

Antequera and Alhama, where the road from Granada enters the hills.

As this insurrection was spreading, not only in the mountains, but through the plains of Granada, Sebastiani resolved to fall on at once, lest the Granadans, having Gibraltar on the one flank, Murcia on the other, and in their own country many sea-ports and fortified towns, should organize a regular system of resistance. Wherefore, after a slight skirmish at Alhama, he penetrated the hills, driving the insurgents upon Malaga, near which place they rallied, and an engagement with the advanced guard of the French, under General Milhaud, taking place, about five hundred Spaniards fell, and the conquerors entered the town fighting. A few of the vanquished took refuge on board some English ships of war, the rest submitted, and more than a hundred pieces of heavy, and about twenty pieces of field artillery with ammunition, stores, and a quantity of British merchandise, became the spoil of the conquerors. Vélez-Malaga opened its gates the next day, Motril was occupied, and thus the insurrection was quelled, for in every other part, both troops and peasantry were terrified and submissive to the last degree.*

Meanwhile, Victor followed the traces of Albuquerque with such diligence as to reach Chiclana on the 4th, and it is generally supposed that he might have rendered himself master of Leon, for the defensive works at Cadiz and the Isla were in no way improved, but rather deteriorated since the period of Sir George Smith's negotiation. The bridge of Zuazo was indeed broken, and the canal of Santa Petri a great obstacle; but Albuquerque's troops were harassed, dispirited, ill clothed, badly armed, and in every way inefficient; the people of Cadiz were apathetic, and the authorities, as usual, occupied with intrigues and private interests. In this state, eight thousand Spanish soldiers could scarcely have defended a line of ten miles against twenty-five thousand French, if a sufficient number of boats could have been collected to cross the canal.

Venegas was governor of Cadiz, but when it was known that the Central Junta had been deposed at Seville, a Municipal Junta, chiefly composed of merchants, was elected by general ballot. This body, as inflated and ambitious of power as any that had preceded it, would not suffer the fugitive members of the Central Junta to assume any authority; and the latter, maugre their extreme reluctance, were obliged to submit, but, by the advice of Jovellanos, they appointed a Regency, composed of men not taken from amongst themselves. Although the Municipal Junta vehemently opposed this proceeding, at first, the judicious intervention of Mr. Bartho-

* General Campbell's Correspondence from Gibraltar, MS.

lomew Frere induced them to acquiesce; and on the 29th of January, the Bishop of Orense, General Castaños, Antonio de Escaño, Saavedra, and Fernandez de Leon, were appointed Regents, until the Cortes could be assembled. Leon was afterwards replaced by one Lardizabal, a native of New Spain.

The Council of Castile, which had been reinstated before the fall of Seville, now charged the deposed Junta, and truly, with usurpation—the public voice added peculation and other crimes; and the Regency, which they had themselves appointed, seized their papers, sequestered their effects, threw some of the members into prison, and banished others to the provinces; thus completely extinguishing this at once odious, ridiculous, and unfortunate oligarchy. Amongst the persons composing it, there were undoubtedly some of unsullied honor and fine talents, ready and eloquent of speech, and dexterous in argument; but it is not in Spain only, that men possessing all the “grace and ornament” of words, have proved to be mean and contemptible statesmen.

Albuquerque, elected president of the Municipal Junta, and commander of the forces, endeavored to place the Isla de Leon in a state to resist a sudden attack; and the French, deceived as to its real strength, after an ineffectual summons, proceeded to gird the whole bay with works. Meanwhile, Marshal Mortier, leaving a brigade of the fifth corps at Seville, pursued a body of four thousand men, that, under the command of the Visconde de Gand, had retired from that town towards the Morena; they evaded him, and fled to Ayamonte, yet were like to be destroyed, because the Bishop of Algarve, from national jealousy, would not suffer them to pass the Portuguese frontier.* Mortier, however, disregarding these fugitives, passed the Morena by Ronquillos and Monasterio, and marching against Badajos, summoned it the 12th of February; but Contreras' detachment had arrived there on the 26th of January, and Mortier, finding, contrary to his expectation, that the place was in a state of defence, retired to Merida.

This terminated the first series of operations in the fourth epoch of the war; operations which, in three weeks, had put the French in possession of Andalusia and southern Estremadura, with the exception of Gibraltar and Cadiz in the one, and of Bardajoz, Olivenza, and Albuquerque in the other province. Yet, great as were the results of this memorable irruption, more might have been obtained, and the capture of Cadiz would have been a fatal blow to the Peninsula.

From Andujar to Seville is only a hundred miles, yet the French took ten days to traverse that space; a tardiness for which there

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

appears no adequate cause. The King, apparently elated at the acclamations and seeming cordiality with which the towns, and even villages, greeted him, moved slowly. He imagined that Seville would open her gates at once; and thinking that the possession of that town would produce the greatest moral effect in Andalusia and all over Spain, changed the first judicious plan of campaign, and marched thither in preference to Cadiz. The moral influence of Seville was however transferred, along with the government, to Cadiz, and Joseph was deceived in his expectations of entering the former city as he had entered Corboda. When he discovered his error there was still time to repair it by a rapid pursuit of Albuquerque, but fearing to leave a city with a hundred thousand people in a state of excitement upon his flank, he resolved to reduce Seville, and met indeed with no formidable resistance, yet so much of opposition as left him only the alternative of storming the town or entering by negotiation. The first his humanity forbade; the latter cost him time, which was worth his crown, for Albuquerque's proceedings were only secondary: the ephemeral resistance of Seville was the primary cause of the safety of Cadiz.

The march by which the Spanish Duke secured the Isla de Leon, is only to be reckoned from Carmona. Previous to his arrival there, his movements, although judicious, were more the result of necessity than of skill. After the battle of Ocaña, he expected that Andalusia would be invaded; yet, either fettered by his orders or ill-informed of the enemy's movements, his march upon Agudo was too late, and his after-march upon Guadalcanal was the forced result of his position; he could only do that, or abandon Andalusia and retire to Badajoz.

From Guadalcanal, he advanced towards Cordoba on the 23d, and he might have thrown himself into that town; yet the prudence of taking such a decided part was dependent upon the state of public sentiment, of which he must have been a good judge. Albuquerque, indeed, imagined that the French were already in possession of the place, whereas they did not reach it until four days later; yet they could easily have entered it on the 24th, and as he believed that they had done so, it is apparent that he had no confidence in the people's disposition; in this view, his determination to cross the Guadalquivir, and take post at Carmona, was the fittest for the occasion. It was at Carmona he first appears to have considered Seville a lost city; and when the French approached, we find him marching, with a surprising energy, towards Cadiz, yet he was again late in deciding, for the enemy's cavalry, moving by the shorter road to Utrera, overtook his rear-guard; and the infantry would assuredly have entered the Island of Leon with him, if the King

had not directed them upon Seville. The ephemeral resistance of that city therefore saved Albuquerque, and he, in return, saved Cadiz.

CHAPTER II.

Operations in Navarre, Aragon, and Valencia—Pursuit of the student Mina—Suchet's preparations—His incursion against Valencia—Returns to Aragon—Difficulty of the war in Catalonia—Operations of the seventh corps—French detachments surprised at Mollet and San Perpetua—Augereau enters Barcelona—Sends Duhesme to France—Returns to Gerona—O'Donnell rallies the Spanish army near Centellas—Conduct of Vich—Spaniards make vain efforts to raise the blockade of Hostalrich—Augereau again advances to Barcelona—Sends two divisions to Reus—Occupies Manreza and Villa Franca—French troops defeated at Villa Franca and Esparaguera—Swartz abandons Manreza—Is defeated at Savadel—Colonel Villatte communicates with the third corps by Falcet—Severoli retreats from Reus to Villa Franca—Is harassed on the march—Augereau's unskilful conduct—Hostalrich falls—Gallant exploit of the Governor, Julian Estrada—Cruelty of Augereau.

LORD WELLINGTON'S plans were deeply affected by the invasion of Andalusia. But before treating of the stupendous campaign he was now meditating, it is necessary once more to revert to the operations in the other parts of the Peninsula, tracing them up to a fixed point; because, although bearing strongly on the main action of the war, to recur to them chronologically, would totally destroy the unity of narrative indispensable to a just handling of the subject.

OPERATIONS IN NAVARRE, ARAGON, AND VALENCIA.

