

On the sixteenth, an attempt was made on Fort Trinidad. It failed. The enemy, after a severe struggle to gain possession of the gates, were driven back. The progress of the besiegers was slow—for they appear to have been unprepared for the vigorous resistance which met them at every step of their advance. But time pressed. St. Cyr was aware that Barcelona, unless speedily succoured, must fall; and it became necessary that the operations should be pushed on with the greatest speed. The town was attacked on the night of the twenty-seventh. It was defended by five hundred men, who opposed the most resolute resistance to the assailants. These, however, were at length overpowered; and, of the whole number, fifty only succeeded in effecting their escape into the citadel.

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 November.

Nov. 27.

The capture of the town was of material advantage to the besiegers. A breaching-battery was immediately established in front of a bastion formerly injured by the explosion of a magazine. Another was erected on the shore, by which the communication between the ships and the citadel was cut off.

Before the battery opened fire on the citadel,

CHAP. II. a summons was sent in by General Reille. The
 1808. garrison, however, refused to surrender; and
 November. the enemy continued to push on their operations. Fort Trinidad had already been breached; and the communication with the citadel was cut off.

At this juncture, Lord Cochrane arrived in the Imperieuse. With eighty seamen and marines he threw himself into the fort, and revived the sinking spirits of the garrison. On the
 Nov. 30. thirtieth, General Sanson, commanding the French engineers, pronounced the breach practicable; and at night it was directed to be stormed. The attack was made, and failed. Lord Cochrane had formed a rampart, within the breach, of palisadoes and barrels filled with sand and rubbish, which the assailants found it impossible to surmount.

In the meanwhile, the situation of General Souham had been one of alarm. Had the Spaniards advanced in force against him, the siege must inevitably have been raised. But they wanted cavalry; energy and promptitude were not the characteristics of their leaders; the opportunity of effective action was suffered to escape; and Souham, though subjected to frequent

annoyance from the Miquelets, was successful in maintaining his ground. CHAP. II.

On the fifth of December, the citadel, having an open breach and being no longer tenable, consented to surrender; and the garrison, consisting of about two thousand men, were marched into France as prisoners of war. Sixteen bronze cannon were taken in the place. It then became apparent to Lord Cochrane that further resistance in the fort was impossible. He accordingly withdrew his men, blew up the magazine, burned the buildings, and quitted the Bay of Rosas with the squadron.

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On the day after the capitulation, the French army commenced its march. On the eighth, the whole force, destined for the relief of Barcelona, was collected on the Fluvia. It amounted to fifteen thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse; the division of Reille being ordered to remain in the Ampourdan, holding Figueras and Rosas, and guarding the communications of the army.

Dec. 8.

The numerical strength of the French was apparently inadequate to the object it was intended to effect. The Spanish army in Catalonia

CHAP. II. mustered upwards of thirty thousand; and had
1808. General Vives, by whom the Marques de Pala-
December. cio had been superseded in command, concen-
trated his forces for one decisive effort, there can
be little doubt that the projects of the French
General would have been defeated. But St.
Cyr calculated on the imbecility of his adver-
sary, and, unfortunately, was not deceived in
his computation.

The march of the French army to Barcelona was one of great difficulty and danger. In case of defeat, retreat was impossible; for it was necessary to pass over mountains covered with snow, through long and dangerous defiles; and the swarms of armed peasants which occupied the heights, though dispersed with facility by the advancing army, again united, like the waves of the sea when furrowed by the keel of a ship, and closed up all avenue of escape.

The road by the coast had been broken up; and the other, commanded by the Fort of Hostalrich, was not practicable for artillery. At La Bisbal, therefore, St. Cyr found it necessary to send back his artillery to Figueras; and, issuing four days provisions, and fifty cartridges, to each

soldier, with one hundred and fifty thousand cartridges carried on mules, the army continued their march on Barcelona.

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Don Juan Claros, with a body of Miquelets and Somatenes, had taken up a strong position at Col de la Grange, in order to oppose their march. From this he was driven by Pino's division; and the army proceeded to Val de Aro, without encountering other danger than that of receiving a few shots from the English ships, where the road near Palamos passes close to the shore.

On the thirteenth, the French halted at Vidreras. By his manœuvres, St. Cyr had endeavoured to propagate the belief that his object was Gerona. Having now passed that city, the deception could continue no longer; yet he adopted every means of creating doubt as to the route he intended to follow, aware that every hour of delay, in the concentration of the hostile forces, was an important advantage.

Dec. 13.

