

even this fall short of the fact; there are fords at other periods also.

Page 48.—The author, continuing his reprimand, says, “the Tagus could not be forded by Victor.”

Answer.—The question is not whether he could *ford*, but whether he could *pass*; but even as to fording, the extract from Sir John Cradock’s letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated 12th April, before quoted, proves this writer’s error.

Page 49.—It is asked, “Supposing Marshal Victor had, as Colonel Napier points out, marched to Almada, what result would have ensued?”

Answer.—The allies’ advance to Oporto would have been changed to a retreat; but I have nowhere pointed out such a march for Marshal Victor.

Pages 50 and 51.—“The historian recommends Saccavem and Lumiar as advantageous and proper posts for the defence of Lisbon.”

“Place the British army at Sacavem and Lumiar and the enemy could, without difficulty, turn it by Loures and Bemfica.”

Answer.—It is again Sir John Cradock, and not the historian, who recommends those positions; neither are they, as this writer would have it believed, spoken of at all as fields of battle, but as positions on which to concentrate the whole allied forces, with a view of covering Lisbon. Where is the position that may not be turned? The thing to look to is, whether an army, in position, can by shorter routes intercept the march of the enemy, and offer battle again. In this view the French engineer, St. Vincent, after a careful examination, recommended those posts to Junot, and in this view Sir John Cradock decided to occupy them. “I shall,” he writes to Lord Castlereagh, “collect the British force on the heights of Lumiar, my cavalry and light troops at the passes of Monte Cabeços and Bucellar, and a supporting corps at Bucellar. From this station at Lumiar I can move in any direction where the enemy can present himself.”

Page 52.—The pamphleteer says, “He has shown, and he trusts to the satisfaction of the reader, that the position so much recommended in the History of the Peninsular War, was improper in every point of view; that looking to the position of the enemy’s corps, neither Lisbon nor its environs could be considered as affording a central, but, on the contrary, a very retired position.”

Answer.—The posts alluded to, namely Saccavem and Lumiar, were neither commended nor discommended by me; nor are they anywhere expressly called a central position. I said, “Sir John Cradock resolved to preserve his central position; covering the

capital at such a distance as to preclude the danger of being cut off by one army, while he was engaged with another." This refers, not to one, but to any place suiting that plan of action. Again, I remarked, "it must not be objected to Sir John Cradock that he disregarded the value of a central position, which might enable him to be beforehand with the enemy in covering Lisbon if the latter should march on his flank."

But Cradock's position at Lumiar was, in regard to Lisbon and the expected advance of the enemy, a central position. Victor and Soult, marching direct upon Lisbon, could not have formed a junction without giving Cradock an opportunity to push between and fight either separately. Here, as this writer makes himself merry with what he calls my central position, I will take the trouble to inform him that, in a military sense, a central position is one from which a general can, when opposed by two adversaries, acting on different lines of operations, prevent his opponents from uniting except by circuitous marches; wherefore it may be central, and at the same time retired. Napoleon's position at the siege of Mantua was central, yet so retired, that his opponents were close upon Mantua ere he could fight them.

Page 63.—"Lord Beresford departed from Lisbon on the 8th of April, leaving Sir John Cradock still opposed to his views of marching to Leiria."

Answer.—"I consented to General Beresford's wish to make a movement in advance."—*Letter from Sir John Cradock to General R. Stewart, 8th of April.*

Page 76.—"But where are these mountains which Colonel Napier has placed between Oporto and Lisbon?"

Answer.—Between Lisbon and Oporto!

They have various names—there is the Sierra de Caramula, Sierra de Busaco, Monte Junto, and the mountains of Torres Vedras, Mafra, Montechique, &c., on which Lord Wellington's famous lines were established in 1810.

Page 77, the pamphleteer says, I have mentioned many reasons, but not the real and substantial one why Lord Wellington moved against Soult instead of Victor, namely—"Lisbon would have been left open to the former general."

Answer.—The reasons given by me were,—

1. Sir Arthur Wellesley preferred attacking Soult, because he held a rich province, and Oporto the second city of Portugal, which both regent and people desired to recover.

2. To attack Victor, it was requisite to combine operations with Cuesta, which required time, *which might be employed against Soult.*

Authorities.—Sir A. Wellesley's correspondence :

"I should prefer an attack upon Victor in concert with Cuesta, if Soult was not in possession of a fertile province of the kingdom, and of the favorite town of Oporto;"*—"and if any operation against Victor, connected with Cuesta's movements, did not require time to concert it, which may as well be employed in dislodging Soult."

"An operation against Victor is attended by those advantages— if successful, it relieves effectually Seville and Lisbon," &c. &c.†

Thus the "substantial reason" falls to the ground. Sir Arthur does not mention it; and if he thought a movement against Victor would effectually relieve Lisbon, he could have had no fear of Soult.

Page 78.—The pamphleteer "is at a loss to see how their (Soult's and Victor's) operations could have been carried on by the Zezere."

