

of Fontanes' troops having turned the town during the action, intercepted the fugitives, and put all to the sword.

Scarcely had Palamos fallen when Wimpfen and the Milans, arriving near Hostalrich, began to harass Souham's outposts at Santa Coloma, hoping to draw St. Cyr's attention to that side, while a reinforcement for the garrison of Gerona should pass through the left of the line into the city. The French General was not deceived, but fifteen hundred chosen men, under the command of one Marshal, an Englishman, endeavored to penetrate secretly through the enemy's posts at Llagostera; they were accompanied by an aide-de-camp of Alvarez, called Rich, apparently an Englishman also, and they succeeded on the 9th in passing General Pino's posts unobserved. Unfortunately a straggler was taken, and St. Cyr being thus informed of the march, and judging that the attempt to break the line of investment would be made in the night, and by the road of Casa de Selva, immediately placed one body of men in ambush near that point, and sent another in pursuit of the succoring column.

As the French General had foreseen, the Spaniards continued their march through the hills at dusk, but being suddenly fired upon by the ambuscade, hastily retired, and the next day fell in with the other troops, and lost a thousand men; the rest dispersing, escaped the enemy, yet were ill used and robbed of their arms by the Somatenes. St. Cyr says that Mr. Marshal having offered to capitulate, fled during the negotiation, and thus abandoned his men; but the Spanish General Coupigny affirmed that the men abandoned Marshal, and refused to fight; that Rich ran away before he had seen the enemy, and that both he and the troops merited severe punishment. It is also certain that Marshal's flight was to Gerona, where he afterwards fell fighting gallantly.

This disappointment was sensibly felt by Alvarez. Sickness and battle had already reduced his garrison to fifteen hundred men, and he was thus debarred the best of all defences, namely, frequent sallies as the enemy neared the walls; his resolution was unshaken, but he did not fail to remonstrate warmly with Coupigny, and even denounced his inactivity to the Supreme Junta. That General excused himself on the ground of Blake's absence, the want of provisions, and the danger of carrying the contagious sickness of Tarragona into Gerona, and finally adduced Colonel Marshal's unfortunate attempt, as a proof that due exertion had been made. Yet he could not deny that Gerona had been invested two months, had sustained forty days of open trenches, a bombardment and an assault without any succor, and that during that time he himself

remained at Tarragona, instead of being at Hostalrich with all the troops he could collect.

From the prisoners taken the French ascertained that neither Coupigny nor Blake had any intention of coming to the relief of Gerona, until sickness and famine, which pressed as heavily on the besiegers as on the besieged, should have weakened the ranks of the former; and this plan receives unqualified praise from St. Cyr, who seems to have forgotten, that with an open breach, a town, requiring six thousand men to man the works and having but fifteen hundred, might fall at any moment.

After the failure of the assault at Monjouic, Verdier recommenced his approaches in due form, opened galleries for a mine, and interrupted the communication with the city by posting men in the ruins of the little fort of St. Juan; his operations were, however, retarded by Claros and Rovira, who captured a convoy of powder close to the French frontier; and to prevent a recurrence of such events, the brigade from Souham's division was pushed from Bañolas to St. Lorenzo de la Muja.

The 2d of August, the fortified convent of St. Daniel, situated in the valley of the Galligan, between the Constable fort and Monjouic, was taken by the French, who thus entirely intercepted the communication between the latter place and the city. The 4th of August, the glacis of Monjouic being crowned, the counterscarp blown in and the flank defences ruined, the ditch was passed, and the half-moon in front of the curtain carried by storm, but no lodgment was effected. During this day, Alvarez made an unsuccessful effort to retake the ruins of St. Juan, and at the same time, two hundred Spaniards who had come from the sea-coast with provisions, and penetrated to the convent of St. Daniel, thinking that their countrymen still held it, were made prisoners.

On the 5th, the engineers having ascertained that the northern bastion being hollow, the troops would, after storming it, be obliged to descend a scarp of twelve or fourteen feet, changed the line of attack, and commenced new approaches against the eastern bastion. A second practicable breach was soon opened, and preparations made for storming on the 12th, but in the night of the 11th, the garrison blew up the magazines, spiked the guns, and, without loss, regained Gerona. Thus the fort fell, after thirty-seven days of open trenches and one assault.



Drawn by Geol. Napier



## CHAPTER III.

Claros and Rovira attack Bascara and spread dismay along the French frontier—Two Spanish officers pass the Ter and enter Gerona with succors—Alvarez remonstrates with the Junta of Catalonia—Bad conduct of the latter—Blake advances to the aid of the city—Pestilence there—Affects the French army—St. Cyr's firmness—Blake's timid operations—O'Donnell fights Souham, but without success—St. Cyr takes a position of battle—Garcia Conde forces the French lines and introduces a convoy into Gerona—Blake retires—Siege resumed—Garcia Conde comes out of the city—Ridiculous error of the French—Conde forces the French lines and escapes—Assault on Gerona fails—Blake advances a second time—Sends another convoy under the command of O'Donnell to the city—O'Donnell with the head of the convoy succeeds, the remainder is cut off—Blake's incapacity—He retires—St. Cyr goes to Perpignan—Augereau takes the command of the siege—O'Donnell breaks through the French lines—Blake advances a third time—Is beaten by Souham—Pino takes Hostalrich—Admiral Martin intercepts a French squadron—Captain Hallowell destroys a convoy in Rosas bay—Distress in Gerona—Alvarez is seized with delirium, and the city surrenders—Observations.

VERDIER, elated by the capture of Monjouic, boasted, in his despatches, of the difficulties that he had overcome, and they were unquestionably great, for the rocky nature of the soil had obliged him to raise his trenches instead of sinking them, and his approaches had been chiefly carried on by the flying sap. But he likewise expressed his scorn of the garrison, held their future resistance cheap, and asserted that fifteen days would suffice to take the town, in which he was justified neither by past nor succeeding facts. The Spaniards, indignant at his undeserved contempt, redoubled their exertions and falsified all his predictions; and while these events were passing close to Gerona, Claros and Rovira, at the head of two thousand five hundred Migueletes, attacked Bascara, a post between Figueras and Gerona, at the moment when a convoy, escorted by a battalion, had arrived there from Belgarde. The commandant of Figueras, uniting some "*gens d'armes*" and convalescents to a detachment of his garrison, succored the post on the 6th, but, meanwhile, the escort of the convoy had fallen back on France and spread such terror, that Augereau applied to St. Cyr for three thousand men to protect the frontier. That General refused this ill-timed demand, and, in his Memoirs, takes occasion to censure the system of movable columns, as more likely to create than to suppress insurrections; as being harassing to the troops, weakening to the main force, and yet ineffectual, seeing that the peasantry must always be more movable than the columns, and better informed of their marches and strength. There is great force in these observations, and if an army is in such bad moral

discipline that the officers commanding the columns cannot be trusted, it is unanswerable. It must also be conceded that this system, at all times requiring a nice judgment, great talents, and excellent arrangement, was totally inapplicable to the situation and composition of the seventh corps. Yet, with good officers and well combined plans, it is difficult to conceive any more simple or efficient mode of protecting the flanks and rear of an invading army, than that of movable columns supported by small fortified posts; and it is sufficient that Napoleon was the creator of this system, to make a military man doubtful of the soundness of St. Cyr's objections. The Emperor's views, opinions, and actions will, in defiance of all attempts to lessen them, go down with a wonderful authority to posterity.

