

each division were acquainted with the works of the fort, and received the most minute instructions in regard to their duty. Intelligence had previously been established with three soldiers of the garrison, in the interest of Rovira. By these men, on the following night, the Spaniards were admitted into the castle; and the first sentinel they encountered was killed before he could give the alarm. The party then separated into detached bodies; and with such skill and accuracy had the duties of each been defined, that while the governor and garrison were yet sleeping in their quarters, the castle of Figueras was in the hands of the Spaniards. The whole of the garrison, amounting to about one thousand men, were made prisoners. The guns of the castle were then turned against the town, which also surrendered. The Baron d'Eroles, who was ordered to reinforce the victors, succeeded, in his march from Martorel, in capturing the forts at Castellfullit and Olot, by which upwards of five hundred of the enemy were made prisoners.

So badly, however, was Figueras supplied with provisions, that towards the end of April it became necessary to throw an additional sup-

CHAP. V.

1811.

April.

CHAP. V. ply into the place. With this view Campoverde
 1811. left his camp near Tarragona, to escort a convoy
 May. for its relief. In the meanwhile, General Bara-
 guay d'Hilliers, who commanded in Upper Cata-
 lonia, blockaded the town with the whole force
 May 3. at his disposal. In attempting to approach the
 town, Campoverde was attacked in flank and
 rear, and forced to retreat in great confusion,
 leaving the convoy and fifteen hundred prisoners
 in the hands of the enemy. His loss in killed
 and wounded amounted to about nine hundred.

During the progress of these events, Suchet,
 who had long been making preparations for the
 siege of Tarragona, took advantage of the ab-
 sence of Campoverde, and advanced against the
 May 4. city. On the fourth of May, he drove in the
 Spanish posts established in front of Fort Oliva,
 and his artillery and stores were put in motion
 from Tortosa and Lerida. The communication
 with the former place was protected by Fort
 Balaguer, and an entrenched post at Perillo;
 and, to secure that with Lerida, he fortified the
 convent which commanded the town of Mont
 Blanch.

Tarragona stands on the side and summit of
 a steep and isolated height, situated between the

points where the rivers Gaya and Francoli discharge into the sea. On the northern, western, and southern sides, the rock is scarped and precipitate; but, on the east and south-east, the ground slopes down by a gentle descent to the harbour and the Francoli river. The upper town is encircled by an old wall which crowns the summit of the rock; and the western side, on which is the approach from Barcelona, is besides protected by five *Lunettes*, which form a line reaching to the sea. There are likewise two large *Lunettes* on the northern face. Both present to the besiegers a front of naked rock, which renders any approach on these sides peculiarly difficult.

CHAP. V.
1811.
May.

The lower town stands at the bottom of the height near the harbour, and is protected to the landward by a small bastioned square, called the Fort Royal, about three hundred toises distant from the *enceinte* of the upper town, and two hundred from the sea. Both this fort and the lower town are covered by a second wall, extending from the upper town to the sea, and protected by three regular bastions, and several other works.

The Spaniards, having always contemplated the probability of a siege, had repaired the



CHAP. V.

1811.

May.

works, which were in condition for an obstinate defence. The garrison were in number nearly equal to the besieging army, and a squadron of British men-of-war were anchored in the bay, thus securing the admission of reinforcements and supplies.

Strong as Tarragona unquestionably was, the chief feature of its strength was the Fort Oliva, situated on a plateau of equal elevation with the upper town, from which it was about four hundred toises distant. It was armed with sixty pieces of cannon, and surrounded by a ditch twenty feet deep, which had been cut in the solid rock.

It was judged necessary by Suchet that this fort should be carried; and approaches were accordingly made against it, and pushed on with great vigour. In order to check the fire of the men-of-war, which was found exceedingly annoying, and force them to draw off to a greater distance, a large redoubt was erected on the shore, which being found insufficient, three other batteries were erected nearer to the Francoli.

