

Bernardin de Saint Pierre gave up in despair the description of the strawberry-plant in his window, because he found that at least seven-and-thirty different species of gorgeous butterflies made it their beautiful pleasure-ground. The Prado, with the fair spirits which are its ministers, must remain unchronicled in loveliness, by me, for reasons quite as plentiful. I may be permitted only to say, by way of qualification, that I do not think beauty has a much longer span in Madrid than other vitalities. At a moderately middle age, there is a sad tendency towards the robustious in figure, and a young maiden at all prudential should carefully keep her mother in the background, lest hopeful swains might be deterred from uttering obligatory vows, by the dread of avoirdupois weight to come !

V.

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND EPOCHS. — CONSTITUTIONS.
 — FERDINAND THE SEVENTH. — DUC D'ANGOULÊME. —
 CRISTINA. — DON CARLOS. — ESTATUTO REAL. — HISTORY
 OF PARTIES. — ESPARTERO. — NARVAEZ.

THE Spanish government is called “a constitutional monarchy,” and there is no doubt that it is entitled to the appellation, if the number of organic laws that have ruled it be taken as evidence. I had the pleasure of examining the original of the first of these, the constitution of 1812, which was reproclaimed in 1820 and 1836. It is magnificently engrossed and bound, and has the interesting signatures of many patriotic and illustrious men, who devoted themselves during the struggle with Napoleon, and the gloomy period which followed it, to the glorious work of their country's political regeneration. It has been the fashion of late days, in some quarters, to undervalue the efforts of these men, and to reproach them with failures and follies which were but the unavoidable results of political inexperience and the most untoward circumstances. My occupations in Madrid made it necessary for me often to recur to the proceed-



ings of the constituent and legislative Cortes of 1812–20, &c., and it would be unjust for me to conceal how much my admiration was excited by the deliberative eloquence and the political philosophy which they displayed. That in the midst of revolution, uncertainty, and novelty, — with prejudices the most inveterate to overcome, and ignorance and apathy to enlighten and stimulate, — there should have been many things evolved which were ephemeral and puerile, can surely be no matter of surprise. But that in a country where political discussion of every sort had been unknown for centuries, — where free thought and a free press had never existed, — where education had been imperfect or perverted, and oratory had never stepped beyond the precincts of the pulpit and a restricted forum, — there should have sprung at a moment's warning, from an oppressed and exhausted people, men equal to the labors which the Constitutionalist leaders of those days did unquestionably perform, — is a phenomenon well worth the notice of those who believe that “benighted” and “barbarous” are the only epithets to which the Spaniards are entitled.

Side by side with the first constitution, in the archives of the Chamber of Deputies, is its successor of 1837, even more gorgeous in vellum, velvet, and chirography. It was shown to me, with just and manly pride, by a distinguished member of the *Progresista* party who had a conspicuous share in its formation, and could not avoid sighing over the departure of its authority. In the same archives is the original of the constitution now in force, which was promulgated in 1845. It does not appear to have been considered as of any great

dignity, if one may judge from the fact that it exists only in printed form, and that its garniture is by no means luxurious, — a significant thing in Spain. It is probably adorned, however, quite as well as it is sometimes observed, — if it be not treason to say so.

Every one who is familiar with the recent history of the Peninsula will remember that the constitution of 1812 was framed during the absence of Ferdinand the Seventh in captivity in France, by the men who had been most active and earnest in devoting themselves and their fortunes to the maintenance of the national independence. Loyal, as well as patriotic, they had taken no advantage of their king's long absence, to weaken his legitimate authority or sap the foundation of his throne. They had done nothing without his declared and apparently sincere approbation, and when, at last, he was about to resume the sceptre of his ancestors, it was the pride of the good and brave men who had preserved it for him, that they had made him and his descendants secure in it, by linking the dignity and power of the monarch with the freedom and happiness of the people. The defects of the constitution were probably many. It was not easy to ingraft a representative system — in the sense in which such systems are now understood — upon the habits and traditions of the most eminently monarchical country of Europe. But the Constitutionals of 1812 — be their errors what they may — kept constantly before them the one great principle of making the throne subordinate to the law. The Cortes were intrusted, to all intents and purposes, with the government of the realm, in subjection to the constitution. The personal

inviolability of the monarch was neutralized, so far as was proper, by the direct responsibility of his ministers, and there were guards and checks which secured the rights of all classes from the encroachments of prerogative and power.

