

been crushed by Soult if they had attacked the enemy, is evidently false from the following facts. Lord Wellington expressly says, in his answer to my questions quoted before,—That the *right* of the troops in the seminary *was protected* by the troops under Murray; which could not be if the latter were several miles off. Again, if the dragoons of Murray's corps could charge repeatedly with advantage, the infantry and guns of that corps might have followed up the attack without danger upon a confused, flying, panic-stricken body of men who had been surprised and were at the same time taken both in flank and rear. But if Murray dared not with any prudence even approach the enemy,—if it were absolutely necessary for him to retire as he did,—what brought him there at all? Is the Duke of Wellington a general to throw his troops wantonly into such a situation—and on ground which his elevated post at the Serra Convent enabled him to command perfectly, and where the men and movements of both sides were as much beneath his eye as the men and movements on a chess-board? Bah!

But the fact is, that a part of the Germans under Murray, ay!—a very small part! did actually engage the enemy with success. Major Beamish, in his *History of the German Legion*, on the authority of one of the German officers' journals, writes thus:—

“The skirmishers of the first line under Lieutenant Von Hölle, and two companies of the same regiment under Ensign Hoderberg, were alone brought into fire. The skirmishers made several prisoners, and one rifleman (Henry Hauer) was lucky enough to capture a French lieutenant-colonel. Seven of the legion were wounded.”

Murray wanted hardihood. And it is no answer to say Lord Wellington did not take notice of his conduct. A Commander-in-chief is guided by many circumstances distinct from the mere military facts, and it might be, that on this occasion he did not choose to judge rashly or harshly a man who had other good qualities, for an error into which perhaps a very bold and able man might have fallen by accident. And neither would I have thus judged Sir John Murray from this fact alone, although the whole army were disgusted at the time by his want of daring and openly expressed an unfavorable opinion of his military vigor. But when I find that the same want of hardihood was again apparent in him at Castalla, as I have already shown in my *History*, and still more glaringly displayed by him at Tarragona, as shall be shown hereafter, the matter became quite different, and the duty of the historian is to speak the truth even of a general, strange as that may and I have no doubt does appear to this reviewer.

Having disposed of this matter, I shall now set down some passages evincing the babbling shallowness and self-conceit of the critic, and beneath them my authorities, whereby it will appear that the big book containing all Sir George does not know is increasing in bulk :—

“ Sir Arthur Wellesley was detained at Oporto neither by the instructions of the English cabinet nor by his own want of generalship, *but simply by the want of provisions.*”—*Review.*

Indeed! Reader, mark the following question to, and answer from the Duke of Wellington.

*Question to the Duke of Wellington by Colonel Napier.*

Why did the Duke halt the next day after the passage of the Douro?

*Answer.*—“ The halt was made next day,—first, because the whole army had not crossed the Douro and none of its supplies and baggage had crossed. Secondly, on account of the great exertion and fatigue of the preceding days, particularly the last. Thirdly, because we had no account of Lord Beresford being in possession of Amarante, or even across the Douro; we having, in fact, out-marched everything. Fourthly, the horses and animals required a day’s rest as well as the men.”

And, in the answer to another question, the following observation occurs :—“ The relative numbers and the nature of the troops must be considered in all these things; and this fact moreover, *that excepting to attain a very great object we could not risk the loss of a corps*”

I pass over the reviewer’s comments upon my description of Soult’s retreat, because a simple reference to my work will at once show their folly and falseness; but I beg to inform this acute and profound historical critic that the first field-marshal captured by an English general was Marshal Tallard, and that the English general who captured him was called John, Duke of Marlborough. And, with respect to his sneers about the “ *little river of Ruivaens* ;” “ *Soult’s theatrical speech* ;” “ *the use of the twenty-five horsemen* ;” “ *the non-repairs of the Ponte-Nova* ;” and the “ *Romance composed by Colonel Napier and Le Noble* ;” I shall, in answer, only offer the following authorities, none of which, the reader will observe, are taken from Le Noble.

*Extract from Soult’s General Report.*

“ The 15th, in the morning, the enemy appeared one league from Braga; our column was entangled in the defile; the rain

came down in torrents ; and the wind was frightful. On reaching Salamonde, we learned that *the bridge of Ruivaens, over the little river (ruisseau) of that name was cut, and the passage guarded by 1200 men with cannon.* It was known also that the *Ponte Nova on the route of Montelegre*, which they had begun to destroy, was feebly guarded ; and the marshal gave to Major Dulong the command of 100 brave men, of his own choice, to carry it. The valiant Dulong under cover of the night reached the bridge, passed it notwithstanding the cuts in it, surprised the guard, and put to the sword those who could not escape. *In four hours the bridge was repaired ; General Loison passed it, and marched upon the bridge of Misserella, near Villa da Ponte, where 800 Portuguese well retrenched defended the passage. A battalion and some brave men, again led by the intrepid Dulong, forced the abattis, entered the entrenchments, and seized the bridge.*"

*Extract from the "Victoires et Conquêtes des Français."*

"The marshal held a council, at the end of which he called Major Dulong. It was nine o'clock in the evening. 'I have selected you from the army, he said to that brave officer, to seize the bridge of Ponte Nova which the enemy are now cutting: you must endeavor to surprise them. The time is favorable. Attack vigorously with the bayonet, you will succeed or you will die. I want no news save that of your success, send me no other report ; your silence will be sufficient in a contrary case. Take a hundred men at your choice ; they will be sufficient ; add twenty-five dragoons, and kill their horses to make a rampart, if it be necessary, on the middle of the bridge to sustain yourself, and remain master of the passage.'

"The major departed with determined soldiers and a Portuguese guide who was tied with the leather slings of the muskets. Arrived within pistol shot of the bridge he saw the enemy *cutting the last beam.* It was then one o'clock, the rain fell heavily, and the enemy's laborers being fatigued, thought they might take some repose before they finished their work. The torrents descending from the mountains and the cavado itself made such a noise that the march of the French was not heard, the sentinel at the bridge was killed without giving any alarm, and Dulong with twenty-five grenadiers passed crawling on the beam ; one of them fell into the cavado, but happily his fall produced no effect. The enemy's advanced post of twenty-four men was destroyed, &c. &c. The marshal, informed of this happy event, came up in haste with the first troops he could find to defend the bridge and accelerate the passage of the army ; but the repairing was neither sufficiently prompt

or solid to prevent many brave soldiers perishing. The marshal embraced Major Dulong, saying to him, 'I thank you in the name of France, brave major; you have saved the army.'

Then follows a detailed account of the Misserella bridge, or Saltador, and its abattis and other obstacles; of Dulong's attack; of his being twice repulsed; and of his winning that bridge, the Leaper as it was called, at the third assault, falling dreadfully wounded at the moment of victory; finally, of the care and devotion with which his soldiers carried him on their shoulders during the rest of the retreat. And the reader will observe that this account is not a mere description in the body of that work, but a separate paper in the Appendix, written by some officer evidently well acquainted with all the facts, perhaps Dulong himself, and for the express purpose of correcting the errors of detail in the body of the work. Theatrical to the critic, and even ridiculous it may likely enough appear; the noble courage and self-devotion of such a soldier as Dulong is a subject which no person will ever expect a *Quarterly* reviewer to understand.

In the foregoing comments I have followed the stream of my own thoughts, rather than the order of the reviewer's criticisms; I must therefore retrace my steps to notice some points which have been passed over. His observations about Zaragoza have been already disposed of in my published reply to his first articles, but his comments upon Catalonian affairs shall now be noticed.

