

or had reason to believe that it ought to have been.

On the retreat of the enemy after the battle of Albuera, Marshal Beresford sent back General Hamilton's Portuguese division, with orders to observe Badajoz upon its southern side, whilst he himself advanced with the rest of his corps, and took post at Almendralejo. The troops were thus distributed when Lord Wellington arrived; and as it was essential that Soult's columns, which were understood to have concentrated at Fuente del Maestre, should be narrowly watched, he did not interfere with the material parts of this arrangement. But the reduction of Badajoz being the object in which he felt most deeply interested, he applied to it all the resources and numerical force at his disposal, and earnestly urged forward every measure which promised in any way to accelerate the undertaking. No great while elapsed before the siege was regularly renewed; and if the means applied were still very inferior to what they ought to have been, they were at least more respectable than any which it had been practicable to apply during the late investment; and not less respectable than the circumstances of the army, and the general resources of the country, were adequate to procure.

As soon as the two divisions came up, of whose march from the position of the Agueda notice has

already been taken, Lord Wellington proceeded to invest the place anew, upon both banks of the river. For this purpose, the seventh division, under General Houston, drove in on the 25th all the enemy's posts upon the right bank, and established its pickets within a short distance of Fort Christoval, at the same time that a flying bridge was thrown across the Guadiana as at the last attack, and the stores and materials forwarded from Elvas to the depots before the place. On the left bank, again, the Portuguese corps was already at its post; but it was strengthened, on the 27th, by the arrival of the third division, which, marching from Campo Mayor, crossed the Guadiana at the ford above the town. The garrison was thus shut completely within its works, and the business of the siege began.

I have said that the total amount of men and means employed in this service, though certainly greater than had been employed before, was not such as to raise any very lively expectations, in the breast of an ordinary observer, of a speedy and successful termination to our labours. There sat down before the place a besieging army of fourteen or fifteen thousand men, including three thousand Spaniards, and two thousand Portuguese militia; and the artillery to be employed amounted to forty pieces, among which are to be numbered four ten-inch and six eight-inch howitzers. Of mortars we

possessed none ; eight, therefore, out of the ten howitzers, were directed to be used as such ; and our guns, of which two were twenty-four pounders, and four sixteen pounders, were all brass, and of Portuguese manufacture. The engineers' stores collected on the occasion comprised 3500 intrenching tools, 60,000 sand-bags, 600 gabions, a very few fascines, and an extremely inadequate quantity of splinter-proof timber and planks ; whilst, independently of the officers, there were attached to the department, 169 men of the line, to act as overseers, 48 carpenters, 48 miners, and 25 rank and file, of the corps of royal artificers. The chief engineer and principal director of the operations was Lieutenant-colonel Fletcher. Major Dixon, of the Portuguese artillery, was at the head of that department ; and Captains Ross and M'Leod were put in charge of two depots, which were established on each side of the river.

To oppose this force, there was understood to be in Badajoz and in its outworks, a garrison of three thousand men, amply provided with food and other stores for two months' consumption. Their artillery, too, was of a very excellent description. It numbered full 150 pieces ; from which a fire might, at almost any point, be thrown out, infinitely superior to that which we could bring against it ; and though, at first, we were led to believe that the stock of ammunition was scanty in the place,

a short experience of its uses served to convince us that in that rumour there was no foundation. In spite, however, of these disadvantages, our engineers appeared sanguine as to the results. They determined to make two attacks upon two sides at the same time, directing one against Fort Christoval, and the other against the old castle. That the reader may the better understand the object of these, it will be necessary to inform him, somewhat more minutely than has yet been done, how Badajoz, Fort Christoval, and the Castle, were respectively situated.

