patched Colonel Murray to Lisbon, with directions to inform Junot of the Admiral's objection, and to give notice of the consequent rupture of the armistice, Murray himself being provided, however, with full powers to enter into and conclude a definitive treaty upon a fresh basis. The army was, at the same time, pushed forward to Ramalhal, and Sir J. Moore's troops were landed at Maceira Bay, but the order to repair to that place did not reach them until several regiments had been disembarked in the Mondego;* the re-shipping of these, together with contrary winds, had caused a delay of four days, and at Maceira great difficulty and some loss was sustained in getting on shore, an operation only effected by five days of incessant exertion on the part of the navy; the boats were constantly swamped by the surf, and such was its fury that not more than thirty remained fit for service at the conclusion.

On the 27th, information was received from Colonel Murray that a fresh treaty was in agitation upon an admissible basis; and the next day the army took a new position, a part occupying Torres Vedras, and the remainder being placed in the rear of that town. Meanwhile, in Lisbon, the agitation of the public mind was excessively great; hope and fear were magnified by the obscurity of affairs, and the contradictory news which was spread by the French, and by those who held communication with the country, had increased the anxious feeling of joy or grief almost to phrenzy. Junot made every effort to engage Admiral Siniavin in the negotiation, and the necessity by which the latter was forced to put his ships in a hostile and guarded attitude, contributed powerfully to control the populace, and give strength to an opinion industriously spread, that he would make common cause with the French. Nevertheless Siniavin had no intention of this kind, and very early gave notice that he would treat separately; wherefore the French, being thus left to themselves, had no resource but their own dexterity, and brought all the ordinary machinery of diplomatic subtlety into play. Among other schemes, Junot opened a separate communication with Sir Hew Dalrymple at the moment when Colonel Murray, invested with full powers, was engaged in daily conferences with Kellermann; and the difficulty of coming to a conclusion was much increased by the natural sources of suspicion and jealousy incident to such a singular transaction, where two foreign nations were seen bargaining, and one of them honestly bargaining, for the goods and interests of a third, yet scarcely hinting even at the existence of the latter. The French being the weakest, were most subtle, and to protect the vital questions advanced extravagant claims; on the other hand, the Portuguese leaders, no longer fearing a defeat, pro-

* Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

tested against the convention, passed the line of demarcation, attacked the French patrols, and menaced an attack from the side of Santarem. This movement, and the breach of faith in attacking the patrols, were promptly and distinctly disavowed by Sir Hew; yet they kept suspicion awake, and the mutual misunderstandings arose at last to such a height, that Junot, seeming for a moment to recover all his natural energy, threatened to burn the public establishments, and make his retreat good at the expense of the city; a menace which nothing could have prevented him from executing. Finally, however, a definitive treaty was concluded at Lisbon on the 30th, and soon afterwards ratified in form.

This celebrated convention, improperly called "of Cintra," consisted of twenty-two original, and three supplementary articles, upon the expediency of many of which Sir Arthur Wellesley and the commander-in-chief disagreed; but as their disagreement had reference to the details and not to the general principle, the historical importance is not sufficient to call for remark. An informality on the part of Junot caused some delay in the ratification of the instrument; the British army marched notwithstanding to take up the position near Lisbon, assigned to it by the 11th article of the treaty, and on the march, Sir Hew Dalrymple met two Russian officers, who were charged to open a separate negotiation for the Russian squadron; he, however, refused to receive their credentials, and referred them to Sir Charles Cotton. Thus baffled in an attempt to carry on a double treaty, for a naval one was already commenced, Siniavin, whose conduct appears to have been weak, was forced to come to a conclusion with the English Admiral. At first he claimed the protection of a neutral port, but as singly he possessed none of that weight which circumstances had given him before the convention with Junot, his claim was answered by an intimation that a British flag was flying on the forts at the mouth of the Tagus; and this was true, for the third and forty-second regiments, under the command of Major-General Beresford, having landed and taken possession of them, in virtue of the convention, the British colors were improperly hoisted instead of the Portuguese. Foiled again by this proceeding, the justice of which is somewhat doubtful, Siniavin finally agreed to surrender upon the following terms:

1. The Russian ships, with their sails, stores, &c., were to be held by England, as a deposit, until six months after the conclusion of a peace between the two governments of the contracting parties.

2. The Admiral, officers, and seamen, without any restriction as to their future services, were to be transported to Russia at the expense of the British government.

But two additional articles were, subsequently to the ratification of the original treaty, proposed by the Russians, and assented to by the English Admiral. The first stipulated that the imperial flag should be displayed, even in the British harbors, as long as the Russian Admiral remained on board. The second provided that the ships themselves and their stores should be delivered again at the appointed time, in the same state as when surrendered. The rights of the Portuguese were not referred to, but Sir Charles Cotton was justified by his instructions, which authorized him to make prize of the Russian fleet.* Siniavin thus suffered all the inconvenience of hostilities, and the shame of striking his colors, without having violated in any manner the relations of amity in which his nation stood with regard to Portugal. On the other hand, for the sake of a few old and decaying ships, the British government made an injudicious display of contempt for the independence of their ally, because, with singular inconsistency, they permitted the officers and crews, the real strength of the squadron, to return to the Baltic, although scarcely a year had elapsed since the national character was defiled in that quarter, to suppress a navy inimical to Great Britain. This inconsistency belonged wholly to the ministers; for the two original articles of the treaty only were confirmed by them, and they were copied from the Admiralty instructions delivered to Sir Charles Cotton four months previous to the transaction.† Yet that officer, by the very men who had framed those instructions, was, with matchless effrontery, rebuked for having adopted a new principle of maritime surrender!

On the 2d of September head-quarters were established at Oyeras; the right of the army occupied the forts at the mouth of the river, the left rested upon the heights of Bellas. The French army concentrated in Lisbon posted their piquets and guards as if in front of an enemy, and at night the sentries fired upon whoever approached their posts; the police disbanded of their own accord, and the city became a scene of turbulence, anarchy, and crime.‡ Notwithstanding the presence of their enemies, the inhabitants of the capital testified their joy, and evinced their vengeful feelings in a remarkable manner; they refused to sell any provisions, or to deal in any manner with the French; they sung songs of triumph in their hearing, and in their sight fabricated thousands of small lamps for the avowed purpose of illuminating the streets at their

* Parl. Pap. 1809.

† Ibid. Admiralty Instructions to Sir C. Cotton, 16th April, 1808. Mr. Wellesley Pole to Sir C. Cotton, 17th Sept. 1808.

‡ Thiebault.

departure; the doors of many of the houses occupied by the troops were marked in one night; men were observed bearing in their hats lists of Portuguese or Frenchmen designed for slaughter, and the quarters of Loison were threatened with a serious attack. Yet amidst all this disorder and violence, General Travot, and some others of the French army, fearlessly and safely traversed the streets, unguarded save by the reputation of their just and liberal conduct when in power, a fact extremely honorable to the Portuguese, and conclusive of the misconduct of Loison.* Junot himself was menaced by an assassin, but he treated the affair with magnanimity, and in general he was respected, although in a far less degree than Travot.

The dread of an explosion, which would have compromised at once the safety of his army and of the city, induced the French General to hasten the period when an English division was to occupy the citadel and take charge of the public tranquillity. Meanwhile emissaries from the Junta of Oporto fomented the disposition of the populace to commit themselves by an attack upon the French, the convention was reprobated, and endeavors were fruitlessly made to turn the tide of indignation even against the English, as abettors of the invaders. The judge of the people, an energetic, but turbulent fellow, issued an inflammatory address in which, calling for a suspension of the treaty, he designated the French as robbers and insulters of religion. The Monteiro Mor, who commanded a rabble of peasantry, which he dignified with the title of an army, took possession of the south bank of the Tagus, and from his quarters issued a protest against the convention, the execution of which he had the audacity to call upon Sir Charles Cotton to interrupt; the latter sent his communications to Sir Hew Dalrymple, who treated them with the contemptuous indignation they merited.