Answer.—My expression was not "carry on," but "connect their operations," and the Zezere was only mentioned as the line by which Soult and Victor, after reaching the Mondego and the Tagus, could best communicate, or, if necessary, form a junction—and why not? If two armies make a flank march to effect a junction, to cover their movements by a river will not only protect their march, but render their junction militarily secure long before the troops actually meet; the enemy cannot safely pass the river to prevent it.

Pages 93, 94, contain a labored rebuke, for, that I have called small bodies of troops "corps."

Answer.—It may be that "corps" is a barbarism, but it is found in Johnson's Dictionary, and there defined "a body of soldiers."

Page 101.—It is asserted that on Soult's retreat from Oporto, Silveira, in disobedience of the most positive orders, "never turned his troops on the Mondin road or towards Salamonde," and that early on the 15th, "Lord Beresford, leaving Amarante on his way to Chaves, overtook General Silveira's division."

Answer.—These assertions have little reference to anything I have said, but they are meant to explain the "failure in Marshal Beresford's operations" to which the French owed their safety. I will not contradict them; yet Silveira always affirmed that his division did march on the 14th to Mondin, and thence through Cavez to Ginzo, where he took thirty prisoners on the 15th, and where his further progress was arrested by unexpected orders from Marshal Beresford's head-quarters. He also affirmed that the troops Beresford overtook, as above stated, were not his, but Buccellar's Beira

* To Lord Castlereagh, April 5.

† To Mr. Frere.

division, which at that time was only an auxiliary. I have, therefore, in nowise misrepresented the matter in saying, "*there was a failure in Beresford's operations,*" and "*there seemed to be some misunderstanding between him and Silveira.*"

Page 104.—Adverting to my praise of Trant's advance to the Vouga, the writer says, "*the author, for a military man, has an extraordinary method of separating the subordinate or executive officer from the general under whose direction that officer acts.*"

Answer.—General Trant assured me that his advance to the Vouga was his own sudden and spontaneous act.

Page 110.—The following passage from my work is quoted. "*Early in June, Marshal Beresford was, with three brigades, directed on Castello Branco.*" Upon which the writer observes, "*Lord Beresford was neither directed on that place, nor did he go there.*"

Answer.—Lord Londonderry, in his "Narrative of the War," p. 305, says, "*Marshal Beresford, for example, instead of returning to the north, was ordered to proceed with one British and two Portuguese brigades by Castello Branco to the Tietar.*" As his lordship was adjutant-general at the time, and must, therefore, have issued the order himself, I adopted his assertion without a suspicion of its incorrectness.

Page 115.—The pamphleteer says, "*the Duke del Parque would not give Lord Beresford some British biscuit left in store at Ciudad Rodrigo by the commissariat of Sir John Moore's army,*" and he appends to this the following note: "*Colonel Napier, with his usual inaccuracy, says by order of Sir Arthur Wellesley,*"—that is, I said, "*the store was formed by Sir Arthur Wellesley's order.*"

Answer.—Extract from Sir A. Wellesley's correspondence: "*It is a curious circumstance respecting Marshal Beresford's corps, that the Cabildo of Ciudad Rodrigo actually refused to allow them to have 30,000 lbs. of 100,000 lbs. of biscuit which I had prepared there in case the operations of the army should be directed to that quarter.*"*

I now come to the last, not the least of this writer's mistakes. In my History, it is said, Marshal Beresford was so credulous of French weakness in the number of troops, as publicly to announce to the junta of Badajos, that "*Soult's force, wandering and harassed by continual attacks, was reduced to 8000 or 10,000 soldiers,*" upon which the pamphleteer (p. 112) remarks, "*Lord Beresford will, I apprehend, be surprised at this information: although reading of events with which he had no inconsiderable concern, he must feel himself indebted to Lieutenant-colonel Napier for a great deal of very important intelligence relating both to them and to himself.*"

* To the Marquis Wellesley, Merida, September 1, 1809.

The above relation will, I suspect, be received by his lordship as news of the very newest description. I doubt whether Lord Beresford, in the whole course of his life ever communicated with the junta of Badajoz."—"Of course, the historian will give his authority for the fact."—"This public announcement to the junta of Badajoz—this numerical accuracy with which Lord Beresford's estimate of Soult's force is set down—all these particularities remind one vastly of the veracious anecdotes of the worthies of the 'School for Scandal,' and I can only reply to them in the words of Sir Benjamin—the lieutenant-colonel's account is more circumstantial, I confess, but I believe mine is the only true one, for all that."

Authority.—Letter from his excellency, Marshal Beresford, to the junta of Badajoz; extracted from the *British Press* of July 7, 1809.

"To his Excellency the President and the Lords of Junta of Estremadura.