The large and fortified town of Badajoz stands upon the left bank of the Guadiana, having one-fourth of its enceinte washed by the river, which varies from about three hundred to five hundred yards in width, and secures all the space which it embraces from insult. Towards the land side its defences consist of eight regularly constructed fronts, connected by a good covered way and glacis. The ravelines are, however, unfinished; but the fronts possess whole revetments, and the escarpe of the bastions is thirty feet in height, though that of the curtains is considerably lower. In advance of these fronts are two detached works, namely, the Pardaleras, a crown work, about two hundred yards distant, and the Pecurina, a strong redoubt, four hundred yards removed from the glacis. On the north-east side, again, where an

angle is formed by the junction of the river Revel-
las with the Guadiana, there is a hill, measuring,
perhaps, 120 feet in height, the summit of which
is crowned by an old castle ; and the walls of that
castle, naked, weak, and only partially flanked,
form part of the enceinte of the place. The castle
itself embraces an area of very considerable extent,
and might, if proper care were bestowed upon it,
be rendered exceedingly formidable ; but its de-
fences have, by some accident, been most unac-
countably neglected, and, at the period of which I
am now speaking, it was deficient even in an ordi-
nary parapet to shelter its guns. It was against
this point that our engineers determined to conduct
one of their attacks, and it was here that they
seemed to possess the best, if not the only chance,
of ultimately succeeding.

On the opposite bank of the Guadiana, and in a
direct line with this ancient building, stand the
heights of St. Christoval, which measure in alti-
tude little less than the hill of the castle itself, and
may, from the peculiar shape and bearing of the
latter eminence, be said completely to command
it. The castle hill, it will be observed, forms a sort
of inclined plain, which eases itself off towards the
edge of the water ; and hence a spectator from the
summit of the heights of St. Christoval is enabled
to see, with perfect accuracy, anything which may
happen to be going on within the walls of the

castle. To hinder an enemy from availing himself of this advantage, a square fort, of above three hundred feet per face, has been constructed. It is strongly and regularly built, with a stone scarp twenty feet in height ; and it is capable, from the rocky nature of the ground on which it stands, to offer a stout resistance, even when methodically besieged. Between it and the town, however, the communication is far from being good ; inasmuch as it is carried on entirely by means of a long bridge, subject to be enfiladed, or by the still more precarious and insecure instrumentality of boats. Against this fort was the second attack directed ; and the obstacles to be encountered soon proved to be as serious as from the general appearance of the place might have been expected.

Every preliminary measure having been duly adopted, large working parties were ordered out on the night of the 31st, and ground was broken both before the Castle and Fort St. Christoval. The former operation went on wholly unobserved by the enemy, till daylight disclosed our people, already well covered by their embankment ; but in the latter we were immediately detected, and an incessant fire of grape and round shot kept up in the direction of the noise. In spite, however, of this interruption, the men toiled on ; and four distinct batteries, at different distances from the place,

were marked out, and in part completed. From that moment reliefs regularly succeeded one another by day as well as by night; and though the enemy, by shifting two or three of their guns, contrived to throw shot into our very trenches, still all the batteries, including one against the angle of the castle, were completed and armed by the 2nd of June. On the 3rd they opened; and a heavy fire was kept up on both sides, during several days and nights, without the smallest intermission.

It was now that the inefficient nature of Portuguese artillery, as well as the inferiority of Portuguese ammunition, became conspicuous. Our guns, one after another, became disabled by their own fire; whilst our breaching batteries, though they caused the masonry both of Fort Christoval and the Castle to peel off, were far from producing that effect which had been anticipated from them. On the side of the castle all that could be said was, that at the end of several days of open batteries, the wall and rampart appeared to be a little shaken; but of a practicable breach the commencement had not yet been made; nor could it be surmised how far it was ever likely to be effected. On the side of Fort Christoval, however, our progress, though not what it was expected to have been, seemed more certain. Two bastions at length fell, apparently filling up the ditch with

their ruins, and on the 6th, the breach being reconnoitred, it was conceived that an assault might safely be hazarded.

There were a variety of reasons which combined to produce an inclination in Lord Wellington, rather to risk an attack before the place should have been laid perfectly bare, than lose even another day in distant cannonading. We heard from all quarters that the enemy were moving, in great force, for the relief of the place. So early, indeed, as the 25th, the very day on which the re-investment took place, circumstances occurred to produce a suspicion of the kind, and every hour gave to it greater force, and an increased degree of credibility. On that day an affair took place in front of our covering corps, which, though creditable in the highest degree to the troops engaged, could not be regarded by us, at head-quarters, without uneasiness, since it clearly indicated a disposition, on the part of Marshal Soult, to resume the offensive, and led to the conclusion, either that reinforcements had already arrived, or that they were close at hand, and therefore to be securely counted on.

