

## LOSS OF THE ALLIES IN THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

	Officers.	Sergeants.	Rank and file.	Horses	Men
British .. .. .	{ 28 188	24 136	336 2400	96 Killed .. ..	5224
				120 Wounded .. ..	
				37 Missing .. ..	
Portuguese .. .. .	{ 13 74 1	" "	287 1436 180	18 Killed .. ..	
				13 Wounded .. ..	
				7 Missing .. ..	
Total ..	304	207	4713	291	

LOSS OF THE GERMAN CAVALRY ON THE ALMAR STREAM,  
JULY 23.

Men and Officers.	Horses.	
117	117	117

THE BRITISH LOSS BY INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND  
CAVALRY BRIGADES.

Cavalry .. .. .	{	Le Marchand's Brigade	lost.	Men and officers	105	} 141
		Anson's do.	do.	do.	5	
		Victor Alten's do.	do.	do.	31	
Infantry .. .. .	{	1st Division General Campbell	do.	do.	69	} 2886
		3rd do. General Pakenham	do.	do.	456	
		4th do. General Cole	do.	do.	537	
		5th do. General Leith	do.	do.	464	
		6th do. General Clinton	do.	do.	1198	
		7th do. General S. Hope	do.	do.	119	
		Light do. General C. Alten	do.	do.	29	
Artillery	General Framingham do.	do.	14	3027		

## No. XXII

STRENGTH OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ARMY AT  
VITTORIA.

EXTRACTED FROM THE MORNING STATE OF THE 19TH JUNE, 1813.

	Present under arms.	On Command.	Total. Present. On Command.	
British Cavalry .. ..	7,791	851		
Portuguese do. .. ..	1,452	225		
Total Cavalry	.....	.....	9,243	
British Infantry .. ..	33,658	1771	1076	
Portuguese do. .. ..	23,905	1638		
Total infantry	.....	.....	57,563	
	Sabres and bayonets ..		66,806	
	Deduct the 6th division left at Medina de Pomar ..		6,320	
	Sabres and bayonets ..		60,486	
	Spanish Auxiliaries.			
Infantry.. .. .	{	Morillo's division	about 3,000	23,000
		Giron's do.	do. 12,000	
		Carlos d'Espagna's do.	do. 3,000	
		Longa's do.	do. 3,300	
Cavalry.. .. .	{	Penne Villemur	do. 1,000	
		Julian Sanchez	do. 1,000	
Grand Total	.....	.....	83,486	

NUMBER OF ANGLO-PORTUGUESE GUNS AT THE BATTLE  
OF VITTORIA.

COLONEL A. DICKSON, COMMANDING.

British horse artillery	....	....	....	9 lbs.	....	....	....	45		
Do.	do.	....	....	6 lbs.	....	....	....	30		
Do.	do.	....	....	8½ inch howitzers	....	....	....	15		
Total								....	....	90

No Spanish guns set down in the return. Number unknown.

No. XXIII.

## JUSTIFICATORY PIECES.

*Lord William Bentinck to Sir E. Pellew.**At Sea, June 18th, 1813.*

SIR,—Y. E. has seen the information I have received of a projected attack upon Sicily by Murat, in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. It seems necessary that the French fleet should leave Toulon, should reach the coast of Naples, embark the men and land them in Sicily, or cover their passage from Calabria or the Bay of Naples, if the intention be, as in the last instance, to transport them to Sicily in the tonnage and small craft of the country. The most important question is, whether this can be effected by the enemy. I have no difficulty in saying on my part, that in the present disposition of the Neapolitan army in Sicily, and in the non-existence of any national force, and the imperfect composition of the British force, if half the number intended for this expedition should land in Sicily, the island would be conquered.

(Signed)

W. BENTINCK.

*Sir E. Pellew to Lord W. Bentinck.**H. M. S. Caledonia, June 19th, 1813.*

MY LORD,—I feel it my duty to state to your lordship that in my judgment the Toulon fleet may evade mine without difficulty under a strong N. W. wind to carry them through the passage of the Hieres islands, without the possibility of my interrupting them, and that they may have from twelve to twenty-four hours' start of me in chasing them. When blown off the coast, my look-out ships would certainly bring me such information as would enable me to follow them immediately to the Bay of Naples. Your lordship is most competent to judge whether in the interval of their arrival and my pursuit, the French Admiral would be able to embark Murat's army artillery and stores, and land them on the coast of Sicily before I came up with them. The facility of communication by telegraph along the whole coast of Toulon would certainly apprise Murat of their sailing at a very short notice, but for my own part, I should entertain very sanguine hopes of overtaking them either in the Bay of Naples or on the coast of Sicily before they could make good their landing.

*Lord William Bentinck to Lord Wellington.**At Sea, June 20th, 1813.*

MY LORD,—By the perusal of the accompanying despatch to Lord Castle

reagh, your lordship will perceive that Murat has opened a negotiation with us, the object of which is friendship with us and hostility to Buonaparte. You will observe in one of the conversations with Murat's agent, that he informed me that Buonaparte had ordered Murat to hold twenty thousand men in readiness for the invasion of Sicily in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. I enclose the copy of a letter I have in consequence addressed to Sir E. Pellew, together with his answer, upon the practicability of the Toulon fleet sailing without the knowledge of the blockading fleet. Your lordship will have received my letter of the 21st of May enclosing a copy of my despatch to Lord Bathurst, relative to the discontent of the Neapolitan troops in Sicily and the consequent state of weakness if not of danger resulting from it to that island. I stated also that this circumstance had induced me to detain in Sicily the two battalions which had been withdrawn from Spain.

*Lord Wellington to Lord William Bentinck.*

*Huarte, July 1st, 1813.*

MY LORD,—In answer to your lordship's despatch, I have to observe, that I conceive that the island of Sicily is at present in no danger whatever.