A few days after the affair of Bascara, eight hundred volunteers, commanded by two officers, named Foxa and Cantera, quitted Olot, made a secret march through the mountains, arrived in the evening of the 10th upon the Ter, in front of Angeles, and being baffled in an attempt to pass the river there, descended the left bank in the night, pierced the line of investment, and, crossing at a ford near St. Pons, entered Gerona at daybreak. This hardy exploit gave fresh courage to the garrison; yet the enemy's approaches hourly advanced, pestilence wasted the besieged, and the Spanish generals outside the town still remained inactive. In this conjuncture, Alvarez and his council were not wanting to themselves; while defending the half-ruined walls of Gerona with inflexible constancy, they failed not to remonstrate against the cold-blooded neglect of those who should have succored them. The Supreme Junta of Catalonia forwarded their complaints to the Central Junta at Seville, with a remarkable warmth and manliness of expression.

"The generals of our army," they said, "have formed no efficient plan for the relief of Gerona; not one of the three lieutenant-generals here has been charged to conduct an expedition to its help; they say that they act in conformity to a plan approved by your Majesty. Can it be true that your Majesty approves of abandoning Gerona to her own feeble resources? If so, her destruction is inevitable; and should this calamity befall, will the other places of Catalonia and the Peninsula have the courage to imitate her fidelity, when they see her temples and houses ruined, her heroic defenders dead, or in slavery? And if such calamities should threaten towns in other provinces, ought they to reckon upon Catalonian assistance when this most interesting place can obtain no help from them? Do you not see the consequences of this melancholy reflection, which is sufficient to freeze the ardor, to desolate the hearts of the most zealous defenders of our just cause? Let this

bulwark of our frontier be taken, and the province is laid open, our harvests, treasures, children, ourselves, all fall to the enemy, and the country has no longer any real existence."

In answer to this address, money was promised, a decree was passed to lend Catalonia every succor, and Blake received orders to make an immediate effort to raise the siege. But how little did the language of the Spaniards agree with their actions! Blake, indeed, as we shall find, made a feeble effort to save the heroic and suffering city; but the Supreme Central Junta were only intent upon thwarting and insulting the English General after the battle of Talavera; and this was the moment that the Junta of Catalonia, so eloquent, so patriotic with the pen, were selling to foreign merchants the arms supplied by England for the defence of their country!

Towards the end of August, when the French fire had made three breaches in Gerona, and the bombardment had reduced a great part of the city to ashes, Blake commenced his march from Tarragona with a force of eight or ten thousand regulars. Proceeding by Martorel, El Valles, and Granollers, he reached Vich, and from thence crossed the mountains to St. Hilario, where he was joined by Wimpfen and the Milans. As he had free communication with Rovira and Claros, he could direct a body of not less than twenty thousand men against the circle of investment, and his arrival created considerable alarm among the French. The pestilence which wasted the besieged was also among the besiegers, and the hospitals of Figueras and Perpignan contained many thousand patients; the battalions in the field could scarcely muster a third of their nominal strength. Even the generals were obliged to rise from sick-beds to take the command of the brigades; and the covering army, inferior in number to the Spanish force, was extended along more than thirty miles of mountainous wooded country, intersected by rivers, and every way favorable for Blake's operations.

Verdier was filled with apprehension, lest a disastrous action should oblige him to raise the long-protracted siege, notwithstanding his fore-boasts to the contrary. But it was on such occasions that St. Cyr's best qualities were developed. A most learned and practised soldier, and of a clear methodical head, he was firm in execution, decided and prompt in council; and, although apparently wanting in those original and daring views which mark the man of superior genius, seems to have been perfectly fitted for struggling against difficulties. So far from fearing an immediate battle, he observed, "that it was to be desired, because his men were now of confirmed courage, and Blake's inaction was rather the thing to

be dreaded; for, notwithstanding every effort, not more than two days' provisions could be procured, to supply the troops when together, and it would be necessary after that period to scatter them again in such a manner, that scarcely two thousand would be disposable at any given point. The Spaniards had already commenced skirmishing in force on the side of Bruñola, and as Blake expected no reinforcements, he would probably act immediately; hence it was necessary to concentrate as many men as possible, in the course of the night and next day, and deliver battle; and there were still ten thousand good troops under arms, without reckoning those that might be spared from the investing corps."

On the other hand, Blake, with an army, numerous indeed, but by no means spirited, was, from frequent defeat, become cautious without being more skilful. He resolved to confine his efforts to the throwing supplies of men and provisions into the town; forgetting that the business of a relieving army is not to protract, but to raise a siege, and that to save Gerona was to save Catalonia. He had collected and loaded with flour about two thousand beasts of burthen, placed them in the mountains, on the side of Olot, under an escort of four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry; and Garcia Conde, an ambitious and fiery young man, undertook to conduct them to Gerona, by the flat ground between the Ter and the Oña, precisely opposite to that of the French attack. To facilitate this attempt, Blake caused Colonel Henry O'Donnell to fall upon Souham's posts, near Bruñola, on the evening of the 31st of August, supporting this attack with another detachment under General Logoyri. At the same time he directed Colonel Landen to collect the Migueletes and Somatenes on the side of Palamos, and take possession of "*N. S. de los Angelos*," a convent, situated on a high mountain behind Monjouic. Claros and Rovira also received directions to attack the French on the side of Casen Rocca. Thus the enemy were to be assailed in every quarter, except that on which the convoy was to pass.

O'Donnell, commencing the operations, attacked and carried a part of the position occupied by one of Souham's battalions at Bruñola, but the latter, with an impetuous charge, recovered the ground. The Spanish General, being then joined by Logoyri, renewed the skirmish, but could make no further impression on the enemy. Meanwhile, St. Cyr, having transferred his headquarters to Fornels, was earnestly advised to concentrate his troops on the left of the Ter, partly, that it was thought Blake would attempt to penetrate on that side; partly that, being so close to the Spanish army, the French divisions might, if ordered to assemble on their actual centre, be cut off in detail during their march. He



however argued that his opponent must be exceedingly timid, or he would have attacked Souham with all his forces, and broken the covering line at once; wherefore, seeing that such an opportunity was neglected, he did not fear to concentrate his own troops on the Oña, by a flank march close under the beard of his unskilful adversary.

Souham's division, falling back in the night, took post the first of September on the heights of San Dalmaz, reaching to Hostalnou, and at eight o'clock the head of Pino's division entered this line, prolonging it by the left, in rear of the village of Rieudellot. At twelve o'clock, these two divisions were established in position, and at the distance of four miles in their rear, Verdier, with a strong detachment of the besieging corps, was placed in reserve on the main road to Gerona. Lecchi was sick, and his troops, commanded by Millosewitz, took post at Salt, guarding the bridge and the flat ground about St. Eugenio; having also instructions to cross the Ter and march against Rovira and Claros, if they should press the Westphalian division which remained at San Pons. The trenches under Monjouic were guarded. The mortar battery of Casen Rocca was disarmed, and the Westphalians had orders, if attacked, to retire to Sarria and look to the security of the parc and the trenches.

A thick fog and heavy rain interrupted the view, and both armies remained apparently quiet until the middle of the day, when, the weather clearing, St. Cyr rode to examine the Spanish positions; for the heads of Blake's columns were disposed as if he would have penetrated at once, by Bruñola, Coloma de Farnes, Vidreras, and Mallorquinas. Scarcely had the French General quitted Fornels, when Garcia Conde, who under cover of the mist had been moving down the mountains, crossed the Ter at Amer, and descended the heights of Bañolas with his convoy. He was now on the flat ground, having two thousand men under Millosewitz, placed, as I have said, at Salt to watch the garrison and the movements of Rovira at Claros, and consequently with their rear to the advancing convoy.