The advanced station of our cavalry was, at this time, in Usagre, a small town, distant about two leagues from Almedralejo. Here General Lumley, who commanded the allied squadrons, took up his quarters; and here an opportunity was af-

forded him of distinguishing himself. On the 25th, about five hundred of the enemy's cavalry crossed a little stream which runs before the village, and filing through the street, which our people, on their approach, had evacuated, debouched at its extremity, and formed with a wall in their rear. General Lumley seized this favourable opportunity, by ordering out the 3rd dragoon guards, and 4th dragoons, to charge. They executed the movement in good style, and overthrowing the French in a moment, cut down about one hundred, and made many prisoners. The rest fled in every direction ; whilst their comrades, in large numbers, stood upon the opposite bank of the rivulet, to witness a defeat which they could not interfere to prevent. The affair naturally produced the best effect upon the spirits of our troopers, who had almost begun to consider themselves inferior to the French ; and it had an effect diametrically the reverse upon the enemy. The latter came not on again whilst our squadrons retained their attitude of defiance ; but as it was not intended that we should keep this place by dint of hard fighting, that attitude was gradually laid aside. Our men fell back upon Los Santos, Villa Franca, and Puebla ; and the enemy took quiet possession of Úsagre.

Had the report of this rencontre come alone, it would have been treated by us as an indication of

nothing more than a desire on the part of the French Marshal to feel how we were disposed, and whether it might not be practicable to alarm us into an abandonment of our present undertaking; but it did not come alone. We soon learned that Drouet had actually set out from Salamanca for the south, with seventeen battalions and several squadrons; and that a large proportion, if not the whole of Marmont's army, was expected to follow. Lord Wellington instantly despatched orders for General Howard's brigade of the first division, as well as for a brigade of Portuguese infantry, to hasten from the Agueda, in order to reinforce us at Badajoz; and instructions were, at the same time, conveyed to other divisions, that they should hold themselves in readiness to undertake a similar journey. By and by a rumour came in that Drouet was near at hand, and that his arrival at Cordova was confidently expected on the 9th of June at furthest. Now as Soult was at this time at Llerena, Villa Garcia, and the villages near, there could be little doubt as to his being able to collect a force upon the Albuera by the 12th; and then the question arose, whether it would be possible for us to continue our operations against Badajoz beyond the 10th. It was quite evident that the covering army, even after it should have been strengthened by the troops called in from the north, would not be competent to oppose Soult,

thus increased to full thirty thousand men ; whereas, should Marmont himself appear upon the stage in this quarter, to risk a battle with the covering and even besieging corps combined, would have been most injudicious. On all these accounts Lord Wellington determined to try the effect of an assault on the very first opportunity which should hold out the slightest prospect of success ; and hence the breach in Fort St. Christoval was no sooner pronounced practicable, than preparations were made to storm it.

In the mean while a few changes occurred in the distribution both of the men and officers employed in this part of the country. The Portuguese government had become, of late, so little attentive to the condition of its army, that the troops, destitute of pay, and miserably supplied with necessaries, were sinking fast into the state of inefficiency from which they had been so lately delivered. The men, after enduring privations more severe than could have been borne by the natives of almost any other country, began at last, some of them to desert their colours, and the rest to lay aside all that esprit de corps, with which Marshal Beresford had taken so much pains to inspire them ; and the officers, as many at least as were not Englishmen, or thoroughly imbued with the English system, hardly endeavoured to restrain them in their proceedings. Under these circum-

stances, it became indispensable to relieve Marshal Beresford from his command of the covering corps; because it was felt that, if he could not restore something like alacrity and discipline to the Portuguese legions, no other officer in either service need attempt it. Marshal Beresford was accordingly called in, and General Hill proceeded to take upon himself the charge thus rendered vacant. At the same time, General Howard's brigade was incorporated into the second division; whilst the remains of the brigade lately commanded by General Houghton, as well as of the buffs, the 31st, and the 66th, being formed into a single battalion of detachments, and placed in the brigade of General Lumley, were attached to the same division. The brigade of Portuguese, likewise, which marched from the Agueda at the same time with General Howard's regiments, took its station in the second division. Thus, whilst the third and seventh divisions, with one corps of Portuguese, and another of Spaniards, under the immediate orders of Lord Wellington, pressed the blockade, and carried on the siege of Badajoz, the second and fourth divisions, with the light brigade of the King's German Legion, supported by General Cotton with the cavalry from the north, as well as by the cavalry of the south under General Erskine, covered their operations; the infantry holding the

position of Albuera, as being the most advantageous in this neighbourhood, and the cavalry keeping watch at Almendralejo, Los Santos, Villa Franca, and the country round.

