

peated; this was a matter that involved the interests, and, of course, stimulated the activity of a multitude of monks and priests, who found no difficulty in persuading an ignorant and bigoted people that the aggressive stranger was also the enemy of religion and accursed of God. With processions, miracles, prophecies, distribution of reliques, and the appointment of saints to the command of the armies, they fanaticized the mass of the patriots, and in every part of the Peninsula the clergy were distinguished for their active zeal; monks and friars were invariably either leaders in the tumults, or at the side of those who were, instigating them to barbarous actions. Bonaparte found the same cause produce similar effects during his early campaigns in Italy; and if the shape of that country had been as favorable for protracted resistance, and a like support had been furnished by Great Britain, the patriots of Spain would have been rivalled by modern Romans.*

The continental system of mercantile exclusion was another spring of this complicated machinery. It threatened to lessen the already decayed commerce of the maritime towns, and the contraband trade, which has always been carried on in Spain to an incredible extent, was certain of destruction; with that trade the fate of one hundred thousand excise and custom-house officers was involved.† It required but a small share of penetration to perceive that a system of armed revenue officers, organized after the French manner and stimulated by a vigorous administration, would quickly put an end to the smuggling, which was, in truth, only a consequence of monopolies and internal restrictions upon the trade of one province with another—vexations abolished by the constitution of Bayonne: hence all the activity and intelligence of the merchants engaged in foreign trade, and all the numbers and lawless violence of the smugglers were enlisted in the cause of the country, swelling the ranks of the insurgent patriots; and hence, also, the readiness of the Gibraltar merchants to advance the loan before spoken of.

The state of civilization in Spain was likewise exactly suited to an insurrection; for if the people had been a little more enlightened they would have joined the French—if very enlightened, the invasion could not have happened at all. But in a country where the comforts of civilized society are less needed and therefore less attended to than in any other part of Europe, where the warmth and dryness of the climate render it no sort of privation, or even inconvenience, to sleep for the greatest part of the year in the open air, and where the universal custom is to go armed, it was not dif-

* Napoleon's Mémoires, Campagne d'Italie, Venise.

† Wellesley's letter to Burrard. Appendix, No. 9.

ficult for any energetic man to assemble and keep together large masses of the credulous peasantry. No story could be too gross for their belief, if it agreed with their wishes. "Es verdad, los dicen"—"It is true, they say it"—is the invariable answer of a Spaniard if a doubt be expressed of the truth of an absurd report. Temperate, possessing little furniture, and generally hoarding all the gold he can get, he is less concerned for the loss of his house than the inhabitant of another country would be, and the effort that he makes in relinquishing his abode must not be measured by the scale of an Englishman's exertion in a like case; once engaged in an adventure, the lightness of his spirits and the brilliancy of his sky make it a matter of indifference to the angry peasant whither he wanders.

The evils which had afflicted the country previous to the period of the French interference also tended to prepare the Spaniards for violence, and aided in turning that violence against the intruders. Famine, oppression, poverty, and disease, the loss of commerce, and unequal taxation, had pressed sorely upon them. For such a system the people could not be enthusiastic; but they were taught to believe that Godoy was the sole author of the misery they suffered, that Ferdinand would redress their grievances—and as the French were the protectors of the former and the oppressors of the latter, it was easy to add this bitterness to their natural hatred of the domination of a stranger, and it was so done.*

Such were the principal causes which combined to produce this surprising revolution, from which so many great events flowed, without one man of eminent talent being cast up to control or direct the spirit thus accidentally excited. Nothing more directly shows the heterogeneous nature of the feelings and interests which were brought together than this last fact, which cannot be attributed to a deficiency of natural talent, for the genius of the Spanish people is notoriously ardent, subtle, and vigorous; but there was no common bond of feeling save that of individual hatred to the French, which a great man could lay hold of to influence large masses. Persons of sagacity perceived very early that the Spanish revolution, like a leafy shrub in a violent gale of wind, greatly agitated, but disclosing only slight unconnected stems, afforded no sure hold for the ambition of a master-spirit, if such there were. It was clear that the cause would fail unless supported by England; and then England would direct all, and not suffer her resources to be wielded for the glory of an individual whose views and policy might afterwards thwart her own; nor was it difficult to perceive that the downfall

* Historia de la Guerra contra Napoleon.

of Napoleon, not the regeneration of Spain, was the object of her cabinet.

The explosion of public feeling was fierce in its expression, because political passions will always be vehement at the first moment of their appearance among a people new to civil commotion, and unused to permit their heat to evaporate in public discussions. The result was certainly a wonderful change in the affairs of Europe—it seems yet undecided whether that change has been for the better or for the worse; and in the progress of their struggle the Spaniards certainly developed more cruelty than courage, more violence than intrepidity, more personal hatred of the French than enthusiasm for their own cause. They opened, indeed, a wide field for the exertions of others, they presented a fulcrum upon which a lever was rested that moved the civilized world, but assuredly the presiding genius, the impelling power, came from another quarter; useful accessories they were, but as principals they displayed neither wisdom, spirit, nor skill sufficient to resist the prodigious force by which they were assailed. If they appeared at first heedless of danger, it was not because they were prepared to perish rather than submit, but that they were reckless of provoking a power whose terrors they could not estimate, and in their ignorance despised.

It is, however, not surprising that great expectations were at first formed of the heroism of the Spaniards, and those expectations were greatly augmented by their agreeable qualities. There is not upon the face of the earth a people so attractive in the friendly intercourse of society. Their majestic language, fine persons, and becoming dress, their lively imaginations, the inexpressible beauty of their women, and the air of romance which they throw over every action, and infuse into every feeling, all combine to delude the senses and to impose upon the judgment. As companions, they are incomparably the most agreeable of mankind, but danger and disappointment attend the man who, confiding in their promises and energy, ventures upon a difficult enterprise. "Never do to-day what you can put off until to-morrow," is the favorite proverb in Spain, and rigidly followed.

CHAPTER IV.

New French corps formed in Navarre—Duhesme fixes himself at Barcelona—Importance of that city—Napoleon's military plan and arrangements.

THE commotion of Aranjuez undeceived the French Emperor he perceived that he was engaged in a delicate enterprise, and that the people he had to deal with were anything but tame and quiescent under insult. Determined, however, to persevere, he pursued his political intrigues, and without relinquishing the hope of a successful termination to the affair by such means, he arranged a profound plan of military operations, and so distributed his forces, that at the moment when Spain was pouring forth her swarthy bands, the masses of the French army were concentrated upon the most important points, and combined in such a manner, that, from their central position, they had the power of overwhelming each separate province, no three of which could act in concert without first beating a French corps. And if any of the Spanish armies succeeded in routing a French force, the remaining corps could unite without difficulty, and retreat without danger. It was the skill of this disposition which enabled seventy thousand men, covering a great extent of country, to brave the simultaneous fury of a whole nation; an army less ably distributed would have been trampled under foot, and lost amidst the tumultuous uproar of eleven millions of people.

In a political point of view the inconvenience which would have arisen from suffering a regular army to take the field, was evident. To have been able to characterize the opposition of the Spanish people as a partial insurrection of peasants, instigated by some evil-disposed persons to act against the wishes of the respectable part of the nation, would have given some color to the absorbing darkness of the invasion. And to have permitted that which was at first an insurrection of peasants, to take the form and consistence of regular armies and methodical warfare, would have been a military error dangerous in the extreme. Napoleon, who well knew that scientific war is only a wise application of force, laughed at the delusion of those who regarded the want of a regular army as a favorable circumstance, and who hailed the undisciplined peasant as the more certain defender of the country. He knew that a general insurrection can never last long, that it is a military anarchy, and incapable of real strength; he knew that it was the disciplined battalions of Valley Forge, not the volunteers of Lexington, that established American independence; that it was the veterans of Arcole and

Marengo, not the republicans of Valmy, that fixed the fate of the French Revolution. Hence his efforts were directed to hinder the Spaniards from drawing together any great body of regular soldiers, an event that might easily happen, for the gross amount of the organized Spanish force was, in the month of May, about one hundred and twenty-seven thousand men of all arms. Fifteen thousand of these were in Holstein, under the Marquis of Romana, but twenty thousand were already partially concentrated in Portugal, and the remainder, in which were comprised eleven thousand Swiss and thirty thousand militia, were dispersed in various parts of the kingdom, principally in Andalusia. Besides this force, there was a sort of local reserve called the urban militia, much neglected indeed, and more a name than a reality, yet the advantage of such an institution was considerable; men were to be had in abundance, and as the greatest difficulty in a sudden crisis is to prepare the framework of order, it was no small resource to find a plan of service ready, the principle of which was understood by the people.*

