of Castanos were falling back on Madrid; that CHAP. I. ten thousand from the Somosierra were likewise concentrating; and that nearly forty thou- December. sand other troops were prepared to join in the defence of the capital. With these forces Sir John Moore was strongly invited to unite his army, or else to take such a direction as would enable him to fall on the rear of the French. "The Junta," concluded the letter, "cannot doubt that the rapidity of your Excellency's movements will be such as the interests of both countries require."

Before Sir John Moore had made any decision on the contents of this letter, Colonel Charmilly, a French emigrant in the British service, arrived with despatches from Mr. Frere. On the first of December, Charmilly had been in Madrid. He had witnessed the strongest and most unequivocal demonstrations of ardour among all classes of the people. The whole mass of the population was rising in arms; the streets were broken up, houses barricaded, and peasants from all quarters were flocking into the city, to bear part in the defence. The Duke del Infantado had commissioned him to make known this state of things to the British general, and to entreat



1808. December.

CHAP. I. him to make some movement that might operate as a diversion for the capital, which its defenders had determined to hold out to the last extremity.

> In passing Talavera, to which place the Junta and Mr. Frere had retired, the latter strongly enforced the same considerations, and intrusted Charmilly with a letter to Sir John Moore, urging him to relinquish the resolution of retreat. In case, however, this letter should prove ineffectual, he gave Charmilly another, to be delivered only in the event of the General still persisting in his determination.

> The first letter of Mr. Frere contained a reiteration of his entreaties, that Sir John Moore would suspend his resolution of retiring on Portugal. The enthusiasm pervading Madrid, he said, so far transcended all his hopes, that he could not forbear urging, in the strongest manner, not only the propriety, but the necessity, of supporting the determination of the Spanish people by every possible assistance. "I have no hesitation," continued Mr. Frere, "in taking upon myself any degree of responsibility which may attach to this advice, as I consider the state of Spain to depend absolutely, for the present, on the reso

lution you may adopt. I say, for the present; CHAP. I. for such is the spirit and character of the country, that, even if abandoned by the British, I December, should by no means despair of ultimate success."

The resolution of Sir John Moore was at length shaken by these official statements. It was impossible to suspect that the Junta would deceive him in a mere matter of fact. He could not suppose that a person of Mr. Frere's known perspicacity had become the dupe of a mere flimsy delusion. Of the ardour and effervescence of the popular spirit, Colonel Charmilly declared himself to have been a personal witness. To discover the real state of affairs, under such representations, when cut off from all sources of more authentic intelligence, was beyond the power of human penetration.

Sir John Moore, therefore, decided on a change of plan. He sent immediate orders to Sir David Baird, directing him to stop his retrogressive march, and to make arrangements for returning to Astorga. In these orders, the caution and prudence of the general were admirably displayed. "The city of Madrid have taken up arms, have refused to capitulate to the

Dated Dec. 5.

1808. December.

CHAP. I. French, are barricading their streets, and say they are determined to suffer every thing rather than submit. This arrests the French; and people who are sanguine entertain great hopes from it. I own, myself, I fear this spirit has arisen too late, and the French are now too strong to be resisted in this manner. However. there is no saving; and I feel myself the more obliged to give it a trial, that Mr. Frere has made a formal representation, which I received this evening. I must beg, therefore, that you will suspend your march until you hear from me again, and make arrangements for your return to Astorga, should it be necessary."

Dec. 6.

On the day following, he wrote as follows:-"Let all your preparations, as far as provisions, &c. go, continue to be made for a retreat, in case that should again become necessary. Establish one magazine at Villa Franca, and one or two farther back; to which let saltmeat, biscuit, rum or wines, forage, &c. be brought up from Corunna. Send me, to Zamora, two regiments of cavalry, and one brigade of horse-artillery, keeping one regiment of cavalry, and one brigade of horse-artillery with yourself; and send your troops by brigades to Benevente. The enemy have nothing at present in that direction; and we must take advantage of it, and, by working double tides, make up for lost time. By means of the cavalry-patrols, you will discover any movements immediately near you; and I take for granted, you have got other channels of information; and both you and me, although we may look big, and determine to get every thing forward, yet we must never lose sight of this, that, at any moment, affairs may take that turn that will render it necessary to retreat."

Dec. 7.