During the short period of their sway, the Cortes reformed many abuses, and established much that was wise, liberal, and of hopeful promise. The first act, however, of the restored king was to avail himself of the enthusiasm produced by his return to overthrow the constitution, forswear the oath he had voluntarily taken to support it, and repudiate and denounce whatever had been done in its name. To the faithful servants who had devoted themselves, through blood and fire, to their country and to him, but had been guilty of the sin of constitutionalism, dungeons and chains were the mildest testimonials of his gratitude. All that was wise and eloquent, and liberal and good, in the land, was sent into exile, poverty, and sorrow. Despotism became more despotic than ever, for it was the despotism of a treacherous and unprincipled reaction. In 1820 the constitutional system was revived, and there was a brief, brave struggle to maintain it; but the suffering saint of San Ildefonso called aloud to his once suffering brother of St. Cloud, who hearkened mercifully to his voice. In the face of all the world, and especially of constitutional England, — by whose teachings the patriots had been led, and on whose succor they relied in vain, — the Duc d'Angoulême, in 1823, marched from the Bidasoa to Cadiz, trampling down every vestige and hope of rational freedom. Unhappily for Spain, those were the days, in Europe, of sovereign congresses

and Holy Alliances, and the United States had not as yet been enlightened on the subject of intervention by any Hungarian revelations as to the meaning of the Washingtonian policy. Riego was hanged without let or hindrance of Turk or Christian, and Quiroga, escaping as best he might, had not a single speech made to him by a major-general or other functionary, legislative, judicial, or executive.

From that period down to the death of Ferdinand, in 1833, the picture is all shadow. It is hard to say whether folly or iniquity was the predominant characteristic of that very wicked and foolish man. His only objects in life were power, vengeance, and the gratification of his appetites. His policy had but two departments, — force and fraud. His only address was falsehood, and when it was not necessary to him as an instrument, he sported with it as an accomplishment, or revelled in it as a luxury. He hated constitutions, because they trammelled him. He hated reform, even when it did him no harm, because the Constitutionals were reformers, and had befriended him, and he hated them. Having no idea of government except as the exercise of his own will, he found the ancient traditions and institutions of the kingdom as objectionable as the new lights, and he loved them all the less because he understood none of them. Religion — though he professed it sturdily, went through its forms ostentatiously, and clung to it like a bad coward when death terrified him — he practically valued only as a lever of government. Education and literature he discouraged, because he knew nothing about them, and had an indefinite idea that they were not to be trusted. Men of

learning and talent he drove as far away from him as possible, "being as much afraid of them," to use a phrase of Lord Chesterfield's, "as a woman is of a gun, which, she thinks, may go off of itself, and do her a mischief." He had, in fine, no sympathy with the feelings of his people, because he had no heart, and none with their intellectual yearnings, because he had no head. The only good thing he ever did was to die; and he did that as slowly and as unsatisfactorily as possible, having never learned, in all his vicissitudes, to submit with grace to necessity, and being opposed, on principle, to gratifying his subjects, as long as he could in any way avoid it. As a rebel poet said of his grand-sire, Charles the Third, — a far better and wiser man, —

"Murió de mandar harto," —

he died of a surfeit of power. We may pardon power many of its enormities, for having ultimately become his executioner.