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No. XXIV.

*Letter from General Nugent to Lord William Bentinck.*

*Vienna, January 24th, 1812.*

MY DEAR LORD WILLIAM,—I hope you have received the letter I wrote to you, shortly after my arrival here by a person sent for that purpose. Soon after his departure the affair of La Tour happened, as King mentions in his letter. It required some time before I could judge of the result it would have, and the manner it would be considered by the emperor and the government here, and then to settle again the manner of sending officers down to the Mediterranean, for some of those then destined to be sent were implicated. All these circumstances caused the delay of the present, which otherwise you would have had much sooner. Another cause of the delay was that I wanted to inform you of the answer which would be given by this house to the speculations that I was commissioned by the prince-regent to propose, relative to the archduke. There was no decisive answer given, and the only manner of forming an opinion upon that subject was by observing and getting information of their true intentions. I am now firmly convinced that these are such as we could wish, and that it is only fear of being committed that prevents them to speak in a more positive manner. Their whole conduct proves this, more particularly in La Tour's affair, which has produced no change whatsoever nor led to any discovery of views or connexions. There is even now less difficulty than ever for officers going to the Mediterranean. They get passports from government here without its inquiring or seeming to know the real object. As it can do nothing else but connive, to which this conduct answers, I think a more explicit declaration is not even requisite, and I am convinced that when the thing is once done they will gladly agree. This is likewise King's and Hardenberg's and Johnson's opinion upon the subject, and as such they desire me to express it to you, and to observe that the situation of things here makes the forwarding of

the measures you may think expedient in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic the more desirable.

They are here extremely satisfied with the conduct of government in England, and by the accounts we have, the latter is much pleased with the conduct of this country, particularly relative to the affairs of Prussia. These are however not decided yet. But whatever the consequence may be and whatever this country may do for the present, I am convinced that your measures will ultimately contribute much to the result. I am happy to perceive by the last information from England that everything seems to have been settled there by you. The recruiting business of Major Burke is going on rapidly. As it was not begun at the time of my departure I can only attribute it to your presence. The letters contain likewise that government is come to the most favorable resolutions relative to the archduke, and I hope the formation of the troops will soon be effectuated. The dispositions of the Adriatic coasts and the Tyrol are as good as can be, but all depends upon establishing a basis, and without that all partial exertions would be useless or destructive. At the same time that some regiments would be formed, I think it would be very expedient to form at the same place a Dalmatian or a Croat regiment, particularly as in the present state of things it will be much easier even than the other. The men could be easily recruited in Bosnia, and sent from Durazzo to the place you should appoint. The bearer will give you every information upon the subject, and at all events, I should propose to you to send him immediately back to Durazzo, and, should you adopt the above, to give him the necessary orders and the commission for recruiting and sending the men to the place of formation. No person can be better qualified than he is. He knows the languages, the country, and the character of the people, and understands everything relative to commercial affairs. As to the place of formation, I think I already proposed Cephalonia to you. Lissa or one of the nearer islands would give too much jealousy in the beginning in those parts, until our capital increases so as to undertake an important enterprise, at all events it is important to form a noyau of the three nations; it is then that we may hope to be joined by the whole of Dalmatia and Croatia after a short time. Major and other officers will shortly proceed to the Mediterranean. They will be directed to Messina where I request you will send orders for them. It would be very useful and saving to provide means for transporting them to that place from Durazzo, and if possible to establish a more frequent and regular intercourse between you and the latter. Johnson who soon sets off from here will in the meantime establish a communication across Bosnia to Durazzo. His presence in those parts will be productive of many good effects. You will find that he is an able active and zealous man, and will certainly be very useful in forwarding your views. I can answer for his being worthy of your full confidence. Should you adopt the proposition relative to the recruiting, it would be necessary to put at his disposal the requisite funds.

You will judge by the account the bearer of this will give you whether cloth, &c., can be had at a cheaper rate from this country or where you are, and he will bring back your directions for this object. Allow me to observe that it would be highly useful to have clothes for a considerable number of men prepared beforehand. Many important reasons have prevented me hitherto from proceeding to the Mediterranean as speedily as I wished. I hope however not to be detained much longer, and soon to have removed every obstacle. I think to set off from here in the beginning of March, and request you will be so kind as to provide with the return of the bearer to



Durazzo the means of my passage from thence, where I shall come with a feigned name. I hope he will be back there by the time of my arrival. I shall endeavor to hasten my journey, as I have important information in every respect. By that time we shall know the decision relative to the north. King has informed you of the reasons which made an alteration necessary in regard to Frozzi's journey. Part of your object is in fact fulfilled already, and there are agents in Italy, &c. As to the other and principal part relative to connexions in the army, and the gaining an exact knowledge of it and of the government in Italy, with other circumstances, I expect soon to have a person of sufficient consequence and ability to execute your instructions, and he will go to Milan, &c. as soon as it can be done with safety. His permanent residence in that country seems to be necessary, that he may be able to accomplish fully the object, and as the sum you have assigned for this purpose is sufficient for a considerable time, you can determine whether he is to remain there permanently or not. Frozzi will bring you an exact account of what has been arranged relative to this business, and will himself be a very proper person for communications between you and Italy or this country. He will for that purpose go back to Italy, the obstacle that opposed it hitherto being now no more. I cannot but repeat the importance of giving all possible extent to the arch-duke's establishment, and particularly the raising of as much troops as possible, for all will depend upon having the means of landing. We are then sure of augmenting very speedily, and finding the greatest assistance. The place for beginning cannot be determined on exactly, but there is much to be expected in Dalmatia and Croatia where we could be joined by the inhabitants and troops. The lower part would be best adapted in case we begin with a small force. I shall send and bring officers particularly acquainted with the country, and provide every other assistance such as plans, &c., and I think it would be expedient to prevent for the present any enterprise in that country that would alarm them. Since I began my letter a courier has arrived from Paris.