CHAPTER VI.

Siege of Badajoz—Fort St. Christoval twice stormed without effect—Movements of the enemy to relieve the town—Lord Wellington determines to raise the siege, and retire into Portugal—Blake crosses the Guadiana to effect a diversion, and retires to Cadiz—The British army takes post behind the Caya, and repairs the works at Elvas—Intercepted letter from Marmont to Berthier—The allies go into cantonments.

THE breach in St. Christoval having been examined by Lieutenant Foster of the engineers, and pronounced practicable, orders were issued that an assault should take place on the night between the 6th and 7th of June; and the forlorn hope, consisting of twenty-five men, advanced about midnight under the guidance of that officer, and directed their operations against the part which appeared most assailable, namely, the right salient angle of the fort. By the fire of our batteries the palisades had all been destroyed; and as the counterscarp was here little more than four feet in depth, it proved no obstacle to the assailants: they

sprang into the ditch, and marched straight to the foot of the breach. But here a sad reverse awaited them. The enemy, labouring incessantly between dusk and the hour of attack, had removed the rubbish, and the escarpe was found to stand clear nearly seven feet from the bottom of the ditch. Our men, though totally unprepared for such an occurrence, made repeated efforts to surmount the obstacle ; but all were unavailing. They accordingly determined to relinquish the attempt, and they might have retired with a very trifling loss, had they not been met by the main body of the storming party, amounting to 155 men. These having brought with them a few ladders, insisted upon trying the effect of an escalade ; and they unhappily planted their instruments against a point, the summit of which overtopped the longest of them by full five feet. The consequence was, that the enemy, roused to a sense of their danger, hurled down into the ditch a shower of shells, grenades, stones, and other missiles, which taking effect among men unavoidably crowded together, produced considerable slaughter and great confusion. The party at length retired, leaving behind them twelve dead, and carrying away upwards of ninety wounded.

From this period up to the 9th, our people sedulously employed themselves in constructing new batteries, and making better preparations for

a fresh assault. There arrived upon the 8th seven iron guns, which having been transported from Lisbon to Elvas, were from the latter place forwarded to our camp; and these, with the whole of our serviceable artillery, amounting to no more than seven cannons and two howitzers, played incessantly upon the breach, and the batteries which commanded and defended it. But the practice was far from being accurate, and the walls seemed to be made of materials more than ordinarily durable; for after expending a considerable portion of ammunition, it was found that the breach could not be made by many degrees more promising than it was before. Still, as a good deal of rubbish lay under its gorge, so as to form, in our view, a sort of rude path up the face, it was again determined to try the fortune of an assault, and the determination was formed on grounds not very dissimilar from those which guided our resolutions on the previous occasion.

We heard, upon authority which left us no room to doubt the truth of the report, that Drouet had actually reached Cordova on the 7th and 8th, and that his division of eight thousand men was in communication with the corps of Marshal Soult. The latter, too, had, as it appeared, refused his left, and was manœuvring that he might come, by Medellin, into connexion, either with a part, or with the whole of Marmont's army; for of the

movement of the latter towards this quarter of Spain we were now credibly informed, and we saw at once that the main effort of the enemy would be directed to the preservation of Badajoz. Nor, in truth, was this at all to be wondered at. Situated as their forces now were, Badajoz was to the French a point of paramount importance, inasmuch as it formed the key of all their intended operations in the Alentejo, and a connecting link with Seville and their divisions before Cadiz. It was but natural, therefore, that they should use every effort to preserve it; and that such was their intention, a despatch received on the 8th from General Spencer, together with other information collected elsewhere, sufficiently assured us. The following is an outline of the details contained in that despatch, in which, as the reader will easily believe, we felt ourselves deeply interested.

