

tain terms in a less precise sense than I take them. Thus he says he was posted in front of the convent wall, and also on the right of the light division; but the light division was half a mile in front of the convent wall, and hence he probably does not mean, as his words seem to imply, immediately under the wall. He speaks also of the light division being to his left, but unless he means the line of battle with reference to the sinuosities of the ground, the light division was, with respect to the enemy and the convent, in his front; and if he does speak with regard to those sinuosities, his front would have been nearly at right angles to the front of the fifty-second and forty-third, which most likely was the case. Again he says he charged and drove the French from their position down to the bottom of the ravine; but the enemy's position, properly so called, was on the opposite side of the great ravine; and as all his artillery and cavalry, all the eighth corps and the reserves of the sixth corps, were in order of battle there, not ten regiments, much less one, dared have crossed the ravine, which was of such depth it was difficult to distinguish troops at the bottom; General M'Bean probably means by the word position some accidental ground on which the enemy had formed. Taking this to be so, let me endeavor to reconcile General M'Bean's statement with my own recollection, because certainly I do still hold my description of the action at that part to be accurate as to all the main points.

The edge of the table-land or tongue on which the light division stood was very abrupt, and formed a salient angle, behind the apex of which the forty-third and fifty-second were drawn up in a line, the right of the one and the left of the other resting on the very edges; the artillery was at the apex looking down the descent, and far below, the *caçadores* and the ninety-fifth were spread on the mountain side as skirmishers. Ney employed only two columns of attack. The one came straight against the light division, the head of it, striking the right company of the fifty-second and the left company of the forty-third, was broken as against a wall; at the same time, the wings of those regiments, reinforced by the skirmishers of the ninety-fifth, who had retired on the right of the forty-third, advanced and lapped over the broken column on both sides. No other troops fought with them at that point. In this there can be no mistake, because my company was in the right wing of the forty-third, and followed the enemy down to the first village, which was several hundred yards below the edge; it returned leisurely, the ground was open to the view on the right and on the left, we saw no other column, and heard of none save that which we were pursuing. When we returned from this pursuit, the light division had been re-formed on the little plain above, and

some time after several German battalions, coming from under the convent wall, passed through our ranks and commenced skirmishing with Ney's reserve in the woods below.

General M'Bean says he saw no German infantry, and hence it is clear it was not at this point his charge had place; but it is also certain Ney had only two columns of attack. Now his second, under General Marchand, moved up the hollow curve of the great mountain to the right of the light division, and having reached a pine-wood, far below the height on which the light division stood, he sent skirmishers out against Pack's brigade, which was in his front. A part of Ross's troop of artillery, under the direction of Lieutenant, now Colonel M'Donald, played very sharply upon this column in the pine-wood; I was standing in company with Captain Loyd of the forty-third, close to the guns, watching their effect, and it was then the advance of the Portuguese regiment, to which allusion has been made, was effected; but General M'Bean again assures me the nineteenth regiment was not there, and therefore two suppositions present themselves. The enemy's skirmishers from this column were very numerous; some of them might have passed the left flank of Pack's skirmishers, might have gathered in a body, have reached the edge of the hill on which the light division were posted, and then rising behind it have been attacked by General M'Bean. Or what is more likely, the skirmishers, or a small flanking detachment from the column which attacked the light division, might have passed under the edge of the descent on the right of the light division, and gathering in a like manner have risen under General M'Bean's line. Either of these suppositions, and especially the last, would render the matter clear to me on all points, save that of attacking the enemy's position, which as I have before observed, may be only a loose expression of the general's to denote the ground which the French opposed to him had attained on our position. This second supposition seems also to be confirmed by a fact mentioned by General M'Bean, namely, that the enemy's guns opened on him immediately after his charge. The French guns did open also on that part of the light division which followed the enemy down the hill to the first village; thus the time the nineteenth charged seems marked, and as I was one of those who went to the village, it also accounts for my not seeing that charge. However, considering all things, I must admit error, inasmuch as I really did not, nor do now possess any clear recollection of this exploit of the nineteenth regiment; and in proof of the difficulty of attaining strict accuracy on such occasions, the observation of General M'Bean may be here adduced, viz., that he saw no Germans, save the artillery; yet there was a whole brigade of

that nation near the convent wall, and they advanced and skirmished sharply with the enemy soon after the charge of the nineteenth would appear to have taken place. Very often also, things appear greater to those who perform them than to the bystanders, and it may be asked how many men the nineteenth lost in the charge, how many prisoners it took, and how many French were opposed to it; for certainly neither by the nineteenth Portuguese, nor by any other troops, save those of the light division, was any charge made which called for particular notice in a general history. I am not bound to relate all the minor occurrences of a great battle; "those things belong to the history of regiments," is the just observation of Napoleon. Yet General M'Bean may be assured no desire to under-rate either his services, or the gallantry of the Portuguese soldiers ever actuated me; and to prove it, if my third volume should ever come to a third edition, his letter shall be taken as ground for noticing this charge, without however making it so prominent as your lordship desires.

Your lordship closes this subject by the following observation. "As Colonel Napier represents himself as having been an eye-witness of a gallant movement made by a certain Portuguese regiment—which regiment he does not profess to know—but which movement took place a mile distant from the position given to the nineteenth regiment, it is evident he could not also have been an eye-witness of what was passing a mile to the left. Nor can he therefore negative what is said to have occurred there. It is extraordinary that the historian should not have perceived the predicament in which he has placed himself." Now you do not say that the two events occurred at the *same time*, wherefore your conclusion is what the renowned Partridge calls a "*non sequitur*;" and as General M'Bean expressly affirms his charge to have taken place on the *right* of the light division, it was not absolutely necessary that I should look to the *left* in order to see the said charge: hence the predicament in which I am placed, is that of being obliged to remark your lordship's inability to reason upon your own materials.

Your next subject is Captain Squire, but that matter has been sufficiently discussed before, and the memory of that very gallant and able officer will never suffer from your lordship's angry epithets. Campo Mayor follows. In your *Further Strictures* you said Colonel Colborne was not near the scene of action; you now show in detail that he was actively engaged in it. You denied also that he was in support of the advanced guard, and yet quote his own report explaining how he happened to be separated from the advanced guard just before the action, thus proving that he was

marching in support of it. You refuse any credit to the statements of Captain Gregory and Colonel Light, and you endeavor to trample on the evidence of the officer of the thirteenth dragoons who was an actor in the charge of that regiment, but with respect to him a few remarks are necessary.

1. The accuracy of his narrative concerns my *Justification* very little, except in one part. It was published whole as he gave it to me, because it threw light upon the subject, and there is nothing in your lordship's observations to make me doubt its general correctness. But it was only the part printed in italics that concerned me. I had described a remarkable combat of cavalry wherein the hostile squadrons *had twice passed through each other*, and then the British put the French to flight. You ridiculed this as a nursery tale; you called a description of it a "*country dance*," and you still call it a "*scenic effect*." Did the hostile masses meet twice, and did the British then put their opponents to flight? These were the real questions. The unusual fact of two cavalry bodies charging through each other, was the point in dispute; it is scenic, but is it true? Now my first authority designated as an "*eye-witness*," was Colonel Colborne; my second Colonel Dogherty of the thirteenth dragoons, an *actor*; and when you so coolly say the latter's statement does not afford "the slightest support to the scenic description," I must take the liberty of laughing at you. Why, my lord, you really seem disposed to treat common sense as if it were a subaltern. Colonel Dogherty bears me out even to the letter; for as the second charge took place with the same violence that the third did, if the hostile bodies had not passed through to their original position, the French must have fled towards the allied army: but they fled towards Badajos. The English must therefore have passed through and turned, and it was in that personal conflict with the sabre which followed the second charge the thirteenth dragoons defeated the French.