The contingent of the Rhenish confederacy have got orders to be ready for marching. Reinforcements are sending from France to the north, and every preparation is making for war. Buonaparte told to Swartzenburg that he would begin in April and all circumstances seem to agree with this. On the other side Russia is very slow in making peace with Turkey. He entirely neglects Prussia, and for this reason it is to be feared that the latter will place his capital with Buonaparte notwithstanding that this cabinet is endeavoring to prevent it. I should be then very much afraid for the conduct of this house, well inclined as the Emperor is. Proposals were made by France but no resolution has been taken until it is known how things turn out. The worst is that Romanzow is still in credit with Alexander, which prevents all confidence in other houses and makes Russia adopt half measures. This sketch of the situation will give you some idea of the wavering and uncertain state people are in. There is no calculation to be made as to the conduct of government, nor must we be surprised at anything they may do. On the other side our speculations are not built upon them, but upon the disposition of the people; and whatever may happen I am convinced that this is a good foundation if the measures are taken and the means prepared. A principal object of mine in these parts has been to prepare the measures for the case that it comes here to the very worst. The most important thing is the augmenting in every possible manner the force at your disposition. The accounts we have to-day of your return and the powers I hope you have, give me the best hopes of your overcoming every

difficulty. I must here observe that as Johnson's proceedings are entirely subordinate to, and make a part of your plans and operations in general, and that he cannot of course depend upon King, you will be so good as to give him decisive instructions to that purpose, and assign him the means and powers for acting in consequence. I shall combine with him in my passage through Bosnia everything in the hopes that you will approve of this.

*Letter from Mr. King to Lord William Bentinck.*

*Vienna, January 24th, 1812.*

MY LORD,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's letter of the 25th of August, which was delivered to me towards the latter end of October, by Captain Frozzi whom I should immediately have furnished with the means of proceeding to Italy for the purpose of carrying your lordship's instructions into effect, had it not appeared to me that the measures which I had taken on my arrival here, had already in a great degree anticipated your lordship's intentions. As a confirmation of this, I beg leave to transmit for your lordship's perusal the reports (marked A) of three messengers whom I sent to the north of Italy for the purpose of ascertaining the state of the public mind, particularly in the *ci-devant* Venetian territories and adjacent districts. These reports confirm in a very satisfactory manner the assurances, which I have received through various other channels, that the inhabitants of those countries are ready and determined to avail themselves of the first opportunity to shake off a yoke which is become insupportable. I have also the honor to transmit to your lordship the copy of a letter from Count Montgelas, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bavaria, to the commissary-general at Nimpten, from which it appears that the Bavarian government is not altogether ignorant of the intentions of the Swiss and Tyrolese, but I am happy to have it in my power to inform your lordship that the persons who seem to have excited the suspicions of the Bavarian government do not enjoy the confidence of our friends in Switzerland, and have not been made acquainted with their intentions; it is nevertheless indispensably necessary that we should act with the greatest possible caution in the employment of emissaries, lest the French and Bavarian governments should take the alarm and adopt measures which would defeat our projects or at least occasion a premature explosion. On these grounds (having previously consulted with General N. to whom Captain Frozzi was particularly addressed and who entirely coincides in my opinion I think it eligible to send this officer back to Sicily, and I trust that in so doing I shall meet with your lordship's approbation. I beg leave to observe that the only service Captain Frozzi could render in Italy at the present moment would be to ascertain the number and distribution of the French forces in this country, but as these undergo continual changes I think it will be sufficient to despatch a confidential agent to your lordship with the latest intelligence from Italy, at a period when the northern war and consequent occupation of the French troops will enable your lordship to derive advantage from such intelligence.

The general opinion is that hostilities will commence between France and Russia in the month of April at which period the preparations of the French government will be completed, and there is little reason to hope that the Russians will avail themselves of the interval, either to annihilate the army of the duchy of Warsaw or to advance to the assistance of the King of Prussia, who will in all probability ally himself with France not

withstanding his former declarations to the contrary. The latest intelligence from Berlin states that Count St. Marsan had presented the ultimatum of his government, which demands an unconditional surrender of all the Prussian fortresses, and insists on the military force and resources of Prussia being placed at the disposal of French generals. It is positively asserted that the King is inclined to submit to these humiliating proposals, but nothing has been as yet definitively concluded. I am sorry to inform your lordship that the aspect of affairs in this country is highly discouraging; the injudicious financial measures which Count Wallis has thought proper to adopt have rendered it impossible for government to place the army on a respectable footing, and have considerably increased the discontent of the people, who however still retain their characteristic aversion to the French. The government is determined to maintain a strict neutrality during the approaching crisis if possible.

In my former letter I mentioned to your lordship my intention of establishing a person at Durazzo in order to forward messengers, &c., &c., and to transmit to me occasionally intelligence of the state of things in the Adriatic. But having received of late repeated assurances of the increasing discontent of the inhabitants of those parts of the coast who have the misfortune to be under the dominion of the French, and of their willingness to make every effort to shake off the yoke, and being aware how important it is at the present moment not to neglect an object of this nature, I have desired Mr. Johnson to proceed thither in order to form connexions in Albania, Dalmatia, and to avail himself in every possible manner of the spirit of discontent which has so decidedly manifested itself. Mr. Johnson who has been employed on the continent for some years past as an agent of government, and who has given proofs of his zeal and abilities, will repair to Durazzo, or according to circumstances to some other town in the neighborhood of the Adriatic, and will there reside as agent of the British government. He will communicate his arrival to your lordship with as little delay as possible.

