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was severely wounded, an officer whose Journals of the Sieges, and whose general Account of the War have been the most useful as well as the most trust-worthy of the printed authorities from which the present history has been composed. About an hundred feet of the wall were thrown down by the explosion: the storming party, instead of being composed of detachments from different regiments, consisted of the 24th regiment, supported by the working and covering parties in the trenches, a reserve of 500 men having also been formed in the parallel. This assault was made in the face of day. The officer who led the left party was at the foot of the old breach before the smoke had cleared away, and he was the first man on the top of it; and the dust had scarcely subsided before the troops had gained the summit of both breaches, and driven the enemy into their covered way, and behind their new palisades. During the night the besiegers established themselves in both breaches, and along the wall to the left of them, and began an approach towards the second line of works. But the rains now began to set in heavily; and on the following afternoon 300 of the garrison made a sortie from their covered way, gained possession of the first breach, and retained it long enough to ruin the lodgement and carry off the tools. They did not get possession of the second breach, nor of the parallel along the parapet: but the advantage which they had gained was sufficient to encourage them, and to lessen the confidence of the besiegers, who could not but perceive that they were struggling against all advantages of situation, and with means the most inadequate. The enemy could not depress their guns so as to bear upon the new works, but they kept up a constant fire of musketry upon them, and from time to time rolled large shells down the steep glacis, and these either carried away the gabion where the men were breaking ground in the night, or lodging against it and

bursting, blew it to pieces. The rain was now so heavy that much time was daily expended in draining and keeping the communications up the steep banks and breaches practicable. The garrison meantime were never idle: they had now disabled two of the three 18-pounders; and making another sortie at two in the morning of the 8th, from the covered way with 400 men, they surprised the advanced covering party, drove the remainder from the parallel of the outer line, and once more levelled the work and carried off the tools. Major Cocks was killed in a charge to regain it: he was shot through the body when ascending the breach, by a French infantry man close to him: the ball entered on the right side between the fourth and the fifth rib, passed through the great artery immediately above the heart, and so out at the left side, breaking the left arm. Major Cocks was a young officer of the highest promise. He was the eldest son of Lord Somers, and by the demise of his maternal grandfather, in possession of a large landed estate; but preferring the military profession to the peaceful enjoyment of good fortune, and to the pursuits whereto his station in society invited him, he devoted himself to the study of that profession with an ardour, of which an ordinary observer would not, from his mild manners and habitual composure, have supposed him capable. Entering early into the service, and leaving his regiment in England, he joined the army at Lisbon in the spring of 1809, for the purpose of acquiring the Portuguese and Spanish languages. He was in the south of Spain when the French attempted to surprise Cadiz, and he it was who gave Alburquerque the first information of their movements, by which timely advice that magnanimous Spaniard was enabled to prevent their design and throw himself into the place. He read much, and let no opportunity pass unimproved of perfecting by practice the knowledge which he acquired from books: and

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*Major  
Cocks  
killed.*

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thus he had distinguished himself on so many occasions, that the promotion which his rank and fortune might have commanded was not more rapid than his conspicuous merit had deserved. When the despatches relating the capture of the horn work on St. Miguel's reached home, his commission as Lieutenant-Colonel was immediately sent out; but before these despatches arrived in England his career was closed. On the day preceding his death he was field-officer of the trenches; the day was very wet, and he went round to every sentry to see that the orders were clearly understood, . . . a duty generally left to the serjeant who posts them, and not often attended to by a subaltern having only a picket of twenty men; but Major Cocks never spared himself, and never left any thing which depended upon him undone. The death of such a man (for such men are rare) was justly regarded in the army as a national loss. He was buried in the camp ground of his regiment near Bellema, Lord Wellington, Sir Stapleton Cotton, Generals Anson and Pack, with the whole of their staffs, attending his funeral, and the officers of the 79th (his own regiment) and of the 16th light dragoons.

After this second successful sortie, no farther attempt was made to push the works between the outer and second line: a third breach was effected with the view of making a flank attack at the moment of assaulting the second line in front; but when it was made, it could not be stormed for want of musket ammunition. The enemy attempted to repair it during the night, but were several times driven in. A small supply of powder having now been received from Santander, the howitzers were put in battery; but the 24-pound shot were nearly expended, and for the 18-pounders the 16-pound shot fired by the enemy were collected and made to serve: when the embrazures were opened, the guns could not be run in on account of the weather, and

one of the batteries was silenced in half an hour by the enemy's fire. By the 18th, a sufficient opening had been made in an exposed part of the second line; and the church of St. Roman, which was near the second line, had been mined. The assault was made by daylight, the works were immediately carried with very little loss, and some of the German legion escalated the third line, but they were few, and were presently driven back, for the course of the siege had taken confidence from the besiegers and given it to the besieged; and when the guards gained the parapet the garrison rallied on the *terre plein* of the work and assembled in force, then advanced and drove the assailants back completely from the line. The mine under the church did little injury to it, but it so alarmed the enemy that they exploded their own mines, which destroyed the greater part; the troops lodged themselves in the ruins, and a communication was carried to this point during the night. A convoy of heavy artillery and ammunition was now on its way from Santander, and the castle might then have been reduced in a few days, without further loss; but it was now too late, and after this last failure all circumstances induced Lord Wellington to think only of retreat.