My lord, you will never by such special pleading, there is no other term by which your argument can be properly designated, you will never by such special pleading hide your bad generalship at Campo Mayor. The proofs of your errors are too many and too clear, the errors themselves too glaring, too gross to leave you the least hope; the same confusion of head which prevented you from seizing the advantages then offered to you seems to prevail in your writing; and yet while impeaching every person's credit where their statements militate against your object, you demand the most implicit confidence in your own contradictory assertions and preposterous arguments. You only fatigue yourself and your readers by your unwieldy floundering, you are heavy and throw

much mud about, and like one of those fine Andalusian horses so much admired in the Peninsula, you prance and curvet and foam and labor in your paces but never get on. At Campo Mayor you had an enormous superiority of troops, the enemy were taken by surprise, they were in a plain, their cavalry was beaten, their artillery-drivers cut down, their infantry, hemmed in by your horsemen and under the play of your guns, were ready to surrender; you suffered them to escape and carry off their captured artillery and then blamed your gallant troops. The enemy escaped from you, my lord, but you cannot escape from the opinion of the world by denying the truth of all statements which militate against you.

The march by Merida.—If you had said at once that the Duke of Wellington forbade you to go by Merida, there would have been an end of all my arguments against your skill; yet it does not follow that these arguments would be futile in themselves, though not applicable to you personally: new combinations were presented, and the Duke of Wellington might very probably have changed his instructions had he been present on the spot. But, why was this your justification withheld until now? why was so plain, so clear, so decisive a defence of yourself never thought of before? and why is it now smothered with such a heap of arguments as you have added, to prove that you ought not to have gone by Merida? Have you found out that I am not such a bad reasoner upon military affairs as you are pleased to style me in your former publication? Have you found out that pleading high rank is not a sufficient answer to plain and well supported statements? It is good however that you have at last condescended to adopt a different mode of proceeding. I applaud you for it, and with the exception of two points leave you in the full enjoyment of any triumph which the force of your arguments may procure you; always, however, retaining my right to assume, that your lordship's memory with respect to the Duke of Wellington's negative may have been as treacherous as it was about your own letter to the junta of Badajoz. There is therefore nothing to add to the arguments used in my *Justification* and *History*, in favor of the march to Merida; if I am wrong the world will so judge me. But the two points reserved are, 1. That you assert now, in direct contradiction to your former avowal, that the march to Merida would have been one of *four* days instead of *two*; and that the road by Albuquerque was the only one which you could use. In answer to this last part be it known, that the French before, the Spaniards then, marched by the road of Montijo; and that a year after, when Lord Hill's expedition against Almaraz took place, the whole of his battering

and pontoon-train, with all the ammunition belonging to it, moved with great facility in three days from Elvas, by this very road of Montijo, to Merida; and Elvas, as your lordship knows, is rather further than Campo Mayor from Merida.

The second point is that mode of conducting a controversy which has been before exposed in your former publications, viz., misstating my arguments to suit your own reasoning. I never said you should have attempted, or could have succeeded in a "*coup de main*" against Badajos, not even that you should have commenced the siege immediately. But that marching through Merida you could have placed your army at once between Badajos and the French army, have thrown the former upon its own resources at a most inconvenient time, and in that situation could have more readily thrown your bridge at Jerumenha, and proceeded at your convenience.

Further than this it is not necessary to dissect and expose your new fallacies and contradictions, it requires too much time. You have written upwards of six hundred pages, four hundred of them were before demolished; but my own volumes are rather thick, and to me at least more important than yours; your lordship must therefore spare me the other two hundred, or at least permit me to treat them lightly. The whole siege of Badajos is resigned to you, it is matter of opinion, and your example in overloading what is already clear by superfluity of argument, need not be followed: one error only into which you have been led by Colonel La Marre's work shall be exposed. On his authority you say the garrison on the 10th of April had three months' provisions; but the following extract from a letter of Marshal Soult to the Prince of Wagram, will prove that La Marre is wrong:

Seville, 18th April.

"From the 11th of this month the place was provisioned, according to the report of General Phillipon, for *two months and some days* as to subsistence; and there are 100 milliers of powder," &c. &c.

Let us now come to the *battle of Albuera*.

You still doubt that the position as explained by me is four miles long, and you rest upon the superior accuracy of Major Mitchell's plan, on which you have measured the distance with your compasses. I also am in possession of one of Major Mitchell's plans, and find by the aid of my pair of compasses, that even from the left of the Portuguese *infantry* (without noticing Otway's squadron of cavalry) to the right of the Spanish line, as placed at the termination of the battle, is exactly four miles; and everybody knows that a line over the actual ground will, from the latter's rises and falls, exceed the

line on paper. Wherefore, as this measurement does not coincide with your lordship's, and as we are both Irishmen, it may be concluded that your compasses are too short, or mine are too long. Your grand cheval de bataille is, however, the numbers of the armies on each side. Thirty-eight long pages you give us, to prove what cannot be proved, namely, that my estimate is wrong, and yours right; and at the end you are just where you began. All is uncertain, there are no returns, no proof! the whole matter is one of guess, of probabilities as to the allies, and until lately was so also with respect to the French. Mine was a very plain statement. Certain numbers were assumed by me as the nearest approximation, and when the accuracy of the ciphers were questioned by you, the foundation for assuming them was briefly explained; you, in refutation, give thirty-eight pages of most confused calculations, and what is the result? why, that the numbers of the allies on your own showing still remain uncertain; and your estimate of the French is quite erroneous.

In my History it was said you had more than two thousand cavalry in the field, and in my *Justification* reasons were adduced for believing you had nearly three thousand; you now acknowledge two thousand, and my History is therefore not far wrong. But you do not seem to know the composition of your own divisions. General Long's morning states, now before me, do not include General Madden's cavalry. That officer's regiments were the fifth and eighth, and the sixth and ninth were also under him; those in General Long's division are the first and seventh. General Madden's account of his services, given in the *Military Calendar*, states that a part of his brigade, namely, the eighth regiment, under Colonel Wyndham, was in the battle of Albuera. Now, taking the eighth to be between two hundred and seventy and two hundred and eighty-one troopers, which were the respective strengths of the first and seventh regiments in Long's division on the 29th of May, we have above eighteen hundred troopers, namely, fifteen hundred and eighty-seven in Long's division, and two hundred and seventy-five in the eighth regiment; to these add two hundred and fifty officers and sergeants, and there will be in all more than two thousand sabres. In General Long's states of the 8th of May, those two Portuguese regiments had indeed fewer under arms than on the 29th, but then six hundred and eighty-nine men and forty-four sergeants and trumpeters were on command, of which more than four hundred belonged to those two Portuguese regiments. Many of them must surely have joined before the battle, because such an unusual number on command could only be temporary. Again, in the state of the 29th of May, one hundred and fifteen

sergeants, trumpeters and troopers are returned as prisoners of war; and when the killed and wounded in the battle are added, we may fairly call the British and Portuguese cavalry above two thousand. Your lordship admits the Spaniards to have had seven hundred and fifty; but for clearness, let this be placed in a tabular form:

GENERAL LONG'S STATES.

8th May.

Serjeants, Trumpeters, and Troopers.

Present under arms	1576
On command	733
Prisoners of war	115
	<hr/>
	2424

29th May.

Present	1739
Command	522
Prisoners of war	127
	<hr/>
	2388

Medium estimate for the 16th of May.

Present, 8th May	1576
Ditto, 29th May	1739

2)3315

1657 $\frac{1}{2}$

270 8th Portuguese regiment.

1927

127 Prisoners of war.

2054

750 Spaniards.

2804

Deduct prisoners on 8th 115

Total 2689

To which are to be added the killed and wounded of the Anglo-Portuguese, and the men rejoined from command.