The enemy, it appeared, entered Ciudad Rodrigo on the evening of the 5th, with 2,500 cavalry, 14 pieces of artillery, and 16,000 infantry; and our light division retiring, on the 6th, as far as Nave d'Avel, the French pursued their march in two columns, composed chiefly of cavalry, along the roads which lead to Gallegos and Carpeo. The mass which moved by the latter road seemed to be the stronger of the two, and it was accompanied by six pieces of cannon. Our cavalry, observing them all the while, fell back to the high

grounds, and formed a line between Espeja and Gallegos ; upon which the enemy pushed through the wood, in two bodies, with great impetuosity, and made a daring attempt to cut off a large proportion, if not the whole, of the force opposed to them. The cavalry, however, saw through the manœuvre, and skilfully defeated it. By inclining to their right, they avoided the left and front attacks directed against them, and coming down with great gallantry upon the column on the Espeja road, overthrew and repulsed it with loss. On this occasion the royals particularly distinguished themselves. Our people then retrograded to Sabugal, whilst the French having merely entered Fuentes de Honor, and patrolled as far as Almeida and the Coa, withdrew their troops, and ended their recognisance.

Whilst the preceding operation was going forward, another and more important movement, which this was intended to cover, received its accomplishment, though not unnoticed by us. Despatches from Colonel Grant, who occupied posts about the Puerto de Banos, informed us that two divisions of Marmont's infantry with 500 cavalry had passed along the rear of the reconnoitring columns, and arrived on the 6th—the very day on which the recognisance was made—at Los Santos and Fuentes. They were commanded by Regnier, and continued their march upon Banos, at which

place their leader slept on the night of the 9th. But it was not from the reports of our own officers alone, that we obtained, at this time, a pretty accurate insight into the enemy's designs and operations. From intercepted letters which fell into our hands, we learned that Marmont fully intended to co-operate in raising the siege of Badajoz—though whether with the whole or only a part of his force, we had no opportunity of accurately determining. All our speculations, however, tended to excite a belief that, if he moved at all, he would move with his army entire; and we were the further confirmed in this opinion by various hints, which, though in their more direct allusions inexplicable, were yet sufficiently clear to put us generally upon our guard. It was stated in these letters that as soon as Badajoz should be relieved, the two Marshals would proceed to act upon the plan originally formed; and hence, though of the object of that plan we necessarily remained in the dark, we were not slow in discovering that it required for its accomplishment a perfect union of force. Upon these grounds we came to the conclusion that Badajoz must either be reduced at once, or not at all; because we could hardly pretend to continue the siege in presence of Marmont's and Soult's armies combined; and as little could we hope to fight them to advantage on the south side of the Guadiana, keeping the city in a

state of blockade. That we might not, however, be exposed to greater hazard than was necessary, General Spencer received directions to move by Penamacor to Castello Branco; which place he was commanded to reach on the 12th, and to hold himself in readiness to form a junction with our corps at the shortest notice.

Such was the general state of our affairs, when the breach in Fort St. Christoval was pronounced, for the second time, practicable; and it may not be amiss, before proceeding to narrate the particulars of the assault, if I give a brief review of the relative strength and prospects of the contending armies.

There were now, on the south and north frontiers of Portugal, two large and effective French armies,—that of Marshal Soult in the province of Estremadura, that of Marshal Marmont in La Mancha. The former, by dint of extraordinary exertions, was enabled, when reinforced by Drouet's and Sebastiani's divisions, and by two or three battalions, which he did not scruple to withdraw from before Cadiz, to muster full thirty thousand men; of which not fewer than four thousand were cavalry; the latter having reorganised the army of Portugal, and arranged it into six divisions, possessed thirty thousand infantry, besides cavalry and artillery. Allowing, therefore, for casualties on the march, and for those little mis-statements which