"I have already transmitted you an account of the forces I sent to Alcantara, and which were obliged to abandon that position to the enemy on account of his superior numbers. The resistance they made, however, was highly honorable to the small corps which ultimately remained to defend that pass, though the loss and damage sustained by the town in consequence gave me great concern. I have again sent to Alcantara four battalions under the same brave officer, Colonel Mayne. I flatter myself that in a short time all that part of Spain will be freed from its oppressors. I have much pleasure in transmitting to the junta copies of the letters received yesterday from Galicia, and congratulate it on the favorable appearance of things in that province. You already know that upon the defeat of the corps of Marshal Soult by General Sir Arthur Wellesley, the enemy were reduced to a most disgraceful flight, abandoning their ammunition, &c., and the soldiers throwing away their arms; after which, they made such forced marches that it was impossible to come up with the main body of the army before it had passed the bridge of Breuga. Our troops followed them with all expedition to that place, between which and Alariz we made some prisoners. I have previously communicated to all the juntas and generals in Galicia the probability that *the remnant of this army, amounting only to about 8000 or 10,000 men, without any cannon or ammunition, and in every respect in the most wretched condition, flying from our troops,* would retire into that country, in order that they might be prepared in the best manner to receive them; and I entertain no doubt that the consequences of the capture of Lugo, and of Ney

having left Galicia, will be fatal to Soult. I have the honor to remain, with the most profound respect,

“Your most obedient servant,

“G. C. BERESFORD”

Coimbra, May 29.

Is that sufficient authority? or will it be called a forgery, as some other letters have been, because the initial of the first Christian name is given according to the Spanish spelling, namely, Guilhelmo for William? But having now tracked the pamphleteer through most of his tortuous statements, I pray my readers to observe, that this mass of errors and scurrility is contained in a pamphlet of less than 130 pages; it is the production of a writer who acknowledges to have spent three months in its preparation, because he was “*anxious that nothing should be published in reply to my mistakes which could be justly cited as a mistake of his own;*” and who, after roughly noticing even a false punctuation, in such an extensive work as mine, lays down the following rules for the guidance of contemporary historians. “*That they should not attempt to go farther than a bare register of facts.*” That they must “*cast aside all evidence which would be scouted in a court of justice;*” and that they must “*never allow the words, ‘it is said,’ to disgrace their work.*” In fine, that the public must be content, by a species of comparative anatomy, to judge of the size and form of the great transactions of the world from a few dry bones presented by the grubbers for small facts.

Since writing the above, *Further Strictures* from the same pen have appeared. The author is surprised that his former admonitions have had no effect upon me; perhaps he will be more surprised to find that his present corrections are likely to have the same fate; for being written in the same style, and as inaccurate as those I have just analyzed, it would be waste of time to notice them. Sir Benjamin D’Urban has, however, now mixed himself up in this controversy, and his objections shall have an answer.

His account of the battle of Albuera I had before me when I wrote mine;—if I have not quoted him, it is because that was the condition on which a copy was placed in my hands;—if I have not followed him as a guide exactly, it is because other information justified me in quitting him at certain points with respect to matters of fact, and his opinions and conclusions I was in no manner bound to.

1. I acknowledge an involuntary error in saying Marshal Beresford’s failure at Badajos kept Lord Wellington for nearly *two years* on the frontier of Portugal. I should have said more than one

year. How the mistake crept in, I cannot say, but I had already detected and corrected it in my copy for the second edition.

2. I know that Marshal Beresford obeyed Lord Wellington's instructions by crossing the Guadiana at Jerumenha, it is so stated in my History; but Lord Wellington had also given him a discretionary power of acting, and to invest Badajos quickly was the principal object. It is Marshal Beresford's judgment in the use of that discretionary power that I have censured.

3. In opposition to Sir Benjamin, I adhere to my assertion that Marshal Beresford fought an unnecessary battle, and *fought it against his own judgment*. Nor was it upon slight authority that I said the impatient feeling of the army was so strongly represented to him as to affect his decision. I am not bound to name that authority because Sir Benjamin chooses to "regard the fact as imaginary," but that Lord Beresford fought the battle against his own judgment is undeniable, or there is no truth in the following extract from General Harvey's journal.

24th May, 1811.—"Met General Beresford, and rode to Villalba, where there is an old castle," &c., &c. "The Marshal was remarkably communicative as to the policy of fighting at Albuera, which he blames himself much for, depicting the consequences of defeat in most serious colors."

Here I must notice the Second Strictures. If Marshal Beresford is content to have such a defender, I have no reason to regret his taste; but should the production reach a second edition, I would advise the writer not to let his authorities contradict his text.

Page 125, he says Sir Alexander Dickson having "furnished me with the number of guns, I arbitrarily decided as to their calibre." But in page 51, Appendix, No. IV., General D'Urban (whom I followed) sets down, under the head of artillery employed in the battle of Albuera, six German, six Portuguese, and six British nine-pounders; wherefore, if nine is nine, and three sixes make eighteen, I did not "arbitrarily decide as to their calibre."

Page 35, it is said: "As to the author's assertion that the Tagus might have been forded after a week's dry weather, nothing can be more imaginary. The whole allied army, and the whole French army, know the absurd incorrectness of this statement." But at p. 3, Appendix, Sir Benjamin D'Urban says: "The Tagus between Golegao and Rio Moinhos was known to offer several fords after a few days' dry weather."

Page 36, he says: "The whole army was about 20,000;" but at page 13, Appendix, D'Urban gives 20,000 infantry and 1400 cavalry, besides artillery.

Page 75, it is affirmed that Beresford could form his bridge and

pass over his troops in the sight and in despite of the French; and that it was "perfectly impossible for them to frustrate the operation;" but at page 12, D'Urban's Appendix, it is said: "The French might have opposed the operation with a rational prospect of success."