By the following piece of information, which I have derived from an authentic source, your lordship will perceive that the French and Swedish governments are far from being on friendly terms. An alliance has been proposed by the former to the latter and instantaneously rejected. The terms of the alliance were as follows, viz. 1st, a body of 30,000 Swedes to be placed at the disposal of France; 2d. 3000 seamen to be furnished to the French marine; and 3d, a regiment of Swedes to be raised for the service of France as was the case before the French revolution. I transmit this letter to your lordship by Captain Steinberg and Ensign Ferandi, two officers who have served creditably in the Austrian army. The former has connexions and local knowledge in his native country which may become particularly useful. I fear it will not be in my power to send 50 subaltern officers to Sicily, as your lordship desired. I shall however occasionally despatch some intelligent officers who will I think be extremely useful in the formation of new corps.

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No. XXV.

*Extracts from the correspondence of Sir Henry Wellesley, Sir Charles Stuart, and Mr. Vaughan.*

*Mr. Vaughan to Sir Charles Stuart.*

*" Cadiz, August 3d, 1813.*

"The Spanish troops in Catalonia and elsewhere are starving, and the government are feeding them with proclamations to intendants. Since I

have known Spain I have never known the seat of Government in a worse state. There is a strong feeling against the English and a miserable jacobin party which is violent beyond measure."

*Ditto to Ditto.*

*"Chichana, Nov. 2d, 1813.*

"Never was anything so disgraceful in the annals of the world as the conduct of all the Spanish authorities on the occasion of the sickness breaking out. It is believed that no persons have the sickness twice, and as almost every family in Cadiz has passed the epidemic of the fever, the interested merchants would not allow it to be said that the epidemic existed, they have continued to issue clean bills of health to vessels leaving the port in the height of the mortality, and did all they could to intimidate the government and Cortes into remaining amongst them."

*Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Wellington.*

*"Sept. 13th, 1813.*

"A curious scene has been passing here lately. The permanent deputation\* having been appointed, the Cortes closed their session the 14th. There had been for some days reports of the prevalence of the yellow fever which had excited alarm. On the 16th, in the evening, I received an official note from the ministers of state, apprising me of the intention of the government to proceed to Madrid on the following day, but without assigning any reason for so sudden a resolution. At night I went to the regency, thinking this was an occasion when it would be right to offer them some pecuniary assistance. I found Agar and Ciscar together, the cardinal being ill of the gout. They told me that the prevalence of the disorder was the sole cause of their determination to leave Cadiz; and Ciscar particularly dwelt upon the necessity of removing, saying he had seen the fatal effects of delay at Carthagena. They then told me that there was disturbance in the town, in consequence of which they determined on summoning the extraordinary Cortes. I went from the Regency to the Cortes. A motion was made for summoning the ministers to account for the proceedings of the regency. Never was I witness to so disgraceful a scene of lying and prevarication. The ministers insisted that it was not the intention of the regency to leave Cadiz until the Cortes had been consulted, although I had in my pocket the official note announcing their intention to do so, and had been told by Ciscar that the extraordinary Cortes was assembled for no other reason than because there were disturbances in town."

*Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Wellington.*

*"Cadiz, Dec. 10th, 1813.*

"The party for placing the Princess at the head of the Spanish regency is gaining strength, and I should not be surprised if that measure were to be adopted soon after our arrival at Madrid, unless a peace and the return of Ferdinand should put an end to all such projects."

*Mr. Stuart to Lord Wellington.*

*"June 11th, 1813.*

"The repugnancy of the Admiralty to adopt the measures suggested by

\* Called the Extraordinary Cortes.

your lordship at the commencement of the American war for the protection of the coast, has been followed by events which have fully justified your opinion. *Fifteen merchantmen have been taken off Oporto in a fortnight, and a valuable Portuguese homeward-bound merchant ship was captured three days ago close to the bar of Lisbon.*

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No. XXVI.

*Extract from a manuscript memoir by Captain Norton, thirty-fourth regiment.*

COMBAT OF MAYA.

“The thirty-ninth regiment, commanded by the Hon. Col. O’Callaghan, then immediately engaged with the French, and after a severe contest also retired, the fiftieth was next in succession and they also after a gallant stand retired, making way for the ninety-second, which met the advancing French column first with its right wing drawn up in line, and after a most destructive fire and heavy loss on both sides, the remnant of the right wing retired, leaving a line of killed and wounded that appeared to have no interval; the French column advanced up to this line and then halted, the killed and wounded of the ninety-second forming a sort of rampart, the left wing then opened its fire on the column, and as I was but a little to the right of the ninety-second I could not help reflecting painfully how many of the wounded of their right wing must have unavoidably suffered from the fire of their comrades. The left wing after doing good service and sustaining a loss equal to the first line retired.

COMBAT OF RONCEVALLES.

*Extracts from General Cole’s and Marshal Soult’s Official Reports, MSS.*

*General Cole to Lord Wellington.*

*“Heights in front of Pampeluna, July 27th, 1813.*

— “The enemy having in the course of the night turned those posts, were now perceived moving in very considerable force along the ridge leading to the Puerto de Mendichurri. I therefore proceeded in that direction, and found that their advance had nearly reached the road leading from Roncesvalles pass to Los Alduides, from which it is separated by a small wooded valley. Owing to the difficulty of the communications the head of Major-general Ross’s brigade could not arrive there sooner; the major-general however, with great decision, attacked them with the Brunswick company and three companies of the twentieth, all he had time to form; these actually closed with the enemy and bayoneted several in the ranks. They were however forced to yield to superior numbers, and to retire across the valley; the enemy attempted to follow them, but were repulsed with loss, the remainder of the brigade having come up.”

*Marshal Soult to the Minister of War.*

*“Linzoin, 26 Juillet, 1813.*

*“Leurs pertes ont également été considérables, soit à l’attaque du Lin*

douz par le général Reille, où le 20<sup>me</sup> régiment a été presque détruit à la suite d'une charge à la bayonette exécutée par un bataillon du 6<sup>me</sup> léger, division Foy, soit à l'attaque d'Altobiscar par le général Clauzel.