The assertion that Lord Collingwood was incapable of judging of the efforts of the Catalans, although he was in daily intercourse with their chiefs, coöperating with their armies and supplying them with arms and stores, *because he was a s aman*, is certainly ingenious. It has just so much of pertness in it as an Admiralty clerk of the Melville school might be supposed to acquire by a long habit of official insolence to naval officers, whose want of parliamentary interest exposed them to the mortification of having intercourse with him. And it has just so much of cunning wisdom as to place it upon a par with that which dictated the inquiry which we have heard was sent out to Sir John Warren during the late American war, namely, "whether *light—very light* frigates, could not sail up the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario?"—and with that surprising providence, which did send out birch-brooms and tanks to hold *fresh water* for the use of the ships on the said Lake of Ontario! But quitting these matters, the reviewer insinuates what is absolutely untrue, namely, that I have only quoted Lord Collingwood as authority for my statements about Catalonia. The readers of my work know that I have adduced in testimony the Spanish generals themselves, namely, Contreras, Lacy, and Rovira.

the testimony of Sir Edward Codrington, of Sir Edward Pellew, of Colonel Doyle, and of other Englishmen. That I have referred to St Cyr, Suchet, Lafaille, and other French writers; that I have quoted Vacani and Cabane's Histories, the first an Italian serving with the French army in Catalonia, the last a Spaniard and chief of the staff to the Catalan army: and now, to complete the reviewer's discomfiture, I will add the Duke of Wellington, who is a landsman, and therefore, according to this reviewer's doctrine, entitled to judge:—

*Letter to Lord Liverpool, 19th Dec. 1809.*

“In Catalonia the resistance is more general and regular; but still the people are of a description with which your armies could not coöperate with any prospect of success, or even of safety. You see what Burghersh says of the somatenes; and it is notorious that the Catalans have at all times been the most irregular, and the least to be depended upon of any of the Spaniards.”

So much for light frigates, birch-brooms, fresh-water tanks, and Collingwood's incapacity to judge of the Catalans, *because he was a seaman*; and as for Reding's complaints of the Spaniards when dying, they must go to Sir George's big book with this marginal note, that St. Cyr is not the authority. But for the grand flourish, the threat to prove at another time, “*from Wellington's despatches,*” that the Spaniards gave excellent intelligence and made *no false reports*, let the reader take the following testimony in anticipation:

*Extracts from Lord Wellington's Correspondence, 1809.*

“At present I have no intelligence whatever, excepting the nonsense I receive occasionally from —; as the Spaniards have defeated all my attempts to obtain any by stopping those whom I sent out to make inquiries.”

“I do not doubt that the force left in Estremadura does not exceed 8000 infantry and 900 cavalry; and you have been made acquainted with the exact extent of it, *because*, the Duque del Albuquerque, who is appointed to command it, *is interested in making known the truth*; but they have *lied* about the cavalry ordered to the Duque del Parque.”

“It might be advisable, however, to frighten the gentlemen at Seville with their own *false intelligence.*”

“It is most difficult to obtain any information respecting roads, or any local circumstances, which must be considered in the decisions to be formed respecting the march of troops.”

1810. “We are sadly deficient in good information, and all the efforts which I have made to obtain it have failed; and all that

we know is the movement of troops at the moment, or probably after it is made."

"I have had accounts from the Marquis de la Romana: he tells me that the siege of Cadiz was raised on the 23d, *which cannot be true.*"

"I believe there was no truth in the stories of the insurrection at Madrid."

"There is so far a foundation for the report of O'Donnell's action, as that it appears that Suchet's advanced guard was at Lerida on the 11th of April. It is doubtful, however, *according to my experience of Spanish reports*, whether O'Donnell was beaten or gained a victory."

"I recommend to you, however, to proceed with great caution in respect to intelligence transmitted to you by the Marquis de la Romana, *and all the Spanish officers.* It is obvious there is nothing they wish for so much as to involve our troops in their operations. This is evident both from the letters of the marquis himself, and from the *false reports* made to Lieutenant Heathcote of the firing heard from Badajoz at Albuquerque."

*Wellington to Lord Liverpool, 1810. Cartaxo.*

"The circumstances which I have related above will show your lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate operations with a corps so ill-organized, *in possession of so little intelligence*, and upon whose actions no reliance can be placed. It will scarcely be credited that *the first intelligence which General Mendizabal received of the assembling of the enemy's troops at Seville was from hence.*"

*Wellington to Sir H. Wellesley, 1810.*

"Mendizabel, &c. &c., have sent us so many *false reports* that I cannot make out what the French are doing."

"This is a part of the system on which *all the Spanish authorities have been acting*, to induce us to take a part in the desultory operations which they are carrying on. *False reports and deceptions of every description are tried*, and then popular insults, to show us what the general opinion is of our conduct."

"The Spaniards take such bad care of their posts, and have so little intelligence, that it is difficult to say by what troops the blow has been struck."

"It is strange that the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo should have no intelligence of the enemy's movements near his garrison, of which we have received so many accounts."

"We hear also a great deal of Blake's army in the Alpujarras,

and of a corps from Valencia operating upon the enemy's communications with Madrid ; but I conclude that there is as little foundation for this intelligence as for that relating to the insurrection of Ronda."

"I enclose a letter to General Carrera, in which I have requested him to communicate with you. I beg you to observe, however, that very little reliance can be placed on the report made to you *by any Spanish general at the head of a body of troops*. They generally exaggerate on one side or the other ; and *make no scruple of communicating supposed intelligence, in order to induce those to whom they communicate it to adopt a certain line of conduct.*"

The reader must be now somewhat tired of quotations ; let us therefore turn for relaxation to the reviewer's observations about light troops,—of which he seems indeed to know as much as the wise gentleman of the admiralty did about the facility of sailing up the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario ; but though that wise gentleman did not know much about sailing-craft, the reviewer knows something of another kind of craft—namely, misrepresentation. Thus he quotes a passage from Captain Kincaid's amusing and clever work, as if it told in his favor, whereas it in no manner supports his foolish insinuation—namely, that the forty-third and fifty-second regiments of the light division were not light troops, never acted as such, and never skirmished ! Were he to say as much to the lowest bugler of these corps, he would give him the fittest answer for his folly—that is to say, laugh in his face.

"There are but two kinds of soldiers in the world," said Napoleon, 'the good and the bad.'

Now, the light division were not only good, but, I will say it fearlessly, the best soldiers in the world. The three British regiments composing it had been formed by Sir John Moore precisely upon the same system. There was no difference save in the color of the riflemen's jackets and the weapons which they carried. Captain Kincaid's observation, quoted by the reviewer, merely says, what is quite true, that the riflemen fought in skirmishing order more frequently than the forty-third and fifty-second did. Certainly they did, and for this very sufficient reason—their arms, the rifle and sword, did not suit any other formation ; it is a defect in the weapon, which is inferior to the musket and bayonet, fitted alike for close or open order. Napoleon knew this so well that he had no riflemen in his army, strange as it may appear to those persons who have read so much about French riflemen. The riflemen of the light division could form line, columns, and squares—could move as a heavy body—could do, and did do everything that

the best soldiers in the world ought to do ; and in like manner the fifty-second and forty-third regiments skirmished and performed all the duties of light troops with the same facility as the riflemen ; but the difference of the weapon made it advisable to use the latter nearly always in open order : I do not indeed remember ever to have seen them act against the enemy either in line or square. Captain Kincaid is too sensible and too good a soldier, and far too honest a man, to serve the purpose of this snarling blockhead, who dogmatizes in defiance of facts and with a plenitude of pompous absurdity that would raise the bile of an alderman. Thus, after quoting from my work the numbers of the French army, he thus proceeds :—

“ Notwithstanding that this enormous force was *pressing* upon the *now unaided* Spanish people with *all its weight*, and acting against them with its *utmost energy*, it proved wholly unable to put down resistance.”—*Review*, page 497.