The French army in the Peninsula about the same period, although amounting to eighty thousand men, exclusive of those under Junot in Portugal, had not more than seventy thousand capable of active operations; the remainder were sick or in *dépôts*. The possession of the fortresses, the central position, and the combination of this comparatively small army, gave it great strength, but it had also many points of weakness; it was made up of the conscripts of different nations, French, Swiss, Italians, Poles, and even Portuguese whom Junot had expatriated; and it is a curious fact, that some of the latter remained in Spain until the end of the war. A few of the imperial guards were also employed, and here and there, an old regiment of the line was mixed with the young troops to give them consistence; yet with these exceptions the French army must be considered as a raw levy, fresh from the plough and unacquainted with discipline; † so late even as the month of August, many of the battalions had not completed the first elements of their drill, ‡ and if they had not been formed upon good skeletons, the difference between them and the insurgent peasantry would have been very trifling. § This fact explains, in some measure, the otherwise incomprehensible checks and defeats which the French sustained at the commencement of the contest, and it likewise proves how little of vigor there was in Spanish resistance at the moment of the greatest enthusiasm.

* *Historia de la Guerra contra Napoleon Bonaparte.*

† Napoleon's notes. Appendix, No. 3.

‡ Thiebault.

§ Dupont's Journal, MS.

In the distribution of these troops Napoleon attended principally to the security of Madrid. As the capital, and the centre of all interests, its importance was manifest, and the great line of communication between it and Bayonne was early and constantly covered with troops. But the imprudence with which the Grand Duke of Berg brought up the corps of Monecy and Dupont to the capital, together with his own haughty, impolitic demeanor, drew on the crisis of affairs before the time was ripe, obliged the French monarch to hasten the advance of other troops, and to make a greater display of his force than was consistent with his policy. For Murat's movement, while it threatened the Spaniards and provoked their hostility, isolated the French army, by stripping the line of communication, and the arrival of fresh battalions to remedy this error generated additional anger and suspicion at a very critical period.

It was, however, absolutely necessary to fill the void left by Monecy's advance, and a fresh corps sent into Navarre, being by successive reinforcements increased to twenty-three thousand men, received in June the name of the "army of the Western Pyrenees."* Marshal Bessieres assumed the command, and, on the first appearance of commotion, fixed his headquarters at Burgos, occupied Vittoria, Miranda de Ebro, and other towns, and pushed advanced posts into Leon. This position, while it protected the line from Bayonne to the capital, enabled him to awe the Asturias and Biscay, and also by giving him the command of the valley of the Duero to keep the kingdom of Leon and the province of Segovia in check. The town and castle of Burgos, put into a state of defence, contained his dépôts and became the centre and pivot of his operations, while intermediate posts, and the fortresses, connected him with Bayonne, where a reserve of twenty thousand men was formed under General Drouet, then commanding the eleventh military division of France.

By the convention of Fontainebleau, the Emperor was entitled to send forty thousand men into the northern parts of Spain, and though the right thus acquired was grossly abused, the exercise of it, being expected, created at first but little alarm; it was however different on the eastern frontier. Napoleon had never intimated a wish to pass forces by Catalonia, neither the treaty nor the convention authorized such a measure, nor could the pretence of supporting Junot in Portugal be advanced as a mask;† nevertheless, so early as the 9th of February eleven thousand infantry, sixteen hundred cavalry, and eighteen pieces of artillery, under the command of

* Napoleon's notes. Appendix, No. 2.

† St. Cyr.

VOL. I.—D

General Duhesme,* had crossed the frontier at La Jonquera, and marched upon Barcelona, leaving a detachment at the town of Figueras, the strong citadel of which commands the principal pass of the mountains. Arrived at Barcelona, Duhesme prolonged his residence there, under the pretext of waiting for instructions from Madrid relative to a pretended march upon Cadiz;† but his secret orders were to obtain exact information concerning the Catalonian fortresses, dépôts, and magazines,—to ascertain the state of public feeling,—to preserve a rigid discipline,—scrupulously to avoid giving any offence to the Spaniards, and to enter into close communication with Marshal Moncey, at that time commanding the whole of the French army in the north of Spain.

The political affairs were then beginning to indicate serious results, and as soon as the troops in the north were in a condition to execute their orders, Duhesme, whose report had been received, was directed to seize upon the citadel of Barcelona and the fort of Monjuick. The citadel was obtained by stratagem; the fort, one of the strongest in the world, was surrendered by the governor, Alvarez, because that brave and worthy man knew that from a base court he should receive no support. It is said that, stung by the disgrace of his situation, he was at one time ready to spring a mine beneath the French detachments, yet his mind, betraying his spirit, sank under the weight of unexpected events. What a picture of human weakness do these affairs present!—the boldest shrinking from the discharge of their trust like the meanest cowards, the wisest following the march of events, confounded, and without a rule of action! If such a firm man as Alvarez afterwards proved himself to be, could think the disgrace of surrendering his charge at the demand of an insolent and perfidious guest, a smaller misfortune than the anger of a miserable court, what must the state of public feeling have been, and how can those who, like O'Farril and Azanza, served the intruder, be with justice blamed, if, amidst the general stagnation, they could not perceive the elements of a salutary tempest? At the view of such scenes Napoleon might well enlarge his ambitious designs; his fault was not in the projection, but in the rough execution of his plan; another combination would have insured success, and the resistance he encountered only shows that nations, like individuals, are but the creatures of circumstances, at one moment weak, trembling, and submissive, at another proud, haughty, and daring; every novel combination of events has an effect upon public sentiment distinct from, and often at variance with what is called national character.

* Napoleon's notes. Appendix, No. 2.

† Duhesme's instructions, Jan. 28th. Vide St. Cyr.

The treacherous game played at Barcelona was renewed at Figueras, with equal success; the citadel of that place fell into the hands of the detachment left there; a free entrance, and a secure base of operations, was thus established in Catalonia; and when the magazines of Barcelona were filled, Duhesme, whose corps took the name of the "army of the Eastern Pyrenees," concluded that his task was well accomplished. The affair was indeed a momentous one, and Napoleon earnestly looked for its termination before the transactions at Madrid could give an unfavorable impression of his ulterior intentions; for he saw the importance which, under certain circumstances, a war would confer upon Barcelona, which, with its immense population, great riches, good harbor, and strong forts, might be called the key of the south of France or Spain, just as it happened to be in the possession of the one or the other nation. The proximity of Sicily, where a large British force was kept in a state of constant preparation, made it more than probable that an English army would be quickly carried to Barcelona, and a formidable systematic war be established upon the threshold of France; and hence Napoleon, seeing the extent of the danger, obviated it, at the risk of rendering abortive the attempt to create a French party in Madrid. The greater evil of finding an English army at Barcelona left no room for hesitation; thirty or forty thousand British troops occupying an intrenched camp in front of that town, supported by a powerful fleet, and having reserve dépôts in Sicily and the Spanish islands, might have been so wielded as to give ample occupation to a hundred and fifty thousand enemies. Under the protection of such an army, the Spanish levies might have been organized and instructed; and as the actual numbers assembled could have been easily masked, increased, or diminished, and the fleet always ready to co-operate, the south of France, whence the provisions of the enemy must have been drawn, would have been exposed to descents, and all the inconvenience of actual hostilities. The Spanish provinces of València, Murcia, and even Andalusia, being thus covered, the war would have been drawn to a head, and concentrated about Catalonia, the most war-like, rugged, sterile portion of Spain. Duhesme's success put an end to this danger, and the affairs of Barcelona sank into comparative insignificance; nevertheless, that place was carefully watched, the troops were increased to twenty-two thousand men, their General corresponded directly with Napoleon, and Barcelona became the centre of a system distinct from that which held the other corps rolling round Madrid as their point of attraction.

The capital of Spain is situated in a sort of basin, formed by a semi-circular range of mountains, which, under the different denom-

inations of the Sierra de Guadarama, the Carpentanos and the Sierra de Guadalaxara, sweep in one unbroken chain from east to west, touching the Tagus at either end of an arch, of which that river is the chord. All direct communication between Madrid and France, or between the former and the northern provinces of Spain, must therefore necessarily pass over one or other of these Sierras, which are separated from the great range of the Pyrenees by the valley of the Ebro, and from the Biscayan and Asturian mountains by the valley of the Duero.

