

CHAP. that he could not consent without an express order from the  
III. court. Where there was prudence enough to prompt this answer,  
1808. a certain degree of precaution might have been looked for, which  
February. nevertheless was wanting. The French soldiers were permitted  
every day to enter the citadel and receive their rations there, and  
this with such perfect confidence on the part of the garrison, that  
even the forms of discipline were not observed at such times.  
One night, during the darkness, D'Armagnac secretly introduced  
three hundred grenadiers into the house he occupied, which was  
opposite the principal gate of the citadel. Some of the ablest  
and most resolute men were selected to go as usual for the  
rations, but with arms under their cloaks. The ground hap-  
pened to be covered with snow, and some of the French, the  
better to divert the attention of the Spaniards, pelted each other  
with snow-balls; and some running, and others pursuing, as if in  
sport, a sufficient number got upon the drawbridge to hinder it  
from being raised; the signal was then given, some of the party  
who had entered seized the arms of the Spaniards, which were  
not, as they ought to have been, in the hands of the guard; others  
produced their own concealed weapons to support their comrades;  
the grenadiers from the general's house hastened and took pos-  
session of the gate, the rest of the division was ready to follow  
them, and the first news which the inhabitants of Pamplona  
heard that morning was, that the French, whom they had re-  
ceived and entertained as friends and allies, had seized the  
citadel. When all was done, D'Armagnac addressed a letter  
to the magistrates, informing them, that, as he understood he  
was to remain some time in Pamplona, he felt himself obliged  
to insure its safety in a military manner; and he had therefore  
ordered a battalion to the citadel, in order to garrison it, and  
do duty with the Spanish troops: "I beseech you," he added,  
"to consider this as only a trifling change, incapable of disturb-

ing the harmony which ought to subsist between two faithful allies." CHAP. III.

The Spanish court had by its own folly and its treachery towards Portugal, reduced itself to so pitiable a state of helpless embarrassment, that it dared not resent this act of unequivocal insult and aggression. Not to perceive that some hostile purpose was intended, was impossible ; but Charles and his minister were afraid to remonstrate, or to express any feeling of displeasure, or to prepare for resistance, or even to take any measures for guarding against a like act of treason on the part of their formidable ally in the other strong holds, upon the security of which so much depended. This wretched court contented itself with repeating instructions to the commanders and captains-general, on no account to offend the French, but to act in perfect accord with them, and by all means preserve that good understanding which so happily subsisted between the two governments ! And when representations were repeatedly made of the suspicions which were entertained, and the danger which all the measures of the French gave so much reason for apprehending, the answers of the court were written in vague and empty official language, from which nothing could be understood, except that the government was determined to let the whole responsibility fall upon its officers, and to be answerable itself for nothing ! While D'Armagnac secured Pamplona, General Duhesme had been instructed in like manner to get possession of Barcelona, where he was quartered. Immediately on his arrival he requested that his troops might do duty in the city jointly with the Spaniards, and occupy with them the principal posts, assigning candidly as a reason for this suspicious request, his own personal security in the disturbed state of public feeling which was then apparent ; and as a farther reason, the probability that such a proof of perfect amity and confidence would

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more than any other measure tend to satisfy and tranquillize the people. The Conde de Espeleta, captain-general of Catalonia, was so strictly charged in his instructions to offer no displeasure to the French, that he could not refuse his assent to this insidious proposal. If there had been any doubt of the intention which it covered, that doubt was speedily removed; the usual guard at the principal gate of the citadel was twenty men, but Duhesme stationed a whole company of *chasseurs* there.