Thus, the statements in the History and *Justification* are both borne out; for the numbers are above two thousand as set down in the first, and nearly three thousand as stated in the last. Moreover, a general historian is not blamable for small inaccuracies; if he has reasonably good authority for any fact, he cannot be justly censured for stating that fact, and you should make a distinction between that which is stated in the History and that which is stated in the controversial writings: all mistakes in the latter, however trifling, are fair, but to cavil at trifles in the former rather hurts yourself. Now, with respect to the artillery, there is an example of this cavilling, and also an illustration of your lordship's mode of raising a very confused argument on a very plain fact. I said there were so many guns in the field, a given number being nine-pounders. You accused me of arbitrarily deciding upon their calibre; but in reply you were shown, that the *number* was given on the report of Colonel Dickson, the commanding officer of artillery; the *calibre* upon the authority of your own witness and quarter master-general, Sir Benjamin D'Urban. The latter was wrong, and there the matter should have ended. Your lordship, however, requires me, as a mark of ingenuousness, to acknowledge as my mistake that which is the mistake of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and you give a grand table with the gross number of pounds of iron, as if the affair had been between two ships. You set down in your columns the statements of the writer of a note upon your *Strictures*, the statement of the *Strictures* themselves, and my statement; and then come on with your own observations as if there were three witnesses on your side. But the author of the note is again your witness D'Urban, who thus shows himself incorrect both as to number and weight; and the author of the *Strictures* is yourself. This is an *ingenious* not an *ingenuous* mode of multiplying testimony. In your *Further Strictures* also you first called in Sir B. D'Urban in person, you then used his original memoir, you also caused him to write anonymously a running commentary upon yours and his own statements, and now you comment in your own name upon your own anonymous statements, thus making five testimonies out of two.

The answer is simple and plain. Where Sir Benjamin D'Urban was the guide, he led me wrong; you, instead of visiting his error upon his own head, visit it upon mine, and require me and your readers to follow him implicitly upon all points while to do so avails for your defence, but not when they contradict it. From Sir B. D'Urban, the *calibre* of the allies' guns employed in the battle of Albuera was taken and he was wrong! From him, if Sir A. Dickson's official return had not been available, the *number* of guns

would also have been taken, and they would have been wrong, because he calls them thirty-four instead of thirty-eight. He also (see page 26 of the Appendix to your *Further Strictures*) says the Spaniards had six guns, whereas Dickson says they had but four; and if his six guns were reckoned there would have been forty pieces of artillery; which he however reduced to thirty-four by another error, namely, leaving out a whole brigade of German artillery. On Sir Benjamin's authority, Major Dickson was called the commander of the artillery, and this also was wrong. From Sir Benjamin D'Urban's memoir, the statement that the fourth division arrived on the field of battle at *six o'clock in the morning* was made, and yet it seems certain they did not arrive until nine o'clock, and after the action had commenced. And this last is a very serious error, because it gives the appearance of skill to your lordship's combinations for battle, and to Sir Benjamin's arrangements for the execution, which they do not merit, if that division arrived at nine o'clock. But the latter hour would be quite in keeping with the story of the cavalry going to forage, and both together would confirm another report very current, namely, that your lordship did not anticipate any battle on the 16th of May. Setting this, however, aside, why, in the face of all these glaring errors and a multitude of smaller ones, is Sir Benjamin D'Urban's authority to be taken upon any disputed point?

Now, my lord, one complete triumph you have attained in your dissertation upon the numbers of the troops. I did say that from the 20th of March to the 16th of May, was only twenty days, and though the oversight is so palpably one that could not be meant to deceive, your right to laugh at it is not denied. I have laughed at so many of your lordship's oversights that it would be unfair to deny you this opportunity for retaliation, which you have certainly used moderately.

Since my *Justification* was written some proofs about the French numbers have reached me. You will find them in the following extracts from the Duke of Dalmatia's correspondence of that time, and they are worth your attention; they throw light upon the numbers of the allies, and one of them shows unquestionably that my estimate of the French numbers was, as before said, too high instead of too low. Translations are given to avoid the trouble and expense of printing in two languages, and your lordship will observe that these extracts are not liable to the praise of that generous patriotism which you alluded to in speaking of French authors, because they were written before the action and for the emperor's information, and because it was the then interest of the

writer rather to exaggerate than to lessen his own numbers, in order to give his sovereign an idea of his activity and zeal.

Extract of a letter from MARSHAL SOULT to the PRINCE of WAGRAM.

“Seville, 22d April, 1811.

“General La'our Maubourg announces to me that General Beresford commanding the Anglo-Portuguese army, and the Spanish Generals Castaños and Ballesteros with the remains of the corps of their nation are united at Zafra, and I am assured that the whole of their forces is twenty-five thousand men, of which three thousand are cavalry.”

“Colonel Quennot of the ninth regiment of dragoons, who commands upon the lines of the Tinto and observes the movements on that side as far as Ayamonte, informs me that on the 18th and 19th, General Blake disembarked ten thousand infantry and seven hundred cavalry between the mouths of the Piedra and the Guadiana. These troops come from Cadiz, they have cannon, and Blake can unite in that part fifteen thousand men.”

Ditto to Ditto.

May 4th, 1811.

“Cordova is menaced by a corps of English, Portuguese and Spaniards, many troops are concentrated in Estremadura, Badajos is invested, Blake *has* united on the Odiel an army of fifteen to sixteen thousand men.”—“I depart in four days with *twenty thousand men, three thousand horses, and thirty pieces of cannon* to drive across the Guadiana the enemy's corps which are spread in Estremadura, to disengage Badajos and facilitate the arrival of Count D'Erlon. If the troops which that general brings can unite with mine, and if the troops coming from the armies of the north and centre, and which I have already in part arranged, arrive in time, I shall have in Estremadura, thirty-five thousand men, five thousand horses and forty pieces of artillery.”

Now, my lord, I find by the imperial returns that Count D'Erlon marched towards Andalusia with twelve thousand men present under arms, and that he did not arrive until the 14th June. There remain three thousand men as coming from the armies of the north and centre, to make up the thirty-five thousand men mentioned by Soult, and I find the following passage in his letter to the Prince of Wagram, dated the 19th of May.

“The 12th, I shall be at Fuente Cantos, General Bron commands there, he brings with him the first reinforcement coming from the armies of the north and centre, and I shall employ him in the expedition.”

Hence, if we take the first reinforcement at half of the whole number expected, we add one thousand five hundred men and five guns to the twenty thousand, making a total for the battle of Albuera of twenty-one thousand five hundred men of all arms, and thirty-five guns. From these must be deduced the detachments left at Villalba, stragglers on the march, and some husars sent to scout on the flanks, for I find in General Madden's narrative of his services, that he was watched by part of the enemy's cavalry on the day of the battle.

You have now, my lord, positive and undeniable testimony that the French numbers were over-rated instead of being under-rated by me, and you have corroborative evidence, that the number of the allies was as great as stated by me; for we find in the above extracts Soult giving Blake fifteen thousand men, of which, at least, seven hundred are cavalry, before the battle, and twenty-five thousand, of which three thousand are cavalry, to your lordship, Castaños, &c. We find the French general's information, taking into consideration the troops which joined Blake in the Niebla, not differing essentially from Mr. Henry Wellesley's report of the numbers of Blake's army, namely, twelve thousand, of which one thousand one hundred were cavalry; and we find both in some manner confirmed by Lord Wellington's repeated statements of the forces of Blake's army after the battle, that is to say, making a reasonable allowance for the numbers lost in the action. Soult and Mr. Wellesley also agree in making out the Spanish cavalry more numerous than your lordship will admit of. Blake alone had from seven to eleven hundred cavalry, following the statement of these persons, and there was in addition the corps of Penne Villemur, which, as said in my *Justification*, was not less than five hundred.