Now this relates to the period following Sir John Moore's death, which was on the 16th of January. That general's fine movement upon Sahagun, and his subsequent retreat, had drawn the great bulk of the French forces towards Gallicia, and had paralyzed many corps. The war with Austria had drawn Napoleon himself and the imperial guards away from the Peninsula. Joseph was establishing his court at Madrid ; Victor remained very inactive in Estremadura ; Soult marched into Portugal ;—in fine, this was precisely the period of the whole war in which the French army were most inert. Napoleon has fixed upon the four months of February, March, April, and May, 1809, as the period in which the king let the Peninsula slip from his feeble hands.

Let us see then what the Spaniards did during that time. And first it is false to say that they were unaided. They were aided against Victor by the vicinity of Sir John Cradock's troops ; they were aided on the Gallician coast by an English squadron ; they were aided on the Beira frontier, against Lapisse, by the Portuguese troops, under Sir Robert Wilson ; they were aided on the Catalonian coast by Lord Collingwood's fleet ; they were aided at Cadiz by the presence of General M'Kenzie's troops, sent from Lisbon ; and they were aided everywhere by enormous supplies of money, arms and ammunition sent from England. Finally, they were aided, and most powerfully so, by Sir John Moore's generalship, which had enabled them to rally and keep several considerable armies on foot in the southern parts of the country. What did these armies—these invincible Spaniards—do ? They lost Zaragoza, Monson, and Jaca, in the east ; the fortresses of Ferrol

and Coruña, and their fleet, in the north; they lost Estremadura, La Mancha, Aragon, the Asturias, and Galicia; they lost the battles of Ucles and of Valls; the battle of Monterrey, that of Ciudad Real, and the battle of Medellin. They won nothing! they did not save themselves: it was the *British army and the indolence and errors of the French that saved them.*

*Extract from Napoleon's Memoirs.*

"After the embarkation of the English army, the King of Spain did nothing; *he los' four months*; he ought to have marched upon Cadiz, upon Valencia, upon Lisbon; political means would have done the rest."

*Extracts from Lord Wellington's Correspondence.—1809.*

"It is obvious that the longer and the more intimately we become acquainted with the affairs of Spain the less prospect do they hold out of anything like a glorious result. The great extent of the country, the natural difficulties which it opposes to an enemy, and the enmity of the people towards the French may spin out the war into length, and at last the French may find it impossible to establish a government in the country; but there is no prospect of a glorious termination to the contest."

"After the perusal of these details, and of Soult's letters, can any one doubt that the evacuation of Galicia was occasioned by the operations of the British troops in Portugal?"

"The fact is, that the British army *has saved Spain and Portugal* during this year."

The reviewer is not only a great critic, he is a great general also. He has discovered that there are no positions in the mountains of Portugal; nay, he will scarcely allow that there are mountains at all; and he insists that they offer no defence against an invader, but that the rivers do—that the Douro defends the *eastern* frontier of Beira, and that the frontier of Portugal generally is very compact and strong for defence, and well suited for a weak army to fight superior numbers;—that the weak army cannot be turned and cut off from Lisbon, and the strong army must invade in mass and by one line.

Now first, it so happened, unluckily for this lucid military notion of Portugal, that in Massena's invasion Lord Wellington stopped to fight on the mountain of Busaco, and stopped Massena altogether at the mountains of Alhandra, Aruda, Sobral, and Torres Vedras—in other words, at the lines, and that he did not once stop him, or attempt to stop him by defending a river. That Massena, in his retreat, stopped Lord Wellington on the mountain of Santarem, attempted to stop him on the mountains of Casal Nova,

Moita, and Guarda, but never attempted to stop him by defending a river, save at Sabugal, and then he was instantly beaten. Oh, certainly, 'tis a most noble general, and a very acute critic! Nevertheless, I must support my own opinions about the frontier of Portugal, the non-necessity of invading this country in one mass, and the unfordable nature of the Tagus, by the testimony of two generals as distinguished as honest Iago.

*Extract of a letter from Sir John Moore.*

“I am not prepared at this moment to answer minutely your lordship’s question respecting the defence of Portugal; but I can say generally that the frontier of Portugal is not defensible against a superior force. It is an open frontier, all equally rugged, but all equally to be penetrated.”

*Extracts from Lord Wellington’s Correspondence.*

“In whatever season the enemy may enter Portugal, he will probably make his attack by *two distinct lines*, the one north, the other south of the Tagus; and the system of defence must be founded upon this general basis. In the summer season, however, the *Tagus being fordable, &c., &c.*, care must be taken that the enemy does not, by his attack, directed from the south of the Tagus and by the passage of that river *cut off from Lisbon the British army engaged in operations to the north of the Tagus.*”

“The line of frontier to Portugal is so long in proportion to the extent and means of the country, and the Tagus and the mountains separate the parts of it so effectually from each other, and it is so open in many parts, that it would be impossible for an army acting upon the defensive to carry on its operations upon the frontier without being cut off from the capital.”

“In the summer it is probable as I have before stated that the enemy will make his attack in two principal corps, and that he will also push on through the mountains between Castello Branco and Abrantes. His object will be by means of his corps *south of the Tagus*, to turn the positions which might be taken in his front on the north of that river; to cut off from Lisbon the corps opposed to him; and to destroy it by an attack in front and rear at the same time. This can be avoided only by the retreat of the right centre and left of the allies, and their junction at a point at which from the state of the river they cannot be turned by the passage of the Tagus by the enemy’s left. The first point of defence which presents itself below that at which the Tagus ceases to be fordable, is the river Castanheira close to the lines.”

In the above extracts, the fordable nature of the Tagus has

been pretty clearly shown, but I will continue my proofs upon that fact to satiety.

*Lord Wellington to Charles Stuart, Esq.*

“The line of operations which we are obliged to adopt for the defence of Lisbon and for our own embarkation necessarily throws us back as far as below Salvaterra on the Tagus, to which place, and I believe lower, the Tagus is fordable during the summer; and we should be liable to be turned or cut off from Lisbon and the Tagus if we were to take our line of defence higher up the river.”

*Lord Wellington to General Hill, August.*

“I had already considered the possibility that Regnier might move across the fords of the Tagus at Villa Velha and thus turn your right.”

*Lord Wellington to General Hill, October.*

“If there are no boats, send them (the sick and encumbrances) across the Tagus by the ford (at Santarem).”

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to General Hill.*

“I have desired Murray to send you the copy of a plan we have with some of the fords of the Tagus marked upon it, but *I believe the whole river from Barquina to Santarem is fordable.*”

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Marshal Beresford.*

“I enclose a letter which Colonel Fletcher has given me, which affords but a bad prospect of a defence for the Tagus. I think that if Captain Chapman’s facts are true his arguments are unanswerable, and that it is very doubtful whether any heavy ordnance should be placed in the batteries on the upper Tagus.”

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Admiral Berkeley.*

“But if the invasion should be made in summer, when the Tagus is fordable in many places.” . . . “In the event of the attack being made between the months of June and November, when the Tagus is fordable, at least as low down as Salvaterra (near the lines).”

*Sir John Cradock to Lord Castlereagh, April.*

“There is a ferry at Salvaterra, near Alcantara, and another up the left bank of the Tagus in the Alemtajo, where there is also a ford and the river may be easily passed.”