Upon the death of Ferdinand, his widow Cristina, the Regent, would have willingly adhered to the simple despotism which he had taken so much trouble to establish; but Don Carlos, the brother of the late king, declared himself at once the legitimate heir to the crown, and the Regent was compelled to make friends, as well as she could, for her infant daughter, who had been proclaimed Queen under the title of Isabella the Second. Don Carlos, being a narrow-minded bigot, whose chronology of ideas came down no lower than the fifteenth century, rallied around him, of course, the most influential politicians of the stationary and retrograde schools. There was no alternative, therefore,

left to Cristina, but to throw herself and her daughter's cause into the arms of the liberal party. It was an alliance of interest, not of love, so far as the Queen Regent was concerned, and the smiles of Heaven were never upon it. The first pledge of it which appeared was the *Estatuto Real*, or Royal Statute, a poor apology for a liberal system, establishing the semblance of popular representation, but in reality only adding that attractive and ostensible machinery to the usual conveniences of absolute rule. It created a Chamber of *Proceres*, or Peers, who of course were to be the creatures of the government, and placed the election of the popular branch substantially under the same control. Such a contrivance could not please or last. The liberal party had devoted themselves with undeviating faith to the throne of Isabella ; but they were too wise not to know the folly of relying upon royal generosity or justice. They had just come home from the banishment into which kingly treachery had sent them, and they were aware that Cristina was of the house of Naples. The *Estatuto Real*, therefore, could not satisfy them. The Regent, being a Bourbon, was of course fated to be deaf to reason and experience, and the result was, that in 1836 she found herself compelled, amid the bayonets of a rebellious soldiery at La Granja, to sign a decree for the promulgation, once again, of the constitution of 1812 - 20. This was but a prelude to the meeting of a constituent Cortes, — or, as we should call it, a constitutional convention, — whose labors were crowned, in June, 1837, by the adoption of yet another fundamental law.

When the constitutional system was overthrown, in

1823, the liberal party had been long enough in power to be broken into factions. Many of its divisions had a merely personal foundation, but the absorbing question was one of principle. It was the same which divides all popular parties, — the question as to where progress should end, and conservatism begin. Ten years of sorrow and persecution seemed but to have confirmed the advocates of each set of doctrines in their original convictions, and when the necessities of the Queen Regent recalled them all to the responsibilities of government, it was but a signal for the revival of old discords. The conservative liberals had become more than ever satisfied, that they could only escape the dangers of the past by centralizing the administration, strengthening constitutionally the hands of the executive, and appealing to loyal and conservative traditions. The men of progress, on the other hand, were quite as thoroughly convinced, that too many concessions had been already made to the monarchical idea, and they believed that they could see in those concessions the true secret of the downfall of former free institutions. The Regent, being a queen, of course followed but her instinct, in assuming that conservative liberalism was a lesser evil than the same iniquity, rampant with the spirit of change. She therefore, without hesitation, united her fortunes with those of the *Moderados*, between whom and the *Progresistas* the breach was of course made wider daily, by personal struggles for power.

Party names, like all other words which typify practical opinions, mean much or little, according to the latitude. Most things, indeed, owe a great deal of their

signification to the eyes with which we look at them, and the light in which we see them. A *Progresista*, who would be deemed quite a rabid and dangerous radical in Spain, would be but a pale and twinkling light beside even the most subdued exhibition of those democratical pyrotechnics, which, here in America, we have grown to consider quite harmless at their brightest. An unenterprising *Moderado*, on the other hand, whom our Kossuthian disciples might consider altogether un-republican, and bad enough to be under "Austrian influence," would perhaps be taken for quite a revolutionist in Spain, when placed in contrast with those orthodox *Realistas* who adhered to Don Carlos and the *jus divinum*, and would have gloried in reëstablishing for church and state the maxims and practices of Philip the Second and Antonio Perez, without a spark of the intellect and energy which gave dignity and respectability to that grand, though gloomy despotism. The two fractions of the liberal party, therefore, were not as far apart as they might seem, and although, by dwelling upon their peculiar points of difference, — each to defend and fortify its own, — each grew more absolute and more exclusive, — the *Moderado* more moderate, and the *Progresista* more progressive, — they were near enough together still, in 1837, to find some terms of compromise. The *Progresistas* had the Cortes of that year entirely at their command, but, to the lasting credit of their intelligence and patriotism, they magnanimously made concessions to the vanquished, even in the flush of victory.