A people so intelligent, so active, and so high-minded, as the Catalans, were neither to be deceived nor intimidated; and if the inhabitants had not been restrained by obedience to their own government, Barcelona might certainly have been preserved. Duhesme felt himself in danger, and the Spanish troops, as well as the inhabitants, sometimes expressed an impatience, which at any moment might have produced a perilous conflict. The French reported that their passports from Madrid were arrived, and that they were to march for Cadiz as speedily as possible; on the morrow they were to be reviewed preparatory to their march. This welcome news completely deceived the inhabitants, and no surprise was excited by the beat of drum and the movement of battalions at the time appointed. Some regiments were drawn up upon the esplanade which separates the citadel from the town, and a battalion of Italian light troops were stationed upon the road leading from the custom-house to the principal gate of the citadel. At two in the afternoon, an hour when the people, satisfied with the spectacle, had mostly left the streets and returned to their dinner and their *siesta*, General Lechi came to review this body of Italians, and passed on, followed by his aides-de-camp and his staff, into the citadel. The French who were on duty received him under arms, according to military etiquette, and the Spaniards did the same. Under pretence of giving some orders to the officer of the guard, Lechi and his suite halted

on the drawbridge, and occupying it by that manœuvre, covered the approach of the infantry. The Italians defiled under cover of the ravelin which defended the gate, and knocked down the first Spanish centinel, whose voice when he would have given the alarm was drowned by the beating of the French drums under the archway. Lechi then advanced; the Spanish part of the guard could make no resistance, their French comrades being ready to act against them in the first moment when the treason was discovered; and immediately afterwards overpowering numbers were upon them. Four battalions followed the first, and the invaders were completely masters of the place. The Spanish governor, Brigadier Santilly, indignant at a treachery against which he should have taken some precautions, presented himself to Lechi as a prisoner of war: he was received however with perfect courtesy, and all protestations of friendship and alliance, which General Lechi, with an effrontery worthy of his master and his cause, made no scruple of repeating in the very act of breaking them. Upon the alarm of this aggression the Spanish and Walloon guards who belonged to the garrison hastened to their post; they were not permitted to enter the citadel till night, by which time the French had secured themselves in possession of the place. Having been admitted, they ranged themselves in arms opposite the French, and in that menacing position the night was passed, and the following morning, till orders came to quarter themselves in the town; and the French were then left sole masters of the place.

While one division of these treacherous allies surprised the citadel, another advanced upon Monjuic, a fort upon a hill which commands the town. An Italian colonel, by name Floresti, commanded this latter division. Monjuic is one of the strongest fortresses in Spain: it had a sufficient garrison, and the commander, D. Mariano Alvarez, was a man of the highest and most heroic

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CHAP. patriotism. When he was summoned to open the gate, he de-  
 III. murred, saying he must receive instructions from his govern-  
 1808. ment. Floresti insisted that his orders were peremptory and must  
 February. be executed. He and his men were standing upon ground which  
 was undermined, and Alvarez was strongly inclined, instead of  
 admitting them, to fire the train. Could he have foreseen what  
 a spirit was about to display itself in the Peninsula, this he  
 would undoubtedly have done ; but the spirit of Spain was still  
 overlaid by its old wretched government ; and the responsibility  
 at such a time of involving his country in direct hostilities with  
 France was more than even the bravest man would venture to  
 take upon himself.

*Seizure of  
 St. Sebas-  
 tian's and  
 Figueras.*

*March 3.*

At St. Sebastian's General Thouvenot requested leave to  
 place his hospital in the fort and in the Castle of S. Cruz, and  
 to deposit there the baggage of the cavalry corps which was in  
 his charge. Both the Spanish commanders did their duty by  
 returning a refusal, and transmitting an account of their con-  
 duct to the court ; . . the court returned for answer, that there  
 was no inconvenience in acceding to the wishes of the French  
 general ; and this fortress was thus, by the imbecility of Charles  
 and his ministers, delivered up to the French. There still re-  
 mained the strong and important fortress of Figueras. Colonel  
 Pie had been left in the town with 800 men, and with instructions  
 to get possession of the fort. He attempted to win it by the same  
 stratagem which had been practised at Barcelona ; but the  
 Spaniards also knew and remembered that example, and raised  
 the drawbridge in time. Here however the governor seems to  
 have acted with more facility than had been shown elsewhere ;  
 two days after the treacherous attempt had been frustrated, he  
 consented to let Pie introduce two hundred conscripts, whom  
 he pretended he wished to secure ; . . two hundred chosen men  
 marched in under this pretext ; the rest followed them, and the

*March 18.*

French then obtained from a government which dared deny them nothing, the keys of the magazines, and an order which removed the Spaniards from the garrison.