Verdier's reserve, the nearest support, was six miles distant, and separated from Millosewitz by considerable heights, and the Spanish columns, coming into the plain without meeting a single French post, advanced unperceived close to the main body, and, with one charge, put the whole to flight. The fugitives, in their panic, at first took the direction of the town, but being fired upon, turned towards the heights of Palau, made for Fornels, and would have gone straight into Blake's camp, if they had not met St. Cyr on his return from viewing that General's position. Rallying and reinforcing them with a battalion from Pino's division, St. Cyr instantly

directed them back again upon Salt, and at the same time sent Verdier orders to follow Garcia Conde with the reserve. It was too late; the latter had already entered the town, and Alvarez, sallying forth, destroyed the French works near St. Ugenio; and thinking the siege raised, had immediately sent five hundred sick men out of the town, into the convent of St. Daniel, which place had been abandoned by the French two days before. Verdier, after causing some trifling loss to Conde, passed the bridge of Salt, and marched down the left of the Ter to Sarria, to save his parcs, which were threatened by Rovira and Claros; for when those two partisans skirmished with the Westphalian troops, the latter retired across the Ter, abandoning their camp and two dismounted mortars. Thus the place was succored for a moment; but, as Blake made no further movement, Alvarez was little benefited by the success. The provisions received did not amount to more than seven or eight days' consumption, and the reinforcement, more than enough to devour this food, was yet insufficient to raise the siege by sallies.

While Millosewitz's troops were flying on the one side of the Ter, the report of Claros and Rovira, exaggerating their success on the other side of that river, had caused Alvarez to believe that Blake's army was victorious and the French in flight; hence he refrained from destroying the bridge of Salt, and Verdier, as we have seen, crossed it to recover his camp at Sarria. But for this error, the garrison, reinforced by Conde's men, might have filled the trenches, razed the batteries, and even retaken Monjouic, before Verdier could have come to their support.

St. Cyr, having now but one day's provisions left, resolved to seek Blake and deliver battle; but the Spanish General retired up the mountains, when he saw the French advancing, and his retreat enabled St. Cyr again to disseminate the French troops. Thus ended the first effort to relieve Gerona. It was creditable to Garcia Conde, but so contemptible with reference to the means at Blake's disposal, that Alvarez believed himself betrayed, and, trusting thenceforth only to his own heroism, permitted Conde's troops to go back or to remain, as they pleased—exacting, however, from those who stopped, an oath not to surrender. Renewing the edict against speaking of a capitulation, he reduced the rations of the garrison first to one half and afterwards to a fourth of the full allowance—a measure which caused some desertions to the enemy; but the great body of the soldiers and citizens were as firm as their chief, and the townsmen, freely sharing their own scanty food with the garrison, made common cause in everything.

Garcia Conde's success must be attributed partly to the negli-

gence of St. Cyr's subordinates; but the extended cantonments occupied in the evening of the 31st gave Blake, as the French General himself acknowledges, an opportunity of raising the siege without much danger or difficulty. Nor were St. Cyr's dispositions for the next day perfectly combined; it is evident that giving Blake credit for sound views, he was himself so expectant of a great battle, that he forgot to guard against minor operations. The flat country between the left of the Oña and the Ter was the natural line for a convoy to penetrate to the town; hence it was a fault to leave two thousand men in that place, with their front to the garrison and their rear to the relieving army, when the latter could steal through the mountains until close upon them. Cavalry posts at least should have been established at the different inlets to the hills, and beacons raised on convenient eminences. The main body of the army appears also to have been at too great a distance from the town. The firing that took place in the plain of Salt was disregarded by Verdier's reserve, and the first information of the attack was brought to Fornels by the fugitives themselves.

St. Cyr says that his generals of division were negligent, and so weakened by sickness as to be unable to look to their outposts; that he had recommended to Verdier the raising of field-works at the bridge of Salt and in the passes of the hills, and, when his advice was disregarded, forbore, from the peculiar situation in which he himself was placed by the French government, to enforce his undoubted authority. St. Cyr, however, acknowledges that his soldiers answered honestly to every call he made, and he was bound, while he retained the command, to enforce every measure necessary for maintaining their honor.\* In other respects, his prudence and vigilance were such as beseeemed his reputation. It was not so with Blake: the whole of his operations proved that he had lost confidence, and was incapable of any great enterprise. He should have come up with a resolution to raise the siege or to perish. He contented himself with a few slight skirmishes and the introduction of a small convoy of provisions, and then, notwithstanding the deep suffering of this noble city, turned away with a cold look and a donation that mocked its wants.

When the siege was resumed, St. Cyr withdrew the French posts from Palau and Monte Livio, leaving the way apparently open on that side for the return of Garcia Conde, who, deceived by this wile, came out at daybreak on the 3d, with fifteen hundred men and the beasts of burthen. He halted for a little time, just beyond the gate, to examine the country in front with his glass, and as everything appeared favorable, his troops were beginning to move for-

\* St Cyr's Journal of Operations.

ward, when the noise of drums beating to arms gave notice that an ambuscade was placed behind Palau. St. Cyr had, indeed, posted a brigade there in the hope of surprising the Spaniards, but the French, forgetting the ambush, were performing the regular service of the camp at daylight, and a cry of astonishment burst from the Spanish column as it hastily retreated again into the town.

Baffled by this ridiculous mistake, and concluding that the next attempt would be by Castellar and La Bispal, St. Cyr placed Mazzuchelli's brigade (the same that had been behind Palau) in the valley of the Oña in such a manner that it could fall upon Conde's rear when the latter should again come forth. He likewise put a battalion on the hills in a position to head the Spanish column, and drive it back either upon Mazzuchelli's brigade, or upon La Bispal, where he also posted three battalions and a squadron of Pino's division.

The 4th, one thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and eleven hundred mules again came out of Gerona, and ascending the heights in which the fort of the Capuchin was situated, pushed in single files along a bypath, leading to Castellar de Selva. Mazzuchelli saw them plainly, but did not attack, waiting for the fire of the battalion ahead, and that battalion did not fire because Mazzuchelli did not attack, and it was supposed the Spaniards were part of his brigade. Garcia Conde quickly perceived their double error, and with great readiness filing off to his left, turned the right of the battalion in his front, and gained Castellar without hurt, although the French in Monjouic, observing all that passed, plied their guns against the rear of his column. Being informed by the peasants at Castellar, that troops were also waiting for him at La Bispal, Conde made for Casa de Selva, and General Pino having notice of his approach, directed two battalions to seize the summit of a ridge which crossed the Spanish line of march; these battalions took a wrong direction, the Spaniards moved steadily on, and although their rear was attacked by Pino's personal escort, and that fifty men and some mules were captured, the main body escaped with honor.

There were now four open breaches in Gerona. Mazzuchelli's brigade and the troops at La Bispal were added to the investing corps, and the immediate fall of the city seemed inevitable, when the French store of powder failed; ten days elapsed before a fresh supply could be obtained, and Alvarez profited of this cessation, to retrench and barricade the breaches in the most formidable manner. Verdier had retaken the convent of St. Daniel in the valley of Galligan, and obliged the five hundred sick men to return to the town on the 4th; but Landen, the officer sent by Blake, on the 31st

of August, to seize the convent of *Madonna de los Angeles*, had fortified that building, and introduced small supplies of provisions. This revived, in the mind of Alvarez, a plan for taking possession of the heights beyond those on which the Capuchin and Constable forts were situated, by which, in conjunction with the post at *Madonna de los Angeles*, and with the assistance of Blake's army, he hoped to maintain an open communication with the country. But this bold and skilful conception he was unable to effect; because in a sally from the Capuchins on the 6th with eighteen hundred men, he was beaten by a single French regiment, and the same day Mazzuchelli's Italians stormed *Madonna de los Angeles*, and put the garrison to the sword.

