

armies. Reform abuses, raise your actual taxes with vigor and impartiality, pay your present debt before you contract a new one, was his constant reply to the propositions for loans. And when the English ministers pressed the other plans, which, besides the bank, included a re-coinage of dollars into cruzados, in other words, the depreciation of the silver standard, he, with an unsparing hand, laid their folly bare. The military and political state of Portugal, he said, was such that no man in his senses, native or foreigner, would place his capital where he could not withdraw it at a moment's notice. When Massena invaded that country, unreasonable despondency had prevailed amongst the ministers, now they seemed to have a confidence as wild as their former fear; but he who knew the real state of affairs, he who knew the persons who were expected to advance money, he who knew the relative forces of the contending armies, the advantages and disadvantages attending each, he who knew the absolute weakness of the Portuguese frontier as a line of defence, could only laugh at the notion that the capitalists would take gold out of their own chests to lodge it in the chests of the bank, and eventually in those of the Portuguese treasury, a treasury deservedly without credit. The French armies opposed to him in the field (he was then on San Christoval) were just double his own strength, and a serious accident to Ballesteros, a rash General with a bad army, would compel the Anglo-Portuguese force to retire into Portugal, and the prospects of the campaign would vanish; and this argument left out of the question any accident which might happen to himself or General Hill. Portugal would, he hoped, be saved, but its security was not such as these visionaries would represent it.

They had proposed also a British security in jewels for the capital of their bank, and their reasonings on this head were equally fallacious. This security was to be strengthened by collecting the duties on wines exported from Portugal to England, and they had not even ascertained whether those duties were conformable to the treaty with England. Then came the former question. Would Great Britain guarantee the capital of the subscribers whether Portugal was lost or saved? If the country should be lost, the new possessors would understand the levying of duties upon wines as well as the old; would England make her port-drinkers pay two duties, one for the benefit of the bank capitalists, another for the benefit of French conquerors? If all these difficulties could be got over, a bank would be the most efficacious mode in which England could use her credit for the benefit of Portugal; but all the other plans proposed were mere spend-thrift schemes to defray the expenses of the war, and if the English

government could descend to entertain them, they would fail, because the real obstacle, scarcity of specie, would remain.

A nation desirous of establishing public credit should begin, he said, by acquiring a revenue equal to its fixed expenditure, and must manifest an inclination to be honest by performing its engagements with respect to public debts. This maxim he had constantly enforced to the Portuguese government, and had they minded it instead of trusting to the fallacious hope of getting loans in England, the deficiency of their revenue would have been made up without imposing new taxes, and even with the repeal of many which were oppressive and unjust. The fair and honest collection of taxes which ought to exist would have been sufficient. For after protracted and unsparing exertions, and by refusing to accept their paper money on any other condition in his commissariat transactions, he had at last forced the Portuguese authorities to pay the interest of that paper and of their exchequer bills, called "*Apolicies grandes*;" and the effect had been to increase the resources of the government, though the government had even in the execution evinced its corruption. Then showing in detail how this benefit had been produced, he traced the mischief created by men whom he called the *sharks* of Lisbon and other great towns, meaning speculators, principally Englishmen, whose nefarious cupidity led them to cry down the credit of the army-bills and then purchase them, to the injury of the public and of the poor people who furnished the supplies.

A plan to re-coin Spanish dollars and gain eight in the hundred of pure silver, which they contained above the Portuguese cruzado, he treated as a useless fraud. In Lisbon, where the cruzado was current, some gain might perhaps be made; but it was not certain, and foreigners, Englishmen and Americans, from whom the great supplies were purchased, would immediately add to their prices as the coin deteriorated. The operations and expenditure of the army were not confined to Lisbon, nor even to Portugal, and the cruzado would not pass for its nominal value in Spain; thus the greatest inconvenience would result from a scheme at the best unworthy of the British government. In fine, the reform of abuses, the discontinuance of useless expenses, economy and energy, were the only remedies.

Such was his reasoning, yet it had little effect on his persecutors; for when his best men were falling by hundreds, his brightest visions of glory fading on the smoky walls of Burgos, he was again forced to examine and refute anew voluminous plans of Portuguese finance, concocted by Funchal and Villiers, with notes by Vansittart. And these projects were accompanied with com-

plaints that frauds had been practised on the custom-house, and violence used towards the inhabitants by the British commissaries, whose misconduct was the real cause of the financial distresses of Portugal. The patient industry of genius was never more severely taxed!

Wellington repelled the charge of exactions and frauds as applied to the army; he showed that to reform the custom-house so as to prevent frauds, had been his unceasing recommendation to the Portuguese government; that he had in detail taught that government how to remedy the evils they complained of; how to increase their customs, how to levy their taxes, and arrange their whole financial system in a manner to render their revenues equal to their expenses, without that oppression and injustice which they were in the habit of practising: for the extortions and violence complained of, were perpetrated by the Portuguese commissariat, and yet the troops of that nation were starving. Having exposed Funchal's ignorance of financial facts in detail, and challenged him to prove his charges against the British army, he discussed the great question of selling the crown and church lands, proposed as a substitute for that economy and reform of abuses which he so long, so often, and so vainly had pressed upon the Regency. The proposal was not quite new. "I have already," he observed, "had before me a proposition for the sale, or rather transfer, of crown lands to the creditors of the Junta de Viveres; but these were the uncultivated lands in Alemtejo, and I pointed out the improbability that anybody would take such lands in payment, and the injury to the public credit by making the scheme public if not likely to be successful. My opinion is, that there is nobody in Portugal possessed of capital who entertains, or who ought to entertain, such an opinion of the state of affairs in the Peninsula, as to lay out his money in the purchase of crown lands. The loss of a battle, not in the Peninsula even, but elsewhere, would expose his estate to confiscation, or at all events to ruin, by a fresh incursion of the enemy. Even if any man could believe that Portugal is secure against the invasion of the enemy, and his estate and person against the '*violence, exactions, and frauds*' (these were Funchal's words respecting the allied army) of the enemy, he is not, during the existence of the war, according to the Conde de Funchal's notion, exempt from those evils from his own countrymen and their allies. Try this experiment; offer the estates of the crown for sale, and it will be seen whether I have formed a correct judgment on this subject." Then running with a rapid hand over many minor though intricate fallacies for raising the value of the Portu-

guese paper-money, he thus treated the great question of the church lands.

First, as in the case of crown lands, there would be no purchasers; nothing could render it palatable to the clergy, and the influence of the church would be exerted against the allies, instead of being as hitherto strongly exerted in their favor. It would be useless if the experiment of the crown lands succeeded, and if that failed, this sale could not succeed; but the attempt would alienate a powerful party in Spain as well as in Portugal. Moreover, if it should succeed and be honestly carried into execution, it would entail a burthen on the finances of five in the hundred on the purchase-money for the support of the ecclesiastical owners of the estates. The best mode of obtaining for the state eventually the benefit of the church property would be to prevent the monasteries and nunneries from receiving novices, because, in course of time, the Pope might consent to the sale of the estates, or the nation might assume possession when the ecclesiastical corporations became extinct. It was no disadvantage to Spain or Portugal that large portions of land should be held by the church. The bishops and monks were the only proprietors who lived on their estates, and spent the revenues amongst the laborers; until the habits of the new landed proprietors changed, the transfer of landed property from the clergy to the laymen would be a misfortune.

This memoir, sent from the trenches of Burgos, quashed Funchal's projects; but that intriguer's object was to get rid of his brother's opponents in the Regency by exciting powerful interests against them; wherefore, failing in this proposal, he ordered Redondo, now Marquis of Borba and Minister of Finance, to repair to the Brazils, intending to supply his place with one of his own faction. Wellington and Stuart were at this time doggedly opposed by Borba, but as the credit of the Portuguese treasury was supported by his character for probity, they forbade him to obey the order, and represented the matter so forcibly to the Prince Regent, that Funchal was severely reprimanded for his audacity. And it was amidst these vexations that Wellington retreated, and in such destitution, that he declared all former distress for money had been slight in comparison of his present misery!* British naval stores had been trucked for corn in Egypt; and the British ministers, finding Russia was gathering specie from all quarters, desired Mr. Stuart to prevent English and American merchant captains carrying coin away from Lisbon; a remedial measure, indicating their total ignorance of the nature of commerce. It was not attempted to be enforced; but then it was they transmitted their plan of supplying

* Correspondence with Mr. Stuart, MS.

the army by requisitions, the particulars of which may be best gathered from the answers to it.