*Extract from the correspondence of the Duke of Dalmatia with the Minister of War.*

*Ascain, 12 Août, 1813.*

“Dès à présent, V. E. voit la situation de l'armée, elle connaît ses forces, celles de l'ennemi, et elle se fait sans doute une idée de ses projets, et d'avance elle peut apprécier ce qu'il est en notre pouvoir de faire; je ne charge point le tableau, je dis ma pensée sans détour, et j'avoue que si l'ennemi emploie tous ses moyens, ainsi que probablement il le fera, ceux que nous pourrons en ce moment lui opposer étant de beaucoup inférieurs, nous ne pourrons pas empêcher qu'ils ne fasse beaucoup de mal. Mon devoir est de le dire à V. E., quoique je tiennne un autre langage aux troupes et au pays, et que d'ailleurs je ne néglige aucun moyen pour remplir de mon mieux la tâche qui m'est imposée.

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No. XXVII.

EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS.

*Report of the movements of the army of Aragon during the first fifteen days of September, 1813.*

“Le 12<sup>eme</sup>, toute l'armée d'Aragon, se réunit à Molino del Rey : une partie de celle de Catalogne et la garnison de Barcelonne se placent à droite, à Ollessa et Martorel, pour partir tous ensemble, à 8 heures du soir, et se porter la droite par San Sadurn, le reste par la grand route d'Ordal sur Villa Franca, où l'armée Anglaise était rassemblée. Le général Harispe rencontra à onze heures du soir une forte avant-garde au Col d'Ordal, dans les anciens retranchemens. Un combat des plus vifs s'engagea sous les ordres du général de l'avant-garde Mesclop. Les 7<sup>eme</sup> et 44<sup>eme</sup> reg<sup>ns</sup> montrèrent une haute valeur, ainsi qu'une partie du 116<sup>eme</sup>. Les positions sont prises et reprises, et nous restent enfin, couvertes de morts et de blessés Anglais. Dans la poursuite, le 4<sup>eme</sup> hussards se saisirent des 4 pièces de canon Anglais, &c., avec trois ou quatre cents prisonniers, presque tous du 27<sup>eme</sup> reg<sup>ns</sup> Anglais. La droite ayant rencontré des obstacles et quelques troupes ennemies à combattre dans les passages, est retardée dans sa marche, et n'arriva pas avant le jour au rendez-vous entre L'Ongat et Grénada. Un bataillon du 117<sup>eme</sup> venant à gauche, par Bejas sur Avionet, rejoint l'armée en position, avec des prisonniers.

“Le maréchal Suchet dirigea un mouvement de cavalerie et d'artillerie qui tenaient la tête pour donner le temps à l'infanterie d'entrer en ligne. Les Anglais étaient en bataille sur trois lignes en avant de Villa Franca, ils commencèrent aussitôt leur retraite en bon ordre. On les poursuivit et on les harcela, la cavalerie fit plusieurs charges assez vives. Ils opposèrent de la résistance, essayèrent des pertes, surtout en cavalerie, précipitèrent leur marche, brûlèrent un pont et s'éloignèrent vers Arbos et Vendrils, laissant plus que 150 hommes pris et beaucoup de morts et de blessés, surtout des hussards de Brunswick. Notre avant-garde va ce soir à Vendrils et plusieurs centaines de déserteurs sont ramassés.”



## No. XXVIII.

No. 1.—*Extract from the official state of the allied army, commanded by Lieutenant-general Sir John Murray, at the Col de Balaguer, 17th June, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers.*

	Present fit for duty.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total men.
British and German cavalry..	739	12	6	733	"	757
British, Portuguese and Sicilian artillery.....	783	8	199	362	604	990
British engineers and staff corps.....	78	5	36	"	"	119
British and German infantry..	7,226	830	637	"	"	8,693
Whittingham's infantry.....	4,370	503	316	"	"	5,189
Sicilian infantry.....	985	121	272	"	"	1,378
<b>General Total.....</b>	<b>14,181</b>	<b>1479</b>	<b>1466</b>	<b>1095</b>	<b>604</b>	<b>17,126</b>

No. 2.—*Extract from the original weekly state of the Anglo-Sicilian force, commanded by Lieutenant-general Sir William Clinton. Head-quarters, Tarragona, 25th September, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers.*

	Present fit for duty.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules	Total men.
Cavalry.....	663	61	215	875	40	939
Artillery, engineers, and staff corps.....	997	67	58	507	896	1,122
Infantry.....	9,124	1,390	1,019	115	429	11,533
<b>General Total.....</b>	<b>10,784</b>	<b>1,518</b>	<b>1,292</b>	<b>1,497</b>	<b>1,465</b>	<b>13,504</b>

No. 3.—*Extract from the original state of the Mallorquina division (Whittingham's). Tarragona, 15th of December, 1813.*

	Under arms.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total men
Infantry.....	4,014	400	627	110	21	5,041

No. 4.—*Extract from the original state of the first army commanded by the camp-marshal, Don Francisco Copons et Navia. Head-quarters, Vich, 1st of August, 1813.*

	Under arms.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total men.
Infantry disposable.....	10,219	1535	2207	586	"	13,961
In Cardona.....	1,182	115	398	"	"	1,695
Sec d'Urgel.....	984	172	144	"	"	1,300
Artillery, &c.....	871	7	59	6	"	1,070
<b>Grand Total.....</b>	<b>13,262</b>	<b>1829</b>	<b>2808</b>	<b>592</b>	<b>"</b>	<b>18,026</b>

No. 5.—*Extract from the original state of the second army commanded by the camp-marshal, Don Francisco Xavier Elio. Vinaros, 19th September, 1813.*

	Present under arms.	Sick	Command.	Total men.	Horses.
Total of all arms.....	26,835	3181	7454	37,470	4073

*Note.*—This state includes Villa Campa's, Sarsfield, Duran's, the Empeinado's, and Roche's divisions, besides the troops immediately under Elio himself.

