

and neither know their plans nor those of their government. No channel of information has been opened to me, and I have no knowledge of the force or situation of the enemy, but what as a stranger I picked up."—"I am in communication with no one Spanish army, nor am I acquainted with the intentions of the Spanish government or any of its generals. Castaños, with whom I was put in correspondence, is deprived of his command at the moment I might have expected to hear from him, and La Romana, with whom I suppose I am now to correspond, (for it has not been officially communicated to me,) is absent, God knows where."

9. *History*.—"Sir John's first intention was to move upon Valladolid, but at Alaejos an intercepted despatch of the Prince of Neufchatel was brought to head-quarters, and the contents were important enough to change the direction of the march. Valderas was given as the point of union with Baird."

Authority.—Extract from Sir John Moore's journal.

"I marched on the 13th from Salamanca; head-quarters, Alaejos; there I saw an intercepted letter from Berthier, Prince of Neufchatel, to Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, which determined me to unite the army without loss of time. I therefore moved on the 15th to Toro instead of Valladolid. At Valderas I was joined by Sir David Baird with two brigades."

10. *History*.—"No assistance could be expected from Romana."—"He did not destroy the bridge of Mansilla."—"Contrary to his promise, he pre-occupied Astorga, and when there proposed offensive plans of an absurd nature."

Authorities.—1. Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Dec. 12th, 1808.

"I have heard nothing from the Marquis de la Romana, in answer to the letters I wrote to him on the 6th and 8th instants. I am thus disappointed of his co-operation or of knowing what plan he proposes."

2. Colonel Symes to Sir David Baird, 14th Dec.

"In the morning, I waited on the marquis, and pressed him as far as I could with propriety, on the subject of joining Sir John Moore, to which he evaded giving any more than general assurances."

3. Extract from Sir John Moore's journal.

"At two, I received a letter from Romana, brought to me by his aide-de-camp, stating that he had twenty-two thousand (he only brought up six thousand), and would be happy to co-operate with me."—"At Castro Nuevo, Sir D. Baird sent me a letter he had addressed to him of rather a later date, stating that he was retiring into the Gallicias. I sent his aide-de-camp back to him with a letter requesting to know if such was his intention, but without ex-

pressing either approbation or disapprobation. *In tru'h, I placed no dependence on him or his army."*

4. Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Astorga, 31st December.

"I arrived here yesterday, when, *contrary to his promise* and to my expectations, I find the marquis de la Romana with a great part of his troops."—"He said to me in direct terms, that had he known how things were, he neither would have accepted the command nor have returned to Spain. With all this, however, he talks of attacks and movements which are *quite absurd*, and then returns to the helpless state of his army."—"He could not be *persuaded to des'roy the bridge at Mansillas*, he posted some troops at it, which were forced and taken prisoners by the French on their march from Mayorga."

The reviewer must now be content to swallow his disgust at finding Napoleon's genius admired, Soult's authority accepted, and Romana's military talents contemned in my History. These proofs of my accuracy are more than enough, and instead of adding to them an apology is necessary for having taken so much notice of two articles only remarkable for a malevolent imbecility and a systematic violation of truth. But if the reader wishes to have a good standard of value, let him throw away this silly fellow's carpings, and look at the Duke of Wellington's *Despatches*, 5th and 6th volumes. He will there find that my opinions are generally corroborated, never invalidated by the duke's letters, and that while no fact of consequence is left out by me, new light has been thrown upon many events, the true bearings of which were unknown at the time to the English general. Thus at page 337, vol. 4, of the *Despatches*, Lord Wellington speaks in doubt about some obscure negotiations of Marshal Victor, which I have shown in my History, book vii. chap. iii., to be a secret intrigue for the treacherous surrender of Badajos. In the proceedings of Joseph's council of war, related by me, and I am the first writer who was ever informed of them, are to be found the real causes of the various attacks made by the French at the battle of Talavera. I have shown also, and I am the first English writer who has shown it, that the French had in Spain one hundred thousand more men than the English general knew of; that Soult brought down to the valley of the Tagus after the fight of Talavera, a force which was stronger by more than twenty thousand men than Sir Arthur Wellesley estimated it to be; and without this knowledge the imminence of the danger which the English army escaped by crossing the bridge of Arzobispo cannot be understood.

Again, the means of correcting the error which Wellington fell

into in 1810 relative to Soult,* who he supposed to have been at the head of the second corps in Placentia when he was really at Seville, has been furnished by me; insomuch as I have shown that it was Mermet who was at the head of that corps, and that Wellington was deceived by the name of the younger Soult who commanded Mermet's cavalry.

Two facts only have been misstated in my History.

1. Treating of the conspiracy in Soult's camp at Oporto, I said that D'Argentou, to save his life, readily told all he knew of the British, but *with respect to his accomplices, was immovable.*

2. Treating of Cuesta's conduct in the Talavera campaign I have enumerated amongst his reasons for not fighting that it was Sunday.

Now the Duke of Wellington says D'Argentou did betray his accomplices, and yet my information was drawn from authority only second to the Duke's, viz., Major-General Sir James Douglas, who conducted the interviews with D'Argentou, and was the suggester and attendant of his journey to the British head-quarters. He was probably deceived by that conspirator, but the following extract from his narrative proves that the fact was not lightly stated in my History.

"D'Argentou was willing enough to save his life by revealing everything he knew about the English, and among other things assured Soult it would be nineteen days before any serious attack could be made upon Oporto; and there can be little doubt that Soult, giving credit to this information, lost his formidable barrier of the Douro by surprise. *As no threats on the part of the marshal could induce D'Argentou to reveal the names of his accomplices,* he was twice brought out to be shot and remanded in the expectation that between hope and intimidation he might be led to a full confession. On the morning of the attack he was hurried out of prison by the gens-d'armes, and, no other conveyance for him being at hand, he was placed upon a horse of his own, and that one the very best he had. The gens-d'armes in their hurry did not perceive what he very soon found out himself, that he was the best mounted man of the party, and watching his opportunity he sprang his horse over a wall into the fields, and made his escape to the English, who were following close."

For the second error so good a plea cannot be offered, and yet there was authority for that also. The story was circulated, and generally believed at the time, as being quite consonant with the temper of the Spanish general; and it has since been repeated in a narrative of the campaign of 1809, published by Lord Munster.

* See Wellington's Despatches, vol. v. p. 488, et passim.

Nevertheless it appears from Colonel Gurwood's compilation, 5th vol. page 343, that it is not true.

Having thus disposed of the *Quarterly Review* I request the reader's attention to the following corrections of errors as to facts, which have lately reached me, and are inserted here in preference to waiting for a new edition of the volumes to which they refer.

1. *The storming of Badajos.*

"General Viellande, and Phillipon who was wounded, seeing all ruined, passed the bridge with a few hundred soldiers, and entered San Christoval, where they all surrendered the next morning to Lord Fitzroy Somerset."—*History.*

Correction by Colonel Warre, assented to by Lord Fitzroy Somerset.

"Lieutenant-colonel Warre was the senior officer present at the surrender, having joined Lord Fitzroy Somerset (who was in search of the governor and the missing part of the garrison) just as he was collecting a few men wherewith to summon in his capacity of aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, the tête-du-pont of San Christoval."

2. *Assault of Tarifa.*—"The Spaniards and the forty-seventh British regiment guarded the breach."

Correction by Sir Hugh Gough.