Suchet, being ordered to quell the disorders in Navarre, repaired to Pampeluna, having previously directed an active pursuit of the student Mina,* who, availing himself of the quarrel between the military governor and the viceroy, was actually master of the country between that fortress and Tudela, and was then at Sanguessa. General Harispe, with some battalions, marched straight against him from Zaragoza, while detachments from Tudela and Pampeluna endeavored to surround him by the flanks, and a fourth body, moving into the valleys of Ainsa and Mediano, cut him off from the Cinca river.

Harispe quickly reached Sanguessa, but the column from Pampeluna being retarded, Mina, with surprising boldness, crossed its line of march, and attacked Tafalla, thus cutting the great French line of communication;† the garrison, however, made a strong re-

* Plan 7, p. 201.

† Suchet's Memoirs.

sistance, and Mina disappeared the next day. At this period, reinforcements from France were pouring into Navarre, and a division under Loison was at Logroño; wherefore Harispe having, in concert with that General and with the garrison of Pampeluna, occupied Sanguessa, Sos, Lodosa, Puente de Reyna, and all the passages of the Arga, Aragon, and Ebro rivers, launched a number of movable columns, that continually pursued Mina until, chased into the higher parts of the Pyrenees, cold and hunger obliged his band to disperse. The enterprising chief himself escaped with seven followers, and when the French were tracking him from house to house, he, with a romantic simplicity truly Spanish, repaired to Olite, that he might see Suchet pass on his way from Zaragoza to Pampeluna.

But that General, while seemingly occupied with the affairs of Pampeluna, was secretly preparing guns and materials for a methodical war of invasion beyond the frontiers of Aragon; and when General Reynier, coming soon afterwards from France, with troops intended to form an eighth corps, was appointed Governor of Navarre, Suchet returned to Zaragoza. During his absence, although some petty actions had taken place, his general arrangements were not disturbed, and the Emperor having promised to increase the third corps to thirty thousand men, with the intention of directing it at once against Valencia, all the stores befitting such an enterprise were collected at Teruel in the course of January. The resistance of Gerona, and other events in Catalonia, having, however, baffled Napoleon's calculations, this first destination of the third corps was changed. Suchet was ordered to besiege Tortosa or Lerida; the eighth corps, then forming at Logroño, was directed to cover his rear; the seventh corps to advance to the lower Ebro and support the siege. But neither was this arrangement definite; fresh orders sent the eighth corps towards Castile, and just at this moment Joseph's letter from Cordoba, calling upon Suchet to march against Valencia, arrived, and gave a new turn to the affairs of the French in Spain.

A decree of the Emperor, dated the eighth of January, and constituting Aragon a particular government, rendered Suchet independent of the King's orders, civil or military. This decree, together with a renewed order to commence the siege of Lerida, had, however, been intercepted, and the French General, doubtful of Napoleon's real views, undertook the enterprise against Valencia; but wishing first to intimidate the partisans hanging on the borders of Aragon, he detached Laval against Villa Campa, who was defeated on the side of Cuença, and his troops dispersed.

Suchet then fortified a post at Teruel, to serve as a temporary

base of operations, and drew together at that place twelve battalions of infantry, a regiment of cuirassiers, several squadrons of light cavalry, and some field artillery, and at the same time caused six battalions and three squadrons of cavalry to be assembled at Alcañitz, under General Habert. The remainder of the third corps was distributed on the line of the Cinca, and on the right bank of the Ebro. The castles of Zaragoza, Alcañitz, Monzon, Venasque, Jaca, Tudela, and other towns, were placed in a state of defence, and four thousand men newly arrived from France were pushed to Daroca, to link the active columns to those left in Aragon. These arrangements occupied the whole of February, and, on the 1st of March, a duplicate of the order, directing Suchet to commence the siege of Lerida, reached Teruel; yet as Habert's column, having marched on the 27th by the road of Morella, was already committed in the province of Valencia, the operation went on.

INCURSION TO VALENCIA.

The first day brought Suchet's column in presence of the Valencian army, for Ventura Caro, Captain-General of the province, was in march to attack the French at Teruel, and his advanced guard of five or six thousand regulars, accompanied by armed peasants, was drawn up on some high ground behind the river Mingares, the bed of which is a deep ravine so suddenly sunk as not to be perceived until close upon it. The village and castle of Alventosa, situated somewhat in advance of the Spanish centre, were occupied, and commanded a bridge over the river. Their right rested on the village and bridge of Puenseca, and their left on the village of Manzanera, where the ground was rather more practicable.

Suchet, judging that Caro would not fight so far from Valencia, while Habert's column was turning his right, sent a division before daylight on the 2d, to turn the left of the position and cut off the retreat; nevertheless, although the French, after a skirmish, crossed the ravine, the Spaniards retired with little loss upon Segorbe, and Caro fell back to the city of Valencia. Suchet then entered Segorbe, and on the 4th was at Murviedro, the ancient Saguntum, four leagues from Valencia. At the same time Habert, who had defeated a small corps at Morella, arrived at Villa Real on the sea-coast. The country between their lines of march was mountainous and impracticable, but after passing Saguntum, the columns united in the Huerta, or garden of Valencia, the richest and most delightful part of Spain.

Suchet arrived before the city on the 5th of March, and seized

the suburb Seranos, and the harbor called the Grao. His spies at first confirmed the hopes of an insurrection within the walls, but the treason was detected, the leader, a Baron Pozzo Blanco, publicly executed, and the Archbishop and many others imprisoned; in fine, the plan had failed, the populace were in arms, and there was no movement of French troops on the side of Murcia. Five days the French General remained before the city vainly negotiating, and then, intrigue failing, and his army being inadequate to force the defences, he resolved to retire. In the night of the 10th he commenced his retreat in one column by Segorbe and Teruel. Meanwhile the Spanish partisans were gathering on his rear. Combats had already taken place at Liria and Castellon de la Plana, and General Villa Campa, who had re-assembled his dispersed troops, captured four guns, with their ammunition and escort, between Teruel and Daroca; cut off another detachment of a hundred men left at Alventoza, and, having invested the post at Teruel on the 7th by a bold and ready-witted attempt, nearly carried the castle. The 12th, however, the head of Suchet's column came in sight, Villa Campa retired, and the 17th the French General reached Zaragoza. During his absence, Pereña had invested Monzon, and when the garrison of Fraga marched to its relief, the Spaniards from Lerida entered the latter town and destroyed the bridge and French intrenchments. Mina, also, was again become formidable, and, although several columns were sent in chase of him, it is probable that they would have done no more than disperse his band for the moment but for an accident, which threw him into their hands a prisoner.

Suchet's failure at Valencia was more hurtful to the French than would at first sight appear. It happened at the moment when the National Cortes, so long desired, was at last directed to assemble; and as it seemed to balance the misfortunes of Andalusia, it was hailed by the Spaniards as the commencement of a better era. The principal military advantage was the delaying of the sieges of Lerida and Mequinenza, whereby the subjugation of Catalonia was retarded; and although Suchet labors, and successfully, to show that he was drawn into this enterprise by the force of circumstances, Napoleon's avowed discontent was well founded. The operations in Catalonia were so hampered by the nature of the country, that it was only at certain conjunctures any progress could be made, and one of the most favorable of those conjunctures was lost for want of the co-operation of the third corps; but to understand this, the military topography of Catalonia must be well considered.

That province is divided in its whole length by shoots from the Pyrenees, which, with some interruptions, run to the Atlantic

shores; for the sierras separating Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia from the central parts of Spain, are but continuations of those shoots. The Ebro, forcing its way transversely through the ridges, parts Catalonia from Valencia, and the hills, thus broken by the river, push their rocky heads southward to the sea, cutting off Tarragona from Tortosa, and inclosing what may be called the eastern region of Catalonia, which contains Rosas, Gerona, Hostalrich, Vich, Barcelona, Manresa, Tarragona, Reus, and many more towns. The torrents, the defiles, and other military features of this region have been before described.* The western portion of Catalonia, lying beyond the principal spine, is bounded partly by Aragon, partly by Valencia; and, like the eastern region, it is an assemblage of small plains and rugged valleys, each the bed of a river, descending towards the Ebro from the Pyrenees. It contains the fortresses of Balaguer, Lerida, Mequinenza, Cervera, and, near the mouth of the Ebro, Tortosa, which, however, belongs in a military view rather to Valencia than Catalonia.