Now the principal roads which lead from France directly upon Madrid are four.

The first a royal causeway, which, passing the frontier at Iran, runs under St. Sebastian, and through a wild and mountainous country, full of dangerous defiles, to the Ebro. It crosses that river by a stone bridge at Miranda, goes to Burgos, and then turning short to the left, is carried over the Duero at Aranda. Afterwards encountering the Carpentanos and the Sierra de Guadalaxara, it penetrates them by the strong pass of the Somosierra, and descends upon the capital.

The second, which is an inferior road, commences at St. Jean Pied de Port, unites with the first at Pampeluna, runs through Taffalla, crosses the Ebro at Tudela, and enters the basin of Madrid by the eastern range of the Sierra de Guadalaxara, where the declination of the mountains presents a less rugged barrier than the snowy summits of the northern and western part of the chain.

The third threads the Pyrenees by the way of Jaca, passes the Ebro at Zaragoza, and uniting with the second, likewise crosses the Guadalaxara ridge.

The fourth is the great route from Perpignan by Figueras, Gerona, Barcelona, Cervera, Lerida, and Zaragoza, to Madrid.

Thus Zaragoza, which contained fifty thousand inhabitants and was one of the great Spanish magazines for arms, furnished a point of union for two great roads, and was consequently of strategic importance. An army in position there could operate on either bank of the Ebro, intercept the communication between the Eastern and Western Pyrenees, and block three out of the four great routes to Madrid. If the French had occupied it in force, their army in the capital would have been free and unconstrained in its operations, and might have acted with more security against Valencia, and the danger from the united forces of Galicia and Leon would also have been diminished when the road of Burgos ceased to be the only line of retreat from the capital. Nevertheless, Napoleon neglected Zaragoza at first, because, having no citadel, a small body of troops could not control the inhabitants, and a large force, by

creating suspicion too soon, would have prevented the success of the attempts against Pampeluna and Barcelona, objects of still greater importance; neither was the heroic defence afterwards made within a reasonable calculation.

The Grand Duke of Berg and the Duke of Rovigo remained at Madrid, and from that central point appeared to direct the execution of the French Emperor's projects; but he distrusted their judgment, and exacted the most detailed information of every movement and transaction. In the course of June, Murat, who was suffering from illness, quitted Spain, leaving behind him a troubled people and a name for cruelty which was foreign to his character. Savary remained the sole representative of the new monarch, and his situation was delicate. He was in the midst of a great commotion, and as upon every side he beheld the violence of insurrection and the fury of an insulted nation, it behoved him to calculate with coolness and to execute with vigor. Each Spanish province had its own junta of government, and they were alike enraged, yet not alike dangerous in their anger. The attention of the Catalonians was completely absorbed by Duhesme's operations, but the soldiers which had composed the Spanish garrisons of Barcelona, Monjuick, and Figueras, quitted their ranks after the seizure of those places, and joined the patriotic standards in Murcia and Valencia; the greatest part belonged to the Spanish and Walloon guards, and they formed a good basis for an army which the riches of the two provinces and the arsenal of Carthagena afforded ample military resources to equip.* The French had, however, nothing to fear from any direct movement of this army against Madrid, as such an operation could only bring on a battle; but if, by a march towards Zaragoza, the Valencians had united with the Aragonese, and then operated against the line of communication with France, the insurrection of Catalonia would have been supported and the point of union for three great provinces fixed. In the power of executing this project lay the sting of the Valencian insurrection, and to besiege Zaragoza and prevent such a junction was the remedy.

The importance of Andalusia was greater. The regular troops which, under the command of the unhappy Solano, had been withdrawn from Portugal, were tolerably disciplined; a large veteran force was assembled at the camp of San Roque, under General Castaños, and the garrisons of Ceuta, Algeziras, Cadiz, Granada and other places, being united, the whole formed a considerable army, while a superb cannon foundry at Seville and the arsenal at Cadiz furnished the means of equipping a train of artillery. An

* Cabane's War in Catalonia, 1st Part.

active intercourse was maintained between the patriots and the English, and the Juntas of Granada, Jaen and Cordova, and the army of Estremadura, admitted the supremacy of the Junta of Seville. Thus Andalusia, rich, distant from the capital, and well fenced by the Sierra Morena, afforded the means to establish a systematic war, by drawing together all the scattered elements of resistance in the southern and western provinces of Spain and Portugal.* This danger, pregnant with future consequences, was, however, not immediate; there was no line of offensive moment against the flank or rear of the French army open to the Andalusian patriots, and as a march to the front, against Madrid, would have been tedious and dangerous, the true policy of the Andalusians was palpably defensive.

In Estremadura, neither the activity nor means of the Junta were at first sufficient to excite much attention; but in Leon, Old Castile, and Galicia, a cloud was gathering that threatened a perilous storm. Don Gregorio Cuesta was Captain-General of the two former kingdoms. Inimical to popular movements, and of a haughty, resolute disposition, he at first checked the insurrection with a rough hand, and thus laid the foundation for quarrels and intrigues, which afterwards impeded the military operations and split the northern provinces into factions; yet finally he joined the side of the patriots. Behind him the kingdom of Galicia, under the direction of Filanghieri, had prepared a large and efficient force, chiefly composed of the strong and disciplined body of troops which, under the command of Tarranco, had taken possession of Oporto, and after that general's death had returned with Belesta to Galicia: the garrisons of Ferrol and Coruña, and a number of soldiers flying from the countries occupied by the French, swelled this army; the agents of Great Britain were active to blow the flame of insurrection, and money, arms and clothing were poured into the province through their hands, because Coruña afforded an easy and direct intercourse with England. A strict connection was also maintained between the Gallician and Portuguese patriots, and the facility of establishing the base of a regular systematic war in Galicia was therefore as great as in Andalusia,—the resources were perhaps greater, on account of the proximity of Great Britain, and the advantage of position at this time was essentially in favor of Galicia, because, while the sources of her strength were as well covered from the direct line of the French operations, the slightest offensive movement upon her part, by threatening the communications of the French army in Madrid, endangered the safety of any corps marching from the capital against the southern provinces.

* Mr. Stuart's Letters; vide Parliamentary Papers, 1810.

To be prepared against the Gallician forces was, therefore, a matter of pressing importance; a defeat from that quarter would have been felt in all parts of the army, and no considerable or sustained operation could be undertaken against the other insurgent forces until the strength of Galicia had been first broken.

Biscay and the Asturias wanted regular troops and fortified towns, and the contracted shape of those provinces placed them completely within the power of the French, who had nothing to fear as long as they could maintain possession of the seaports.

From this sketch it results that Savary, in classing the dangers of his situation, should have rated Galicia and Leon in the first, Zaragoza in the second, Andalusia in the third, and Valencia in the fourth rank, and by that scale he should have regulated his operations. It was thus Napoleon looked at the affair, but the Duke of Rovigo, wavering in his opinions, neglected or misunderstood the spirit of his instructions, lost the control of the operations, and sunk amidst the confusion which he had himself created.

Nearly fifty thousand French and eighty guns were disposable for offensive operations in the beginning of June; collected into one mass, such an army was more than sufficient to crush any or all of the insurgent armies combined, but it was necessary to divide it, and to assail several points at the same time. In doing this, the safety of each minor body depended upon the stability of the central point from whence it emanated, and again the security of that centre depended upon the strength of its communications with France; in other words, Bayonne was the base of operations against Madrid, and Madrid in turn became the base of operations against Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia. To combine all the movements of a vast plan, which would embrace the operations against Catalonia, Aragon, Biscay, the Asturias, Galicia, Leon, Castile, Andalusia, Murcia, and Valencia, in such a simple manner as that the corps of the army working upon one principle might mutually support and strengthen each other, and at the same time preserve their communication with France, was the great problem to be solved. Napoleon felt that it required a master mind, and from Bayonne he put all the different armed masses in motion himself, and with the greatest caution; for it is a mistaken notion, although one very generally entertained, that he plunged headlong into the contest, without foresight, as having to do with adversaries he despised.