On the fourteenth, St. Cyr took post in the neighbourhood of Hostalrich. Here, in order to avoid the fort, endeavours were made to find a path across the mountains, which were at length successful. The march was con-

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tinued on the fifteenth, but not without annoyance from the garrison of Hostalrich, which, having discovered the vicinity of the enemy, came out and annoyed their rear. No sooner had these assailants been repulsed, than the neighbouring heights were observed to be covered with Somatenes, who kept up a continued fire on the flanks of the advancing column. Observing that it did not halt, they became more bold, and approached nearer to the line of march. The French loss during the day amounted to two hundred men.

In the evening, the troops, harassed and tired, arrived at Torderas. St. Cyr determined on pushing on through the defile of Treinta-pasos, in expectation of encountering the Spanish army on the following morning. The road was broken up and obstructed by *abattis*; but this strong and defensible defile, about two leagues in extent, was passed without opposition, and the army bivouacked on a plain, about a league in rear of Llinas.

While the French were engaged before Rosas, General Vives had been engrossed with preparations for the siege of Barcelona. He had taken none of the ordinary means for ob-

taining prompt knowledge of the enemy's movements. He knew nothing of their strength or of their plans. He had neglected to exert the means in his power of opposing their progress. He suffered repeated opportunities to escape him of striking a signal blow,—of not only defeating, but utterly annihilating the French army. He knew nothing of the points to be occupied in the country traversed by the enemy. He was surrounded by men ignorant as their leader of all military knowledge; and, secure in the belief that the French could not advance without first becoming masters of Gerona, he remained in a state of deplorable inaction, till the opportunity of overpowering the enemy had passed.

At length, intelligence was received that St. Cyr, having sent back his artillery, was continuing his march, and doubt could no longer be entertained that Barcelona was his object. Instead of instantly marching with his whole force, Reding, with about four thousand men, was sent to oppose his progress. Succeeding advices confirmed the intelligence of the enemy's motions. A council of war was held, and Vives set forward with five thousand to join Reding,

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CHAP. II. whom he overtook at Granollers. From that
1808. place he set out at midnight, when the French
December. had just passed the defile of Treinta-pasos.

It was the intention of Vives to occupy a position between Llinas and Villalba; but, owing to delays, the head of the column had only reached Cardedeu by six in the morning, when the fires of the enemy's bivouack were discerned. Vives continued his march; but, at eight o'clock, the advanced-guard gave information that the French were already formed in column.

Vives immediately ranged his army, fatigued and dispirited by a long night march, in order of battle. The position chosen was a range of flat eminences; the right was protected by a rugged and precipitous mountain covered with Miquelets, the centre by a deep and difficult ravine, and the left by a thick wood; twelve pieces of artillery were distributed along the line.

St. Cyr determined on immediate attack. The Marques de Lazan was advancing on his rear, and the delay even of an hour might prove fatal. Without artillery, he was exposed to every disadvantage; and he felt aware that

it was only by a combination of skill, promptitude, and audacity, that he could surmount the perils by which he was environed.

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The army was directed to advance in column, in order, by one powerful and united effort, to break the line of their opponents; and it was the positive order of the General, that not even a battalion should be deployed. General Pino's division led the column, exposed, during its advance, to the fire of the Spanish artillery. In direct disobedience of the orders of his General, Pino deployed his leading brigade, which advanced against the left of Reding's division, and, after a warm struggle, was compelled to give ground.

This circumstance occasioned considerable derangement in the plans of the French General. He directed Souham's division to attack the right of Reding, and turn it. Pino was ordered to advance with his remaining brigade in column, according to his original instructions. Two battalions were directed to make a false attack on the left, in order to distract the attention of the enemy from the other movements.

These arrangements were crowned with com-

CHAP. II. plete success. The Spanish line was at once
1808. broken; panic spread among the troops, and
December. they fled in all directions, relinquishing their
guns and ammunition without further struggle.
In this action, the French made two thousand
prisoners, of whom eight hundred were wound-
ed. The killed were about four hundred. The
loss of the French amounted to six hundred in
killed and wounded.

The triumph, thus easily achieved over his ignorant and vacillating opponent, at once extricated St. Cyr from all his difficulties. Without waiting to collect prisoners, or to engage Lazan, whose approach might be hourly expected, he continued his march to Barcelona. There was nothing in that quarter to oppose him. One column alone of the Spanish army had been enabled to quit the field unbroken. This was joined by Reding, who led it across the Llobregat to Molino del Rey. Vives lost his horse; and, escaping on foot across the mountains, reached Mataro, where he sought safety on ship-board. In a few days he re-appeared at Tarragona.