Mr. Stuart, firm in opposition, shortly observed, that it was by avoiding and reprobating such a system, although pursued alike by the natives and by the enemy, that the British character and credit had been established so firmly as to be of the greatest use in the operations of the war. Wellington entered more deeply into the subject.

Nothing, he said, could be procured from the country in the mode proposed by the ministers' memoir, unless resort was also had to the French mode of enforcing their requisitions. The proceedings of the French armies were misunderstood. It was not true that the French never paid for supplies. They levied contributions where money was to be had, and with this paid for provisions in other parts; and when requisitions for money or clothing were made, they were taken on account of the regular contributions due to the government. Heavier indeed they were than even a usurping government was entitled to demand; yet it was a regular government account, and the British could not adopt a similar plan without depriving their allies of their own legitimate resources. Requisitions were enforced by terror. A magistrate was ordered to provide for the troops, who would, in case of failure, take the provisions, and punish the village or district in a variety of ways. Were it expedient to follow this mode of requisition, there must be two armies, one to fight the enemy, one to enforce the requisitions; for the Spaniards would never submit quietly to such proceedings. The conscription gave the French a more moral description of soldiers; and if this second army was provided, the British troops could not be trusted to inflict an exact measure of punishment on a disobedient village; they would plunder it as well as the others, but their principal object would be to get at and drink as much liquor as they could, and then destroy all property falling in their way; the objects of their mission, the bringing supplies to the army, and inflicting an exact measure of punishment on the magistrates or district, would not be accomplished at all. Moreover the holders of supplies in Spain, being unused to commercial habits, would regard payment for these requisitions by bills of any description to be rather worse than the mode of contribution followed by the French, and would resist it as forcibly. And upon such a nice point did the contest hang, that if they accepted the bills, and discovered how to get cash for them by discounting high, it would be the most fatal blow possible to the credit and resources of the British army in the Peninsula. The war would then soon cease.

The memoir asserted, that though Sir John Moore had been well furnished with money, the Spaniards would not give him provisions; and this was urged as an argument for enforcing requisitions. But to say Moore was furnished with money, itself the index to the ministers' incapacity, Wellington told them was not true. "Moore had been even worse furnished than himself. That General had borrowed a little, a very little, money at Salamanca, but had no regular supply for the military chest until the army had nearly reached Coruña; and the Spaniards were not very wrong in their reluctance to meet his wants, for the debts of his army were still unpaid in the latter end of 1812." In fine, supplies could only be procured from the country by payment on the spot, or soon after the transaction, unless the Spanish government would yield a part of the government contributions, and the revenues of the royal domains, to be received from the people in kind at a reasonable rate. This he had obtained in the province of Salamanca, and the system might be extended to other provinces, as the legitimate government was re-established. But this only partially met the evil: it would give some supplies cheaper than they could otherwise be procured, but they must afterwards be paid for at Cadiz in specie, and less money would come into the military chest, which, as before noticed, was only supported by mercantile speculations.

Such were the discussions forced upon Wellington when all his faculties were wanted on the field of battle, and such was the hardiness of his intellect to sustain the additional labor: such also were the men, calling themselves statesmen, who then wielded the vast resources of Great Britain. The expenditure of that country for the year 1812 was above one hundred millions; the ministers who controlled it were yet so ignorant of the elementary principles of finance, as to throw upon their General, amidst the clangor and tumult of battle, the task of exposing such fallacies. And to reduce these persons from the magnitude of statesmen to their natural smallness of intriguing debaters, is called political prejudice! But though power may enable men to trample upon reason for a time, they cannot escape ultimate retribution; she re-assumes her sway, and history delivers them to the justice of posterity. Perverse, however, as the English ministers were, the Portuguese and Spanish governments were more so; and the temper of the Spanish rulers was at this time of even greater importance, because of Napoleon's misfortunes. The opportunity given to strike a decisive blow at his power in the Peninsula demanded an early and vigorous campaign, and the experience of 1812 had taught Wellington no aid could be had from Spain, unless a change was

made in the military system. Hence when assured the French armies had taken winter quarters, he resolved in person to urge the Cortes to give him the real, as well as nominal, command of their troops.

During the past campaign, and especially after Abispa! had resigned, the weakness of the Spanish government became more deplorable; nothing was done to ameliorate the military system; an extreme jealousy actuated the Cortes and the Regency, and when the former offered Wellington the command of their armies, Mr. Wellesley advised him to accept it, were it only to give a point upon which Spaniards true to the English alliance and the aristocratic cause might rally in case of reverse. The disobedience of Ballesteros had been indeed promptly punished, but the vigor of the Cortes was the result of offended pride, not of sound policy, and the retreat of the allies was the signal for a renewal of those dangerous intrigues which the battle of Salamanca had arrested without crushing.

Lord Wellington reached Cadiz the 24th of December. He was received without enthusiasm, yet with honor, and his presence seemed agreeable to the Cortes and the people; party passions subsided, and his ascendancy of mind procured patient hearing, even when in private he urged the leading men to turn their attention to the war, to place in abeyance their factious disputes, and above all things to uphold the Inquisition, lest they should drive the church party into the arms of the enemy. His exhortations had no effect, save to encourage the serviles to look more to England; yet they did not prevent the Cortes yielding to him the entire control of fifty thousand men, to be paid from the English subsidy, with an engagement that he should have power of dismissal and the right to recommend for promotion; that no general should be appointed without his knowledge and consent, and that all orders and reports should pass through him.

At his recommendation also the Spanish forces were reorganized in four numbered active armies and two reserves. The Catalans were to form the first army. Elio's troops, including the divisions of Sarsfield, Duran, Bassecour, the Empecinado, Roche, and Villa Campa, received the name of the second army. The forces in the Morena, formerly under Ballesteros, constituted the third army, under Del Parque. The troops of Estremadura, Leon, Galicia, and the Asturias, including Morillo's, Penne Villemur's, Downie's and Carlos d'España's separate divisions, were called the fourth army, and given to Castaños, whose appointment to Catalonia was cancelled, and his former dignity of Captain-General in Estremadura and Galicia restored. The partidas of Longa, Mina, Porlier,

and the other chiefs in the northern provinces, were afterwards united to this army as separate divisions.

Abispa, made Captain-General of Andalusia, commanded the first reserve, and Lacy, replaced in Catalonia by Copons, was ordered to form a second reserve in the neighborhood of San Roque. Such were the new dispositions; but when Wellington had completed this important negotiation, some inactivity was for the first time discovered in his own proceedings. His stay was prolonged without apparent reason, and it was whispered that if he resembled Cæsar, Cadiz had provided him with a Cleopatra; yet he soon returned to the army by Lisbon, where he was greeted with very great honors and the most unbounded enthusiasm, especially by the people. His departure from Cadiz revived all the political dissensions. The liberals and serviles became more rancorous, and the executive was always on the side of the latter, the majority of the Cortes on the side of the former; neither enjoyed the confidence of the people nor of the allies, and the intrigues of Carlotta advanced: a desire to make her sole Regent was manifested, and Sir Henry Wellesley, tired of fruitless opposition, remained neuter. One cause of this feeling was her vehemence against the insurgents at Buenos Ayres, another the disgust given to the merchants of Cadiz by the diplomatic proceedings, or rather intrigues, of Lord Strangford with that revolted state. The Princess denounced England as pursuing a smuggling policy, and not without truth, for Wellington's counsels had been unheeded. Lord Castlereagh offered indeed a new mediation, the old commission being to proceed under the restriction of not touching at Mexico, whither a new mission, composed entirely of Spaniards, was to proceed, accompanied by an English agent without an ostensible character. This proposal ended as the others had done, and jealousy of England increased.