Page 77, "the night was so dark, that the enemy neither was *nor could be seen*;" but page 12 of D'Urban's Appendix, says: "The enemy observed the heights occupied, and gave up his design."

Page 80, "the army did not halt at Olivenza;" page 13 of the Appendix, Sir Benjamin says: "The army being without provisions, encamped in the woods round that town."

Page 162, "the sudden shift of wind, which Colonel Napier has introduced with somewhat of dramatic effect, to clear away the obscurity of mist and smoke in which he had veiled the scene, never occurred;" page 31 of the Appendix, Sir B. D'Urban says: "The wind at this moment blew aside the smoke and rain."

This suffices to prove my opponent vulnerable. But I have stated no fact without authority, and I shall hereafter show this, on all important points that may be contradicted. To fix exactly all the periods and circumstances of a battle is nearly impossible, and I admit that on some minor points this writer seems better informed than General D'Urban or myself. Wherefore, in a second edition I will accept and use his correction; and also other recent information, showing that Lord Beresford's errors at Albuera and Campo Mayor were greater than I have represented them. I cannot promise to say with Dumouriez, who it would seem is angler enough to know a trout from a gudgeon, that Marshal Beresford, at Albuera, "did more than Cæsar at Pharsalia," but I will endeavor to chastise "the spirit of the inquisitor," and retain only the "liberal" in my composition; meanwhile, this writer, who, "being pestered with a popinjay, answers he knows not what," may recover temper, which, next to "parmaceti, is the sovereignest thing on earth for an inward bruise."

From the tedium of personal justification, I turn to the more grateful task of replying to some unfounded criticisms on Sir John Moore's campaign.

It might be imagined, when time had blunted the edge of political malice, Moore's heroic death would have arrested censure which could not be substantiated; but in this, as in other human affairs, all opinions are not to be bound in one fetter. Yet will I show, that his censurers have only opinions unsupported by facts to offer. To effect this, I must again advert to "Colonel Sorrel's Notes."

classing them with "Hamilton's Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns," and "Sherer's Life of the Duke of Wellington," quoting and answering all indifferently, as their arguments or assertions present themselves.

They accuse Sir John Moore—1. Of vacillation and of losing time at Salamanca. 2. Of taking counsel from others rather than from his own judgment. 3. Of neglecting Galicia as a defensive position. These are their words :

"That time was lost at Salamanca, is a matter of fact, and a great subject of regret. The value of a day, or an hour in war is great. It is in vain to ask what might have been the consequences of a movement into the heart of Spain, which was never made, and which, according to able and acute men, should never have been contemplated; but it is certain that between that measure and a retreat on Portugal, Sir John Moore wavered long in his designs."

—*Life of the Duke of Wellington*, page 163.

"Part of his difficulties must be admitted to have proceeded from his own arrangements."—"While the infantry proceeded by Almeida, the cavalry and artillery were directed to advance by Merida and Truxillo; and the consequence was, that the difficulty of collecting his army was prodigiously enhanced, and Sir John Moore was compelled to remain above a month inactive at Salamanca. Precious time was there lost. The thoughts of the general were bent on a retreat. The army did not move until the eleventh hour, and action was unfortunately delayed till the precise period when action could no longer be available."—*Annals of the Campaign*, page 102.

"It is much to be lamented that Sir John Moore did not feel himself fully at liberty to follow the dictates of his own excellent judgment, instead of yielding to suggestions and opinions which, being founded on false data, scarcely merited attention."—*Sorrel's Notes on the Campaigns*, 1808-9, page 41.

These three writers here agree in censuring Sir John Moore, yet afterwards all disagree on what he should have done. The author of *The Life* would have had him retreat at once upon Portugal; the author of *The Notes* insists on the primary importance of defending Galicia; the author of *The Annals* vacillates between that and "retiring," as he phrases it, "across the Tagus to the south." This discrepancy shows a variety of fancy, no difference of judgment, because none of them have examined the subject with a reference to facts. This shall be demonstrated.

"He was compelled to remain a month inactive at Salamanca."—*Annals*.

Two thousand men, the head of Sir John Moore's column, reached

Salamanca the 13th of November, the rear did not arrive until the 25th, and on the 11th of December the army marched towards Sahagun; thus, if the troops could have commenced operations the day after they arrived, the month is reduced to fifteen days. Were those days wasted in inactivity? Was it inactivity to keep so near a powerful enemy until Baird and Hope effected their junction? Was it inactivity to fix in that short period, amidst a thousand conflicting and false representations and reports, the true character of the Spanish insurrection, and with so sure a judgment that every operation founded upon a different view failed even to the end of the war? Was it inactivity to have arranged the means of throwing the army into the heart of Spain? And when the battle of Tudela, breaking that measure, obliged Moore to prepare for a retreat, was it inactivity, amidst such difficulties and anxieties, when without money to establish sure intelligence, he had new prospects opened, to arrange a forward movement in the face of three hundred thousand men, at the same time changing the line of operations from Portugal to Galicia? Are these things the work of a moment?