While these events were in progress, a sally had been made by Duhesme against the besieg-

ing force under Caldaques. It was bravely re- CHAP. II.
pulsed. But, on learning the result of the bat-
tle, Caldaques withdrew behind the Llobregat, 1808.
relinquishing the large magazines which Vives December.
had, with so much unfortunate industry, been
long occupied in collecting.

On the seventeenth, St. Cyr entered Barce- Dec. 20.
lona. On the twentieth, he took up a position
on the left of the Llobregat, fronting that of the
Spaniards. The latter were encamped on the
right bank of the river; their centre ranged
along the heights in rear of San Vicensa, their
left was at Pelleja, and their right extended to-
wards the little village of Llors. The head-
quarters of St. Cyr were at San Felici, his left
at Cornella, his right at Molino del Rey.

The position of the Spanish army was strong ;
but, in order to prevent their being reinforced
by the arrival of Lazan, St. Cyr determined to
attack them. Their chief attention had been di-
rected to the works defending the bridge at
Molino del Rey; but, at daybreak on the twen-
ty-first, the two divisions of Souham and Pino Dec. 21.
passed the river simultaneously, by the fords of
San Felici, and San Juan d'Espi; while Chabran

CHAP. II. kept up a warm cannonade on the bridge, and
1808. excited the enemy's alarm in that quarter. The
December. Spaniards were attacked with vehemence by
Pino and Souham. Chabot, with three bat-
talions, likewise passed the ford, and took up a
position on the left of Pino, threatening the
right of the Spanish army. To counteract this
manœuvre, Reding extended his line; and, by
so doing, weakened it. The consequence was,
that the right was driven back behind the centre,
and the centre, in its turn, behind the left. All
then became confusion. The army fled, without
order, towards the bridge; but in that quarter
the retreat to Villa Franca was cut off by Cha-
bot, and that to Martorell by Chabran, who had
succeeded in crossing a detachment at a ford.
Had Chabran, at that moment, forced the pas-
sage of the bridge, all retreat for the Spaniards
would have been cut off. But that General
did not move till too late, though frequently
urged to do so by General Rey.

The country, being rugged, woody, and full
of ravines, was unfavourable for cavalry, and
contributed to the escape of the fugitives. Not
more than from one thousand to twelve hundred
prisoners were taken. Among these, was Cal-

daques, who, during the progress of the operations, had been uniformly distinguished by zeal and talent.

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The rout of the Spaniards was complete. About fifteen thousand were afterwards enabled to collect in Tarragona; but many continued their flight to the Ebro. All the artillery, consisting of about fifty pieces, was taken; and large stores of ammunition were found by the enemy in Villa Franca.

After this important victory, St. Cyr pushed on his cavalry to the walls of Tarragona. That city had scarcely twenty guns on the ramparts, and disorder and consternation reigned in its population. Vives, on his arrival there, was deprived of his command, and thrown into a dungeon. It was with difficulty that he escaped massacre. Some accused him of treason, others of imbecility; crimes undoubtedly of very different magnitude and atrocity, yet nearly certain, in such a case, to encounter the same recompense.

Reding, by the almost unanimous voice of the soldiers and the people, was appointed successor to the unfortunate Vives. This measure tended greatly to restore that confidence which

CHAP. II. the recent disasters had contributed to over-
 1808. throw. Efficacious measures were taken to
 December. re-organize the scattered troops. A reinforce-
 ment of three battalions was received from
 Grenada and Majorca ; supplies were sent from
 Valencia ; men came in from all quarters ; and,
 before the middle of January, the force collect-
 ed in Tarragona wore a formidable aspect.

CHAPTER III.

SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.

THE sufferings of the gallant Zaragozans, during the former siege, had not subdued the spirit of heroic devotion by which they had been animated. Another trial awaited them, not less memorable and glorious, though less fortunate in its result.

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After the defeat of Tudela, Palafox retired to Zaragoza, to make preparations for a second siege. He was not present in the action. The intelligence of its issue came upon him like a thunderbolt; and the refusal of Castanos to throw his troops into Zaragoza, instead of retreating on Madrid, put an end to those feelings of confidence and frankness which had hitherto existed between the Generals.