## No. XXIX.

No. 1.—*Force of the Anglo-Portuguese army under the Marquis of Wellington's command. Extracted from the original morning state for the 24th of July, 1813.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank & file.	Men.	Total. Horses.
British and German cavalry } present under arms.....	916	5,834	6,750	5834
Ditto infantry.....	4,665	20,926	34,581	"
Portuguese cavalry.....	251	1,241	1,492	1178
Ditto infantry.....	2,894	20,565	23,459	"
Grand Total, exclusive of sick } and absent on command ... }	8,726	57,566	66,282	7012 {Infantry and cavalry.

The artillerymen, &c., were about 4000.

No. 2.—*Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 15th of October, 1813.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank & File.	Total.
British and German cavalry and infantry	5,859	37,250	43,109
Portuguese ditto.....	4,253	21,374	25,527
Grand Total, exclusive of sick, absent } on command, &c. .... }	10,112	58,524	68,636
The artillerymen and drivers about....			4,000
Total.....			72,636

No. 3.—*Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 9th November, 1813.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank & file.	Total.
British and German cavalry and infantry....	5,356	39,687	45,043
Portuguese ditto.....	2,990	22,237	25,227
Grand Total, exclusive of sick, absent on } command, &c..... }	8,346	61,924	70,270
The artillerymen, &c. &c., about.....			4,000
Total.....			74,270

No. 4.—*Sir Rowland Hill's force at the battle of St. Pierre. Extracted from the original morning state, 13th February, 1814.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and file.	Total.
Second division { British.....	802	5,371	6,173
{ Portuguese.....	277	2,331	2,608
Le Cor's Portuguese division.....	507	4,163	4,670
Total under arms, exclusive of artillerymen...	1,586	11,865	13,451

No. 5.—*Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 13th February, 1814.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and file.	Total.	Cavalry.
British and German cavalry.....	1,093	7,315	8,408	} 9,898
Portuguese cavalry.....	230	1,210	1,490	
British and German infantry.....	4,853	29,714	34,567	} Infantry. 56,306
Portuguese infantry.....	2,828	18,911	21,739	
General Total, present under arms.....				66,204
Artillerymen, &c., about.....				4,000

No. 6.—*Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 10th April, 1814.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and file.	Total.	
British and German cavalry.....	1,159	7,640	8,799	} 9,987
Portuguese cavalry.....	230	958	1,188	
British and German infantry.....	4,946	29,999	34,945	} Infantry. 54,550
Portuguese infantry.....	2,622	16,983	19,605	
General Total, present under arms.....				64,537
The Artillerymen, &c., about.....				4,000

No. 7.—*Actual strength of the infantry divisions engaged in the battle of Toulouse. Extracted from the original morning state, 10th April, 1814.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and file.	Total.	
Infantry, present under arms.				
Second division, British.....	715	4,123	} 6,940	} Grand Total, infantry, officers, and soldiers, Pre- sent under arms. 30,963
Ditto Portuguese....	235	1,867		
Third division, British.....	529	2,741	} 4,679	
Ditto Portuguese....	226	1,183		
Fourth division, British.....	531	3,028	} 5,383	
Ditto Portuguese....	239	1,585		
Sixth Division, British.....	558	3,233	} 5,681	
Ditto Portuguese....	246	1,644		
Light division, British.....	378	2,469	} 4,318	
Ditto Portuguese....	231	1,240		
Le Cor's Portuguese division..	455	3,507	3,962	
	4343	26,620		

*Note.*—There is no separate state for the cavalry on the 10th of April, but on the 15th of May, 1814, they stood as follows:—

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and file.	
Cavalry, present under arms			
Bock's brigade of Germans.....	112	694	} Total cavalry, present under arms. 6,954
Ponsonby's brigade of British....	188	1,221	
Fane's brigade of British.....	240	1,506	
Vivian's brigade of British.....	128	960	
Lord Edw. Somerset's brigade of British	214	1,691	
	882	6,072	

Total of Anglo-Portuguese cavalry and infantry, present under arms.....	37,917
Add the Spaniards under Freyre and Morillo, together said to be.....	14,000
	<hr/>
	51,917
Artillerymen, &c.....	1,500
	<hr/>
Grand Total..	53,417

*Note.*—My authority for the number of guns employed during this campaign are copies of the returns given to me by Sir Alexander Dickson, who commanded that arm. The number of artillerymen is not borne on the morning states; but in the original weekly state of the 15th of May, 1814, I find the artillerymen, engineers, drivers, and wagon-train, amounted to four thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, with five thousand and thirty horses and mules. This may be taken as the average strength during the campaign; and as more than half were with Sir John Hope, and some with Lord Dalhousie, the number at the battle of Toulouse could not have exceeded fifteen hundred, making a total of all ranks and arms of fifty-three thousand combatants.

## No. XXX.

No. 1.—*General state of the French armies under Soult and Suchet. Extracted from the Imperial Muster-rolls, July, 1813. The armies of the north, centre, and south being, by an imperial decree, re-organized in one body, taking the title of the army of Spain.*

	Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospitals.	Total	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.
Army of Spain.....	94,983	12,676	2,110	392	14,074	114,167	13,028
Aragon.....	32,392	4,919	3,621	551	3,201	39,184	5,470
Catalonia.....	25,910	1,869	168	..	1,379	27,457	1,744
General Total.....	156,255	19,464	5,899	943	18,654	180,808	20,242

No. 2.—*15th of September, 1813.*

					Total.		Horses.
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	
Army of Spain.....	81,351	11,159	4,004	1,438	22,488	107,843	11,272
Aragon.....	32,476	4,447	2,721	320	3,616	38,813	6,305
Catalonia.....	24,026	1,670	120	..	2,137	26,283	2,497
General Total.....	137,853	17,276	6,845	1,758	28,241	172,939	20,074

*Note.*—The garrison of San Sebastian, though captive, is borne on this state

This is the last general state of the French army in my possession, but the two following notes were inserted in the Imperial Rolls:

“Army of Spain, 16th November, 1813.—102 battalions. 74 squadrons, without garrisons. 74,152 men present under arms. 100,212 effectives. 17,206 horses.