In closing your calculation of numbers, you exultingly observe that it is the first time you ever heard of a general's being censured for keeping one-third of his force in reserve and *beating the enemy with the other two*. Ay—but this involves the very pith of the question. At Albuera the *general* did not beat the enemy. My lord, you have bestowed great pains on your argument about the battle of Albuera, and far be it from me to endeavor to deprive you of any addition to your reputation which you may thus obtain, there is no desire to rob you of well-earned laurels; my observations were directed against what appeared to me your bad generalship; if that has not been pointed out to the satisfaction of the public, I have nothing further to offer in fairness, and certainly will not by any vile sophistry endeavor to damage your fame. But do not think the force of your present arguments is admitted; if they are

not here carefully dissected, it is not from any want of points to fasten upon; indeed, my lord, your book is very weak, there are many failures in it, and a few more shall be noticed that you may estimate my forbearance at its proper value. We will begin with your observations on Captain Gregory's testimony, not in defence of that gentleman's credit, for in truth, as his and the other officers' evidence is given to facts of which they were personally cognizant, not the slightest regard can be paid to your confused arguments in opposition to their honor. You do not, indeed, mean to impeach anything but their memory; but to attempt to defend them from your observations would make it appear as if I thought otherwise. My lord, you have missed Captain Gregory, but you have hit yourself very hard.

Behold the proof.

At page 167 you say: "I will now point out the gross and palpable errors of Captain Gregory's narrative.—He says, that on receiving the intelligence from an orderly of the thirteenth dragoons, who came in from a piquet on the right with intelligence that the enemy was crossing the river, General Long galloped off—I conclude to the right,—and found half the army across,—and to the right. *Why, every other authority has stated that the enemy's first movement was from the wood along the right bank of the Albuera upon our left*; and that we were not at all aware of their intention to cross above our right, and there make an attack, till after their first movement was considerably advanced, and the action had actually commenced with Godinot's corps on the opposite side of the river to our left. It is quite surprising that Colonel Napier should have overlooked a blunder so gross as to destroy the value of the whole of his friend's testimony."

Now, my lord, compare the passage marked by italics (pardon me the italics) in the above, with the following extract from your own despatch.

"The enemy, on the 16th, did not long delay his attack: at eight o'clock," (the very time mentioned by Captain Gregory) "he was observed to be in movement, and his cavalry were seen passing the rivulet of Albuera considerably *above our right, and shortly after* he marched out of the wood opposite to us, a strong force of cavalry and two heavy columns of infantry, posting them to our front, *as if to attack the village and bridge of Albuera*. During this time, he was filing the principal body of his infantry over the river *beyond our right*, and it was not long before his intention appeared to be to turn us by that flank." Your lordship has, indeed, in another part discarded the authority of your despatch, as appears most ne-

cessary in treating of this battle, but it is rather hard measure to attack me so fiercely for having had some faith in it.

With respect to Sir Wm. Lumley's letter, I cannot but admire his remembrance of the exact numbers of the British cavalry; a precise recollection, after twenty-three years, of a few hasty words spoken on a field of battle, is certainly a rare thing; yet such precision did not take me quite by surprise, for if I do not greatly mistake, Sir William was the general who at Santarem edified the head-quarters by a report that "*the enemy were certainly going to move either to their right or to their left, to their front or to their rear.*" One would suppose that so exact a person could never be in error; and yet the following extract from General Harvey's journal would lead me to suppose his memory was not quite so clear and powerful as he imagines. Sir William Lumley says, that to the best of his recollection he was not aware of the advance of the fusileers and Harvey's brigade until they had passed his left flank; that they then came under his eye, and as the rain and smoke cleared away, he saw them in one body moving to engage; and although they had become so oblique relative to the point where he stood that he could not well speak as to their actual distance from one another, there did not appear any improper interval between them.

Now hear General Harvey!

"The twenty-third and one battalion of the seventh fusileers were in line. The other battalion at quarter distance, forming square, at every halt to cover the right which the cavalry continued to menace. *Major-general Lumley, with the British cavalry, was also in column of half squadrons in rear of our right, and moved with us, being too weak to advance against the enemy's cavalry.*"

There, my lord, you see that generals, as well as doctors, differ. Sir W. Lumley, twenty-three years after the event, recollects seeing the fusileers and Harvey's brigade at such a distance and so obliquely, that he could not speak to their actual distance from one another. General Harvey, writing the day after the event, says, Sir William Lumley had his cavalry in half squadrons, close in rear of these very brigades, and was moving with them! This should convince your lordship that it is not wise to cry out and cavil at every step in the detail of a battle.

As to the term *gap*, the word was used without the mark of quotation, because it was my own, and it expressed mine and your meaning very well. You feared the cavalry of the French would overpower ours and break in on your rear and flank when the support of the fusileers was taken away; I told you General Cole had placed Harvey's brigade in the *gap*; that is, in such a situation that the French could not break in. I knew very well Harvey's

brigade followed in support of the attack of the fusileers, because he says so in his journal; but he also says, that both ours and the enemy's cavalry made a corresponding movement. Thus the fear of the latter breaking in was chimerical, especially as during the march Harvey halted, formed, received and beat off a charge of the French horsemen.

But we have not yet done with Sir W. Lumley's numbers. How curious it is that Brigade-major Holmes's verbal report on the field of battle, as recollected by Sir William, should give the third dragoon-guards and the fourth dragoons, forming the heavy brigade, the exact number of five hundred and sixty men, when the same Brigade-major Holmes, in his written morning state of the 8th of May, one week before the battle, gives to those regiments seven hundred and fifty-two troopers present under arms, and one hundred and eighty-three on command. What became of the others in the interval? Again, on the 29th of May, thirteen days after the battle, he writes down these regiments six hundred and ninety-five troopers present under arms, one hundred and eighty-two on command, and thirty-two prisoners of war. In both cases also, the sergeants, trumpeters, &c., are to be added; and this circumstance must be marked, because in the French returns all persons from the highest officer to the conductors of carriages are included in the strength of men: it is probable neither of the distinguished regiments alluded to will be willing to admit that their ranks were full before and after, but empty on the day of battle; it is contrary to the English custom. Your lordship, also, in a parenthesis (page 125) says the thirteenth dragoons had not three hundred men at this time to produce; but this perverse Brigade-major Holmes writes that regiment down also on the 8th of May, at three hundred and fifty-seven troopers present under arms, and sixty-three on command; and on the 29th of May, three hundred and forty-one present, seventy-nine on command, eighty-two prisoners of war. Staff-officers are notoriously troublesome people.

One point more.

You accuse me of having placed Sir A. Dickson in a position where he never was, and you give a letter from that officer to prove the fact. You also deny the correctness of Sir Julius Hartman's statement, and you observe that even were it accurate, he does not speak of an order to retreat, but an order to cover a retreat. Now to say that Dickson is placed in a wrong position by me is scarcely fair, because Sir Julius Hartman's words are used, and that in the *Justification*; whereas in the History, Colonel Dickson's guns are placed exactly in the position where he himself says they were. If you refer to the work you will see that it is so; and

surely it is something akin to quibbling, to deny, that artillery posted to defend a bridge was not at the bridge, because its long range enabled it to effect its object from a distance.

You say also that there was your quarter-master-general's evidence to counteract Sir Julius Hartman's relative to this retreat. But Sir Benjamin D'Urban had already misled me more than once; and why did you garble Sir A. Dickson's communication? I will answer for you. It contained positive evidence that a *retreat was ordered*. You may ask how I know this. I will tell you that also. Sir Alexander Dickson sent me the substance of his communication to you. You are now I hope convinced that something else than weakness makes me neglect a complete analysis of your work, which is in every part open to animadversion.