The constitution of 1812, instead of being merely an organic law, had more the appearance of a code or

an elementary treatise, in the multitude and particularity of its details. This violation of the unity and brevity so essential in such instruments arose in a great degree from the pressure of peculiar circumstances. The Cortes of 1837 corrected this error, and, by giving to the executive the power of convoking and dissolving the Cortes, under proper limitations, as well as a substantial participation in the making of the laws, removed some of the most serious objections which the advocates of prerogative had upheld against the former system. The legislature itself, which had consisted of a single body under the constitution of 1812, was separated into two. Of the wisdom of such a change, few, it is supposed, could now be found to doubt. The experience of the French Republic has made conspicuous what the experience of the Cortes had demonstrated long before in Spain, — that a single chamber, having no battles to fight with one of its own kind, is always ready, at a moment's warning, either to serve under the banner of the executive or to usurp its powers. It is invariably either subservient or contumacious. An executive or a legislative tyranny is thus its inevitable result, unless peculiar circumstances so equalize the strength of the contending departments, that they neutralize each other, and render all government impossible. At the same time that the Cortes of 1837 applied the remedy to this evil, and added one more enlightened conservative element to their system, they developed the peculiar principles of the *Progresista* majority in a more liberal and simple electoral machinery, an increase in the number of representatives, and a series of other important popular

guaranties. The new constitution was thus made acceptable to both parties, and there seemed to be in prospect, for a while, one of those political millenniums, which are so often prophesied, but never happen, even in communities where political augury ought to be a more demonstrative science than in Spain.

The famous *convenio*, or settlement, made at Vergara, in August, 1839, between Espartero and the Carlist general Maroto, virtually put an end to the bloody and protracted civil war, and the pretensions of Don Carlos. The defeat and emigration of Cabrera, his ablest general, in the following year, left nothing further even for his hopes. The victorious leader of the national armies, Espartero, of course became — as from his many high qualities and eminent services he certainly deserved to be — a person of much weight in public affairs. Being at the head of the *Progresistas*, he naturally availed himself of his influence to elevate and strengthen the position of his party, which at that moment was much depressed. A *Moderado* majority in the Cortes had just adopted a law adverse to the system of *ayuntamientos*, or municipal corporations, which the liberal party had always vigorously upheld, as the chief protection of provincial and popular rights against the absorbing centralization to which the *Moderado* doctrines tended. To procure from the Queen Regent a veto upon the obnoxious measure, and a dissolution of the Cortes which had passed it, was the object of Espartero's solicitude. Cristina refused to yield, and the result was a popular outbreak, which was followed, in the autumn of 1840, by her renunciation of the regency and immediate departure for France.

Espartero succeeded her, as was to have been expected. Agustin Arguëlles, the distinguished author of the preliminary discourse to the constitution of 1812, and an orator so graceful and impressive that he had the surname of "the divine," was appointed "tutor" to the royal children. The *Progresistas* then, for a little while, had every thing in their own hands.

In Calderon's beautiful drama of the *Cisma de Inglaterra*, the melancholy Catherine of Aragon, in the depth of her desertion and disgrace, calls on her maidens for a song, wherein she asks the very flowers to learn from her how all things fleet and fade: —

"Aprended, flores, de mí,
Lo que va de ayer á hoy:
Que ayer maravilla fui,
Y hoy, sombra mia no soy!"

The chances and changes of Spanish politics might give quite as serious instruction to the leaves and grass, as the vicissitudes of Henry's victim. In the summer of 1843, Espartero, Duke of Victory, Regent and Saviour of the Realm, found himself a fugitive on board an English steamer in the Bay of Cadiz, stripped of his titles, and stigmatized in a ministerial decree as "bearing the mark of public execration"! With Espartero fell the friends who had clung to him, and the doctrines they had espoused. In the face of the constitution, — which expressly provided that fourteen years should be the term of the royal minority, — the Queen, a child not quite thirteen, was declared to be of full age, and invested with the symbols of dominion. Then commenced the predominant influence of Narvaez,

Duke of Valencia, who from that time to the period of my visit had, with occasional interruptions, been the ruling spirit of the Peninsula. Much, of both good and evil, has been said of this remarkable man, to whose position and character I shall have occasion hereafter to allude. Those who praise him may perhaps do him more than justice, — those who denounce him, less; but it were folly to deny that he has permanently and honorably linked his name with the repression of civil discord and the revival of his country's prosperity in the nineteenth century.