Sir John Hope being appointed English commandant of Lisbon, took possession of the castle of Belem on the 10th, and of the citadel the 12th, and, by his firm and vigorous conduct, reduced the effervescence of the public mind, and repressed the disorders which had arisen to a height that gave opportunity for the commission of any villainy. The Duke of Abrantes, with his staff, embarked the 13th. The first division of his army sailed the 15th; it was followed by the second and third divisions, and on the 30th, all the French, except the garrisons of Elvas and Almeida, were out of Portugal.

But the execution of the convention had not been carried on thus far without much trouble and contestation. Lord Proby, the English commissioner appointed to carry the articles of the treaty

* Thiebault.

into effect, was joined by Major-General Beresford on the 5th, and their united labors were scarcely sufficient to meet the exigencies of a task, in the prosecution of which disputes hourly arose. Anger, the cupidity of individuals, and opportunity, combined to push the French beyond the bounds of honor and decency, and several gross attempts were made to appropriate property which no interpretation of the stipulations could give a color to; amongst the most odious were the abstraction of manuscripts and rare specimens of natural history from the National Museum, and the invasion of the deposito publico, or funds of money awaiting legal decision for their final appropriation. These dishonest attempts were met and checked with a strong hand, and at last a committee, consisting of an individual of each of the three nations, was appointed by the commissioners on both sides. Their office was to receive reclamations, to investigate them, and to do justice by seizing upon all contraband baggage embarked by the French—a measure attended with excellent effect. It must, however, be observed that the loud complaints and violence of the Portuguese, and the machinations of the Bishop of Oporto, seem to have excited the suspicions of the British, and influenced their acts more than the real facts warranted; for the national character of the Portuguese was not then understood, nor the extent to which they supplied the place of true reports by the fabrication of false ones, generally known.

Party writers have not been wanting since to exaggerate the grounds of complaint. The English have imputed fraud and evasions of the most dishonorable kind to the French, and the latter have retorted by accusations of gratuitous insult, and breach of faith, inasmuch as their soldiers, when on board the British ships, were treated with cruelty in order to induce them to desert. It would be too much to affirm that all the error was on one side, but it does appear reasonable and consonant to justice to decide that as the French were originally aggressors and acting for their own interest, and that the British were interfering for the protection of the Portuguese, an indecorous zeal on the part of the latter, if not commendable, was certainly more excusable than in their opponents. Upon the ground of its being impossible for Junot to know what was doing in his name, the British commissioners acquitted him of any personal impropriety of conduct, and his public orders, which denounced severe punishments for such malpractices, corroborated this testimony; yet Kellermann, in his communications with Sir Hew Dalrymple, did not scruple to insinuate matters to the Duke's disadvantage.* But, amidst all these

* Sir Hew Dalrymple's Narrative. Court of Inquiry.

conflicting accusations, the British commander's personal good faith and scupulous adherence to justice has never been called in question.

To define the exact extent to which each party should have pushed their claims is not an easy task, yet an impartial investigator would begin by carefully separating the original rights of the French from those rights which they acquired by the convention; and much of the subsequent clamor in England against the authors of that treaty sprung from the error of confounding these essentially distinct grounds of argument. Conquest being the sole foundation of the first, defeat, if complete, extinguished them; if incomplete, nullified a part only. Now the issue of the appeal to arms not having been answerable to the justice of the cause, an agreement ensued, by which a part was sacrificed for the sake of the remainder, and upon the terms of that agreement the whole question of right hinges. If the French were not prisoners of war, it follows that they had not forfeited their claims founded on the right of conquest, but they were willing to exchange an insecure tenure of the whole for a secure tenure of a part. The difficulty consisted in defining exactly what was conceded, and what should be recovered from them. With respect to the latter, the restitution of plunder acquired anterior to the convention was clearly out of the question; if officially obtained, it was part of the rights bargained for—if individually, to what tribunal could the innumerable claims which would follow such an article be referred? Abstract notions of right in such matters are misplaced. If an army surrenders at discretion, the victors may say with Brennus, "Woe to the vanquished;" but a convention implies some weakness, and must be weighed in the scales of prudence, not in those of justice.

CHAPTER VI.

The Bishop and Junta of Oporto aim at the supreme power; wish to establish the seat of government at Oporto; their intrigues; strange proceedings of General Decken; reflections thereupon—Clamor raised against the convention in England and in Portugal; soon ceases in Portugal—The Spanish General Galluzzo refuses to acknowledge the convention; invests Fort La Lippe; his proceedings absurd and unjustifiable—Sir John Hope marches against him; he alters his conduct—Garrison of La Lippe; march to Lisbon; embarked—Garrison of Almeida; march to Oporto; attacked and plundered by the Portuguese—Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard recalled to England—Vile conduct of the daily press—Violence of public feeling—Convention, improperly called, of Cintra—Observations—On the action of Roriça—On the battle of Vimiero—On the convention.

The interview that took place at Vimiero between Don Bernardin Freire d'Andrada and Sir Hew Dalrymple has been already noticed as the commencement of an intrigue of some consequence. The Portuguese chief objected at the time to the armistice concluded with Kellermann, ostensibly upon general grounds, but really, as it appeared to Sir Hew, because the Bishop and Junta of Oporto were not named in the instrument. At the desire of Freire, one Ayres Pinto de Souza was received at the English head-quarters as the protector of Portuguese interests during the subsequent negotiation, and he was soon apprised that a treaty for a definitive convention was on foot, himself and his General being invited to state their views and wishes before any further steps were taken. Neither of them took any notice of this invitation, but when the treaty was concluded clamored loudly against it. The British army was, they said, an auxiliary force, and should only act as such; nevertheless, it had assumed the right of treating with the French for Portuguese interests, and a convention had been concluded which protected the enemy from the punishment due to his rapine and cruelty; it was more favorable than the strength of the relative parties warranted, and no notice had been taken of the Portuguese government, or of the native army in the Alemtejo; men who were obnoxious to their countrymen for having aided the invaders, were protected from a just vengeance; finally, the fortresses were bargained for as acquisitions appertaining to the British army—a circumstance which must inevitably excite great jealousy both in Portugal and Spain, and injure the general cause by affording an opportunity for the French emissaries to create disunion among the allied nations. They dwelt also upon the importance of the native forces, the strength of the insurrection, and insinuated that separate operations were likely to be carried on notwithstanding the treaty.

Noble words often cover pitiful deeds: this remonstrance, apparently springing from the feelings of a patriot whose heart was ulcerated by the wrongs his country had sustained, was but a cloak for a miserable interested intrigue. The Bishop of Oporto, a meddling ambitious priest, had early conceived the project of placing himself at the head of the insurrectional authorities, and transferring the seat of government from Lisbon to Oporto. He was aware that he should encounter great opposition, and he hoped that by inveigling the English General to countenance these pretensions, he might, with the aid of Freire's force, and his own influence, succeed in the object of his wishes. With this view he wrote a letter to Sir Charles Cotton dated the fourth of August, in which was inclosed, as the letter describes it, "The form of government with which they, the Junta of Oporto, meant to govern Portugal when the city of Lisbon should be free from the French;" and this letter, together with its inclosure, being transmitted to Sir Arthur Wellesley, he placed them among other public documents in the hands of Sir Hew Dalrymple when the latter first landed at Maceira. In the document itself it was declared that "The body of government had taken the glorious resolution of restoring the Portuguese monarchy in all its extent, and of recovering the crown of Portugal for its lawful sovereign Don Juan VI., their prince." But this "glorious resolution" was burthened with many forms and restrictions; and although the Junta professed the intention of re-establishing a regency, they declared, "that if this new regency should be interrupted by a new invasion of the French, or by *any other thing*, the Junta would immediately take the government on itself, and exercise the authority and jurisdiction which it had done ever since its institution."