"The only part of the forty-seventh engaged *during the assault* were two companies under Captain Livesley, stationed on the east bastion one hundred and fifty paces from the breach, and the Spaniards were nowhere to be seen, except behind a palisade in the street, a considerable way from the breach. *The eighty-seventh, and the eighty-seventh alone, defended the breach.* The two companies of the forty-seventh, I before mentioned, and the two companies of the rifles, which latter were stationed on my left, but all under my orders, did all that disciplined and brave troops could do in support, and the two six-pounders under Lieutenant-colonel Mitchel of the artillery, most effectively did their duty while their fire could tell, the immediate front of the breach from the great dip of the ground not being under their range."

This correction renders it proper that I should give my authority for saying the Spaniards were at the breach.

Extract from a letter of Sir Charles Smith, the engineer who defended Tarifa.

"The next great measure of opposition was to assign to the Spaniards the defence of the breach. This would have been insupportable: the able advocacy of Lord Proby proved that it would be a positive insult to the Spanish nation to deprive its

troops of the honor, and all my solemn remonstrances could produce, was to split the difference, and take upon myself to determine which half of the breach should be entrusted to our ally."

The discrepancy between Sir Charles Smith's and Sir Hugh Gough's statement is, however, easily reconciled, being more apparent than real. The Spaniards were *ordered* to defend half the breach, but in *fact* did not appear there.

To the above it is proper here to add a fact, made known to me since my account was published, very honorable to Major Henry King, of the eighty-second regiment. Being commandant of the town of Tarifa, a command distinct from the island, he was called to a council of war on the 29th of December, and when most of those present were for abandoning the place he gave in the following note :—

"I am decidedly of opinion that the defence of Tarifa will afford the British garrison an opportunity of gaining eternal honor, and it ought to be defended to the last extremity.

"I. H. S. KING,
"Commandant of Tarifa."

3. *Battle of Barosa*.—"The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment of Ciudad Real, and some guerilla cavalry turned indeed without orders, coming up just as the action ceased, and it was expected that Colonel Whittingham, an Englishman, commanding a powerful body of horse, would have done as much; but no stroke in aid of the British was struck by a Spanish sabre that day, although the French cavalry did not exceed two hundred and fifty men, and it is evident that the eight hundred under Whittingham might, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin's division, have rendered the defeat ruinous."—*History*.

Extract of a letter from Sir Samford Whittingham.

"I am free to confess that the statement of the historian of the Peninsular War, as regards my conduct on the day of the battle of Barosa, is just and correct; but I owe it to myself, to declare that my conduct was the result of obedience to the repeated orders of the general commanding in chief under whose command I acted. In the given strength of the Spanish cavalry under my command on that day, there is an error. The total number of the Spanish cavalry, at the commencement of the expedition, is correctly stated; but so many detachments had taken place by orders from head-quarters that I had only one squadron of Spanish cavalry under my command on that day."

REPLY

TO A

THIRD ARTICLE IN THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.

“Now there are two of them; and one has been called *Crawley*, and the other is *Honest Iago*.”—OLD PLAY.

THIS Article is the third of its family, and like its predecessors, is only remarkable for malignant imbecility and systematic violation of truth. The malice is apparent to all; it remains to show the imbecility and falseness.

The writer complains of my ill-breeding, and with that valor which belongs to the *incognito*, menaces me with his literary vengeance for my former comments. His vengeance! Bah! The ass' ears peep too far beyond the lion's hide. He shall now learn that I always adapt my manners to the level of the person I am addressing; and though his petty industry indicates a mind utterly incapable of taking an enlarged view of any subject, he shall feel that chastisement awaits his malevolence. And first with respect to the small sketches in my work which he pronounces to be the very worst *plans* possible. It is expressly stated on the face of each that they are only “Explanatory Sketches,” his observations, therefore, are a mere ebullition of contemptible spleen; but I will now show my readers why they are only sketches and not accurate plans.

When I first commenced my work, amongst the many persons from whom I sought information was Sir George Murray, and this in consequence of a message from him, delivered to me by Sir John Colborne, to the effect that if I would call upon him he would answer any question I put to him on the subject of the Peninsular War. The interview took place in the presence of Admiral Sir Graham Moore, but Sir George Murray, far from giving me information, seemed intent upon persuading me to abandon my design; repeating continually that it was his intention to write the History

of the war himself. He appeared also desirous of learning what sources of information I had access to. I took occasion to tell him that the Duke of Wellington had desired me to ask him particularly for the "Order of Movements," as essentially necessary to a right understanding of the campaign and the saving of trouble; because otherwise I should have to search out the different movements through a variety of documents. Sir George replied that he knew of no such orders, that he did not understand me. To this, I could only reply that I spoke as the duke had desired me, and knew no more.* I then asked his permission to have reduced plans made from Captain Mitchell's fine drawings, informing him that officer was desirous so to assist me. His reply was uncourteously vehement—"No! certainly not!" I proposed to be allowed to inspect those drawings if I were at any time at a loss about ground. The answer was still "No!" And as Sir George intimated to me that my work could only be a momentary affair for the booksellers and would not require plans, I took my leave. I subsequently discovered that he had immediately caused Captain Mitchell's drawings to be locked up and sealed.

I afterwards waited on Sir Willoughby Gordon, the quarter-master-general, who treated me with great kindness, and sent me to the chief of the plan department in his office, with an order to have access to everything which might be useful. From that officer I received every attention; but Sir George Murray had been there the day before, to borrow all the best plans relating to the Peninsular War, and, consequently, little help could be given to me. Now, Captain Mitchell's drawings were made by him after the war, by order of the government, and at the public expense. He remained in the Peninsula for more than two years with pay as a staff officer, his extra expenses were also paid;† he was attended constantly by two Spanish dragoons as a protection, and the whole mission was costly. Never was money better laid out, for I believe no topographical drawings, whether they be considered for accuracy of detail, perfection of manner, or beauty of execution, ever exceeded Mitchell's. But those drawings belong to the public, and were merely placed in Sir George Murray's official keeping. I believe they are still in his possession, and it would be well if

* I have since obtained from other sources many of those orders of movements, signed George Murray, and addressed to the generals commanding divisions. Had they been given to me according to the Duke of Wellington's desire when I first commenced my work, they would have saved me much time, much expense, and much labor; but I repeat that from Sir George Murray, and from him only, I have met with hostility. He has not been able to hurt me, but I take the will for the deed.

† About five thousand pounds.

some member of parliament were to ask why they are thus made the property of a private man?*

Here I cannot refrain from observing that, in the course of my labors, I have asked information of many persons of various nations, even of Spaniards, after my first volume was published, and when the unfavorable view I took of their exertions was known. And from Spaniards, Portuguese, English, French and Germans, whether of high or low rank, I have invariably met with the greatest kindness, and found an eager desire to aid me. Sir George Murray only has thrown obstacles in my way; and if I am rightly informed of the following circumstance, his opposition has not been confined to what I have stated above. Mr. Murray, the bookseller, purchased my first volume with the right of refusal for the second volume. When the latter was nearly ready, a friend informed me that he did not think Murray would purchase, because he had heard him say that Sir George Murray had declared it was not "The Book." He did not point out any particular error; but it was not "The Book;" meaning, doubtless, that his own production, when it appeared, would be "The Book." My friend's prognostic was good. I was offered just half of the sum given for the first volume. I declined it, and published on my own account; and certainly I have had no reason to regret that Mr. Murray waited for "The Book;" indeed, he has since told me very frankly that he had mistaken his own interest. Now, whether three articles in *The Quarterly*, and a promise of more,† be a tribute paid to the importance of "My Book," or whether they be the puff preliminary to "The Book," I know not; but I am equally bound to Mr. Editor Lockhart for the distinction, and only wish he had not hired such a stumbling sore-backed hackney for the work. Quitting this digression, I return to the *Review*.