*Extract from a Memoir by Sir B. D'Urban, quarter-master-general to Beresford's army:—*“The Tagus, between Golegao and Rio Moinhos was known to offer several fords after a few days dry weather.”\*

Thus we see that, in nearly every month in the year, this unfordable Tagus of the reviewer is fordable in many places, and that in fact it is no barrier except in very heavy rains. But to render this still clearer I will here give one more and conclusive proof. In an elaborate manuscript memoir, upon the defence of Portugal, drawn up by the celebrated General Dumourier for the Duke of Wellington, that officer argues like this reviewer, that the Tagus is unfordable and a strong barrier. But a marginal note in Wellington's handwriting runs thus:—“He (Dumourier) does not seem to be aware of the real state of the Tagus at any season.”

What can I say more? Nothing upon this head, but much upon others. I can call upon the reader to trace the deceitful mode in which the reviewer perverts or falsifies my expressions throughout. How he represents the Spaniards at one moment so formidable as to resist successfully the utmost efforts of more than 300,000 soldiers, the next breath calls them a poor unarmed horde of peasants incapable of making any resistance at all. How he quotes me as stating that the ministers had unbounded confidence in the success of the struggle in Spain; whereas my words are, that the ministers *professed* unbounded confidence. How he represents me as saying, the *Cabinet* were too much dazzled to analyze the real causes of the Spanish Revolution; whereas it was the *nation* not the *Cabinet* of which I spoke. And this could not be mistaken, because I had described the ministers as only anxious to pursue a warlike system necessary to their own existence, and that they were actuated by a personal hatred of Napoleon. Again, how he misrepresents me as wishing the British to *seize* Cadiz, and speaks of a *mob* in that city, when I have spoken only of the *people* (oh, true Tory!); and never proposed to seize Cadiz at all, and have also given the unexceptionable authority of Mr. Stuart, General M'Kenzie, and Sir George Smith, for my statement. And here I will notice a fine specimen of this reviewer's mode of getting up a case. Having undertaken to prove that every river in Portugal is a barrier, except the Zezere which I had fixed upon as being an important line, he gives an extract of a letter from Lord Wellington to a General *Smith*, to the effect that, as the Zezere might be *turned at that season* in so many ways, he did not wish to construct works to defend it then. Now, first, it is necessary to inform the reader that there is no letter to General Smith.

\* This was in February.

The letter in question was to General Leith, and the *mistake* was not without its object, namely, to prevent any curious person from discovering that the very next sentence is as follows:—"If, however, this work can be performed, either by the peasantry or by the troops, without any great inconvenience, the line of the Zezere may, hereafter, become of very great importance."

All this is very pitiful, and looks like extreme soreness in the reviewer; but the effrontery with which he perverts my statements about the Austrian war surpasses all his other efforts in that line, and deserves a more elaborate exposure.

In my History it is stated, that some obscure intrigues of the Princess of Tour and Taxis, and the secret societies on the continent, emanating from patrician sources, excited the sympathy, and nourished certain *distempered feelings* in the English ministers, *which feeling* made them see only weakness and disaffection in France. This I stated, because I knew that those intrigues were, in fact, a conspiracy concocted with Talleyrand's connivance, for the dethronement of Napoleon; and the English ministers neglected Spain and every other part of their foreign affairs for the moment, so intent were they upon this foolish scheme and so sanguine of success. These facts are not known to many, but they are true.

In the same paragraph of my History it is said, *the warlike preparations of Austria*, and the reputation of the Archduke Charles, whose talents were foolishly said to exceed Napoleon's, *had awakened the dormant spirit of coalitions*; meaning, as would be evident to any persons not wilfully blind, had awakened that dormant spirit in the English ministers.

Now, reader, mark the candor and simplicity of the reviewer. He says that I condemned these ministers, "for nourishing their distempered feelings by combining the efforts of a German monarch in favor of national independence." As if it were the *Austrian war*, and not the *obscure intrigues for dethroning Napoleon* that the expression of *distempered feelings* applied to. As if the awakening the *dormant spirit of coalitions*, instead of being a reference to the sentiments of the English ministers, meant the exciting the Austrians and other nations to war, and the forming of a vast plan of action by those ministers! And for fear any mistake on that head should arise, it is so asserted in another part of the review in the following terms:—

"To have 'awakened the dormant spirit' of *coalitions* is another of the crimes which the British ministers are charged with, as if it would have been a proof of wisdom to have abstained from *forming a combination of those states of Europe, which still retained some de-*

*gre<sup>e</sup> of indep:naence and magnanimity to resist a conqueror," &c., &c.*  
—*Review.*

The *Quarterley's* attention to Spanish affairs seems to have rendered it very intimate with the works of Ferdinand Mendez Pinto. But since it has thus claimed the Austrian war as the work of its former patrons, the ministers of 1809, I will throw some new light upon the history of that period, which, though they should prove little satisfactory to the *Quarterley*, may, as the details are really curious, in some measure repay the reader for his patience in wading through the tedious exposition of this silly and unscrupulous writer's misrepresentations.

After the conference of Erfurth, the Austrian Count Stadion, a man of ability and energy, either believing or affecting to believe, that Napoleon was determined to destroy Austria, and only waited until Spain was conquered, resolved to employ the whole force of the German empire against the French monarch in a war of destruction for one or other of the contending states. With this view, his first efforts were directed to change the opinions of the Archduke Charles and those immediately about him who were averse to a war; and though he was long and vigorously resisted by General Grün, an able man, and the archduke's confidant, he finally succeeded. Some time before this France had insisted upon a reduction of the Austrian forces, and being asked if she would do the same for the sake of peace, replied that she would maintain no more troops in Germany than should be found necessary; but the army of the confederation must be kept up as a constitutional force, and it was impossible during the war with England to reduce the French troops in other quarters. To this, succeeded an attempt at a triple treaty, by which the territories of Austria, Russia, and France, were to be mutually guaranteed. Champagny and Romanzow suggested this plan, but the Austrian minister did not conceive Russia strong enough to guarantee Austria against France. Stadion's project was more agreeable, and a note of a declaration of war was sent to Metternich, then at Paris, to deliver to the French government. The Archduke Charles set off for the army, and was followed by the emperor.

When the war was thus resolved upon, it remained to settle whether it should be carried on for the sole benefit of Austria, or in such a manner as to interest other nations. Contrary to her usual policy Austria decided for the latter, and contrary to her usual parsimony she was extremely liberal to her general officers and spies. It was determined that the war should be one of restitution, and in that view secret agents had gone to Italy, and were said to have made great progress in exciting the people;

officers had been also sent to Sicily and Sardinia to urge those courts to attempt their own restoration to the continental thrones. The complete restoration of Naples, of Tuscany, and the Pope's dominions, and large additions to the old kingdom of Piedmont, were proposed, and Austria herself only demanded a secure frontier, namely, the Tyrol, the river Po, and the Chiusa, which was not much more than the peace of Campo Formio had left her.

Such were her views in the south where kings were to be her coadjutors, but in the north she was intent upon a different plan. There she expected help from the people, who were discontented at being parcelled out by Napoleon. Treaties were entered into with the Elector of Hesse, the Dukes of Brunswick and Oels, and it was understood that the people there and in the provinces taken from Prussia, were ready to rise on the first appearance of an Austrian soldier. Hanover was to be restored to England; but Austria was so discontented with the Prussian king, that the restoration of the Prussian provinces, especially the duchy of Warsaw, was to depend upon his conduct in the war.