In his instructions to the Duke of Rovigo, he says: "*In a war of this sort it is necessary to act with patience, coolness, and upon calculation.*" "*In civil wars it is the important points only which should be guarded—we must not go to all places;*" and he inculcates the doctrine, that to spread the troops over the country without the

power of uniting upon emergency, would be a dangerous display of activity. The principle upon which he proceeded may be illustrated by the comparison of a closed hand thrust forward and the fingers afterwards extended: as long as the solid part of the member was securely fixed and guarded, the return of the smaller portions of it and their flexible movement was feasible and without great peril; whereas a wound given to the hand or arm, not only endangered that part, but paralyzed the action of the whole limb. Hence all the care and attention with which his troops were arranged along the road to Burgos; hence all the measures of precaution already described, such as the seizure of the fortresses and the formation of the reserves at Bayonne.

The insurrection having commenced, Bessieres was ordered to put Burgos into a state of defence,—to detach a division of four or five thousand men, under General Lefebre Desnouettes, against Zaragoza,—to keep down the insurgents of Biscay, Asturias, and Old Castile,—and to observe the army assembling in Galicia; he was likewise enjoined to occupy and watch with jealous care the port of Santander and the coast towns. A reinforcement of nine thousand men was also prepared for Duhesme, which, it was supposed, would enable him to tranquillize Catalonia, and co-operate with a division marching from Madrid against Valencia. The reserve under General Drouet was nourished by drafts from the interior; it supplied Bessieres with reinforcements, and afforded a detachment of four thousand men to watch the openings of the valleys of the Pyrenees, especially towards the Castle of Jaca, then in possession of the Spanish insurgents.* A smaller reserve was established at Perpignan, another body watched the openings of the eastern frontier; and all the generals commanding corps, or even detachments, were directed to correspond daily with General Drouet.

The security of the rear being thus provided for, the main body at Madrid commenced offensive operations. Marshal Moncey was directed, with part of his corps, upon Cuença, to intercept the march of the Valencian army upon Zaragoza;† General Dupont, with ten thousand men, marched towards Cadiz, and the remainder of his and Moncey's troops being kept in reserve, were distributed in various parts of La Mancha and the neighborhood of Madrid. Napoleon likewise directed that Segovia should be occupied and put in a state of defence; that Gobert's division of Moncey's corps should co-operate with Bessieres on the side of Valladolid, and that movable columns should scour the country in rear of the acting bodies, uniting again at stated times, upon points of secondary

* Napoleon's notes. Appendix, No. 2.

† Journal of Moncey's Operations, MS.

interest.* Thus linking his operations together, Napoleon hoped, by grasping as it were the ganglia of the insurrection, to paralyze its force, and reduce it to a few convulsive motions, which would soon subside; the execution of his plan failed in the feeble hands of his lieutenants, but it was well conceived, embraced every probable immediate chance of war, and even provided for the uncertain contingency of an English army landing upon the flank or rear of his corps, at either extremity of the Pyrenean frontier.

Military men would do well to reflect upon the prudence which the French Emperor displayed upon this occasion. Not all his experience, his power, his fortune, nor the contempt which he felt for the prowess of his adversaries, could induce him to relax in his precautions; every chance was considered, and every measure calculated with as much care and circumspection as if the most redoubtable enemy was opposed to him. The conqueror of Europe was as fearful of making false movements before an army of peasants as if Frederick the Great had been in his front—and yet he failed! Such is the uncertainty of war!

CHAPTER V.

First operations of Marshal Bessieres—Spaniards defeated at Cabeçon, at Segovia, at Logrono, at Torquemada—French take Santander—Lefebvre Desnouettes defeats the Spaniards on the Ebro, on the Huecha, on the Xalon—First siege of Zaragoza—Observations.

As all the insurrections of the Spanish provinces took place nearly at the same period, the operations of the French divisions were nearly simultaneous; I shall, therefore, narrate their proceedings separately, classing them by the effect each produced upon the stability of the intrusive government of Madrid.

OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL BESSIERES.

This officer had scarcely fixed his quarters at Burgos when a general movement of revolt took place.† On his right, the Bishop of Santander excited the inhabitants of the diocese to take arms.‡ In his rear, a mechanic assembled some thousand armed peasants at the town of Logrono. In front, five thousand men took possession of the Spanish artillery dépôt at Segovia, and an equal num-

* Napoleon's notes. Appendix, No. 1.

† Moniteur.

‡ Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.

ber assembling at Palencia, advanced to the town of Torquemada, while General Cuesta, with some regular troops and a body of organized peasantry, took post on the Pisuerga at Cabeçon.

Bessieres immediately divided his disposable force, which was not more than twelve thousand men, into several columns, and traversing the country in all directions, disarmed the towns and interrupted the combinations of the insurgents, while a division of Dupont's corps, under General Frere, marched from the side of Madrid to aid his efforts. General Verdier attacked Logrono on the 6th of June, dispersed the peasantry, and put the leaders to death after the action. General Lasalle, departing from Burgos with a brigade of light cavalry, passed the Pisuerga, fell upon the Spaniards at Torquemada on the 7th, broke them, and pursuing with a merciless sword, burnt that town, and entered Palencia on the 8th. Meanwhile Frere defeated the Spanish force at Segovia, taking thirty pieces of artillery; and General Merle, marching through the country lying between the Pisuerga and the Duero with a division of infantry, joined Lasalle at Duenas on the 12th; from thence they proceeded to Cabeçon, where Cuesta accepting battle, he was overthrown with much slaughter, the loss of his artillery, and several thousand muskets.

The flat country being thus subdued, Lasalle's cavalry remained to keep it under, while Merle, marching northward, commenced operations, in concert with General Ducos, against the province of Santander. On the 20th, the latter General drove the Spaniards from the pass of Soncillo; on the 21st, he forced the pass of Venta de Escudo, and descending the valley of the river Pas, approached Santander; on the 22d, Merle, after some resistance, penetrating by Lantueno, followed the course of the Besaya to Torre La Vega, then turning to his right, entered Santander on the 23d. Ducos arrived at the same time, the town submitted, and the Bishop fled, with the greatest part of the clergy. The authorities of Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia and Santander were then compelled to send deputies to take the oath of allegiance to Joseph. By these operations the above-named provinces were completely disarmed, and so awed by the activity of Bessieres that no further insurrections took place; his cavalry raised contributions and collected provisions without the least difficulty. Frere's division then returned to Toledo, and from thence marched to San Clemente, on the borders of Murcia.

While Bessieres thus broke the northern insurrections, the march of General Lefebvre Desnouettes against the province of Aragon brought on the first siege of Zaragoza. To that place had flocked from the most distant parts soldiers, flying from Madrid and Pam-

peluna, the engineers of the school of Alcala, and all the retired officers in Aragon.* With their assistance Palafox's forces were rapidly organized, and numerous battalions were posted on the roads leading to Navarre. The Baron de Versage, an officer of the Walloon guards, occupied Calatayud with a regiment composed of students, and made a levy there to protect the powder mills of Villa Felice, and to keep a communication with Soria and Sigüenza. The arsenal of Zaragoza supplied the patriots with arms; the people of Tudela broke their bridge on the Ebro, and Palafox reinforced them with five hundred fusileers.

It was in this situation of affairs Lefebvre commenced his march from Pampeluna on the 7th of June, at the head of three or four thousand infantry, some field batteries, and a regiment of Polish cavalry.† On the 9th he forced the passage of the Ebro, put the leaders of the insurrection to death after the action, and then continued his movement by the right bank to the Mallen.‡ On the Huecha, Palafox, with ten thousand infantry, two hundred dragoons, and eight pieces of artillery, disputed the passage, but on the 13th he was overthrown. The 14th the French reached the Xalon, where another combat and another victory carried Lefebvre across that river. The 15th he was on the Huerba, in front of the heroic city.

FIRST SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.

Zaragoza contained fifty thousand inhabitants. Situated on the right bank of the Ebro, it was connected with a suburb on the opposite side by a handsome stone bridge. Its immediate vicinity was flat, and on the side of the suburb low and marshy. The small river Huerba, running through a deep cleft, cut the plain on the right bank, and taking its course close to the walls, fell into the Ebro nearly opposite to the mouth of the Gallego, which, descending from the mountains on the opposite side, also cut the plain on the left bank. The convent of St. Joseph, built on the right of the Huerba, covered a bridge over that torrent, and at the distance of cannon-shot a step of land commenced, which, gradually rising, terminated at eighteen hundred yards from the convent, in a hill called the Monte Torrero. On this hill, which commanded all the plain, and overlooked the town, several storehouses, built for the use of the canal, were intrenched, and occupied by twelve hundred men, and the canal itself, a noble work, furnished water carriage without a single lock from Tudela to Zaragoza.§

* Cavallero.

