

morning, when within two leagues of that town, a small body of French horse came up, and made a charge on the rear. The whole army then fell into confusion, and dispersed. Fortunately, the enemy were not near enough for immediate pursuit; and, on reaching the Pena de Francia, in that secure position a considerable body of the fugitives were collected.

By this victory, the French were enabled, without further obstacle, to direct their views against Ciudad Rodrigo, and threaten Portugal. Lord Wellington, in consequence, removed his army from their unhealthy station in the neighbourhood of Badajos; and crossing the Tagus, fixed his head-quarters at Vizeu.

While the Supreme Junta were wasting the national resources in ill-concerted endeavours to regain possession of the capital, the defence of Catalonia was left to the unaided efforts of its inhabitants. A French fleet had succeeded in escaping the English squadron, and in re-victualing Barcelona. This done, preparations were set on foot for the siege of Gerona. General Reille who was to have commanded the besieging army, was at this period superseded by General Verdier. The force under St. Cyr, which

CHAP.VIII
1809.
November.

CHAP. VIII was destined to act as a corps of observation, occupied the fertile country around Vich.

1809.

May.

On the sixth of May, the besiegers appeared before Gerona; and taking possession of the heights of Casa Roca, and Costarroja, began to form their lines without opposition. The garrison of the city, which amounted only to three thousand four hundred men, was commanded by Don Mariano Alvarez; and the inhabitants, encouraged by having twice driven the enemy from their walls, were again prepared to signalize their patriotism by a strenuous and unshrinking defence.

Since the period of the former siege, the fortifications of the place had been considerably strengthened. The three advanced redoubts, of which the enemy, in eighteen hundred and eight, had gained easy possession, were now in a complete state of defence; and much labour had been expended in increasing the security of the other works.

When the lines were completed, a summons was sent into the city, exhorting Alvarez to avoid the evils which could not fail to result from resistance. All terms, however, were rejected, and the siege went on.

On the night of the thirteenth of June, the bombardment commenced. This event had not been unprovided for by the inhabitants. The alarm sounded; and the women, the aged, and the children, sought refuge in cellars, and other places of comparative security, which had been prepared for their reception. On the seventeenth, an ill-judged sally was made by the besieged, which, though successful, was yet attended by a loss of life which more than counterbalanced the benefit it produced.

CHAP. VIII

1809.

June.

Jun. 17.

The bombardment continued, and spread devastation through the buildings of the city. Several hospitals were destroyed; and the difficulty of providing accommodation for the sick and wounded, became daily greater. Fever and disease broke out among the inhabitants, yet their spirit remained firm and unbroken.

In the meanwhile, St. Cyr, who had hitherto remained in his position near Vich, moved his head-quarters to Caldas de Malavella, in order to prevent succours being thrown into Gerona; and his army occupied a line, extending from the Ona to San Feliu de Guixols, from which place the Spaniards, after an obstinate resistance, were driven on the twen-

Jun. 21.

CHAP. VIII ty-first. While thus stationed, the General

1809.

June.

received official intelligence that Marshal Augerau was about to supersede him in the command of the seventh corps; and this circumstance contributed to deprive him of the influence which he would otherwise naturally have exerted on the operations of the siege. He objected to the manner in which Verdier had conducted his advances against the town, and his neglect of many salutary precautions. But his opinions were disregarded, and Verdier continued to prosecute the siege, in full expectation of speedily becoming master of the place.

July.

The redoubts in advance of Mont Jouy, were carried by assault, and with a facility which tended to increase the contempt with which the French army regarded their opponents. Emboldened by this success, they determined to assault a breach which a battery of twenty guns had opened in one of the bastions of Mont Jouy.

Jul. 4.

The attack was made in the night of the fourth of July, and terminated in the complete repulse of the assailants.

During the three following days an incessant fire was kept up on the breach; and on the eighth, it was again assaulted. The French

Jul. 8.

columns were received with a fire, so well directed and destructive, that, after several ineffectual efforts, the troops were withdrawn in confusion, with the loss of eleven hundred of their number.

CHAP.VIII
1809.
August.

From this time forward the siege was conducted with greater prudence. Batteries were opened on three different sides of the fort, and every precaution was adopted to ensure success. An entire month passed in the dispute of a ravelin, which, when at length carried by the enemy, was found untenable from being exposed to the musquetry from the fort.