It was under the auspices of Narvaez and the *Moderado* party, that the constitution of 1845 was adopted, which, down to the last steamer's dates from Madrid, continued to be preached from as the fundamental text. It is not likely to be soon changed, for all parties seem to have adopted the idea, made illustrious among ourselves not long ago, of administering constitutions "as they understand them." In such case, one form answers about as well as another.



VI.

CONSTITUTION OF 1845. — ITS PROVISIONS AND CHARACTER.
— THE CORTES. — ELECTIONS. — PAY OF MEMBERS. —
EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE. — ITS BENEFITS. — REPUBLICAN
PROPAGANDISM.

THE fanciful theorist who thought the concoction of popular songs a far more important source of power than the making of laws, might, if he had lived in these days, have applied his remark *a fortiori* to constitutions. The Marseillaise has been generally found equal to the overthrow of any organic establishment against which it has been pitted, and I greatly doubt whether, if a popular question were made between Yankee-Doodle and the best of our State constitutions, there would not be large odds, and perhaps a convention, in favor of the ditty. The truth is, that, where there is any decided and predominant governing element in a nation, experience shows that paper regulations are far more apt to subserve than to thwart it. It is easy, at the worst, for those who make to unmake if they please, but the science of interpretation has of late been carried to such a pitch of perfection, as al-

most entirely to supersede the older and clumsier methods of change. We certainly are not without our own examples of new constitutional readings, made orthodox at once by the very popularity of the novelty or the expounder, and we cannot fairly express any surprise that the few who have the power elsewhere should wield it, in their own way, like the many who possess it here. The knowledge of this mutability in fundamental laws, and of the trifling resistance which they practically make to real power, has destroyed a great deal of that sacredness with which people used to invest such things, when society and politics were in a more reverent and pastoral state. It is not worth while to inquire whether such a falling off in respect for what ought to be most respectable is not a sad and serious evil. It is a fact, let it be what else it may. Men may differ a little as to the sort and number of masters they would prefer, if they could have their choice; and most men prefer being among the masters themselves; but it is now pretty generally understood, that those who have the mastery will use it, be they few or many, and that paper obstructions are not likely to prevent them.

The Spanish constitution of 1845 does not surround the exercise of absolute dominion by the powers that be with any insurmountable barriers. It is very full, no doubt, of patriotic and liberal generalities, and many of its theories and guaranties are ostensibly as popular as need be. Yet while almost every right is seemingly secured to the citizen, there is attached to each of the provisions on which that security depends a significant clause, which has the real effect of set-

ting the whole matter, to all intents and purposes, at sea. Thus, for example, by "Art. 2. All Spaniards may print and publish their ideas freely, without previous censorship, *but with subjection to the laws.*" By "Art. 3. Every Spaniard has the right to direct written petitions to the Cortes and the king, *as the laws may direct.*" By "Art. 7. No Spaniard shall be detained or imprisoned, or kept from his domicile, nor shall his house be forced, *except in those cases and in that manner which the laws may prescribe.*" And by "Art. 8. If the security of the state should require, under extraordinary circumstances, the temporary suspension, in the whole or in any part of the kingdom, of the provisions of the preceding article, *it shall be so determined by law.*"

It will be very obvious that the protection which the citizen is to derive from these and similar provisions must depend altogether upon the constitution and temper of the law-making department. If, by the fundamental law, the legislature can, without hindrance, be made what the people will, then the constitution secures, or may be made to secure, the popular immunities, and the nation will be well or ill governed according to the popular capacity and disposition to govern. If the throne, on the contrary, can make or manage the law-givers, then there is nothing but a circumlocution and a slight complication of machinery in the way of its being, to a degree, absolute. This last seems to be frequently the practical working of the Spanish system at present.