† S. Journal of Lefebvre's Operations, MSS.

‡ Moniteur. Victoires et Conquêtes des Français. Cavallero.

§ Cavallero. Siege of Zaragoza.

The city, surrounded by a low brick wall, presented no regular defences, and possessed very few guns in a serviceable state; but the houses were strongly constructed, and for the most part of two stories, each story vaulted, so as to be nearly fire-proof. Every house had its garrison, and the massive convents, rising like castles around the circuit and inside the place, were crowded with armed men. Such was Zaragoza when Lefebre Desnouettes appeared before it, his previous movements having cut the direct communication with Calatayud, and obliged the Baron Versage to retire to Belchite with his volunteers and fresh levies.

Palafox had occupied the olive groves and houses on the step of land between the convent of St. Joseph and Monte Torrero, but his men, cowed by their previous defeats, were easily driven from thence on the 16th.* The town was then closely invested on the right bank of the Ebro, and so great was the terror of the Spaniards, that some of the French, penetrating without difficulty into the street of St. Engracia, were like to have taken the city.† Palafox, accompanied by his brother Francisco, an aid-de-camp, and one hundred dragoons, endeavored, under pretence of seeking succor, to go forth on the side of the suburb at the moment when the French were entering on the side of Engracia; but the plebeian leaders, suspicious of his intentions, would not suffer him to depart without a guard of infantry, commanded by *Tio*, or goodman Jorge. It was this person and *Tio* Marin who by their energy contributed most to the defence of the city in the first siege; but for them Palafox, who has gathered the honors, would have fled at one gate while the enemy was pressing in at another,—and Zaragoza was then on the verge of destruction, for the streets were filled with clamor, the troops making little resistance, and all things in confusion. But the French, either fearful of an ambuscade or ignorant of their advantages, suddenly retired, and then the people, as if inspired, changed from the extreme of terror to that of courage, suddenly fell to casting up defences, piercing loop-holes in the walls of the houses, and constructing ramparts with sand-bags,—working with such vigor that, under the direction of their engineers, in twenty-four hours they put the place in a condition to withstand an assault. Whereupon Lefebre, confining his operations to the right bank of the Ebro, established posts close to the gates, and waited for reinforcements.

Meanwhile Palafox, crossing the Ebro at Pina, joined Versage at Belchite, and having collected seven or eight thousand men, and four pieces of artillery, gained the Xalon in rear of the French.

* S. Journal of Lefebre's Operations, MSS.

† Cavallero.

From thence he proposed to advance through Epila and relieve Zaragoza by a battle, but his officers, amazed at this project, resisted his authority, and would have retired upon Valencia.* Nevertheless, ignorant of war, and probably awed by Tio Jorge, he expressed his determination to fight, saying, with an imposing air, "that those who feared might retire." Touched with shame, all agreed to follow him to Epila, but two French regiments, detached by Lefebre, met him on the march, and the Spaniards, unable to form any order of battle, were, notwithstanding their superior numbers, defeated with the loss of three thousand men. Palafox, who did not display that firmness in danger which his speech promised, must have fled early, for he reached Calatayud in the night, although many of his troops arrived there unbroken the next morning. After this disaster, leaving Versage at Calatayud, to make fresh levies, the Spanish chief repaired, with all the beaten troops that he could collect, to Belchite, and from thence regained Zaragoza on the 2d of July.

Meanwhile Lefebre had taken the Monte Torrero by assault, and on the 29th of June was joined by General Verdier with a division of infantry and a large battering train; and being then twelve thousand strong, attacked the convents of St. Joseph and the Capuchins, the very day that Palafox returned. A first assault on St. Joseph's failed, but the second succeeded, and the Capuchins, after some fighting, was set fire to by the Spaniards and abandoned. All this time the suburb was left open and free for the besieged; and Napoleon, who blamed this mode of attack, sent orders to throw a bridge across the Ebro—to press the siege on the left bank—and to profit of the previous success, by raising a breaching battery in the convent of St. Joseph.† A bridge was accordingly constructed at St. Lambert, two hundred yards above the town, and two attacks were carried on at the same time. A change also took place in the command, for hitherto the French troops employed in the siege formed a part of Marshal Bessieres' corps, but the Emperor now directed Lefebre to rejoin that Marshal with a brigade, and then constituting the ten thousand men who remained with Verdier a separate corps, gave him the command.

Verdier continued to press the siege as closely as his numbers would permit, but around him the insurgents were rapidly organizing small armies, and threatened to inclose him in his camp, wherefore he sent detachments against them;‡ and it is singular that, with so few men, while daily fighting with the besieged, he

* Cavallero.

† S. Journal of Lefebre's Operations, MSS.

‡ Napoleon's notes. Appendix, No. 2.

should have been able to scour the country, and put down the insurrection, as far as Lerida, Barbastro, Tudela, Jacca and Calatayud, without any assistance save what the garrison of Pampeluna could give him from the side of Navarre. In one of these expeditions the powder-mills of Villa Felice, thirty miles distant, were destroyed, and the Barou Versage was defeated, and forced to retire with his division towards Valencia.*

During the course of July, Verdier made several assaults on the gate of El Carmen and the Portillo, but he was repulsed in all, and the besieged having been reinforced by the regiment of Estremadura, composed of eight hundred old soldiers, made a sally with two thousand men to retake the Monte Torrero; they were, however, beaten, with the loss of their commander, and regular approaches were then commenced by the French against the quarter of St. Engracia and the castle of Aljaferia. The 2d of August, the besieged were again reinforced by two hundred men of the Spanish guards and volunteers of Aragon, who brought some artillery with them, but the French also were strengthened by two old regiments of the line, which increased their numbers to fifteen thousand men; and on the 3d of August the breaching batteries opened against St. Engracia and Aljaferia; the mortars threw shells at the same time, and a Spanish magazine of powder blowing up in the Cosso, a public walk formed on the line of the ancient Moorish ramparts, destroyed several houses, and killed many of the defenders. The place was then summoned, but as Palafox rejected all offers, a breach in the convent of St. Engracia was stormed on the 4th. The French penetrated to the Cosso, and a confused and terrible scene ensued, for while some Spaniards defended the houses and some drew up in the streets, others fled by the suburb to the country, where the cavalry fell upon them. † Cries of treason, the sure signals for assassinations, were everywhere heard, and all seemed lost, when a column of the assailants, seeking a way to the bridge over the Ebro, got entangled in the Arco de Cineja, a long crooked street, and being attacked in that situation, were driven back to the Cosso; others began to plunder, and the Zaragozans, recovering courage, fought with desperation, and finally set fire to the convent of Francisco: at the close of day the French were in possession of one side of the Cosso, and the Spaniards of the other. A hideous and revolting spectacle was exhibited during this action, for the public hospital being set on fire, the madmen confined there issued forth among the combatants, muttering, shouting, singing, and moping, each according to the

* Cavallero.

† Ibid.

character of his disorder, while drivelling idiots mixed their unmeaning cries with the shouts of contending soldiers.*

The Spaniards now perceived that, with courage, the town might still be defended, and from that day the fighting was murderous and constant; one party endeavoring to take, the other to defend the houses. In this warfare, where skill was nearly useless, Verdier's force was too weak to make a rapid progress, and events disastrous to the French arms taking place in other parts of Spain, he received, about the 10th, orders from the King to raise the siege, and retire to Logrono. Of this operation I shall speak in due time.†

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Mere professional skill and enterprise do not constitute a great general. Lefebre Desnouettes, by his activity and boldness, with a tithe of their numbers, defeated the insurgents of Aragon in several actions, and scoured the open country; but the same Lefebre, wanting the higher qualities of a general, failed miserably where that intuitive sagacity which reads passing events aright, was required. There were thousands in the French army who could have done as well as he, probably not three who could have reduced Zaragoza; and yet it is manifest that Zaragoza owed her safety to accident, and that the desperate resistance of the inhabitants was more the result of chance than of any peculiar virtue.

2. The feeble defence made at Mallen, at the Xalon, at the Monte Torrero, at Epila; the terror of the besieged on the 16th, when the French penetrated into the town; the flight of Palafox under the pretence of seeking succor; nay, the very assault which in such a wonderful manner called forth the energy of the Zaragozans, and failed only because the French troops plundered, and, by missing the road to the bridge, missed that to victory, proves that the fate of the city was determined by accident, in more than one of those nice conjunctures, which men of genius know how to seize, but others leave to the decision of fortune. However, it must be acknowledged that Lefebre and Verdier, especially the latter, displayed both vigor and talent; for it was no mean exploit to quell the insurrections to a distance of fifty miles on every side, at the same time investing double their own numbers, and pushing the attack with such ardor as to reduce to extremity a city so defended.