Suppose the artillery under Hope had moved with Sir John Moore, had been at Salamanca on the 25th November; the junction with Baird was still to be effected, and the separation of that general was not the work of Moore. Would this writer, then, have had the latter advance with fourteen or fifteen thousand men to Burgos, or to Aranda de Duero, or to Madrid? If to the last, Baird must have been abandoned, because the fourth corps, which was at Rio Seco the 25th November, would have intercepted his line of march. Burgos? He was still too late, because Blake's and Belvedere's armies had been dispersed on the 10th and 11th. Say they had not been dispersed; then the arrangement of sending Hope by Madrid was better than marching in one column to Salamanca; because the latter, enlarged and troubled with a great train of carriages and guns, could not have reached that town so soon as the 25th; but moving as they did on separate roads, all marched more rapidly, and Hope could have united at Burgos with a difference of only twelve leagues and at Aranda with a difference only of one league in the distance traversed. Wherefore it is clear that Sir John Moore's mind was not "continually bent on retreat," that his arrangements did not in any manner oblige him to remain a month inactive at Salamanca. In fine, he was not inactive at all.

But says the author of the Annals, "the time chosen for action was precisely when action could not avail." And "On the advance of the British, Soult, as a matter of course, would have fallen back to Burgos, where his corps would have affected a junction

with that of Junot. Nothing therefore could be more visionary than a project of defeating Soult."

Is there any foundation for all this? Sir John Moore reasoned thus, "Soult knows nothing of my march—he may be surprised and beaten; if he retreats, the French grand communications are exposed: in either case Napoleon must come to his succor. If he come with a small force, he also may be fought withal. If with a large force, I incur danger, but a diversion for the south is effected." What was the result? Soult instead of "*retiring as a matter of course*," stood his ground, the emperor came back with his whole army, and the only thing visionary is the argument of this writer.

"It is certain that he long wavered."—*Life of Wellington*.

When only two thousand British had reached Salamanca, Blake and Belvedere, whose armies were to cover the junction of Moore's divisions, were utterly routed, and the French cavalry entered Valladolid. Moore then told the junta that if the enemy advanced he must go back; they did not advance and he remained at Salamanca.

On the 25th his column was closed up, and on the 27th the state of affairs being more clearly known, he prepared to throw himself into the heart of Spain.

On the 28th, news of Castaños' destruction and of Napoleon's movement on Madrid arrived; the British flanks were not then united to the centre, and the proposed measure became impracticable; wherefore, Moore resolved, when his artillery and cavalry should have joined, to retreat to Portugal.

The 4th of December Hope arrived; the 5th, information came that Napoleon was resisted at Madrid, and by the 7th, from every quarter came news, which whether from natives or Englishmen, private or official, was all of the same tenor—namely, that the enthusiasm of Spain was again awakened. Moreover, Napoleon's march from Burgos to the capital, not only permitted a junction with Baird's division, but opened a point of attack to the now united British army. On the 7th, therefore, Sir John, seizing the opportunity thus suddenly offered, resolved to advance on Sahagun, thereby meeting new combinations with fresh dispositions. Is that wavering? Is a general to shut his eyes to what is passing around him, and stupidly follow a plan preconceived upon circumstances totally different from the actual ones?

"He should have followed his own excellent judgment," says the author of the Notes.—"He should have retired across the Tagus to the south," says the author of the Annals.

He could not have done both. When Napoleon was at Burgos,

Moore might have retired across the Tagus; but the author of the *Annals* speaks of the period when the advance to Sahagun was commenced; at that time Napoleon was at Madrid with 60,000 men, and the 4th corps was moving on Talavera; wherefore any movement towards the Tagus would have been an advance, and Moore's excellent judgment certainly would not have let him call an advance a retreat. But did he not follow his own judgment? Mr. Frere and the Spaniards wanted him to move upon Madrid, and he went towards Burgos. Sir David Baird wanted him to take a defensive position in Galicia, and he made a forward movement to Sahagun. Others wanted him to retreat to Portugal, and militarily speaking that was most advisable: Moore said so. But the awakening enthusiasm offered a hope for Spain, and he advanced on political grounds, calculating, as indeed happened, that he should always be able to retreat by Galicia, which was not worse than a retreat on Portugal. There was danger, yet war is never a safe game; and when, as in this case, all the difficulties are foreseen and boldly met or skilfully evaded, a dangerous operation is not rash but great.

Let me now prove, that he acted upon such a calculation—that he foresaw and judged all the difficulties and results, military and political—that he adopted no man's recommendations, but executed his own plan.