CHAP. III. The multiplied disasters of the Spanish armies, however, so far from shaking the resolution of Palafox or the Zaragozans, appear only to have stimulated them to redoubled exertions in the service of their country. Proclamations were issued, commanding all women, old men, and children, to quit the city. Every inhabitant was imperatively called upon to make sacrifice, if necessary, of his life and property in the common cause; and the whole population were required, by their personal exertions, to contribute to the completion of the fortifications of the city.

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The approach of the enemy cut short the preparations for defence. Neither women nor children left the place. Even these refused to seek safety at a distance from their fathers and husbands, and preferred participating in the danger and the glory which awaited them in Zaragoza, to wandering unprotected, through a troubled and a suffering country.

During the former siege, the defenders had been embarrassed by the presence of French residents in the city. These had been strictly guarded, with the double object of preventing any intercourse between them and the besiegers,

and of protecting them against the fatal effects of popular suspicion, to which, without such precaution, it is more than probable they would have fallen victims. In order to prevent the repetition of such danger and inconvenience, Palafox determined that these unfortunate persons should be removed from the city to other places of confinement. This was done, notwithstanding the hostility of the populace, though not until Palafox had issued a proclamation appealing to Spanish honour and humanity, and imploring the gallant Zaragozans not to stain the sacred cause of liberty and justice by the foul murder of these defenceless victims.

The aid of superstition was not wanting to strengthen the confidence of the Zaragozans. They relied on the miraculous protection of Our Lady of the Pillar, who had made their favoured city the seat of her peculiar worship. The successful termination of the former siege had given strength to their belief in the beneficent regards of the patron saint. Omens too had been observed in the sky. Approaching victory had been prefigured by unwonted conformations of the clouds; and celestial voices were heard in the elements offering divine promise of glory and protection.

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Fortunately, the Zaragozans were not induced, by their belief in these flattering portents, to disregard any of the human means of safety in their power. A continued line of exterior defensive works had been planned and executed, as far as time and circumstances permitted. Yet this, imperfect as it was, added little to the real strength of the city; and, in forming a just estimate of the zeal and courage of the defenders, Zaragoza should almost be considered as an unfortified town. The walls, originally built rather for the purpose of civic impost than defence, were surmounted by one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. Large stores of provisions had been formed. Arms and ammunition were in abundance; and the town contained upwards of twenty thousand regular troops, besides fifteen thousand armed peasants.

All the houses, within seven hundred toises of the place, were demolished, and the materials employed to strengthen the fortifications. The trees round the city were cut down. The greatest activity reigned on all hands:—the women were employed in making clothes for the soldiers,—the monks made cartridges; and all those

not employed in labouring at the works, practised the use of arms. CHAP. III.

Measures were likewise taken for the defence of the city, in case the enemy, which was scarcely to be doubted, should effect an entrance. Traverses were cut across the streets. The doors and windows on the ground-floor were strongly barricaded. Communications were made between the houses; and parapets were constructed on the roofs. Every householder had in his dwelling an ample store of provisions, to enable him to continue his resistance when the enemy should gain possession of the streets. Thus prepared, the Zaragozans awaited the approach of the besiegers.

In the meanwhile, the corps of Marshal Moncey, which had been ordered to blockade the city, remained at Alagon, collecting materials, and awaiting the arrival of his heavy artillery from Pamplona. On the nineteenth of December it was joined by the corps of Mortier, and on the twentieth the united army appeared before Zaragoza. It consisted of about thirty-five thousand infantry, and was accompanied by a battering train of sixty pieces. A corps of

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Dec. 20.

CHAP. III. cavalry was stationed at Fuentes, to keep the surrounding country in subjection.

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The city was approached on both sides of the Ebro. Gazan's division, having passed the river at Tauste, marched, by the road of Castejon, to Cuera and Villa Nuevo. That of Suchet took post on the right of the Ebro, near a convent about a league distant from Zaragoza, after driving in the Spanish outposts.

During the night, the enemy erected a battery, which commanded the Torrero, and, in the morning, opened fire on the fort. Unfortunately, a quantity of ammunition was blown up, by the bursting of a shell, which occasioned considerable disorder in the garrison. The French took advantage of this. A column crossed the canal by an aqueduct, of which, on the evening before, they had become masters, and entering the fort by the gorge, succeeded in maintaining the place against the efforts of the garrison. At the same time, a brigade of Morlot's division advanced up the ravine of the Huerba, and, passing the canal under the aqueduct on which it crosses that river, gained possession of a work commanding the sluices of the canal. Two guns

were taken in this work. Three guns and one hundred prisoners in the fort. General St. Marc succeeded in withdrawing the rest of the garrison.