3. The current romantic tales, of women rallying the troops and leading them forward at the most dangerous periods of this siege,

* Cavallero.

† S. Journal of Lefebre's Operations, MSS

I have not touched upon, and may perhaps be allowed to doubt, yet it is not unlikely that, when suddenly environed with horrors, the delicate sensitiveness of women, driving them to a kind of phrenzy, might produce actions above the heroism of men—and in patient suffering their superior fortitude is acknowledged by all nations; wherefore I neither wholly believe, nor will deny their exploits at Zaragoza, merely remarking that for a long time afterwards Spain swarmed with heroines from that city, clothed in half uniforms, and loaded with weapons.

4. The two circumstances that principally contributed to the success of the defence were, the bad discipline of the French soldiers and the system of terror which was established by the Spanish leaders, whoever those leaders were. Few soldiers can be restrained from plunder when a town is taken by assault, yet there is no period when the chances of war are so sudden and so decisive, none where the moral responsibility of a general is so great. Will military regulations alone secure the necessary discipline at such a moment? The French army are not deficient in a stern code, and the English army, taken all together, is probably the best regulated of modern times; but here it is seen that Lefebvre failed to take Zaragoza in default of discipline, and in the course of this work it will appear that no wild horde of Tartars ever fell with more license upon their rich effeminate neighbors than did the English troops upon the Spanish towns taken by storm. The inference to be drawn is, that national institutions only will produce that moral discipline necessary to make a soldier capable of fulfilling his whole duty; yet the late Lord Melville was not ashamed to declare in Parliament that the worst men make the best soldiers, and this odious, narrow-minded, unworthy maxim had its admirers. That a system of terror was at Zaragoza successfully employed to protract the defence, is undoubted. The commandant of Monte Torrero, ostensibly for suffering himself to be defeated, but according to some for the gratification of private malice, was tried and put to death. A general of artillery was in a more summary manner killed without any trial, and the chief engineer, a man of skill and undaunted courage, was arbitrarily imprisoned. The slightest word, or even gesture of discontent, was punished with instant death.* A stern band of priests and plebeian leaders, in whose hands Palafox was a tool, ruled with such furious energy that resistance to the enemy was less dangerous than disobedience to their orders: suspicion was the warrant of death; and this system, once begun, ceased not until the town was taken in the second siege.

* Cavallerc.

CHAPTER VI.

Operations in Catalonia—General Swartz marches against the town of Manresa, and General Chabran against Tarragona—French defeated at Bruch—Chabran recalled—Burns Arbos—Marches against Bruch—Retreats—Duhesme assaults Gerona—Is repulsed with loss—Action on the Llobregat—General insurrection of Catalonia—Figueras blockaded—General Reille relieves it—First siege of Gerona—The Marquis of Palacios arrives in Catalonia with the Spanish troops from the Balearic isles, declared Captain-General under St. Narcissus, re-establishes the line of the Llobregat—The Count of Caldagues forces the French lines at Gerona—Duhesme raises the siege and returns to Barcelona—Observations—Monecy marches against Valencia, defeats the Spaniards at Pajaso, at the Siete Aguas, and at Quarte—Attacks Valencia, is repulsed, marches into Murcia—Forces the passage of the Xucar, defeats Serbelloni at San Felipe, arrives at San Clemente—Insurrection at Cuença quelled by General Caulincourt—Observations.

WHEN Barcelona fell into the power of the French, the Spanish garrison amounted to nearly four thousand men, wherefore Duhesme, daily fearing a riot in the city, connived at their escape in parties, and even sent the regiment of Estremadura entire to Lerida;* but, strange to relate, the gates were shut against it! and thus discarded by both parties, it made its way into Zaragoza during the siege of that place. Many thousand citizens also fled from Barcelona and joined the patriotic standards in the neighboring provinces.

After the first ebullition at Manresa, the insurrection of Catalonia lingered awhile, yet the Junta of Gerona continued to excite the people to take arms, and it was manifest that a general commotion approached.† This was a serious affair, for there were in the beginning of June, including those who came out of Barcelona, five thousand veteran troops in the province, and in the Balearic islands above ten thousand. Sicily contained an English army, and English fleets covered the Mediterranean.‡ Moreover, by the constitution of Catalonia, the whole of the male population fit for war are obliged to assemble at certain points of each district, with arms and provisions, whenever the alarum bell, called the *somaten*, is heard to ring, hence the name of *somatenes*; and these warlike peasants, either from tradition or experience, are well acquainted with the military value of their mountain holds.

Hostilities soon commenced. Duhesme, following his instructions, detached General Chabran, with five thousand two hundred men, to secure Tarragona and Tortosa, to incorporate the Span-

* Cabanes, 1st Part.

† Napoleon's Notes.

‡ Cabanes, 1st Part.

regiment of Wimpfen with his own troops, and to aid Marshal Moncey in an attack on Valencia. At the same time General Swartz, having more than three thousand Swiss, Germans and Italians under his command, was detached by the way of Martorel and Montserrat to Manresa.* His orders were to raise contributions, to put down the insurrection, to destroy the powder mills at the last town, to get possession of Lerida, to incorporate all the Swiss troops found there in his own brigade, to place five hundred men in the citadel, and finally to penetrate into Aragon and cooperate with Lefebvre against Zaragoza.

These two columns quitted Barcelona the 3d and the 4th of June, but a heavy rain induced Swartz to halt the 5th at Martorel; the 6th he resumed his march, without any military precautions, although the object of his expedition was known, and, the somatenes ringing out among the hills, the peasants of eight districts were assembled in arms.† These men having taken a resolution to defend the pass of Bruch, the most active of the Manresa and Igualada districts, assisted by a few old soldiers, immediately repaired there, and when Swartz came on in a careless manner, opened a heavy but distant fire from the rocks. Some confusion arose, but the Catalans were soon beaten from their fastness, and pursued for four or five miles along the main road to Casa Mansana, where a cross road leads to Manresa; here one part broke away, while the others continued their flight to Igualada.

Swartz, a man evidently destitute of talent, halted at the very moment when his success was complete, and the Catalans, seeing his hesitation, first rallied in the rear of Casa Mansana, then returned to the attack, and finally drove the advanced guard back upon the main body. The French General now became alarmed, formed a square, and retired hastily towards Esparraguera, followed and flanked by clouds of somatenes, whose courage and numbers increased every moment. At Esparraguera, which was a long single street, the inhabitants had prepared an ambush; but Swartz, who arrived at twilight, getting intelligence of their design, passed to the right and left of the houses, and continuing his flight, reached Martorel the 7th. He lost a gun and many men by this inglorious expedition, from which he returned in such disorder, and with his soldiers so discouraged, that Duhesme thought it necessary to recall Chabran from Tarragona. That General, although the country westward of the Llobregat is rugged and difficult for an army, had reached Tarragona on the 8th, without encountering an enemy; but when he attempted to return, the line of his march was inter-

* St. Cyr. Victoires et Conquêtes des Français. Foy Cabanes.

† Ibid.

cepted by the insurgents, who took post at Vendrill, Arbos and Villa Franca, and spread themselves along the banks of the Llobregat. As he approached Vendrill, the somatenes fell back to Arbos, and were defeated there; whereupon the French set fire to the town and proceeded to Villa Franca. Here the excesses so common at this time among the Spaniards were not spared; the governor, an old man, and several of his friends, had been murdered, and the perpetrators of these crimes, as might be expected, made little or no defence against the enemy. Meanwhile General Lechi moved out of Barcelona, and acting in concert with Swartz's brigade, which had reached Martorel, cleared the banks of the Llobregat, and formed a junction at San Felice with Chabran on the 11th. The latter, after a day's rest, then marched with his own and Swartz's brigade on Manresa, to repair the former disgrace, and he arrived at Bruch the 14th; but the somatenes, assisted by some regular troops with artillery, were again there, and Chabran, more timid even than Swartz, finding that in a partial skirmish he made no impression, took the extraordinary resolution of retreating, or rather flying from those gallant peasants, who pursued him with scoffs and a galling fire back to the very walls of Barcelona.