We shall not enter on the numerous and complicated details of this interesting siege. Suffice it, that in its progress the French engineers gave

proof of the highest accomplishment in their profession. The siege was pushed with a degree of vigour and skill, which the garrison, brave, but unpractised, were unequal to withstand. Fort Oliva was carried on the night of the twenty-ninth. It chanced that a column of twelve hundred men was in the act of entering the fort to relieve the garrison, when the signal of assault was given by the enemy. The rear of this body was attacked, and many of the assailants entered the gate, *pele mele* with the Spaniards. This distracted the defenders, the French columns continued to press on, and the fort was at length carried. Fifteen hundred of the garrison perished in this assault ; about a thousand were made prisoners.*

CHAP. V.

1811.

May.

May 29,

Memoires
de Marechal
Suchet.

The loss of Fort Oliva could not but depress the hopes of the garrison of Tarragona. On the following morning a column of three thousand men attempted to regain it, but without success. The enemy then pushed forward his advances

* Marshal Suchet, in his official report, makes the number of prisoners amount only to one hundred and sixty. In his memoirs he rates them at one thousand. We are inclined to believe the latter statement as most creditable to the French army and its commander.

CHAP. V. against the works of the upper town ; and the
breaching batteries were nearly complete when
1811. Colonel Skerret, with two thousand men, ar-
June. rived in the bay from Cadiz. Colonel Skerret
was prevented from throwing his troops into the
town, by the assurances of the Governor that
Tarragona was already amply garrisoned ; and
that the force he commanded would render far
greater and more important service by uniting
with Campoverde in an attack on the rear of the
besieging army. The Governor likewise stated,
that when the enemy should commence batter-
ing in breach, it was his intention to abandon
the place, considering the lives of his soldiers
to be of higher value than the ruins of Tarragona.

Colonel Skerret, therefore, sailed in a man-of-war to join Campoverde, who had taken post with his army at Vendrels, about twenty-five miles to the eastward. Time was thus lost, and before any combined operation could be carried into effect, Tarragona had fallen.

Unfortunately, Contreras, instead of keeping secret his intention of abandoning the town, made it publicly known. The inhabitants, thus aware they were about to be forsaken by their

defenders, became stupified with fear; and Su-
chet, having gained intelligence of the design,
was enabled to defeat it.

CHAP. V.

1811.

June.

Jun. 28.

No time was afforded for the proposed retreat. The French batteries opened at daylight on the twenty-eight, and by ten o'clock a practicable breach had been formed. In a few hours the assault was given. The defence was trifling; for the views of the garrison had been directed to retreat, and panic reigned throughout the city. A scene of terrible slaughter ensued. All within the city were put indiscriminately to the bayonet; and a continued fire from the batteries swept away crowds of trembling fugitives, who fled to the shore in hope of rescue by the boats of the squadron. To many this hope was not broken. The British sailors, animated by compassion for the sufferers, persevered, amid the enemy's fire, in conveying the fugitives to the ships moored in the offing.

We have the assurance of Marshal Suchet, that the officers of his army made strenuous exertions to put a stop to the carnage. But the soldiers, with hands already steeped in blood, would not be restrained. Within and without the town the slaughter continued with unabated ferocity. The

CHAP. V. claims of age and sex were disregarded. Those
 1811. who sought refuge in the churches, were massa-
 June. cred even at the altar. Beauty, innocence, and
 helplessness, did not save life, though they en-
 sured violation. More than six thousand unre-
 sisting persons were butchered. "And thus,"
 said Marshal Suchet, in his official report, after
 detailing the circumstances of the massacre, "has
 the terrible example which I predicted taken
 place, and it will long be remembered by the
 Spaniards."*

* In allusion to this dreadful scene of slaughter, and atrocities even worse than slaughter, Colonel Jones, in his able and excellent history of the war, makes the following observations:—"There is something so exceedingly revolting in the picture of these severities, that the mind cannot divest itself of feelings of abhorrence towards the individual who directed them; or, otherwise, were the subject coolly and dispassionately considered, the censure would be equally divided between the aggressors, and the commander of the suffering party. It is the paramount duty of every general to use every means in his power to bring his operations to a successful termination, and to preserve the lives of his own men; and there seems no other such effectual mode of preventing similarly obstinate defences to those of Gerona and Zaragoza, as for the assailants to avail themselves of every power of retaliation which victory furnishes. It is no more than the custom of war justifies, and self-preservation demands. In a battle, if a division stand the charge, the successful party make no scruple to bayonet all those whom they overtake, and no reason can be assigned why troops, fighting behind a wall, should be differently treated, and have the privilege of destroying their opponents till the last moment, and when they can no longer do

No sooner was Suchet master of Tarragona CHAP. V.
 than he proceeded to Montserrat, where the Ba-

1811.