Now the mountain ridge, parting the eastern from the western region of Catalonia, could only be passed by certain routes, for the most part impracticable for artillery, and those practicable leading upon walled towns at both sides of the defiles. Thus Cervera is situated on the principal and direct line from Lerida to Barcelona; Balaguer, Cardona, and Montserrat, on another and more circuitous road to the same city. Between Lerida and Tarragona stands Momb Blanch, and between Tarragona and Tortosa, the Fort St. Felipe blocks the Col de Balaguer. All these places were in the hands of the Spaniards, and a number of smaller fortresses, or castles, such as Urgel, Berga, and Solsona, served as rallying points, where the warlike Somatenes of the higher valleys took refuge from the movable columns, and from whence, supplied with arms and ammunition, they sallied, to harass the flanks and rear of both the French corps.

In the eastern region, the line of operations for the seventh corps was between the mountains and the sea-coast, and parallel with both; hence, the Spanish irregular forces, holding all the communications, and the high valleys on both sides of the great dividing spine, could at all times descend upon the rear and flanks of the French, while the regular troops, opposed to them on a narrow front, and supported by the fortresses of Gerona, Hostalrich and Tarragona, could advance or retire as circumstances dictated. And upon this principle, the defence of Catalonia was conducted.

Detachments and sometimes the main body of the Spanish army, passing by the mountains, or by sea from Tarragona, harassed the

* Book I. Chap. VI.

French flanks, and when defeated, retired on Vich, Manresa, Montserrat, or Cervera, and finally to Tarragona. From this last, the generals communicated with Tortosa, Valencia, Gibraltar, the Balearic Isles, and even Sicily, and drew succors of all kinds from those places, and meanwhile the bands in the mountains continued to vex the French communications; and it was only during the brief period of lassitude in the Spanish army, following any great defeat, that the seventh corps could chase those mountaineers. Nor, until Gerona and Hostalrich fell, was it easy to make any but sudden and short incursions towards Tarragona, because the Migueletes from the higher valleys, and detachments from the army at Tarragona, again passing by the hills or by sea, joined the garrisons, and interrupted the communication, and thus obliged the French to retire, because the country beyond the Llobregat could never feed them long.

But when Barcelona could not be succored by sea, it was indispensable to conduct convoys by land, and to insure their arrival, the whole army was obliged to make frequent movements in advance, retiring again when the object was effected; this being often renewed, offered many opportunities for cutting off minor convoys, detachments, and even considerable bodies isolated by the momentary absence of the army. Thus during the siege of Gerona, Blake passed through the mountains and harassed the besiegers. When the place fell, he retired again to Tarragona, and Augereau took the occasion to attack the Migueletes and Somatenes in the high valleys; but in the midst of this operation Admiral Baudin's squadron was intercepted by Admiral Martin, and the insatiable craving of Barcelona obliged Augereau to re-assemble his army and conduct a convoy there by land; yet he was obliged to return immediately, lest he should himself consume the provisions he brought for the city. This retreat, as usual, drew on the Spaniards, who were again defeated, and Augereau once more advanced, in the intention of co-operating with the third corps, which, he supposed, would, following the Emperor's design, be before Lerida or Tortosa. But at this time, Suchet was on the march to Valencia; and Henry O'Donnell, who had succeeded Blake in the command, recommenced the warfare on the French communications, and forced Augereau again to retire to Gerona, at the moment when Suchet, having returned to Aragon, was ready to besiege Lerida. Thus, like unruly horses in a chariot dragging different ways, the French impeded each other's movements. I shall now briefly narrate the events touched upon above.

OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS.

Gerona having fallen, General Souham with a division scoured the high valleys, beat the Migueletes of Claros and Rovira, at Besalu, Olot, Ribas and Campredon, and at Ripoll destroyed a manufactory of arms.* Being afterwards reinforced with Pino's division, he marched from Olot, by the road of Esteban and Manlieu, and although the Somatenes disputed the defiles near the last point, the French forced the passage, and took possession of Vich. Meanwhile Blake having been called to Andalusia, the Provincial Junta of Catalonia rejecting the Duke Del Parque, took upon themselves to give the command to Henry O'Donnell, whose courage during the siege of Gerona had gained him a high reputation. He was now with the remains of Blake's army at Vich, and as the French approached that town he retired to the pass of Col de Sespina, from whence he had a free retreat upon Moya and Manresa. Souham's advanced guard pursued, and at Tona captured some baggage, but the Spaniard turned on finding his rear pressed, and when the pursuers mounted the heights of Sespina, charged with a shock that sent them headlong down again. Souham rallied the beaten troops in the plain, and the next day offered battle, but O'Donnell continued his retreat, and the French General returned to Vich.

During these events, Augereau, leaving a detachment in Hostalrich to blockade the castle, marched to Barcelona, by the road of Cardadeu; having previously ordered Duhesme to post three battalions and five squadrons of cuirassiers, with some guns, near the junction of the roads of Cardadeu and Manresa, to watch O'Donnell. Colonel Guery, commanding this detachment, placed one battalion at Granollers, a second at Santa Perpetua, and with the remainder occupied Mollet, taking no military precautions, wherefore O'Donnell, who had been joined by Campo Verde, sent him to fall upon the French posts. Campo Verde, passing by Tarrassa and Sebadel, surprised and put to the sword or captured all the troops at Santa Perpetua and Mollet; those at Granollers threw themselves into a large building, and defended it for three days, when by the approach of Augereau they were relieved. The Marshal, finding the streets of Mollet strewed with French carcasses, ordered up the division of Souham from Vich, but passed on himself to Barcelona; and when there, affecting to be convinced how oppressive Duhesme's conduct had been, sent him to France in disgrace. After this act of justice or of personal malice, for it has been called both names, Augereau, unable to procure provisions without exhausting the magazines of Barcelona, resumed his former position at Gerona, and Souham returned to Vich.

* Plan 8, p. 218.

All this time the blockade of Hostalrich continued; but the retreat of Augereau, and the success of Campo Verde's enterprise, produced extraordinary joy over all Catalonia. The prisoners taken were marched from town to town, the action everywhere exaggerated, the decree for enrolling a fifth of the male population was enforced with vigor, and the execution intrusted to the Baron d'Erolles, a native of Talarn, who afterwards obtained considerable celebrity. The army, in which there was still a large body of Swiss troops, was thus reinforced, the confidence of the people increased hourly, and a local Junta was established at Arenas de Mar, to organize the Somatenes on the coast, and to direct the application of succors from the sea. The partisans, also reassembling their dispersed bands in the higher valleys, again vexed the Ampurdan, and incommoded the troops blockading the citadel of Hostalrich.

O'Donnell himself, moving to Manresa, called the Migueletes from the Lerida side to his assistance; and soon formed a body of more than twelve thousand fighting men, with which he took post at Moya, in the beginning of February, and harassed the French in front of Vich, while, in the rear of that town, Rovira occupied the heights above Roda. Souham, seeing the crests of the hills thus swarming with enemies, and having but five thousand men of all arms to oppose to them, demanded reinforcements, but Augereau paid little attention to him, and O'Donnell, descending the mountain of Centellas, on the 20th, entered the plains in three columns. The French General had scarcely time to draw up his troops a little in front of the town, ere he was attacked with a vigor hitherto unusual with the Spaniards.

COMBAT OF VICH.

Rovira commenced the action, by driving the enemy's posts, on the side of Roda, back upon the town; O'Donnell, then, coming close up on the front of the French position, opened all his guns, and, throwing out skirmishers along the whole of the adverse line, filed his cavalry, under cover of their fire, to the right, intending to outflank Souham's left. The latter General, leaving a battalion to hold Rovira in check, encouraged his own infantry, and sent his dragoons against the Spanish horsemen, who, at the first charge, were driven back in confusion. The Spanish foot then fell in on the French centre, but failed to make any serious impression, wherefore O'Donnell, whose great superiority of numbers enabled him to keep heavy masses in reserve, endeavored to turn both flanks of the enemy at the same time. Souham was now hard pressed, his infantry were few, his reserves all engaged, and him-

self severely wounded in the head. O'Donnell, who had rallied his cavalry, and brought up his Swiss regiments, was full of confidence, and in person fiercely led the whole mass once more against the left. At this critical period, the French infantry, far from wavering, firmly closed their ranks, and sent their volleys more rapidly into the hostile ranks, while the cavalry, sensible that the fate of all (for there was no retreat) hung upon the issue of their charge, met their adversaries with such a full career that horse and man went down before them, and the Swiss, being separated from the rest, surrendered. Rovira was afterwards driven away from the rear, and the Spanish army returned to the hills, having lost a full fourth of its own numbers, and killed or wounded twelve hundred of the enemy.