Thus prepared for some cabal, Sir Hew Dalrymple was at no loss for an answer to Freire's remonstrance. He observed, that if the government of Portugal had not been mentioned in the treaty, neither had that of England, nor that of France. The convention was purely military, and for the present concerned only the commanders in the field. With regard to the occupation of the fortresses, and the fact of the British army being an auxiliary force, the first was merely a measure of military precaution absolutely necessary, and the latter was in no way rendered doubtful by any act which had been committed; he, Sir Hew, was instructed by his government to assist in restoring the Prince Regent of Portugal to his lawful rights, without any secret or interested motives; finally, the Portuguese General had been invited to assist in the negotiations, and if he had not done so, the blame rested with himself. To this Sir Hew might have justly added that the con-

duct of Freire in withdrawing his troops at the most critical moment of the campaign, by no means entitled him to assume a high tone towards those whom he had so disgracefully deserted in the hour of danger.

The Portuguese General was silenced by this plain and decided answer; yet the English General was quickly convinced that the Bishop and his coadjutors, however incapable of conducting great affairs, were experienced plotters. In his first interview with Andrada, Sir Hew Dalrymple had taken occasion to observe, that "no government lawfully representing the Prince Regent actually existed in Portugal;" in fact, a Junta, calling itself independent, was likewise established in Algarvé, and the members of the regency legally invested by the Prince with supreme authority were dispersed, and part of them in the power of the French. This observation, so adverse to the prelate's views, was transmitted to him by Freire, together with a copy of the armistice; and he was well aware that a definitive convention, differing materially from the armistice, was upon the point of being concluded, the refusal of Sir Charles Cotton to concur in the latter having rendered it null and void. Nevertheless, preserving silence on that point, the Bishop forwarded the copy of the armistice to the Chevalier Da Souza, Portuguese minister in London, accompanied by a letter filled with invectives and misrepresentations of its provisions; the Chevalier placed this letter, with its inclosures, in the hands of Mr. Canning, the English Secretary of State for foreign affairs, and at the same time delivering to him an official note, in which, adopting the style of the prelate and Junta, he spoke of them as the representatives of his sovereign, and the possessors of the supreme power in Portugal.

Nor were the efforts of the party confined to formal communications with the ministers: the daily press teemed with invectives against the English General's conduct; ex-parte statements, founded on the provisions of an armistice that was never concluded, being thus palmed upon a public, always hasty in judging of such matters, a prejudice against the convention was raised before either the terms of, or the events which led to it, were known. For Sir Hew, forgetting the ordinary forms of official intercourse, had neglected to transmit information to his government until fifteen days after the commencement of the treaty, and the ministers, unable to contradict or explain any of Souza's assertions, were thus placed in a mortifying situation, by which their minds were irritated and disposed to take a prejudiced view of the real treaty. Meanwhile the Bishop pretended to know nothing of the convention, hence the silence of Freire during the negotiation; but that once con-

cluded, a clamor was, by the party, raised in Portugal, similar to what had already been excited in England: thus both nations appeared to be equally indignant at the conduct of the General, when, in fact, his proceedings were unknown to either.

It would appear that the Bishop had other than Portuguese coadjutors. The Baron Von Decken, a Hanoverian officer, was appointed one of the military agents at Oporto; he was subject to Sir Hew Dalrymple's orders, but as his mission was of a detached nature, he was also to communicate directly with the Secretary of State in England. Von Decken arrived at Oporto upon the 17th August, and the same evening, in concert with the Bishop, concocted a project admirably adapted to forward the views of the latter: they agreed that the prelate was the fittest person to be at the head of the government, and that as he could not or pretended he could not quit Oporto, the seat of government ought to be transferred to that city.

Two obstacles to this arrangement were foreseen: first, the Prince Regent at his departure had nominated a regency, and left full instructions for the filling up of vacancies arising from death or other causes; secondly, the people of Lisbon and of the southern provinces would certainly resist any plan for changing the seat of government; hence, to obviate these difficulties, Von Decken wrote largely in commendation of the proposed arrangement, vilifying the conduct of the regency, and urging Sir Hew not only to give his sanction to the ambitious project, but to employ the British troops in controlling the people of Lisbon, should they attempt to frustrate the Bishop's plans.* To conciliate the members of the regency, it was proposed to admit a portion of them into the new government, and Francisco Noronha, Francisco de Cunha, the Monteiro Mor, and the principal Castro, were named as being the only men who were faithful to their sovereign. Now the last had accepted the office of Minister of Worship under the French, and was consequently unfaithful; but he was the half-brother of the Bishop, Castro being legitimately born. Under the pretext of sparing the feelings of the people of Lisbon, it was further proposed to appoint a Portuguese commandant, subject to the British governor, yet with a native force under his orders, to conduct all matters of police, and the Bishop took the occasion to recommend a particular general for that office. Finally, civil dissension and all its attendant evils were foretold as the consequences of rejecting this plan.

Sir Hew Dalrymple's answer was peremptory and decisive. He reprimanded General Von Decken, and at once put an end to th Bishop's hopes of support from the English army. This secon

* Appendix, No. 11.

repulse—for Sir Hew's answer did not reach Oporto until after Freire's report had arrived there—completed the mortification of the prelate and his Junta, and they set no bounds to their violence Efforts were made to stimulate the populace of Lisbon to attack both French and English, in the hope that the terrible scene which must have ensued would effectually prevent the re-establishment of the old regency, and at the same time render the transfer of the seat of government to Oporto an easy task. Hence the outrageous conduct of the Monteiro Mor and of the judge of the people, and the former's insolent letter calling upon Sir Charles Cotton to interrupt the execution of the convention.

The 3d September, Sir Hew Dalrymple received instructions from home relative to the formation of a new regency which were completely at variance with the plan arranged between the Bishop and General Von Decken, yet no difficulty attended the execution; and here, as in the case of Prince Leopold, we are arrested by the singularity of the transaction. General Charles Stewart, brother of Lord Castlereagh, was the bearer of Von Decken's first letter. He would not knowingly have lent himself to an intrigue subversive of his brother's views, as explained in the official instructions sent to Sir Hew; neither is it likely that Von Decken should plunge into such a delicate and important affair in one hour after his arrival at Oporto, if he had not been secretly authorized by some member of the English Cabinet: are we then to seek for a clue to these mysteries in that shameful Machiavelian policy that soon afterwards forced Lord Castlereagh to defend his public measures by a duel?

But the usual fate of plans laid by men more cunning than wise attended the Bishop of Oporto's projects. He was successful for a moment in rendering the convention of Cintra odious to the Portuguese, yet the great mass of the people soon acknowledged with gratitude the services rendered them by the English, rejoicing at the fulfilment of a treaty which freed their country at once from the invaders. And well might they rejoice, when they beheld above twenty-five thousand* bold and skilful soldiers reluctantly quitting the strongholds of the kingdom, and to the last maintaining the haughty air of an army unsubdued, and capable on the slightest provocation of resorting once more to the decision of battle. The Portuguese people were contented, but the Spanish General Galluzzo appears to have favored the views of the Oporto faction. Detachments of his troops and Portuguese refugees, principally from the northern provinces, and commanded by a Spaniard, were acting in conjunction with the insurgents of the Alemtejo. Many disputes had arisen between the two nations, as I have already

* Appendix, No. 23.

related; for the Spaniards treated Portugal as a conquered country, denied the authority of the Portuguese General Leite, who was not of the Bishop's party, and insulted him personally; they even seized his military chest at Campo Mayor, and in all things acted with the utmost violence and rapacity.*

Galluzzo himself was required by his own government to join the Spanish armies concentrating on the Ebro; but instead of obeying, he collected his forces near Elvas, and when he heard of the convention concluded at Lisbon, invested Fort La Lippe, and refused to permit the execution of the treaty relative to that impregnable fortress. Colonel Girod de Novillard commanded the French garrison, and, profiting from its situation, had compelled the inhabitants of Elvas to shut their gates also against the Spaniards, and to supply the fort daily with provisions. Galluzzo's proceedings were therefore manifestly absurd in a military point of view, for his attacks were confined to a trifling bombardment of La Lippe from an immense distance, and the utmost damage sustained, or likely to be sustained by that fortress, was the knocking away the cornices and chimneys of the governor's house, every other part heing protected by bomb proofs of the finest masonry.