July.

so with impunity, be greeted with friendship. Till a certain point of the attack, it is perfectly safe to continue the defence; if the garrison persevere longer they do it at their own risk,—it is optional with them. It was so at Tarragona; and the principle of putting to the sword, after the assault of a breach, all those found with arms in their hands, seems so fully justified by right and policy, that General Suchet, on the abstract consideration of the subject, cannot be censured for having done so. The peculiar nature of the contest, however, ought to have made him hesitate in its application to the Spaniards, a people merely defending their homes against unprincipled aggression. The idea of so severely punishing an act of pure self-defence should have revolted his own feelings and those of his officers. Such not having been the case, and the ferocious acts of which they were guilty towards the unarmed inhabitants, equally with the garrison, having been publicly avowed, give rise to many reflections on the abasement of the moral character under military despotism. In what country, enjoying a sufficient share of freedom for impartial discussion, would a man, after such deeds, be received in society? or what government, having the voice of a free and enlightened people to control their acts, dare to confer rewards upon him?"

In these ingenious remarks of Colonel Jones there is much truth, and we think some little inconsistency. On the general principles of military ethics, he asserts that a general is authorized in directing the massacre of the garrison of a town carried by assault. In this we cannot coincide. It is unquestionably true, that, when two hostile parties are contending against each other, the laws of reason and necessity authorize the exercise of every means in the power of either, to ensure its own safety by destroying its opponent, or reducing him to a condition in which he can inflict no further injury. But the law of self-preservation, which alone can sanction the destruction of an enemy, places like-

CHAP. V. ron d'Eroles had established large magazines,
 1811. and from whence he made incursions into the

July.

wise a limit to that right. Wherever security can be obtained by means less revolting than that of actual slaughter, the infliction of death becomes an act of mere wanton barbarity, irreconcilable with moral principle, and adverse to that eternal code imprinted in the heart of man. In no case, therefore, can death be justifiably inflicted on men who lay down their arms, and who, by the privation of their liberty, can be prevented from endangering the future safety of the conquerors. In the case of a town carried by assault, it must frequently happen that rude, ignorant, and unprincipled men, who compose the mass of all armies, and whose passions have been excited to the highest pitch, will burst the shackles by which at other times they are bound, and give full sway to a sentiment of ferocious revenge. But such an event must be considered as an unavoidable misfortune, not as the voluntary and justifiable infliction of an authorized retribution. It is a great and terrible evil, which every exertion should be made to modify or avert, and which no general is warranted, not merely in openly sanctioning, but in passively permitting.

But Colonel Jones, admitting that the massacre of Tarragona was fully sanctioned by the abstract principles of war, denies the application of these principles to the case of a people struggling in defence of their rights against unprincipled aggression. Thus, the Spaniards, in Colonel Jones's opinion, fighting in the cause of liberty, would have been justified in the slaughter of a French garrison under circumstances similar to those of Tarragona, and the reciprocity only of this privilege of massacre is denied. Now, the fallacy of Colonel Jones's reasoning consists in this: He confounds the motive or *cause* of war, which may be just or unjust, with the *laws* of war, which exclusively regard the conduct of its details. In a monarchical government, it is the king exclusively who declares war; who decides when the national safety is so much endangered as to require an appeal to arms. To him the justice or injustice of a war is

neighbouring country. On the twenty-fourth of July, Suchet was joined by a detachment from the garrison of Barcelona, commanded by General Maurice Mathieu.

CHAP. V.
1811.
July.

Montserrat is a mountain of very singular cha-

a matter of conscience,—a question, the right solution of which involves a high degree of moral responsibility ; but it is one on which the soldiers who fight his battles are not called on to decide. The war, whether just or unjust, when once undertaken, must be conducted on certain fixed principles ; and it is for the fair application of these that the commander of an army is alone responsible.