My topographical ignorance is a favorite point with the writer, and he mentions three remarkable examples on the present occasion:—1. That I have said Oporto is built in a hollow; 2. That I have placed the Barca de Avintas only three miles from the Serra Convent, instead of nine miles; 3. That I have described a ridge of land near Medellin where no such ridge exists.

These assertions are all hazarded, in the hope that they will pass current with those who know no better, and will be unnoticed by those who do. But first a town may be *on* a hill and yet *in* a

* Since this was written, Mr. Leader did put the question in the house, when Sir George Murray's conduct was strongly animadverted upon by Lord Howick, and his lordship's observations were loudly cheered. Sir George is now publishing these maps, but they belong to the public.

† Another has appeared since, but I have not read it, being informed that it was precisely like its predecessors.

hollow. If the reader will look at Lieutenant Godwin's Atlas,* or at Gage's Plan of Oporto, or at Alvis' Plan of that city—all three published by Mr. Wyld of Charing Cross—he will find that Oporto, which, by the way, is situated very much like the hot wells at Bristol, is built partly on the slopes of certain heights, partly on the banks of the river; that it is surrounded on every side by superior heights; and that consequently my description of it, having relation to the Bishop's lines of defence and the attack of the French army, is militarily correct. Again, if the reader will take his compasses and any or all of the three maps above mentioned, he will find that the Barco de Avintas is, as I have said, just three miles from the Serra Convent, and not nine miles as the reviewer asserts. Lord Wellington's despatch called it four miles *from Oporto*, but there is a bend in the river which makes the distance greater on that side.

Such being the accuracy of this very correct topographical critic upon two or three examples, let us see how he stands with respect to the third.

Extracts from Marshal Victor's Official report and Register of the Battle of Medellín.

“Medellin is situated upon the left bank of the Guadiana. To arrive there, a handsome stone-bridge is passed. On the left of the town, is a very high hill (*mamelon très élevé*), which command all the plain; on the right, is a ridge or steppe (*rideau*), which forms the basin of the Guadiana. Two roads or openings (*débouchés*) present themselves on quitting Medellin; the one conducts to Mingrabil, the other to Don Benito. They traverse a vast plain, bounded by a ridge (*rideau*), which, from the right of the Ortigosa, is prolonged in the direction of Don Benito, and Villa Nueva de la Serena.” . . . “The ridge which confines the plain of Medellin has many rises and falls (*accidents de terrain*) more or less apparent. *It completely commands (domine parfaitement) the valley of the Guadiana*, and it was at the foot of this ridge the enemy's cavalry was posted. Not an infantry man was to be seen; but the presence of the cavalry made us believe that the enemy's army was *masked behind this ridge of Don Benito.*” . . . “Favored by *this ridge, he could manœuvre his troops and carry them upon any point of the line he pleased without being seen by us.*”

Now “*rideau*” can only be rendered, with respect to ground, a *steppe* or a *ridge*; but, in this case, it could not mean a *steppe*,

* This work has been since discontinued by Lieutenant Godwin, in consequence, as he told me, of foul play in a high quarter, where he least expected it, in truth, where I also had met with it.

since the Spanish army was hidden *behind it*, and on a steppe it would have been seen. Again, it must have been a *high ridge*, because it not only *perfectly commanded the basin* of the Guadiana, overlooking the *steppe* which formed that basin, but was itself not overlooked by the very high hill on the left of Medellin. What is my description of the ground?—"The plain on the side of Don Benito was bounded by a *high ridge of land*"—mark, reader, not a mountain ridge—"behind which Cuesta kept the Spanish infantry concealed, showing only his cavalry and guns in advance." Here then we have another measure of value for the reviewer's topographical pretensions.

The reference to French military reports and registers has not been, so far, much to the advantage of the reviewer; and yet he rests the main part of his criticisms upon such documents. Thus, having got hold of the divisional register of General Heudelet, which register was taken, very much mutilated, in the pursuit of Soult from Oporto, he is so elated with his acquisition that he hisses and cackles over it like a goose with a single gosling. But I have in my possession the general report and register of Soult's army, which enables me to show what a very little callow bird his treasure is. And first, as he accuses *me* of painting the wretched state of Soult's army at St. Jago, previous to the invasion of Portugal, for the sole purpose of giving a false coloring to the campaign, I will extract Soult's own account, and the account of *Le Noble*, historian of the campaign, and *ordonnateur en chef* or comptroller of the civil administration of the army.

Extract from Soult's Official Journal of the Expedition to Portugal, dated Lugo, 30th May, 1809.

"Under these circumstances the enterprise was one of the most difficult, considering the nature of the obstacles to be surmounted, the *shattered and exhausted state* ("delabrement et epuisement") of the '*corps d'armée*,' and the insufficiency of the means of which it could dispose. But the order was positive; it was necessary to obey." . . . "The march was directed upon St. Jago, where the troops took the first repose it had been possible to give them since they quitted the Carrion River in Castille." . . . "Marshal Soult rested six days at St. Jago, during which he distributed some shoes, had the artillery carriages repaired and the horses shod; the parc, which since the Carrion had not been seen, now came up, and with it some ammunition (which had been prepared at Coruña,) together with various detachments that the previous hardships and the exhaustion of the men had caused to remain behind. He would have prolonged his stay until the end of February because

he could not hide from himself that his troops had the most urgent need of it; but his operations were connected with the Duke of Belluno's, &c., &c., and he thought it his duty to go on without regard to time or difficulties."

Extract from Le Noble's History.

"The army was without money, without provision, without clothing, without equipages, and the men (personnel) belonging to the latter, not even ordinarily complete, when they should have been doubled to profit from the feeble resources of the country."

Who now is the false colorist? But what can be expected from a writer so shameless in his statements as this reviewer? Let the reader look to the effrontery with which he asserts that I have celebrated *Marshal Soult* for the reduction of two fortresses, Ferrol and Coruña, which were not even defended, whereas my whole passage is a censure upon the Spaniards for not defending them, and without one word of praise towards the French marshal.

To return to General Heudelet's register. The first notable discovery from this document is, that it makes no mention of an action described by me as happening on the 17th of February at Ribadavia; and therefore the reviewer says no such action happened, though I have been so particular as to mention the strength of the Spanish position, their probable numbers, and the curious fact that twenty priests were killed, with many other circumstances, all of which he contradicts. Now this is only the old story of "*the big book which contains all that Sir George does not know.*" For first, Heudelet's register, being only divisional, would not, as a matter of course, take notice of an action in which other troops were also engaged, and where the commander-in-chief was present. But that the action did take place, as I have described it, and on the 17th February, the following extracts will prove, and also the futility of the reviewer's other objections. And I request the reader, both now and always, to look at the passages quoted from my work, in the work itself, and not trust the garbled extracts of the reviewer, or he will have a very false notion of my meaning.

Extract from Soult's General Report.

"The French army found each day greater difficulty to subsist, and the Spanish insurrection feeling itself sustained by the approach of La Romana's corps, organized itself in the province of Orense.