During these events, Verdier marched against Claros and Rovira, who were posted at St. Gregorio, near Amer, but was repulsed with loss, and the French General Joba was killed. Meanwhile, the batteries having recommenced their fire on the 13th, Alvarez made a general sally, by the gates of San Pedro, beat the guards from the trenches, and spiked the guns in one of the breaching batteries. The 18th, Verdier thinking the breaches practicable, proposed to give the assault, and required assistance from St. Cyr, but disputes between the generals of the covering and the investing forces were rife; the engineers of the latter declared the breaches practicable, those of the former asserted that they were not, and that while the fort of Calvary, outside the walls, although in ruins, was in possession of the Spaniards, no assault should be attempted.

Either from negligence, or the disputes between St. Cyr and Augereau, above five thousand convalescents capable of duty were retained in a body at Perpignan, and Verdier could not produce so many under arms for the assault, nor even for this number were there officers to lead, so wasting was the sickness. The covering army was scarcely better off, and Blake had again taken the position of St. Hilario. Howbeit, St. Cyr, seeing no better remedy, consented to try the storm provided Calvary were first taken.

Souham's division was appointed to watch Blake; Pino was directed to make a false attack on the opposite quarter to where the breaches were established, and, on the 19th, Verdier's troops, in three columns, advanced rapidly down the valley of Galligan to the assault; but the fort of Calvary had not been taken, and its fire swept the columns of attack along the whole line of march. Two hundred men fell before they reached the walls, and just as the summit of the largest breach was gained, the French batteries, which continued to play on the Spanish retrenchments, brought down a large mass of wall upon the head of the attacking column. The besieged resisted manfully, and the besiegers were completely

repulsed from all the breaches with a loss of six hundred men. Verdier accused his soldiers of cowardice, and blamed St. Cyr for refusing to bring the covering troops to the assault;\* but that General asserted that the men had behaved perfectly well, and calling a council of war, proposed to continue the operations with as much vigor as the nature of the case would permit. His spirit was not, however, partaken by the council, and the siege was turned into a blockade.

Blake now advanced with his army, and from the 20th to the 25th, made as if he would raise the blockade; yet his object was merely to introduce another convoy, and St. Cyr, divining his intention and judging that he would make the attempt on the 26th, resolved to let him penetrate the covering line, and then fall on him before he could reach the town. In this view, Souham's division was placed behind Palau, and Pino's division at Casa de Selva, and Lecchi's division of the investing troops was directed to meet the Spaniards in front, while the two former came down upon their rear.

Blake assembled his troops on the side of Hostalrich, then made a circuitous route to La Bispal, and, taking post on the heights of St. Sadurni, detached ten thousand men, under Wimpfen, to protect the passage of the convoy, of which Henry O'Donnell led the advanced guard. At daybreak on the 26th, O'Donnell fell upon the rear of the French troops at Castellar, broke through them, and reached the fort of the Constable with the head of the convoy; but the two French battalions which he had driven before him, rallying on the heights of San Miguel to the right of the Spanish column, returned to the combat, and at the same time St. Cyr in person, with a part of Souham's division, came upon the left flank of the convoy, and, pressing it strongly, obliged the greater part to retrograde. Pino's division, then running up from Casa de Selva, attacked the rear-guard under Wimpfen, the rout was complete, and Blake made no effort to save the distressed troops. O'Donnell with a thousand men and about two hundred mules got safely into the town; the remainder of the convoy was taken, the Italians gave no quarter, and three thousand of the Spaniards were slain.

After this action, some troops being sent towards Vidreras, to menace Blake's communications with Hostalrich, he retired by the side of St. Felieu de Quixols, and Gerona was again abandoned to her sufferings, which were become almost insupportable—without money, without medicines, without food; pestilence within the walls, the breaches open. "If," said Alvarez, "the Captain-General be unable to make a vigorous effort, the whole of Catalonia must rise

\* St Cyr's Journal of Operations.

to our aid, or Gerona will soon be but a heap of carcasses and ruins, the memory of which will afflict posterity!"

St. Cyr having repaired to Perpignan to make arrangements for future supply, found Augereau in a good state of health, and obliged him to assume the command. Then, he says, everything needful was bestowed with a free hand upon the seventh corps, because he himself was no longer in the way; but a better reason is to be found in the state of Napoleon's affairs. Peace had been concluded with Austria, the English expeditions to the Scheldt and against Naples had failed, and all the resources of the French government becoming disposable, not only the seventh, but every "corps d'armée" in Spain was reinforced.

Augereau, escorted by the five thousand convalescents from Perpignan, reached the camp before Gerona the 12th of October. In the course of the following night, O'Donnell, issuing from the town on the side of the plain, broke through the guards, fell upon Souham's quarters, obliged that General to fly in his shirt, and finally effected a junction with Milans, at Santa Coloma; thus successfully executing as daring an enterprise as any performed during this memorable siege. Augereau, however, pressed the blockade, and thinking the spirit of the Spaniards reduced, offered an armistice for a month, with the free entry of provisions, if Alvarez would promise to surrender unless relieved before the expiration of that period. Such, however, was the steady virtue of this man and his followers, that, notwithstanding the grievous famine, the offer was refused.

Blake, on the 29th, took possession once more of the heights of Bruñola, but Souham with an inferior force put him to flight, and this enabled Augereau to detach Pino against the town of Hostalrich. This place, fortified with an old wall and towers, was defended by two thousand men, and supported by the fire of the castle; it was, however, carried by storm, and the provisions and stores laid up there captured, although Blake, with his army, was only a few miles off. Meanwhile Rear-Admiral Baudin, with a French squadron, consisting of three ships of the line, two frigates, and sixteen large store-ships, having sailed from Toulon for Barcelona, about the 20th, was intercepted by Admiral Martin on the 23d, who burnt several of his smaller vessels and drove the rest on shore at different places, when two of the line-of-battle ships were set on fire by their own crews. The store-ships and some of the armed vessels took refuge at Rosas, put up boarding nettings, and protecting their flanks by Rosas and the Trinity fort, presented a formidable front, having above twenty guns on board disposed for defence, besides the shore batteries. But on the 31st, Captain Hallowell

appeared in the bay with a squadron, and the same evening, sending his boats in, destroyed the whole fleet, in despite of a very vigorous resistance which cost the British seventy men killed and wounded.

The distress of Gerona increased, desertions became frequent, and ten officers having failed in a plot to oblige the Governor to capitulate, went over in a body to the enemy. During November, famine and sickness tormented the city, and the French were inactive for want of powder, but on the 6th of December, ammunition having arrived, the suburbs of Marina, that of Girondella, the fort of Calvary, and all the other towers beyond the walls, were carried by the besiegers, and Alvarez, thus confined to the circuit of the walls, was cut off from the Capuchin and Constable forts. He had been ill for some days, but rousing himself for a last effort, made a general sally on the 7th, retook the suburb of Girondella and the redoubts, and opening a way to the outworks of the Constable, carried off the garrison; the next day, overcome by suffering, he became delirious. A council of war then assembled, and after six months of open trenches, Gerona yielded on the 10th. The garrison marched out with the honors of war, the troops were to be exchanged in due course, the inhabitants were to be respected, and none but soldiers were to be considered prisoners. Such was the termination of a defence which eclipsed the glory of Zaragoza.

French and Spanish writers alike affirm that Augereau treated Alvarez with a rigor and contumely that excited every person's indignation; and that, in violation of the capitulation, the monks were, by an especial order of Napoleon, sent to France. This last accusation admits, however, of dispute: the monks had, during the siege, formed themselves into a regular corps, named the Crusaders; they were disciplined and clothed in a sort of uniform, and being to all intents soldiers, it can hardly be said, that to constitute them prisoners, was a violation, although it was undoubtedly a harsh interpretation of the terms.