The question, therefore, of Marshal Suchet's culpability in the present case, may be reduced to this : If, for the sake of striking terror, by a terrible example, he voluntarily permitted the slaughter in Tarragona to exceed the limits necessary for the immediate security of his army, there is no degree of indignation too great for his offence ; if, on the other hand, the massacre proceeded solely from the untameable excitement of the soldiery, which every practicable measure was adopted to check and allay, then the evil was inevitable, and Suchet stands absolved from that charge of moral turpitude which must otherwise affix a deep stigma on his name.

On these principles, we fear it is impossible that Suchet can be altogether justified. We may admit that the exertions of the officers were ineffectual to prevent the perpetration of atrocities in the town ; but what can be said of the slaughter of the helpless and unresisting crowds who were swept away by grape-shot, and sabred by the cavalry on the shore, and on the road to Barcelona ? It is but fair, however, to state, that the Governor Contreras, in his official report, not only declares that he himself, wounded and made prisoner, was treated with the greatest humanity, but that every effort was made by the French officers to check the excesses of their troops.

CHAP. V.

1811.

July.

racter. Situated at a short distance from Barcelona, Igualada, and Manresa, it commands the principal roads, and the numerous heights by which it is surrounded. It consists of a congregation of vast pyramidal heights, rising from insulated rocks, from which singular peculiarity it derived its name of Monte Serrado, or the Sawed Mountain. On the summit stands the celebrated convent, so difficult of access and so commanding in situation as to form a post of very extraordinary strength. The Spaniards had increased the difficulties of attack, by obstructing the road leading to the convent, and by constructing redoubts on very steep rocks, to the summits of which artillery had with great difficulty been conveyed.

Suchet, aware that the force of d'Eroles was insufficient to defend the place, if attacked at numerous points, directed an attack on three redoubts at the foot of the mountain, whilst several columns of voltigeurs climbed the rocks wherever they were found accessible. The peasants, stationed on the summits of the heights, received the assailants with a brisk fire, and rolled down stones and masses of rocks on the advancing columns. This, however, did not

check their progress—the whole position was carried by the bayonet, and d'Eroles himself was only enabled to escape by the darkness of the night, and his intimate knowledge of the passes.

After the capture of Montserrat, Maurice Mathieu returned to Barcelona, while Suchet repaired to Arragon to make preparations for invading the kingdom of Valencia.

After the failure of Campoverde's attempt to throw provisions into Figueras, the blockade of the place was continued without interruption by General Baraguay d'Hilliers. During a period of four months, the garrison held out in spite of the miserable condition to which they were reduced by the entire exhaustion of their provisions. At length General Martinez, encouraged by the success of the garrison of Almeida, determined to sally from the place, and force his way through the enemy's lines with the bayonet. By the treachery of a Spanish officer, Macdonald received intelligence of this project, and was prepared to frustrate its execution. Lines of contravallation had been formed, covered by a strong *abattis*. During the day the French posts were doubled, and at night the troops were placed in bivouac, in the direction towards which it was

CHAP. V. considered probable the garrison would direct their flight.

1811.

August.

On the night of the sixteenth Martinez, at the head of three thousand men, sallied from the town, and succeeded in forcing their way to the *abattis*. Here, however, his progress was arrested. After eight gallant attacks, he was forced to return to the town, with the loss of four hundred men.

Martinez then felt that all hope was at an end. Every horse and domestic animal within the place had been consumed for food. He, therefore, determined to capitulate; but before doing so, he employed two days in destroying every thing within the place which could be useful to the enemy. Macdonald granted honourable terms, and on the nineteenth the place was given up; and the whole of the fortresses of Catalonia were in possession of the French.

Aug. 19.

The spirit of the Catalonians, however, was not broken by the misfortunes of the campaign. A new general was appointed to command the army, which, at that moment, existed rather in *posse* than in *esse*. Fortunately, General Lacy was a man of enterprise and spirit, suited to the times. He issued a proclamation, calling on the

people to return to the standard of their country. CHAP. V.
 On the first of September, d'Eroles, whose ac-
 tivity was ever conspicuous, succeeded, with the
 assistance of a British frigate, in recovering the
 islands of Las Medas, which had been lost in
 the preceding campaign. These being consid-
 ered of importance were occupied by a consid-
 erable force, and measures were speedily adopt-
 ed for strengthening the works.