With the contests for possession of the ravelin personal conflict ceased between the garrison of Mont Jouy and the besiegers. Though the defences were daily suffering by the enemy's mines and artillery, yet the fort was not abandoned till the walls had been nearly levelled with the ground, and the whole guns had been silenced. In this situation, the ruins were resigned to the enemy; and on the night of the eleventh of August, the garrison effected its retreat.

Aug. 11.

In defence of the town an equal share of resolution and gallantry was displayed. By the

CHAP. VIII surrender of Mont Jouy, the French were enabled to throw up works nearer to the *enceinte*, and a tremendous fire was opened from their numerous batteries.

1809.

August.

Towards the end of August, several breaches had been made, and the garrison was greatly reduced by the casualties of war and disease. The hospitals were already crowded, and unable to contain the patients whose situation demanded admission. The ravages of the fever were hourly increasing, and the want of provisions began to be severely felt. Yet no proposal of surrender was heard in the city. The determination of all ranks to resist the enemy to the last extremity remained unshaken by calamity.

Sep. 1.

At this critical period, Blake having, by a series of skilful manœuvres, succeeded in deceiving St. Cyr as to his intentions, was enabled to throw three thousand of his army, with a supply of provisions, into the city. By this timely reinforcement the spirits of the garrison were raised; and the besiegers, from a want of ammunition, were compelled for a time to suspend their operations. The interval thus afforded was employed in strengthening and repairing the dilapidations of the place.

On receiving the expected supplies, the besiegers redoubled their quantity of fire, and on the eighteenth of September three breaches were declared practicable. On the day following, the assault was made, and the struggle, which was long and severe, at length terminated in favour of the garrison. The French were repulsed in all their efforts, and having suffered great loss, were at length withdrawn in disorder.

CHAP.VIII

1809.

September.

Sep. 19.

The besiegers were dispirited by this signal defeat of their greatest effort. It was determined to convert the siege into a blockade, and to reduce those by famine whom they could not conquer by the sword. This was done. The situation of the garrison and the inhabitants of the city, was one of accumulating suffering. Famine was in their dwellings. The supply of corn was small, and the mules and horses were slaughtered at the shambles. The fever, which the heats of summer had rendered more virulent and fatal, was raging in its fury, and other forms of disease, scarcely less destructive, assailed those whom the pestilence had spared.

It is not in the breach or on the battle-field,—it is not amid the inspiriting and glorious accompaniments of hostile struggle, where death

CHAP. VIII comes suddenly if he comes at all, and the heart

1809.
September. which panted for victory, and the lips which shouted triumph, in a moment become mute and motionless,—it is not in such circumstances that the courage of the human soul is most severely tested. In Gerona, the period of active struggle had passed away. All that now remained to its inhabitants, was to exert that calm and passive fortitude, that firmness of endurance, which shrinks from no suffering which duty demanded they should encounter. This highest, rarest, and noblest description of courage, was not wanting in the Geronans. Amid famine and pestilence they remained unshaken, hoping the best, yet prepared to brave the worst; looking for succour, but determined on resistance.

Relief—enough only to prolong their sufferings—came. General O'Donnel, with one hundred and sixty mules loaded with provisions, succeeded, on the side of Bispal, in breaking through the enemy and reaching the town. The same officer, by a bold and skilful manœuvre, Oct. 13. subsequently succeeded in passing the besieging army, and retreating with his troops.

The joy of the inhabitants at this seasonable relief was at first great. It raised hopes of

support from without, which were not realized. CHAP. VIII
 Marshal Augerau had assumed the command of
 the besieging army. Convoys of provisions ar-
 rived from France, accompanied by a large rein-
 forcement of troops; and a detachment which
 had been sent against Hostalrich, drove the
 Spaniards from the town, and became masters
 of the large magazines which had been formed
 there.

1809.
 October.

The hope of external relief no longer existed
 in the city. A fearful mortality was raging with-
 in its walls. The burial-places were choked with
 corpses, and the deaths sometimes amounted
 even to seventy a day. Augerau straitened the
 blockade, and persevered in bombarding the city.
 He likewise sent letters into the city, to commu-
 nicate his victory at Hostalrich, the defeat of
 Blake's army, and the peace with Austria. With
 a humanity highly honourable, he even offered
 to grant an armistice for a month, and suffer
 supplies immediately to enter the city, provided
 Alvarez would capitulate at the expiration of
 that period, should the city not be relieved.