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The government of Spain had not virtue enough to know the strength which it possessed in such a people as the Spaniards; feeling nothing but its own imbecility, it had not had courage to prevent these aggressions, and consequently dared not resent them; and as the French seized these places in the name of their Emperor as an ally, this wretched court consented to the occupation of them upon the same plea. Symptoms of a far different spirit appeared in Barcelona; and the Count of Espeleta, captain-general of Catalonia, found it necessary to issue a proclamation, calling upon all fathers of families, and heads of houses, to preserve tranquillity, and thus co-operate with the intentions of their rulers; and declaring that the late transactions did in no way obstruct or alter the system of government, neither did they disturb public nor private order. His proclamation was posted in all parts of the city. Duhesme, however, soon gave the inhabitants new cause for alarm, by calling upon the captain-general to fill the magazines, and establish depots for the subsistence of his troops. The Count of Espeleta returned for answer to this requisition, "that the French general might consider the whole city as his magazine: that, as he had no enemy to dread, and was quartered there as an ally, the measures which he proposed to take could only serve to create suspicion and distrust: and that the Emperor would be ill pleased to hear that he had alarmed, with fearful forebodings, a city which had afforded him so hospitable a reception. Your Excellency," he pursued, "will be pleased to request the opinion of his Imperial Majesty respecting your determination, before you carry it into effect, and to accompany your request with this explanation of

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mine; as I shall also lay the business before the King my master, without whose orders I cannot give to your Excellency what the forts in possession of the Spanish troops have not. Meanwhile I wish to impress upon your mind, that it will serve no good purpose to supply the forts with stores of provisions; that such an intention is pointed and offensive; and that it will neither be in the power of your Excellency, nor of myself, to remedy the consequences of the feeling which such a measure may excite among the inhabitants."

*Alarm of the Spaniards.*

When the French troops first began to enter Spain, various reports were circulated to account for so extraordinary a measure. The occupation of Portugal had been the first pretext; and when Junot had taken possession of that country with one army, the possibility that the English would attack him there was a sufficient plea for having another near at hand to support him. An English expedition against Ceuta had been talked of; it was pretended that they meant to make a descent upon the southern coast of Spain, and therefore French troops were to occupy the whole of that coast. The recovery of Gibraltar was another project, and another one an invasion of the opposite shore, which would exclude the English from the ports of Barbary, and give France entire command of the Mediterranean. Buonaparte, in his dreams of ambition, had sometimes looked that way, and had inquired of those who were best able to answer the question, what force would be sufficient for the conquest of Morocco. But he was resolved first to be master of the Peninsula, and the measures which he had now taken were such as could no longer leave a doubt in any reasonable mind of his intention. The occupation of four important fortresses, which were considered as the keys of Spain, astonished the Spaniards. Never before had the public mind been so agitated, but they knew the

weakness of the King and the incapacity of his counsellors; they had none to look to who should direct their willing hands; and though no people could be better disposed to stand forth in defence of their country, they remained in a state of helpless and hopeless astonishment.