"The insurrection of the province of Orense, directed by the monks and by officers, became each day more enterprising, and extended itself to the quarters of General La Housaye at

Salvaterra. *It was said the corps of Romana was at Orense (on disait le corps de Romana à Orense), and his advanced guard at Ribadavia.*

“The 16th of February the troops commenced their march upon Ribadavia.

“The left column, under General Heudelet, found the route intercepted by barricades on the bridges between Franquiera and Canizar; and defended besides by a party of insurgents eight hundred strong. The brigade Graindorge, arriving in the night, overthrew them *in the morning of the 17th*, and pursued them to the heights of Ribadavia, where they united themselves with a body *far more numerous*. General Heudelet having come up with the rest of his division, and being sustained by Maransin’s brigade of dragoons, overthrew the enemy and killed many. *Twenty monks at the least perished, and the town was entered fighting.*

“The 18th, General Heudelet scoured all the valley of the Avia, where *three or four thousand insurgents had thrown themselves*. Maransin followed the route of Rosamunde chasing all that was before him.”

The reviewer farther says that, with my habitual inaccuracy as to dates, I have concentrated all Soult’s division at Orense on the 20th. But Soult himself says, “The 19th, Franceschi and Heudelet marched upon Orense, and seized the bridge. *The 20th, the other divisions followed the movement upon Orense.*” Here then, besides increasing the bulk of the book, containing what Sir George *does not know*, the reviewer has only proved his own habitual want of truth.

In the above extracts nothing is said of the “*eight or ten thousand Spaniards* ;” nothing of the “*strong rugged hill*” on which they were posted; nothing of “*Soult’s presence in the action.*” But the reader will find all these particulars in the appendix to the *Victoires et Conquêtes des Français*, and in Le Noble’s *History of Soult’s Campaign*. The writers in each work were present, and the latter, notwithstanding the reviewer’s sneers, and what is of more consequence, notwithstanding many serious errors as to the projects and numbers of his enemies, is highly esteemed by his countrymen, and therefore good authority for those operations on his own side which he witnessed. Well, Le Noble says there were 15,000 or 20,000 insurgents and some regular troops in position, and he describes that position as very rugged and strong, which I can confirm, having marched over it only a few weeks before. Nevertheless, as this estimate was not borne out by Soult’s report,

I set the Spaniards down at 8000 or 10,000, grounding my estimate on the following data: 1st. Soult says that 800 men fell back on a body *far more numerous*. 2d. It required a considerable body of troops and several combinations to dislodge them from an extensive position. 3d. *Three or four thousand fugitives went off by one road only.*" Finally, the expression *eight or ten thousand* showed that I had doubts.

Let us proceed with Heudelet's register. In my History it is said that Soult softened the people's feelings by kindness and by enforcing strict discipline. To disprove this the reviewer quotes, from Heudelet's register, statements of certain excesses, committed principally by the light cavalry, and while in actual pursuit of the enemy—excesses, however, which he admits that Count Heudelet blamed and rigorously repressed, thus proving the truth of my statement instead of his own, for verily the slow-worm is strong within him. Yet I will not rely upon this curious stupidity of the reviewer. I will give absolute authority for the fact that Soult succeeded in soothing the people's feeling, begging the reader to observe that both Heudelet and my History speak of Soult's stay at Orense immediately after the action at Ribadavia.

Extract from Soult's General Report.

"At this period the *prisoners of Romana's corps* (note, the reviewer says none of Romana's corps were there) had all demanded to take the oath of fidelity, and to serve King Joseph. The Spanish general himself was far off (*fort éloigné*). The inhabitants of the province of Orense were returning to their houses, breaking their arms, and cursing the excitement and the revolt which Romana had fomented. The priests even encouraged their submission, and offered themselves as sureties. Those circumstances appeared favorable for the invasion of Portugal."

Animated by a disgraceful anxiety which has always distinguished the *Quarterly Review* to pander to the bad feelings of mankind by making the vituperation of an enemy the test of patriotism, this critic accuses me of an unnatural bias, and an inclination to do injustice to the Spaniards, because I have not made the report of some outrages, committed by Soult's cavalry, the ground of a false and infamous charge against the whole French army and French nation. Those outrages, which I did notice, and which he admits himself were vigorously repressed, were committed by troops in a country where all the inhabitants were in arms, where no soldier could straggle without meeting death by torture and mutilation, and, finally, where the army lived from day to day on what they could take in the country. I shall now put this sort of

logic to a severe test, and leave the reviewer's patriots to settle the matter as they can. That is, I shall give from Lord Wellington's despatches, through a series of years, extracts touching the conduct of British officers and soldiers in this same Peninsula, where they were dealt with, not as enemies, not mutilated, tortured, assassinated, but well provided and kindly treated.

Sir A. Wellesley to Mr. Villiers.

Extract, May 1, 1809.—"I have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither success nor failure, and I have had manifest proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of its branches in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. They have plundered the country most terribly."—"They have plundered the people of bullocks, amongst other property, for what reason I am sure I do not know, except it be, as I understand is their practice, to sell them to the people again."

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, May 31, 1809.

"The army behave terribly ill. They are a rabble who cannot bear success more than Sir John Moore's army could bear failure. I am endeavoring to tame them, but if I should not succeed I shall make an official complaint of them and send one or two corps home in disgrace; they plunder in all directions."

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, June 13, 1809.

"It is obvious that one of the private soldiers has been wounded; it is probable that all three have been put to death by the peasantry of Martede; I am sorry to say that from the conduct of the soldiers of the army in general, I apprehend that the peasants may have had some provocation for their animosity against the soldiers; but it must be obvious to you and the general, that these effects of their animosity must be discouraged and even punished, otherwise it may lead to consequences fatal to the peasantry of the country in general as well as to the army."

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Colonel Donkin, June, 1809.

"I trouble you now upon a subject which has given me the greatest pain, I mean the accounts which I receive from all quarters of the disorders committed by, and the general irregularity of the — and — regiments."

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, June, 1809.

"It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of the sight of their officers, I may almost say never out of the sight of the

commanding officers of the regiments and the general officers of the army, that outrages are not committed." . . . "Not a post or a courier comes in, not an officer arrives from the rear of the army, that does not bring me accounts of outrages committed by the soldiers who have been left behind on the march. *There is not an outrage of any description which has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers who never yet for one moment suffered the slightest want or the smallest privation.*" . . . "It is most difficult to convict any prisoner before a regimental court-martial, for I am sorry to say that soldiers have little regard to the oath administered to them; and the officers who are sworn, "well and truly to try and determine *according to evidence*, the matter before them," have too much regard to the strict letter of that administered to them." . . . "There ought to be in the British army a regular provost establishment." . . . "All the foreign armies have such an establishment. The French *gendarmerie nationale* to the amount of forty or fifty with each corps. The Spaniards have their police militia to a still larger amount. *While we who require such an aid more, I am sorry to say, than any other nation of Europe*, have nothing of the kind."

"We all know that the discipline and regularity of all armies must depend upon the diligence of regimental officers, particularly subalterns. I may order what I please, but if they do not execute what I order, or if they execute it with negligence, I cannot expect that British soldiers will be orderly or regular." . . . "I believe I should find it very difficult to convict any officer of doing this description of duty with negligence, more particularly as he is to be tried by others probably guilty of the same offence." . . . "We are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight, *but we are worse than an enemy in a country*, and take my word for it that either defeat or success would dissolve us."

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, July, 1809.