The Geronans, however, were prepared to bear
 all, and would not, for the sake of shortening
 their own sufferings, consent to aught that might

CHAP. VIII injure their country. They knew that, should they accept the proposal of Augerau, a large proportion of the besieging army would become disposable for other operations. The offer, therefore, was declined. The records of history present few instances of more pure and memorable heroism.

1809.
November.

Notwithstanding the sufferings of the besieged, few cases occurred of desertion. But in one instance ten officers—two of whom were of noble birth—went over to the enemy. At length, however, suffering reached such a pitch, that many of the inhabitants, determined to risk death in the field rather than await his slow approach in the city, attempted to escape through the enemy's lines, and in some instances succeeded.

Nov. 29. Towards the end of November, Samaniego, the chief surgeon to the garrison, delivered a report to Alvarez on the state of health in the city. Aware of the nature of its contents, Alvarez directed Samaniego to read it, observing, "This paper will inform posterity of our sufferings—should there be none left to recount them."

The report was a dreadful one. In the whole city there did not remain a single house unin-

jured by the bombardment. The people bur-
rowed in cellars, vaults, and crevices of the ruins.
The water stagnated in the streets which were
broken up. The sick were frequently killed in
the hospitals. The dead bodies, which lay rot-
ting in holes amid the ruins, poisoned the atmos-
phere. Even vegetation was affected by it. Trees
withered in the gardens, and esculents re-
fused to grow. Within three weeks five hundred
of the garrison had died in the hospitals. The
sick lay upon the ground without beds, and al-
most without food. Nearly the whole fuel and
provisions had been exhausted. "If by these
sacrifices," concluded Samaniego, "worthy to be
the admiration of history,—and if by consummat-
ing them with the lives of those of us who by
the will of Providence have survived our com-
rades, the liberty of our country can be secured,
happy shall we be in the bosom of eternity, and
in the memory of all good men, and happy will
our children be among their fellow country-
men."

The breaches, which ten weeks before had
been assaulted, were still open; and the be-
siegiers having learned that the ammunition of
the place was exhausted, determined on bolder

CHAP. VIII

1809.

November.

CHAP. VIII operations. All the outworks were carried, and
 1809. a gallant sally of the garrison, though successful
 December. did not materially amend their situation.

The besiegers had now advanced close to the
 walls, the breaches were open, and the enemy
 were evidently preparing for another assault.
 Dec. 4. In this state of things, the brave Alvarez became
 smitten with the prevailing epidemic. He re-
 signed the command to Don Julian De Bolivar,
 who summoned a council to determine what
 measures should be adopted in the extremity to
 which the city had been reduced.

The meeting was of opinion that further re-
 sistance was hopeless, and it was resolved to
 Dec. 10. treat for a capitulation. Marshal Augerau
 granted honourable terms. The garrison were to
 march out with the honours of war, and be sent
 prisoners into France, to be exchanged as soon
 as possible for an equal number of French
 prisoners then detained at Majorca, and other
 places. None but those who ranked as soldiers
 were to be considered prisoners. The French
 army were not to be quartered on the inhabi-
 tants. The public records of the city were nei-
 ther to be removed nor destroyed. The inhabi-
 tants were to be at liberty to quit Gerona, taking

with them their property. The heroic Alvarez was to be allowed to choose any place of residence on the French frontier. He afterwards retired to Figueras, where he died.

CHAP. VIII
1809.
December.

When the garrison, reduced by famine and disease, marched out, in presence of the French army, their shrunken forms, their glazed and hollow eyes, their wan and meagre countenances, excited even the compassion of their enemies. On entering the city, it was found that most of the guns had been fired so often as to have become useless. Brass itself, observed Samaniego, had given way before the constancy of the Geronans. It may be added, that brass will be found less durable than the tribute which shall be paid, by all noble and generous spirits, to the heroism and devotion of these intrepid patriots.

After the battle of Ocana, the Central Junta displayed little of that energy which, on former occasions, had contributed to bear them through increasing difficulties. They endeavoured to conceal from the nation the full extent of their misfortunes. The discovery of a conspiracy for a change of government contributed yet more to their alarm. They knew themselves to have

CHAP. VIII

1809.

December.

become unpopular with the nation. Libels were poured forth on them in all quarters ; and the chief efforts of the Junta were directed rather to the maintenance of their own precarious authority, than to any measures of effective resistance to the enemy.