O'Donnell's advance had been the signal for all the irregular bands to act against the various quarters of the French; they were, however, with the exception of a slight succor thrown into Hostalrich, unsuccessful, and, being closely pursued by the movable columns, dispersed. Thus the higher valleys were again subdued, the Junta fled from Arenas de Mar, Campo Verde returned to the country about Cervera, and O'Donnell, quitting the upper Llobregat, retired by Taraza, Martorel, and Villa Franca to the camp of Tarragona, leaving only an advanced guard at Ordal.

It was at this moment, when upper Catalonia was in a manner abandoned by the Spanish General, that the Emperor directed the seventh corps upon the lower Ebro, to support Suchet's operations against Lerida and Mequinenza. Augereau, therefore, leaving a detachment under Verdier, in the Ampurdan, and two thousand men to blockade Hostalrich, ordered his brother and General Mazzuchelli (the one commanding Souham's, and the other Pino's division) to march upon Manresa, while he himself, with the Westphalian division, repaired once more to Barcelona, and from thence directed all the subsequent movements.

General Augereau, passing by Col de Sespina, entered Manresa the 16th of March, and there joined Mazzuchelli: the inhabitants had abandoned the place, and General Swartz was sent with a brigade, from Moncada, to take possession, while the two divisions continued their movement by Montserrat upon Molino del Rey. The 21st they advanced to Villa Franca, and the Spaniards retired from Ordal towards Tarragona. The French, acting under orders from Barcelona, left a thousand men in Villa Franca, and, after scouring the country on the right and left, passed the Col de San Cristina, and established their quarters about Reus, by which the Spanish army at Tarragona was placed between them and the troops at Villa Franca.

O'Donnell, whose energy and military talents were superior to his predecessors, saw, and instantly profited from this false position. By his orders, General Juan Caro marched, with six thousand men, against the French in Villa Franca, and, on the 28th, killed many and captured the rest, together with some artillery and stores, but, being wounded himself, resigned the command to General Gasca, after the action. Augereau, alarmed for Manresa, then detached columns, both by Olesa and Montserrat, to reinforce Swartz, and the first reached its destinations, but the other, twelve hundred strong, was intercepted by Gasca, and totally defeated at Esparaguera on the 3d of April. Campo Verde immediately came down from the side of Cervera, took the chief command, and proceeded against Manresa by Montserrat, while Milans de Boch and Rovira hemmed in the French on the opposite side, and the Somatenes gathered on the hills to aid the operations. Swartz thus menaced evacuated the town in the night, and thinking to baffle the Spaniards, by taking the road of Taraza and Sebadel, was followed closely by Rovira and Milans, and so pressed, on the 5th of April, that with great difficulty and the loss of all his baggage he reached Barcelona.

These operations having insulated the French divisions at Reus, an officer was despatched by sea, with orders to recall them to Barcelona. Meanwhile Count Severoli, who had taken the command of them, and whose first instructions were to co-operate with Suchet, feared to pass the mountains between Reus and the Ebro, lest he should expose his rear to an attack from Tarragona, and perhaps fail of meeting the third corps at last. Keeping, therefore, on the defensive at Reus, he detached Colonel Villatte, at the head of two battalions and some cavalry, across the hills, by Dos Aguas and Falcet, to open a communication with the third corps, a part of which had just seized Mora and Flix, on the lower Ebro. Villatte having accomplished his object, returned with great celerity, fighting his way through the Somatenes, who were gathering round the defiles in his rear, and regaining Reus just as Severoli, having received the order of recall, was commencing his march for Barcelona.

In the night of the 6th, this movement took place, but in such confusion, that from Tarragona O'Donnell perceived the disorder, and sending a detachment, under Colonel Orry, to harass the French, followed himself with the rest of his army.* Nevertheless, Severoli's rear-guard covered the retreat successfully, until a position was attained near Villa Franca, where Orry, pressing on too closely, was wounded and taken, and his troops rejoined their

* Vacani, *Istoria Militare degl' Italiani in Ispagna.*

main body. When these divisions arrived, Campo Verde fell back to Cervera, Severoli reached Barcelona, and Augereau retired to Gerona, having lost more than three thousand men, by a series of most unskilful movements; the situation in which he had voluntarily placed himself, was precisely such as a great general would rejoice to see his adversary choose.

Barcelona, the centre of his operations, was encircled by mountains, to be passed only at certain defiles; now Reus and Manresa were beyond those defiles, and several days' march from each other. Rovira and Milans, being about San Culgat, cut the communication between Manresa and Barcelona; O'Donnell at Tarragona was nearer to the defiles of Cristina, than the French divisions at Reus; and his own communication with Campo Verde was open by Valls, Pla, and Santa Coloma de Querault; and with Milans and Rovira, by Villa Franca, San Sadurn and Igualada. Augereau indeed placed a battalion in Villa Franca, but this only rendered his situation worse; for what could six hundred men effect in a mountainous country, against three considerable bodies of the enemy? The result was inevitable. The battalion at Villa Franca was put to the sword, Swartz only saved a remnant of his brigade by a timely flight, and the divisions at Reus with difficulty made good their retreat. O'Donnell, who, one month before, had retired from the battle of Vich, broken and discomfited by only five thousand French, now, with that very beaten army, baffled Augereau, and obliged him, although at the head of more than twenty thousand men, to abandon lower Catalonia, and retire to Gerona, with disgrace; a surprising change, yet one in which fortune had no share.

Augereau's talents for handling small corps in a battle have been recorded by a master hand.* There is a vast difference between that and conducting a campaign. But the truth is, that Catalonia had, like Aragon, been declared a particular government, and Augereau, afflicted with the gout, remained in the palace of Barcelona, affecting the state of a viceroy, when he should have been at the head of his troops in the field. On the other hand, his opponent, a hardy resolute man, excited by a sudden celebrity, was vigilant, indefatigable and eager; he merited the success he obtained, and, with better and more experienced troops, that success would have been infinitely greater. Yet, if the expedition to Valencia had not taken place, O'Donnell, distracted by a double attack, would have remained at Tarragona, and neither the action of Vich, nor the disasters at Mollet, Villa Franca and Esparaguera, would have taken place.

* Napoleon's Memoirs.

Napoleon, discontented, as he well might be, with these operations, sent Macdonald, Duke of Tarentum, to supersede Augereau; meantime, the latter, having reached Gerona, disposed his troops in the most commodious manner to cover the blockade of Hostalrich, giving Severoli the command.

FALL OF HOSTALRICH CASTLE.

This citadel had been invested early in January. Situated on a high rock, armed with forty guns, well garrisoned, and commanded by a brave man, it was nearly impregnable, and the French at first endeavored to reduce it by a simple blockade, but towards the middle of February, they commenced the erection of mortar batteries. Severoli also pressed the place more vigorously than before, and although O'Donnell, collecting convoys on the side of Vich and Mataro, caused the blockading troops to be attacked at several points by the Migueletes, every attempt to introduce supplies failed. The garrison was reduced to extremity, and honorable terms were offered, but the Governor, Julian Estrada, rejected them, and prepared to break through the enemy's line; an exploit always expected from a good garrison in Turenne's days, and, as Napoleon has shown by numerous examples, generally successful.*

O'Donnell, who could always communicate with the garrison, being aware of their intention, sent some vessels to Arenas de Mar, and made demonstrations from thence, and from the side of St. Celoni, to favor the enterprise; and in the night of the 12th, Estrada leaving his sick behind, came forth with about fourteen hundred men. He first made as if for St. Celoni, afterwards turning to his right he broke through on the side of St. Felieu de Buxalieu and pushed for Vich; but the French, closing rapidly from the right and left, pursued so closely, that Estrada himself was wounded and taken, together with about three hundred men, many were killed, the rest dispersed in the mountains, and eight hundred reached Vich in safety; this courageous action was therefore successful. Thus, after four months of blockade and ten weeks of bombardment, the castle fell, the line of communication with Barcelona was completed, and the errors committed by Duhesme were partly remedied, after two years of field operations, many battles, and four sieges.

Two small islands, called Las Medas, situated at the mouth of the Ter, and affording a safe anchorage, were next seized. This event, which facilitated the passage of the French vessels, stealing from port to port with provisions or despatches, finished Augereau's career. It had been the very reverse of St. Cyr's. The latter,

* Napoleon's Memoirs.

victorious in the field, was humane afterwards; but Augereau, endeavoring to frighten those people into submission whom he had failed to beat, erected gibbets along the high-roads, upon which every man taken in arms was hung up without remorse, which cruelty produced precisely the effect that might be expected.* The Catalans, more animated by their successes than daunted by this barbarous severity, became incredibly savage in their revenge, and thus, all human feeling lost, both parties were alike steeped in blood and loaded with crimes.