My lord, you have mentioned several other letters which you have received from different officers, Colonel Arbuthnot, Colonel Colborne, &c., as confirming your statements, but you have not, as in the cases of Sir James Douglas and General M'Bean, where they were wholly on your own side, given these letters in full; wherefore, seeing the gloss you have put upon Lord Stuart's communication, and this garbling of Sir A. Dickson's letter, there is reason to suppose the others do not bear up your case very strongly—probably they contradict it on some points, as Sir Alexander Dickson's, which is here given entire, does.

“The Portuguese artillery under my command (twelve guns) attached to General Hamilton's division, was posted on favorable ground about 750 or 800 yards from the bridge, and at least 700 yards S. W. of the village of Albuera; their fire bore effectually upon the bridge and the road from it to the bridge, and I received my orders to take this position from Lord Beresford when the enemy threatened their main attack at the bridge. At a certain period of the day, I should judge it to have been about the time the fourth division moved to attack, *I received a verbal order in English from Don Jose Luiz de Souza* (now Conde de Villa Real, an aid-de-camp of Lord Beresford) *to retire by the Valverde road, or upon the Valverde road, I am not sure which*; to this I strongly expressed words of doubt, and he then rode off towards Albuera; as, however, I could see no reason for falling back, and the infantry my guns belonged to being at hand, I continued in action, and though I believe I limbered up once or twice previous to the receipt of this message and moved a little to improve my position, I never did so to retire. Soon after Don Jose left me, seeing Lord Beresford and some of his staff to my right, I rode across to satisfy myself that I was acting correctly; but perceiving that the French were giving way I did not mention the order I had received, and as

soon as Lord Beresford saw me, he asked what state my guns were in, he then ordered me to proceed as quickly as I could with my nine-pounders to the right; which I did in time to bring them into action against the retiring masses of the enemy. The foregoing is the substance of an explanation given to Lord Beresford which he lately requested."

Thus you have the whole of what Sir Alexander Dickson (as he tells me) wrote to you. Here therefore I might stop, my lord, to enjoy your confusion, and harp upon this fact, which is so formidable a bar to your lordship's argument, that rather than give it publicity, you garbled your own correspondent's letter. But my object is not to gain a triumph over you, it is to establish the truth, and I will not follow your example in suppressing what may tend to serve your argument or weaken mine. It is of no consequence to me whether you gave orders for a retreat or not, it was said in my History that you did not do so, the weight of testimony being on that side; it was only when your anonymous publications called forth new evidence that doubt as to the correctness of the first statement entered my mind.* But if the following observation in Sir Alexander Dickson's letter can serve your argument, you are welcome to it, although it is not contained in the substance of what he wrote to you; and here also be it remembered that Sir Alexander's letter was written *after my Justification* was printed.

"I had never mentioned the matter to any one, except to Hartman, with whom I was on the greatest habits of intimacy, and indeed I was from the first induced to attribute Souza's message to some mistake, as neither in my conversation with Lord Beresford was there any allusion to it, nor did anything occur to indicate to me that he was aware of my having received such an order."

Your lordship will no doubt deny that the Count of Villa Real had authority from you to order this retreat, so be it; but when you call upon me and others to accept this Count of Villa Real's evidence upon other points, and you attempt to discredit some of my witnesses, because their testimony is opposed to the testimony of the Count of Villa Real; if you deny him at Albuera, you cannot have him at Campo Mayor. And behold another difficulty you thus fall into. Your publications are intended to prove your talent as a general, and yet we find you acknowledging, that in the most critical period of this great and awful battle of Albuera, your own staff had so little confidence in your ability, that Sir

* Since the first publication of this Letter I have learned from excellent authority that Marshal Beresford did actually in person order General Sir Colin Hackett to retreat from the bridge, and rebuked him for being slow to obey.

Henry Hardinge took upon himself to win it for you while the Conde de Villa Real took upon himself to lose it, the one ordering an advance, which gained the day, the other ordering a retreat which would have ruined all: be assured such liberties are never taken by the staff of great commanders.

In ancient times it was reckoned a worthy action to hold the mirror of truth up to men placed in high stations, when the partiality of friends, the flattery of dependents, and their own human vanity had given them too exalted notions of their importance. You, my lord, are a man in a high station, and you have evidently made a false estimate of your importance, or you would not treat men of inferior rank with so much disdain as you have expressed in these your publications; wherefore it may be useful, and certainly will be just, to let you know the judgment which others have formed of your talents. The following character was sketched about two months after the battle of Albuera. The author was a man of great ability, used to public affairs, experienced in the study of mankind, opposed to you by no personal interest, and withal had excellent opportunities of observing your disposition; and surely his acuteness will not be denied by those who have read your three publications in this controversy.

“ Marshal Beresford appears to possess a great deal of information upon all subjects connected with the military establishments of the kingdom, the departments attached to the army, and the resources of the country. But nothing appears to be well arranged and digested in his head; he never fixes upon a point, but deviates from his subject, and overwhelms a very slender thread of argument by a profusion of illustrations, stories and anecdotes, most of which relate to himself. He is captious and obstinate, and difficult to be pleased. He appears to grasp at everything for his own party, without considering what it would be fair, and reasonable, and decent to expect from the other party.”

I now take leave of you, my lord, and notwithstanding all that has passed, with respect, because I think you a brave soldier, and even an able organizer of an army. You have served your country long and to the utmost of your ability, and I admit that ability to have been very considerable; but History, my lord, deals with very great men and you sink in the comparison. She will speak of you as a general far above mediocrity, as one who has done much and a great deal of it well; yet when she looks at Campo Mayor and Albuera she will not rank you amongst great commanders; and if she should ever cast her penetrating eyes upon this your present publication, she will not class you amongst great writers.

ANSWER

r o

THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.

THIS is but a sorry attack to repel. "*Le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle,*" but "rats and mice and such small deer have been Tom's food for many a year."

The reviewer does not like my work, and he invokes the vinous vagaries of Mr. Coleridge in aid of his own spleen. I do not like his work, or Mr. Coleridge's either, and I console myself with a maxim of the late eccentric General Meadows, who being displeased to see his officers wear their cocked hats awry, issued an order beginning thus: "All men have fancy, few have taste." Let that pass. I am ready to acknowledge real errors, and to give my authorities for disputed facts.

1. I admit that the road which leads over the Pyrenees to Pampeluna does not *unite* at that town with the royal causeway; yet the error was *typographical*, not *topographical*, because the course of the royal causeway was shown, just before, to be through towns very distant from Pampeluna. The true reading should be "*united with the first by a branch road commencing at Pampeluna.*"

2. The reviewer says, the mountains round Madrid do not touch the Tagus at both ends within the frontier of Spain; that river is not the chord of their arc; neither are the heights of Palmela and Almada near Lisbon one and the same. This is very true, although not very important. I should have written the heights of Palmela *and* Almada, instead of the heights of Palmela *or* Almada. But though the mountains round Madrid do not to the westward actually touch the Tagus within the Spanish frontier, their shoots are scarcely three miles from that river near Talavera; and my description was general, being intended merely to show that Madrid could not be approached from the eastward or northward, except over one of the mountain ranges, a fact not to be disputed.

3. It is hinted by the reviewer that Lord Melville's degrading observation, namely, that "the worst men made the best soldiers," was picked by me out of General Foy's historical fragment. Now, that passage in my History was written many months before General Foy's work was published; and my authority was a very clear recollection of Lord Melville's speech, as reported in the papers of the day.*

General Foy's work seems a favorite authority with the reviewer, and he treats General Thiebault's work with disdain; yet both were Frenchmen of eminence, and the ennobling patriotism of vituperation might have been impartially exercised, the weakness of discrimination avoided. However, General Thiebault's work, with some apparent inaccuracies as to numbers, is written with great ability and elegance, and is genuine; whereas General Foy's history is not even General Foy's writing; Colonel D'Esmenard, in his recent translation of the Prince of Peace's memoirs, has the following conclusive passage upon that head.