These successes spurred on the insurrection. Gerona, Rosas, Hostalrich, and Tarragona prepared for defence. The somatenes of the Ampurdan obliged the French commandant to quit the town of Figueras and shut himself up with three hundred men in the citadel, while others, gathering between the Ter and the Besos, intercepted all communication between France and Barcelona. In this predicament, Duhesme resolved to make a sudden attempt on Gerona, with six thousand of his best troops and eight pieces of artillery; but as the fortress of Hostalrich stood in the direct road, he followed the coast line, and employed a French privateer then in the harbor to attend his march. The somatenes soon got intelligence of his designs: one multitude took possession of the heights of Moncada, which are six miles from Barcelona, and overhang the road to Hostalrich; another multitude was posted on the ridge of Mongat, which, at the same distance from Barcelona, abuts on the sea; and these last were protected on the left by an intrenched castle with a battery of fifteen guns, and on the right were slightly connected with the people at Moncada. The 17th, Duhesme, after some false movements, defeated them, and a detachment from Barcelona dispersed those at Moncada the same day; the 18th, the town of Mattaro was taken and plundered, the somatenes were again defeated at the pass of St. Pol, and at nine o'clock in the morning of the 20th, the French appeared before Gerona.

This town, built on the right bank of the Ter, is cut in two by the

Oña. To the eastward it is confined by strong rocky hills, whose points filling the space between the Oña and the Ter, overlook the town at different distances. Fort Mont Jouy, a regular fortification, crowned the nearest hill or table land, at five hundred yards' distance; three other forts, namely, that of the Constable, that of Queen Ann, and that of Capuchins, all connected by a ditch and rampart, formed one irregular outwork a thousand yards in length, and commanding all the ridge to the south-east. The summit of this ridge is five, eight, and twelve hundred yards from Gerona, and sixteen hundred from Fort Mont Jouy, and is separated from the latter by the narrow valley and stream of the Gallegan.

South-west, between the left of the Oña and Ter, the country is comparatively flat, but full of hollows and clefts close to the town, and the body of the place on that side was defended by a ditch and five regular bastions, connected by a wall with towers. To the west the city was covered by the Ter, and on the east fortified by a long wall with towers, having an irregular bastion at each extremity, and some small detached works placed at the opening of the valley of Gallegan. Three hundred of the regiment of Ultonia and some artillery-men composed the garrison of Gerona; they were assisted by volunteers and by the citizens, and the somatenes also assembled on the left of the Ter to defend the passage of that river.

Duhesme, after provoking some cannon-shot from the forts, occupied the village of St. Eugenia, in the plain, and making a feint as if to pass the Ter by the bridge of Salt, engaged the somatenes in a useless skirmish. Great part of the day was spent by him in preparing ladders for the attack; at five o'clock in the evening the French artillery opened from the heights of Palau, and then a column crossing the Oña passed between the outworks and the town, threw out a detachment to keep the garrison of the former in check, and assaulted the gate of El Carmen.* This attempt failed completely, and with great loss to the assailants. Two hours after, another column advancing by the left of the Oña assaulted the bastion of Santa Clara, but with so little arrangement or discipline, that the storming party had only three or four ladders;† and although by favor of the hollows they reached the walls unperceived, and the Neapolitan Colonel Ambrosio and the engineer Lafaille actually gained the top of the ramparts, the confusion amongst the assailants was such that no success was obtained. Duhesme tried negotiation on the following day, yet dreading a

* St. Cyr.

† Lafaille.

longer absence from Barcelona, broke up on the 22^d, and returned by forced marches, leaving Chabran with some troops in Mattaro as he passed. During his absence the victorious somatenes of Bruch had descended the Llobregat, rallied those of the lower country, and getting artillery from Tarragona and other fortresses, planted batteries at the different passages of the river, and intrenched a line from San Boy to Martorel. Regular officers now took the command of the peasants. Colonel Milans assembled a body at Granollers; Don Juan Claros put himself at the head of the peasants of the Ampurdan; Colonel Baget took the command of those at Bruch.

Chabran, after a few days' rest at Mattaro, made a foraging excursion through the district of El Valles, but Milans, who held the valley of the Congosta, encountered him near Granollers, and both sides claimed the victory; Chabran, however, retired to Barcelona, and Milans remained on the banks of the Besos. The 30th, Duhesme caused the somatenes on the Llobregat to be attacked, sent Lechi to menace those at the bridge of Molinos del Rey, and the brigades of Bessieres and Goullus to cross at San Boy; the latter, having surprised a battery at that point, turned the whole line, and Lechi then crossing the river by the bridge of Molinos, ascended the left bank, took all the artillery, burnt several villages, and put the insurgents to flight. They however rallied again at Bruch and Igualada, and returning the 6th of July, infested the immediate vicinity of Barcelona, taking possession of all the hills between San Boy and Moncada, and connecting their operations with Colonel Milans. Other parties collected between the Besos and the Ter, and the line of insurrection was extended to the Ampurdan; Juan Claros occupied the flat country about Rosas, and the French garrison of Figueras having burnt the town, were blocked up in the Fort of San Fernando by two thousand somatenes of the Pyrenees; a nest of Spanish privateers was formed in Palamos Bay, and two English frigates, the *Impérieuse* and the *Cambrian*, watched the coast from Rosas to Barcelona. A supreme junta was now established at Lerida, and opened an intercourse with Aragon, Valencia, Seville, Gibraltar, and the Balearic islands; it also decreed that forty tercios, or regiments of one thousand men, to be selected from the somatenes, should be paid and organized as regular troops, and that forty others should be kept in reserve, but without pay.

This state of affairs being made known to Napoleon through the medium of the movable columns watching the valleys of the eastern Pyrenees, he ordered General Reille, then commanding the reserve at Perpignan, to take the first soldiers at hand and march

to the relief of Figueras; after which, his force being increased by drafts from the interior of France to nine thousand, he was to assault Rosas and besiege Gerona; and the Emperor imagined that the fall of the latter place would induce the surrender of Lerida, and would so tranquillize Catalonia, that five thousand men might again be detached towards Valencia. On receiving this order, Reille, with two battalions of Tuscan recruits, conducted a convoy safely to Figueras and raised a blockade, but not without difficulty, for his troops were greatly terrified, and could scarcely be kept to their colors.* He however relieved the place the 10th of July, and the same day, Duhesme, who had been preparing for a second attack on Gerona, quitted Barcelona with six thousand infantry, some cavalry, a battering train of twenty-two pieces, and a great number of country carriages to transport his ammunition and stores, leaving Lechi in the city with five thousand men. Meanwhile Reille, having victualled Figueras and received a part of his reinforcements, proceeded to invest Rosas; but he had scarcely appeared before it when Juan Claros raised the country in his rear, and Captain Otway, of the Montague, landing with some marines, joined the migueletes, whereupon the French retired with a loss of two hundred men.†

Duhesme pursued his march by the coast, but the somatenes broke up the road in his front, Milans hung on his left, and Lord Cochrane, with the *Impérieuse* frigate and some Spanish vessels, cannonaded his right. Thus incommoded, he halted five days in front of Arenas de Mar, and then dividing his force, sent one part across the mountains by Villagorguin, and another by San Isicle. The first column made an attempt on Hostalrich, and failed; the second, beating Milans, dispersed the somatenes of the Tordera; and finally, Duhesme united his forces before Gerona, but he lost many carriages on his march. The 23d he passed the Ter, and dispersed the migueletes that guarded the left bank. The 24th General Reille, coming from Figueras with six thousand men, took post at Puente Mayor, and the town was invested, from that point, by the heights of San Miguel to the Monte Livio; from Monte Livio by the plain to the bridge of Salt; and from thence along the left bank of the Ter to Sarria. The garrison, consisting of five hundred migueletes and four hundred of the regiment of Ultonia, was reinforced on the 25th by thirteen hundred of the regiment of Barcelona, who entered the town with two guns; the defences were in bad repair, but the people were resolute.

In the night of the 27th, a French column passed the valley of the

* Foy's History.

† Lord Collingwood's despatch, Aug. 27. Foy's History.