The preceding order reached Sir David Baird at Villa Franca, late on the seventh of December, when in full retreat on Corunna; and the movement was immediately arrested. The position of the army at Salamanca had now become materially improved. Sir John Hope, who, in order to avoid the enemy, had advanced by a circuitous route, was already at Alba de Tormes, and, by a movement to the left, the junction of the whole army was secure.

In the meanwhile, the change which had taken place in the mind of the general was unknown in Salamanca. Charmilly, supposing, from the tone of those around him, that the circumstances un1808.

der which he was to deliver the second letter had occurred, presented it to Sir John Moore. It ran thus:—

"Sir,—In the event, which I did not wish to presuppose, of your continuing the determination already announced to me, with the army under your command, I have to request that Colonel Charmilly, who is the bearer of this, and whose intelligence has already been referred to, may be examined before a Council of war.—I have, &c. J. H. Free."

That Sir John Moore should feel indignant at the receipt of such a letter was natural. He considered Mr. Frere as unwarrantably intruding on his office as Commander of the forces, and attempting to control him, by a Council of war, to act against the dictates of his judgment. He tore the letter in pieces, and dismissed the messenger from his presence. Nor did his resentment rest here. On the day following, Charmilly received an order to quit Salamanca, which, after a fruitless attempt to procure its revocation, he was compelled to obey.

On a calm review of the circumstances connected with this unpleasant collision, we feel little disposed to attribute blame to either party. -Both unquestionably decided on the purest CHAP. I. and most conscientious motives. Both were animated by a vehement desire to act as might most contribute to the honour of their country, and the interest of the common cause.-The style of Mr. Frere, indeed, is somewhat less courteous than might have been expected from so accomplished a diplomatist; and the opinions of Sir John Moore were certainly entitled to greater respect than the minister seemed inclined to accord them; but the question on which they differed was one on which men, zealous for the same end, might arrive at dissimilar conclusions, without imputation on the motives of either.

In truth, the minds of Mr. Frere and Sir John Moore were of different mould and consistency. The one, ardent and enthusiastic, was disposed to rely with too facile a credence on the energy and devotion of the assertors of a noble cause. The other, too strongly disgusted perhaps, with repeated proofs of ignorance and imbecility in the Spanish leaders, regarded the scene around him with the eye of a general. He felt little disposed to anticipate a fortunate issue to the resistance

O B

CHAP. I.

1808

which popular enthusiasm might oppose to military skill and highly disciplined troops. They beheld the same events through different media. December. In the picture of the one, the sun was mounting in the horizon, and the landscape was bathed in a flood of prospective radiance. In that of the other, the last rays of departing light had faded from the sky, and the face of nature lay hid in darkness.

> The resentment of Sir John Moore however, strong as it might be at the moment of receiving the offence, did not lead him to forget the respect due to the minister of his Sovereign. His answer to Mr. Frere's communications was mild and dignified: "I shall abstain," said he, "from any remark on the two letters delivered to me last night and this morning, by Colonel Charmilly. I certainly did feel and express much indignation at a person like him being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you to me. These feelings are at an end, and I daresay they will never be excited towards you again. If Mr. Charmilly is your friend, it was perhaps natural for you to employ him; but I have prejudices against all that class, and it is impossible for me to put any trust in him." He informed

Mr. Frere, that the order for retreat had been CHAP. I. countermanded, and that he had put himself in communication with the Marques de la Romana, December. at Leon. He declared his readiness to do every thing in his power for the assistance of Madrid and the Spanish cause; but stated the impossibility of a direct movement on the capital, from the circumstance of the passes of Guadarama and Somosierra being already in possession of the French, and from the weakness of his army, until it should have formed a junction with the corps of Sir David Baird.

Having at length adopted the resolution to advance, Sir John Moore wrote to the Marques de la Romana, informing him of this change in his decision, and expressing a strong wish for the speedy junction of their armies, in order that combined efforts might be made for the support of Madrid. The account of his army, however, given by the Spanish General, was abundantly discouraging. He had twenty thousand men under arms; but they were stated to be in the very worst condition with regard to equipment. The soldiers were without havresacks, cartridge-boxes, or shoes, and many even with-

1808 December.

CHAP. I. out clothing; yet their spirit was undaunted, and, if sufficiently provisioned, they would discharge their duty in the field.

> The Marques likewise stated, that he would gladly have formed an immediate junction, with the view of advancing to the relief of the capital, were he not prevented from abandoning his present position by a corps of eight or ten thousand men posted between Sahagun and Almanza, the apparent object of which was to check his movements. Any approach to the British army would leave, to this corps, free ingress into Asturias, from whence he drew large supplies, and would likewise endanger Gallicia. A combined movement with Sir David Baird, however, might oblige them to fall back on Reynosa, and, in that event, he should be ready to unite his army with the English.