CHAPTER III.

Suchet marches against Lerida—Description of that fortress—Suchet marches to Tarega—O'Donnell advances from Tarragona—Suchet returns to Balaguer—Combat of Margalef—Siege of Lerida—The city stormed—Suchet drives the inhabitants into the citadel, and thus forces it to surrender.

WHILE Augereau lost, in Barcelona, the fruits of his success at Gerona, Suchet, sensible how injurious the expedition to Valencia had proved, was diligently repairing that error. Reinforcements from France had raised his fighting men to about twenty-three thousand, and of these he drew out thirteen thousand to form the siege of Lerida; the remainder were required to maintain the forts in Aragon, and to hold in check the partisans, principally in the higher valleys of the Pyrenees. Villa Campa, however, with from three to four thousand men, still kept about the lordship of Molina, and the mountains of Albaracin.

Two lines of operation were open to Suchet: the one, short and direct, by the high road leading from Zaragoza through Fraga to Lerida; the other, circuitous, over the Sierra de Alcubierre, to Monzon, and from thence to Lerida. The first was inconvenient, because the Spaniards, when they took Fraga, destroyed the bridge over the Cinca. Moreover, the fortress of Mequinenza, the Octogesa of Cæsar, situated at the confluence of the Segre and Ebro, was close on the right flank, and might seriously incommode the communications with Zaragoza, whereas the second route, although longer, was safer, and less exhausted of forage and provisions.

Monzon was already a considerable military establishment; the battering train, consisting of forty pieces, with seven hundred rounds of ammunition attached to each, was directed there, and placed

* *Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.*

under the guard of Habert's division, which occupied the line of the Cinca. Leval, leaving General Chlopiski with a brigade at Daroca, to observe Villa Campa, drew nearer to Zaragoza with the rest of his division. Musnier marched with one brigade to Alcañitz, and was there joined by his second brigade, which had been conducted to that point, from Teruel, across the Sierra de Gudar. And while these movements were executing, the castles of Barbastro, Huesca, Ayerbe, Zuera, Pina, Bujarola, and other points on the left of the Ebro, were occupied by detachments.

The right bank of that river being guarded by Leval's division, and the country on the left bank secured by a number of fortified posts, there remained two divisions of infantry, and about nine hundred cavalry, disposable for the operations against Lerida. On the Spanish side, Campo Verde was with O'Donnell at Manresa, Garcia Novarro was at Tarragona, having small detachments on the right bank of the Ebro to cover Tortosa; Pereña with five battalions occupied Balaguer on the upper Segre.

Such were the relative situations of both parties, when General Musnier, quitting Alcañitz towards the end of March, crossed the Guadalupe, drove Novarro's detachments within the walls of Tortosa, and then remounting the Ebro, seized some boats, and passing that river at Mora and at Flix, communicated, as I have before related, with Colonel Villatte of the seventh corps. While this was passing on the Ebro, General Habert crossed the Cinca in two columns, one of which moved straight upon Balaguer, while the other passed the Segre at Camarasa. Pereña, fearing to be attacked on both sides of that river, and not wishing to defend Balaguer, retired down the left bank, and using the Lerida bridge, remounted the right bank to Corbins, where he took post behind the Noguerra, at its confluence with the Segre.

Suchet himself, having repaired to Monzon the 10th of April, placed a detachment at Candasnos to cover his establishments from the garrison of Mequinenza, and the 13th advanced with a brigade of infantry, and all his cavalry, by Almacellas, against Lerida; meanwhile Habert, descending the right bank of the Segre, forced the passage of Noguerra, and obliged Pereña to retire within the place. The same day Musnier came up from Flix, and the town being thus encompassed, the operations of the seventh and third corps were connected. Suchet's line of operations from Aragon was short, direct, and easy to supply, because the produce of that province was greater than the consumption. Augereau's line was long and unsafe, and the produce of Catalonia was at no time equal to the consumption.

Lerida contained about eighteen thousand inhabitants. Situated

upon the high road from Zaragoza to Barcelona, and about sixty-five miles from each, it possessed a stone bridge over the Segre, and was only a short distance from the Ebro and the Cinca rivers; its strategic importance was therefore great, and the more so, that it in a manner commanded the plain of Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia. The regular governor was named Gonzalez, but Garcia Conde had been appointed chief commandant, to appease his discontent at O'Donnell's elevation; and the troops he brought with him had increased the garrison to nine thousand regulars, besides the armed inhabitants.

The river Segre covered the town on the south-east, and the head of the bridge was protected on the left bank, by a rampart and ditch inclosing a square stone building. The body of the place on the north side was defended by a wall, without either ditch or covered way, but strengthened and flanked by bastions, and by towers. This wall on the east was joined to a rocky hill more than two hundred and fifty feet high, the top of which sustained the citadel, which was an assemblage of huge solid edifices, clustered about a castle of great height, and surrounded by an irregular work flanked by good bastions with ramparts from forty to fifty feet high.

The descent from the citadel into the town was gentle, and the works were there strengthened by ditches; on the other parts, the walls could be seen to their base; yet the great height of the rock rendered it impossible to breach them, and the approaches were nearly inaccessible. Between the citadel-rock and the river, the town was squeezed out about two or three hundred yards, and the salient part was secured by an intrenchment, and by two bastions called the Carmen and the Magdalen.

To the westward of the town, at the distance of seven or eight hundred yards, the hill, on which Afranius and Petreius encamped to oppose Cæsar, was crowned, on the end next to Lerida, by Fort Garden, which was again covered by a large horn-work with ditches above twenty feet deep; and at the farthest extremity of the Afranian hill, two large redoubts called the Pilar and San Fernando secured the whole of the flat summit. All the works of Lerida were in good condition, and armed with more than one hundred pieces of artillery, the magazines were full, and the people enthusiastic. A local Junta also had been formed to excite public feeling, and two officers of artillery had already been murdered and their heads nailed to the gates of the town.

The siege was to be a joint operation by the third and seventh corps, but the information derived from Colonel Villatte, and the appearance of Spanish partisans on the lower Ebro, led Suchet to

suspect that the seventh corps had already retired, and that the burthen would rest on him alone, wherefore he still kept his battering train at Monzon, intending to wait until O'Donnell's plans should be clearly indicated, before he commenced the siege. Meanwhile, he established a communication across the Segre, by means of a rope ferry, one league above Lerida, and after closely examining the defences, prepared materials for the construction of batteries. Two battalions of the investing troops had been left at Monzon and Balaguer; the remainder were thus distributed: On the left bank of the Segre, at Alcoteletge, four thousand men, including the cavalry, which was composed of a regiment of cuirassiers and one of hussars, were stationed as a corps of observation; Harispe, with three battalions, invested the bridge-head of Lerida. By this disposition, the ferry-boat was protected, and all danger from the sudden rising of the Segre obviated, because the stone bridge of Balaguer furnished a certain communication. The rest of the troops occupied different positions, on the roads to Monzon, Fraga, and Corbins, but as the number was insufficient to complete the circle of investment round Fort Garden, that part was continually scoured by patrols.

Scarcely were these arrangements completed when a Spanish officer, pretending to bear propositions for an exchange of prisoners, was stopped on the left bank of the Segre, and the French General detained him, suspecting his real object was to gain information; for there were rumors that O'Donnell was collecting troops at Momblanch, that Campo Verde was at Cervera, and that the Somatenes of the high valleys were in arms on the upper Segre. Suchet, anxious to ascertain the truth of these reports, reinforced Harispe with three hundred hussars on the 19th of April, and carried the corps of observation to Balaguer. The Governor of Lerida took that opportunity to make a sally, but was repulsed, and the 21st, the French General, to strengthen his position at Balaguer, caused the bridge of Camarasa, above that town, to be broken, and then advanced as far as Tarrega, forty miles on the road to Barcelona, to obtain intelligence; for he was still uncertain of Augereau's movements, and like every other general, French or English, found it extremely difficult to procure authentic information. On this occasion, however, by a happy fortune, he ascertained that O'Donnell, with two divisions, was at Momblanch, ready to descend the mountains and succor Lerida; wherefore, returning by one forced march to Balaguer, he directed Musnier to resume his former position at Alcoteletge.

This rapidity was well-timed, for O'Donnell had passed the defiles of Momblanch, with eight thousand chosen infantry and six hun

dred cavalry, and was encamped at Vinaxa, about twenty-five miles from Lerida, on the 22d, when a note from Garcia Conde, saying that, the French reserve being drawn off, the investing force was weak, reached him. Being willing to seize the favorable moment, he immediately pushed forward, reached Juneda, fourteen miles from Lerida, by ten o'clock in the morning of the 23d, and, after a halt of two hours, resumed his march with the cavalry and one division of infantry, leaving the other to follow more leisurely.