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Godoy is said to have been the first person about the court whose eyes were opened to the real designs of Buonaparte. They flashed upon him as soon as he learnt the seizure of Pamplona; and he ordered the Spanish General Laburia, who had been stationed at Irun that he might provide every thing for the French troops, to demand from the French commander in chief an explanation of his conduct in having taken possession of that fortress. An answer was returned, half mockery, half insult, that the citadel had been occupied in order to secure the public tranquillity. Godoy had been the tool of Buonaparte, not the accomplice: he might have foreseen such a reply; but no means were left him of resenting the aggression, or repairing the follies of which he had been guilty. Buonaparte seems at this time to have intended that the royal family should fly to their American empire; he might then take possession of the kingdom as left to him by their abdication; and there were no means of ultimately securing Spanish America also, so likely as by letting this family retire there; both countries would needs be desirous that the intercourse between them should continue; nor were there any Spaniards who would with less reluctance submit to hold it in dependence upon him, than those persons who had given so many proofs of abject submission to his will. For the purpose of increasing the fear of Charles and his ministers, he wrote an angry letter, complaining, in the severest terms of reproach, that no farther measures had been taken for negotiating the proposed marriage. The King replied, that he was willing it should take place immediately. He probably con-

*Fears and  
perplexities  
of the  
Spanish  
Court.*



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sidered Buonaparte to be sincere in his intentions of forming this alliance, and never having been fit for business, and now, perhaps, for the first time really feeling its cares, a natural wish for repose began to be felt, and a thought of abdication passed across his mind. "Maria Louisa," said he to the Queen, in the presence of Cevallos, and of all the other Ministers of State, "we will retire to one of the provinces, where we will pass our days in tranquillity, and Ferdinand, who is a young man, will take upon himself the burden of the government." This was a thought which the example of his predecessors might readily suggest to a King of Spain. But it was not this which the Corsican desired; . . . that tyrant perceived his victim was not yet sufficiently terrified, and therefore Izquierdo, who had been kept at Paris in a state of perpetual suspense and agitation, was now commanded to return to Spain. No written proposals were sent with him, neither was he to receive any; and he was ordered not to remain longer than three days. Under these circumstances he arrived at Aranjuez, and was immediately conducted by Godoy to the King and Queen. What passed in their conferences has never transpired; but, soon after his departure from Madrid, Charles began to manifest a disposition to abandon Spain, and emigrate to Mexico. If he were capable of feeling any compunctious visitations, how must he have felt at reflecting that he had assisted in driving his kinsman and son-in-law to a similar emigration; that he was now become the victim of his own misconduct; and, envying the security which that injured Prince had obtained, was himself preparing, in fear and in peril, to follow his example!

*Measures  
for protect-  
ing the in-  
tended emi-  
gration.*

But there was a wide difference between the circumstances of Spain and Portugal, making that a base action in the sovereign of the former kingdom, which for the last half century would have been the wisest measure that the House of Braganza could

have adopted. This seems to have been felt, for the intention was neither avowed at the time, nor acknowledged afterwards. The ostensible intention was, that the royal family should remove to Seville, and that a camp should be formed at Talavera. Solano was summoned from his Utopian experiments in Portugal, and ordered to march to Badajoz without delay, that he might be ready to meet the court with a sufficient escort, and protect their embarkation; and Junot was requested to part with the Spanish troops who were at Lisbon, that they might be stationed in the southern provinces, which it was pretended were in danger from the English. This pretence did not impose upon Junot; neither could preparations for such a removal be made as easily at Madrid and Aranjuez as at Lisbon. Great agitation prevailed in the metropolis: the French were now rapidly advancing thither, and the intentions of the royal family were suspected; secretly perhaps divulged by those friends of Ferdinand in the ministry to whom they had necessarily been entrusted. Things were in this state when Godoy, as commander in chief, sent an order to Madrid for the Royal Guards, and all the other corps which were stationed there, to repair immediately to Aranjuez; at the same time he desired the Council of Castille would issue a proclamation to assure the people that this was merely a measure of precaution, for the purpose of preventing any disputes between the French and Spanish soldiery, and that the alliance between the King and the Emperor of the French remained unalterable. The Council demurred at this, and dreading the consequences of the intended flight, which they clearly perceived these troops were to protect, they sent a memorial to the King, representing the imminent danger to which, by such a measure, his royal person, his whole family, and the whole nation, would be exposed. This remonstrance produced no effect, but the Council escaped the infamy of asserting a direct falsehood to the people,

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