The means of effecting this mighty project were the great resources which Stadion had found or created; they were greater than Austria had ever before produced and the enthusiasm of her people was in proportion. The landwehr levy had been calculated at only 150 battalions; it produced 300 battalions, besides the Hungarian insurrection. The regular army was complete in everything, and the cavalry good, though not equal to what it had been in former wars. There were nine "*corps d'armée*." The Archduke Ferdinand with one was to strike a blow in the duchy of Warsaw. The Archduke Charles commanded in chief. Marching with six corps, containing 160,000 regular troops besides the landwehr attached to them, he was to cross the frontier and fall on the French army, supposed to be only 40,000. That is to say, the first corps, under Belgarde and Klenau, were to march by Peterwalde and Dresden against Bernadotte who was in that quarter. The second corps, under Kollowrath and Brady, were to march by Eger upon Bareith and Wurzburg, to prevent the union of Davoust and Bernadotte. The third corps, under Prince Rosenberg, was to move by Waldmunchen, in the Upper Palatinate, and after beating Wrede at Straubingen, to join the Archduke Charles near Munich. The archduke himself was to proceed against that city with the reserves of Prince John of Lichtenstein, Hiller's corps, Stipchitz, and those of Hohenzollern's, and the Archduke Louis. The Archduke John was to attack Italy; and the different corps, exclusive of landwehr, amounted to not less than 260,000 men.

The project was gigantic, the force prodigious, and though the quarter-master-general Meyer, seeing the vice of the military plan, resigned his situation, and that Meerfelt quarrelled with the Archduke Charles, the general feeling was high and sanguine; and the princes of the empire were, with the exception of Wirtemberg and Westphalia, thought to be rather favorable towards the Austrians. But all the contributions were in kind; Austria had only a depreciated paper currency which would not serve her beyond her own frontiers; wherefore England, at that time the paymaster of all Europe, was looked to. England however had no ambassador, no regular accredited agent at Vienna; all this mighty armament and plan were carried on without her aid, almost without her knowledge; and a despatch from the Foreign Office, dated the 8th of December, but which only arrived the 10th of March, *refused all aid whatsoever! and even endeavored to prove that Austria could not want, and England was not in a situation to grant.* Yet this was the period in which such lavish grants had been made to Spain without any condition—so lavish, that, in Cadiz, nearly four hundred thousand pounds, received from England, was lying untouched by the Spaniards. They were absolutely glutted with specie, for they had, at that moment, of their own money, and lying idle in their treasury, *fourteen millions of dollars, and ten millions more were on the way from Vera Cruz and Buenos Ayres.* Such was the wisdom, such the providence of the English ministers! heaping money upon money at Cadiz, where it was not wanted, and if it had been wanted, ill bestowed; but refusing it to Austria to forward the explosion of the enormous mine prepared against Napoleon in Germany and Italy. Their agent, Mr. Frere, absolutely refused even to ask for a loan of some of this money from the Spaniards. This is what the reviewer, wilfully perverting my expression, namely, “awakened the dormant spirit of coalitions,” calls “the forming a combination of the States of Europe!” The English ministers were treated as mere purse-bearers, to be bullied or cajoled as the case might be; and in these two instances, not without reason, for they neither knew how to give nor how to refuse in the right time or place. Nor were their military dispositions better arranged, as we shall presently see.

To proceed with the narrative. Stadion, to prevent the mischief which this despatch from England might have produced, by encouraging the peace party at the court, and discouraging the others, only imparted it to the emperor and his secret council, but hid it from those members of the cabinet who were wavering. Even this was like to have cost him his place; and some members of the council actually proposed to reduce one-third of the army.

In fine, a cry was arising against the war, but the emperor declared himself on Stadion's side, and the cabinet awaited the result of Count Walmoden's mission to London. That nobleman had been despatched with full powers to conclude a treaty of alliance and subsidy with England, and to learn the feeling of the English Cabinet upon an extraordinary measure which Austria had resorted to; for being utterly unable to pay her way at the outset, and trusting to the importance of the crisis, and not a little to the known facility with which the English ministers lavished their subsidies, she had resolved to raise, through the principal bankers in Vienna, £150,000 a month, by making drafts through Holland upon their correspondents in London, *to be repaid from the subsidy* TO BE granted by England! Prince Staremberg was sent at the same time with a special mission to London, to arrange a definite treaty for money, and a convention regulating the future object and conduct of the war—a very curious proceeding—because Staremberg had been recalled before for conduct offensive to the English Cabinet; but he was well acquainted with London, and the emperor wished to get him away lest he should put himself at the head of the peace party in Vienna. Thus the English ministers continued so to conduct their affairs, that, while they gave their money to Spain and their advice to Austria, and both unprofitably, they only excited the contempt of both countries.

From the conference of Erfurth, France had been earnest with Russia to take an active part according to treaty against Austria; and Romanzow, who was an enemy of England, increased Alexander's asperity toward that country, but nothing was done against Austria; and when Caulaincourt, the French ambassador at Petersburg, became clamorous, Alexander pretended to take the Austrian ambassador Swartzenberg to task for the measures of his court, but really gave him encouragement, by repairing immediately afterwards to Finland without inviting Caulaincourt. A contemporaneous official note from Romanzow to Austria, was indeed couched in terms to render the intention of Alexander apparently doubtful, but this was only a blind for Napoleon. There was no doubt of the favorable wishes and feelings of the court, the Russian troops in Poland did not stir, and Stadion, far from having any dread of them, calculated upon their assistance in case of any marked success in the outset. The Emperor Alexandria was however far from inattentive to his own interests, for he sent General Hitroff at this time to Turkey to demand Moldavia and Wallachia as the price of a treaty, hoping thus to snatch these countries during the general commotion. He was foiled by the Austrian Cabinet, which secretly directed the Turks sent to meet Hitroff to as-

sume a high tone and agree to no negotiation in which England was not a party: hence, when the Russians demanded the dismissal of Mr. Adair from Constantinople, Hitroff was himself sent away.

While the affairs with Russia were in this state, the present king of Holland arrived, incognito, at Vienna, to offer his services either as heir to the stadtholdership, as a prince of the German empire, or as a near and confidential connection of the House of Brandenburg; but it was only in the latter view he could be useful, and it was evident he expected the Austrian Court would make their policy in the north coincide with that of the Prussian Court. He said the secret voyage of the royal family to Petersburg had exposed them to mortifications and slights which had changed the sentiments of both the king and queen towards France, and the queen, bowed down by misfortune, dreaded new reverses and depressed the spirit of the king. They stood alone in their court, ministers and officers alike openly maintained opinions diametrically opposed to the sovereign, and at a grand council held in Koningsberg, every minister had voted for war with Napoleon. The king assented, but the next day the queen induced him to retract. However, the voice of the people and of the army was for war, and any order to join the troops to those of the Rhenish Confederation was sure to produce an explosion. There were between 30,000 and 40,000 regular troops under arms, and Austria was assured, that if any Austrian force approached the frontier, the Prussian soldiers would, bag and baggage, join it, despite of king or queen.

In this state of affairs, and when a quarrel had arisen between Bernadotte and the Saxon king (for the people of that country were ill-disposed towards the French), it is evident that a large English army appearing in the north of Germany would have gathered around it all the people and armies of the north, and accordingly Stadion proposed a landing in the Weser and the Elbe. Now England had at that time the great armament which went to Walcheren, the army under Wellington in the Peninsula, and that under Sir John Stuart in Sicily; that is to say, she had about 80,000 or 90,000 men disposable; and yet so contriving were the ministers, that they kept Wellington too weak in Spain, Stuart too strong in Sicily; and instead of acting in the north of Germany, where such a great combination awaited them, they sent their most powerful force to perish in the marshes of Walcheren, where the only diversion they caused was the bringing together a few thousand national guards from the nearest French departments. And this the reviewer calls "the forming a combination of those states

in Europe which still retained some degree of independence and magnanimity to resist the ambition of a conqueror." What a profound, modest, and, to use a *Morning Post* compound, not-at-all-a flagitious writer this reviewer is.