COMBAT OF MARGALEF.

Four miles from Juneda stood the ruined village of Margalef, and from thence to Lerida was an open country, on which O'Donnell could perceive no covering force; hence, trusting implicitly to Conde's information, (already falsified by Suchet's activity,) the Spanish General descended the hills, and crossed the plain in three columns, one following the high road and the other two marching on the right and left. The centre, outstripping the flankers, soon beat back the advanced posts of Harispe; but that General charged with his three hundred hussars upon the centre Spanish column, so suddenly, that it was thrown into confusion, and fled towards Margalef, to which place the flank columns also retreated, yet in good order. During this skirmish, the garrison sallied over the bridge, but as the French infantry stood firm, the besieged, seeing the rout of O'Donnell's people, returned to the town.

Meanwhile, Musnier, hearing the firing, guessed the real state of affairs, and marched at once with his infantry and four hundred cuirassiers from Alcoteletge across the plain towards Margalef, hoping to cut off the Spaniards' retreat. O'Donnell, who had rallied his troops, was already in line of battle, having the artillery on the right and the cavalry on the left, but his second division was still in the rear. The French cuirassiers and a battery of light artillery came up at a quick pace, a cannonade commenced, and the Spanish cavalry rode forward, when the French cuirassiers, commanded by General Boussard, charged hotly, and forced them back on the line of battle in such a manner that the latter wavered, and Boussard, observing the confusion, came with a rude shock upon the flank of the infantry. The Walloon guards made a vain effort to form square, but the confusion was extreme, and finally nearly all the Spanish infantry threw down their arms or were sabred. The cuirassiers, elated with their success, then met and overthrew a Swiss regiment, forming the advanced guard of the second Spanish division; yet the main body of the latter checked their fury, and O'Donnell retreated in good order and without further loss to the defile of Momblanch. This action, although not discreditable to

O'Donnell, was very unfortunate. The plain was strewed with carcasses; three Spanish guns, one general, eight colonels, and above five thousand men were captured; and the next day the prisoners, being first ostentatiously marched under the walls of the town, were shown to the Spanish officer who had been detained on the 19th, after which he was dismissed by the road of Cervera, that he might spread the news of the defeat.

Suchet, wishing to profit from the effect of this victory upon the besieged, attempted the night after the battle to storm the redoubts of San Fernando and Pilar. He was successful with the latter, and the assailants descended into the ditch of San Fernando, and as the Spaniards, only fifty in number and unprovided with hand grenades, could not drive them away, a parley ensued, when it was agreed that the French should retire without being molested. Thus the Pilar was also saved, for, being commanded by San Fernando, it was necessarily evacuated. Previous to this attempt, Suchet had summoned the city to surrender, offering safe conduct for commissioners to count the dead on the field of Margalef, and to review the prisoners; but Garcia Conde replied, "*that Lerida had never looked for external succor in her defences.*"

SIEGE OF LERIDA.

The absolute retreat of Augereau was now fully ascertained, yet the victory of Margalef, and the apathy of the Valencians, encouraged Suchet to commence the siege in form. The prisoners were sent to France by the way of Jaca, the battering train was brought up from Monzon, and all the other necessary preparations being completed, the Spanish outposts were driven within the walls between the 26th and 27th. The following night, under the direction of General Haxo, ground was broken three hundred yards from the bastions of the Carmen and Magdalen; the Spaniards threw some fire-balls, and opened a few guns, without interrupting the workmen, and when day broke, the besiegers were well covered in the trenches.

In the night of the 30th the first parallel was completed. Breaching and counter batteries were commenced, six sixteen-pounders were destined to batter the left face of the Carmen, four long twelve-pounders to ruin the defences of the Magdalen, and four mortars of eight inches to throw shells into the citadel. The weather was rainy and the labor heavy, yet the works advanced rapidly, and on the 2d of May, a fourth battery, armed with two mortars and two sixteen-pounders, was raised against the Carmen. Meanwhile the Spanish musketeers incommoded the trenches from

the left bank of the Segre, which obliged the French to contract the circle of investment on that side.

In the evening of the 4th, six hundred Spaniards, sallying from the Carmen, carried the fourth battery and all the left of the trenches, while another body, coming from the Magdalen, menaced the right of the French works. The French guards held the latter in check, and the reserves finally drove the former back into the town; but after this attack, a ditch and rampart, to serve as a place of arms, was carried from the battery which had been taken down to the river; and as the light troops still continued to ply the trenches from the other side of the Segre, ground was broken there, close to the water, and a battery of two guns was constructed to answer six Spanish field-pieces, posted on the bridge itself. The parallel of the main attack was also extended on the right, embracing a part of the northern front of the citadel, and two mortars were placed at this extremity.

All the French batteries opened at daybreak on the 7th, the mortars played into the town and citadel, and four Spanish guns were dismounted in the Carmen. Nevertheless, the counter fire silenced three French batteries, the dismounted guns were replaced, and three hundred men, stealing out at dusk by the Puerta Nueva, fell upon the right of the parallels, took the two mortars, and penetrated as far as the approaches against the Magdalen. This sally was repulsed by the French reserves, but they suffered from the Spanish guns in the pursuit, and in the night a violent storm, with rain, damaged the batteries and overflowed the trenches. From the 8th to the 11th the besiegers labored at their works, and opened a second parallel one hundred and fifty yards in advance of the first, with the intention of forming fresh batteries, that, being closer under the citadel-rock, would be less exposed to its plunging fire. More guns, and of a larger size, were also mounted; three new batteries were constructed, and marksmen were planted to harass the Spanish cannoneers.

On the 12th the fire recommenced from eight batteries, containing fifteen guns and nineteen mortars. The besieged replied at first sharply, but in a little time stammered in their answers, the French artillery took the ascendant, the walls of the Carmen and Magdalen crumbled under their salvos, and a portable magazine blew up in the citadel. Towards evening two breaches in the Carmen, and one in the Magdalen, appeared practicable, and after dark, some Swiss deserters coming out through the openings, brought intelligence that the streets of the town behind the breaches were retrenched and defended by batteries.

Suchet's hopes of an early termination to the siege now rose high.

He had from the first supposed that the vehemence of the citizens, and of the armed peasantry who had entered the place, would oblige the governor to fight the town to the last, instead of reserving his efforts for the defence of the citadel. He knew that armed mobs, easily excited, are as easily discouraged, and he projected to carry the breaches briskly, and with one sweep, to force all the inhabitants into the citadel, being well assured that they would hamper, if not entirely mar, the defence of that formidable fortress; but he resolved first to carry the forts of San Fernando and the Pilar and the horn-work of Fort Garden, lest the citizens, flying from the assault of the breaches, should take refuge on that side. To effect this, three columns, provided with ladders and other necessary implements, simultaneously mounted the hill of Afranius that night; one marched against the redoubts, and the others were ordered to storm the horn-work on two sides. The Pilar was carried without difficulty, and the garrison flying towards Fort Garden, fell in with the second French column, which arrived with the fugitives at the ditch of the horn-work, and being there joined by the third column, which had taken a wrong direction, the whole mass entered the place fighting. The Spaniards saved themselves in Fort Garden, but meanwhile the people in Fernando resisted desperately, and that redoubt was not taken until two-thirds of the defendants were put to the sword. Thus the French effected their object with the loss of a hundred men.

During this operation the great batteries played into the citadel only, but, at daybreak, renewed their fire on the breaches; steps were also cut in the parallel, to facilitate the advance of the troops to the assault; and all the materials, necessary to effect a solid lodgment on the walls, were conveyed into the trenches. These arrangements being completed at seven o'clock in the evening of the 13th, the signal was made, and four storming parties jumped out of the trenches; two made for the Carmen, one against the Magdalen, and one moved close by the river, and the Spaniards being at this moment preparing a sally to retake the horn-work of Fort Garden, did so little expect this assault, that they suffered the French to mount the breaches without opposition; but then rallying, poured such a fire of musketry and artillery upon the heads of the principal columns, that the latter staggered and would have yielded if Habert had not revived their courage, and led them into the town, at the very moment that the troops on the right and left, having also forced their way, turned all the retrinchments in the streets. On the other side of the river, General Harispe carried the bridge, and Suchet himself, with the reserve, followed close upon the steps of the storming parties; the Spaniards were thus

overpowered, and the regular troops commenced a retreat into the citadel.