1811.
 September.

Soon afterwards, when the French forces had concentrated at Tortosa, General Lacy determined to attack a series of fortified posts, which the enemy had formed from Barcelona to Leri-
 da. He accordingly marched rapidly on Igua-
 lada, where a convent had been strongly forti-
 fied by the French. The town was surprised,
 one hundred and fifty of the enemy were killed,
 and twenty-five made prisoners. The remain-
 der escaped into the convent; and, at daylight,
 Lacy, learning that succours were approaching
 from Montserrat and Casa Masana, fell back on
 Manresa.

Oct. 4.

The enemy, little apprehensive of further at-
 tack, moved forward with a convoy, destined for
 the supply of the garrison of Igualada. Lacy
 formed his force into two divisions. The first,



CHAP. V. under d'Eroles, intercepted the advance of the
1811. convoy; while Lacy, with the second, cut off
October, its retreat. A column, with artillery, from Igu-
lada, sallied out to the assistance of their coun-
trymen; but the day went in favour of the Span-
iards. The whole convoy was taken; upwards
of two hundred of the French were killed and
wounded; and the remainder with difficulty ef-
fected their escape into the convent.

After this achievement, Lacy, finding his pre-
sence necessary in the Junta, to forward the
formation and organization of the army, left the
command to d'Eroles. The enemy, weakened
by their recent losses, soon after abandoned
Igualeda, Montserrat, and Casa Masana, and
withdrew to Barcelona.*

D'Eroles then marched against Cervera. The
French, on his approach, retired from the town
into the university, which had been fortified;

* It is a remarkable fact, that, about the middle of eighteen hundred and eleven, when his armies in the east of Spain were in full career of success, Napoleon appears to have anticipated the necessity, to which he was afterwards reduced, of abandoning the Peninsula. Observing that the spirit of the gallant Catalans remained unbroken under every reverse, and aware that a war of extermination must eventually terminate in the defeat of his projects, he gave orders that preparations should be made to destroy the fortifications of Barcelona.

and a party of five hundred foot, and thirty horse, which were approaching from Lerida, instantly retraced its steps. A detachment was sent in pursuit of this body; and d'Eroles, with one ten-pounder, proceeded to attack the buildings occupied by the enemy. The gun opened fire, and the French, not aware that it was the only one in possession of the assailants, agreed to capitulate. Upwards of six hundred men were thus made prisoners, at an expense to the Catalans of only ten in killed and wounded.

CHAP. V.

1811

October.

Oct. 10.

This success was followed by another of a similar kind. At Bilpuig, a body of the enemy were posted in the castle which commanded the town. Here the solitary gun, which had done good service at Cervera, was again brought into action. Though without engineers, three mines were formed, the explosion of which reduced the castle to ruins. Of the garrison, which consisted of four hundred men, one hundred and eighty were made prisoners,—the rest perished.

By these several successes, the whole country between Lerida and Barcelona was freed from the enemy. An attempt made by the French to intercept d'Eroles failed. By a bold and skilful

CHAP. V. movement that leader entered France, where
 he levied heavy contributions on the inhabitants.
 1811. It is highly honourable to d'Eroles, that, during
 October. the whole of this incursion, he succeeded in pre-
 venting any retaliation of those atrocities which
 had marked the progress of the French in Spain.
 Having collected a considerable quantity of corn
 and cattle, and a considerable sum in specie, this
 enterprising leader succeeded in regaining his
 native mountains.

Blake, on reaching Cadiz after his unsuccessful
 attempt on Niebla, prepared again to take
 the field; and, embarking with a corps of choice
 troops, landed at Almeria, and joined the Mur-
 cian army near Baeza. Soult immediately ad-
 vanced with his whole disposable force to at-
 Aug. 9. tack him; and, on the ninth of August, an en-
 gagement took place near Lorea. The Span-
 iards were driven with great loss from their
 position; and, being closely pursued, the retreat
 became a complete rout, and they fled to the
 mountains near Caravaca. The Spanish cavalry
 in this action behaved with great courage, and
 gave protection to the fugitives who had taken
 Aug. 10. the road to Murcia; but, on the tenth, they
 were attacked by the whole of the French ca-

valry, and about five hundred were killed, wounded, or made prisoners. The remainder, amounting to about fifteen hundred men, retired precipitately to Murcia.