Through Lord Burghersh, who had been appointed to communicate with the Spanish troops in Portugal, Galluzzo was, early in September, officially informed of the articles of the convention, and that the troops of his nation confined on board the hulks at Lisbon were by that treaty released, and would be clothed, armed, and sent to Catalonia. Sir Hew Dalrymple also wrote to the Spanish General on the 5th of September, to repeat this intelligence, and to request that his detachment might be withdrawn from the Alemtejo, where they were living at the expense of the people. Galluzzo, however, took no notice of either communication, pretending that he had opened his fire against La Lippe before the date of the convention, and that no third party had a right to interfere; he declared he would grant no terms to the garrison, nor permit any but Portuguese to enter the fort. Yet at this moment the Spanish armies on the Ebro were languishing for cavalry, which he alone possessed; and his efforts were so despised by Girod that the latter made no secret of his intention, if the fate of the French army at Lisbon should render such a step advisable, to blow up the works and march openly through the midst of Galluzzo's troops.

Colonel Ross being finally detached with the 20th regiment to receive the fort from Colonel Girod, and to escort the garrison to Lisbon under the terms of the convention, sent a flag of truce, and Major Colborne, who carried it, was also furnished with an autograph letter from Kellermann. He was received with civility, but

* Appendix, No. 12.

Girod refused to surrender his post without more complete proof of the authenticity of the treaty, and with the view of acquiring that he proposed that a French officer should proceed to Lisbon to verify the information. He did not affect to disbelieve Colborne's information, but he would not surrender his charge while the slightest doubt capable of being removed was attached to the transaction; and so acting he did well, and like a good soldier. General D'Arcy, who commanded the Spanish investing force, was persuaded to grant a truce for six days, to give time for the journey of the officers appointed to go to Lisbon, but on their return it was not without great difficulty and delay that they were permitted to communicate with Colonel Girod, and no argument could prevail upon the obstinate Galluzzo to relinquish the siege. After a warm intercourse of letters, Sir Hew Dalrymple ordered Sir John Hope to advance to Estremos with a considerable body of troops, to give weight to his remonstrances, and, if pushed to extremity, even to force the Spaniard to desist from his unwarrantable pretensions; for it must be observed that Galluzzo was not only putting aside the convention, by which he profited himself, but violating the independence of the Portuguese, who desired his absence from their territory.* He was likewise setting at nought the authority of his own government; for the army of Estremadura pretended to act under the orders of the Junta of Seville, and Laguna, an accredited agent of that Junta, was at the moment receiving from Sir Hew Dalrymple the Spanish prisoners liberated by the effect of the convention, together with money and arms to prepare them for immediate service in Catalonia, whither they were to be transported in British vessels. One more effort was however made to persuade the intractable Galluzzo to submit to reason, before recourse was had to violent measures, which must have produced infinite evil. Colonel Graham repaired upon the 25th of September to Badajos, and his arguments, backed up by the approach of the powerful division under Hope, were finally successful.

Colonel Girod evacuated the forts, and his garrison proceeded to Lisbon, attended by the 52d regiment as an escort; the rival troops agreed very well together, striving to outdo each other by the vigor and the military order of their marches, but the Swiss and French soldiers did not accord, and many of the latter wished to desert. At Lisbon the whole were immediately embarked, and the transports being detained for some time in the river, Major de Bosset, an officer of the Chasseurs Britanniques, contrived to persuade near a thousand of the men to desert, who were afterwards received into the British service.† Girod complained of this as a

* Appendix, No. 12.

† Appendix to Colonel De Bosset's Parga, p. 134. Thiebault.

breach of the convention, and it must be confessed that it was an equivocal act, yet one common to all armies, and if done simply by persuasion very excusable.

Almeida surrendered without any delay, and the garrison being marched to Oporto, were proceeding to embark, when the populace rose and would have slain them if great exertions had not been made by the British officers to prevent such a disgraceful breach of faith. The escort, although weak, was resolute to sustain the honor of their nation, and would have fired upon the multitude if the circumstances had become desperate; yet several of the French soldiers were assassinated, and, in spite of every effort, the baggage was landed, and the whole plundered, the excuse being, that church plate was to be found amongst it; an accusation easily made, difficult to be disproved to the satisfaction of a violent mob, and likely enough to be true.

This tumult gives scope for reflection upon the facility with which men adapt themselves to circumstances, and regulate their most furious passions by the scale of self-interest. In Oporto, the suffering, in consequence of the invasion, was trifling compared to the misery endured in Lisbon, yet the inhabitants of the former were much more outrageous in their anger. In Lisbon, the very persons who had inflicted the worst evils upon the people were daily exposed, more or less, to violence, yet suffered none; while in Oporto, it was with extreme difficulty that men, until that moment unseen of the multitude, were rescued from their frantic revenge. In both cases fear regulated the degree of hatred shown, and we may conclude from hence, that national insurrections, however spontaneous and vehement, if the result of hatred only, will never successfully resist an organized force, unless the mechanical courage of discipline be grafted upon the first enthusiasm.

While the vexatious correspondence with Galluzzo was going on, Sir Hew Dalrymple renewed his intercourse with Castaños, and prepared to prosecute the war in Spain. The Spanish prisoners, about four thousand in number, were sent to Catalonia, and the British army was cantoned principally in the Alemtejo along the road to Badajos; some officers were despatched to examine the roads through Beira with a view to a movement on that line, and General Anstruther was directed to repair to the fortress of Almeida, for the purpose of regulating everything which might concern the passage of the army, if it should be found necessary to enter Spain by that route. Lord William Bentinck was also despatched to Madrid, having instructions to communicate with the Spanish generals and with the central Junta, and to arrange with them the best line of march, the mode of providing magazines, and the

plan of campaign. But in the midst of these affairs, and before the garrison of Elvas arrived at Lisbon, Sir Hew Dalrymple was called home to answer for his conduct relative to the convention; the command then devolved upon Sir Harry Burrard, and he, after holding it a short time, also returned to England, there to abide the fury of the most outrageous and disgraceful public clamor that was ever excited by the falsehoods of venal political writers.

The editors of the daily press, adopting all the misrepresentations of the Portuguese minister, and concluding that the silence of government was the consequence of its dissatisfaction at the convention, broke forth with such a torrent of rabid malevolence, that all feelings of right and justice were overborne, and the voice of truth entirely stifled by their obstreperous cry. Many of the public papers were printed with mourning lines around the text which related to Portuguese affairs, all called for punishment, and some even talked of death to the guilty, before it was possible to know if any crime had been committed; the infamy of the convention was the universal subject of conversation, a general madness seemed to have seized all classes, and, like the Athenians after the sea-fight of Arginusæ, the English people, if their laws would have permitted the exploit, would have condemned their victorious generals to death.