Alvarez died at Figueras in his way to France; but so long as virtue and courage are esteemed in the world, his name will be held in veneration; and if Augereau forgot what was due to this gallant Spaniard's merit, posterity will not forget to do justice to both.

#### OBSERVATIONS.

1. In this siege, the constancy with which the Geronans bore the most terrible sufferings accounts for the protracted resistance; yet constancy alone could not have enabled them to defy the regular progress of the engineer; the combinations of science are not to



be defied with impunity; but the French combinations were not scientific, and this, saving the right of Gerona to the glory she earned so hardly, was the secret of the defence.

2. General St. Cyr, after observing that the attack on Monjouic was ill-judged and worse executed, says, "The principal approaches should have been conducted against the Marcadel, because the soil there was easy to work in, full of natural hollows and clefts, and the defences open in flank and rear to batteries on the Monte Livio and the Casen Rocca; but on the side of Monjouic, the approaches, from the rocky nature of the soil, could only be carried forward by the flying sap, with great loss and difficulty." If, however, the Marcadel had fallen, the greatest part of the city would still have been covered by the Oña, and Monjouic, and the forts of the Constable and Capuchin, (regular places complete in themselves,) would have remained to be taken, unless it can be supposed, that a governor, who defended the feeble walls of the town after those outworks fell, would have surrendered all, because a lodgment was made in an isolated quarter. These things are, however, ordinarily doubtful, and certainly it must always be a great matter with a general to raise the moral confidence of his own army, and to sink that of his adversary, even though it should be by a momentary and illusive success.

3. The faulty execution of the attack on Monjouic is less doubtful than the choice of direction. The cessation of the breaching fire for four days previous to the assault, and the disregard of the rules of art already noticed, amply account for failure; and it is to be observed, that this failure caused the delay of a whole month in the progress of the siege, that during that month disease invaded the army, and the soldiers, as they will be found to do in all protracted operations, became careless and disinclined to the labors of the trenches.

4. The assault on the body of the place was not better conducted than that against Monjouic; and considering these facts, together with the jealousy and disputes between the generals, the mixture of Germans, Italians, and French in the army, and the maladministration of the hospitals, by which so many men were lost, and so many more kept from their duty, it is rather surprising that Gerona was taken at all.

5. The foregoing conclusions in no wise affect the merits of the besieged, because the difficulties and errors of their adversaries only prolonged their misery. They fought bravely, they endured unheard-of sufferings with constancy, and their refusal to accept the armistice offered by Augereau is as noble and affecting an instance of virtue as any that history has recorded. Yet how mixed are

good and evil principles in man, how dependent upon accidental circumstances is the development of his noble or base qualities! Alvarez, so magnanimous, so firm, so brave, so patriotic at Gerona, was the same Alvarez who, one year before, surrendered the Barcelona Monjouic, on the insolent summons of Duhesme! At that period, the influence of a base court degraded public feeling, and what was weak in his character came to the surface; but in times more congenial to virtuous sentiments, all the nobility of the man's nature broke forth.

6. When the siege of Gerona is contrasted with that of Zaragoza, it may shake the opinion of those who regard the wild hostility of the multitude as superior to the regulated warfare of soldiers. The number of enemies that came against the latter was rather less than those who came against the former city; the regular garrison of Zaragoza was above thirty thousand, that of Gerona about three thousand. The armed multitude, in the one, amounted to at least twenty-five thousand, in the other; they were less than six thousand. Cruelty and murder marked every step in the defence of Zaragoza; the most horrible crimes were necessary to prolong the resistance; above forty thousand persons perished miserably, and the town was taken within three months. In Gerona there was nothing to blush for; the fighting was more successful, the actual loss inflicted upon the enemy greater, the suffering within the walls neither wantonly produced nor useless; the period of its resistance doubled that of Zaragoza, and every proceeding tended to raise instead of sinking the dignity of human nature. There was less of brutal rule, more of reason, and consequently more real heroism, more success at the moment, and a better example given to excite the emulation of generous men.

7. With reference to the general posture of affairs, the fall of Gerona was a reproach to the Spanish and English cabinets. The latter having agents in Catalonia, and such a man as Lord Collingwood in the Mediterranean, to refer to, were yet so ignorant or so careless of what was essential to the success of the war, as to let Gerona struggle for six months, when half the troops employed by Sir John Stuart to alarm Naples, if carried to the coast of Catalonia, and landed at Palamos, would have raised the siege. It was not necessary that this army should have been equipped for a campaign, a single march would have effected the object. An engineer and a few thousand pounds would have rendered Palamos a formidable post, and that place being occupied by English troops, and supported by a fleet, greater means than the French could have collected in 1809, would not have reduced Gerona. The Catalans, indeed, were not more tractable nor more disposed than others to

act cord ally with their allies ; but the natural sterility of the country, the condensed manufacturing population, the number of strong posts and large fortified towns in their possession, and, above all, the long and difficult lines of communication which the French must have guarded for the passage of their convoys, would have rendered the invaders' task most difficult.

8. From the commencement of the Spanish insurrection, the policy of the Valencians had been characterized by a singular indifference to the calamities that overwhelmed the other parts of Spain. The local Junta in that province, not content with asserting their own exclusive authority, imagined that it was possible to maintain Valencia independent, even though the rest of the Peninsula should be conquered ; hence the siege of Zaragoza passed unheeded, and the suffering of Gerona made no impression on them. With a regular army of above ten thousand men, more than thirty thousand armed irregulars, and a large fleet at Carthagená, the governors of this rich province, so admirably situated for offensive operations, never even placed the fortified towns of their own frontier in a state of defence, and carelessly beheld the seventh and third corps gradually establishing, at the distance of a few days' march from Valencia itself, two solid bases for further invasion ! But it is now time to revert to the operations of the "*Central Supreme Junta*," that it may be fully understood how the patriotism, the constancy, the lives, and the fortunes of the Spanish people were sported with by those who had so unhappily acquired a momentary power in the Peninsula.

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#### CHAPTER IV.

Plot at Seville against the Supreme Junta defeated by Lord Wellesley—Junta propose a new form of government—Opposed by Romana—Junta announce the convocation of the National Cortes, but endeavor to deceive the people—A Spanish army assembled in the Morena under Eguía—Bassecour sends cavalry to reinforce Del Parque, who concentrates the Spanish army of the left at Ciudad Rodrigo—He is joined by the Gallician divisions—Santocildes occupies Astorga—French endeavor to surprise him, but are repulsed—Ballesteros quits the Asturias, and marching by Astorga attempts to storm Zamora—Enters Portugal—Del Parque demands the aid of the Portuguese army—Sir A. Wellesley refuses, giving his reasons in detail—Del Parque's operations—Battle of Tamames—Del Parque occupies Salamanca, but hearing that French troops were assembling at Valladolid, retires to Bejar.

WHEN Sir Arthur Wellesley retired to the frontier of Portugal, the calumnies propogated in Andalusia, relative to the cause of that movement, were so far successful that no open revolt took place ;

but the public hatred being little diminished, a design was formed to establish a better government, as a preliminary to which, measures were secretly taken to seize the members of the Junta, and transport them to Manila. The old Junta of Seville being the chief movers of this sedition, no good could be expected from the change; otherwise, such an explosion, although sure to be attended with slaughter and temporary confusion, was not unlikely to prove advantageous to the nation at large, it being quite obvious that some violent remedy was wanting to purge off the complicated disorders of the state.

"Spain," said Lord Wellesley, "has proved untrue to our alliance, because she is untrue to herself." "Until some great change shall be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of her armies, no British army can attempt safely to co-operate with Spanish troops in the territories of Spain." "No alliance can protect her from the results of internal disorders and national infirmity."

