

CHAP. coast. A large sheep having been first stunned by a blow on
 XIV. the neck, was immediately flayed, the reeking skin was sown
 1808. round the Marshal's body, while his limbs were wrapped in warm
 November. flannels, and some cups of weak tea were given him. He felt
 immediate relief, complaining only of a painful sense of formi-
 cation, and of the manner in which the skin seemed to attract
 every part wherewith it was in contact. In the course of ten
 minutes he was asleep. When he awoke, after two hours, the
 body was streaming with perspiration, the dangerous symptoms
 were relieved, and on the fifth day he was able to mount on
 horseback and follow the army.

*Larrey,
 Campagnes
 et Memoires
 t. iii. 243—
 246.*

*Defeat of
 the Extre-
 maduran
 army at
 Burgos.*

Nov. 10.

Buonaparte reached the head-quarters at Vitoria on the 8th, and immediately pushed forward a corps under Soult against the Extremaduran army in his front. Bessieres commanded the cavalry, which had before proved so fatal to the Spaniards at Rio Seco, and which had now been greatly reinforced. This army, under the Conde de Belveder, had been intended to support Blake, and keep up a communication between his army and that of Castaños. It consisted of about 13,000 men; and their Commander, a young man, although aware that a superior force was advancing against him, waited for the attack in an open position at Gamonal. He had with him some of the Walloon and Spanish guards, and a few regiments of the line; the rest were new levies, and among them a corps of students, volunteers from Salamanca and Leon. These youths, the pride and the hope of many a generous family, were in the advanced guard. They displayed that courage which might be looked for in men of their condition, and at that time of life: twice they repulsed the French infantry, and when Bessieres with the horse came upon their flank, fell almost to a man where they had been stationed. The loss in killed was estimated at 3000, nearly a fourth of this brave army; the victorious cavalry entered Burgos with the

fugitives, and the city, which was entirely forsaken by its inhabitants, was given up to be plundered. Bessieres pursued Count Belveder, while Soult turned aside toward Reynosa, to complete the destruction of Blake's army. One corps of the French marched upon Palencia, another upon Lerma ; from the latter place the Count retreated to Aranda ; there also Bessieres pursued, and the wreck of the army collected at Segovia ; the piquets of the French were now upon the Douro, and their cavalry covered the plains of Castille.

On the second day after the defeat of the Extremaduran army Buonaparte established his head-quarters at Burgos, and issued a proclamation, granting, in the Intruder's name, a pardon to all Spaniards who, within one month after his arrival at Madrid, should lay down their arms, and renounce all connexion with England. Neither the members of the Juntas nor the general officers were excepted : but wishing, he said, to mark those, who, after having sworn fidelity to Joseph Buonaparte, had violated that oath ; and who, instead of employing their influence to enlighten the people, had only used it to mislead them : wishing also that the punishment of great offenders might serve as an example in future times to all those, who, being placed at the head of nations, instead of directing them with wisdom and prudence, should mislead them into disorders and popular tumults, and precipitate them into misfortunes and war : for these reasons he excepted from this amnesty the Dukes of Infantado, Hajar, Medina Celi, and Ossuna, the Marques de Santa Cruz, Counts Fernan Nunez and Altamira, the ex-Minister of State Cevallos, and the Bishop of S. Andero ; declaring them traitors to the two crowns of France and Spain, and decreeing that they should be seized, brought before a military commission, and shot. Those persons who had sworn homage to the Intruder, compulsory as that homage was, had unquestionably exposed

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Proclamation excluding certain Spaniards from pardon.

CHAP. themselves to its possible consequences : they had been forced
 XIV. into a situation in which the only alternative was to become
 1808. traitors to him, or traitors to their country : but by what law or
November. what logic were they traitors to France, a country to which they
 owed no allegiance, and with which they had contracted no
 obligation ?

*Movements
 against
 Castaños.*

From Burgos Marshals Ney and Victor were dispatched with their divisions to act on the rear of Castaños, and cut off his retreat, while Lasnes, with 30,000 men, should attack him in front. This last remaining army of the Spaniards is represented by the French as consisting of 80,000 men, of whom three-fourths were armed. But the nominal force of the conjoined armies under Castaños and Palafox was only 65,000, and the effective soldiers hardly more than half that amount. Many of the Andalusian troops had returned to their homes after the first success, and many more had remained at Madrid, so that though some thousands (mostly from Valencia) had joined Castaños, his force was little more numerous than it had been at Baylen. His own opinion was decidedly against risking an action in which there could be no reasonable hope of advantage ; but the commissioner, D. Francisco Palafox, to whom the power of overruling the General had been madly entrusted by the Central Junta, determined that a battle should be fought, and Castaños therefore was compelled to fight, lest he should be stigmatized as a traitor, and murdered by his own men, or torn to pieces by a mob. Already the Conde de Montijo, who left the army at this time, was every where accusing him of treachery, because he had warmly opposed a determination, the fatal consequences of which he certainly foresaw.