Early in 1813, Carlotta, diligently served by Pedro Souza, had gained adherents amongst the liberals of the Cortes, for she was ready to sacrifice even the rights of her posterity; and as she promised to maintain all ancient abuses, the clergy and serviles were not averse to her. The decree to abolish the Inquisition, now the test of political party, passed on the 7th of March, and the Regency were ordered to have it read in the churches. The clergy of Cadiz resisted the order. They intimated their refusal through the medium of a public letter, and the Regency encouraged them by removing the Governor of Cadiz, Admiral Valdez, a known liberal and opponent of the Inquisition, appointing in his stead Alos, a warm advocate for that horrid institution. But in the vindication of official power the Spaniards are prompt and decided. Augustin

Arguelles moved, and it was instantly carried, that the sessions of the extraordinary Cortes should be declared permanent, with a view to measures worthy of the nation and to prevent the evils with which the state was menaced by the opposition of the Regency and the clergy to the Cortes. A decree was then proposed for suppressing the actual Regency and replacing it with a provisional government, to be composed of the three eldest councillors of state. This being conformable to the constitution was carried by a majority of eighty-six to fifty-eight, while another proposition, that two members of the Cortes publicly elected should be added to the Regency, was rejected as an innovation by seventy-two against sixty-six. The Councillors Pedro Agar, Gabriel Ciscar, and the Cardinal Bourbon, Archbishop of Toledo, were then installed as Regents.

A committee, appointed to consider how a government felt by all parties to be imperfect could be improved, now recommended that the Cardinal Archbishop, who was of the blood-royal, should be President of the Regency, leaving Carlotta's claims unnoticed; and as Ciscar and Agar had been formerly removed from the Regency for incapacity, it was generally supposed the intention was virtually to make the Archbishop sole Regent. Soon, however, Carlotta's influence was again felt; for a dispute arising in the Cortes between what were called the Americans and the Liberals about the annual Acapulco ship, twenty of the former joined her party, and it was resolved that Ruiez Pedron, a distinguished opponent of the Inquisition, should propose her as the head of the Regency. When almost sure of a majority the scheme was detected, and the people, who liked her not, became so furious that her partisans were silenced. The opposite side proposed on the instant that the provisional Regency should be made permanent, which was carried; and thus, chance rather than choice ruling, an old prelate and two imbecile councillors were intrusted with the government, and factious intrigues and rancor exploded more frequently as the pressure from above became slight.

More than all others the clergy were violent and daring, yet the Cortes was not to be frightened. Four canons of cathedrals were arrested in May, and orders were issued to arrest the Archbishop of St. Jago and many bishops, because of a pastoral letter published against the abolition of the Inquisition; for according to the habits of their craft of all sects, they deemed religion trampled under foot when the power of levying money and spilling blood was denied to ministers professing the faith of Christ. Nor did the English influence fail to suffer; the democratic spirit advanced hastily, the Cadiz press teemed with writings to excite the people

against the designs of the English Cabinet, and to raise a hatred of the British General and his troops. They were not all falsehoods, nor unsuccessful, because the desire to preserve the Inquisition displayed by Wellington and his brother, although arising from military considerations, accorded too much with the known tendency of the English Cabinet's policy not to excite the suspicions of the whole liberal party. The Bishops of Logroño, Mondonedo, Astorga, Lugo and Salamanca, and the Archbishop of St. Jago were arrested; several other bishops fled to Portugal, and were there protected as martyrs in the cause of legitimacy and despotism. The Bishop of Orense and the ex-Regent Lardizabal had before this escaped to Algarve and the *Tras os Montes*, and from the latter the prelate kept up an active intercourse with Galicia, where the Cortez were far from popular; indeed the flight of the bishops created general anger, for the liberal party was stronger in the *Isla* than in other parts, and by a curious anomaly the military were generally their partisans while the people were partisans of the clergy. Nevertheless the seeds of freedom, though carelessly sown by the French on one side and the Cortes on the other, took deep root, and have since sprung up into strong plants in due time to burgeon and bear fruit.

When the bishops fled from Spain, Gravina, the Pope's nuncio, assumed such a tone that the good offices of Sir Henry Wellesley could only for a time screen him from the vengeance of the Cortes, and finally the latter, encouraged by the English newspapers, dismissed him and sequestered his benefices. He also took refuge in Portugal, and with the expelled clergy sought to render the Cortes odious in Spain. He formed a strict alliance with the Portuguese nuncio, Vicente Machiechi, and they interfered, not with the concerns of Spain only, but with the Catholics in the British army, and even extended their intrigues to Ireland; whereupon, as justice was never the English policy towards that country, alarm pervaded the Cabinet, and the nuncio, protected when opposed to the Cortes, was considered troublesome and indiscreet regarding the Irish.

This state of feud led to a crisis of a formidable and decisive nature. Many persons in the Cortes held secret intercourse with Joseph, being desirous to acknowledge his dynasty if he would accede to the general policy of the Cortes in civil government. He had, as already shown, organized a large native force, and the coasts of Spain and Portugal swarmed with French privateers manned with Spanish seamen; the victory at Salamanca withered these resources for the moment, but Wellington's failure at Burgos and retreat revived them and gave a heavy shock to public confidence in the power of England; a shock which the misfortunes of Napoleon

in Russia only could have prevented from being fatal. That wonderful man had indeed, with the activity and energy which made him the foremost hero of the world, raised a fresh army to march into the heart of Germany; but for this he was forced to withdraw so many old soldiers from Spain, that the French could no longer act on the offensive. This stayed the Peninsular cause on the brink of a precipice, for in that curious and authentic work called "*Bourrienne and his Errors*," it appears that early in 1813, the ever-factious Conde de Montijo, then a general in Elio's army, secretly made proposals to pass over with his forces to the King; and soon afterwards the whole army of Del Parque, then advancing into La Mancha, made offers of a like nature.

They were negotiating with Joseph when the Emperor's orders compelled him to take up the line of the Duero; but being thus advertised of French weakness, feared to continue their negotiations; Wellington then advanced, and as this feeling for the intrusive monarch was not general, resistance revived with the British successes. But if Napoleon, victorious in Russia, had strengthened his army, this defection would have taken place and have been followed by others; the King at the head of a Spanish army would have reconquered Andalusia, Wellington would have been confined to the defence of Portugal, and England would not have purchased the independence of that country with her own permanent ruin. This conspiracy is not, however, related with entire confidence, because no trace of it is to be found in the King's papers taken at Vittoria. Nevertheless there are abundant proofs that the work called "*Bourrienne and his Errors*," inasmuch as it relates to Joseph's transactions in Spain, was compiled from his correspondence; many documents also taken at Vittoria were lost at the time, and in a case involving lives he would probably have destroyed the proofs of a treason which had failed. Napoleon in his memoirs speaks of secret negotiations with the Cortes about this time, and he is corroborated by the correspondence of the British embassy at Cadix and by the intrigues against British influence.

CHAPTER II.

Political state of Portugal—Wellington's difficulties—Improper conduct of some English ships of war—Piratical violence of a Scotch merchantman—Disorders in the military system—Irritation of the people—Misconduct of the magistrates—Wellington and Stuart grapple with the disorders of the administration—The latter calls for the interference of the British government—Wellington writes a remarkable letter to the Prince Regent and requests him to return to Portugal—Partial amendment—The efficiency of the army restored, but the country remains in an unsettled state—The Prince unable to quit the Brazils—Carlotta prepares to come alone—Is stopped by the interference of the British government—An auxiliary Russian force is offered to Lord Wellington by Admiral Greig—The Russian Ambassador in London disavows the offer—The Emperor Alexander proposes to mediate between England and America—The Emperor of Austria offers to mediate for a general peace—Both offers are refused.