A court was assembled at Chelsea to inquire into the transactions relating to the armistice and the definitive convention. Sir Arthur Wellesley, Sir Harry Burrard, Sir Hew Dalrymple, and the principal generals engaged at Vimiero, were called before it; a minute investigation of all the circumstances took place, and a detailed report was made, at the end of which it was stated that no further judicial measures seemed to be called for. This was not satisfactory to the government, and the members of the court were required to state, individually, whether they approved or disapproved of the armistice and convention. It then appeared, that four approved and three disapproved of the convention, and among the latter the Earl of Moira distinguished himself by a labored criticism, which, however, left the pith of the question entirely untouched. The proceedings of the board were dispassionate and impartial, but the report was not luminous; a circumstance to be regretted, because the rank and reputation of the members were sufficiently great to secure them from the revenge of party, and no set of men were ever more favorably placed for giving a severe and just rebuke to popular injustice.

Thus ended the last act of the celebrated convention of Cintra, the very name of which will always be a signal record of the ignorant and ridiculous vehemence of the public feelings; for the ar-

mistice, the negotiations, the convention itself, and the execution of its provisions, were all commenced, conducted and concluded at the distance of thirty miles from Cintra, with which place they had not the slightest connection, political, military, or local. Yet Lord Byron has gravely sung, that the convention was signed in the Marquis of Marialva's house at Cintra; and the author of the "Diary of an Invalid," improving upon the poet's discovery, detected the stains of ink spilt by Junot upon the occasion!

OBSERVATIONS.

1. General Thiebault says, that the scattered state of the French army in the beginning of August rendered its situation desperate, and that the slowness of Sir Arthur Wellesley saved it. Others again have accused the latter of rashness and temerity. Neither of these censures appears to be well founded. It is true that Junot's army was disseminated; yet, to beat an army in detail, a general must be perfectly acquainted with the country he is to act in, well informed of his adversary's movements, and rapid in his own. Now rapidity in war depends as much upon the experience of the troops as upon the energy of the chief; but the English army was raw, the staff and commissariat mere novices, the artillery scantily and badly horsed, few baggage or draft animals were to be obtained in the country, and there were only a hundred and eighty cavalry mounted. Such impediments are not to be removed in a moment, and therein lies the difference betwixt theory and practice—between criticism and execution.

2. To disembark the army without waiting for the reinforcements, was a bold yet not a rash measure. Sir Arthur Wellesley knew that the French troops were very much scattered, although he was not aware of the exact situation of each division, and, from the Bishop of Oporto's promises, he had reason to expect good assistance from the Portuguese, who would have been discouraged if he had not landed at once. Weighing these circumstances, he was justified in disembarking his troops, and the event proved that he was right; he had full time to prepare his army, his marches were methodical, and he was superior in numbers to his enemy in each battle; his plans were characterized by a due mixture of enterprise and caution, well adapted to his own force, and yet capable of being enlarged without inconvenience when the reinforcement should arrive.

3. In the action of Roriça there was a great deal to admire, and some grounds for animadversion. The movement against Laborde's first position was well conceived and executed, but the subsequent attack against the heights of Zambugeira was undoubtedly

faulty, as the march of Ferguson's and Trant's divisions would have dislodged Laborde from that strong ridge without any attack on the front. It is said that such was Sir Arthur's project, and that some mistake in the orders caused General Ferguson to alter the direction of his march from the flank to the centre. This, if true, does not excuse the error, because the commander-in-chief, being present at the attack in front, might have restrained it until Ferguson had recovered the right direction. It is more probable that Sir Arthur did not expect any very vigorous resistance—that, wishing to press the French in their retreat, he pushed on the action too fast; and Laborde, who was unquestionably no ordinary general, made the most of both time and circumstances.

4. Towards the close of the day, when the French had decidedly taken to the mountains, the line of Loison's march was in the power of the English General. If he had sent two thousand men in pursuit of Laborde, left one thousand to protect the field of battle, and with the remaining ten thousand marched against Loison, whose advanced guard could not have been far off, it is probable that the latter would have been surprised and totally defeated; at all events he could only have saved himself by a hasty retreat, which would have broken Junot's combinations and scattered his army in all directions. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, marched to Lourinham, to cover the immediate landing of his reinforcement and stores; and this was prudent, because a southwest wind would in one night have sent half the fleet on shore in a surf unequalled for fury. Such indeed was the difficulty of a disembarkation, that a detachment from the garrison of Peniché would have sufficed to frustrate it. The existence of a French reserve, estimated by report at four thousand men, was known, its situation was unknown, and it might have been on the coast line; hence great danger to Anstruther, if he attempted a landing without being covered, greater still if he remained at sea. The reasons then for the march to Lourinham were cogent, and, perhaps, outweighed the advantages of attacking Loison; yet it seems to have been an error not to have occupied Torres Vedras on the 18th; the disembarkation of Anstruther's force would have been equally secured, while the junction of the French army, and the consequent battle of Vimiero, would have been prevented.

5. It is an agreeable task to render a just tribute of applause to the conduct of a gallant although unsuccessful enemy; and there is no danger of incurring the imputation of ostentatious liberality, in asserting that Laborde's operations were exquisite specimens of the art of war. The free and confident manner in which he felt for his enemy—the occupation of Brilos, Obidos and Roriça in succession,

by which he delayed the final moment of battle and gained time for Loison—the judgment and nice calculation with which he maintained the position of Roriça—the obstinacy with which he defended the heights of Zambugeira, were all proofs of a consummate knowledge of war, and a facility of command rarely attained.

6. Sir Arthur Wellesley estimated Laborde's numbers at six thousand men, and his estimation was corroborated by the information gained from a wounded French officer during the action. It is possible that at Alcobaça there might have been so many, but I have thought it safer to rate them at five thousand, for the following reasons:—First, it is at all times very difficult to judge of an enemy's force by the eye, and it is nearly impossible to do so correctly when he is skilfully posted, and, as in the present case, desirous of appearing stronger than he really was; secondly, the six hundred men sent on the 14th to Peniché, and three companies employed on the 16th and 17th to keep open the communication with Loison by Bombaral, Cadaval, and Segura, must be deducted; thirdly, Laborde himself, after the convention, positively denied that he had so many as six thousand.* General Thiebault indeed says that only one thousand nine hundred were present under arms; but this assertion is certainly inaccurate, and even injurious to the credit of Laborde, because it casts ridicule upon his really glorious deed of arms. It is surprising that a well-informed and able writer should disfigure an excellent work by such trifling.

7. Vimiero was merely a short combat, yet it led to important results, because Junot was unable to comprehend the advantages of his situation. Profitable lessons may however be drawn from every occurrence in war, and Vimiero is not deficient in good subjects for military speculation. To many officers the position of the British appeared weak from its extent, and dangerous from its proximity to the sea, into which the army must have been driven if defeated. The last objection is well founded, and suggests the reflection that it is unsafe to neglect the principles of the art even for a moment. The ground having been occupied merely as a temporary post, without any view to fighting a battle, the line of retreat by Lourinham was, for the sake of a trifling convenience, left uncovered a few hours. The accidental arrival of Sir Harry Burrard arrested the advance movement projected by Sir Arthur Wellesley for the 21st, and in the mean time Junot took the lead; and had he been successful upon the left, there would have been no retreat for the British army. But the extent of the position at Vimiero, although considerable for a small army, was no cause of weakness, because the line of communication from the right to the

* Sir A. Wellesley's Narrative. Court of Inquiry.



Explanatory Sketch of the CAMPAIGN in PORTUGAL in August 1808

Scale ——— Miles

..... British route

- - - - - Labordes Do.

— — — — Loisons Do.

+ + + + + Route of the Reserve

left was much shorter and much easier for the British defence than it was for the French attack; and the centre was very strong, and perfectly covered the movement of the right wing. Sir Arthur, when he placed the bulk of the combatants in that quarter, did all that was possible to remedy the only real defect in his position—that of having no line of retreat.