"We must have some general rule of proceeding in cases of criminal outrages of British officers and soldiers." . . . "As matters are now conducted, the government and myself stand complimenting each other while no notice is taken of the murderer."

Sir Arthur to Lord Wellesley, August, 1809.

"But a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose their discipline and spirit; they plunder even in the presence of their officers. The officers are discontented and are almost as bad as the men."

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, September, 1809.

“In respect to the complaints you have sent me of the conduct of detachments, they are only a repetition of others which I receive every day from all quarters of Spain and Portugal and I can only lament my inability to apply any remedy. In the first place, our law is not what it ought to be, and I cannot prevail upon government even to look at a remedy; secondly, our military courts having been established solely for the purpose of maintaining military discipline, and with the same wisdom which has marked all our proceedings of late years we have obliged the officers to swear to decide according to the evidence brought before them, and we have obliged the witnesses to give their evidence upon oath, the witnesses being in almost every instance common soldiers whose conduct this tribunal was constituted to control; *the consequence is, that perjury is almost as common an offence as drunkenness and plunder.*”

Lord Wellington to Mr. Villiers, September, 1809.

“I really believe that *more plunder and outrage have been committed by this army than by any other that ever was in the field.*”

Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, January, 1810.

“I am concerned to tell you, that notwithstanding the pains taken by the general and other officers of the army the conduct of the soldiers is infamous.” . . . “At this moment there are three general courts-martial sitting in Portugal for the trial of soldiers guilty of wanton murders, (no less than four people have been killed by them since we returned to Portugal,) robberies, thefts, robbing convoys under their charge, &c., &c. Perjury is as common as robbery and murder.”

Lord Wellington to the adjutant-general of the forces, 1810.

“It is proper I should inform the commander-in-chief that desertion is not the only crime of which the soldiers of the army have been guilty to an extraordinary degree. A detachment seldom marches, particularly if under the command of a non-commissioned officer (which rarely happens,) that a murder or a highway robbery, or some act of outrage, is not committed by the British soldiers composing it: they have killed eight people since the army returned to Portugal.”

Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, 1810.

“Several soldiers have lately been convicted before a general court-martial and have been executed.” . . . “I am still appreh-

hensive of the consequence of trying them in any nice operation before the enemy, for they really forget everything when plunder or wine is within reach."

Lord Wellington to Sir S. Cotton, 1810.

"I have read complaints from different quarters of the conduct of the hussars towards the inhabitants of the country." . . . "It has gone so far, that they (the people) have inquired whether they might kill the Germans in our service as well as in the service of the French."

Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, May, 1812.

"The outrages committed by the British soldiers have been so enormous, and they have produced an effect on the minds of the people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so injurious to the army itself, that I request your lordship's early attention to the subject."

Many more extracts I could give, but let us now see what was the conduct of the French towards men who did not murder and mutilate prisoners:—

Lord Wellington to Sir H. Wellesley, August, 1810.

"Since I have commanded the troops in this country I have always treated the French officers and soldiers who have been made prisoners with the utmost humanity and attention; and in numerous instances I have saved their lives. The only motive which I have had for this conduct has been, that they might treat our officers and soldiers well who might fall into their hands; and I must do the French the justice to say that they have been universally well treated, and in recent instances *the wounded prisoners of the British army have been taken care of before the wounded of the French army.*"

Lord Wellington to Admiral Berkeley, October, 1810.

"I confess, however, that as the French treat well the prisoners whom they take from us and the Portuguese treat their prisoners exceedingly ill, particularly in point of food, I should prefer an arrangement, by which prisoners who have once come into the hands of the provost marshal of the British army should avoid falling under the care of any officer of the Portuguese government."

Having thus displayed the conduct of the British army, as described by its own general through a series of years; and having

also from the same authority, shown the humane treatment English officers and soldiers, when they happened to be made prisoners, experienced from the French, I demand of any man with a particle of honor, truth or conscience in his composition,—of any man, in fine, who is not at once a knave and fool, whether these outrages perpetrated by British troops upon a friendly people can be suppressed, and the outrages of French soldiers against implacable enemies enlarged upon with justice? Whether it is right and decent to impute relentless ferocity, atrocious villany, to the whole French army, and stigmatize the whole French nation for the excesses of some bad soldiers, prating at the same time of the virtue of England and the excellent conduct of her troops; and this too in the face of Wellington's testimony to the kindness with which they treated our men, and in the face also of his express declaration (see letter to Lord Wellesley, 26th January, 1811.) that the majority of the French soldiers were "*sober, well disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree educated.*" But what intolerable injustice it would be to stigmatize either nation for military excesses which are common to all armies and to all wars; and when I know that the general characteristic of the British and French troops alike, is generosity, bravery, humanity, and honor.

And am I to be accused of an unnatural bias against the Spaniards because I do not laud them for running away in battle; because I do not express my admiration of their honor in assassinating men whom they dared not face in fight; because I do not commend their humanity for mutilating, torturing, and murdering their prisoners! I have indeed heard of a British officer, a chief of the staff, who, after the battle of Talavera, looked on with apparent satisfaction at a Spaniard beating a wounded Frenchman's brains out with a stone, and even sneered at the indignant emotion and instant interference of my informant. Such an adventure I have heard of, yet there are few such cold-blooded men in the British army. But what have I said to the disparagement of the Spaniards in my History without sustaining it by irrefragable testimony? Nothing, absolutely nothing! I have quoted the deliberate judgment of every person of note, French and English, who had to deal with them; nay, I have in some instances supported my opinion by the declaration even of Spanish generals. I have brought forward the testimony of Sir Hew Dalrymple, of Sir John Moore, of Sir John Cradock, of Mr. Stuart, of Mr. Frere, of General Graham, of Lord William Bentinck, of Sir Edward Pellew, of Lord Collingwood, of Sir Edward Codrington, and of Mr. Sydenham, and a crowd of officers of inferior rank. Lastly, I have produced the testimony of the Duke of Wellington;

and I will now add more proofs that his opinion of the Spanish character coincides with that expressed in my History.

Extracts from Lord Wellington's Correspondence, 1809.

"I come now to another topic, which is one of serious consideration. . . . "That is the frequent, I ought to say constant and shameful misbehavior of the Spanish troops before the enemy; we in England never hear of their defeats and flights, but I have heard of Spanish officers telling of nineteen and twenty actions of the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo. . . . "In the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army with very trifling exceptions was not engaged, whole corps threw away their arms and ran off *in my presence* when they were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack, but frightened I believe by their own fire." . . . "I have found, upon inquiry, and from experience, the instances of the misbehavior of the Spanish troops to be so numerous and those of their good behavior to be so few, that I must conclude that they are troops by no means to be depended upon."

"The Spanish cavalry are I believe nearly entirely without discipline; they are in general well clothed, armed and accoutred, and remarkably well mounted, and their horses are in good condition; but I never heard anybody pretend that in one instance they have behaved as soldiers ought to do in the presence of an enemy." . . . "In respect to that great body of all armies—I mean the infantry—it is lamentable to see how bad that of the Spaniards is." . . . "It is said that sometimes they behave well; though I acknowledge I have never seen them behave otherwise than ill." . . . "Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army; and it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has by the measures it has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military profession by any individual." . . . "I cannot say that they do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away and assembling again in a state of nature."

"The Spaniards have neither numbers, efficiency, discipline, bravery or arrangement to carry on the contest."

Extracts, 1810.