*Battle of
 Tudela.*

The plan of the French against this army was the same as that which they had practised against Blake's ; they meant to rout it by a powerful attack in front, and to destroy the fugitives

by intercepting them with a second force in their flight. Their destruction was considered to be as certain as their defeat, but Ney was less expeditious in his movements than had been calculated; and Castaños hearing on the 21st that this corps was advancing upon Soria, while Lasnes and Moncey approached from the side of Logroño and Lodosa, abandoned Calahorra and fell back upon Tudela. On the 22d Lasnes entered Calahorra and Alfaro, and at daybreak on the following morning he found the Spaniards drawn up in seven divisions, with their right before Tudela, and their left extending along a line of from four to five miles upon a range of easy heights. The Aragonese, who had joined only a few hours before by forced marches, were on the right, the Valencians and the troops of New Castille in the centre, the Andalusians on the left. Their line was covered by forty pieces of artillery. Situations were chosen by the enemy for planting sixty pieces against them; but upon seeing their own relative strength, and the confusion which was observable among the Spaniards, they preferred a more summary mode of attack. General Maurice Mathieu, with a division of infantry, forced the Spanish centre; and General Lefebvre, with the cavalry, passing through, wheeled to the left, and coming in the rear of the Aragonese, at a time when that wing, having withstood an attack, supposed itself victorious, the fate of the battle was decided. At the same time Lagrange, with his division, attacked the left; a brave, and in some part a successful resistance was opposed; and the action, which began in the morning, was prolonged on this side till darkness enabled Lapeña's division to fall back from Cascante to Tarazona, where the first and third divisions were stationed, and had not been engaged. There too the second division arrived, which had been ordered to support Lapeña; but though it received these orders at noon, and the distance which it had to march was only two leagues, either from

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November.*Retreat of
the defeated
army.*

incapacity in the leaders, or want of order, it did not arrive till night, after the action was decided.

According to the French 4000 Spaniards fell in this battle, 3000 men, 300 officers, and thirty pieces of cannon were taken, their own loss not amounting to 500. The right wing, dispersing and escaping how it could, assembled again at Zaragoza, with some of the central division also, there to prove that their failure in the field had not been for want of courage. As soon as the wreck of the left had collected at Tarazona, Castaños ordered them to begin their march by way of Borja to Calatayud. It was midnight, and at the moment when they were setting forward a chapel, which served as a magazine, blew up. Many shells went off after the explosion; this occasioned an opinion that an enemy's battery might be playing upon them, and the Royal Carabineers, in the midst of the confusion, fancying that the chapel was occupied by the French, presented themselves sword in hand to charge it. Presently a cry of treason was set up; it spread rapidly; misfortune in such times is always deemed a proof of treachery; those troops who had not been engaged could not understand wherefore they were ordered to retreat, and at such an hour; a general distrust prevailed; some corps dispersed, and they who remained together were in a fearful state of insubordination. They retreated however through Borja and Ricla, without stopping in either place, and on the night of the 25th reached Calatayud.

*Their de-
plorable
condition
at Cala-
tayud.*

On that same day Maurice Mathieu entered Borja in pursuit, . . . too late to make any prisoners. Ney arrived on the day following. He had been ordered to reach Agreda on the 23d, which, if he had done, the wreck of this army must have been destroyed; but he found a pretext for delay in the fatigue of his men, and a cause in the pillage of Soria. The people of that city, unmindful of the example which the Numantines had set

them upon that very ground, opened their gates to the enemy. This did not save them from being plundered. Their church, and their rich wool-factors, afforded good spoil to the French; and for the sake of this booty, and that he might extort all he could from the inhabitants, Ney remained there three days, not because his men had been over-marched. But this delay enabled Castaños to reach Calatayud. He had thus escaped the danger of immediate pursuit, and men and officers had leisure now to feel the whole wretchedness of their situation. There were neither magazines nor stores here; the system of supplying the troops, which before had been miserably incomplete, was at an end, and the military chest, containing two million *reales*, had been conveyed to Zaragoza. Desperate with hunger, the men broke through all restraint, and the inhabitants fled from their houses, hardly less dismayed at the temper of their own soldiers than at the vicinity of the French. The muleteers attached to the baggage and artillery could obtain no payment, nor food either for their animals or themselves; such as could find opportunity threw away the baggage, mounted their beasts, and rode away; others abandoned them altogether, cursing their ill fortune, and yet glad to escape with their lives. The soldiers, having nothing else to stay the cravings of hunger, devoured cabbage leaves, or whatever crude vegetables they could find, and many literally dropped for want.