Dec. 7.

On the seventh, Sir John Moore was informed, by a communication from the Junta of Toledo, that they intended to reunite the dispersed armies in that quarter, and defend the city to the last extremity. In reply, he assured the Junta that, if the rest of Spain were animated by a similar enthusiasm, ultimate success was certain,

by whatever disasters its advent might be imped- CHAP. I. ed or delayed. He assured them they might rely on all practicable assistance from the army he commanded: and sent a British officer to reside at Toledo, and concert measures for its defence. The word of promise, however, though liberally given to the ear, was broken to the hope; for the Junta, on the first approach of a column of the enemy, retired from the city, and it was occupied, without opposition, by the corps of Victor.

December.

On the ninth, Colonel Graham, who had been despatched to Madrid, returned, with intelligence of its being already in occupation of the enemy. His progress had been arrested at Talavera, where he encountered two members of the Supreme Junta. These informed him that Morla had entered into some agreement with the French, who had already gained possession of the Retiro and Prado of Madrid; that Morla was suspected of treason in this proceeding, having refused admission to the troops of San Juan and Hereida, whose presence would have enabled the inhabitants to defend the city; that Castellar, the Captain-General, and all the military officers of rank, had refused to ratify the capitula-

Dec. 9.

1808 December.

CHAP. I. tion, and had left the town, carrying with them sixteen guns; that the inhabitants still retained their arms; that the French army, amounting to about twenty-five thousand, had sufficient occupation in holding the people in subjection; that La Pena, with thirty thousand men, was at Guadalaxara; that fourteen thousand of San Juan's and Hereida's forces were assembling at Almaraz; and that Romana, in Leon, was in command of an army exceeding thirty thousand men.

> The fall of Madrid, however, did not deter Sir John Moore from pursuing his projected operations. The great bulk of the French army, which might have been employed against him, had been carried into Catalonia, or towards Madrid; and Sir John Moore considered that, by a forward movement, and effecting a junction with Baird, he would be able to menace the communication of the enemy, thus creating a diversion in favour of those Spaniards who still remained in arms, and giving time for the raising and embodying of new levies in the south. He never ceased, however, to contemplate the necessity of retreat, whenever the British army should become the chief object of the enemy's attention.

It is now necessary that we should take a re- CHAP. I. trospect of the events more immediately connected with the advance of the French army to November. Madrid, and its consequent surrender.

After the battle of Tudela, General Maurice Mathieu entered Borja in pursuit of Castanos, having secured a great many prisoners on his march. On the day following he was joined by Marshal Ney. Castanos reached Calatayud in safety, where his followers were exposed to extraordinary privations. No magazines existed for the supply of provisions, the country was exhausted, and the military chest, containing two millions of reals, had been conveyed to Zaragoza. The soldiers, desperate with hunger, were no longer amenable to discipline; and the inhabitants fled from their dwellings, dismayed alike by the conduct of their countrymen and the vicinity of the enemy.

The position of Castanos at Calatayud was sufficiently advantageous. It enabled him to cover the preparations for defence then making at Zaragoza, and, in some degree, to menace the left flank of the enemy on his advance towards the south. From this station, however, he was recalled, by an order from Morla, to assist in the

1808 November.

CHAP. I. defence of the capital. On the twenty-seventh, therefore, he continued his retreat on Siguenza, where he arrived on the day following. During his march the rear-guard, under Don Francisco Venegas, was attacked in the pass of Buvierca; but, after a severe contest, it succeeded in repelling the enemy, though not without considerable loss. At Siguenza, Castanos received a summons from the Central Junta, and resigned the command of the army to Don Manuel de La Pena. This officer was subsequently superseded at Guadalaxara, by the Duke del Infantado. On its retreat towards Valencia, the army was pursued by a body of cavalry and infantry under Bessieres; and, after many difficulties, succeeded in reaching Cuenca, where it was enabled to rally unmolested.

The victory of Tudela at once determined Napoleon to march rapidly on Madrid, with the centre of his army, while the wings continued the pursuit of the defeated Spaniards on the right and left. The advance of the army was commanded by Marshal Victor, who, on the Nov. 30. thirtieth, arrived in front of the defile of Somosierra, where the road crosses a mountainous chain, about sixty miles distant from the capital.