It was now that the French General put his design into execution.* Harispe's brigade, passing the bridge, made for the gate of St. Anthony, looking towards Fort Garden, and thus cut off all egress from the town; this done, the French columns advanced from every side, in a concentric direction, upon the citadel, and, with shouts, and stabs, and musketry, drove men, women and children before them, while the guns of the castle smote friends and foes alike. Then flying up the ascent, the shrieking and terrified crowds rushed into the fortress with the retiring garrison, and crowded on the summit of the rock; but all that night, the French shells fell amongst the hapless multitude, and, at daylight, the fire was redoubled, and the carnage swelled, until Garcia Conde, overpowered by the cries and sufferings of the miserable people, hoisted the white flag. At twelve o'clock, the horrible scene terminated. The capitulation that followed was honorable in terms to the besieged, but Fort Garden being included, Suchet became master of Lerida, with its immense stores and near eight thousand prisoners, for the whole loss of the garrison had been only twelve hundred men.

Thus suddenly was this powerful fortress reduced, by a proceeding, politic indeed, but scarcely to be admitted within the pale of civilized warfare. For, though a town taken by assault be considered the lawful prey of a licentious soldiery, this remnant of barbarism, disgracing the military profession, does not warrant the driving of unarmed helpless people into a situation where they must perish from the fire of the enemy, unless the governor fail in his duty. Suchet justifies it, on the ground that he thus spared a great effusion of blood which must necessarily have attended a protracted siege, and the fact is true. But this is to spare soldiers' blood at the expense of women's and children's, and, had Garcia Conde's nature been stern, he, too, might have pleaded expediency, and the victory would have fallen to him who could longest have sustained the sight of mangled infants and despairing mothers.

* Suchet's Memoirs.

CHAPTER IV.

Reflections on that act—Lazan enters Alcañitz, but is driven out by the French—Colonel Petit taken with a convoy by Villa Campa, and assassinated after the action—Siege of Mequinenza—Fall of that place—Morella taken—Suchet prepares to enter Catalonia—Strength and resources of that province.

WHEN Lerida fell, Conde was accused of treachery, but there seems no foundation for the charge; the cause stated by Suchet was sufficient for the effect; yet the defence was very unskilful. The walls on the side of the attack could not be expected to, and scarcely did, offer an impediment to the French General; hence the citadel should have been the better prepared, and, as the besiegers' force, the corps of observation being deducted, did not exceed the garrison in number, it might have baffled Suchet's utmost efforts. Engineers require that the relative strength of besiegers and besieged should not be less than four to one; yet here, the French invested a force equal to themselves, and in a short time reduced a great fortress in the midst of succoring armies: for Lerida had communications, 1. With the armed population of the high valleys; 2. With O'Donnell's corps of fourteen thousand; 3. With Cervera, where Campo Verde was posted with four thousand men; 4. With Tortosa, where the Marquis of Lazan, now released from his imprisonment, commanded from five to six thousand; 5. With Valencia, in which province there was a disposable army of fifteen thousand regular and more than thirty thousand irregular soldiers.

It is evident that if all these forces had been directed with skill and concert upon Lerida, not only the siege would have been raised, but the very safety of the third corps endangered; and it was to obviate this danger that Napoleon directed the seventh corps to take such a position on the lower Ebro as would keep both O'Donnell and the Valencians in check. Augereau, as we have seen, failed to do this; and St. Cyr asserts that the seventh corps could never safely venture to pass the mountains and enter the valley of the Ebro. On the other hand, Suchet affirms that Napoleon's instructions could have been obeyed without difficulty. St. Cyr himself, under somewhat similar circumstances, blockaded Tarragona for a month; Augereau, who had more troops and fewer enemies, might have done the same, and yet spared six thousand men to pass the mountains; Suchet would then have been tranquil with respect to O'Donnell, would have had a covering army to protect

the siege, and the succors, fed from the resources of Aragon, would have relieved Catalonia.

Augereau has been justified on the ground that the blockade of Hostalrich would have been raised while he was on the Ebro. The danger of this could not have escaped the Emperor, yet his military judgment, unerring in principle, was often false in application, because men measure difficulties by the standard of their own capacity, and Napoleon's standard only suited the heroic proportions. One thing is however certain, that Catalonia presented the most extraordinary difficulties to the invaders. The powerful military organization of the Migueletes and Somatenes,—the well-arranged system of fortresses,—the ruggedness and sterility of the country,—the ingenuity and readiness of a manufacturing population thrown out of work, and, finally, the aid of an English fleet, combined to render the conquest of this province a gigantic task. Nevertheless, the French made progress; each step planted, slowly indeed, and with pain, but firmly, and insuring the power of making another.

Hostalrich and Lerida fell on the same day. The acquisition of the first consolidated the French line of communication with Barcelona; and, by the capture of the second, Suchet obtained large magazines, stores of powder, ten thousand muskets, the command of several dangerous rivers, easy access to the higher valleys, and a firm footing in the midst of the Catalonian strongholds; and he had taken or killed fifteen thousand Spanish soldiers. Yet this was but the prelude to greater struggles. The Migueletes supplied O'Donnell with abundance of men, and neither his courage nor his abilities were at fault. Urgel, Cardona, Berga, Cervera, Mequinenza, Tarragona, San Felipe, Balaguer, and Tortosa, the link of connection between Valencia and Catalonia, were still to be subdued, and, during every great operation, the partisans being unmolested, recovered strength. Thus during the siege of Lerida, the Marquis of Lazan entered the town of Alcañitz with five thousand men, and would have carried the castle, but that General Laval despatched two thousand men from Zaragoza to its succor, when the Spaniards, after a skirmish in the streets, retired; and, while this was passing at Alcañitz, Villa Campa intercepted four hundred men conducting a convoy of provisions from Calatayud to Zaragoza. Colonel Petit, the commander, being attacked in the defile of Frasnó, was forced to abandon his convoy, and, under a continued fire, to fight his way for ten miles, until his detachment, reduced to one hundred and eighty wounded men, passed the Xalon river, and at the village of Arandiza finally repulsed the assailants. The remainder of this desperate band were taken or killed, and Petit

himself, wounded, a prisoner, and sitting in the midst of several Spanish officers, was basely murdered the evening after the action. Villa Campa put the assassin to death, but at the same time suffered the troops to burn alive an old man, the Alcalde of Frasnó, who was taken among the French.

This action happened the day Lerida fell, and the next day Chlopiski, following Villa Campa's march from Daroca, reached Frasnó, but the Spaniards were no longer there; Chlopiski, then dividing his forces, pursued them by the routes of Calatayud and Xarava to Molina, where he destroyed a manufactory for arms, and so pressed the Spanish General that his troops disbanded, and several hundred retired to their homes. At the same time, an attack made from the side of Navarre, on the garrison of Ayerbe, was repulsed.

These petty events, while they evinced the perseverance of the Spaniards, proved also the stability of Suchet's power in Aragon. His system was gradually sapping the spirit of resistance in that province. In Lerida his conduct was as gentle and moderate as the nature of this unjust war would permit; and however questionable the morality of the proceeding by which he reduced the citadel, it must be acknowledged that his situation required most decided measures, for the retreat of the seventh corps set free not only O'Donnell's army, but Campo Verde's and all the irregular bands. The Somatenes of the high valleys appeared in force on the upper Segre the very day of the assault; eight hundred Migueletes attacked Venasque three days after, and Campo Verde, marching from Cervera by Aramunt, took post in the mountains of Lliniana, above Talarn and Tremp, where great bodies of the Somatenes also assembled.

Their plans were disconcerted by the sudden fall of Lerida; the Migueletes were repulsed from Venasque; the Somatenes defeated at Tremp; and General Habert, marching from Balaguer, cut off Campo Verde from Cervera, and forced him to retreat upon Cardona. If the citadel of Lerida had held out, and O'Donnell, less hasty, had combined his march at a later period with these Somatenes and with Campo Verde, the third corps could scarcely have escaped a disaster; whereas, now the plain of Urgel and all the fertile valleys opening upon Lerida fell to the French, and Suchet, after taking measures to secure them, turned his arms against Mequinenza. This place, situated at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, just where the latter begins to be navigable, was the key to further operations. The French General could not advance in force against Tortosa, nor avail himself of the water-carriage, until Mequinenza should fall; and such was his activity

that one detachment, sent the day after the assault of Lerida, by the left bank of the Segre, was already before the place; and Musnier's division, descending the right bank of that river, drove in some of the outposts and commenced the investment on the 20th of May.