8. The project of seizing Torres Vedras and Mafra, at the close of the battle, was one of those prompt daring conceptions that distinguish great generals, and it is absurd to blame Sir Harry Burrard for not adopting it. Men are not gifted alike, and even if the latter had not been confirmed in his view of the matter by the advice of his staff, there was in the actual situation of affairs ample scope for doubt; the facility of executing Sir Arthur's plan was not so apparent on the field of battle as it may be in the closet. The French cavalry was numerous, unharmed, and full of spirit; upon the distant heights behind Junot's army, a fresh body of infantry had been discovered by General Spencer, and the nature of the country prevented any accurate judgment of its strength being formed; the gun-carriages of the British army were very much shaken, and they were so badly and so scantily horsed, that doubts were entertained if they could keep up with the infantry in a long march; the commissariat was in great confusion, the natives, as we have seen, were flying with the country transport; the Portuguese troops gave no promise of utility, and the English cavalry was destroyed. To overcome obstacles in the pursuit of a great object is the proof of a lofty genius; but the single fact that a man of Sir George Murray's acknowledged abilities was opposed to the attempt, at once exonerates Sir Harry Burrard's conduct from censure, and places the vigor of Sir Arthur Wellesley's in the strongest light. It was doubtless ill-judged of the former, aware as he was of the ephemeral nature of his command, to interfere at all with the dispositions of a general who was in the full career of victory, and whose superior talents and experience were well known; yet it excites indignation to find a brave and honorable veteran borne to the earth as a criminal, and assailed by the most puerile, shallow writers, merely because his mind was not of the highest class. Sir Arthur Wellesley himself was the first to declare before the Court of Inquiry that Sir Harry Burrard had decided upon fair military reasons.

GENERAL PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.

1. Although double lines of operation are generally disadvantageous and opposed to sound principles, the expediency of landing Sir John Moore's troops at the mouth of the Mondego, and pushing

them forward to Santarem, was unquestionable; unless the probable consequences of such a movement are taken into consideration, Sir Arthur Wellesley's foresight cannot be justly appreciated.

Lisbon, situated near the end of the tongue of land lying between the sea-coast and the Tagus, is defended to the northward by vast mountains, that, rising in successive and nearly parallel ranges, end abruptly in a line extending from Torres Vedras to Alhandra on the Tagus; and as these ridges can only be passed at certain points by an army, the intersections of the different roads form so many strong positions. Moreover, the great mass of the Monte Junto, which appears to lead perpendicularly on to the centre of the first ridge, but stops short at a few miles distance, sends a rugged shoot, called the Sierra de Barragueda, in a slanting direction towards Torres Vedras, from which it is only divided by a deep defile.

From this conformation it results, that an army marching from the Mondego to Lisbon must either pass behind the Monte Junto, and follow the line of the Tagus, or keeping the western side of that mountain, come upon the position of Torres Vedras.

If Sir Arthur Wellesley had adopted the first line of operations, his subsistence must have been drawn by convoys from the Mondego; the enemy's numerous cavalry would then have cut his communications, and in that state he would have had to retreat, or to force the positions of Alhandra, Alverca, and finally the heights of Bellas, a strong position the right flank of which was covered by the creek of Saccavem, and the left flank by the impassable Sierra dos Infiernos. On the other line, Torres Vedras was to be carried, and then Mafra or Montechique, following the direction of Junot's retreat. If Mafra was forced, and it could not well be turned, a line of march, by Cassim and Quelus, upon Lisbon, would have been open to the victors; but that route, besides being longer than the road through Montechique and Loures, would, while it led the English army equally away from the fleet, have entangled it among the fortresses of Ereceira, St. Antonio, Cascaes, St. Julian's, and Belem. Again, supposing the position of Montechique to be stormed, the heights of Bellas offered a third line of defence; and lastly, the citadel and forts of Lisbon itself would have sufficed to cover the passage of the river, and a retreat upon Elvas would have been secure.

Thus it is certain, that difficulties of the most serious nature awaited the English army while acting on a single line of operations, and the double line proposed by Sir Arthur was strictly scientific. For if Sir John Moore, disembarking at the Mondego, had marched first to Santarem and then to Saccavem, he would have turned the

positions of Torres Vedras and Montechique; and Sir Arthur, on the other side, would have turned the heights of Bellas by the road of Quelus, and Junot's central situation could not have availed him, because the distance between the British corps would be more than a day's march, and their near approach to Lisbon would have caused an insurrection of the populace. The Duke of Abrantes must then either have abandoned that capital and fallen vigorously upon Sir John Moore, with a view to overwhelm him and gain Almeida or Elvas, or he must have concentrated his forces, and been prepared to cross the Tagus if he lost a battle in front of Lisbon. In the first case, the strength of the country afforded Moore every facility for a successful resistance, and Sir Arthur's corps would have quickly arrived upon the rear of the French. In the second case, Junot would have had to fight superior numbers, with an inveterate populace in his rear, and if, fearing the result of such an encounter, he had crossed the Tagus, and pushed for Elvas, Sir John Moore's division could likewise have crossed the river, and harassed the French in their retreat. The above reasoning being correct, it follows that to re-embark Sir John Moore's army after it had landed at the Mondego, and to bring it down to Maceira bay, was an error which, no convention intervening, might have proved fatal to the success of the campaign; and this error was rendered more important by the danger incurred from the passage, for, as the transports were not sea-worthy, the greatest part would have perished had a gale of wind come on from the south-west.*

2. Sir Arthur Wellesley's project of seizing Mafra by a rapid march on the morning of the 21st, was exceedingly bold; its successful execution would have obliged Junot to make a hurried retreat by Enxara dos Cavalleiros to Montechique, at the risk of being attacked in flank during his march; if he had moved by the longer route of Ruña and Sobral, it is scarcely to be doubted that the British army would have reached Lisbon before him. But was it possible so to deceive an enemy, inured to warfare, as to gain ten miles in a march of sixteen? was it possible to evade the vigilance of an experienced general, who, being posted only nine miles off, possessed a formidable cavalry, the efforts of which could neither be checked nor interrupted by the small escort of horse in the British camp? was it, in fine, possible to avoid a defeat, during a flank march, along a road crossed and interrupted by a river, and several deep gullies which formed the beds of mountain torrents? These are questions which naturally occur to every military man. The sticklers for a rigid adherence to system would probably decide in the negative; Sir Arthur Wellesley was, however, not only prepared

* Captain Pulteney Malcolm's evidence. Court of Inquiry.

to try at the time, but he afterwards deliberately affirmed that, under certain circumstances of ground, an operation of that kind would succeed. To investigate such questions is the best study for an officer.

A night march is the most obvious mode of effecting such an enterprise, but not always the best in circumstances where expedition is required; great generals have usually preferred the day-time, trusting to their own skill in deceiving the enemy, while their army made a forced march to gain the object in view: thus Turenne, at Landsberg, was successful against the Archduke Leopold in broad day-light, and Cæsar in a more remarkable manner overreached Afranius and Petrieus, near Lerida. Nor were the circumstances at Vimiero unfavorable to Sir Arthur Wellesley. He might have pushed a select corps of light troops, his cavalry, the marines of the fleet, the Portuguese auxiliaries, and a few field pieces, to the entrance of the defile of Torres Vedras before day-break, with orders to engage the French outposts briskly, and to make demonstrations as for a general attack. There is no doubt that such a movement, if skilfully conducted, would have completely occupied the enemy's attention, while the main body of the army, marching in great coats, and hiding the glitter of their arms, might have profited from the woods and hollows through which the by-road to Mafra led, and gained such a start as would have insured the success of the enterprise.