IN Portugal the English General desired to apply all resources to the war; but he had to run counter to the habits of the people and the government, to detect the intrigues of subordinates and of higher powers, to oppose factious men in the local government, to stimulate the sluggish apathy, and combat the often honest obstinacy of those who were not factious. And all this without power of recompensing or chastising, and even while forced to support those who merited rebuke against the more formidable intriguers of the court of Brazil; for the best men of Portugal were in the local government, and he was not foiled so much by them as by the sluggish national system, dull for good purposes, but vivacious for mischief. And at Rio Janeiro the personal intrigues fostered by the peculiarly scheming disposition of the English envoy, Lord Strangford,—the weak yet dogged habits of the Prince,—and the meddling nature and violence of Carlotta, stifled all great national views. There also the Souzas, a family deficient neither in activity nor talent, were predominant, and the object of all was to stimulate the government in Portugal against the General's military policy. To this had been opposed the influence of the English government, but that resource was dangerous, and only to be resorted to in extremities. When to all these things is added a continual struggle with the knavery of merchants of all nations, his difficulties must be admitted, his indomitable vigor, his patience, and his extraordinary mental resources admired. An instructive lesson in the study of nations is thus presented. Wellington was not simply a general who with greater or less means was to plan military operations, leaving to others the settling of political difficulties. He had also to regenerate a people, and force them against the current of their prejudices and usages in a

dangerous and painful course; to teach at once the populace and the government; to infuse spirit and order without the aid of rewards or punishments, and to excite enthusiasm through the medium of corrupt oppressive institutions, while he suppressed all tendency towards revolution. Thus only could he maintain the war, and as it was beyond the power of man to continue such a struggle for any length of time, he was more than ever anxious to gather strength for a decisive blow, which the enemy's situation now rendered possible. It may indeed be wondered at that he so long supported the pressure, and more than once he was like to yield, and would have yielded if fortune had not offered him certain happy military chances, yet such as few but himself could have profited from. In 1810, on the Busaco mountain, and in the lines, the military success was rather over the Portuguese government than the enemy; at Santarém, in 1811, the glory of arms scarcely compensated for the destitution of the troops; at Fuentes Onoro, and on the Caya, after the second unsuccessful siege of Badajos, the Portuguese army had nearly dissolved; and the astonishing sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, in 1812, were necessary to save the cause from dying of inanition. Even then the early deliverance of Andalusia was frustrated, and time, more valuable than gold or life in war, was lost; the enemy became the strongest in the field, and despite the victory of Salamanca, the political evils were felt in the repulse from Burgos, and the double retreat from that place and Madrid. Accumulated mischiefs were now to be encountered in Portugal.

It has been shown how obstinately the Regency opposed the plans of financial reform; for thinking Portugal out of danger, and tired of their British allies, they had no desire to aid, nor indeed any wish to see Spain delivered from her difficulties.* To harass the English General, and drive him away, or force him, and through him his government, to grant them loans or new subsidies, was their object. But Wellington knew that Portugal could, and was resolved it should, find resources within itself. Wherefore, after the battle of Salamanca, when a fresh subsidy was demanded, he would not listen; and when that scheme, already exposed, of feeding, or rather starving their troops, through the medium of a treaty with the Spanish government, was proposed, he checked the shameful and absurd plan by applying a part of the money in the chest of aids, intended for the civil service, to the relief of the Portuguese troops. Yet the Regency did not entirely fail in their aim; many persons dependent upon the subsidy were thus deprived of their payments, their complaints hurt the British credit, and

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

the British influence with the people, whose faithful attachment to the alliance no intrigues had hitherto been able to shake, was reduced.*

Into every branch of government the Regency then infused their own captious spirit. They complained falsely that General Campbell had insulted the nation by turning some Portuguese residents publicly out of Gibraltar in company with Jews and Moors; they refused the wheat delivered to them in lieu of their subsidy, saying it was not fit for food, though the English troops were then living on the same grain, though their own troops were glad to get it, and no other was to be had. When a wooden jetty was to be thrown in the Tagus for the convenience of landing stores, they supported one Caldas, a rich proprietor, in his refusal to permit the trees wanted to be felled, alleging the rights of property, although he was to be paid largely, and they had themselves, then and always, disregarded the rights of property—especially when poor men were concerned—seizing upon whatever was required for the public service or the support of their own irregularities, without payment, and in shameful violation of law and humanity.†

The commercial treaty, and the proceedings of the Oporto Wine Company, an oppressive corporation, unfair in all its dealings, irresponsible, established in violation of that treaty, and supported without regard either to the interests of the Prince Regent or his British allies, furnished them also with continual subjects for disputes, and nothing was too absurd or too gross for their interference. Under the management of Mr. Stuart, who had vigorously enforced Wellington's plans, their paper money had obtained a reasonable and increasing circulation, their custom-house resources had increased, the expenses of their navy and arsenal had been reduced, and it was evident that an extensive vigorous application of the same principles would overcome all financial difficulties; but there were too many personal interests, too much shameful profit made to permit such a reform. The naval establishment, instead of being entirely transferred to the Brazils, was continued in the Tagus, and with it the arsenal, as its natural appendage; and though the infamous Junta de Viveres had been suppressed by the Prince Regent, the government, under pretext of paying its debts, still disbursed ten thousand pounds a month in salaries to men whose offices had been formally abolished.

About this time also the opening of the Spanish ports in those provinces from whence the enemy had been driven, deprived Lis-

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

† Wellington's Correspondence, MS.

bon of a monopoly of trade enjoyed for the last three years. Then the Regency, feeling the consequent diminution of revenue, with inexpressible effrontery insisted that the grain imported by Wellington, which had saved their army and nation from famine, and furnished their own subsidy, should enter the public warehouses under specific regulations, and pay duty for so doing. And so tenacious were they, that he was forced to menace a formal appeal to the English Cabinet; for he knew the subordinate officers, knavish in the extreme, would have sold the secrets of the army magazines to the speculators. And the latter, in whose hands the furnishing of the army would under the new plan of the English ministers be placed, being thus accurately instructed of its resources, would have regulated their supplies with great nicety, so as to have famished the soldiers and paralyzed the operations at the greatest possible expense. But the supply of the army under any system was now extremely precarious; for besides the activity of the American privateers, English ships of war used to capture vessels secretly employed in bringing provision, under licenses from Mr. Stuart and Mr. Forster. The captain of a Scotch merchant vessel, engaged in the same trade, and having no letter of marque, had the piratical insolence to seize in the very mouth of the Tagus an American vessel sailing under a license from Mr. Forster; thus violating at once the license of the English minister, the independence of Portugal, and the general law of nations.* The American traders were dismayed, the Portuguese government justly indignant, and the matter altogether embarrassing, because no measure of punishment could be inflicted without exposing the secret system which had been the principal support of the army. Congress, however, soon passed an act, forbidding neutrals to ship flour in the American ports; and this blow, chiefly aimed at the Portuguese ships, following upon the non-importation act, and coupled with the illegal violence of the English vessels, nearly dried up the source of supply, and threw the army principally upon the Brazil trade; which by the negligence of the Admiralty was, as before noticed, exposed to the enterprise of the United States privateers.

During Wellington's campaign in Spain, the military administration of Portugal was in the hands of the Regency, and all the ancient abuses revived. The army in the field received no succors, the field artillery disappeared, the cavalry was in the worst condition, the infantry reduced in numbers, the equipments scarcely fit for service, the spirit of the men waning to despondency; there was no money in the military chest, no recruits in the dépôts, and

* Mr. Stuart, MSS.

the transport service was neglected altogether. Beresford's severity did not stop desertion, because want, the parent of crimes, had proved too strong for fear; the country swarmed with robbers, no fault was punished by the Regency, and everywhere knaves triumphed. All persons whose indolence or timidity led them to fly from the defence of their country to the Brazils, were there received and cherished as martyrs to their personal affections for the Prince; they were lauded, and called victims to the injustice of Beresford and the encroachments of the English officers. The Prince also permitted officers possessing family interest to retire from service, retaining their pay and rank; thus offering a premium for bad men to enter the army, with intent to quit it in this disgraceful manner. Multitudes did so; promotion came too quickly, and the nobility, whose influence over the poorer classes was great, and might have been beneficially employed to keep up the zeal of the men, disappeared rapidly from the regiments; the foul stream of knaves and cowards thus continually pouring through the military ranks, destroyed all cohesion, and tainted everything as it passed.