Well, notwithstanding this grand "combination," things did not turn out well. The Austrians changed their first plan of campaign in several particulars. Napoleon suddenly and unexpectedly appeared at the head of his army, which, greatly inferior in number, and composed principally of German contingents, was not very well disposed towards him; and yet, such was the stupendous power of this man's genius and bravery, he in a few days by a series of movements unequalled in skill by any movement known in military records, broke through the Austrian power, separated her armies, drove them in disorder before him, and seized Vienna; and but for an accident, one of those minor accidents so frequent in war, which enabled the Archduke Charles to escape over the Danube at Ratisbon, he would have terminated this gigantic contest in ten days. The failure there led to the battle of Esling, where the sudden swell of the Danube again baffled him, and produced another crisis, which might have been turned to his hurt if the English army had been in the north of Germany; but it was then perishing amongst the stagnant ditches of Walcheren, and the only combination of the English ministers to be discovered was a combination of folly, arrogance, and conceit. I have now done with the review. Had all the objections contained in it been true, it would have evinced the petty industry of a malicious mind more than any just or generous interest in the cause of truth; but being, as I have demonstrated, false even in the minutest particular, I justly stigmatize it as remarkable only for malignant imbecility and systematic violation of truth.

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The reviewers having asserted that I picked out of Foy's history the charge against Lord Melville of saying "the worst men made the best soldiers," I replied that I drew for it on my own clear recollection of the fact.

Since then a friend, the Rev. Mr. Rowlatt, has sent me Lord Melville's speech, extracted from the *Annual Register* (Baldwin's) 1808, p. 112; and the following passage proves the effrontery with which the reviewers deny facts.

"What was meant by a better sort of men? Was it that they should be taller or shorter, broader or thinner? This might be

intelligible, but it was not the fact. The men that had hitherto formed the British army were men of stout hearts and habits; men of spirit and courage; lovers of bold enterprise. These were the materials of which an army must be composed. Give him such men, though not of the better description. *The worse men were the fittest for soldiers.* Keep the better sort at home."

## REMARKS

ON

## ROBINSON'S LIFE OF PICTON.

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“Many there are that trouble me and persecute me; yet do I not swerve from the testimonies.”—PSALM CXIX.

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THIS writer of an English general's life is so entirely unacquainted with English military customs, that he quotes a common order of the day, accrediting a new staff officer to the army, as a remarkable testimony to that staff officer's talents.\* And he is so unacquainted with French military customs, that, treating of the battle of Busaco, he places a French marshal, Marmont, who, by the way, was not then even in Spain, at the head of a division of Ney's corps.† He dogmatizes upon military movements freely, and is yet so incapable of forming a right judgment upon the materials within his reach, as to say, that Sir John Moore should not have retreated, because, as he was able to beat the French at Coruña, he could also have beaten them in the heart of Spain. Thus setting aside the facts that at Coruña Moore had fifteen thousand men to fight twenty thousand, and in the heart of Spain he had only twenty-three thousand to fight more than three hundred thousand!

And lest this display of incompetency should not be sufficient, he affirms, that the same Sir John Moore had, comparatively, greater means at Sahagun to beat the enemy than Lord Wellington had in the lines of Torres Vedras.‡ Now those lines which Wel-

\* Life of Picton, page 31.

† Page 325.

‡ In a recent number of the *Quarterly Review* the writer of an article upon the correspondence of Louis the XVIII. quotes me as saying that Massena had *one hundred and thirty-five thousand men* under his orders, as if he had invaded Portugal with an army of that amount, whereas I have expressly said that he invaded Portugal with *sixty-five thousand*, the rest being extended as far as Biscay. The assertion of the reviewer is therefore essentially false with the appearance of truth. The same writer, while rebuking the Editor of the Correspondence for ignorance, asserts, that the battle of Busaco was fought between the

lington had been fortifying for more than a year, offered three impregnable positions, defended by more than a hundred thousand men. There was a fortress, that of St. Julian's, and a fleet close at hand as a final resource, and only sixty thousand French, commanded by Massena, were in front. But Sir John Moore having only twenty-three thousand men at Sahagun, had no lines, no fortifications for defence, and no time to form them, he was nearly three hundred miles from his fleet, and Napoleon in person had turned one hundred thousand men against him, while two hundred thousand more remained in reserve!

Any lengthened argument in opposition to a writer so totally unqualified to treat of warlike affairs, would be a sinful waste of words; but Mr. Robinson has been at pains to question the accuracy of certain passages of my work, and with what justice the reader shall now learn.

1. *Combat on the Coa.*—The substance of Mr. Robinson's complaint on this subject is, that I have imputed to General Picton the odious crime of refusing, from personal animosity, to support General Craufurd;—that such a serious accusation should not be made without ample proof;—that I cannot say whether Picton's instructions did not forbid him to aid Craufurd;—that the roads were so bad, the distance so great, and the time so short, Picton could not have aided him;—that my account of the action differs from General Craufurd's;—that I was only a lieutenant of the forty-third, and consequently could know nothing of the matter;—that I have not praised Picton—that he was a Roman hero, and so forth. Finally it is denied that Picton ever quarrelled with Craufurd at all; and so far from having an altercation with him on the day of the action, he did not even quit his own quarters at Pinhel. Something also there is about General Cole's refusing to quit Guarda.

To all this I reply that I never did accuse General Picton of acting from personal animosity; neither the letter nor the spirit of my statement will bear out such a meaning, which is a pure hallucination of this author. That the light division was not supported, is notorious; that it ought to have been supported, I have endeavored to prove; why it was not supported, I have not attempted to divine. Yet it was neither the distance nor the badness of the

9th of October and the 5th of November! It was fought on the 27th of September.

Another writer in the same No., treating of Professor Drumman's work, speaks of "*following* an impulse which is from *behind*," a figure of speech which must appear singularly felicitous to those who have watched a puppy dog chasing his own tail; but your Quarterly reviewers are your only men for accuracy of fact and expression!

roads, nor the want of time, as Mr. Robinson gratuitously supposes; for the action, which took place in July, lasted from daybreak until late in the evening, the roads, and there were several, were good at that season, and the distance not more than eight miles.

It is quite true, as Mr. Robinson observes, that I cannot affirm of my own knowledge whether the Duke of Wellington forbade Picton to succor Craufurd; but I can certainly affirm that he ordered him to support him, because it is so set down in his grace's *Despatches*, volume 5th, pages 535 and 547; and it is not probable that this order should have been rescinded and one of a contrary tendency substituted, to meet an event, namely, the action on the Coa, which Craufurd had been forbidden to fight. Picton acted no doubt upon the dictates of his judgment, but all men are not bound to approve of that judgment; and as to the charge of faintly praising his military talents, a point was forced by me in his favor when I compared him to General Craufurd, of whose ability there was no question; more could not be done in conscience, even under Mr. Robinson's assurance that he was a Roman hero.