This evident discontent of the British ambassador led the conspirators to impart their designs to him, in the hope of assistance; but he being accredited to the existing government, apprised it of the danger, concealing, however, with due regard to humanity, the names of those engaged in the plot. The Junta, in great alarm, immediately sought to mitigate the general hatred; but still averse to sacrificing any power, projected a counter scheme. They had, for the public good according to some, for private emolument according to others, hitherto permitted trading, under licenses, with the towns occupied by the enemy. This regulation and some peculiarly heavy exactions they now rescinded, and, as a final measure of conciliation, appointed, with many protestations of patriotism, commissioners to prepare a scheme of government which should serve until the fit period for convoking the Cortes arrived.

But the commissioners, principally chosen from amongst the members of the Junta, soon made manifest the real designs of that body. They proposed that five persons should form a supreme executive council, every member of the existing Junta, in rotation, to have a place; the colonies to be represented as an integral part of the empire; and the council so composed, to rule until the Cortes should meet, and then to preside in that assembly. Thus, under the pretence of resigning their power, by a simple change of form, the present and the future authority of the Junta were to be confirmed, and even the proposal in favor of the colonies was, following the opinion of Lord Wellesley, a mere expedient to obtain a momentary popularity, and entirely unconnected with enlarged or liberal views of policy and government.

This project was foiled by Romana, who, being of the commission, dissented from his colleagues; and it was on this occasion that he drew up that accusatory paper, quoted in another part of this history, and the bad acts therein specified, although sufficiently heinous, were not the only charges made at this period. It was objected to some amongst the Junta, that having as merchants contracted for supplying the army, they in their public capacity raised the price to be paid by the treasury for the articles; and that the members generally were venal in their patronage, difficult of access, and insolent of demeanor.

Romana proposed a council of regency, to be composed of five persons, not members of the Junta. This council to be assisted by a fresh chosen Junta, also composed of five members and a procurator-general, and to be styled "*The Permanent Deputation of the Realm.*" One of this body to be a South American, and the whole to represent the Cortes, until the meeting of that assembly, which, he thought, could not be too soon. His plan, introduced by misplaced declarations in favor of arbitrary power, and terminated by others equally strong in favor of civil liberty, was not well considered. The "Permanent Deputation," being to represent the Cortes, it was obvious that it must possess the right of controlling the Regency; but the numbers and dignity of both being equal, and their interests opposed, it was as obvious that a struggle would commence, in which the latter, having the sole distribution of honors and emoluments, could not fail to conquer, and no Cortes would be assembled.

Some time before this, when the terror caused by Sir Arthur Wellesley's retreat from Spain was fresh, Don Martin de Garay had applied to Lord Wellesley for advice as to the best form of government, and that nobleman also recommended a "Council of Regency," and, like Romana, proposed a second council; but with this essential difference, that the latter were only to arrange the details for electing the members of Cortes, a proclamation for the convocation of which was to be immediately published, together with a list of grievances, "a Bill of Rights," founded on an enlarged conciliatory policy, and having equal regard for the interests of the colonies as for those of the mother country. Garay approved of this advice while danger menaced the Junta; but when the arrangement for the command of the armies had been completed, and the first excitement had subsided, his solicitude for the improvement of the government ceased. It must, however, be acknowledged, that Lord Wellesley condemned the existing system, as much for its democratic form as for its inefficiency; the English Cabinet never forgot that they were the champions of privilege,

nor that the war was essentially less for the defence of Spain, than the upholding of the aristocratic system of Europe.

To evade Romana's proposition, the Junta, on the 28th of October, announced that the National Cortes should be convoked on the 1st of January, 1810, and assembled for business on the 1st of March following. Having thus, in some measure, met the public wishes, they joined to this announcement a virulent attack on the project of a regency, affirming, and not without some foundation as regarded Romana's plan, that such a government would disgust the colonies, trample on the King's rights, and would never assemble the Cortes; moreover, that it would soon be corrupted by the French. Then, enlarging on their own merits in a turgid declamatory style, they defended their past conduct by a tissue of misrepresentations, which deceived nobody; for, to use the words of Lord Wellesley, "no plan had been adopted for any effectual redress of grievances, correction of abuses or relief from exactions, and the administration of justice, the regulation of revenue, finance, commerce, the security of persons and property, and every other great branch of government, were as defective as the military establishments."

However, the promise of assembling the Cortes sufficed to lull the public wrath; and the Junta resolved to recommence offensive military operations, which they fondly imagined would, at once, crush the enemy, and firmly establish their own popularity and power. They were encouraged by a false, but general impression throughout Andalusia, that Austria had broken off negotiations with France; and in September and October fresh levies, raised in Estremadura and Andalusia, had been incorporated with the remains of Cuesta's old army; the whole forming a body of more than sixty thousand soldiers, of which nearly ten thousand were cavalry. Nor was the assembling and equipment of this force a matter of great difficulty; for, owing to the feeble resistance made against the invaders, the war had hitherto drawn so little on the population, that the poorer sort never evaded a call for personal service; and the enormous accumulation of English stores and money at Cadiz and Seville was sufficient for every exigency.

In October Eguia advanced with this army a short way into La Mancha; but when the French, unwilling to lose the resources of that fertile province, made a movement towards him, he regained the Sierra Morena on the 16th, taking post, first at St. Elena, and finally at La Carolina. The first and fourth corps then occupied the whole of La Mancha, with advanced posts at the foot of the mountains; the second and fifth corps were established in the valley of the Tagus and at Toledo; and the reserve at Madrid.

During these movements, Bassecour, who commanded in Estremadura, detached eight hundred horsemen to reinforce the Duke Del Parque, and quartered the rest of his forces behind the Guadiana. Thus in the latter end of October, there were sixty thousand men, under Eguia, covering Seville by the line of La Mancha; ten thousand under Bassecour on the line of Estremadura, and about six thousand employed as guards to the Junta and in the service of the dépôts behind the Morena.

In the north, the Spanish army of the left was concentrated near Ciudad Rodrigo. For when Beresford marched down the Portuguese frontier to the Tagus, the Duke Del Parque, reinforced with the eight hundred cavalry from Estremadura, and with the Gallician divisions of Mendizabel and Carrera, (amounting to thirteen thousand men, completely equipped from English stores, brought out to Coruña in July,) made a movement into the rugged country about the Sierra de Francia, and sent his scouting parties as far as Baños. At the same time General Santocildes, marching from Lugo with two thousand men, took possession of Astorga, and menaced the rear of the sixth corps, which, after forcing the pass of Baños, had been quartered between the Tormes and the Esla.\* In this situation, a French detachment attempted to surprise one of the gates of Astorga on the 9th of October, and, being repulsed, returned to their cantonments. Soon afterwards Ballesteros, having again collected about eight thousand men in the Asturias, armed and equipped them from English stores, and, coming down to Astorga, crossed the Esla, and attempted to storm Zamora. Failing in this, he entered Portugal by the road of Miranda, and from thence proceeded to join the Duke Del Parque. Thus the old armies of Galicia and the Asturias being broken up, those provinces were ordered to raise fresh forces; but there was in Galicia a general disposition to resist the authority of the Central Junta.

Del Parque, eager to act against the sixth corps, had demanded in September, through Perez Castro, the Spanish envoy at Lisbon, that the Portuguese army should join him; this being referred to Sir Arthur Wellesley, he gave it a decided negative, grounding his refusal upon reasons which I shall insert at large, as giving a clear and interesting view of the military state of affairs at this period.