Yet for such measures the time imperatively called. The enemy threatened Andalusia ; and it was evident that by nothing but a rapid and vigorous concentration of the national efforts could his projects be successfully opposed. Under these circumstances, the Junta issued proclamations to the people, couched in the same high tone of chivalrous patriotism which had formerly produced so animating an effect. But it was already apparent that the nation had lost confidence in the government. The Provincial Juntas had in many places resumed their authority ; and Spain was probably on the verge of relapsing into the state of confusion from which the formation of the Central Junta had delivered it, when the progress of the enemy put a stop to these intestine dissensions.

So unpopular indeed had the Junta become, that no officer of reputation would consent to serve under them. In Galicia, the Conde de

Noronha had already reared the standard of rebellion. Romana, to whom the chief command of the armies had been offered, declined its acceptance. The Duke del Albuquerque, who commanded a corps of about twelve thousand in Estramadura, was an object of fear and jealousy to the Junta. Castanos was in disgrace at Algesiras; and the chief command in Andalusia, at a crisis so important, was, almost from necessity, intrusted to the imbecile Arisaigo. Worse placed it could not be.

CHAP. VIII

1809.

December.

CHAP. IX.

1810.

CHAPTER IX.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

CHAP. IX. THE year had closed in Spain triumphantly
1810. for the French arms, as it had commenced. The Spanish armies had sustained a series of unparalleled defeats. The British had retired into Portugal; and the efforts of Lord Wellington were, for the present, limited to the defence of that kingdom. England had wasted her resources in a fruitless and ill-judged expedition to the Isle of Walcheren, where disease had done the work of the sword. A triumphant peace had been concluded with Austria; and the whole of the immense forces of the French empire were thus disposable for the reduction of Spain.

At Paris, Napoleon, in a speech to the senate,

recounted the triumphs of the year, and intimated his intention of returning to Spain, to complete the conquest already almost achieved. CHAP. IX.
1810.
“When I shall shew myself beyond the Pyrenees,” said he, in metaphor somewhat staled by frequent repetition, “the frightened Leopard will fly to the ocean to avoid shame, defeat, and death. The triumph of my arms will be the triumph of the genius of good over that of evil,—of moderation, order, and morality, over civil war, anarchy, and the evil passions!”

The war minister reported, that, of the conscriptions already decreed, there still remained eighty thousand men uncalled into service. Of these, thirty-six thousand were to be immediately embodied. Thirty thousand men, collected at Bayonne, were ready to repair the casualties which had diminished the French armies in Spain; and an additional force of twenty-five thousand, raised from the conscription of the year following, would be at the disposal of the Emperor.

Such was the threatening aspect of affairs at the commencement of eighteen hundred and ten. Yet Lord Wellington did not despair of the cause in which he had embarked. When

CHAP. IX. he entered Spain, but a few months before,
1810. he had done so in co-operation with an army of considerable strength, against a comparatively small and extended body of the enemy. Since that period, the Spanish armies had been routed and dispersed; and, whatever ideas he might have previously formed, it was now evident, that neither the talents of their leaders, nor the character of the troops, gave any prospect of vigorous and effective resistance to the progress of the enemy. But Lord Wellington likewise knew, that the security of Spain did not depend on the conduct of her armies,—that an indomitable spirit of hostility was abroad among her people,—that a desultory but destructive war was carrying on in all her provinces,—and that the expense of life, at which the French maintained their hold on the country, was one which could not fail gradually to enfeeble the invaders, and call for a succession of efforts, of such magnitude, as France, in the precarious state of Europe, might soon be unable to support.

In the meantime, it was obvious that defensive war was the only one which could be waged with any prospect of success. It was

the policy of England to protract the contest ; to lead the enemy to divide his forces by distracting his attention, and thus to subject him to the full operation of that petty but pervading hostility which was ever wasting his numbers. For the present, therefore, Lord Wellington determined to confine his efforts to the defence of Portugal, yet to stand prepared on the occurrence of more favourable circumstances, again to widen the sphere of his operations, and advance into Spain.

CHAP. IX.

1810.

On crossing the Tagus, he moved his headquarters to Vizeu ; and the army went into cantonments, extending from Coimbra to Pinhel, while the corps of General Hill remained at Abrantes and its neighbourhood. In this position, the troops remained for some time inactive, in order to recover the effects of the preceding campaign, and the sickness which had been engendered by the unhealthy station to which they had subsequently removed.