The Cortes are composed of two chambers, the Senate and the Congress of Deputies. The Senators hold

office for life, and — with the exception of the sons of the reigning monarch and of the immediate heir to the throne, who are members of the Senate, as of course, on attaining the age of twenty-five, — they derive their appointments exclusively from the crown. Their number is unlimited, so that a ministry can always create a majority at need. To secure their conservatism, they are required to have a considerable fixed income, or to pay a specified amount of taxes. That their sympathies may be upon the side of power, they can only, now, be chosen from among the nobility, the higher clergy, and such individuals as may have filled certain distinguished positions in the public service. Lest, however, it should be important for the government, hereafter, in an exigency, to go beyond the enumerated classes in search of friends, it is provided that the sphere of selection may at any time be enlarged by law. So far, then, as the control of affairs by legislation is concerned, it must be a rare ministry which cannot, with such facilities, protect itself against the happening of any thing inconvenient or disagreeable. But the functions of the senators go farther. The creatures of the throne, they are yet the constitutional judges of all alleged offences against the state and the person or dignity of the monarch. Dependent upon the ministry for the very dignities which make them eligible, or for the senatorial dignity itself, they have yet exclusive jurisdiction over impeachments of ministers. It must be no small relief to a statesman, in his sense of official responsibility, to know that he has a check on the laws which are to govern him, and can legitimately pack the tribunal which alone can try him !

The Congress of Deputies is, to all appearance, a mere popular body, though not always so in fact, as the system works. Its members are chosen for five years and are indefinitely reëligible. They need not reside in their respective districts, and may, therefore, be lawfully selected, as they often are, from among the hack politicians and the courtiers who trade in place, at Madrid. They must be laymen, above the age of twenty-five, and chosen in the proportion of at least one to every fifty thousand souls. The mode of election, and the pecuniary and other qualifications required, are prescribed, under the constitution, by the electoral laws of 1846 and 1849, — chiefly by that of 1846. A representative, under those laws, is given to every district containing thirty-five thousand inhabitants. The colonies, however, have no share in this distribution, having lost, since 1837, the right of representation in the Cortes, which they enjoyed under the constitution of 1812–20. They are now governed by special enactments, which, be they as wise as they may, can never be welcome, altogether, to a people who have no voice in their making.

A Deputy is required to have an annual income of at least six hundred dollars from real property, or to pay fifty dollars yearly in direct taxes. Captains-general, and certain other specified functionaries, are declared to be ineligible, unless their official duties should require their presence in Madrid; so that, if any obnoxious officer of the kind should be chosen, the government has but to render his duties engrossing, somewhere else, and there is an end of his legislative pretensions. As many of the most able and influential men are likely to

hold the offices enumerated, this provision is an important spring in the ministerial man-trap.

To vote for deputies, the elector must be at least twenty-five years old, and pay, at the lowest, twenty dollars of direct taxes annually. Lawyers, physicians, academicians, parish priests, and persons of similar category, are allowed the right of suffrage upon paying half that amount. The extent to which even this moderate qualification sometimes diminishes the number of electors may be inferred from an article of the law, which provides for those districts in which they may be fewer than one hundred and fifty. The *Jefes Politicos* (political chiefs of the provinces, who have since been superseded by provincial governors) are required to make out the electoral lists once in two years. From any error of omission or commission upon their part, an appeal is provided to the *Audiencia*, or court of superior jurisdiction for the province. As, however, the *Jefes Politicos* were, as their successors, the governors, continue to be, subject to removal at discretion, and as judicial officers of all kinds may, under the constitution, be suspended at any time for trial, by a simple royal order, it needs no sorcery to divine the probable complexion of the electoral lists, whenever the government chooses to take sides. So well, indeed, is the matter understood, that, in most of the special elections, the successful candidate can always be named at Madrid before the votes have been counted. Some idea may be formed of the thorough manner in which the thing can be done, even in a general canvass, from the fact that, in the election which first took place after my return,

two hundred and thirty ministerial deputies were chosen, to fourteen *Progresistas*!