"The illustrious General Foy undertook a history of the war in Spain; his premature death prevented him from revising and purifying his first sketch; he did me the honor to speak of it several times, and even attached some value to my observations; the imperfect manuscripts of this brilliant orator have been re-handled and re-made by other hands. In this posthumous history, he has been gratuitously provided with inaccurate and malignant assertions."

While upon this subject, it is right to do justice to Manuel Godoy, Prince of the Peace.† A sensual and corrupt man he was generally said to be, and I called him so, without sufficient consideration for the extreme exaggerations which the Spaniards always display in their hatred. The prince has now defended himself; Colonel D'Esmenard and other persons well acquainted with the dissolute manners of the Spanish capital, and having personal experience of Godoy's character and disposition, have testified that his social demeanor was decent and reserved, and his disposition generous; wherefore I express my regret at having ignorantly and unintentionally calumniated him.

To return to the reviewer. He is continually observing that he does not know my authority for such and such a fact, and therefore he insinuates that no such fact had place, thus making his ignorance the measure of my accuracy. This logic seems to be akin to that of the wild beast showman, who declares that "the little negro

* See note at the end of my *Reply to the third article in the Quarterly*.

† See *Memoirs of Manuel Godoy*, translated by Colonel D'Esmenard. See also *London and Westminster Review*, No. 1.

boys tie the ostrich bird's leg to a tree, which fully accounts for the milk in the cocoa-nuts." I might reply generally as the late Alderman Coombe did to a certain baronet, who, in a dispute, was constantly exclaiming, "I don't know that, Mr. Alderman! I don't know that!" "Ah, Sir George! all that you *don't know* would make a large book!" However, it will be, though less witty, more conclusive to furnish at least some of my authorities.

1. In opposition to the supposititious General Foy's account of Solano's murder, and in support of my own History, I give the authority of Sir Hew Dalrymple, from whom the information was obtained; a much better authority than Foy, because he was in close correspondence with the insurgents of Seville at the time, and had an active, intelligent agent there.

2. Against the supposititious Foy's authority as to the numbers of the French army in June, 1808, the authority of Napoleon's imperial returns is pleaded. From these returns my estimate of the French forces in Spain during May, 1808, was taken, and it is so stated in my Appendix. The inconsistency of the reviewer himself may also be noticed, for he marks my number *exclusive* of Junot's army, and yet *includes* that army in what he calls Foy's estimate! But Junot's army was more than 29,000 and not 24,000 as the supposititious Foy has it; and that number taken from 116,000 which, though wrong, is Foy's estimate of the whole, leaves less than 87,000. I said 80,000. The difference is not great, yet my authority is the best, and the reviewer feels that it is so, or he would also have adopted General Foy's numbers of the French at the combat of Rorica. In Foy's history they are set down as less than 2500, in mine they are called 5000. He may be right, but it would not suit the reviewer to adopt a *truth* from a French writer.

3. On the negative proofs afforded 1. by the absence of any quoted voucher in my work, 2. by the absence of any acknowledgment of such a fact in General Anstruther's manuscript journal, which journal may or may not be garbled, the reviewer asserts that the English ministers never contemplated the appointing of a military governor for Cadiz. Against this, let the Duke of Wellington's authority be pleaded, for in my note-book of conversations held with his grace upon the subject of my History, the following passage occurs:—

"The ministers were always wishing to occupy Cadiz, Lord Wellington thinks this a folly, Cadiz was rather a burthen to him, but either General Spencer or General Anstruther was intended to command there, thinks it was Anstruther, he came out with his appointment."

Now it is possible that as Acland's arrival was also the subject

of conversation, his name was mentioned instead of Anstruther's; and it is also possible, as the note shows, that Spencer was the man, but the main fact relative to the government could not have been mistaken. To balance this, however, there undoubtedly is an error as to the situation of General Anstruther's brigade at the battle of Vimiero. It appears by an extract from his journal, that it was disposed, not, as the reviewer says, on the right of Fane's brigade, but at various places, part being on the right of Fane, part upon his left, part held in reserve. The forty-third were on the left of Fane, the fifty-second and ninety-seventh on his right, the ninth in reserve; the error is therefore very trivial, being simply the describing two regiments as of Fane's brigade, when they were of Anstruther's without altering their position. What does the public care whether it was a general called Fane, or a general called Anstruther, who was on the right hand if the important points of the action are correctly described? The fighting of the fifty-second and ninety-seventh has indeed been but slightly noticed, in my History, under the denomination of Fane's right, whereas those regiments make a good figure, and justly so, in Anstruther's journal, because it is the story of the brigade; general history ought not to enter into the details of regimental fighting, save where the effects are decisive on the general result, as in the case of the fiftieth and forty-third on this occasion. The whole loss of the ninety-seventh and fifty-second together did not exceed sixty killed and wounded, whereas the fiftieth alone lost ninety, and the forty-third one hundred and eighteen.

While on the subject of Anstruther's brigade, it is right also to admit another error, one of place; that is if it be true, as the reviewer says, that Anstruther landed at Paymayo bay, and not at Maceira bay. The distance between those places may be about five miles, and the fact had no influence whatever on the operations; nevertheless the error was not drawn from Mr. Southey's history, though I readily acknowledge I could not go to a more copious source of error. With respect to the imputed mistake as to time, viz. the day of Anstruther's landing, it is set down in my first edition as the 19th, wherefore the 18th in the third edition is simply an error of the press! Alas! for the reviewer.

But there are graver charges. I have maligned the worthy Bishop of Oporto, and ill-used the patriotic Gallician junta! Reader, the Bishop of Oporto and the patriarch of Lisbon are one and the same person! Examine then my History and especially its Appendix, and judge for yourself, whether the reviewer may not justly be addressed as the pope was by Richard I, when he sent him the Bishop of Beauvais' bloody suit of mail. "See now

if this be thy son's coat." But the junta! Why, it is true that I said they glossed over the battle of Rio Seco after the Spanish manner; that their policy was but a desire to obtain money, and to avoid personal inconvenience; that they gave Sir Arthur Wellesley incorrect statements of the number of the Portuguese and Spaniards at Oporto, and a more inaccurate estimate of the French army under Junot. All this is true. It is true that I have said it, true that they did it. The reviewer *says* my statement is a "gratuitous misrepresentation." I will *prove* that the reviewer's remark is a gratuitous impertinence.

1. The junta informed Sir Arthur Wellesley, that Bessières had twenty thousand men in the battle, whereas he had but fifteen thousand.

2. That Cuesta lost only two guns, whereas he lost eighteen.

3. That Bessières lost seven thousand men and six guns, whereas he lost only three hundred and fifty men, and no guns.

4. That the Spanish army had retired to Benevente as if it still preserved its consistence, whereas Blake and Cuesta had quarrelled and separated, all the magazines of the latter had been captured, and the whole country was at the mercy of the French. This was glossing it over in the Spanish manner.

Again the junta pretended that they desired the deliverance of Portugal, to enable them to unite with the southern provinces in a general effort; but Mr. Stuart's letters prove that they would never unite at all with any other province, and that their aim was to separate from Spain altogether, and join Portugal. Their wish to avoid personal inconvenience was notorious; it was the cause of their refusal to let Sir David Baird's troops disembark, it was apparent to all who had to deal with them, and it belongs to the national character. Then their eagerness to obtain money, and their unpatriotic use of it when obtained, have been so amply set forth in various parts of my History, I need not do more than refer to that, and to my quoted authorities, especially in the second chapters of the 3d and 14th Books. Moreover, the reviewer's quotations belie his comments, and like the slow-worm defined by Johnson to be "a blind worm, a large viper, *venomous, not mortal*," he is at once dull and malignant.