18,230 Hospital  
8,555 Troop horses.  
1,809 Officers' horses.  
5,384 Horses of draft.”

“Army of Spain, 1st December.—93 battalions. 74 squadrons 17,989 horses.”

No. 3.—Detailed state of the army of Spain, July, 1813, when Soult took the command.

Right wing—Lieutenant-general Reille.		Effective and non-effective.	
Men.	Horses	Men.	Total.
First division, Foy, 9 battalions.....	5,922	189	Present under arms { 6784 } { 5676 } { 8906 }
Seventh ditto, Maucune, 7 ditto.....	4,186	110	
Ninth ditto, La Martiniere, 11 ditto.....	7,127	151	
Centre.—Drouet, Count D'Erlon			
Second division, D'Armagnac, 8 batt....	6,961	116	20,957 { 624 } { 8728 } { 6627 }
Third ditto, Abbé, 9 ditto.....	8,030	285	
Sixth ditto, Daricau, 8 ditto.....	5,956	223	
Left Wing.—Lieutenant-general Clausel.			
Fourth division, Conroux, 9 battalions...	7,056	150	17,218 { 432 } { 7477 } { 5201 } { 7587 }
Fifth ditto, Vandermaesen, 7 ditto..	4,181	141	
Eighth ditto, Taupin, 10 ditto..	5,981	141	
Reserve.—General Villette.			
French.....	14,959	2091	17,929
Foreign.....	4 battalions of the Rhine, strength not given.		
	4 ditto      Italians, General St. Pol, ditto.		
	4 ditto      Spaniards, General Cassabianca, ditto.		
Cavalry.—Pierre Soult.		Effective and non-effective.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men. Total.
22 squadrons.....	4723	4116	Present under arms { 5098 } { 2523 } { 7,621 }
Ditto.—Trielhard.....	2358	2275	
Total according to the organization, but exclusive of the foreign battalions....	77,450		91,086
Men under arms.			
Troops not in the organization.....		14,938	16,946
Generals { Garrison of St. Sebastian, 1st July } { Rey forming part of this number... }		2,731	3,096
Cassan.—Ditto of Pampeluna, 1st July.....		2,951	3,121
Lameth.—Ditto of Santona, 1st May.....		1,465	1,674
Second reserve, not in the above.....		5,595	6,105
General Total.....		97,983	12,676
			Present under arms... 114,167 13,028

No. 4.—Detailed state of the army of Spain, 16th of September, 1813.

		Men.	Effective and non-effective.	
			Men.	Horses.
Right wing {	Foy.....	5002	14,875 present under arms.	
	Maucune.....	4166		
	Menne.....	5707		
Centre..... {	D'Armagnac.....	4353	15,098 ditto	45,752
	Abbé.....	5903		
	Maranzin.....	4842		
Left wing . {	Conroux.....	4736	15,789 ditto	
	Rouget.....	5982		
	Taupin.....	5071		
Reserve.....	Villatte.....	8256		
Provisional troops of the right wing, destined to reinforce the garrison of Bayonne.....		2168	The Italian brigade, about 2000, ordered to Milan. } 10,424	

## APPENDIX.

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	Men.	Horses.	Total. Men.	
Cavalry.—Pierre Soult.....	4456	4617	8,325	
Ditto Trielhard.....	2368	2583		
Gend'armes { mounted.....	291	247	1,399	
{ dismounted.....	1210	"		
Parc.....	895	885	15,164	
Engineers.....	504	127		
Garrisons... {	Pampeluna.....	3805	137	
	San Sebastian.....	2366		prisoners of war.
	Santona.....	1633		
	Bayonne.....	4631		
	St. Jean Pied de Port.....	1786		
	Navarrens.....	842		
	Castle of Lourdes.....	107		
			81,064	
	Deduct garrison of San Sebastian.....		2,366	
	Total, present under arms .....		78,698	

## No. XXXI.

*Orders for the several divisions of the allied army for the attack of the enemy's fortified position in front of Toulouse for to-morrow, 1st April, 1814. Published in the United Service Journal, October, 1838.*

(Extract.)

*St. Jory, 9th April, 1814.*

"The front attack of the third division is to extend from the river Garonne to the great road which leads from the village of La Lande to Toulouse (the road from Montauban), inclusive of that road.

"The light division will be immediately on the left of the third division, and it will extend its front of attack from the great road above mentioned until it connects its left flank with the right of the Spanish troops.

"The operations of these two divisions are meant, however, more as diversions than as real attacks; it not being expected that they will be able to force any of the passes of the canal which covers Toulouse. The line of the canal is to be threatened chiefly at the bridges and at the locks or any other points where the form of the ground, or other circumstances, most favor the advance of the troops. A considerable part both of the third and of the light divisions must be kept in reserve."

## No. XXXII.

*Note.*—The analysis of the allied army on the 10th of April, given in Appendix XXIX., sections 6 and 7, has been very carefully made and faithfully set down; but as the real number of the allies has lately become a point of dispute between French and English writers, I here give the morning state of the whole army, accurately printed from the original document delivered by the adjutant-general to Lord Wellington on the morning of the 10th of April, 1814. The reader will thus be enabled, with the help of my text, to trace each division in its course and ascertain its true numbers.