"The misfortune throughout the war has been that the Spaniards are of a disposition too sanguine; they have invariably expected only success in objects for the attainment of which they had adopted no measures; they have never looked to or prepared for a lengthened contest; and all those, or nearly all who have had any

thing to do with them, have imbibed the same spirit and the same sentiments."

"Those who see the difficulties attending all communications with Spaniards and Portuguese, and are aware how little dependence can be placed upon them, and that they depend entirely upon us for everything, will be astonished that with so small a force as I have I should have been able to maintain myself so long in this country.

"The character of the Spaniards has been the same throughout the war; they have never been equal to the adoption of any solid plan, or to the execution of any system of steady resistance to the enemy by which their situation might be gradually improved. The leading people amongst them have invariably deceived the lower orders; and instead of making them acquainted with their real situation, and calling upon them to make the exertions and sacrifices which were necessary even for their defence, they have amused them with idle stories of imaginary successes, with visionary plans of offensive operations which those who offer them for consideration know that they have not the means of executing, and with hopes of driving the French out of the Peninsula by some unlooked-for good. The consequence is, that no event is provided for in time, every misfortune is doubly felt, and the people will at last become fatigued with the succession of their disasters which common prudence and foresight in their leaders would have prevented."

Wellington to Sir H. Wellesley, 1810.

"In order to show you how the Spanish armies are going on, I enclose you a report which Sir William Beresford has received from General Madden, the officer commanding the brigade of Portuguese cavalry in Estremadura. I am convinced that there is not one word in this letter that is not true. *Yet these are the soldiers who are to beat the French out of the Peninsula!!!!*

"There is no remedy for these evils, excepting a vigorous system of government, by which a revenue of some kind or other can be raised to pay and find resources for an army in which discipline can be established. *It is nonsense to talk of rooting out the French or of carrying on the war in any other manner.* Indeed, if the destruction occasioned by the guerillas and by the Spanish armies, and the expense incurred by maintaining the French armies, are calculated, it will be obvious that it will be much cheaper for the country to maintain 80,000 or 100,000 regular troops in the field.

"But the Spanish nation will not sit down soberly and work to produce an effect at a future period. *Their courage, and even their*

activity is of a passive nature, it must be forced upon them by the necessity of their circumstances and is never a matter of choice or of foresight."

Wellington to Lord Wellesley, 1810.

"There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army, either amongst officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted (as, indeed, it would be in vain to attempt) to establish either. It has in my opinion been the cause of the *dastardly conduct* which we have so frequently witnessed in Spanish troops, and *they have become odious to the country. The peaceable inhabitants, much as they detest and suffer from the French, almost wish for the establishment of Joseph's government to be protected from the outrages of their own troops.*"

Wellington to Sir H. Wellesley, Dec. 1810.

"I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It is scandalous that in the third year of the war, and having been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained no loss of importance since the battle of Ocana, they should now be depending for the safety of Cadiz—the seat of their government—upon having one or two, more or less, British regiments; and that after having been shut in for ten months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of General Graham and the British officers on the danger of omitting them.

"The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as great a degree as the other authorities—that is, *boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and indulging their national indolence.*"

Wellington to General Graham, 1811.

"The conduct of the Spaniards, throughout this expedition (Barrosa), *is precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be.* They march the troops night and day without provisions or rest, and abuse everybody who proposes a moment's delay to afford either to the famished and fatigued soldiers. They reach the enemy in such a state as to be unable to make any exertion or to execute any plan, even if any plan had been formed; and thus, when the moment of action arrives, they are totally incapable of movement, and they stand by to see their allies destroyed, and afterwards abuse them because they do not continue, unsupported, exertions to which human nature is not equal."*

* That very successful Spanish general and very temperate English politician, Sir De Lacy Evans, pronounces all such animadversions upon the Spanish armies to be "*a most deplorable defect in a historian, and the result of violent partialities.*" I dare to say the Spaniards will agree with him.

So much for Wellington's opinion of the Spanish soldiers and statesmen; let us now hear him as to the Spanish generals:—

1809.—“Although the Duque de Albuquerque is *proné* by many, amongst others by Whittingham and Frere, you will find him out. I think the Marquis de la Romana the best I have seen of the Spaniards. I doubt his talents at the head of an army, but he is certainly a sensible man, and has seen much of the world.”

Now, reader, the following is the character given to Romana in my History: compare it with the above:—

“Romana was a man of talent, quickness, and information, but disqualified by nature for military command.” And again, speaking of his death, I say: “He was a worthy man, and of quick parts, although deficient in military talent. His death was a great loss.” If the expressions are more positive than Wellington's, it is because this was the duke's first notion of the marquis; he was more positive afterwards, and previous circumstances unknown to him, and after circumstances known to him, gave me a right to be more decided. The following additional proofs, joined to those already given in my former reply, must suffice for the present. Sir John Moore, in one of his letters, says: “I am sorry to find that Romana is a shuffler.” And Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, writing about the same period to General Doyle to urge the advance of Palafox and Infantado, says: “I know that Romana has not supported the British as he ought to have done, and has left our army to act alone when he might have supported it with a tolerably efficient force.”

In 1812, during the siege of Burgos, Mr. Sydenham, expressing Lord Wellington's opinions, after saying that Wellington declared he had never met with a really able man in Spain, while in Portugal he had found several, proceeds thus:—

“It is indeed clear to any person who is acquainted with the present state of Spain, that *the Spaniards are incapable of forming either a good government or a good army.*” . . . “With respect to the army there are certainly in Spain abundant materials for good common soldiers. But where is one general of even moderate skill and talents? I know nothing of Lacy and Sarsfield, but assuredly a good general is not to be found amongst Castaños, Ballesteros, Palacios, Mendizabel, Santocildes, Abadia, Duque del Parque, La Peña, Elio, Mahy, or Joseph O'Donnel.” . . . “*You cannot make good officers in Spain.*”

If to this the reader will add what I have set forth in my History about Vives, Imas, Contreras, Campo Verde, Cuesta, and Areyasaga, and that he is not yet satisfied, I can still administer to his craving. In 1809 Wellington speaks with dread of “*Ro-*

man's cormorants flying into Portugal," and says, "that foolish fellow the Duque del Parque has been endeavoring to get his corps destroyed on the frontier." Again:—

"The Duque del Parque has advanced, because, whatever may be the consequences, the Spaniards always think it necessary to advance when their front is clear of an enemy."

"There never was anything like the *madness*, the *imprudence*, and the *presumption* of the *Spanish officers* in the way they risk their corps, knowing that the *national vanity* will prevent them from withdrawing them from a situation of danger, and that if attacked they must be totally destroyed. A retreat is the only chance of safety for the Duque del Parque's corps; but instead of making it he calls upon you for cavalry." . . . "I have ordered magazines to be prepared on the Douro and Mondego to assist in providing *these vagabonds* if they should retire into Portugal, which I hope they will do as their only chance of salvation."

Again in 1811, defending himself from an accusation made by the Spaniards, that he had caused the loss of Valencia, he says, "the misfortunes of Valencia are to be attributed to *Blake's ignorance of his profession* and to *Mahy's cowardice and treachery.*"

Now if any passage in my History can be pointed out more disparaging to the Spaniards than the expressions of Lord Wellington and the other persons quoted above, I am content to be charged with an "unnatural bias" against that people. But if this cannot be done, it is clear that the reviewer has proved, not my unnatural bias to the French, but his own natural bias to calumny. He has indeed a wonderful aversion to truth, for close under his eye, in my volume which he was then reviewing, the following passage occurs, and there are many of a like tendency in my work relative to the Spaniards, all of which he leaves unnoticed.