The junta told Sir Arthur Wellesley that ten thousand Portuguese troops were at Oporto, and that two thousand Spaniards, who had marched the 15th, would be there on the 25th of July; yet when Sir Arthur arrived at Oporto, on the 25th, he found only fifteen hundred Portuguese and three hundred Spaniards; the two thousand men said to be in march had never moved, and were not expected. Here then, instead of twelve thousand men, there were

only eighteen hundred! At Coimbra, indeed, eighty miles from Oporto, there were five thousand militia and regulars, one-third of which were unarmed, and, according to Colonel Browne's letter, as given in the folio edition of the inquiry upon the Cintra convention, there were also twelve hundred armed peasants, which the reviewer has magnified into twelve thousand. Thus without dwelling on the difference of place, the difference between the true numbers and the statements of the Gallician junta was four thousand; nor will it mend the matter, if we admit the armed peasants to be twelve thousand, for that would make a greater difference on the other side.

Again, the junta estimated the French at fifteen thousand men, but the embarkation returns of the number shipped after the convention gave twenty-five thousand seven hundred and sixty; making a difference of more than ten thousand men, exclusive of those who had fallen or been captured in the battles of Vimiero and Rorica, and of those who had died in hospital! Have I not a right then to treat these as inaccurate statements, and the reviewer's remark as an impertinence?

The reviewer, speaking of the battle of Baylen, scoffs at the inconsistency of calling it an insignificant event, and yet attributing to it immense results. But my expression was, an insignificant *action in itself*, which at once reconciles the seeming contradiction, and this the writer, who has no honest criticism, suppresses. My allusion to the disciplined battalions of Valley Forge, as being the saviors of American independence, also excites his morbid spleen, and assuming what is not true, namely, that I selected that period as the time of the greatest improvement in American discipline, he says, their soldiers there were few, as if that bore at all upon the question.

But my expression is *of** Valley Forge not "*at** Valley Forge." The allusion was used figuratively to show that an armed peasantry cannot resist regular troops, and Washington's correspondence is one continued enforcement of the principle, yet the expression may be also taken literally. It was with the battalions *of* Valley Forge that Washington drew Howe to the Delaware, and twice crossing that river in winter, surprised the Germans at Trenton and beat the British at Princeton. It was with those battalions he made his attacks at Germantown; with those battalions he prevented Howe from sending assistance to Burgoyne's army, which was in consequence captured. In fine, to use his own expression, "The British eagle's wings were spread, and with those battalions he

* In the first edition these words were by mistake transposed.

clipped them.”* The American general, however, at one time occupied, close to Valley Forge, a camp in the Jerseys, bearing the odd name of *Quibble Town*, on which probably the reviewer’s eye was fixed.

But notwithstanding *Quibble Town*, enthusiasm will not avail in the long run against discipline. Is authority wanted? We have had Napoleon’s and Washington’s and now we have Wellington’s; for in the fifth volume of his *Despatches*, p. 215, as compiled by Colonel Gurwood, will be found the following passage upon the arming of the Spanish and Portuguese people.

“Reflection, and above all, experience, have shown me the exact extent of this advantage in a military point of view. and I only beg that those who have to contend with the French, will not be diverted from the business of raising, arming, equipping, and training regular bodies by any notion that the people when armed and arrayed, will be of, I will not say any, but of much use to them. The subject is too large for discussion in a paper of this description, but I can show hundreds of instances to prove the truth of as many reasons why exertions of this description ought not to be relied on. At all events no officer can calculate upon an operation to be performed against the French by persons of this description, and I believe that no officer will enter upon an operation against the French without calculating his means most anxiously.”

It is said that some officer of rank has furnished the reviewer’s military criticisms; I can understand why, if the fact be true, but it is difficult to believe that any officer would even for the gratification of a contemptible jealousy, have lent himself to the assertion that Sir Arthur Wellesley could not have made a *forced or a secret march* from Vimiero to Mafra, because he was encumbered with four hundred bullock-carts. Sir Arthur did certainly intend to make that march,† and he would as certainly not have attempted such a flank movement *openly and deliberately* while thus encumbered, and moving at the rate of two miles an hour, within a short distance of a general having a more experienced army and an overwhelming cavalry. The sneer is therefore directed more against Sir Arthur Wellesley than against me.

This supposed officer of rank says, that because the enemy had a shorter road to move in retreat, his line of march could not even be menaced, still less intercepted by his opponent moving on the longer route! How then did Cæsar intercept Afranius and Petreius, Pompey’s lieutenants, on the Sicoris? How Pompey

* See Stedman’s History, 4to, p. 285.

† See his evidence, Court of Inquiry on the Convention of Cintra.

himself at Dyrrachium? How did Napoleon pass Beaulieu on the Po and gain Lodi? How did Massena dislodge Wellington from Busaco? How did Marmont turn him on the Guarena in 1812? How did Wellington himself turn the French on the Douro and on the Ebro in 1813? And above all, how did he propose to turn Torres Vedras by the very march in question, seeing that from Torres Vedras to Mafra is only twelve miles, and from Vimiera to Mafra is nineteen miles, the roads leading besides over a river and through narrow ways and defiles? But who ever commended such dangerous movements, if they were not masked or their success insured by some peculiar circumstances, or by some stratagem? And what is my speculation but a suggestion of this nature? "Under certain circumstances," said Sir Arthur Wellesley at the inquiry, "an army might have gained three hours' start in such a march." The argument of the suppositious officer of rank is therefore a foolish sophism; nor is that relative to Sir John Moore's moving upon Santarem, nor the assertion that my plan was at variance with all Sir Arthur Wellesley's objects, more respectable.

My plan, as it is invidiously and falsely called, was simply a reasoning upon the advantages of Sir Arthur Wellesley's plan, and the calculation of days by the reviewer is mere mysticism. Sir Arthur wished Sir John Moore to go to Santarem, and if Sir Arthur's recommendation had been followed, Sir John Moore, who instead of taking five days as this writer would have him do, actually disembarked the greatest part of his troops in the Mondego in half a day, that is before one o'clock on the 22d, might have been at Santarem the 27th even according to the reviewer's scale of march, ten miles a day! Was he to remain idle there, if the enemy did not abandon Lisbon and the strong positions covering that city? If he could stop Junot's retreat either at Santarem or in the Alemtejo, a cavalry country, he could surely as safely operate towards Saccavem, a strong country. What was Sir A. Wellesley's observation on that head? "If the march to Mafra had been made as I had ordered it on the 21st of August in the morning, the position of Torres Vedras would have been turned, and there was no position in the enemy's possession, excepting that in our front at Cabeça de Montechique and those in rear of it. And I must observe to the court that if Sir John Moore's corps had gone to Santarem as proposed as soon as it disembarked in the Mondego, there would have been no great safety in these positions, if it was, as it turned out to be, in our power to beat the French." Lo! then, my plan is not at variance with Sir Arthur Wellesley's object. But the whole of the re-

viewer's sophistry is directed, both as to this march and that to Mafra, not against me, but through me against the Duke of Wellington whom the writer dare not attack openly; witness his cunning defence of that "*wet-blanket*" counsel which stopped Sir Arthur Wellesley's pursuit of Junot from the field of Vimiero. Officer of rank! Ay, it sounds grandly! but it was a shrewd thing of Agesilaus when any one was strongly recommended to him to ask "who will vouch for the voucher!"