Interests of the same nature polluted the civil administration. Rich people, especially those of great cities, evaded taxes and disobeyed regulations for the military service, and during Wellington's absence, English under-commissaries, and that retinue of villains which invariably gather on the rear of armies, being in some measure freed from the dread of his vigilance and vigor, violated orders in a daring manner. The husbandmen were cruelly oppressed, their farming animals were carried off to supply food for the army, and agriculture was thus stricken at the root; the breeds of horned cattle and of horses rapidly and alarmingly decreased, and butchers' meat was scarcely to be procured even for the troops who remained in Portugal.

These irregularities, joined to the gross misconduct of the military detachments and convoys of sick men on all the lines of communication, produced great irritation, and enabled factious persons to declaim with effect; writings and stories were circulated against the troops, the real outrages were exaggerated, others were invented, and the drift of all was to render the English odious to the nation at large. Nor was this confined to Portugal. Agents were busy to the same purpose in London, and when the enthusiasm which Wellington's presence at Lisbon had created amongst the people was known at Cadiz, the press there teemed with abuse. Divers agents of the democratic party in Spain came to Lisbon to aid the Portuguese malcontents, libels accusing Wellington of a design to subjugate the Peninsula for his own ambitious views were published; and as consistency is never regarded on

uch occasions, it was insinuated that he encouraged the excesses of his troops, out of personal hatred to the Portuguese people. The old baseness of sending virulent anonymous letters to him was also revived. In fine, the republican spirit had got beyond Spain, and the Portuguese Regency, terrified at its approach, appealed to Mr. Stuart for the assistance of England, to check its formidable progress. They forbade Portuguese newspapers to admit observations on the political events in Spain, they checked the introduction of Spanish democratic publications, they ordered their diplomatists at Cadiz to encourage writings of an opposite tendency, and support the election of deputies known for their love of despotism. This last measure was, however, baffled by the motion of Arguelles, which rendered the old Cortes permanent. And Mr. Stuart, judging the time unfavorable, advised reserve in the exertion of power against democrats, until military successes, which the state of the continent and the weakness of the French troops in Spain promised, should enable the victors to put down such doctrines with effect; advice which was not unmeaning, as shall be hereafter shown.

All these malignant efforts Wellington viewed with indifference. "Every leading man," he said, "was sure to be accused of criminal personal ambition, and if he was conscious of the charge being false, it did no harm." His position was however rendered more difficult, and other mischiefs existed of long standing, and springing from a different source, but of a more serious character; for the spirit of captious discontent had reached the inferior magistracy, who endeavored to excite the people against the military generally. Complaints came in from all quarters of outrages on the part of the troops, some too true, many false or frivolous; and when courts-martial for the trial of the accused were assembled, the magistrates refused to attend as witnesses, because Portuguese custom rendered such an attendance degrading, and by Portuguese law a magistrate's written testimony was efficient in courts-martial. In vain they were told the English law would not punish men upon such testimony; in vain it was pointed out that the country would be ravaged if the soldiers discovered they might do evil with impunity. It was offered to send in each case lists of Portuguese witnesses to be summoned by the native authorities; but the magistrates answered that this method was insolent, and with sullen malignity continued to accumulate charges against the troops, to refuse attendance in the courts, and to call the soldiers, their own as well as the British, "licensed spoliators of the community."

For a time the generous nature of the poor people resisted these

combining causes of discontent ; neither real injuries nor exaggerations, nor the falsehood of those who attempted to stir up wrath, produced any visible effect upon the great bulk of the population ; yet by degrees affection for the British cooled, and Wellington expressed his fears that a civil war would commence between the Portuguese people on the one hand, and the troops of both nations on the other. Wherefore his activity was redoubled to draw, while he could still control affairs, all the military strength to a head, and make such an irruption into Spain as would establish a new base of operations beyond the power of fatal dissensions. But what made him tremble was the course which the misconduct of the Portuguese government and the incapacity of the English Cabinet forced upon the native furnishers of supplies.

Those persons coming in winter to Lisbon to have bills paid, could get no money, and in their distress sold the bills to speculators ; the Portuguese holders at a discount of fifteen, the Spanish holders at a discount of forty in the hundred. The credit of the chest immediately fell, prices rose in proportion, and as no military enterprise could carry the army beyond the flight of this harpy, and no revenues could satisfy its craving, the contest must have ceased if Mr. Stuart had not found a momentary partial remedy, by publicly guaranteeing the payment of the bills, and granting interest until they could be taken up. The expense was thus augmented, yet the increase fell short of the enhanced cost of supplies which this restricted practice of the bill-holders caused, and of two evils the least was chosen. It may seem strange that such transactions should belong to the history of the military operations in the Peninsula, that it should be the General's instead of the Minister's task to encounter such evils, and to find the remedy. It was so however, and no adequate notion of Wellington's herculean labors can be formed without an intimate knowledge of his financial and political difficulties.

The Portuguese military disorders had brought Beresford to Lisbon while the siege of Burgos was still in progress, and now, under Wellington's direction, he strained every nerve to restore the army to its former efficient state. To recruit the regiments of the line, he disbanded all the militiamen fit for service, replacing them with fathers of families ; to restore the field artillery, he embodied all the garrison artillerymen, calling out the ordenança gunners to man the fortresses and the coast batteries ; the worst cavalry regiments he reduced to render the best more efficient, but this arm never attained any excellence in Portugal. Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart at the same time grappled with the civil administration, and their efforts produced a considerable im-

crease of revenue. The Regency could not deny this beneficial effect, nor the existence of the evils they were urged to remedy; they admitted that their custom-house system was incomplete, that their useless navy consumed large sums wanted for the army; and that the taxes, especially the "*Decima*," were partially collected and unproductive, because the rich people in the great towns, who had benefited largely by the war, escaped the imposts which the poor people in the country, who had suffered most from the war, paid. They acknowledged also that while the soldiers' hire was in arrears, the transport service neglected, and all persons having just claims upon the government suffered severe privations, the tax-gatherers were allowed to keep a month's tribute in their hands, even in the districts close to the enemy; but they would not alter their system, and Borba, the Minister of Finance, combated Wellington's plans in detail with such unusual obstinacy, that it became evident nothing could be obtained save by external pressure. Wherefore, as the season for military operations approached, Mr. Stuart called upon Lord Castlereagh to bring the power of England to bear at once upon the court of Rio Janeiro; and Wellington, driven to extremity, sent the Portuguese Prince Regent one of those clear, powerful and nervous statements, which left those to whom they were addressed no alternative but submission, or an acknowledgment that sense and justice were to be disregarded.

"I call your Highness's attention," he said, "to the state of your troops and of all your establishments; the army of operations has been unpaid since September, the garrisons since June, the militia since February, 1812. The transport service has never been regularly paid, and has received nothing since June. To these evils I have in vain called the attention of the local government, and I am now going to open a new campaign with troops to whom greater arrears are due than when the last campaign terminated, although the subsidy from Great Britain, granted especially for the maintenance of those troops, has been regularly and exactly furnished; and although it has been proved that the revenue for the last three months has exceeded by a third any former quarter. The honor of your Highness's arms and the cause of your allies are thus seriously affected; the uniform refusal of the governors of the kingdom to attend to any one of the measures which I have recommended, either for permanent or temporary relief, has at last obliged me to go as a complainant into your Royal Highness's presence, for here I cannot prevail against the influence of the chief of the treasury.

"I have recommended the entire reform of the customs system,

and it has only been partially carried into effect. I have advised a method of really collecting the taxes, and of making the rich merchants and capitalists pay the tenth of their annual profits as an extraordinary contribution for the war. I declare that no person knows better than I do the sacrifices and the sufferings of your people, for there is no one for the last four years has lived so much amongst those people; but it is a fact, sir, that the great cities, and even some of the smallest places have gained by the war, and the mercantile class has enriched itself; there are divers persons in Lisbon and Oporto who have amassed immense sums. Now your government is, both from remote and recent circumstances, unable to draw resources from the capitalists by loans; it can only draw upon them by taxes. It is not denied that the regular tributes nor the extraordinary imposts on the mercantile profits are evaded; it is not denied that the measures I have proposed, vigorously carried into execution, would furnish the government with pecuniary resources; and it remains for that government to inform your Highness why they have neither enforced my plans, nor any others which the necessity of the times calls for. They fear to become unpopular, but such is the knowledge I have of the people's good sense and loyalty, such my zeal for the cause, that I have offered to become responsible for the happy issue, and to take upon myself all the odium of enforcing my own measures. I have offered in vain!