"Under such a system, it was impossible that the peasantry could be rendered energetic soldiers, and they certainly were not active supporters of their country's cause; but *with a wonderful constancy they suffered for it, enduring fatigue and sickness, nakedness and famine with patience, and displaying in all their actions and in all their sentiments a distinct and powerful national character. This constancy and the iniquity of the usurpation, hallowed their efforts in despite of their jericosity, and merits respect, though the vices and folly of the juntas and the leading men rendered the effect nugatory.*"—*History.*

I would stop here, but the interests of truth and justice, and the interests of society require that I should thoroughly expose this reviewer. Let the reader therefore mark his reasoning upon

Soult's government of Oporto and the intrigue of the *Anti-Braganza* party. Let him however look first at the whole statement of these matters in *my book*, and not trust the garbled extracts made by the reviewer. Let him observe how Heudelet's expedition to Tuy is by this shameless writer, at one time made to appear as if it took place *after* Soult had received the deputations and addresses calling for a change of dynasty; and this to show that no beneficial effect had been produced in the temper of the people, as I had asserted, and of which I shall presently give ample proof. How at another time this same expedition of Heudelet is used as happening *before* the arrival of the addresses and deputations, with a view to show that Soult had labored to procure those addresses, a fact which, far from denying, I had carefully noticed. Let him mark how an expression in my History, namely, that Soult was *unprepared* for one effect of his own vigorous conduct, has been perverted, for the purpose of deceit; and all this with a spirit at once so malignant and stupid, that the reviewer is unable to see that the garbled extracts he gives from Heudelet's and Riccard's registers, not only do not contradict but absolutely confirm the essential point of my statement.

Certainly Soult was not unprepared for the submission of the Portuguese to the French arms, because it was the object and bent of his invasion to make them so submit. But there is a great difference between that submission of which Heudelet and Riccard speak, and the proposal coming from the Portuguese for the establishment of a *new and independent dynasty*; a still greater difference between that and *offering the crown to Soult himself*; and it was this last which the word "unprepared" referred to in my History. So far from thinking or saying that Soult was unprepared for the deputations and addresses, I have expressly said, that he "encouraged the design," that he "acted with great dexterity," and I called the whole affair an "intrigue." But if I had said that he was unprepared for the whole affair, it would have been correct in one sense. He was unprepared to accede to the extent of the *Anti-Braganza* party's views. He had only received authority from his sovereign to conquer Portugal, not to establish a new and independent dynasty, placing a French prince upon the throne; still less to accept that throne for himself. These were dangerous matters to meddle with, under such a monarch as Napoleon; but the weakness of Soult's military position made it absolutely necessary to catch at every aid, and it would have been a proof that the Duke of Dalmatia was only a common man, and unsuited for the great affairs confided to his charge if he had rejected such a powerful auxiliary to his military operations; wisely, therefore, and even

magnanimously did he encourage the *Anti-Braganza* party, drawing all the military benefit possible from it, and trusting to Napoleon's sagacity and grandeur of soul for his justification. Nor was he mistaken in either. Yet I am ready to admit that all this must appear very strange to Quarterly reviewers and parasites, whose knowledge of the human mind is confined to an accurate measure of the sentiments of patrons, rich and powerful, but equally with themselves incapable of true greatness and therefore always ready to ridicule it.

The facts stand thus. Heudelet's expedition through the *Entre Minho e Douro* took place between the 5th of April and the 27th of that month, and the country people being then in a state of exasperation, opposed him vehemently; in my History, the combats he sustained are mentioned, and it is said that previous to the *Anti-Braganza* intrigue the horrible warfare of assassinations had been carried on with infinite activity. But the intrigue of the malcontents was not completed until the end of April, and the good effect of it on the military operations was not apparent until May, consequently could not have been felt by Heudelet in the beginning of April. In my History, the difference of time in these two affairs is expressly marked, inasmuch as I say that in treating of the intrigue I have anticipated the chronological order of events. Truly if Mr. Lockhart has paid for this part of the review as criticism, Mr. Murray should disallow the unfair charge in his accounts.

I shall now give two extracts from Soult's general report, before quoted, in confirmation of my statements:—

“ Marshal Soult was led by necessity to favor the party of the malcontents, which he found already formed in Portugal when he arrived. He encouraged them, and soon that party thought itself strong enough in the province of *Entre Minho e Douro*, to propose to the marshal to approve of the people declaring for the deposition of the house of Braganza, and that the Emperor of the French should be asked to name a prince of his family to reign in Portugal. In a political view, Marshal Soult could not, without express authority, permit such a proceeding, and he could not ask for such authority, having lost his own communication with France, and being without news of the operations of any of the other corps which were to aid him; but considered in a military point of view, the proposition took another character. Marshal Soult there saw the means of escaping from his embarrassments, and he seized them eagerly, certain that whatever irregularity there was in his proceedings ultimate justice would be done to him.”

“ These dispositions produced a remarkable change, tranquillity was re-established, and in the province of *Entre Minho e Douro*

the inhabitants returned to their labors, supplied the markets, and familiarized themselves with the idea of an approaching change."—"Marshal Soult received numerous deputations of the clergy to thank him for his attentions, and for the order which he had restored. Before this, no Frenchman could straggle without being mutilated and killed. The Portuguese, believing that it was glorious and grateful to God to do all the mischief possible to the army, had perpetrated the most dreadful horrors on the wretched soldiers who fell into their hands."

It would be too tedious and unprofitable to the reader to continue thus following the reviewer step by step. Wherefore, neglecting his farrago about the principles of war, and his application of them to show the error of my statement, viz., "that in a strategic point of view, it was better to attack Victor, but especial reasons led Sir Arthur to fall upon Soult," I proceed to lay Sir Arthur's own statement before the reader, and leave him to compare it with mine.

Lisbon, April 24, 1809.

"I intend to move towards Soult and attack him, if I should be able to make any arrangement in the neighborhood of Abrantes, which can give me any security for the safety of this place during my absence to the northward.

"I am not quite certain, however, that I should not do more good to the general cause by combining with General Cuesta in an operation against Victor; and I believe I should prefer the last if Soult was not in possession of a part of this country very fertile in resources, and of the town of Oporto, and if to concert the operations with Cuesta would not take time which might be profitably employed in operations against Soult. I think it probable, however, that Soult will not remain in Portugal when I shall pass the Mondego. If he does I shall attack him. If he should retire, I am convinced that it would be most advantageous for the common cause that we should remain upon the defensive in the north of Portugal, and act vigorously in co-operation with Cuesta against Victor."

"An operation against Victor is attended by these advantages— if successful it effectually relieves Seville and Lisbon, and in case affairs should take such a turn as to enable the King's ministers to make another great effort for the relief of Spain, the corps under my command in Portugal will not be removed to such a distance from the scene of operation as to render its co-operation impossible; and we may hope to see the effect of a great effort made by a combined and concentrated force."

The assertion of the reviewer that I have overrated Cuesta's

force, inasmuch as it was only 19,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, instead of 30,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, as I have stated it to be, and that consequently the greatest numbers could not be brought to bear on Victor, is one of those curious examples of elaborate misrepresentation in which this writer abounds. For first, admitting that Cuesta had only 20,000 men, Sir Arthur would have brought 24,000 to aid him, and Victor had only 30,000. The allies would then have had double the number opposed to Soult. But the pith of the misrepresentation lies in this, that the reviewer has taken Cuesta's account of his actual force on the 23d of April, and suppresses the facts, that reinforcements were continually pouring in to him at that time, and that he actually did advance against Victor with rather greater numbers than those stated by me.