He found the Spanish army, amounting to about CHAP. I. eighteen thousand, strongly posted in the gorge of the mountain. Of these about six thousand November. were intrenched on the heights of Sepulveda; and General San Juan, with the remainder, occupied the pass. Sixteen pieces of cannon were judiciously placed in battery, on the highest part of the ridge flanking the ascent; and thus favourably posted, the Spanish forces awaited the approach of the enemy.

Marshal Victor at once advanced to the attack of the position of Sepulveda. In this he was repulsed; but the defenders, struck with panic, afterwards forsook their intrenchments, and fled in disorder towards Segovia.

On the day following an assault was made on the position of San Juan. Three battalions advanced on the right, three on the left, and three on the centre, under a heavy fire from the Spanish artillery. The heights on either flank were covered with Spanish light infantry, with whom the French maintained a warm, skirmishing fire, unattended by any decided result. At this moment Napoleon arrived, and, halting at the foot of the mountain, carefully examined the posi-

Dec. 1.

1808. December.

CHAP. I. tion, amid the fire of the enemy. Having completed his observations, he immediately ordered the Polish lancers of his guard to execute a charge on a battery which enfiladed the causeway, by which alone the position was approachable. The first squadron of the column was driven back in confusion by the shower of grape-shot and musquetry which it encountered. Under cover of the succeeding squadrons, however, it was again rallied, and the regiment, sword in hand, charged up the mountain at full speed, and in a moment were in possession of the battery. The Spaniards fled on all hands, dispersing among the hills, with the loss of arms, baggage, ammunition, and artillery. The annals of modern war scarcely afford record of a more daring and singular exploit. The loss of the Polish regiment amounted only to fifty-seven men killed and wounded.

> In Segovia, the defeated army united with the troops which had retired from Sepulveda, and, subsequently marching to Guadarama, effected a junction with the corps of Estramadura, under Hereida. With these forces, San Juan, unable to remain in occupation of the pass, from

want of provisions, proceeded to the Escurial, CHAP. I. where an order met him to march instantly on the capital.

1808. December

While executing this order, insubordination spread among his followers, and the great body of the army forsook their ranks and dispersed. When the generals, therefore, approached Madrid, they had with them but a small band of followers; and, discovering that the city had surrendered, they retired on Talavera. To this place the greater number of the deserters had bent their march. By these San Juan was brutally murdered, and his army, being without a rallying point, dispersed.

While the events which we have already detailed, were in progress, the conduct of the government was marked by an inexplicable fatuity Instead of vigorous measures to recruit and re-organize the scattered forces of their armies, the Supreme Junta busied themselves in establishing a special tribunal for the trial of persons suspected of treason; and directed an investigation into the conduct of those who had acknowledged the authority of the usurper. The principles, on which it was provided that the proceedings of this Commission should be

1808. November.

CHAP. I. regulated, were unquestionably humane and liberal. Especial provisions were made to prevent secret arrest, or irresponsible imprisonment. The laws of trial were fair. Anonymous information was rejected; and in all the contemplated proceedings of this novel tribunal, the dictates of impartial justice were laudably observed.

> In this measure, and in others equally unsuited to the circumstances and character of the times, did the Junta waste the precious moments which should have been devoted to matters of deeper importance. But they did worse than this. They adopted the fatal system of deceiving the people with regard to the magnitude and imminence of their danger. Even while the French threatened the important pass of Somosierra, the Junta addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of Madrid, declaring that the body by which the capital was menaced amounted only to eight thousand men. They declared that the enthusiasm, with which the soldiers were preparing to defeat the enemies of their country, was great beyond description; that the English were ready to advance from the Escurial, to defend the capital, and support the oper-

Dated Nov. 21. ations of the gallant army already gloriously en- CHAP. I. gaged in achieving fresh triumphs.

As soon as the pass of Somosierra was forced, November. the Supreme Junta retired from Aranjuez to Badajos, leaving a Military Commission, under the presidency of the Marques de Castellar, to conduct the defence of Madrid. Judging from external demonstrations, the enthusiasm of Madrid rivalled that of Zaragoza. The people broke up the pavement in the streets, and intersected them with ditches, barricaded the doors and windows of the houses, erected batteries on the most commanding situations, and planted cannon in the squares and crossings of the streets. There were in the place sixty thousand men under arms, including six thousand troops of the line, all animated with a desire to defend the city to the last extremity.