CHAP. V.

1811.

August.

In a few days, however, the army of Blake, the greater part of which had been dispersed, again collected in the neighbourhood of Lebrilla; and that leader being appointed to the chief command in Valencia, his force was increased by reinforcements to thirty thousand men, and included nearly all the veteran troops of Spain. Generals Zayas, Sardizabel, Carlos O'Donnell, Mahy, and Juan Caro, most of whom had earned distinction in the service, held subordinate commands in the army; and Soult having returned to Seville, Blake found himself at liberty to employ his whole force for the defence of Valencia.

Shortly after the fall of Tarragona, Macdonald was removed from the command, and General Decaen appointed his successor. To ensure unity in the operations of both armies, this officer was made subordinate to Marshal Suchet, who, on the fifteenth September, advanced from Tortosa, with the whole disposable force from Arragon and Catalonia, to achieve the conquest

September.

Sep. 15.

CHAP. V. of the rich province of Valencia. On the nineteenth he reached Oropesa, and found the castle, which commanded the direct road to Valencia, in possession of a Spanish garrison. Suchet, considering celerity of movement to be essential to the complete success of his operations, determined to proceed by a route impracticable for artillery; and, on the twenty-seventh of September, the army reached Murviedro, a town which stands on the site of the ancient Saguntum, about four leagues to the eastward of Valencia.

Sep. 27.

Blake, with thirteen thousand of the flower of his army, fell back to Valencia on the approach of the French. The town was immediately occupied; and, on the following day, an attempt was made to carry the fort by escalade, which terminated in the repulse of the assailants with considerable loss. From this event till the coming up of his artillery, Suchet directed his attention to the Spanish troops in the field. He detached General Robert to attack a division of Blake's army, under General Obispo, at Segorba. Obispo was defeated with great loss; and, being pursued vigorously by the cavalry, his force dispersed and sought shelter among the mountains.

The next operation was to attack the corps of O'Donnell, which was formed in position near Benaquazil. The Spaniards, after a trifling resistance, retreated across the Guadalaviar in some disorder, but with little loss.

CHAP. V.

1811.

After these successes, Suchet was enabled to continue his operations against Murviedro without interruption. On the tenth, the castle of Oropesa surrendered, at the moment when the besiegers were about to assault the breach. The road to Murviedro was now open, and the heavy battering-train arrived before that place on the sixteenth. A breach was soon effected; and, on the eighteenth, the French attempted to storm it, but encountered a severe repulse. On the nineteenth, the assault was again given, but without more favourable result. The garrison, under General Andrioni, were animated by the best spirit; and, confident in the hope that Blake would advance to the relief of the place, entertained no thought but of resistance.

Oct. 10.

Oct. 19.

In the meanwhile, Blake, at first unwilling to hazard all on the chances of a battle, determined to confine himself to movements on the flank and rear of the French army, and detached a force under Mahy, to surprise a detachment in

CHAP. V. Cuenca, and thus interrupt the communication
 of Suchet with Madrid. The attempt, however,
 1811. proved ineffectual, and Mahy returned with his
 September. division to the main body of the army.

In Arragon, however, Duran and the Empe-
 cinado, with about four thousand men, attacked
 Sep. 26. the town of Calatayud, garrisoned by three batta-
 lions of the enemy. Nearly the whole of these
 were slain and made prisoners. Nor was Mina
 Oct 16. less active or fortunate. He captured a detach-
 ment of eight hundred men in Ayerba, hav-
 ing previously surprised and defeated a party
 advancing to their relief. By these movements,
 the situation of Suchet had been rendered one of
 difficulty and danger. With the army of Blake in
 his front, he was compelled to detach a corps of
 four thousand men to protect Teruel, and escort
 a convoy expected from Zaragoza. Had a junc-
 tion been effected by Mina, Duran, and the Em-
 pecinado, and had these leaders attacked the
 French posts, and cut off the communication with
 Zaragoza, it is in the highest degree improbable
 that Suchet, whose communication with Tortosa
 was already intercepted by the peasantry, would
 have ventured to maintain his ground in Valencia.
 But the Guerilla leaders, influenced by petty jea-

alousies, were little disposed to act in unison, and allowed the opportunity to escape. CHAP. V.

