it must therefore be only taken as an abstract of the contents of one of his papers; but comparing it with

the former passage, and with the facts that your lordship's words are still very vague and uncertain as to the main point in question, namely, the evidence on which this man was really condemned, there is no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of the statement in my first edition, nor the perfect accuracy of it as amended in the second edition of my third volume, published many months ago. You will find that I have there expunged the word "*only*," and made the sentence exactly to accord with the extract from Lord Stuart's letter. You will also observe, that I never did do more than mention the simple fact, for which I had such good authority; and so far from imputing blame to you for the execution of the sentence, I expressly stated that the man richly deserved death.

Passing now to the subject of the eighth Portuguese regiment, I will first observe, that in saying the eighth Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces no blame was imputed; no regiment in the world could have stemmed the first fury of that French column which attacked the mountain where the eighth was posted. If the eighth was not broken by it, as Sir James Douglas's letter would seem to imply, what was it doing while the enemy by their flank movement gained the crest of the position in such numbers as to make it a most daring exploit of the ninth British regiment to attack them there! It is a strange thing that a heavy column of French, resolute to gain the crest of such a position, should have made "*a flank movement*," to avoid one wing of a regiment of Portuguese conscripts. It may rather be imagined, with all deference, that it was the conscripts who made the flank movement, and that some optical deception had taken place, like that which induces children while travelling in a carriage to think the trees and rocks are moving instead of themselves. However my authority is given, namely, the statement of Major Waller, a staff officer present, and the statement of Colonel Taylor (for he is the nameless eye-witness) of the ninth, the very regiment to which Sir James Douglas appeals for support of his account. These are good authorities, and if their recollections are irreconcilable with that of Sir James Douglas it only shows how vain it is to expect perfect accuracy of detail. Sir James Douglas's negative testimony was unknown to me, but there were two positive testimonies to my statement, and therefore it is within the rules of those courts of justice to which your lordship would refer all matter of history: moreover, some grains of allowance must be made for the natural partiality of every officer for his own regiment. The following extract from Sir James Leith's report on the occasion is also good circumstantial evidence in favor of my side of the question.

“The face of affairs in this quarter now wore a different aspect, for the enemy who had been the assailant, having dispersed or driven everything there opposed to him, was in possession of the rocky eminence of the sierra at this part of Major-general Picton’s position without a shot being fired at him. Not a moment was to be lost. Major-general Leith resolved instantly to attack the enemy with the bayonet. He therefore ordered the ninth British regiment, which had been hitherto moving rapidly by its left in columns in order to gain the most advantageous ground for checking the enemy, to form the line, which they did with the greatest promptitude, accuracy and coolness, under the fire of the enemy, who had just appeared formed on that part of the rocky eminence which overlooks the back of the ridge, and who had then for the first time also perceived the British brigade under him. Major-general Leith had intended that the thirty-eighth, second battalion, should have moved on in the rear and to the left of the ninth regiment to have turned the enemy beyond the rocky eminence, which was quite inaccessible towards the rear of the sierra, while the ninth should have gained the ridge on the right of the rocky height, the royals to have been posted (as they were) in reserve; but the enemy having driven everything before them in that quarter, afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was possible for the British brigade to have reached that position, although not a moment had been lost in marching to support the point attacked, and for that purpose it had made a rapid movement of more than two miles without halting and frequently in double quick time.”

Here we have nothing of flank movements to avoid a wing of Portuguese conscripts, but the plain and distinct assertion twice over, that everything in front was dispersed or driven away—and that not even a shot was fired at the enemy. Where then was the eighth Portuguese? Did the French column turn aside merely at the menacing looks of these conscripts? If so, what a pity the latter had not been placed to keep the crest of the position. There is also another difficulty. Sir James Douglas says he was with the royals in the attack, and Sir James Leith says that the royals were held in reserve while the ninth drove away the enemy; besides which, the eighth Portuguese might have been broke by the enemy when the latter were mounting the hill, and yet have rallied and joined in the pursuit when the ninth had broken the French. Moreover, my lord, as you affirm that both yourself and the Duke of Wellington *saw* all the operations of the eighth Portuguese on this occasion, the former extract from Colonel

Taylor's letter shall be enlarged whereby you will perceive something which may lead you to doubt the accuracy of your recollection on that head.

"No doubt General Leith's letter to the duke was intended to describe the aspect of affairs in so critical a situation, and where the duke himself could not *possibly* have made his observations; and also Leith wished to have due credit given to his brigade, which was not done in the despatches. On the contrary, their exertions were made light of, and the eighth Portuguese regiment was extolled, which I know gave way to a man, save their commanding officer and ten or a dozen men at the outside; but he and they were amongst the very foremost ranks of the ninth British."—"General Leith's correspondence would be an interesting document to Colonel Napier, as throwing considerable light upon the operations at Busaco, between Picton and Hill's corps, a very considerable extent of position which could not of possibility be overlooked from any other part of the field."

Charge of the nineteenth Portuguese.—Your lordship has here gained an advantage; some of General M'Bean's expressions are to me obscure, but it is impossible to doubt his positive statement that he was in front of the convent wall and that he charged some body of the enemy. It is, however, necessary to restore the question at issue between your lordship and myself to its true bearing. You accused me of a desire to damage the reputation of the Portuguese army, and you ask why no mention was made of a particular charge effected by the nineteenth Portuguese regiment at Busaco. This charge you describe as being against one of *Ney's attacking columns*, which had, you said, gained the ascent of the position and then forming advanced on the plain above before it was charged by the nineteenth regiment. As this description was certainly wrong, it was treated as a magniloquent allusion to an advance made by a Portuguese regiment posted on the mountain to the right. General M'Bean is mistaken when he quotes me as saying *his* line was never nearer to the enemy's lines than a hundred yards. I spoke of *a* Portuguese regiment, which might possibly be the nineteenth. I never denied that any charge had been made, but only a charge *such as described by you*; and in fact General M'Bean's letter while it confirms the truth of your general description, by implication denies the accuracy of the particulars. Certainly Ney's columns never passed the front of the light division nor advanced on the plain behind it.

The difficulty of reconciling General M'Bean's statement with my own recollections and with the ground and position of the light division, may perhaps arise from the general's meaning to use cer-