Passing now from the officer of rank, I affirm, notwithstanding Mr. Southey's "magnificent chapters" and Sir Charles Vaughan's "brief and elegant work," that the statement about Palafox and Zaragoza is correct. My authority is well known to Sir Charles Vaughan, and is such as he is not likely to dispute; that gentleman will not, I feel well assured, now guarantee the accuracy of the tales he was told at Zaragoza. But my real offence is not the disparagement of Palafox: it is the having spoiled some magnificent romances, present or to come; for I remember the Roman saying about the "Lying Greek fable," and endeavored so to record the glorious feats of my countrymen, that even our enemies should admit the facts. And they have hitherto done so, with a magnanimity becoming brave men who are conscious of merit in misfortune; thus putting to shame the grovelling spirit that would make calumny and vituperation the test of patriotism.

Since writing the above, a second article has appeared in the same review, to which the only reply necessary is, the giving of more proofs, that the passages of my History, contradicted by the reviewer, are strictly accurate. And to begin, it is necessary to inform him, that a man may be perfectly disciplined and a superb soldier, and yet be a raw soldier as to real service; and further, that staff officers may have been a long time in the English service, and yet be quite inexperienced. Even a quarter-master-general of an army has been known to commit all kinds of errors, and discover negligence and ignorance of his duty, in his first campaigns who yet by dint of long practice became a very good officer in his line, though perhaps not so great a general as he would pass himself off for; for it was no ill-saying of a Scotchman, that some men, if bought at the world's price, might be profitably sold at their own. Now, requesting the reader to observe that in the following quotations the impugned passages of my History are first given, and are followed by the authority, though not all the authority which might be adduced in support of each fact, I shall proceed to expose the reviewer's fallacies.

1. *History*.—"Napoleon, accompanied by the Dukes of Dalmatia and Montebello, quitted Bayonne the morning of the 8th, and reached Vittoria in the evening."

The reviewer contradicts this on the authority of Savary's *Memoirs*, quoting twice the pages and volume, namely, Vol. IV., pages 12, 40 and 41. But Savary is a writer so careless about dates and small facts, as to have made errors of a month as to time in affairs which he conducted himself. Thus, he says King Joseph abandoned Madrid on the 3d of July, 1808, whereas it was on the 3d of August. He also says the landing of Sir Arthur Wellesley in Portugal was made known to him, before the council of war relative to the evacuation of Madrid was held at that capital; but the council was held the 29th of July, and Sir Arthur did not land until the 1st of August! Savary is therefore no authority on such points. But there is no such passage as the reviewer quotes, in Savary's work. The reader will look for it in vain in pages 12, 40 and 41. It is neither in the fourth volume nor in any other volume. At page 8 of the second volume, second part, he will indeed find the following passage: "L'empereur prit la route d'Espagne avec toute son armée. Il arriva à Bayonne avec la rapidité d'un trait, de même que de Bayonne à Vittoria. Il fit ce dernier trajet à cheval *en deux courses*, de la première il alla à Tolosa et de la seconde à Vittoria." The words "deux courses," the reviewer, with his usual candor, translates, "*the first day to Tolosa, the second day to Vittoria.*" But notwithstanding this, I repeat, that the emperor made his journey in one day. My authority is the assurance of a French officer of the general staff who was present; and if the value of the fact were worth the pains, I could show that it was very easy for Napoleon to do so, inasmuch as a private gentleman, the correspondent of one of the newspapers, has recently performed the same journey in fourteen hours. But my only object in noticing it at all is to show the flagrant falseness of the reviewer.

2. *History*.—"Sir John Moore had to organize an army of raw soldiers, and in a poor unsettled country just relieved from the pressure of a harsh and griping enemy, he had to procure the transport necessary for his stores, ammunition, and even for the conveyance of the officers' baggage. Every branch of the administration, civil and military, was composed of men zealous and willing indeed, yet new to a service where no energy can prevent the effects of inexperience being severely felt."

Authorities.—Extracts from Sir John Moore's journal and letters.

"I am equipping the troops here and moving them towards the

frontier, but I found the army without the least preparation, without any precise information with respect to roads, and no arrangement for feeding the troops upon their march."—"The army is without equipments of any kind, either for the carriage of the light baggage of regiments, artillery stores, commissariat stores, or any other appendage to an army, and not a magazine is formed on any of the routes."—"The commissariat has at its head Mr. Erskine, a gentleman of great integrity and honor, and of considerable ability, but neither he nor any of his officers have any experience of what an army of this magnitude requires to put it in motion."—"Everything is, however, going on with zeal; there is no want of that in an English army, and though the difficulties are considerable, and we have to move through a very impracticable country, I expect to be past the frontier early in November."

Extract from a memoir by Sir John Colborne, military secretary to Sir John Moore.

"The heads of departments were all zeal, but they had but little experience, and their means for supplying the wants of the army about to enter on an active campaign were in many respects limited."

3. *History*.—"One Sataro, the same person who has been already mentioned as an agent of Junot's in the negotiations engaged to supply the army, but dishonestly failing in his contract, so embarrassed the operations," &c., &c.

Authority.—Extract from Sir John Colborne's memoir quoted above.

"Satara, a contractor at Lisbon, had agreed to supply the divisions on the march through Portugal. He failed in his contract, and daily complaints were transmitted to head-quarters of want of provisions on this account. The divisions of General Fraser and Beresford were halted, and had it not been for the exertions of these generals and of the Portuguese magistrates, the army would have been long delayed."

4. *History*.—"General Anstruther had unadvisedly halted the leading columns in Almeida."

Authority.—Extract from Sir John Moore's journal.

"Br. general Anstruther, who took possession of Almeida from the French, and who has been there ever since, and to whom I had written to make preparations for the passage of the troops on this route and Coimbra, has stopped them within the Portuguese frontier, instead of making them proceed, as I had directed, to Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca."

5. *History*.—"Sir John Moore did not hear of the total defeat and dispersion of Belvedere's Estremaduran army until a week

after it happened, and then only through one official channel." That channel was Mr. Stuart. Sir John had heard indeed that the Estremadurans had been forced from Burgos, but nothing of their utter defeat and ruin: the difference is cunningly overlooked by the reviewer.

Authority.—Extract of a letter from Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Nov. 16th, 1808.

"I had last night the honor to receive your letter of the 13th, together with letters of the 14th, from Mr. Stuart and Lord William Bentinck."—"I did not know until I received Mr. Stuart's letter, that the defeat of the Estremaduran army had been so complete."

Now that army was destroyed on the morning of the 10th, and here we see that the intelligence of it did not reach Sir John Moore till the night of the 15th, which, if not absolutely a whole week, is near enough to justify the expression.

6. *History.*—"Thousands of arms were stored up in the great towns."

Authority.—Extract from Sir John Moore's letter to Mr. Stuart. 1st December, 1808.—"At Zamora, there are *three* or *four thousand* stand of arms, in other places, *there may be more*. If they remain collected in town, they will be taken by the enemy."

7. *History.*—"Sir John Hope's division was ordered to pass the Duero at Tordesillas."

Authority.—Extract of a letter from Sir John Moore to Sir David Baird, 12th December, 1808.

"Lord Paget is at Toro, to which place I have sent the reserve and General Beresford's brigade, the rest of the troops from thence are moving to the Duero; my quarters, to-morrow, will be at Alaejos, *Hope's at Tordesillas.*"

Now it is true that on the 14th, Sir John Moore, writing from Alaejos to Sir David Baird, says that he had *then* resolved to change his direction, and instead of going to Valladolid, should be at Toro on the 15th, with all the troops; but as Hope was to have been at Tordesillas the same day that Moore was at Alaejos, namely, on the 13th, he must have marched from thence to Toro: and where was the danger? The cavalry of his division, under General C. Stewart had already surprised the French at Rueda, higher up the Duero, and it was well known, no infantry were nearer than the Carrion.

8. *History.*—"Sir John Moore was not put in communication with any person with whom he could communicate at all."

Authority.—Extracts from Sir John Moore's letters and journal, 19th and 28th November.

"I am not in communication with any of the Spanish generals,