On the day of that failure, the enemy were joined at Brevesca by the army of observation from Alava, and the remainder of the army of the north. This force considerably outnumbered that which Lord Wellington could bring against them, and in cavalry they were greatly superior. They made a show of coming on in front, and in consequence, the covering army moved up near Quintana-palla, and was joined by most of the besieging corps. On the 20th they advanced in force, drove in the pickets, and obtained possession of Quintana-palla, but Sir Edward Paget drove them back and recovered the place, and they then desisted from their offensive movements.

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*The second  
line assault-  
ed with ill  
success.*

*Movements  
of the  
French in  
the north.*

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*Ballasteros  
refuses to  
act under  
the British  
commander.*

Intelligence which Lord Wellington had reason to expect arrived on the following day, that the united forces of the enemy in the south were in motion. Ballasteros, who had hitherto, if with little success and no great skill, displayed the most indefatigable activity, had in a mood of sullen resentment at the appointment of Lord Wellington to the chief command, ceased to molest the enemy. He had hung upon the flanks of Soult's army, and harassed it as far as Granada, with more effect than in any of his former enterprises, because the enemy were dispirited and on their retreat; but upon receiving instructions to obey Lord Wellington's orders, he took no farther measures for annoying the French, refused to act in concert with Sir Rowland Hill, according to the plan which the British Commander had laid down, and remained obstinately inactive at the most critical time. At length he published a letter to the minister at war, saying, that from the time when the French treacherously seized the four fortresses, he had spared no efforts for raising the nation, and that no person had contributed more to the events of the second of May than himself, without which events, Spain would not have been in its present state. From that time he had never laid aside his arms, and had resisted all solicitations which the foreigners had made him to the prejudice of his country, . . . inexorable in being a Spaniard and nothing but a Spaniard, and that his countrymen should be so, like him; this having been his principle, without any regard to his own fortune, he had always found the nation ready to support it, in every sense. "And now he was surprised," he said, "to see that the English General, Lord Wellington, was by a resolution of the Cortes appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish armies; those armies, thousands upon thousands of whose companions in arms were in the grave, having fallen in defending the reputation of their country, were observing what

would be his conduct on this occasion; and he should not consider himself worthy of being an Aragonese, if he did not represent to the government, that he could not condescend to a determination which disparaged the Spanish name." He spoke of the English as a nation to whom the Spaniards were bound by true friendship and fair dealing, but of whose fair promises and bad faith no one could give more information than the then president of the Regency, the Duque del Infantado. "Was Spain," he asked, "like the petty kingdom of Portugal, that the command of its armies should be intrusted to a foreigner? Had its revolution begun like that of Portugal? Had it not still resources of its own? Had it not generals, officers, and soldiers, who still supported the honour which they had inherited from their forefathers; and who in the present war had made both English and French know that they were nothing inferior to them in discipline or in courage, and that they had chiefs of their own who knew how to lead them to victory? Finally, he required that the opinion of the soldiers and of the people should be taken upon this matter; if they condescended to the appointment, he should renounce his employments, and retire to his own house, thus manifesting, that he had only the honour and the welfare of his country in view, not any ambitious or interested end.

Ballasteros was a rude, intrepid, enterprising and persevering soldier of fortune, handsome in person, strong in body, and of a hale constitution; very useful as a partizan at the head of 4000 or 5000 men, but incapable of conducting any extensive operations with a regular army. Before the appointment of Lord Wellington took place he was in no good humour with the Government, and the Government on its part as little pleased with him. With some better parts of the national character, he partook in no slight degree of its boastfulness, and entertaining

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*He is exiled to Ceuta.*

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a most exaggerated notion of his own merits, made no scruple of saying that Ballasteros had done more for Spain than all her other chiefs put together, and that in spite of the Government, Ballasteros, unassisted and discouraged, would continue to do more than the favourites of the Regency, whose pockets were filled with doubloons by the English. But though he had a large party among the lower orders in Cadiz, and some of his regiments were much attached to him, he overrated his own importance as greatly as his own deserts; he was unpopular in the provinces and disliked by his officers; and when the Government put him under arrest for thus defying its authority, marched him under an escort to Malaga, and sent him from thence to Ceuta as an exile, not a hand, and scarcely a voice was raised in his defence. Some seditious writings indeed were published in his favour at Cadiz, but they produced no effect. The loss of an active partizan was regretted, and the error of an honest, though obstinate and wrong-headed man; but the army and the nation concurred in condemning him, and in approving the promptitude and decision with which the Government had acted.