Salamanca, December 6th.—“What is passing at Madrid may be decisive of the fate of Spain, and we must be at hand to aid and to take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our country and our duty demand this of us with whatever risk it may be attended; yet I mean to proceed bridle in hand, for, if the bubble bursts, we shall have a run for it.”*

Salamanca, 8th December.—“Madrid still holds out, and I have some reason to believe that efforts are making to collect a force at Toledo, and a still larger one on the other side of the Sierra Morena: as long as there is a chance we must not abandon this country.”†

Salamanca, 9th December.—“After Castaños' defeat the French marched for Madrid, the inhabitants flew to arms,” &c.‡ “This is the first instance of enthusiasm shown; there is hope that the example may be followed, and the people be roused, in which case there is still a chance that this country may be saved. Upon this chance I have stopped Baird's retreat, and have taken measures to form our junction, whilst the French are wholly occupied with Madrid: we are bound not to abandon the cause as long as there

* Sir John Moore's Correspondence.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Sir John Moore's Journal.

is hope; but the courage of the populace of Madrid may fail, or, at any rate, they may not be able to resist—in short, in a moment things may be as bad as ever.”

11th December.—“I shall assemble the army at Valladolid.”—“By this movement I shall threaten the French communications, which will make some diversion in favor of the Spaniards if they can take advantage of it;* but I much fear they will not move, but leave me to fight the battle by myself, in which case I must keep my communications open with Astorga and Gallicia.”

Sahagun, December 24.—“I gave up the march on Carrion, which had never been undertaken but with the view of attracting the enemy’s attention from the armies assembled in the south, and in the hopes of being able to strike a blow at a weak corps, while it was still thought that the British were retreating into Portugal.”

“The experiment failed,” says the author of the *Annals*. In what manner? “The object of my movement,” says Sir John Moore, on the 12th of December, “is to threaten the French communications, and attract their attention from Madrid and Zaragoza, and favor any movement which may be made by the Spanish armies forming to the south of the Tagus.” Now, what was the result? The fifth corps left Zaragoza; the 4th corps withdrew from Estremadura; the 2d corps came from New Castille; the 8th corps from Navarre; Napoleon, with 50,000 men, returned from Madrid—the whole plan of his campaign was overturned! Cuesta was then enabled to move an army from the Morena to the Tagus, Infantado to obtain refuge at Cuenca, Palacios to descend into La Mancha; the siege of Zaragoza was delayed, Portugal was saved, and the conquest of Andalusia deferred. This is to fail! And it is thus, turning from the steady light of facts, this writer endeavors by the feeble glimmer of his own imagination to trace Moore’s career?

These authors seem bad generals in the plains of Castille; let us see if they are better on the mountains of Gallicia.

“Had the information of the general, with regard to the country traversed by his army, been more accurate and extensive, he would have known that there was no road leading to Betanzos and Coruña by which the enemy could at any season have advanced with rapidity sufficient to have endangered his communications—in fact, the roads on the right and left occupied by the British, most difficult at any season, must, at the period in question, when covered with deep snow and intersected by swollen torrents from the mountains, have been utterly impracticable.”—*Annals* 112, *et seq.*

The brigades of Alten and Crauford, quitting Moore’s main

* Sir John Moore’s Correspondence.

body near Astorga, marched by Domingo Flores and the Puente de Bibey to Orense and Tuy; from Orense there is a cavalry road to St. Jago; from Tuy there is an artillery road by Ponte Vedra to St. Jago; from St. Jago there is a royal road to Coruña. Soult desired Ney to march the whole of the 6th corps by this last route to Coruña, and General Marchand's division did actually so move, reaching St. Jago soon after the battle of Coruña.

From Villa Franca, Franceschi marched with his cavalry into the Val des Orres, and then, remounting the Minho, rejoined Soult between Villa Franca and Lugo. This march took place during Moore's retreat; after that event, Soult moved from Coruña by Ponte Vedra and Tuy to Orense, sending La Houssaye's dragoons through Mellid to the same place: from Orense there is also a direct route to St. Jago.

From Lugo there is a carriage road to St. Jago, through Mellid. This was the route by which Sir John Moore intended to retreat to Vigo, and along which Mackenzie Fraser's division did actually march and then return, and there were magazines at all three places.

From Lugo there is a road by Monteforte to the Val des Orres, closely flanking the royal road from Villa Franca, by which Moore retired. Soult marched his whole corps by that route when operating against Romana, after the retreat from Oporto.

From Benevente there is a high road by Mombuey and Puebla de Senabria leading to Orense. Soult also traversed this route in June, 1809.

From the Asturias there is a road by the Conceja de Ibas to Lugo. This route was followed by Ney, in May, 1809.

From the Asturias there is a road through Mondonedo to Betanzos and Coruña, and there is also the coast road by Ribadeo to Ferrol. These roads were marched by Ney, and by Romana, in April and May; Moreover, Romana moved from Mondonedo to the sources of the Neyra, and thence into the Val des Orres, his route being by the line of the Asturian frontier, and consequently flanking the royal road of Lugo. So much for "impracticable roads."

These writers think Moore ought to have defended Galicia

"It has been matter of regret to many that Sir John Moore was not led to regard with a more favorable eye the project of defending Galicia. No part of Spain offers equal advantages for a defensive war."

"The documents given in the appendix to Colonel Napier's History, abundantly prove, that it was to this quarter that the anxieties of Napoleon were chiefly directed."—*Annals*, p. 140, *et seq.*

“ Perhaps it is to be regretted that the suggestion thrown out by Sir David Baird’s letter of the 8th December, from Villa Franca, was not adopted.”