The coolness with which such results are canvassed, by men of both parties, is quite amusing. If I had found the influence of government only complained of by the unsuccessful side and denied by the victors, I should have supposed that what I heard was to be taken with the usual and proper allowance for partisan facts. Nobody, however, thinks of disputing the matter or expressing surprise at it. I was talking one day to a friend, in regard to a prominent member of the opposition, a man of distinguished abilities, who had favored me with some degree of intimacy and in whose success as a candidate for the next Cortes I felt much interest. He was about to offer himself for his native district in Andalusia. "I am very sorry," said the gentleman whom I addressed, "very sorry, indeed. My brother-in-law is *Jefe Politico* there, and will have to defeat your friend or lose his place!" Upon another occasion, a senator, deep in the secrets of the ruling powers, was discussing the practical operation of the constitution with me. "*Es un embuste,*" said he, "*y un embuste muy caro, el sistema representativo!* — The representative system is a humbug, and a very dear one! It costs the government, and of course the country, enormously, to get the right sort of people elected, and when they are in, it costs a great deal more to keep them from doing mischief. Every man of them must have something for himself, his children, or his friends, and unless he can get what he wants, he takes advantage of a critical opportunity and goes over to the opposition!" A striking evidence that

my companion made no mistake in this, is furnished by a test vote which took place on the 3d of January, 1850, upon a proposition which the government exerted itself to defeat. Of one hundred and thirty deputies who maintained the ministerial side of the question, the *Clamor Publico*, one of the *Progresista* organs, enumerated, by name and station, one hundred and eighteen who had places, and five who were believed to have them! There was, no doubt, some little of partisan exaggeration in the statement, but the ministerial papers did not succeed in correcting it very materially. The *Clamor* promised to prepare a subsequent table of the salaries which the gentlemen of the majority were enjoying. It would have been very edifying, no doubt, but I do not remember that it appeared. It was in view of such things and their results that Gonzalez Bravo, a prominent member of the *Moderado* section of the opposition, expressed himself thus, one day, in debate: —

“ I can understand the system of force, which closes the door against discussion, — the absolute system which is represented by Russia. I can comprehend that system, on the other hand, which lives with and applies the spirit of the age, — which deals out prudent concessions, and does justice to the national necessities, — the system, in fine, of England. But what I cannot understand, and what signifies nothing, to be understood, is the bastard system, which is neither the one thing nor the other, — which is not constitutional, because it does not rest upon an honest administration of constitutional principles, and is not absolute, because it lacks the dignity and power of monarchical traditions ! ”

Señor Bravo is an able man, no doubt, but it was

hardly reasonable for him to complain that the government of her Majesty was not absolute enough to be comprehended as such. The Duke of Valencia and his colleagues certainly did all that lay in their power to prevent themselves from being justly liable to animadversion on that score. Indeed, the Duke did not scruple to take the orator to task, upon that very occasion, for the tone of his remarks, in a style which I will not say was Russian altogether, but which would have created some astonishment in the House of Commons, and would certainly have elicited some elegant allusions to "here and elsewhere" in either branch of our national legislature.

Neither the senators nor deputies receive any direct compensation, nor is the Spanish language so fortunate as to possess any word corresponding to "mileage," — that pleasant invention of the American genius, whereby honorable gentlemen are so often enabled to illustrate the proverb, that "the longest way round is the shortest way home." The Peninsular legislators are supposed, in theory, to be amply compensated by the honor of the station, the pleasure of serving their country, and the felicity of making speeches. The real *quid pro quo*, however, consists in the opportunity just alluded to, of securing profitable places for themselves and their friends, by the use of a little diplomacy and the advantages of position. An acquaintance of mine, who had been all the winter in Madrid, *pretendiendo*, as they call it, — office-hunting, in the homely American vernacular, — called, late in the season, to take leave of me. He was a worthy person, and I expressed my hope that he had been able to handle his cards success-