MORNING STATE OF THE FORCES IN THE PENINSULA, UNDER THE COMMAND  
Head-Quarters, St. Jory,

Date of State last received.	DIVISIONS.	OFFICERS.							SERGEANTS.						TRUM- DRUM.			
		Colonels.	Lieut.-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets or Ensigns.	Staff.	Quarter-Masters of Cavalry.	Present.	Sick.		Command.	Prs. of War and Missing.	Total.	Present.	Sick.	
											Present.	Absent.					Present.	Absent.
BRITISH.																		
7th Apr.	Cavalry.. ..	1	13	17	106	189	25	94	25	581	9	17	68	7	682	108	..	8
Do.	1st Dn. Infantry	3	16	6	64	53	56	48	..	433	13	40	38	4	528	142	4	3
9th Do.	2nd .. ..	2	2	10	45	123	29	41	..	320	5	89	68	18	500	143	1	23
Do.	3rd .. ..	2	3	10	38	69	30	32	..	231	3	82	47	5	368	114	..	20
6th Do.	4th .. ..	..	3	9	42	86	27	30	..	232	3	76	56	4	371	102	1	15
7th Do.	5th .. ..	1	3	6	35	82	39	38	..	245	28	63	30	10	376	99	10	10
8th Do.	6th .. ..	..	4	9	41	102	41	25	..	236	4	59	41	1	341	101	1	19
5th Do.	7th .. ..	1	4	6	38	74	31	31	..	187	5	62	42	16	312	92	2	8
9th Do.	Lt. .. ..	2	2	4	24	68	13	19	..	182	2	39	21	1	245	66	1	3
7th Do.	Ld. Alymer's Bde.	..	6	7	37	74	19	26	..	188	7	7	8	..	210	72	1	4
TOTAL ..																		
PORTUGUESE.																		
7th Apr.	Cavalry.. ..	2	4	4	17	39	15	41	4	64	2	..	28	..	94	40	..	..
9th Do.	2nd Dn. Infantry	..	2	2	16	16	28	10	..	122	..	19	32	..	173	39	..	1
Do.	3rd .. ..	2	..	2	9	17	23	14	..	101	5	20	39	..	165	58	2	5
6th Do.	4th .. ..	1	1	1	10	12	24	51	..	103	..	27	23	..	153	36	..	6
7th Do.	5th .. ..	1	2	3	13	12	22	49	..	105	3	25	18	..	151	34	1	3
8th Do.	6th .. ..	1	2	3	12	13	16	47	..	119	3	12	20	..	154	33	1	5
9th Do.	7th .. ..	2	3	4	17	18	27	43	..	110	4	12	23	..	149	33	..	3
5th Do.	Lt. .. ..	2	2	3	13	11	26	29	..	101	3	6	27	..	137	51	3	2
7th Do.	Unattached Dvn.	2	4	7	25	22	51	80	..	197	7	47	26	1	278	67	3	6
8th Do.	1st Brigade ..	1	1	6	9	12	27	16	..	137	1	10	20	..	168	64	..	2
Do.	10th .. ..	..	4	4	18	14	23	38	..	124	7	7	15	..	153	31	..	3
Total Portuguese																		
Total British ..																		
Grand Total ..																		

3 men deserted 2nd Line Bn. K. G. L.  
1 Do. " 1st Line Do.  
1 Do. " 47th Foot  
1 Do. " 4th Do.

The men transferred are invalids sent home.

OF HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD MARSHAL THE MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON, K.G.  
10th April, 1814.

PETERS OR MERS.			RANK AND FILE.						HORSES.				ALTERATIONS.							Effective Rank and File, Portuguese included.				
Command.	Prs. of War and Missing.	Total.	Present.	Sick.		Command.	Prs. of War and Missing.	Total.	Present.	Sick.	Command.	Total.	Men.											
				Present.	Absent.								Joined.	Dead.	Discharged.	Deserted.	Transferred.	Promoted.	Reduced.					
4	2	122	7640	106	406	1071	233	9456	7289	611	602	8502	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8144
..	3	152	5894	244	632	200	185	7155	..	..	..	..	4	6	..	4	10	3	4	..	..	..	..	5894
3	8	178	4123	112	2351	474	716	7676	..	..	..	..	..	11	..	..	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	5990
7	4	145	2741	75	1352	297	229	4694	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3924
5	6	129	3028	44	1700	279	201	5252	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4613
3	8	130	3277	363	1075	224	315	5254	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	2	17	1	..	..	..	..	..	4438
3	..	124	3231	54	1223	309	103	4922	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4877
4	11	117	2738	114	1074	391	673	4990	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4474
..	3	73	2469	77	696	131	146	3519	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3709
..	..	77	2496	212	312	92	..	3112	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2496
			37639	1401	10721	3468	2801	56080	7289	611	602	8502	5	4	..	6	33	4	6	..	..	..	..	..
10	..	50	958	5	73	598	16	1650	855	114	404	1373	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
4	..	44	1867	71	472	101	..	2511	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
6	..	71	1183	105	598	383	..	2269	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5	..	47	1585	30	635	199	..	2449	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2	..	40	1161	13	550	176	..	1900	..	..	..	..	69	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
3	..	42	1644	44	469	151	..	2208	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2	..	38	1736	48	228	211	48	2271	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
7	..	63	1340	54	237	394	11	1936	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
6	3	85	3507	215	835	219	76	4852	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3507
2	4	72	1510	68	328	146	213	2265	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1510
5	..	39	1550	115	351	82	4	2102	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1550
			17941	768	4776	2660	368	6513	855	114	404	1373	70	5	1	..	2	1	..	..	..	..	..	..

Note — The figures belonging to the grand total are wanting in the original.