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On the twenty-second, General Gazan advanced against the suburb, on the left of the river. He was encountered by about four thousand of the garrison, posted in the woods and gardens, from which, after a warm contest, he succeeded in dislodging them. Gazan then attempted to carry the suburb by a *coup-de-main*. In this he failed. Repulsed in all his efforts, after a long and fruitless contention, he, at length, withdrew his troops, pursued by the garrison, and with the loss of near one thousand men. The chief loss of the besieged consisted of a corps of Swiss, almost all of whom were killed or taken prisoners in a large building considerably in advance of the suburb.

For several days all was quiet. The enemy were now aware that it was necessary to make a regular investment of the place; and the works, in all quarters, were pushed on with vigour. The besieged on their part endeavoured by incessant labour to complete the works of defence;

Cavallero.

CHAP. III. batteries, were constructed to enfilade the principal approaches, the magazines were rendered bomb-proof, every outlet was palisaded and traversed; and, thus prepared, they waited with calm fortitude for the approaching struggle.

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Dec. 30.

On the thirtieth, Marshal Moncey addressed a letter to Palafox, summoning him to surrender the city, now entirely invested, and to spare the effusion of blood which must necessarily follow any further attempt at hopeless resistance. Moncey likewise informed him that Madrid had fallen; and that Napoleon, at the head of a great army, was then in the act of chasing the English to their ships.

To this Palafox replied, that if Madrid had fallen, Madrid had been *sold*. The works of Zaragoza were yet entire; but, were they levelled with the ground, the people and the garrison would rather be buried in the ruins of their city, than disgraced by surrender.

In the meanwhile, General Gazan succeeded in effecting the blockade of the suburb. One of his brigades extended on the right of the Zuera road, the other on the left to the bridge over the Gallego, on the road to Barcelona. On the

right bank, Suchet held the ground comprised between the high* Ebro and the valley of the Huerba. Morlot's division occupied the valley. That of Meusnier was encamped on the heights of Torrero; and the arc was continued to the low Ebro, by the division of Grandjean, whose right, by means of a bridge of boats, was in communication with Gazan.

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On the twenty-ninth, the trenches were regularly opened against three points, viz. the Chateau of the Inquisition on the left, the bridge of the Huerba in the centre, and the convent of St. Joseph on the right. The last of these was the principal object of the enemy, because the works in rear were destitute of a rampart, and it was intended to connect the attack with a simultaneous attempt to gain possession of the suburb.

Dec. 29.

The garrison, however, were not idle. The communication between the Convent and the city could not be interrupted; and the garrison of the former, being daily relieved, made frequent sallies, by which the progress of the

* To unmilitary readers it may be necessary to explain, that the *high Ebro* means the portion of the river above the city; the *low Ebro*, that below it.



CHAP. III. besiegers was materially retarded. On the
 1808. thirty-first, a general sortie, supported by the
 December, whole guns of the place, was made against the
 enemy's line. Though gallantly supported, it
 was unattended by any successful result. The
 repeated attacks of the garrison were repulsed;
 and, baffled in their efforts, they again entered
 the city. The loss on both sides was nearly
 equal.

1809.
 Jan. 2.

On the second of January, Moncey was su-
 perseded by Marshal Junot in the command of
 the besieging army. The latter was the bear-
 er of an order to Mortier, to move on Calatayud
 with Suchet's division, in order to keep open
 the communication with Madrid. This arrange-
 ment occasioned a material diminution of the
 besieging force, but no cessation of hostile ope-
 ration. The works against the Convent of St.
 Joseph went on, and between the third and sixth
 of January the second parallel was completed.

Jan. 10.

Till the tenth no action took place; but on that
 day no less than eight batteries had been con-
 structed, and a tremendous fire from thirty guns
 was opened on the Convent. It was soon ren-
 dered untenable. But, amid the ruins, the gun-
 ners, covered by bags of wool, still continued to

exercise their vocation, and fired on the enemy, till the walls were nearly levelled with the ground. Even then the post was not relinquished without a gallant effort. At midnight a sortie was made against one of the batteries, in ignorance that two guns had been planted for its protection. The intention of the brave assailants was thus defeated; and, having suffered heavy loss from a murderous fire, both in front and flank, they again retreated to the city.

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January.

Even in the dilapidated condition of the Convent, it was not till the evening of the next day that the enemy attempted to carry it by assault. At the same time a party, having turned the Convent, succeeded, by means of a wooden bridge which the besieged had omitted to destroy, in effecting an entrance; and thus did the French at length become masters of a heap of ruins, and of about an hundred gallant men by whom they were defended.