Unfortunately, however, the people were without confidence in their leaders. A report spread that sand was mixed with the gunpowder in the cartridges. The Marques de Perales was the person upon whom the crime of treason was charged. The mob broke into his house; and before the Duke del Infantado could arrive to his assistance, Perales had been pierced with 1808.

November rabble.

CHAP. I. wounds, and his dead body dragged through the streets, amid the exulting execrations of the

The near approach of the enemy struck the authorities with alarm. They felt little anxious that the city should be subjected to the horrors of a protracted siege, and agreed, should their hopes from without fail, to content themselves with such measures as might prevent the enemy from instantly forcing the town, and induce him to grant favourable terms of capitulation. A diversion by the British might operate in their favour. At all events, it was thought advisable to strengthen the garrison as much as possible. They counted on assistance from the fugitive troops of San Juan, many of which were hourly arriving; and despatched the Duke del Infantado to conduct La Pena's army, with all speed to the capital. On this mission he set out on the second of December.

On the day preceding, the corps of Marshal Ney effected a junction with the army of the centre, by Guadalaxara and Alcala, and head-quarters were advanced to St. Augustino. On the second, the cavalry under Bessieres came in sight of the city, and took possession of the heights. Ma-

drid was in the greatest fermentation. The bells of all the churches rung forth alarm, the priests called the population to arms in defence of their hearths and altars, and the shouting of multitudes, mingling with the loud trumpet peal, gave intelligible intimation to the enemy of the state of the capital. In truth, there were two parties in the city. One consisting of the military, of the armed peasants from the country, and of the poorer class of the people, had no property to lose, and were determined to defend the city to the last extremity. The other comprehended the merchants and principal tradesmen, and all the richer body of inhabitants. These were unwilling to hazard all on the fortune of a cast, and maintained the imprudence of exposing the capital to pillage, by an obstinate and protracted resistance. Jealousies, too, had broken out between the civil and military authorities, and valuable time was wasted in useless altercations, which the urgency of the crisis demanded should be otherwise employed.

In this situation of affairs, Bessieres sent an aid-de-camp into the city with a summons to the

1808.

CHAP. I. authorities to open the gates. The mission was one of danger. The officer was seized by the 1808. exasperated people, and had he not been oppor-December. tunely rescued by a party of soldiers, would unquestionably have fallen a victim to their fury.

Conquetes.

Victoires et A Spanish general, with an escort of thirty men, was despatched to the out-posts of the enemy, with the answer of the authorities to this demand. It stated that the whole population of Madrid were prepared to die in defence of the city. In the meanwhile, the French army was approaching the scene of action. Towards evening, the corps of Victor was sent forward to gain possession of the suburbs on the northern approaches to the city, which, after considerable resistance, was accomplished; and, before nightfall, artillery was posted on the more prominent points of occupation.

> At midnight, Berthier despatched a Spanish colonel of artillery, who had been taken prisoner at Somosierra, with a letter to the Marquis de Castellar, exhorting him not to subject the city to the horrors of an assault. To this communication, Castellar replied that before he could give an explicit answer, it was necessary to

ascertain the sentiments of the authorities and CHAP. I. the people. For this purpose, he demanded a suspension of arms till the following day.

1808 December.

The request was not granted. On the morning of the third, an attack was made on the Retiro, the favourite palace of Philip the Fourth, which stood on an eminence commanding the city. The place was soon breached by the fire of thirty guns, and carried by assault, with the loss of a thousand of the garrison.

The French were not contented with this advantage, but immediately pushing on, succeeded, with little difficulty, in gaining possession of the China Manufactory, the great Barrack, the Hotel de Medina Celi, and other buildings commanding the entrances to several of the principal streets.

The arrival of numerous deserters, chiefly of the Walloon guards, gave intelligence to the enemy of the state of feeling in Madrid. The continued success of the French had spread confusion and disorder. The calmness of resolute resistance was wanting, the population was not bound together by the strong tie of mutual confidence amid surrounding danger. In these circumstances, another message was sent into

Dec. 3.

1808. December.

CHAP. I. the city, stating that the Emperor, unwilling to occasion unnecessary bloodshed, would suspend hostile operations till two o'clock. "To attempt the defence of Madrid," said Berthier, "is against the principles of war, and inhuman for the inhabitants. The Emperor authorizes me to send you a third summons. An immense artillery is already placed in battery; mines are prepared to blow up your principal buildings; columns of troops are at the entrances of your city, of which some companies of riflemen are already masters. But the Emperor, always generous in the course of his victories, suspends the attack till two o'clock. The city of Madrid may expect protection and safety for its peaceable inhabitants, for religion and its ministers. The past shall be forgotten. Raise a white flag before the expiration of two hours, and send commissioners to treat for the surrender of the city."