1811.
October.

Unfortunately, too, Blake at length resolved to fight a battle for the relief of Murviedro. On the twenty-fourth of October, he took post on the heights of Pache, with his right towards the sea, supported by the fire of some English vessels, and his left resting on the village of Betara. On his approach, Suchet, leaving six battalions to continue the investment of Murviedro, advanced with his army, and took up a line, extending from the sea, in rear of Puzol, to the mountains beyond the village of Val de Jesus.

On the following morning, Blake put his army in motion for attack. The right wing was commanded by Zayas, the centre by Carlos O'Donnel, and the left, in which were the Valencians, by Villa Campa. Mahy, with the Murcian division, formed a second line in rear of the left; while Blake, with another body of reserve, remained on El Puig.

At eight in the morning, the French light troops were driven in. General Zayas then advanced in fine order, and, seizing posses- Oct. 25.

CHAP. V. sion of the village of Puzol, changed his front
1811. on the extremity of his left, while with his
October. right he moved on to gain an isolated height
which commanded all the ground in its front.
At the same time, the left wing of the Spaniards, by a wide movement, attempted to turn the enemy's right flank, by which the centre was inconsiderately weakened. Suchet immediately took advantage of this error, and directed a powerful attack on the Spanish centre, in order to isolate the wings. In this quarter the Spaniards fought bravely, and though forced at first to retire, again rallied and drove back the enemy with signal courage. Don Juan Caro made a desperate charge with the cavalry under his command on the enemy's horse, which were supported by artillery, and posted behind a mud wall. The Spaniards, very gallantly, leaped the wall, charged the guns, and cut down the gunners at their posts. No advantage, however, was reaped from this exploit. A fresh column of the enemy came on, the Spanish cavalry were driven back with considerable loss, and Caro himself was made prisoner. The centre at length gave way; but Lardizabel, hav-

ing collected some horse, continued to show front to the enemy, and covered the retreat of the infantry.

CHAP. V.

1811.

October.

On the right, the battle had been waged with the utmost gallantry, by the troops under Zayas. A severe struggle took place for the possession of the height, in which the Spaniards were at first successful, but subsequently compelled to retire. Though this wing was isolated by the retreat of the centre, it still continued the contest with pertinacity and vigour. The French cavalry, in all their charges, were driven back in confusion. Both parties made strenuous efforts to maintain the village of Puzol, and in this quarter the slaughter was very great. The Spaniards kept up a warm fire from the roofs and windows of the houses; but after repeated alternations of success on both sides, Puzol remained in possession of the French. Zayas then retreated to the heights, near Puig, where he was again attacked both in front and flank. When driven from this last position, he executed his retreat in good order, by the road leading to Valencia along the shore. The left wing having also been repulsed, the whole army retreated, and Blake was unfortu-

CHAP. V. nately induced to make a second stand, in the
1811. strong ground behind the rivulet Betara. From
October. this measure no benefit resulted. The retreat

was continued with greater rapidity and less order than before; and it was with great difficulty that he succeeded in throwing himself with the remains of his army across the Guadalaviar.

The loss of the French in this engagement was somewhat above seven hundred in killed and wounded; of the Spaniards, nearly four thousand seven hundred were made prisoners, and about one thousand killed and wounded. Twelve cannon, four standards, and upwards of four thousand musquets—nearly all English—were captured by the victors.

The garrison of Murviedro beheld from the summit of their walls, which commanded all the neighbouring country, the defeat of that army in the success of whose efforts were centred all their hopes of relief. The place surrendered on the following morning, and the garrison, two thousand five hundred in number, were made prisoners. Blake, after his defeat, took up a position on the right of the Guadalaviar, which he strengthened by entrenchments. His left flank rested on the villages of St. Onofie and

Manises, which had been strongly fortified. His right was covered by canals, and appuyed on the city of Valencia.

CHAP. V.

1811.

September.

Before engaging in further operations, Suchet determined to await the arrival of the reinforcements he had solicited from the governments of Paris and Madrid. In the meantime, he halted on the left of the river, with his left at the Grao or port, his right at Liria, and his centre in the suburb Serano. He strengthened the front of his position with strong redoubts, and for nearly two months no occurrence of importance took place,