Meantime, in consequence of this inactivity, in dereliction of all duty, on Ballasteros's part, and of the inefficiency of the Anglo-Sicilian army, Marshals Soult and Suchet were enabled, without any impediment, to concert their operations with the Intruder, and carry them into effect. General Maitland's health gave way under the anxieties of his situation, so that it became necessary for him to return to Sicily. Major-General William Clinton was sent from thence to take the command in his stead, and till his arrival, it devolved upon Major-General John Mackenzie. That general made an attempt to seize the castle of Denia by a *coup-de-main*: from its strength, and its position on commanding ground close to the sea it might have easily

G. Maitland gives up the command of the Anglo-Sicilian army.

been maintained against the enemy, and would have afforded great opportunity for annoying him. Major-General Donkin, Quarter-Master-General of this army, was intrusted with the enterprise; it failed, but the men and guns which had been landed were re-embarked with little loss. Knowing that nothing was to be apprehended from this army in its present state, Marshals Jourdan, Soult, and Suchet, held a council in presence of the Intruder, at Fuente la Higuera. They had feared at one time that it might have been necessary to abandon Valencia: that apprehension was removed, and they now believed that, as the long and brave resistance which had been made by the garrison at Burgos had given the army of Portugal time to recover strength and to unite with the troops in the north, nothing more was required for restoring their affairs, than that the armies of the south and the centre should co-operate with it, for the double purpose of beating Lord Wellington, and re-establishing the Intrusive government at Madrid. It was not deemed necessary to take any part of Suchet's forces for this service; the state of Aragon and Catalonia on the one hand, and the presence of the Anglo-Sicilian expedition on the other, made it dangerous to weaken him.

At the point where the roads from Alicante and Valencia to Madrid join, stands the little castle of Chinchilla; it was in possession of the Spaniards, and while the Intruder was reconnoitring it one day with a telescope, a shot from an eight-pounder passed close by him. This place the French besieged; it was ably defended by the Governor D. Juan Antonio Cearra, who was a lieutenant-colonel of engineers: but the enemy were not scrupulous as to any means which could accelerate their success; and during a night's truce they erected a battery of eight guns, in the most advantageous situation; by this battery the works were much injured, and the garrison

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*Unsuccessful attempt upon Denia.*

*The French prepare to march from the south against Lord Wellington.*

*Castle of Chinchilla taken by the French.*



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 XLII. only remained eight to work the guns, when some of these men  
 1812. were struck dead by lightning, many more, and among them the  
 governor, wounded by it, and the works so shaken, that it be-  
 Oct. 9. came necessary to surrender. The enemy's preparations were  
 They begin their march. complete soon after this obstacle was removed; and on the 16th  
 of October, the Intruder set out from Valencia towards the Tagus,  
 with Marshals Jourdan and Soult at the head of 70,000 troops,  
 10,000 being cavalry. Lord Wellington received intelligence  
 of this from Sir Rowland Hill on the 21st, and the same advices  
 informed him that the Tagus was already fordable by indi-  
 viduals in many places, and was likely soon to be so for an  
 army. As long as the Tagus remained unfordable, Sir Row-  
 land's position was tolerably secure; but when the river fell, it  
 became too hazardous for him to maintain an advanced position  
 near Madrid in front of an enemy so greatly superior. It was  
 necessary that Lord Wellington should move towards him, lest  
 the corps under his own command should be insulated in con-  
 sequence of the movements which Sir Rowland might find him-  
 self compelled to make. He determined therefore to fall back  
 upon the Douro, so to afford Sir Rowland a point upon which  
 to return, and by uniting their forces, to secure a retreat into  
 Portugal.

Lord Wel-  
 lington  
 raises the  
 siege of  
 Burgos.

This resolution was executed as promptly as it was formed.  
 He instantly raised the siege, and filed his whole army in the  
 night of the 21st under the walls of the castle and over the  
 bridge, which was closely enfiladed by its artillery; a bold and  
 unprecedented manœuvre, which military men adduce as a  
 proof that the march of troops cannot be stopped by the fire of  
 artillery in the night. The allies moved in silence and good  
 order; but a party of Guerrillas, regardless of discipline, then,  
 as at all times, put their horses to their speed, and the clatter