> At five o'clock, Morla and Don Bernardo Yriarte arrived at head-quarters. They stated themselves to be charged to demand a cessation of hostilities during the remainder of the day, with the view of giving time to the authorities to dispose the people to surrender. These com-

missioners were ushered into the presence of CHAP. I. Napoleon. His reception of them was calculated to inspire terror. On Morla he particularly vented his indignation. He adverted in strong language to the violation of the capitulation of Baylen. His address concluded thus:-"To violate a military treaty is to renounce civilization; it degrades generals to the rank of the Bedouins of the desert. How dare you then to solicit a capitulation, you who have violated that of Baylen? See how injustice and bad faith ever recoil on the guilty! I had a fleet at Cadiz; it was in alliance with Spain, and yet you directed against it the mortars of the city where you commanded. I had a Spanish army in my ranks, and rather than disarm it, I would have seen it embark on board the English ships, and be forced afterwards to precipitate it from the summit of the rocks of Espinosa. I would rather have seven thousand more enemies to fight, than be deficient in honour and good faith. Return to Madrid. I give you till six o'clock in the morning; come back at that hour to announce the submission of the people, or you and your troops shall all be put to the sword."

1808. December.

CHAP. I. It was the object of Napoleon, in his treatment of the deputies, to stimulate their fears, in order that the impression they carried with them might be diffused among the populace of Madrid. He was, above all things, anxious that the surrender of the capital should appear the voluntary act of the people—not the traitorous betraval of their leaders. He felt the importance of propagating the belief that he had entered Madrid, not as an enemy, but amid the acclamations of the inhabitants.

Dee. 4.

Early on the morning of the fourth, Morla, and Don Fernando de la Vera, returned to the French head-quarters, announcing that the peaceable inhabitants had consented to receive, with gratitude, the generous offers of the Emperor. At ten o'clock, General Belliard, at the head of a body of French troops, entered the city, and assumed the command. During the night, the armed peasants from the country had returned to their habitations: and Castellar, refusing to sanction the capitulation, with the main body of the troops and sixteen guns, marched out of the city, and effected his retreat.

Dec. 7.

On the seventh, Napoleon issued a proclama-

tion to the Spanish nation. He declared they CHAP. I. had been misled by perfidious men to engage in a hopeless struggle. What possible result, he December. asked, could attend even the success of a few campaigns? Nothing but an indefinite protraction of war on their own soil-an endless uncertainty of life and property. Was there one Spaniard amongst them so senseless as not to feel that the nation had been the sport of the eternal enemies of the continent, who took delight in witnessing the effusion of French and Spanish blood? It had cost him but some marches to defeat their armies: he had entered their capital, and the laws of war would justify him by a signal example in washing away, in blood, the insult offered to himself and his country. But he had listened to the voice, not of justice, but of clemency. His wish was to be the regenerator of Spain. All that obstructed their prosperity and greatness he had destroyed; he had broken the fetters which bent the people to the earth. Their destiny now was in their own hands. An absolute monarchy had been displaced by a free constitution. "It depends on yourselves whether this constitution shall continue in your land. But should all my efforts

1808.

prove fruitless, and should you shew yourselves unworthy of my confidence, nothing will remain for me but to treat your country as a conquered province, and to establish my brother on some other throne. I shall then place on my own head the crown of Spain, and cause it to be respected by the guilty. God has given me the will and power to surmount all difficulties."

This proclamation was succeeded by a number of decrees on various subjects. No grant was in future to be made from the public revenue to any individual. The Tribunal of the Inquisition, feudal rights, and the jurisdiction of seigniorial courts of justice, were abolished. The number of convents was reduced to one-third. Most of the members of the Council of Castile were displaced, and declared unworthy of continuing the magistrates of a free nation; and, with few exceptions, a general pardon was granted to all Spaniards, on professing allegiance to the intrusive monarch.

After the fall of the capital, the French still continued to follow up their successes. Toledo was occupied by Marshal Victor on the eleventh, and La Mancha became subject to the pillage of his ferocious soldiery. In the meanwhile, the

Dec. 11.