The exact object of Mr. Robinson's reasoning upon the subject of General Cole's refusal to quit Guarda it is difficult to discover; the passage to which it relates, is the simple enunciation of a fact, which is now repeated, namely, that General Cole being requested by General Craufurd to come down with his whole division to the Coa, refused; and Lord Wellington approved of that refusal, though he ordered Cole to support Craufurd under certain circumstances. Such, however, is Mr. Robinson's desire to monopolize all correctness, that he will not permit me to know anything about the action, though I was present, because, as he says, being only a lieutenant, I could not know anything about it. He is yet abundantly satisfied with the accuracy of his own knowledge, although he was not present, and was neither a captain nor lieutenant. I happened to be a captain of seven years' standing; and surely, though we should admit all subalterns to be blind like young puppies, and that rank in the one case as age in the other is absolutely necessary to open their eyes, it might still be asked, why I should not have been able, after having obtained a rank which gave me the right of seeing, to gather as good information from others as Mr. Robinson has done? Let us to the proof.

In support of his views, he has produced the rather vague testimony of an anonymous officer on General Picton's staff, which he deems conclusive as to the fact that Picton never quarrelled with Craufurd, that he did not even quit Pinhel on the day of the action and consequently could not have had any altercation with

him on the Coa. But the following letters from officers on Craufurd's staff, not anonymous, show that Picton did all these things. In fine, that Mr. Robinson has undertaken a task for which he is not qualified.

*Testimony of Lieutenant-colonel Shaw Kennedy, who was on General Craufurd's staff at the action of the Coa, July 24, 1810.*

“Manchester, 7th November, 1835.

“I have received your letter in which you mention *Robinson's Life of Picton*; that work I have not seen. It surprises me that any one should doubt that Picton and Craufurd met on the day the French army invested Almeida in 1810. I was wounded previously, and did not therefore witness their interview; but I consider it certain that Picton and Craufurd did meet on the 24th July, 1810, on the high ground on the left bank of the Coa during the progress of the action, and that a brisk altercation took place between them. They were primed and ready for such an altercation, as angry communications had passed between them previously regarding the disposal of some sick of the light division. I have heard Craufurd mention in joke his and Picton's testiness with each other, and I considered that he alluded both to the quarrel as to the sick, and to that which occurred when they met during the action at Almeida.

“J. S. KENNEDY.

“*Col. Napier, &c., &c., &c.*”

*Testimony of Colonel William Campbell, who was on General Craufurd's staff at the action on the Coa, July 24, 1810.*

“*Esplanade, Dover, 13th Nov. 1835.*

“Your letter from Freshford has not been many minutes in my hands; I hasten to reply. General Picton *did* come out of Pinhel on the day of the Coa combat, as you term it. It was in the afternoon of that day when all the regiments were in retreat, and General Craufurd was with his staff and others on the heights above, that, I think, on notice being given of General Picton's approach, General Craufurd turned and moved to meet him. Slight was the converse, short the interview, for upon Craufurd's asking inquiringly, whether General Picton did not consider it advisable to move out something from Pinhel in demonstration of support, or to cover the light division? in terms not bland, the general made it understood that ‘he should do no such thing.’ This as you may suppose put an end to the meeting, further than some violent rejoinder on the part of my much loved-friend, and fiery looks

returned! We went our several ways, General Picton, I think, proceeding onwards a hundred yards to take a peep at the bridge. This is my testimony.

“Yours truly,

“Colonel Napier, &c. &c. &c.”

“WILLIAM CAMPBELL.”

*Battle of Busaco.*—Mr. Robinson, upon the authority of one of General Picton's letters, has endeavored to show that my description of this battle is a mass of errors; it shall however be proved that his criticism is so, and that General Picton's letter is very bad authority.

In my work, it is said that the Allies resisted vigorously, yet the French gained the summit of the ridge, and while the leading battalions established themselves on the crowning rocks, others wheeled to their right, intending to sweep the summit of the Sierra, but were driven down again in a desperate charge made by the left of the third division.

Picton's letter says, that the head of the enemy's column got possession of a rocky point on the crest of the position, and that they were followed by the remainder of a large column which was driven down in a desperate charge made by the left of the third division.

So far we are agreed. But Picton gives the merit of the charge to the light companies of the seventy-fourth and eighty-eighth regiments, and a wing of the forty-fifth aided by the *eighth Portuguese regiment under Major Birmingham*, whereas, in my History, the whole merit is given to the eighty-eighth and forty-fifth regiments. Lord Wellington's despatch gives the merit to the forty-fifth and eighty-eighth, aided by the eighth Portuguese regiment, *under Colonel Douglas*. The *Reminiscences of a Subaltern*, written by an officer of the eighty-eighth regiment, and published in the *United Service Journal*, in like manner, gives the merit to the eighty-eighth and forty-fifth British regiments, and the *eighth Portuguese*.

It will presently be seen why I took no notice of the share the eighth Portuguese are said to have had in this brilliant achievement. Meanwhile the reader will observe that Picton's letter indicates the *centre* of his division as being forced by the French, and he affirms that he drove them down again with his *lft* wing without aid from the fifth division. But my statement makes both the *right* and *centre* of his division to be forced, and gives the fifth division, and especially Colonel Cameron and the ninth British regiment, a very large share in the glory of recovering the position; moreover, I say that the *eighth Portuguese was broken to*

*pieces.* Mr. Robinson argues that this must be wrong, for, says he, the eighth Portuguese *were not broken*, and if the right of the third division had been forced, the French would have encountered the fifth division. To this he adds, with a confidence singularly rash, his scanty knowledge of facts considered, that Colonel Cameron and the ninth regiment would doubtless have made as good a charge as I have described, "*only they were not there.*"

In reply, it is now affirmed, distinctly and positively, that the French did break the eighth Portuguese regiment, did gain the rocks on the summit of the position, and on the *right* of the third division; did ensconce themselves in those rocks, and were going to sweep the summit of the Sierra when the fifth division under General Leith attacked them; and the ninth regiment led by Colonel Cameron did form under fire, as described, did charge, and did beat the enemy out of those rocks; and if they had not done so, the third division, then engaged with other troops, would have been in a very critical situation. Not only is all this re-affirmed, but it shall be proved by the most irrefragable testimony. It will then follow that my History is accurate, that General Picton's letter is inaccurate, and the writer of his life incompetent to censure others.

Mr. Robinson may, notwithstanding, choose to abide by the authority of General Picton's letter, which he "fortunately found amongst that general's manuscripts," but which others less fortunate had found in *print* many years before; and he is the more likely to do so, because he has asserted that if General Picton's letters are false, they are wilfully so, an assertion which it is impossible to assent to. It would be hard indeed if a man's veracity was to be called in question because his letters written in the hurry of service gave inaccurate details of a battle. General Picton wrote what he believed to be the fact, but to give any historical weight to his letter on this occasion, in opposition to the testimony which shall now be adduced against its accuracy, would be weakness. And with the more reason it is rejected, because Mr. Robinson himself admits that another letter written by General Picton on this occasion to the Duke of Queensbury, was so inaccurate as to give general offence to the army; and because his letters on two other occasions are as incorrect as on this of Busaco. Thus, writing of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, Picton says, "about this time, namely, when the third division carried the main breach, the light division, which was rather late in their attack, also succeeded in getting possession of the breach they were ordered to attack." Now it has been proved to demonstration, that the light division carried the small breach, and were ac-

tually attacking the flank of the French troops defending the great breach, when the third division carried that point. This indeed is so certain, that Mr. Uniake of the ninety-fifth, and others of the light division, were destroyed on the ramparts close to the great beach by that very explosion which was said to have killed General M'Kinnon; and some have gone so far as to assert that it is doubtful if the great breach would have been carried at all but for the flank attack of the light division.