are unavoidable in making up all returns, the gross amount of the two corps, when united, would not fall short of sixty thousand men. Now, on our parts, although our force upon paper showed nearly fifty thousand British troops, we were quite unable, from sickness (and there were at this time 12,500 upon the list) and other necessary deductions, to bring more than thirty thousand men into the field. The Portuguese, again, having become, in every respect, far less efficient than they were wont to be, could not be calculated at more than twenty-five thousand; whilst the Spaniards, who spoke of themselves as twelve thousand strong, might muster perhaps eight or nine thousand. Thus, in point of gross numbers, the opposing generals were almost on a footing of equality. But it ought to be remembered that, whilst the French possessed ample means of recruiting their losses, and were enabled, after every reverse, to make head again with almost undiminished strength, our reinforcements came in slowly, and by small detachments at a time. To pursue the siege of Badajoz, therefore, leisurely, and with a strict attention to rule, would be to lay ourselves out for a general and decisive action, in which we must fight in an open country, with our flanks exposed, and the Guadiana closing us in upon the rear. It is true that, at the present season, the waters of the river were low; that it might be forded in various points,

and could not, therefore, cut off our retreat, supposing us to be worsted; but the question was, whether it were worth while to cast all upon the hazard of one throw; more especially when the stake on the side of the enemy was not, and could not be made, equally desperate with our own. To act thus had never yet been Lord Wellington's policy; and he saw nothing in present circumstances to bring about a change in his plans. On the contrary, he resolved to make one effort more to possess himself of the beleaguered city; and in case that should fail, either to prosecute the undertaking, provided he were left to do so at his leisure, or to retire from before the place, and take up a convenient position somewhere on the north side of the Guadiana.

Actuated by these motives, and anxious to avail himself of the opportunity still within his reach, Lord Wellington gave orders that Fort St. Christoval should again be stormed, on the night of the 9th of June. On this occasion, the storming party consisted of two hundred men, twenty-five of whom, as formerly, formed an advanced-guard, or forlorn hope, under Lieutenant Hunt, of the royal engineers. They marched from the trenches at the signal given, and pushed for the ditch; but the enemy were far better prepared to receive them now than they had been before, and opened a heavy fire upon them as soon as they arrived

within range of musketry. Unfortunately, Lieutenant Hunt was killed upon the glacis; and though the troops leaped into the ditch with their accustomed gallantry, and pressed forward as they imagined towards the breach, they had no longer a leader capable of guiding them, and in consequence lost their way. They went forward, provided with two ladders from twenty-five to thirty feet in length; but they applied them, not to the breach, but to the face of a bastion which was not in ruins, though considerably injured by stray shot. The consequences were such as might be anticipated. After persisting in their efforts to escalate with the most daring bravery during a full hour, they were finally compelled to retreat, with the loss of forty men killed, and no fewer than one hundred wounded. Thus ended the second attempt on Badajoz; for on our parts nothing further was tried at this time. During the 10th, a truce was agreed upon, for the purpose of carrying off the wounded, and burying the dead; and in the evening our guns and stores began to be removed. On the 11th, all that could be done, without attracting notice, towards the attainment of the same end, was effected; and on the 12th, the siege was finally raised, after it had cost the allies 9 officers and 109 men killed, with 25 officers and 342 men wounded and taken prisoners.

But though the stores and materiel were thus

removed from before Badajoz, it was not esteemed prudent to withdraw the covering army from its position on the Albuera, till the enemy, by some movement more decisive than they had yet made, should throw further light upon their future intentions. In spite of the extreme probability of the rumours which had reached us, it would have been something more than prudent, had we changed our whole line of operations upon their authority alone; and hence the corps of which Marshal Beresford had originally been in command, but which was now under the orders of General Hill, kept its ground, and retained its attitude of watchfulness, up to the 16th. Upon that day, however, we received official information that Regnier, with the advance of Marmont's corps, was at Truxillo; and that the main body was in the act of passing the Tagus at Alcantara; whilst Soult's army was observed to be feeling its way, with the cavalry and light troops, from Llerena towards Medellin and Merida. It was therefore impossible any longer to doubt that the object of the enemy was a combined operation for the relief of Badajoz; and as they refused their left, and marched strongly towards their right, our left became of course the probable point of attack. Under these circumstances, the position of the Albuera was pronounced wholly untenable; nor was there any other on the left of the Guadiana

which offered the slightest advantages, or held out to us the smallest inducement to take it up.