Jan. 11.

No sooner were the enemy in possession of St. Joseph, than they employed themselves in repairing the works, and completing the communication between the second and third parallels, the latter of which they established on the right and left of the Convent. The garrison on

CHAP. III. that side were now compelled to remain within
1809. their walls ; for the besiegers were secured against
January. their efforts by the double obstacle of a river and
an escarpment eight feet high.

Jan. 15. On the fifteenth, a second parallel was opened
against the town ; and batteries were commenced
in it, to enfilade the defences of the Augustine
and Capuchin Convents, and that of Sta. Engra-
cia. Yet neither the loss of their outworks, nor
a tremendous bombardment, which the French
kept up for several days, had the effect of dimin-
ishing the ardour of the inhabitants. The Zara-
gozans were not only actuated by that active and
living energy which stimulates to deeds of high
enterprize, but they possessed, likewise, that
calm and passive fortitude, that buoyant upbear-
ing of the spirit, which suffering cannot depress,
nor misfortune overthrow.

But their cup was not yet full. The inhabit-
ants of the part of the city most injured by the
bombardment, were driven into the other quar-
ters, where many of them took up their abode in
cellars, which afforded comparative security from
the shells. The consequence was, that these
dark and miserable receptacles became the focus
of infectious fever. The disease spread rapidly

among a crowded and redundant population. CHAP. III.
 Thus did death, on all hands, present itself to
 the unshrinking Zaragozans; and the greater
 part preferred exposing themselves on the ram-
 parts, to breathing the infected air which per-
 vaded the dark and noisome retreats in which
 they had sought refuge.

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From the seventeenth to the twenty-first, the
 besiegers were occupied in the construction of
 new batteries to overcome the defences of the
 garrison; and the third parallel was extended to
 command two sides of the Convent of Sta. En-
 gracia. In these circumstances, a sortie was
 made, in the hope of spiking the enemy's artil-
 lery. The fire of a battery of four mortars
 was found peculiarly annoying; and eighty men,
 commanded by Don Mariano Galindo, volun-
 teered to attack it. They boldly precipitated
 themselves on the guard of the third parallel,
 put them to the sword, and succeeded in enter-
 ing the battery. At the same moment the ene-
 my's reserve came up. There was no retreat;
 all perished except the officers and a few wound-
 ed soldiers, who were made prisoners.

Jan. 21.

The movements of the numerous bodies of
 armed peasantry, in the surrounding country,

CHAP. III. occasioned great inconvenience to the besiegers.

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January.

Bands were formed on all hands ; which, though unable to resist the attack of disciplined troops, yet were sufficiently formidable to require perpetual vigilance, and numerous enough to narrow the supplies of the besieging army, in a very important degree. On the left of the Ebro, the Marques de Lazan and Don Francisco Palafox were advancing to the relief of the city. They occupied the country between Villa Franca, Licinia, and Zuera ; and pushed forward parties to Caparoso to intercept the convoys, and surround the division of Gazan.

About this time, Napoleon, dissatisfied with the slow progress of the siege, sent Marshal Lannes to assume the command. This officer directed Mortier, with his division, to leave Calatayud, and to act on the left of the Ebro. Mortier attacked the force of Francisco Palafox, and succeeded in dispersing it with very considerable loss. Lannes, in order to depress the hopes of the garrison of external assistance, addressed a letter to Palafox, communicating this circumstance, and all the other disasters which had befallen the Spanish armies. But the mortifying intelligence thus conveyed did not shake the

firmness of the undaunted leader. He rejected all compromise, and continued, with undiminished vigour, to oppose every possible obstacle to the progress of the enemy.

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All the outworks of the place had now fallen, except the castle of the Inquisition, which had been subjected to no serious attack. The newly raised works of the *Enceinte* had been battered by fifty-five guns; and, on the twenty-seventh, three breaches were declared practicable. One was near an oil-mill, which stood without the walls of the place, though but little removed from them. The second was to the left of this, between the Convent of St. Joseph and the town. The third was in the Convent of Sta. Engracia. All these were attacked. At mid-day, a column issued from the oil-mill, which had been occupied over-night, and, rapidly clearing the short distance which divided it from the walls, entered the breach, unbroken by the heavy fire to which they were exposed, and the explosion of two *Fougasses*. Having reached the summit, the assailants found an interior retrenchment armed with two guns, which the garrison had unexpectedly erected to obstruct their progress. They attempted, without success, to surmount this ob-

Jan. 27.