"The enemy," he said, "were superior to the allies, including those which Beresford might bring into the field, not only in numbers, but (adverting to the composition of the Spanish armies, the want of cavalry in some, of artillery in others, of clothing, ammu-

\* See p. 177.

nition, and arms, and the deficiency of discipline in all) superior in efficiency even to a greater degree than in numbers. These circumstances, and the absolute deficiency in means, were the causes why, after the great victory at Talavera, the armies had been obliged to recur to the defensive, and nothing had altered for the better since.

“ But besides these considerations, the enemy enjoyed peculiar advantages from his central position, which enabled him to frustrate the Duke Del Parque's intended operations. He could march a part or the whole of his forces to any quarter, whereas the operations of the different corps of the allies must necessarily be isolated, and each for a time exposed to defeat. Thus there was nothing to prevent the enemy from throwing himself upon the Duke Del Parque and Beresford with the whole corps of Ney, which was at Salamanca, of Soult, which was at Placentia, and with the force under Kellermann, which was near Valladolid; in which case, even if he, Sir Arthur, had the inclination, he had not the means of marching in time to save them from destruction.

“ In the same manner the British army, if it took an advanced position, would be liable to a fatal disaster; so likewise would the Spanish army of La Mancha. It followed, then, that if any one of these armies made a forward movement, the whole must co-operate, or the single force in activity would be ruined; but the relative efficiency and strength of the hostile forces, as laid down in the commencement of the argument, forbade a general co-operation with any hopes of solid success; and the only consequence that could follow would be that, after a battle or two, some brilliant actions performed by a part, and some defeats sustained by others, and after the loss of many valuable officers and soldiers, the allies would be forced again to resume those defensive positions which they ought never to have quitted.

“ Satisfied that this was the only just view of affairs, he, although prepared to make an effort to prevent Ciudad Rodrigo from falling into the enemy's hands, was resolved not to give the Duke Del Parque any assistance to maintain his former position, and he advised the Portuguese government not to risk Beresford's army in a situation which could only lead to mischief. The proposed operation of the Duke Del Parque was not the mode to save Ciudad Rodrigo. The only effectual one was to post himself in such a situation as that the enemy could not attack and defeat him without a long previous preparation, which would give time for aid to arrive, and a march in which the enemy himself might be exposed to defeat. To expose those troops to a defeat which were ultimately to co-operate in defence of Ciudad Rodrigo, was not the



way of preventing the success of an attempt of that fortress. The best way was to place the Spanish force in such a post that it could not be attacked without risk to the enemy, and from whence it could easily co-operate with the other corps, which must be put in motion if Ciudad was to be saved; and although he would not take upon himself to point out the exact position which the Duke Del Parque ought to occupy, he was certain that in his present forward one, although joined by Beresford, he could not avoid defeat. Ciudad Rodrigo would be lost, and other misfortunes would follow, none of which could occur under any other probable, or even possible concurrence of circumstances. In fine, that he had long been of opinion that the war must necessarily be defensive on the part of the allies, and that Portugal, at least, if not Spain, ought to avail herself of the short period which the enemy seemed disposed to leave her in tranquillity, to organize, and equip, and discipline her armies. Those objects could not be accomplished unless the troops were kept quiet, and yet they were much more important to all parties than any desultory successful operations against the French troops about Salamanca; but any success was doubtful, and certain to be temporary, because the enemy would immediately collect in numbers sufficient to crush the allies, who must then return, having failed in their object, lost a number of men, and, what was worse, time, which would have been more usefully employed in preparing for a great and well combined effort.”\*

This reasoning, solid, clear, convincing, made no impression upon the Spanish Junta or their General. Castro replied to it by demanding a positive and definitive answer as to when the Portuguese army would be in a condition to co-operate with the Spaniards in the Spanish territories. “*When there is a Spanish army with which the Portuguese can co-operate on some defined plan, which all parties will have the means, and will engage to carry into execution, as far as any person can engage to carry into execution a military operation; when means shall be pointed out and fixed for the subsistence of the Portuguese troops while they remain in Spain, so that they may not starve, and be obliged to retire for want of food, as was the case when lately in that country. When decided answers shall be given upon those points, I shall be enabled to tell the governors of Portugal that their Excellencies have an army in a state to be sent into Spain.*”† This was Sir Arthur's reply, which ended the negotiation, and the Duke Del Parque commenced operations by himself.

To favor the junction of Ballesteros, his first movement was towards Ledesma. General Marchand immediately drew together,

\* Letter from sir A. Wellesley, September 23, 1809, MS.

† Sir A. Wellesley's Correspondence with Don M. Forgas, October 19, 1809, MS.

at Salamanca, eleven thousand men and fourteen guns, and marched to meet him. Thereupon, the Duke, without having effected his junction, fell back to Tamames, taking post half-way up a mountain of remarkable strength; where he awaited the enemy, with a thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry, of which the Gallicians only could be accounted experienced soldiers.

#### BATTLE OF TAMAMES.

General Losada commanded the Spanish right, Count Belvedere the reserve, Martin Carrera the left, which being on the most accessible part of the mountain was covered and flanked by the cavalry. Marchand, desirous of fighting before Ballesteros could arrive, moved rapidly, reached the foot of the mountain early on the 18th, and immediately fell upon Del Parque's left. The Spanish cavalry fled rather hastily, the French horsemen followed closely, the infantry, surprised in the midst of an evolution, were thrown into disorder, and the artillery was taken. Carrera, Mendizabel, and the Duke rallied the troops on the higher ground, reinforced them from the reserve, and coming down with a fresh impetus, recovered the guns, and discomfited the French with the loss of an eagle, one cannon, and several hundred men. During this brilliant combat on the left, the right and centre were felt by the French skirmishers, but the ground was too strong to make any impression. Marchand, seeing his men repulsed in all quarters with loss, and fearing to be inclosed by Ballesteros in that disordered state, retreated to Salamanca.

Del Parque did not venture to follow up his victory until the 21st, when, being joined by Ballesteros, he pushed with nearly thirty thousand men for Ledesma; crossed the Tormes there on the 23d, turned Salamanca by a night march, and early in the morning of the 24th crowned the heights of San Cristoval in rear of that city, hoping to cut off Marchand's retreat, but that General had timely information, and was already at Toro, behind the Douro. Meanwhile, the news of the defeat at Tamames reached Madrid; Dessolle's division was detached through the Puerto Pico to reinforce the sixth corps, and Kellermann was directed to advance from Valladolid, and take the command of the whole.

When the Duke Del Parque heard of this reinforcement, he fell back, not to Ciudad Rodrigo, but by the way of Alba de Tormes to Bejar, which latter place he reached on the 8th of November. And while these events were taking place in Castile, the Central Junta, having finally concocted their schemes, were commencing an enterprise of unparalleled rashness on the side of La Mancha.

## CHAPTER V.

Areizaga takes the command of Eguia's army, and is ordered to advance against Madrid—Folly of the Supreme Junta—Operations in La Mancha—Combat of Dos Barrios—Cavalry combat of Ocaña—Battle of Ocaña—Destruction of the Spanish army.

In the arrangement of warlike affairs, difficulties being always overlooked by the Spaniards, they are carried on from one phantasy to another so swiftly, that the first conception of an enterprise is immediately followed by a confident anticipation of complete success, which continues until the hour of battle, and then, when it might be of use, generally abandons them. Now the Central Junta, having to deceive the people affirmed that Sir Arthur Wellesley had retreated to the frontiers of Portugal at the very moment when the French might have been driven to the Pyrenees, came very soon to believe this their own absurd calumny, and resolved to send the army at Carolina headlong against Madrid: nay, such was their pitch of confidence, that forenaming the civil and military authorities, they arranged a provisional system for the future administration of the capital, with a care that they denied to the army which was to put them in possession.