“Never was a sovereign in the world so ill served as your Highness has been by the Junta de Viveres, and I zealously forwarded your interests when I obtained its abolition; and yet, under a false pretext of debt, the government still disburse fifty millions of reis monthly, on account of that board. It has left a debt undoubtedly, and it is of importance to pay it, although not at this moment; but let the government state in detail how these fifty millions granted monthly have been applied; let them say if all the accounts have been called in and liquidated? who has enforced the operation? to what does the debt amount? has it been classified? how much is really still due to those who have received instalments? finally, have these millions been applied to the payment of salaries instead of debt? But were it convenient now to pay the debt, it cannot be denied that to pay the army which is to defend the country, to protect it from the sweeping destructive hand of the enemy, is of more pressing importance. The troops will be neither able nor willing to fight if they are not paid.”

Then touching upon the abuse of permitting the tax-gatherers to hold a month's taxes in their hands, and upon the opposition he met with from the Regency, he continued:—

“I assure your Royal Highness I give my advice to the governors of the kingdom, actuated solely by an earnest zeal for your service, without any personal interest. I can have none relative to Portugal, and none with regard to individuals, for I have no private relation with and scarcely am acquainted with those who direct or would wish to direct your affairs. Those reforms recommended by me, and which have at last been partially effected in the custom-house and the arsenal, in the navy, the payment of the interest of the national debt, and the formation of a military chest, have succeeded, and I may therefore say that the other measures I propose would have similar results. I am ready to allow that I may deceive myself on this point, but certainly they are suggested by a desire for the good of your service; hence in the most earnest and decided manner I express my ardent wish, and it is common to all your faithful servants, that you will return to the kingdom and take charge yourself of the government.”

These vigorous measures to bring the Regency to terms succeeded only partially. In May they promulgated a new system for the collection of taxes which relieved the financial pressure on the army for the moment, but did not content Wellington, because it was made to square with old habits and prejudices, and thus left the roots of all the evils alive and vigorous. Every moment furnished new proofs of the hopelessness of regenerating a nation through the medium of a corrupted government; and a variety of circumstances more or less serious continued to embarrass the march of public affairs. In the *Madeiras* the authorities vexatiously prevented the English money agents from exporting specie, and their conduct was approved of at *Rio Janeiro*. At *Bisao*, in Africa, the troops mutinied for want of pay, and in the *Cape de Verde Islands* disturbances arose from the over-exaction of taxes; for when the people were weak the Regency was vigorous, pliant only to the powerful. These commotions were trifling and soon ended, yet expeditions were sent against the offenders in both places, and the troops thus employed immediately committed far worse excesses and did more mischief than that which they were sent to suppress. At the same time several French frigates, finding the coast of Africa unguarded, cruised successfully against the *Brazil* trade, and aided the American privateers to contract the already too straitened resources of the army.

Notwithstanding these difficulties the exertions of the British officers had restored the numbers, discipline and spirit of the Portuguese army. Twenty-seven thousand excellent soldiers were again under arms and ready to commence the campaign, although the national discontent was daily increasing; and indeed the very

feeling of security created by the appearance of such an army rendered the citizens at large less willing to bear the inconveniences of the war. Distant danger never affects the multitude, and the billeting of troops, who from long habits of war little regarded the rights of the citizens in comparison with their own necessities, being combined with requisitions and with a recruiting system becoming every year more irksome, formed an aggregate of inconveniences intolerable to men who desired ease, and no longer dreaded to find an enemy on their hearthstones. The powerful were more affected than the poorer classes, because of their indolent habits; but their impatience was aggravated by being debarred of the highest situations, or supplanted by British interference; and, unlike those of Spain, the Portuguese nobles had lost little of their hereditary influence. Discontent was thus extended widely, dread of French power was gone, unlimited confidence in the strength and resources of England had succeeded; and this confidence, to use the words of Mr. Stuart, "being opposed to the irregularities which have been practised by individuals, and to the difference of manners and of religion, placed the British in the singular position of a class whose exertions were necessary for the country, but who for the above reasons were in every other respect as distinct from the natives as persons with whom, from some criminal cause, it was necessary to suspend communication." Hence he judged that the return of the Prince Regent would be a proper epoch for the British to retire from all situations in Portugal not strictly military; for if anything should delay that event, the time was approaching when the success of the army and the tranquillity of the country would render it necessary to yield to the first manifestations of national feeling. In fine, notwithstanding the great benefits conferred upon the Portuguese by the British, the latter were, and it will always be so on like occasions, regarded by the upper classes as a captain regards galley slaves: their strength was required to speed the vessel, but they were feared and hated.

To Portugal the Prince would not return, but Carlotta being resolute to come, her apartments were finished, and her valuable effects actually arrived. Ill health was the pretext, the real object to be near Spain; for indefatigable, and of a violence approaching insanity, she had sold even her plate and jewels to raise money wherewith to corrupt the leading members of the Cortes; and if that should not promise success, she proposed to distribute the money amongst the Spanish partidas, to obtain military support for her schemes. Fortunately the Prince, dreading the intriguing advisers of his wife, would not suffer her to quit Rio Janeiro until the wish of the British Cabinet upon the subject was known; and that was

so decidedly averse, it was thought better to do without the Prince himself, than to have him accompanied by Carlotta: so both remained in the Brazils, and this formidable cloud passed away, yet left no sunshine on the land.

It was at this period that the offer of a Russian auxiliary force, before alluded to, was made to Wellington by Admiral Greig, and accepted by him to the amount of fifteen thousand men; yet it led to no result, because the Russian ambassador in London declared the Emperor knew nothing of it! Alexander then proposed to mediate in the dispute between Great Britain and America, but the English ministers, while lauding him as a paragon of magnanimity and justice in regard to the war against Napoleon, remembered the armed neutrality and quadruple alliance, and wisely declined trusting England's maritime pretensions to his faithless, grasping policy. Neither would they listen to Austria, who at this time, probably as a cloak, desired to mediate a general peace. Amidst this political confusion the progress of the military preparations was visible; and, contemporary with the Portuguese, the Spanish troops, under Wellington's influence and providence, acquired more consistence than they had ever before possessed: a mighty power was in arms. But the flood of war which the English General finally poured into Spain, and the channels by which he directed the overwhelming torrent, cannot be described until the political situation of Joseph, and that secondary warfare which occupied the French armies while Wellington was re-organizing his power, are related.

CHAPTER III.

Napoleon's embarrassed position—His wonderful activity—His designs explained—The war in Spain becomes secondary—Many thousand old soldiers withdrawn from the armies—The partidas become more disciplined and dangerous—New bands are raised in Biscay and Guipuscoa, and the insurrection of the northern provinces creeps on—Napoleon orders the King to fix his quarters at Valladolid, to menace Portugal, and to reinforce the army of the north—Joseph complains of his generals, and especially of Soult—Napoleon's magnanimity—Joseph's complaints not altogether without foundation.

IN war it is not so much positive strength as relative situations which gives the victory. Joseph's position thus judged was weak; he could not combine the materials at his disposal, nor wield them when combined by others. France had been suddenly thrown into a new and embarrassing attitude, more embarrassing even than it

appeared to her enemies, or than her robust, warlike proportions, nourished by twelve years of victory, indicated. Napoleon, the most indefatigable and active of mankind, turned his enemy's ignorance on this head to profit; for scarcely was it known that he had reached Paris by that wise, that rapid journey from Smorghoni, which baffled his enemies' hopes and left them only the power of foolish abuse—scarcely was his arrival at Paris known to the world, when a new and enormous army, the constituent parts of which he had with his usual foresight created while yet in the midst of victory, was in march from all parts to unite in the heart of Germany. On this magical rapidity he rested his hopes to support the tottering fabric of his empire; but his design was, while presenting a menacing front on every side, so to conduct his operations, that, if he failed in his first stroke, he might still contract his system without violent concussion. His military power was rather broken and divided than lessened, for the number of men employed in 1813 was greater than in 1812; in the latter four hundred thousand, in the former more than seven hundred thousand, and twelve hundred field-pieces, were engaged on different points, exclusive of the armies in Spain.* On the Vistula, the Oder, the Elbe, he had powerful fortresses and garrisons, or rather armies, of strength and goodness to re-establish his ascendancy in Europe, if he could re-unite them into one system by placing a new host in the centre of Germany: thus also he could retain those allies who felt the attraction of his enemy's success.