It would have been quite unnatural, had Lord Wellington, thus situated, felt otherwise than mortified and grieved to a great degree. In spite of all the exertions which he had made, and the numerous successes which he had obtained, he saw himself, at the present juncture, in a situation at least not more enviable than that which he filled on the opening of the campaign; for the resources of the enemy, instead of diminishing, appeared to increase, whilst his own were becoming daily more and more enfeebled. I have said that the Portuguese army was not now in the state of efficiency in which it appeared to be twelve months before. On the contrary, without pay, without provisions, without sufficient means of transport, the troops seemed to be rapidly falling back into their original disorganisation; whilst the commanders were involved in continual disputes and quarrels, as well with one another, as with the Regency and the court of Brazil. With respect, again, to the Spaniards, nothing could be more disgusting than the apathy with which they regarded passing events, unless, indeed, it was their excessive and mistaken jealousy of English interference. Though we had drawn upon ourselves last year all the French armies of the north, neither Castile, nor Galicia, nor Biscay, nor Na-

varre, nor the Asturias, nor Leon, made the faintest effort to take advantage of the diversion ; and now, when the armies of the south and of the centre were collected in our front, both the interior and northern provinces of Spain remained perfectly quiet. Madrid, which was at this time freed from the presence of French soldiers, was actually guarded by the citizens in the name of Joseph, and with arms and ammunition given to them by the French ; whilst the Cortes and the Regency had become objects of contempt, as general and as complete as ever was heaped upon the government of this or any other country. In every department cabal and party spirit were at work. Each commander of an army had his own plans and his own adherents, both in the Regency and in the Cortes ; whilst among themselves there existed but one point of union, and that was to be found in a universal distrust of their allies. From Spain, therefore, little was now to be expected ; indeed, it was confidently given out that Joseph had retired from the Peninsula, and that Ferdinand was about to return with Marshal Berthier, for the purpose of allaying all misgivings, and reconciling the nation at large to the wishes of Napoleon. Nor were our prospects by many degrees more bright, when we looked only to the defence of Portugal. By the capture of Badajoz in the south, and the destruction of Almeida in the

north, the two great roads into the heart of the country were laid open ; for the government having refused to advance money for its repair, Almeida was blown up ; and hence it was in the power of Buonaparte, whenever he should think fit strongly to reinforce his armies here, to march upon Lisbon by the route which to himself should appear most advantageous. It is true that our works about the capital were capable of a long and obstinate defence, and that if England chose to turn her undivided strength to that point, she might unquestionably preserve it ; but it admitted of serious doubt whether the preservation of Lisbon would repay the cost of defending it, especially when it must be defended by subjecting the richest provinces in the kingdom to devastation. These were gloomy and somewhat dispiriting considerations. Whether they occurred to Lord Wellington or not, I take it not upon me to determine ; but before the rest of the army they rose in full force ; there were few who looked far into the future without serious misgivings.

Lord Wellington having maturely weighed all the reasons for and against his proposed proceeding, at last sent for Castaños and Blake at Albuera, and opened to them the views which he entertained, and the determination to which he had come. He did so, prefacing his declaration by a statement, that nothing which they could do

or say would induce him to depart from his own plans ; leaving it, at the same time, to themselves to choose whether they would follow us in our movements, or act independently ; and when they adopted the latter alternative, he explained to them his own sentiments as to the best course which they had it in their power to pursue. This done, he dismissed them, and immediately issued orders for the breaking up of the army from Albuera and Badajoz. The movement took place on the 18th ; and all the stores and baggage being safely conveyed to the rear, the columns moved without impediment or confusion upon their new ground. On the 20th of June the following was the disposition of the allied British and Portuguese armies.

At Torre del Mouro, on the line of the river Caya, an extensive encampment was formed, which rested its right flank upon Elvas, and had its left covered by Campo Mayor. It was occupied, 1st, by the cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton ; 2ndly, by the second and fourth divisions, by Major-general Hamilton's division of Portuguese infantry, by Major-general Alten's light brigade, and by two brigades of nine pounders. These troops were all under the immediate orders of Lieutenant-general Hill, and held the right wing or Elvas moiety of the encampment. The third and seventh divisions again, which moved from the trenches, di-