“ Had the British army been collected on the frontier of Galicia, about the middle of December, there can be little doubt that it would have been able to have maintained itself, at least during the winter ; and long before spring the face of affairs was completely changed by the departure of Napoleon and of the force which followed him, to the Austrian war.”

“ When the suggestion was offered, our strength was unimpaired, our equipment perfect, and the great body of the French was occupied with Madrid.”

“ Lugo and other points might have been fortified, positions taken up and strengthened, depôts established, and, by a judicious disposition of our force, the danger of being turned by the road through Orense, and by those from the north of Portugal and the Asturias, might have been sufficiently guarded against.”

“ The opinion of Buonaparte on the influence which the occupation of Galicia, by an enemy to France, might have had on the war in Spain, is recorded in a letter, which was written under his dictation to General Savary.”—*Sorrel’s Notes, page 41, et seq.*

The argument of the author of the *Annals* being but a meagre copy of Colonel Sorrel’s *Notes*, to answer one is to answer both ; but previous to examining the question of the defence of Galicia, I will mark some stumbling-blocks in the way of both.

1. On the 8th of December say the *Notes*, “ our strength was unimpaired, and the French were occupied with Madrid.”

The strength of the British army was the same on the 24th as on the 8th of December ; no loss, save a few men hurt in the cavalry skirmishes, had been sustained. Madrid capitulated the 3d of December ; on the 4th the French took possession ; Napoleon was so little occupied with it on the 8th of December, that he had, on the 4th, detached his cavalry in pursuit of Castaños’ fugitive army, sent the 1st corps to La Mancha to menace Andalusia, and the 4th corps to Talavera, to form an advance guard for the march against Lisbon !

2. “ The anxieties of Napoleon were chiefly directed towards Galicia.”—*Annals*.

This expression is not very intelligible, but taken with the context, it means that Napoleon feared opposition in Galicia more than in any other quarter ; yet two pages after we find the same author asserting that Moore should have “ retired across the Tagus,” because “ There it was that he was most dreaded by Napoleon.”

3. The documents quoted from my Appendix, instead of being favorable to, are directly opposed to the views of these writers.

Before the battle of Rio Seco, Napoleon tells Savary that "Bessières had to fight for the communications of the French, and that a wound received by him would give a spasm to the whole army." Nothing could be better expressed or more applicable to the state of affairs. The French then in the Peninsula were about 135,000, of which 48,000 were in Portugal and Catalonia. Of the remainder, 50,000 were scattered in Valencia, Andalusia, and the borders of Murcia. 10,000 were at Zaragoza, some at Madrid, and only 15,000 *under Bessières* were left to protect the communications from Cuesta and Blake; whose united force, exceeding 40,000, the best regular troops in Spain, was entering the plains of Leon; moreover, the king was then on his journey to the capital, and had Bessières been defeated would have been forced to fly. It was, therefore, the comparative strength of the Spaniards on this point, combined with the danger of the king and the scattered state of the other French corps, especially that of Dupont's, which drew Napoleon's attention, not the geographical advantages of Galicia.

What a vast difference also, between the circumstances at the two periods brought into comparison by these writers!

When the emperor wrote, the heads of the French invasion were engaged in Valencia, Andalusia, and Aragon; the whole country was in insurrection. Spanish armies gathering in every quarter, Spanish courage untried, the French communications protected by a force only one third of that opposed to it. When Moore retreated, 90,000 men, that is, four times his force, were united in pursuit of him; all the Spanish armies had been dispersed, the insurrections quelled; Zaragoza was menaced by 35,000 French, 20,000 were at Talavera, 30,000 in La Mancha, 10,000 in Madrid, Burgos was in a state of defence, many thousand soldiers were distributed on the lines of Correspondence, and 50,000 were marching under Napoleon upon Astorga. All that great man's combinations were compact, his communications protected, and the head of the principal operation turned, not as in the former case away from but against Galicia; and this, not because of its geographical advantages (which it is evident he disregarded when he went from Burgos to Madrid although he knew Baird's division was at Astorga), but because the united British army was on his communications. "Napoleon's dread," and "Napoleon's anxieties," sound grandly; but his opinions should be understood before they are quoted. At that time he feared neither British nor Spanish armies in Galicia, nor any other part; his force was overpower-

ing, and the head of his invasion was wherever he choose to place it. If Moore had retired on Lisbon, Napoleon would have followed him to Lisbon. As Moore went to Gallicia, against that point the emperor immediately drove.

"Bessières is to-day at Medina Rio Seco: he will open communication with Portugal, force the rebels into Gallicia, and seize Leon."

"If Cuesta throws himself into Gallicia without fighting or suffering a defeat, the position of the army will be improved. If he does so after a defeat it will be still better."

"By driving Cuesta into Gallicia we deprive him of his communications with Madrid, Andalusia, and Estremadura."

"The two important points, and where they can make a real regular warfare, are Gallicia and Andalusia, because the troops of San Roque, of Cadiz, and Algarve, are nearly 25,000 men, who have taken part with the sedition of Seville; and all those who were at Oporto have taken part with the rebels of Gallicia."