PROOFS.

Sir Arthur to Lord Castlereagh, April 24, 1809.

"Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which it is said will soon be 25,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry."

To General Mackenzie, May 1, 1809.

"They (Victor's troops) have in their front a Spanish army with General Cuesta at Llerena, which army was defeated in the month of March, and has since been reinforced to the amount of *twenty thousand men.*" . . . "They will be attacked by Cuesta, who is *receiving reinforcements.*"

Mr. Frere to Sir Arthur Wellesley, Seville, May 4.

"We have here 3000 cavalry, considered as part of the army of Estremadura (under Cuesta). Cuesta has with him 4000 cavalry."

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, June 17, 1809.

"We had every reason to believe that the French army consisted of about 27,000, of which 7000 were cavalry; and the combined British and Portuguese force which I was in hopes I should have been enabled to march upon this expedition would have amounted to about 24,000 men."

To Lord Wellesley, August 8, 1809.

"The army of Cuesta, which crossed the Tagus *thirty-six or thirty-eight thousand strong,* does not now consist of 30,000."

Extract from a Memoir by Sir A. Wellesley, 1809.

"The Spanish army under General Cuesta had been *reinforced*

with cavalry and infantry, and had been refitted with extraordinary celerity after the action of Medelin."

All the reviewer's remarks about Cuesta's numbers, and about the unfordable nature of the Tagus, are a reproduction of misrepresentations and objections before exposed and refuted by me in my controversy with Marshal Beresford; but as it is now attempted to support them by garbled extracts from better authorities, I will again and completely expose and crush them. This will however be more conveniently done farther on. Meanwhile, I repeat, that the Tagus is only unfordable during the winter, and not then if there are a few days dry weather; that six months of the year it is always fordable in many places, and as low down as Salvaterra near Lisbon; finally, that my expression, "*a river fordable at almost every season,*" is strictly correct, and is indeed not mine but Lord Wellington's expression. To proceed with the rest:—

Without offering any proof beyond his own assertion, the reviewer charges me with having *exagg. rated the importance of D'Argentou's conspiracy for the sole purpose of excusing Soult's remissness in guarding the Douro.* But my account of that conspiracy was compiled from the Duke of Wellington's letters—some public, some private addressed to me; and from a narrative of the conspiracy written expressly for my guidance by Major-General Sir James Douglas, who was the officer employed to meet and conduct D'Argentou to and from the English army;—from Soult's own official report; from Le Noble's history; and from secret information which I received from a French officer who was himself one of the principal movers—not of that particular conspiracy—but of a general one of which the one at Oporto was but a branch.

Again, the reviewer denies that I am correct in saying, that Soult thought Hill's division had been disembarked from the ocean; that he expected the vessels would come to the mouth of the Douro; and that considering that river secure above the town his personal attention was directed to the line below Oporto. Let Soult and Le Noble answer this.

Extract from Soult's General Report.

"In the night of 9th and 10th the enemy made a *considerable disembarkation at Aveiro, and another at Ovar.* The 10th, at day-break, they attacked the right flank of General Franceschi, while the *column coming from Lisbon by Coimbra* attacked him in front."

Extract from Le Noble.

"The house occupied by the general-in-chief was situated beyond the town on the road to the sea. The site was very high,

and from thence he could observe the left bank of the Douro from the convent to the sea. His orders, given on the 8th, to scour the left bank of the river, those which he had expedited in the morning, and the position of his troops, rendered him confident that no passage would take place above Oporto; *he believed that the enemy, master of the sea, would try a disembarkation near the mouth of the Douro.*"

Such is the value of this carping disingenuous critic's observations on this point; and I shall now demolish his other misstatements about the passage of the Douro.

1st. The poor barber's share in the transaction is quite true; my authority is Major-General Sir John Waters who was the companion of the barber in the daring exploit of bringing over the boats. And if Waters had recollected his name, it is not the despicable aristocratic sneer of the reviewer about the "*Plebeian*" that would have prevented me from giving it. 2d. *The Barca de Avintas*, where Sir John Murray crossed, has already been shown by a reference to the maps and to Lord Wellington's despatch, to be not nine miles from the Serra Convent as the reviewer says, but three miles as I have stated; moreover, two Portuguese leagues would not make nine English miles. But to quit these minor points, the reviewer asks, "*Why Colonel Napier departed from the account of the events given in the despatch of Sir Arthur Wellesley?*" This is the only decent passage in the whole review, and it shall have a satisfactory answer.

Public despatches, written in the hurry of the moment, immediately after the events and before accurate information can be obtained, are very subject to errors of detail, and are certainly not what a judicious historian would rely upon for details without endeavoring to obtain other information. In this case I discovered several discrepancies between the despatch and the accounts of eyewitnesses and actors written long afterwards and deliberately. I knew also, that the passage of the Douro, though apparently a very rash action and little considered in England, was a very remarkable exploit, prudent, skilful and daring. Anxious to know the true secret of the success, I wrote to the Duke of Wellington, putting a variety of questions relative to the whole expedition. In return I received from him distinct answers, with a small diagram of the seminary and ground about it to render the explanation clear. Being thus put in possession of all the leading points relative to the passage of the Douro by the commanders on each side, for I had before got Soult's, I turned to the written and printed statements of several officers engaged in the action for those details which the generals had not touched upon.

Now the principal objections of the reviewer to my statement are,—1st. That I have given too many troops to Sir John Murray. 2d. That I have unjustly accused him of want of military hardihood. 3d. That I have erroneously described the cause of the loss sustained by the fourteenth dragoons in retiring from their charge. In reply I quote my authorities; and first, as to the numbers with Murray.

Extract from Lord Wellington's answers to Colonel Napier's questions.

“*The right of the troops which passed over to the seminary, which in fact made an admirable tete du pont, was protected by the passage of the Douro higher up by Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray and the King's German legion, supported by other troops.*”

Armed with this authority, I did set aside the despatch, because, though it said that Murray was sent with a battalion and a squadron, it *did not say* that he was not followed by others. And in Lord Londonderry's narrative I found the following passage:—

“*General Murray, too, who had been detached with his division to a ferry higher up, was fortunate enough to gain possession of as many boats as enabled him to pass over with two battalions of Germans, and two squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons.*”

And his lordship, further on, says that he himself charged several times and with advantage at the head of those squadrons. His expression is “*the dragoons from Murray's corps.*”

With respect to the loss of the dragoons sustained by having to fight their way back again, I find the following account in the narrative of Sir James Douglas, written, as I have before said, expressly for my guidance:—

“*Young soldiers like young greyhounds, run headlong on their prey; while experience makes old dogs of all sorts run cunning. Here two squadrons actually rode over the whole rear French guard, which laid down upon the road; and was, to use their own terms, passé sur le ventre: but no support to the dragoons being at hand no great execution was done; and the two squadrons themselves suffered severely in getting back again through the infantry.*”

Thus, even in this small matter, the reviewer is not right. And now with the above facts fixed I shall proceed to rebut the charge of having calumniated Sir John Murray.

First, the reviewer's assertion, that Murray's troops were never within several miles of the seminary, and that they would have