Mequinenza, built on an elbow of land formed by the meeting of the Segre and Ebro, was fortified by an old Moorish wall, and strengthened by modern batteries, especially on the Fraga road, the only route by which artillery could approach. A shoot from the Sierra de Alcubierre filled the space between the two rivers, and narrowing as they closed, ended in a craggy rock, seven hundred feet high and overhanging the town, which was built between its base and the water. This rock was crowned by a castle, with a rampart, which being inaccessible on two sides from the steepness, and covered on a third by the town, could only be assailed, on the fourth, along a high neck of land, three hundred yards wide, that joined the rock to the parent hills: and the rampart on that side was bastioned, lined with masonry, and protected by a ditch, counterscarp, and covered way with palisades. No guns could be brought against the castle, until the country people, employed by Suchet, had opened a way from Torriente, over the hills, and this occupied the engineers until the 1st of June; and meanwhile the brigade, which had defeated Lazan at Alcañitz, arrived on the right bank of the Ebro, and completed the investment. The 30th of May, General Rogniat, coming from France, with a reinforcement of engineer-officers, and several companies of sappers and miners, also reached the camp, when, taking the direction of the works, he contracted the circle of investment, and commenced active operations.

SIEGE OF MEQUINENZA.

The Spaniards made an ineffectual sally the 31st;* and, the 2d of June, the French artillery, consisting of eighteen pieces, of which six were twenty-four pounders, being brought over the hills, the advanced posts of the Spaniards were driven into the castle. During the night, ground was broken two hundred yards from the place, under a destructive fire of grape, and while this was passing on the height, approaches were made against the town, in the narrow space between the Ebro and the foot of the rock. Strong infantry posts were also intrenched, close to the water, on the right bank of that river, to prevent the navigation, but of eleven boats freighted with inhabitants and their property, nine effected their escape.

In the night of the 3d the parallels on the rock were per-

* Plan 7, p. 201.

fect, the breaching-batteries were commenced, and parapets of sand-bags were raised, from behind which the French infantry plied the embrasures of the castle with musketry; the works against the town were also advanced, but in both places, the nature of the ground greatly impeded the operations. The trenches above, being in a rocky soil, were opened chiefly by blasting; those below were in a space too narrow for batteries, and, moreover, searched by a plunging fire, both from the castle, and from a gun mounted on a high tower in the town wall. The troops on the right bank of the Ebro, however, opened their musketry with such effect on the wall, that the garrison could not stop, and both the wall and tower were then escaladed without difficulty, the Spaniards all retiring to the castle. The French placed a battalion in the houses, and put those next the rock in a state of defence; and although the garrison of the castle rolled down large stones from above, they killed more of the inhabitants than of the enemy.

The 6th, the French batteries on the rock, three in number, were completed; and, in the night, forty grenadiers carried by storm a small outwork called the horse-shoe. The 7th, Suchet, who had been at Zaragoza, arrived in the camp, and on the 8th, sixteen pieces of artillery, of which four were mortars, opened on the castle. The Spaniards answered with such vigor, that three French guns were dismounted, yet the besiegers acquired the superiority, and at nine o'clock in the morning, the place was nearly silenced, and the rampart broken in two places. The Spaniards endeavored to keep up the defence with musketry, while they mounted fresh guns, but the interior of the castle was so severely searched by the bombardment, that, at ten o'clock, the governor capitulated. Fourteen hundred men became prisoners of war; forty-five guns, and large stores of powder and of cast iron were captured, and provisions for three months were found in the magazines.

Two hours after the fall of Mequinenza, General Mont-Marie, commanding the troops on the right bank of the Ebro, marched against Morella, in the kingdom of Valencia, and took it on the 13th of June; for the Spaniards, with a wonderful negligence, had left that important fort, commanding one of the principal entrances into the kingdom of Valencia, without arms or a garrison. When it was lost, General O'Donoju, with a division of the Valencian army, advanced to retake it, but Mont-Marie defeated him. The works were then repaired, and Morella became a strong and important place of arms.

By these rapid and successful operations Suchet secured, 1. A fortified frontier against the regular armies of Catalonia and Valencia; 2. Solid bases for offensive operations, and free entrance

to those provinces; 3. The command of several fertile tracts of country and of the navigation of the Ebro; 4. The co-operation of the seventh corps, which, by the fall of Lerida, could safely engage beyond the Llobregat. But, to effect the complete subjugation of Catalonia, it was necessary to cut off its communications by land with Valencia, and to destroy O'Donnell's base. The first could only be effected by taking Tortosa, the second by capturing Tarragona. Hence the immediate sieges of those two great places, the one by the third, and the other by the seventh corps, were ordered by the Emperor.

Suchet was ready to commence his part, but many and great obstacles arose: the difficulty of obtaining provisions in the eastern region of Catalonia was increased by O'Donnell's measures, and that General, still commanding above twenty thousand men, was neither daunted by past defeats, nor insensible to the advantages of his position. His harsh manners and stern sway rendered him hateful to the people; but he was watchful to confirm the courage and excite the enthusiasm of his troops, by conferring rewards and honors on the field of battle, and, being of singular intrepidity himself, his exhortations had more effect. Two years of incessant warfare had also formed several good officers, and the full strength and importance of every position and town were, by dint of experience, becoming known. With these helps O'Donnell long prevented the siege of Tortosa, and found full employment for the enemy during the remainder of the year. Nevertheless, the conquest of Catalonia advanced, and the fortified places fell one after another, each serving, by its fall, to strengthen the hold of the French, in the same proportion that it had before impeded their progress.

The foundations of military power were, however, deeply cast in Catalonia. There the greatest efforts were made by the Spaniards, and ten thousand British soldiers, hovering on the coast, ready to land on the rear of the French, or to join the Catalans in an action, could at any period of 1809 and 1810 have paralyzed the operations of the seventh corps, and saved Gerona, Hostalrich, Tortosa, Tarragona, and even Lerida. While those places were in the hands of the Spaniards and their hopes were high, English troops from Sicily were reducing the Ionian islands or loitering on the coast of Italy; but when all the fortresses of Catalonia had fallen, when the regular armies were nearly destroyed, and when the people were worn out with suffering, a British army which could have been beneficially employed elsewhere, appeared, as if in scorn of common sense, on the eastern coast of Spain. Notwithstanding the many years of hostility with France, the English ministers were still ignorant of every military principle, and yet too arro-

gant to ask advice of professional men; for it was not until after the death of Mr. Perceval, and when the decisive victory of Salamanca showed the giant in his full proportions, that even Wellington himself was permitted the free exercise of his judgment, although he was more than once reminded by Mr. Perceval, whose narrow views continually clogged the operations, that the whole responsibility of failure would rest on his head.

CHAPTER V.

Operations in Andalusia—Blockade of Cadiz—Desertions in that city—Regency formed—Albuquerque sent to England—Dies there—Regency consent to admit British troops—General Colin Campbell obtains leave to put a garrison in Ceuta, and to destroy the Spanish lines at San Roque—General William Stewart arrives at Cadiz—Seizes Matagorda—Tempest destroys many vessels—Mr. Henry Wellesley and General Graham arrive at Cadiz—Apathy of the Spaniards—Gallant defence of Matagorda—Heroic conduct of a sergeant's wife—General Campbell sends a detachment to occupy Tarifa—French prisoners cut the cables of the prison-hulks, and drift during a tempest—General Lacy's expedition to the Ronda—His bad conduct—Returns to Cadiz—Reflections on the state of affairs.

SUCHET's preparations equally menaced Valencia and Catalonia, and the authorities in the former province, perceiving, although too late, that an exclusive and selfish policy would finally bring the enemy to their own doors, resolved to co-operate with the Catalonians, while the Murcians, now under the direction of Blake, waged war on the side of Granada, and made excursions against the fourth corps. The acts of the Valencians shall be treated of when the course of the history leads me back to Catalonia; those of the Murcian army belong to the

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

During the month of February, the first corps was before Cadiz, the fourth in Granada, Dessolles' division at Cordoba, Jaen, and Ubeda, and the fifth corps (with the exception of six battalions and some horse left at Seville) in Estremadura. The King, accompanied by Marshal Soult, moved with his guards and a brigade of cavalry to different points, and received from all the great towns assurances of their adhesion to his cause. But as the necessities of the army demanded immediate and heavy contributions, both of money and provisions, movable columns were employed to collect them, especially for the fourth corps, and with so little attention to discipline as soon to verify the observation of St. Cyr, that they