But this was a gigantic contest, for his adversaries, deceiving their subjects with false promises of liberty, had brought whole nations against him. More than eight hundred thousand men were in arms in Germany alone; secret societies were in activity all over the continent; and in France a conspiracy was commenced by men who desired rather to see their country a prey to foreigners and degraded with a Bourbon king, than independent and glorious under Napoleon. Wherefore that great monarch had now to make application on an immense scale, of the maxim which prescribes a skilful offensive as the best defence, and he had to sustain two warfares: the one depending principally upon moral force to hold the vast fabric of his former policy together; the other to meet material exigencies. The first, infinitely the most important, was to influence Germany and France, and the Peninsular contest sunk at once into an accessory. In this state he required constant rapid intelligence from Spain, because the ascendancy he yet maintained over the world by his astounding genius might have been broken in a moment if Wellington suddenly abandoned the Penin-

* Imperial muster rolls, MS.

sula to throw his army or a part of it into France. For then would have been deranged all the Emperor's calculations; then would the defection of all his allies have ensued; then would he have been compelled to concentrate both his new forces and his Spanish troops for defence, abandoning all his fortresses, and his still large, though scattered veteran armies in Germany and Poland. It would have been destructive of his moral power to have commotions raised on his own threshold when he was assuming the front of a conqueror in Germany.

* To obviate this danger, or to meet it, alike required that his armies in the Peninsula should adopt a new and vigorous system, under which, relinquishing all real offensive movements, they should yet appear daring and enterprising while preparing to abandon their former conquests. But the Emperor wanted to fortify his young levies with veterans from Spain, and therefore recalled the Young Guard, and with it many thousand men and officers of the line most remarkable for courage and conduct. In lieu the reserve at Bayonne entered Spain, being replaced with another, again to be replaced in May by further levies; and twenty thousand conscripts were appropriated for immediate service. Thus weakened in numbers, considerably so during the transit, the armies were also in quality deteriorated at a critical moment, for Wellington was being powerfully reinforced, and the *partidas*, augmented by English supplies liberally and now usefully dealt out, were in the northern parts acting in concert with the naval squadrons; during the operations of the French on the Tormes, they had revived insurrection in Navarre and Biscay, where recent gross abuses of military authority had been perpetrated by some of the local commanders.

The French troops were indeed only relieved from the crushing pressure of Wellington's operations to struggle in the meshes of the guerilla and insurrectional warfare. Nor was its importance now to be measured by former efforts. The chiefs, more docile to the suggestions of the British chief, possessed fortified posts and harbors, their bands were swelling to the size of armies, their military knowledge of the country, and of the French system of invasion, was more matured, their *dépôts* better hidden, and they could at times bear the shock of battle on nearly equal terms.* New and large bands of a far more respectable and influential kind were also formed or forming in Navarre and Biscay; where insurrectional juntas were organized of men from the best families voluntarily enrolled, and not obnoxious, like the *partidas*, for rapine and violence. In Biscay alone several battalions, each mustering a

* Duke of Feltre's Official Correspondence, MS.

thousand men, were in the field, and the communication with France was so intercepted, that the Minister of War only heard of Joseph receiving his despatches of the 4th of January on the 18th of March, and then through the medium of Suchet! The contributions could no longer be collected, the magazines could not be filled, the fortresses were endangered, the armies had no base of operations, the insurrection was spreading through Aragon, and the bands of the interior were also increasing in numbers and activity. The troops, sorely pressed for provisions, were widely disseminated and everywhere occupied, and each general was averse to concentrate his own forces or aid his neighbor. In fine, the problem was become extremely complicated, and Napoleon only seems to have seized the true solution.

When informed by Caffarelli of the state of affairs in the north, he thus wrote to the King: "Hold Madrid only as a point of observation; fix your quarters, not as monarch, but as general of the French forces, at Valladolid; concentrate the armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal; the allies will not, and indeed cannot make any serious offensive movement for several months,—wherefore it is your business to profit from their forced inactivity, to put down the insurrection in the northern provinces, to free the communication with France, and re-establish a good base of operations before the commencement of another campaign, that the French army may be in condition to fight the allies if the latter advance towards France." Very important indeed did Napoleon deem this object, and so earnest was he to have constant and rapid intelligence, that couriers and their escorts were to be despatched twice a week, travelling day and night at the rate of a league an hour. Caffarelli also was to be reinforced, even by the whole army of Portugal, if it was necessary, to effect the immediate pacification of Biscay and Navarre; and while this pacification was in progress Joseph was to hold the rest of his forces in a position offensive towards Portugal, making Wellington feel that his whole power was required on the frontier; that neither his main body, nor any considerable detachment, could safely embark to disturb France, and that he must cover Lisbon strongly on the frontier, or expect to see the French army menacing that capital. These instructions, well understood and vigorously executed, would certainly have put down the insurrection in the rear of the King's position. And the spring would then have seen that monarch at the head of ninety thousand men, having their retreat upon France clear of all impediments, and consequently free to fight the allies on the Tormes, the Duero, the Pisuerga, and the Ebro.

Joseph, unable to view the matter thus, would not make his

kingly notions subservient to military science, nor his military movements to an enlarged policy. Neither did he perceive that his beneficent notions of government were misplaced amidst the din of arms. Napoleon's orders were imperative, but the principle of them escaped Joseph; he was not even acquainted with the true state of the northern provinces, nor would he at first credit it when told to him; hence while his thoughts were intent upon his Spanish political projects, and the secret negotiations with Del Parque's army, the *partidas* and insurgents became masters of all his lines of communication in the north.* The Emperor's orders, despatched early in January, and reiterated week after week, only arrived the end of February, and their execution did not take place until the end of March, and then imperfectly; the time thus lost was irreparable; and yet, as Napoleon reproachfully observed, the bulletin which revealed the extent of his disasters in Russia might alone have taught the King what to do. But Joseph was nearly as immovable in his resolutions as Napoleon; the firmness of the one being, however, founded upon extraordinary sagacity, while the other's rested on the want of that quality; regarding opposition as a disloyal malevolence, he judged the refractory generals to be enemies to the Emperor and to himself. Reille, Caffarelli, Suchet, alike incurred his displeasure, and the Minister of War also, because of a letter in which he rebuked the King for having removed Souham from command.

Feltre's style, as towards a monarch, was offensive. Joseph attributed it to the influence of Soult, and complaining to the Emperor, said—"The Duke of Dalmatia or himself must quit Spain. At Valencia he had forgotten his injuries, suppressed his just indignation, and instead of sending Soult to France had given him the direction of the operations, hoping shame for the past, combined with his avidity for glory, would urge him to extraordinary exertions; nothing of the kind had happened. Soult was not to be trusted. Restless, intriguing, ambitious, he would sacrifice everything to his own advancement, and possessed that sort of talent which would lead him to mount a scaffold when he thought he was ascending a throne, because he would want courage to strike when the crisis arrived." Then, with a coarse sarcasm, he acquitted him "of treachery at the passage of the Tormes, because there fear alone operated to prevent him from bringing the allies to a decisive action; but he was treacherous, and probably connected with the conspiracy of Malet at Paris."

It was with such language Joseph assailed one of the greatest commanders and most faithful servants of his brother; and thus

* King's Correspondence, MS.

greeted that brother on his arrival at Paris after the disasters of Russia. In the most calm and prosperous state these charges might have excited jealous wrath in the strongest mind; but when the Emperor had just lost his great army, and found the smoking embers of an extinguished conspiracy at his palace gates; when his friends were failing, his enemies accumulating, it seemed scarcely possible these accusations should not have ruined Soult; yet they did not even ruffle the temper of Napoleon. Magnanimous as sagacious, he smiled at Joseph's anger, removing Soult from Spain because, thus at feud with the King, he could not act beneficially; but he made him commander of the Imperial Guard, and afterwards selected him from all his generals to retrieve affairs when Joseph was driven from the Peninsula.