Let us, however, take a view of the other side. Let us suppose that Junot, instructed by his spies and patrols, or divining the intention of the British General, held the masking division in check with a small force, and carrying the remainder of his army by the Puente de Roll, or some other cross road, and there were several, against the flank of the English, had fallen upon the latter while in march, hemmed in, as they would be, between the sea and the mountains, and entangled among hollows and torrents. What then would have been the result? History answers, by pointing to Condé and the battle of Senef. It must, however, be confessed, that it could be no ordinary general that conceived such a project, and notwithstanding the small numbers of the opposing armies, success would have ranked Sir Arthur high among the eminent commanders of the world, if he had never performed any other exploit. "The statue of Hercules, cast by Lysippus, although only a foot high, expressed," says Pliny, "the muscles and bones of the hero more grandly than the colossal figures of other artists."

3. So many circumstances combine to sway the judgment of an officer in the field which do not afterwards appear of weight, that caution should always be the motto of those who censure the con

duct of an unfortunate commander; nevertheless, the Duke of Abrantes' faults, during this campaign, were too glaring to be mistaken. He lingered too long at Lisbon; he was undecided in his plans; he divided his army unnecessarily; he discovered no skill on the field of battle. When the English army was landed, affairs were brought to a crisis, and Junot had only two points to consider: Could the French forces under his command defend Portugal without assistance, and if not, how were its operations to be made most available for furthering Napoleon's general plans against the Peninsula? The first point could not be ascertained until a battle with Sir Arthur had been tried; the second evidently required that Junot should keep his army concentrated, preserve the power of retreating into Spain, and endeavor to engage the British troops in the sieges of Elvas and Almeida. If the two plans had been incompatible, the last was certainly preferable to the chance of battle in a country universally hostile. But the two plans were not incompatible.

The pivot of Junot's movements was Lisbon; he had therefore to consider how he might best fall upon and overthrow the English army, without resigning the capital to the Portuguese insurgents during the operation. He could not hope to accomplish the first effectually without using the great mass of his forces, nor to avoid the last except by skilful management, and the utmost rapidity. Now the citadel and forts about Lisbon were sufficiently strong to enable a small part of the French army to control the populace, and to resist the insurgents of the Alemtejo for a few days. The Russian Admiral, although not hostile to the Portuguese, or favorable to the French, was forced, by his fear of the English, to preserve a guarded attitude, and in point of fact, did materially contribute to awe the multitude, who could not but look upon him as an enemy. The Portuguese ships of war which had been fitted out by Junot were floating fortresses requiring scarcely any garrisons, yet efficient instruments to control the city, without ceasing to be receptacles for the Spanish prisoners, and safe dépôts for powder and arms, which might otherwise have fallen into the power of the populace. Wherefore, instead of delaying so long in the capital, instead of troubling himself about the assemblage of Alcacer do Sal, instead of detaching Laborde with a weak division to cover the march of Loison, Junot should have taken the most vigorous resolutions in respect to Lisbon, the moment he heard of the English descent. He should have abandoned the left bank of the Tagus, with the exception of Palmela and the Bugio, which was necessary to the safety of his shipping; he should have seized upon the principal families of the capital, as hostages for the good behavior of the

rest; he should have threatened, and been prepared, to bombard the city if refractory; then, leaving nothing more than the mere garrisons of the citadel, forts, and ships behind him, have proceeded, not to Leiria, which was too near the enemy to be a secure point of junction with Loison, but to Santarem, where both corps might have been united without danger and without fatigue. General Thomières, in the mean time, putting a small garrison in Peniché, could have watched the movement of the British General, and thus from eighteen to twenty thousand men would have been assembled at Santarem by the 13th at farthest, and from thence, one march would have brought the whole to Batalha, near which place the lot of battle might have been drawn without trembling. If it proved unfavorable to the French, the ulterior object of renewing the campaign on the frontier was in no manner compromised. The number of large boats that Lisbon can always furnish would have sufficed to transport the beaten army over the Tagus from Santarem in a few hours, especially if the stores had been embarked before Junot moved towards Batalha; and the French army, once in the Alemtejo, with a good garrison in Abrantes, could not have been followed until the forts at the mouth of the Tagus were reduced, and the fleet sheltered in the river. Thus, long before the British could have appeared in force in the Alemtejo, the fortress of Elvas would have been provisioned from the magazines collected by Loison after the battle of Evora, and the campaign could have been easily prolonged until the great French army, coming from Germany, crushed all opposition.

The above is not a theory broached after the event. That Junot would attempt something of the kind, was the data upon which the English General formed his plans, and the intercepted memoir of Colonel Vincent treated such an operation as a matter of course. Junot's threats during the negotiation prove that he was not ignorant of his own resources, but his mind was depressed, and his desponding mood was palpable to those around him; it is a curious fact, that Sattaro, the Portuguese agent, who for some purpose or other was in the British camp, told Sir Arthur Wellesley before the battle of Vimiero, that Junot would willingly evacuate Portugal upon terms.

4. When the French, being fourteen thousand in number, occupied Torres Vedras, that position was nearly impregnable; but though seventeen thousand British could scarcely have carried it by force, they might have turned it in a single march by the coast road, and Junot neither placed a detachment on that side, nor kept a vigilant watch by his patrols; hence, if Sir Arthur Wellesley's intended movement had not been arrested by orders from Burrard,

it must have succeeded, because Junot was entangled in the defiles of Torres Vedras from six o'clock in the evening of the 20th, until late in the morning of the 21st.* The two armies would thus have changed camps in the space of a few hours, without firing a shot; Junot would have lost Lisbon, and have been placed in the most ridiculous situation.

5. In the battle, the Duke of Abrantes showed great courage, but no talent. His army was inferior in numbers, yet he formed two separate attacks—an evident error, that enabled Sir Arthur to beat him in detail without difficulty. He was the less excusable because the comparatively easy nature of the ground over which the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham led, and the manner in which the English army was heaped to the right when the position first opened to the view, plainly indicated the true line of attack. Junot should, with all his forces concentrated for one effort, have fallen in upon the left of his opponent's position; if victorious, the sea would have swallowed those who escaped his sword—if repulsed, his retreat was open, and his loss could not have been so great in a well-conducted single effort, as it was in the ill-digested, unconnected attacks that took place.

6. The rapidity with which the French soldiers rallied and recovered their order after such a severe check was admirable, but their habitual method of attacking in column cannot be praised; against the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians it may have been successful, but against the British it must always fail, because the English infantry is sufficiently firm, intelligent, and well disciplined to wait calmly in lines for the adverse masses, and sufficiently bold to close upon them with the bayonet. The column is undoubtedly excellent for all movements short of the actual charge, but as the Macedonian phalanx was unable to resist the open formation of the Roman legion, so will the close column be unequal to sustain the fire and charge of a good line, aided by artillery. The natural repugnance of men to trample on their own dead and wounded, the cries and groans of the latter, and the whistling of the cannon-shots as they tear open the ranks, produce the greatest disorder, especially in the centre of attacking columns, which, blinded by smoke, unsteadfast of footing, and bewildered by words of command coming from a multitude of officers crowded together, can neither see what is taking place, nor make any effort to advance or retreat without increasing the confusion; hence no example of courage can be useful, no moral effect can be produced by the spirit of individuals, except upon the head, which is often firm and even victorious at the moment when the rear is flying in terror. Never-

* Thiebault

theless, well-managed columns are the very soul of military operations; in them is the victory, and in them also is safety to be found after a defeat; the secret consists in knowing when and where to extend the front.

ARMISTICE.—CONVENTION.

1. It is surprising that Junot, having regained Torres Vedras, occupied Mafra, and obtained an armistice, did not profit by the terms of the latter to prepare for crossing the Tagus and establishing the war on the frontiers. Kellermann ascertained during his negotiation, that Sir John Moore was not arrived; it was clear that until he did arrive, the position of Montechique could neither be attacked nor turned, and there was nothing in the armistice itself, nor in the war in which it had been agreed to, which rendered it dishonorable to take such an advantage. The opening thus left for Junot to gain time was Sir Arthur Wellesley's principal objection to the preliminary treaty.