Again, General Picton, writing of the battle of Fuentes Onoro, says: "The light division under General Craufurd was rather *roughly handled by the enemy's cavalry*, and had that arm of the French army been as daring and active upon this occasion, as they were when following us to the lines of Torres Vedras, they would doubtless have cut off the light division to a man." Nevertheless, as an eye-witness, and being then a field-officer on the staff I was by Mr. Robinson's rule entitled to see, I declare most solemnly that the French cavalry, though they often menaced to charge, never came within sure shot distance of the light division. The latter, with the exception of the ninety-fifth rifles, who were skirmishing in the wood of Pozo Velho, was formed by regiments in three squares, flanking and protecting each other, they retired over the plain leisurely, without the loss of a man, without a sabre-wound being received, without giving or receiving fire; they moved in the most majestic manner, secure in their discipline and strength, which was such as would have defied all the cavalry that ever charged under Tamerlane or Genghis.

But it is time to give the proofs relative to Busaco, the reader being requested to compare them with the description of that battle in my History.

*Extracts from Major-General Sir John Cameron's letters to Colonel Napier.*

*"Government House, Devonport, Aug. 9th, 1834.*

"—I am sorry to perceive in the recent publication of Lord Bessford, his 'Refutation of your Justification of your third volume,' some remarks on the battle of Busaco, which disfigure, not intentionally I should hope, the operations of the British brigade in Major-General Leith's corps on that occasion, of which I, as commanding officer of one of the regiments composing it, may perhaps be permitted to know something. I shall, however, content myself at present with giving you a detail of the operations of the British brigade in Major-General Leith's *own words*, extracted from a document in my possession, every syllable of which can be verified

by many distinguished officers now living, some of them actors in, all of them eye-witnesses to the affair.

“ The ground where the British brigade was now moving, was behind a chain of rocky eminences, where it had appeared clearly the enemy was successfully pushing to establish himself, and precluded Major-General Leith from seeing at that moment the progress the enemy was making, but by the information of staff officers stationed on purpose, who communicated his direction and progress. Major-General Leith moved the British brigade so as to endeavor to meet and check the enemy when he had gained the ascendancy. At this time, a heavy fire of musketry was kept up on the height, the smoke of which prevented a clear view of the state of things. When, however, the rock forming the high part of the Sierra became visible, the enemy appeared in full possession of it, and a French officer was in the act of cheering with his hat off, while a continual fire was kept up from thence and along the whole face of the Sierra, in a diagonal direction towards the bottom, by the enemy ascending rapidly from the successive columns formed for the attack on a mass of soldiers from the eighth and ninth Portuguese regiments, who having been severely pressed, had given way, and were rapidly retiring in complete confusion and disorder. Major-General Leith, on that occasion, spoke to Major Birmingham (who was on foot, having had his horse killed), who stated that the fugitives were of the ninth Portuguese as well as the eighth regiment, and that he had ineffectually tried to check their retreat. Major-General Leith addressed and succeeded in stopping them, and they cheered when he ordered them to be collected and formed in the rear. They were passing as they retired diagonally to the right of the ninth British regiment. The face of affairs in this quarter now bore a different aspect, for the enemy, who had been the assailant, having dispersed or driven everything opposed to him, was in possession of the rocky eminence of the Sierra, at this part of Major-General Picton's position, without a shot then being fired at him. Not a moment was to be lost. Major-General Leith resolved instantly to attack the enemy with the bayonet. He therefore ordered the ninth British regiment, which had hitherto been moving rapidly by its left in column, in order to gain the most advantageous ground for checking the enemy, to form the line, which they did with the greatest promptitude, accuracy, and coolness, under the fire of the enemy, who had just appeared formed on that part of the rocky eminence which overlooks the back of the ridge, and who had then for the first time perceived the British brigade under him. Major-General Leith had intended that the thirty-eighth regiment should have moved on in rear of and to the

left of the ninth British regiment, to have turned the enemy beyond the rocky eminence which was quite inaccessible towards the rear of the Sierra, while the ninth should have gained the ridge on the right of the rocky height; the royal Scots to have been posted (as they were) in reserve. But the enemy having driven everything before him in that quarter, afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was possible for the British brigade to have reached that position, although not a moment had been lost in marching to support the point attacked, and for that purpose it had made a rapid movement of more than two miles without halting, and frequently in double-quick-time. The thirty-eighth regiment was therefore directed to form also and support when Major-General Leith led the ninth regiment to attack the enemy on the rocky ridge, which they did without firing a shot. That part which looks behind the Sierra (as already stated) was inaccessible, and afforded the enemy the advantage of outflanking the ninth on the left as they advanced, but the order, celerity, and coolness with which they attacked, panicked the enemy, who immediately gave way on being charged with the bayonet, and the whole was driven down the face of the Sierra in confusion, and with immense loss, from a destructive fire which the ninth regiment opened upon him as he fled with precipitation after the charge."

"I shall merely add two observations on what has been asserted in the *Refutation*.

"First, with regard to the confusion and retreat of a portion of the Portuguese corps, I certainly did not know at the moment what Portuguese corps the fugitives were of, but after the action, I understood they were belonging to the eighth Portuguese; a very considerable number of them were crossing the front of the British column dispersed in sixes and sevens over the field, just before I wheeled the ninth regiment into line for the attack. I pushed on a few yards to entreat them to keep out of our way, which they understood, and called out: '*Viva los Ingleses, valerosos Portugueses!*'

"As regards any support which the Portuguese afforded the British brigade in the pursuit, I beg to say that during the charge, while leading the regiment in front of the centre, my horse was killed under me, which for a moment retarded my own personal advance, and, on extricating myself from under him, I turned round and saw the thirty-eighth regiment close up with us, and the royal Scots appearing over the ridge in support, but did not see any Portuguese join in the pursuit; indeed, it would have been imprudent in them to attempt such a thing, for at the time a brisk cannonade was opened upon us from the opposite side of the ravine

"This, my dear colonel, is, on my honor, an account of the operations of the British brigade in Major-General Leith's corps, at Busaco. It will be satisfactory to you to know that the information you received has been correct. The anonymous officer of the ninth regiment I do not know. There were several very capable of furnishing you with good information on the transactions of that day, not only as regarded their own immediate corps, but those around them. Colonel Waller I should consider excellent authority; that gallant officer must have been an eye-witness to all that passed in the divisions of Picton and Leith. I remember on our approach to the scene of confusion, he delivered me a message from General Picton, intended for General Leith, at the time reconnoitring, to hasten our advance."

"Government House, Devonport, Aug. 21st, 1834.

"—The fact really is that both the eighth and ninth Portuguese regiments gave way that morning, and I am positive that I am not far wrong in saying, that there were not of Portuguese troops within my view, at the moment I wheeled the ninth regiment into line, one hundred men prepared either for attack or defence. Sir James Douglas partly admits that his wing was broken when he says that 'if we were at any time *b.oken*, it was from the too ardent wish of a corps of boy recruits to close.' Now it is perfectly clear that the wing of the regiment under Major Birmingham fled, from what that officer said to General Leith. Sir James Douglas states also that 'no candid man will deny that he supported the royals and ninth regiment,' though before that he says, that 'by an oblique movement, he joined in the charge.' I might safely declare on oath that the Portuguese never showed themselves beyond the ridge of the Sierra that morning.

"Very faithfully yours,

"JOHN CAMERON."

As these letters from General Cameron refer to some of Marshal Beresford's errors, as well as Mr. Robinson's, an extract from a letter of Colonel Thorne's upon the same subject will not be misplaced here.

*Colonel Thorne to Colonel Napier*

"Harborne Lodge, 28th Aug., 1834.

*Extract.*—"Viscount Beresford in the 'Refutation of your Justification of your third volume,' has doubted the accuracy of the strength of the third dragoon guards and fourth dragoons on