It has been shown that when Wellington took winter quarters, the French occupied a line stretching from Valencia to the foot of the Gallician mountains. Suchet, on the extreme left, was opposed by the allies at Alicant. Soult, commanding the centre, had his head-quarters at Toledo, having a detachment near the Sierra Morena watching Del Parque and two others in the valley of the Tagus. Of these last one was at Talavera, one on the Tietar; the first observed Morillo and Penne Villemur, who from Estremadura menaced the bridges on the Tagus; the second watched Hill at Coria. From the Tietar the French communicated by the Gredos mountains with Avila, where Foy's division of the army of Portugal was posted, partly for the sake of food, partly to watch Bejar and the upper Tormes; because the allies, possessing the pass of Bejar, might have suddenly united north of the mountains, and, breaking the French line, have fallen on Madrid. On the right of Foy, Reille's army occupied Salamanca, Ledesma, and Alba, on the Lower Tormes—Valladolid, Toro, and Tordesillas, on the Duero—Benevente, Leon, and other points, on the Esla. Behind the right of this great line, Caffarelli's army had retaken its old positions; and the army of the centre was fixed as before in and around Madrid, its operations being bounded north of the Tagus by the mountains which invest that capital, and south of that river by the districts of Aranjuez, Tarancon, and Cuença.

Joseph issued a royal regulation, marking the extent of country which each army was to forage, and ordered a certain and considerable revenue to be collected by the civil authorities for the support of his court. The subsistence of the French armies was thus made secondary to the revenue of the crown, and soldiers, in a time of insurrectional war, were to obey Spanish civilians; an absurdity heightened by the peculiarly active, vigorous, and prompt military method of the French, as contrasted with the dilatory,

improvident, promise-breaking, and visionary system of the Spaniards. Hence, scarcely was the royal regulation issued, when the generals broke through it in a variety of ways, and the King, as usual, became involved in very acrimonious disputes. If he ordered one to detach troops in aid of another, he was told he should rather send additional troops to the first. If he reprimanded a general for raising contributions contrary to the regulations, he was answered that the soldiers must be fed; and always the authority of the prefects and intendants was disregarded, in pursuance of Napoleon's orders. For that monarch continually reminded his brother, that as the war was carried on by the French armies, their interests were paramount; that the King of Spain could have no authority over them, and must never use his military authority as lieutenant of the empire in aid of his kingly views; for with those the French soldiers could have nothing to do—their welfare could not be confided to Spanish ministers, whose capacity was by no means apparent, and whose fidelity was not certain.*

In reply, Joseph again pleaded his duties towards his subjects, and his sentiments, explained with feeling and great beneficence of design, were worthy of all praise abstractedly, but totally inapplicable, because the Spaniards were not his subjects; they were his inveterate enemies, and it was impossible to unite the vigor of war with the benevolence of a paternal monarch. All his policy was vitiated by this fundamental error, which arose from inability to view any subject largely, for his military operations had a like defect; and though he was acute, courageous, and industrious in details, he never grasped the whole at once. Men of this character, conscious of labor and good intentions, are commonly obstinate; but their qualities, useful under the direction of an able chief, lead to mischief when they become chiefs themselves; for in matters of great moment, and in war especially, it is not the actual but the comparative importance of operations which should determine the choice of measures; and, when all are important, judgment of the highest kind is required; judgment which no man ever possessed more largely than Napoleon, and which Joseph did not possess at all. He neither comprehended his brother, nor would accept advice from those whose capacity approached that of the Emperor. When every general complained of insufficient means, instead of combining their forces to press in mass against the decisive point, he disputed with each, and demanded additional succors for all; at the same time repeating and urging his own schemes upon Napoleon, whose intellect was so immeasurably greater than

* King's Correspondence, MS

his own. The insurrection in the northern provinces he treated as a political question, attributing it to the people's anger at seeing the ancient supreme council of Navarre dismissed, and some members imprisoned by a French general: a cause very inadequate to the effect. Nor was his judgment truer with respect to time. He proposed, if a continuation of the Russian war should prevent the Emperor from sending more men to Spain, to make Burgos the royal residence, to transport there the archives, and all that constituted a capital; then to have the provinces behind the Ebro, Catalonia excepted, governed by himself, through the medium of his Spanish ministers, and as a country at peace, while those beyond the Ebro should be given up to the generals as a country at war.

In this state his civil administration would, he said, remedy the evils inflicted by the armies, would conciliate the people by keeping all the Spanish families and authorities in safety and comfort, would draw all those who favored his cause from all parts of Spain, and would encourage that attachment to his person which he believed many Spaniards to entertain. And while he declared the violence and injustice of the French armies to be the sole cause of the protracted resistance of the Spaniards—a declaration false in fact, that violence being only one of many causes—he continually urged the necessity of beating the English before pacifying the people. As if it were possible, off-hand, to beat Wellington and his veterans, imbedded as they were in the strong country of Portugal, while British fleets, with troops and succors of all kinds, hovering on both flanks of the French, were feeding and sustaining the insurrection of the Spaniards in their rear. Napoleon was willing enough to drive the English from the Peninsula, and tranquillize the people by a regular government; but with profound knowledge of war, of politics, and of human nature, he judged the first could only be done by a methodical combination, in unison with that rule of art which prescribes the establishment and security of the base of operations; security which could not be obtained if the benevolent visions of the King were to supersede military vigor. He laughed in scorn when his brother assured him that the Peninsulars, with all their fiery passions, their fanaticism, and their ignorance, would receive an equable government as a benefit from the hands of an intrusive monarch, before they had lost all hope of resistance by arms.

Joseph was not however totally devoid of grounds for his opinions. He was deeply affected by the misery he witnessed; his Spanish ministers were earnest and importunate, and many French generals gave him too much reason to complain of their violence.

The length and mutations of the war had created a large party willing enough to obtain tranquillity at the price of submission, while others were, as we have seen, not indisposed—if he would hold the crown on their terms—to accept his dynasty, as one essentially springing from democracy, in preference to the despotic, base, and superstitious family which the nation was called upon to uphold. It was not unnatural therefore for him to desire to retain his capital while the negotiations with Del Parque's army were still in existence; it was not strange that he should be displeased with Soult after reading that Marshal's honest but offensive letter: and certainly it was highly creditable to his character as a man and as a king, that he would not silently suffer his subjects to be oppressed by the generals.

"I am in distress for money," he often exclaimed to Napoleon, "such distress as no king ever endured before; my plate is sold, and on state occasions the appearance of magnificence is supported by false metal. My ministers and household are actually starving, misery is on every face, and men, otherwise willing, are thus deterred from joining a king so little able to support them. My revenue is seized by the generals for the supply of their troops, and I cannot as a King of Spain, without dishonor, partake of the resources thus torn by rapine from subjects whom I have sworn to protect; I cannot be King of Spain and General of the French; let me resign both, and live peaceably in France. Your Majesty does not know what scenes are enacted; you will shudder to hear that men, formerly rich and devoted to our cause, have been driven out of Zaragoza, and denied even a ration of food. The Marquis Cavallero, a councillor of state, minister of justice, and known personally to your Majesty, has been thus used. He has been seen actually begging for a piece of bread!"

If this Cavallero was the old minister of Charles the 4th, no misery was too great a punishment for his tyrannical rule under that monarch; yet it was not from the French it should have come; and Joseph's distress must have been severe, because that brave and honest man, Jourdan, a Marshal of France, Major-General of the armies, and a personal favorite of the King, complained that the non-payment of his appointments had reduced him to absolute penury, and after borrowing till his credit was exhausted, he could with difficulty procure subsistence.* It is now time to continue the secondary warfare, which being spread over two-thirds of Spain, and simultaneous, must be classed under two heads; namely, the operations north, and the operations south of the Tagus.

* Jourdan's Correspondence, MS.