At this period, Marshal Soult, with an army of about fifty thousand men, was preparing to advance into Andalusia. The Junta, blind to the approaching danger, felt secure that the giant range of the Sierra Morena

CHAP. IX. would oppose an impenetrable barrier to the progress of the enemy. The passes of these mountains had been fortified with care, and a force of about twenty thousand men, under Arisaigo, was posted for their defence. But on the twentieth of January, the pass of Despena Perros was forced, with but little resistance from the troops, whose spirit was depressed by the remembrance of Ocana. In order to distract the attention of Arisago, Soult divided his army into three columns, which advanced simultaneously on the three principal *debouchés* of the Sierra. The right, under Victor, by Almaden; the centre, under Mortier, by the road from Madrid; the left, under Sebastiani, by Villa Nueva. Several mines had been placed by the Spaniards at the narrow parts of the defile, but the explosion of these produced little effect. On the twenty-first, Soult's headquarters were at Baylen; and, on the twenty-ninth, the corps of Victor effected its junction with the army before Seville.

In Seville—where, till now, nothing had been heard but the sound of presumptuous boasting—all was confusion. The Junta fled to Cadiz; no measures had been taken to put the

city in a condition for effective resistance ; and, after a negotiation of two days, it surrendered.

On the thirty-first, Seville opened her gates, and the intrusive monarch made his triumphal entry on the same day. The French thus became masters of nearly two hundred pieces of serviceable cannon, of immense magazines, and of the great cannon foundry, which was left uninjured.

CHAP. IX.
1810.
February.

In truth, the resistance offered in Andalusia to the progress of the French arms was so slight, as to lead Joseph to believe that the spirit of the people had at length been effectually humbled. Jaen, which boasted every preparation for defence, submitted, without a struggle, to Sebastiani. Granada followed the disgraceful example, after an impotent attempt to check the progress of the enemy by Arisaigo. A feeble effort was subsequently made in defence of Malaga, but this too failed ; and on the fifth of February, the French took possession of the city.

Feb. 5.

At Seville the army remained for two days inactive, when a corps, under Mortier, was detached into Estramadura, for the reduction of Badajos, and Victor was directed to march on



CHAP. IX. Cadiz. Had the latter been at once pushed forward, with that celerity of movement for which the French army is generally remarkable, and to which it has been indebted for many of its most splendid successes, there can exist little doubt that Cadiz would have fallen. The city, in truth, was utterly unprepared for attack; the garrison was insufficient to man the works, and there were not a thousand men in the Isla de Leon. The governor, General Vanegas, was unpopular and distrusted; he accordingly resigned his authority, and a Junta of eighteen householders was elected by ballot to govern the city.

In such circumstances was it, that Cadiz was saved from her impending danger by the vigour and promptitude of the Duke del Albuquerque. That General, placing little faith in the talent and prudence of the Supreme Junta, no sooner received intelligence that the French had passed the Morena, than, disregarding the orders of the Junta, who directed him to repair to Cordova, he marched on Cadiz with the greatest rapidity, and threw himself into the Isla de Leon, with a body of about eight thousand men, in time to barricade the bridge of Zuazo before the head of Victor's column came

1810.
February.

Feb. 4.

up. Thus was Cadiz saved, and Spain spared from a misfortune which could not but have been followed by the most disastrous consequences.

CHAP. IX.
1810.
February.

The unpopularity of the Supreme Junta had now reached its height. On their arrival in Cadiz, they attempted to resume their authority ; but neither the Local Junta, nor the army, nor the populace would obey their decrees. The personal safety of its members was even endangered by the violence of the mob ; and, making a merit of necessity, the Junta at length resigned the shadow of that power which in reality they had long ceased to possess. A Council* of Regency, consisting of five members, was appointed to wield the reins of authority till the Cortes should be assembled ; and the Junta closed their career by issuing a farewell address to the people, claiming credit, amid all their misfortunes, for purity of intention, and unshaken devotion to their country.

* The Council consisted of the following members :—Don Pedro de Quevedo y Quintana, Bishop of Orense ; Don Antonio de Ascano ; General Castanos ; Don Francisco de Saavedra, late President of the Junta of Seville ; and Don Esteban Fernandez de Leon, who was afterwards changed for Don Miguel de Lardizabel.

CHAP. IX. Let this much be granted them :—Let it not
1810. be assumed, because deficient in intellect, that
February. they were likewise corrupt in heart. If the
Junta partook largely of the defects of the
national character, they partook also of its
virtues. Their career was unmarked by any
base truckling or subserviency to the enemies of
their country. Amid the storm of misfortune
they had stood unbending and erect, animating
their countrymen by their voice, and urging
them to renewed efforts. The task of govern-
ing the nation at so arduous a crisis was one
for which they were little qualified by know-
ledge, talent, or experience. But their inten-
tions were honest ; and the integrity of but few
of its members has ever been considered liable
to suspicion.