Galligan, gained the table land of Mont Jouy, and of three towers, which the Spaniards abandoned in a panic. This advantage so elated Duhesme, that he resolved, without consulting his engineer, to break ground on that side;* but at this period a great change in the affairs of Catalonia had taken place.† The insurrection, hitherto confined to the exertions of the unorganized somatenes, was now consolidated by a treaty between Lord Collingwood, who commanded the British navy in the Mediterranean, and the Marquis of Palacios, who was Captain-General of the Balearic isles; thus the Spanish fleet and the troops in Minorca, Majorca, and Ivica, became disposable for the service of the patriots.‡ Palacios immediately sent thirteen hundred men to the port of San Felice di Quixols to reinforce the garrison of Gerona, and these men entered that city, as we have seen, on the 25th, while Palacios himself disembarked four thousand others, together with thirty-seven pieces of artillery, at Tarragona, an event which excited universal joy, and produced a surprising eagerness to fight the French. The Supreme Junta immediately repaired to that town, declared Palacios their President, and created him Commander-in-Chief, subject, however, to their tutelar saint, Narcissus, who was appointed generalissimo of the forces by sea and land, the ensigns of authority being, with due solemnity, placed on his coffin.

The first object with Palacios was to re-establish the line of the Llobregat. To effect this, the Count of Caldagues, with eighteen hundred men and four guns, marched from Tarragona in two columns, the one moving by the coast way to San Boy, and the other by the royal road, through Villafranca and Ordal. Caldagues, in passing by the bridge of Molino del Rey, established a post there, and then ascending the left bank, fixed his quarters at Martorel, where Colonel Baget joined him with three thousand migueletes of the new levy. Now the Llobregat runs within a few miles of Barcelona, but as the right bank is much the steepest, the lateral communications easier, and as the heights command a distinct view of everything passing on the opposite side, the line taken by Caldagues was strong, for the country in his rear was rough with defiles, and very fitting for a retreat after the loss of a battle.

General Lechi, thus hemmed in on the west, was also hampered on the north, because the mountains filling the space between the Llobregat and the Besos approach in tongues as near as two and three miles from Barcelona, and the somatenes of the Manresa and Valls districts occupying them, skirmished daily with the French

* St. Cyr. Campaign in Catalonia.

† Cabanes' History.

‡ St. Cyr. Calanes' History, 2d Part.

outposts. And beyond the Besos, which bounds Barcelona on the eastward, a lofty continuous ridge, extending to Hostalrich, runs parallel to and at the distance of two or three miles from the sea-coast, separating the main from the marine roads, and sending its shoots down to the water's edge; this ridge also swarmed with somatenes, who cut off all communication with Duhesme, and lay in leaguer round the castle of Mongat, in which were eighty or ninety French. The Cambrian and the Impérieuse frigates blockaded the harbor of Barcelona itself; and, on the 31st, Lord Cochrane having brought his vessel alongside of Mongat, landed his marines, and in concert with the somatenes, took it, blew up the works, and rolled the rocks and ruins down in such a manner as to destroy the road.* Thus, at the very moment that Duhesme commenced the siege of Gerona, he was cut off from his own base of operations, and the communication between Figueras and General Reille's division was equally insecure; for the latter's convoys were attacked the 28th of July and the 3d of August; and so fiercely on the 6th, that a Neapolitan battalion was surrounded, and lost one hundred and fifty men.†

Palacios, whose forces increased daily, now wished to make an effort in favor of Gerona, and with this view sent the Count of Caldagues, at the head of three or four thousand men, part miguelletes, part regulars, to interrupt the progress of the siege, intending to follow himself with greater forces. Caldagues marched by Tarrasa, Sabadell, Granollers, and San Celoni, and reached Hostalrich the morning of the 10th, where his force was increased to five thousand men and four guns. The 13th he entered Llagostera, and the 14th Castellar, a small place situated behind the ridges that overlook Gerona, and only five miles from the French camps. Here Juan Claros, with two thousand five hundred migueletes, mixed with some Walloon and Spanish guards from Rosas, met him, as did also Milans with eight hundred somatenes. A communication with the Junta of Gerona was then opened. Fort Mont Jouy was upon the point of surrendering; but the French, who were ignorant of Caldagues' approach, had, contrary to good discipline, heaped their forces in the plain between the left of the Oña and the Ter, but only kept a slender guard on the hills, while a single battalion protected the batteries raised against Mont Jouy. Being an enterprising man, the Spanish general resolved to make an immediate effort for the relief of the place, and, after a careful observation, sent, on the 16th, several columns against the weak part of the besiegers' line; the garrison sallied forth at the same

* Lord Collingwood's despatches.

† St. Cyr.

time from Mont Jouy, and the French guards being taken between two fires, were quickly overpowered, and driven first to the Puente Mayor, and finally over the Ter. The Catalans re-formed on the hills, expecting to be attacked; but Duhesme and Reille remained quiet until dark, and then breaking up the siege, fled, the one to Figueras, the other to Barcelona, leaving both artillery and stores behind.

Duhesme at first wished to retreat by the coast, but at Callella he learned that the road was cut, that an English frigate was ready to rake his columns, and that the somatenes were on all the heights; wherefore, destroying his ammunition, he threw his artillery over the rocks, and, taking to the mountains, forced a passage through the somatenes to Mongat, where Lechi met him and covered the retreat to Barcelona.

OBSERVATION 1st.—Three great communications pierce the Pyrenean frontier of Catalonia, leading directly upon Barcelona.

The first, or Puycerda road, penetrates between the sources of the Segre and the Ter.

The second, or Campredon road, between the sources of the Ter and the Fluvia.

The third, or Figueras road, between the sources of the Muga and the sea-coast.

The first and second unite at Vicque; the second and third are connected by a transverse road running from Olot, by Castle Follit, to Gerona; the third, also dividing near the latter town, leads with one branch through Hostalrich, and with the other follows the line of the coast. After the union of the first and second at Vicque, a single route pursues the stream of the Besos to Barcelona, thus turning the Muga, the Fluvia, the Ter, the Tordera, Besos, and an infinity of minor streams, which, in their rapid course to the Mediterranean, furrow all the country between the eastern Pyrenees and Barcelona. The third, which is the direct and best communication between Perpignan and the capital of Catalonia, crosses all the above-named rivers, and their deep channels and sudden floods offer serious obstacles to the march of an army.

All these roads, with the exception of that from Olot to Gerona, are separated by craggy mountain ridges scarcely to be passed by troops; and the two first, leading through wild and savage districts, are incommoded by defiles, and protected by a number of old castles and walled places, more or less capable of resistance. The third, passing through many rich and flourishing places, is however completely blocked, to an invader, by the strong fortresses of Figueras and Rosas on the Muga, of Gerona on the Ter, and Hos-

talrich on the Tordera. Palamos and other castles likewise impede the coast road, which is moreover skirted by rocky mountains, and exposed for many leagues to the fire of a fleet. Such is Catalonia, eastward and northward of Barcelona.

On the west, at five or six miles distance, the Llobregat cuts it off from a rough and lofty tract, through which the Cardena, the Noga, the Foix, Gaya, Anguera, and Francoli rivers, breaking down deep channels, descend in nearly parallel lines to the coast, and the spaces between are gorged with mountains, and studded with fortified places which command all the main roads.

So few and contracted are the plains and fertile valleys, that Catalonia may, with the exception of the rich parts about Lerida and the Urgel, be described as a huge mass of rocks and torrents, incapable of supplying subsistence even for the inhabitants, whose prosperity depends entirely upon manufactures and commerce. Barcelona, the richest and most populous city in Spain, is the heart of the province; and who masters it, if he can hold it, may suck the strength of Catalonia away. But a French army, without a commanding fleet to assist, can scarcely take or keep Barcelona; the troops must be supplied by regular convoys from France, the fortresses on the line of communication must be taken and provisioned, and the active intelligent population of the country must be beaten from the rivers, pursued into their fortresses, and warred down by exertions which none but the best troops are capable of: for the Catalans are robust, numerous, and brave enough after their own manner.

OBSERVATION 2d.—It follows, from this exposition, that Duhesme evinced a surprising want of forethought and military sagacity, in neglecting to secure Gerona, Hostabrich, and Tarragona, with garrisons, when his troops were received into those places. It was this negligence that rendered the timid operations of Swartz and Chabran capital errors; it was this that enabled some poor, injured, indignant peasants to kindle a mighty war, and in a very few weeks obliged Napoleon to send thirty thousand men to the relief of Barcelona.

OBSERVATION 3d.—Duhesme was experienced in battles, and his energy and resources of mind have been praised by a great authority;* but undoubtedly an absence of prudent calculation and arrangement, a total neglect of military discipline, marked all his operations in Catalonia. Witness his mode of attack on Gerona—the deficiency of ladders, and the confusion of the assaults;† witness also his raising of the second siege, and absolute flight from

* Napoleon. Notes, Appendix, No. 2.

† St. Cyr.