Here Palafox and the Aragonese army expected that Castaños would have rallied, have made a stand, and, acting on the offensive as circumstances permitted, have saved Zaragoza from a second siege, or at least have delayed its evil day. They who formed this expectation did not reckon upon the activity of the enemy, and imputed to their own government a promptitude and power which it was far from possessing. Had the defeat of the central army been apprehended in time, and measures taken

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*They are
ordered to
approach
Madrid.*

CHAP. for supporting it, one of the first objects would have been to
XIV. have strengthened this point. There had been no such foresight.

1808. The French were in pursuit, and orders arrived from Morla,
November. who was one of the council of war, requiring Castaños to hasten
with his army to the defence of the capital. He consulted ac-
cordingly with the chiefs of division, and they resolved to march
by way of Sigüenza; from whence they might either repair to
Somosierra, if that strong position should still be retained, or to
Madrid, if such a movement should be more advisable. In that
direction, therefore, they recommenced their retreat, after one
day's rest.

*Measures
of the Cen-
tral Junta.*

The Central Junta, mean while, was occupying itself with
measures ill adapted to such times. While Blake's army was
fighting, day after day, without clothing, without food, and with-
out reinforcements to recruit its ranks, they passed a decree for
the establishment of a special tribunal, to try all persons accused
of treason; its object being not more to bring such as were guilty
to deserved punishment, than to rescue from suspicion and
danger those who were unjustly suspected; for, under the ex-
isting circumstances of Spain, they said, the people, having
suffered so much from treachery, would naturally suspect all
those whose conduct it did not fully comprehend. The tribunal,
which was composed of members from each of the great councils
of state, was to have a jurisdiction over persons of all ranks:
but not to carry into execution any sentence of death, con-
fiscation, or dismissal from office, till they laid the whole case
before the Supreme Junta. A certain number of its members
might carry on the ordinary business, but a writ for the arrest of
any person, or the sequestration of his goods, must be issued by
the whole. Especial provisions were made to prevent secret
arrest, or long confinement; and the papers of the accused were
not to be detained, as soon as it was ascertained that they con-

tained no relation to the matter with which he was charged. No proceedings were to take place upon anonymous information, nor was any informer to be admitted, who would not consent to let his name be known. The humanity of these provisions is in such direct opposition to the practice of the holy office, that it seems to have been the intention of the framers of this tribunal to render their state inquisition as unlike as possible to that curse and disgrace of their country. The tribunal was particularly charged to inquire into the conduct of those persons who had gone as deputies to Bayonne, or who had submitted to the Intruder at Madrid; endeavouring carefully to distinguish between what was compulsory and what was their own act and deed; and proceeding with the caution and prudence required, where, on the one hand, the public safety was at stake, and, on the other, the reputation of many good and honourable citizens. And when their investigations had established the innocence of any one, they were to consult with the Supreme Junta upon the means of restoring to him all the credit and respectability which he had formerly enjoyed.

By another decree, dated on the day when Castaños was defeated at Tudela, they resolved that honorary militias should be formed in all towns which were not in the scene of war, in order to prevent disorders, and to arrest robbers, deserters, and ill-disposed persons. A more remarkable measure related to the Ex-Jesuits: their banishment was repealed, and they were permitted to return to any part of Spain, and there enjoy their pensions. The reason assigned was, that it was a miserable thing for them to be expatriated, to live far from their friends and kin, and be abandoned to the mercy of strangers; that it was now become difficult to furnish them with the pensions assigned to them by the crown; and that the sums thus allotted were so much withdrawn from the circulating specie of the king-

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CHAP. dom, to increase that of foreign and even of hostile countries.
 XIV. This late act of humanity to the poor survivors of an injured
 1808. community, is not at any time to be censured; but it is ex-
 November. traordinary that at such a time it should have occupied the
 attention of the Junta.

Of these measures, all would have been unexceptionable, and even praise-worthy, had they been well timed; but the Central Junta still pursued the fatal system of deceiving the people as to the extent and imminence of their danger. They addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of Madrid, saying, that they had taken all the measures in their power for defeating the enemy, who, continuing his attacks, had advanced to the neighbourhood of Somosierra; and that the number of the French there hardly amounted to 8000 men. The enthusiasm with which the soldiers were preparing to beat the enemies of their country, they said, and their confidence in their valour, was not to be expressed; and the English were ready to march from the Escorial, to reinforce the position chosen by the able general whom the Junta had appointed, and to support the operations of the van, who, by that time, were already engaged with the slaves of the tyrant.

Nov. 21.

Memorandum
 of the Central Junta.

With such representations did the government endeavour to deceive the people of Madrid, and lull them into a feeling of security, when its duty was, to have told them the whole extent of their danger, and manfully roused them to those exertions which the emergency required. But they themselves still in some degree partook the delusion which they inspired. Their confidence in the Spanish character was too well founded ever to be shaken; and they relied, with little reflection, upon the natural strength of the country. Their present hope was upon the pass of the Somosierra. D. Benito San Juan, a judicious and able officer, of high reputation, was stationed there with the remains of the Extremaduran army, which had with great prompti-