Even the resignation of their authority did
not protect the members of the Junta from
persecution. The voice of the whole nation was
against them ; they were treated as criminals.
The Council of Castile, which had repeatedly
temporized with the intruder, declared their
power to have been a violent and unconstitu-
tional usurpation. The mob accused them of
peculating the public money ; and to gratify the

public appetite for vengeance, some of the more obnoxious were imprisoned; and the rest—including the respectable Jovellanos—were banished to the provinces, and placed in a state of *surveillance* by the local authorities.

 1810.

March.

Disappointed by the activity of the Duke del Albuquerque, in the hope of gaining Cadiz, the French for some months remained in possession of the chief cities of Andalusia, yet subject to continual losses and annoyance from the bands of Guerilla smugglers which abounded in the mountains. In the meantime, efforts were made by Great Britain, to assist the patriots in defending the Isla de Leon and Cadiz. Supplies of all sorts were liberally sent from Gibraltar, and about six or seven thousand British and Portuguese troops, under Lieutenant-General Graham, were landed on the Island.

The Island or Isla de Leon, is somewhat triangular in form, bounded on two sides by the sea, and on the third by the Santi Petri river, of considerable depth, and varying in breadth from eighty to one hundred and fifty yards. This side is strongly fortified, and is besides naturally strong. The Santi Petri can be crossed only by the bridge of Zuazo, flanked by batteries,



CHAP. IX. and connected with the mainland by a causeway,
1810. leading across a broad and swampy marsh, by which the channel of the river is almost everywhere bounded. There are two towns on the Isla de Leon; one which bears the same name, containing about forty thousand inhabitants; and another called San Carlos, consisting almost entirely of barracks and other government buildings.

At the extremity of a long and narrow isthmus projecting from this island towards the north of the bay, stands the city of Cadiz. The portion of the sea enclosed within this isthmus, the Isla, and the mainland, constitutes the harbour of Cadiz, which, opposite to the city, is about three miles broad. Cadiz is on three sides washed by the sea, and is strongly fortified on all. By land it can be approached only from the Isla de Leon, and along the narrow isthmus already mentioned, for defence of which, forts and batteries of great strength had been erected. When an enemy should have surmounted these, he would still find himself opposed by a regular front of fortification, extending from sea to sea, on which no expense or labour had been spared.

The first care of Marshal Soult was to occupy all the outlets from the Isla, and to reduce Fort Matagorda, a small insular work, which was occupied by a detachment of British, and by means of which he would be enabled to annoy the shipping in harbour. The heavy fire of his artillery soon rendered the work untenable, and on the twenty-third of April the garrison was withdrawn by the boats of the squadron under Admiral Purvis.

CHAP. IX.

1810.

Apr. 23.

In Cadiz, dissention had unfortunately broken out between the Duke del Albuquerque, who had been appointed Governor, the Regency, and the Local Junta. The first in his exertions to strengthen the fortifications of the place, was not seconded either by the people or the authorities. The inhabitants remained indolent and lethargic spectators of the labours in which the garrison were engaged. The Junta would do nothing to supply the necessities of the troops, and the time and energies which should have been devoted to their high and important duties, was wasted in frivolous contentions with Albuquerque and the Council of Regency. The former, utterly disgusted, at length resigned the command, and quitted a scene where his

February.

CHAP. IX. endeavours could no longer be useful, to assume the functions of Ambassador to England.

1810.

April.

Notwithstanding the apathy by which on all hands he was surrounded, Sir Thomas Graham did everything which his vigorous mind could suggest to add still greater security to the defences of Cadiz. A canal was cut across the isthmus which connects it with the Isla. The works along the river Santi Petri were improved, and new ones thrown up, and the river frontier of the island soon presented a front of almost unassailable strength. The French on their side were not idle. They fortified the towns of Rota, Puerto Real, Puerto Sta. Maria, and Chiclana; formed entrenched camps in the intervals between them; and at the point of Trocadero established batteries, from whence by means of huge mortars, constructed for the purpose at the cannon foundry of Seville, they succeeded in throwing shells into the city. In this immense line of batteries, extending from Rota to the mouth of the Santi Petri, the enemy had upwards of three hundred pieces of cannon.

In the meantime, the country was scoured by moveable columns of the enemy, which, though they frequently suffered severely from the arm-