2. With regard to the convention, although some of its provisions were objectionable in point of form, and others imprudently worded, yet taken as a whole it was a transaction fraught with prudence and wisdom. Let it be examined upon fair military and political grounds, let it even be supposed for the sake of argument that Sir Arthur, unimpeded by Sir Harry Burrard, had pursued his own plan, and that Junot, cut off from Lisbon and the half of his forces, had been driven up the Tagus—he was still master of flying to Almeida or Elvas, the thousand men left in Santarem would have joined him in the Alemtejo or fallen down to the capital, and what then would have been the advantages that could render the convention undesirable? The British army, exclusive of Moore's division, had neither provisions, nor means of transporting provisions for more than ten days, and the fleet was the only resource when that supply should be exhausted; but a gale from any point between south and north-west would have driven the ships away or cast them on a lee-shore. It was therefore indispensable first to secure the mouth of the Tagus, for the safety of the fleet; and this could only be done by occupying Cascaes, Bugio, and St. Julian's, the last of which would alone have required ten days, open trenches, and a battering train, which must have been dragged by men over the mountains, for the artillery horses were scarcely able to draw the field guns, and no country animals were to be found.* In the mean time, the French troops in Lisbon, upon the heights of Almada, and in the men-of-war, retiring tranquilly through the Alemtejo, would have united with Junot, or, if he had fallen back

* Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

upon Almeida, they could have retired upon Elvas and La Lippe. In this argument the Russians have not been considered, but whatever his secret wishes might have been, Siniavin must have surrendered his squadron in a disgraceful manner, or joined the French with his six thousand men; and it may here be observed, that even after the arrival of Sir John Moore, only twenty-five thousand British infantry were fit for duty.*

Let it now be supposed that the forts were taken, the English fleet in the river, the resources of Lisbon organized, the battering guns and ammunition necessary for the siege of Elvas transported to Abrantes by water; seventy miles of land remained to traverse, and then three months of arduous operations in the sickly season, and in the most pestilent of situations, would have been the certain consequences of any attempt to reduce that fortress. Did the difficulty end there? No! Almeida remained, and in the then state of the roads of Portugal, and taking into consideration only the certain and foreseen obstacles, it is not too much to say that six months more would have been wasted before the country would have been entirely freed from the invaders; but long before that period Napoleon's eagles would have soared over Lisbon again! The conclusion is inevitable: the convention was a great and solid advantage for the allies, a blunder on the part of the French.

With the momentary exception of Junot's threat to burn Lisbon if his terms were not complied with, we look in vain for any traces of that vigor which urged the march from Alcantara. We are astonished to perceive the man, who, in the teeth of an English fleet, in contempt of fourteen thousand Portuguese troops, and regardless of a population of three hundred thousand souls, dared, with a few hundred tired grenadiers, to seize upon Lisbon, so changed in half a year, so sunk in energy, that, with twenty-five thousand good soldiers, he declined a manly effort, and resorted to a convention to save an army which was really in very little danger. But such and so variable is the human mind, a momentary slave of every attraction, yet ultimately true to self-interest. When Junot entered Portugal, power, honors, fame, even a throne was within his view; when he proposed the convention, the gorgeous apparition was gone; toil and danger were at hand, fame flitted at a distance, and he easily persuaded himself that prudence and vigor could not be yoked together. A saying attributed to Napoleon perfectly describes the convention in a few words: "I was going to send Junot before a council of war, when, fortunately, the English tried their generals, and saved me the pain of punishing an old friend!"

* Appendix, No. 22.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

Comparison between the Portuguese and Spanish people—The general opinion of French weakness and Spanish strength and energy, fallacious—Contracted policy of the English Cabinet—Account of the civil and military agents employed—Many of them act without judgment—Mischievous effects thereof—Operations of the Spanish armies, after the battle of Baylen—Murcian army arrives at Madrid—Valencian army marches to the relief of Zaragoza—General Verdier raises the siege—Castaños enters Madrid—Contumacious conduct of Galluzzo—Disputes between Blake and Cuesta—Dilatory conduct of the Spaniards—Sagacious observation of Napoleon—Insurrection at Bilbao; quelled by General Merlin—French corps approaches Zaragoza—Palafox alarmed, threatens the Council of Castile—Council of war held at Madrid—Plan of operations—Castaños unable to march from want of money—Bad conduct of the Junta of Seville—Vigorous conduct of Major Cox—Want of arms—Extravagant project to procure them.

THE convention of Cintra, followed by the establishment of a regency at Lisbon, disconcerted the plans of the Bishop and Junta of Oporto, and Portugal was restored to a state of comparative tranquillity; for the Portuguese people, being of a simple character, when they found their country relieved from the presence of a French army, readily acknowledged the benefit derived from the convention, and refused to listen to the pernicious counsels of the factious prelate and his mischievous coadjutors. Thus terminated what may be called the convulsive struggle of the Peninsular war. Up to that period a remarkable similarity of feeling and mode of acting betrayed the common origin of the Spanish and Portuguese people; a wild impatience of foreign aggression, extravagant pride, vain boasting, and a passionate reckless resentment, were common to both; but there the likeness ceased, and the finer marks of national character which had been impressed upon them by their different positions in the political world, became distinctly visible.

Spain, holding, from time immemorial, a high rank among the great powers, and more often an oppressor than oppressed, haughtily rejected all advice. Unconscious of her actual weakness and ignorance, and remembering only her former dignity, she ridiculously assumed an attitude which would scarcely have suited her in the days of Charles V.; whereas Portugal, always fearing

the ambition of a powerful neighbor, and relying for safety as much upon her alliances as upon her own intrinsic strength, was from habit inclined to prudent calculation, and readily submitted to the direction of England. The turbulence of the first led to defeat and disaster; the docility and patience of the second were productive of the most beneficial results.

The difference between these nations was, however, not immediately perceptible. At the period of the convention the Portuguese were despised, while a splendid triumph was anticipated for the Spaniards. It was affirmed and believed, that from every quarter enthusiastic multitudes of the latter were pressing forward to complete the destruction of a baffled and dispirited enemy; the vigor, the courage, the unmatched spring of Spanish patriotism, was in every man's mouth; Napoleon's power and energy seemed weak in opposition. Few persons doubted the truth of such tales, and yet nothing could be more unsound, more eminently fallacious, than the generally entertained opinion of French weakness and of Spanish strength. The resources of the former were unbounded, almost untouched; those of the latter were too slender even to support the weight of victory; in Spain the whole structure of society was shaken to pieces by the violence of an effort which merely awakened the slumbering strength of France. Foresight, promptitude, arrangement, marked the proceedings of Napoleon, but with the Spaniards the counsels of prudence were punished as treason, and personal interests, everywhere springing up with incredible force, wrestled against the public good. At a distance the insurrection appeared of towering proportions and mighty strength, when, in truth, it was a fantastic object, stained with blood, and tottering from weakness. The helping hand of England alone was stretched forth for its support; all other assistance was denied, for the continental powers, although nourishing secret hopes of profit from the struggle, with calculating policy, turned coldly from the patriots' cause. The English Cabinet was indeed sanguine, and resolute to act, yet the ministers, while anticipating success in a preposterous manner, displayed little industry, and less judgment, in their preparations for the struggle; nor does it appear that the real freedom of the Peninsula was much considered in their councils. They contemplated this astonishing insurrection as a mere military opening through which Napoleon might be assailed, and they neglected, or rather feared, to look towards the great moral consequences of such a stupendous event—consequences which were, indeed, above their reach of policy: they were neither able nor willing to seize such a singularly propitious occasion for conferring a benefit upon mankind.