Eguia was considered unfit to conduct this enterprise, and Albuquerque was distasteful to the Junta; wherefore, casting their eyes upon General Areizaga, they chose him, whose only recommendation was that, at the petty battle of Alcañiz, Blake had noticed his courage. He was then at Lerida, but reached La Carolina in the latter end of October; and being of a quick lively turn, and as confident as the Junta could desire, readily undertook to drive the French from Madrid.

This movement was to commence early in November, and at first, only Villa Campa, with the bands from Aragon, were to assist. But when Areizaga, after meeting the enemy, began to lose confidence, the Duke of Albuquerque, successor to Bassecour in Estremadura, received instructions to cause a diversion, by marching on Arzobispo and Talavera de la Reyna. The Duke Del Parque, coming by the pass of Baños, was to join him there; and thus nearly ninety thousand men were to be put in motion against Madrid, precisely on that plan which Sir Arthur Wellesley had just denounced as certain to prove disastrous. Indeed, every chance was so much in favor of the French, that taking into consideration the solid reasons for remaining on the defensive, Areizaga's irruption may be regarded as an extreme example of military rashness; and

the project of uniting Del Parque's forces with Albuquerque's at Talavera, was also certain to fail, because the enemy's masses were already in possession of the point of junction, and the sixth corps could fall on Del Parque's rear.

Partly to deceive the enemy, partly because they would never admit of any opposition to a favorite scheme, the Junta spread a report that the British army was to co-operate, and permitted Areizaga to march under the impression that it was so. Nothing could be more untrue.\* Sir Arthur Wellesley being at this period at Seville, held repeated conversations with the Spanish ministers and the members of the Junta, and reiterating all his former objections to offensive operations, warned his auditors that the project in question was peculiarly ill-judged, and would end in the destruction of their army. The Spanish ministers, far from attending to his advice, did not even *officially inform him of Areizaga's march until the 18th of November*, the very day before the fatal termination of the campaign. Yet, *on the 16th they had repeated their demand for assistance*, and with a vehemence, deaf to reason, required that the British should instantly co-operate with Albuquerque and Del Parque's forces. Sir Arthur, firm to his first views, never gave the slightest hopes that his army would so act; and he assured the Junta that the diversion proposed would have no effect whatever.

#### OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA.

Areizaga, after publishing an address to the troops on the 3d of November, commenced his march from La Carolina, with sixty pieces of artillery, and from fifty to sixty thousand men, of which about eight thousand were cavalry. Several British officers and private gentlemen, and the Baron Crossand, an Austrian military agent, attended the head-quarters, which was a scene of gaiety and boasting; for Areizaga, never dreaming of misfortune, gave a free scope to his social vivacity. The army marched by the roads of Manzanares and Danyel, with scarcely any commissariat preparation, and without any military equipment save arms; but the men were young, robust, full of life and confidence, and being without impediments of any kind, made nearly thirty miles each day. They moved however in a straggling manner, quartering and feeding as they could in the villages on their route, and with so little propriety, that the peasantry of La Mancha universally abandoned their dwellings, and carried off their effects.

Although the French could not at first give credit to the rumors of this strange incursion, they were aware that some great movement was in agitation, and only uncertain from what point and for what specific object the effort would be made. Jourdan had re-

\* Appendix 16, § 1.

turned to France, Soult was Major-General of the French armies, and under his advice, the King, who was inclined to abandon Madrid, prepared to meet the coming blow. But the army was principally posted towards Talavera, for the false reports had, in some measure, succeeded in deceiving the French as to the approach of the English;\* and it was impossible at once to conceive the full insanity of the Junta.

The second corps, commanded by General Heudelet, being withdrawn from Placentia, was, on the 5th, posted at Oropesa and Arzobispo, with an advanced guard at Calzada, and scouting parties watching Naval Moral, and the course of the Tietar.

The fifth corps, under Mortier, was concentrated at Talavera.

Of the fourth corps, half a division garrisoned Madrid in the absence of Dessolle's troops; the other half, under General Liger Belair, was behind the Tajuna, guarding the eastern approaches to the capital. The remaining divisions, commanded by Sebastiani, were, the one at Toledo, the other with Milhaud's cavalry at Ocaña.

The first corps, about twenty-one thousand strong, and commanded by Marshal Victor, was at Mora and Yébenes, a day's march in advance of Toledo, but the cavalry of this corps under the command of Latour Maubourg occupied Consuegra and Madrilejos, on the road to the Sierra Morena. The whole army, including the French and Spanish guards, was above eighty thousand fighting men, without reckoning Dessolle's division, which was on the other side of the Guadarama mountains.

In the night of the 6th, information reached the King, that six thousand Spanish horsemen, supported by two thousand foot, had come down upon Consuegra from the side of Herencia, and that a second column, likewise composed of cavalry and infantry, had passed the Puerto de Piche, and fallen upon the outposts at Madrilejos.† All the prisoners taken in the skirmishes agreed that the Spanish army was above fifty thousand strong, and the Duke of Belluno immediately concentrated the first corps at Yébenes, but kept his cavalry at Mora, by which he covered the roads leading from Consuegra and Madrilejos upon Toledo. On the 8th, there were no Spaniards in front of the first corps, yet officers sent towards Ocaña were chased back by cavalry; hence Soult judged, what was indeed the truth, that Areizaga, continuing his reckless march, had pushed by Tembleque towards Aranjuez, leaving the first corps on his left flank. The division of the fourth corps was immediately moved from Toledo by the right bank of the Tagus to

\* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

† Ibid.

Aranjuez, from whence Sebastiani carried it to Ocaña, thus concentrating about eight thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry at that point on the 9th; the same day Victor retired with the first corps to Ajofrin.


On the 10th, Gazan's division of the fifth corps was ordered to march from Talavera to Toledo, and the first corps, which had reached the latter town, was directed to move up the right bank of the Tagus to Aranjuez to support Sebastiani, who, holding fast at Ocaña, sent six squadrons to feel for the enemy towards Guardia. The Spaniards continuing their movement, met those squadrons and pursued them towards Ocaña.

#### COMBAT OF DOS BARRIOS.

Areizaga, ignorant of what was passing around him, and seeing only Sebastiani's cavalry on the table-land between the town of Dos Barrios and Ocaña, concluded that they were unsupported, and directed the Spanish horse to charge them without delay. The French, thus pressed, drew back behind the infantry, which was close at hand, and unexpectedly opened a brisk fire on the Spanish squadrons, which were thrown into confusion, and being charged in that state by the whole mass of the enemy's cavalry, were beaten, with the loss of two hundred prisoners and two pieces of cannon. Areizaga's main body was, however, coming up, Sebastiani fell back upon Ocaña, and the next morning took up a position on some heights lining the left bank of the Tagus and covering Aranjuez; the Spaniards entered Dos Barrios, but there their impetuous movement ceased. They had come down from the Morena like a stream of lava, and burst into La Mancha with a rapidity that scarcely gave time for rumor to precede them. This swiftness of execution, generally so valuable in war, was here but an outbreak of folly. Without any knowledge of the French numbers or position, without any plan of action, Areizaga had rushed like a maniac into the midst of his foes, and then suddenly stood still trembling and bewildered.

From the 10th to the 13th he halted at Dos Barrios, and informed his government of Sebastiani's stubborn resistance, and of the doubts which now for the first time assailed his own mind.\* It was then the Junta, changing their plans, eagerly demanded the assistance of the British army, and commanded the Dukes of Albuquerque and Del Parque to unite at Talavera. Albuquerque commenced his movement immediately, and the Junta did not hesitate to assure both their generals and the public, that Sir Arthur was also coming on. Wherefore Areizaga, thus encouraged, and having had time to recover from his first incertitude, made on the 14th a

\* Appendix 16, § 1.



Arieza's  
OPERATIONS  
1809