"Not a peasant of the valleys but sees that the affairs of Spair at this moment depend upon Bessières. How foolish, then, it is to have in this great affair voluntarily given twenty chances against him!"

"A defeat of Bessières will be a blow at the heart; it will be felt at all the extreme points of the army."

"The army of Bessières ought to have at least 8000 men more to obviate all chances against him."

"The great object of the army's efforts should be to secure Madrid. Madrid can only be menaced by the army of Gallicia."

"If Bessières is checked, his object should be to protect Burgos."

Such were Napoleon's expressions; not a word about the geographical importance of Gallicia—he only considers the dangers from such a comparatively large Spanish force entering the plains of Leon: and in his own campaign he did not move against Madrid until he believed Moore was in full retreat upon Portugal. The instant he discovered his mistake he returned with incredible rapidity, not because he feared opposition in Gallicia, but because it was necessary to protect his communications in the plains of Leon. Soult was in the same situation as Bessières had been; but, as the British were more formidable opponents than the Spaniards, Napoleon came with his whole army to protect the communications. Thus it is clear that Sir John Moore's march against Soult was in the very spirit of Napoleon's warfare; they who would have had him go to Gallicia, understood neither his views nor the emperor's reasoning.

Let us now examine whether Galicia could be defended. The arguments, or rather lamentations of these writers, rest on a letter of Sir David Baird: it will be fitting therefore to see how far their foundation is secure.

Sir David Baird commanded only a division, and his knowledge of the real state of affairs was necessarily more confined than that of the commander-in-chief. He was ignorant of the numbers and position of the French armies, and not fully acquainted with the extreme imbecility and falseness of the supreme junta. Any proposition made by him on the spur of the moment, must therefore be taken as the suggestion of a man who had no means of judging largely; and that his proposal to defend Galicia bore that impress is easily shown.

"It has frequently," he says, "occurred to me, that in the event of our being obliged to adopt defensive measures, it might be more advantageous for the combined British army to cover Galicia and part of Leon, than by proceeding to join you at Salamanca to abandon those provinces. The Asturias might be occupied by the troops of the Marquess of Romana; and if you judged it proper by a flank movement to join us in the neighborhood of Astorga, I entertain a confident belief that by occupying the strong ground behind it, we should be able to cover the country in our rear, and might wait until it is seen what efforts the Spanish nation is disposed and determined to make in defence of the national independence."

"The royal road from Coruña to this place and Astorga is remarkably good, although mountainous, and with the sea open to us we should be able to receive, with facility, such reinforcements and supplies as the British government might deem it proper to send. The country abounds in cattle; bread indeed would be required, but flour might be obtained from England, and in the meantime Galicia would have an opportunity of arming under our protection, and our presence in Spain would furnish a rallying point, and act as a stimulus to the Spaniards."

Sir David puts the case hypothetically. He would cover part of Leon and Galicia, Romana might occupy the Asturias—all were to wait for the Spanish efforts. He was but slightly acquainted with the state of affairs; for how could the plains of Leon be covered by 25,000 men against 200,000?—how could Romana with 6000 ill-equipped men defend the Asturias against Napoleon, after flying from thence at the sight of Soult's foragers. Sir David thought it easy to get provisions, yet in a manifesto, published a few days before, he writes thus:

"The kingdom of Galicia, strong from the nature of the country, will require no force to defend it beyond its own brave army now

assembling at Leon, under the Marquess of Romana; the presence of an additional number of troops in its passes and on its mountains would but tend to exhaust its resources without adding to its security." But the best comment is, that Sir John Moore did not only authorize, but pressed Baird, to prepare provisions for the army in Galicia, and he was unable to procure more than a few days' supply for each station.

Authenticities.—*Sir John Moore to Sir David Baird.*

6th December.—“Establish one magazine at Villa Franca, and one or two farther back.”

12th December.—“I am much obliged to you for your opinion upon the Gallicias and Vigo, and it is that which probably I shall now follow, should such a measure become necessary. I am therefore most anxious that magazines should be formed on that communication.”

16th December.—“I cannot help again pressing upon you to take every measure for the forming of magazines at Astorga, Villa Franca, and on the road to Coruña, for though we may do something here, we must always look to a retreat upon Galicia.”

To Lord Castlereagh. 30th Dec., Astorga.—“I found no provision here: the little which had been collected had been consumed by Sir David's corps in their passage. There is not two days' bread to carry the army to Villa Franca—there are no means of carriage—the people run away—the villages are deserted.”

14th Jan., 1809.—“The want of provisions would not permit me to wait longer (at Lugo). I marched that night.”

Let us now examine the question by dates.

Sir David's letter was written the 8th December. The 10th it reached Sir John Moore. The 12th it was answered. The 16th, orders might possibly have reached Coruña, to forward stores and ammunition to the different positions intended to be occupied; on the 25th, Moore commenced his retreat before 90,000 men. This gives ten days for “fortifying Lugo and other points,”—“taking up judicious positions to secure the lateral roads from the north of Portugal,”—“establishing a regular system of supply from England,”—“calling forth and arming the population of Galicia,”—“enforcing the necessary requisitions for transport, and persuading the junta of the province to give the requisite aid.” Ten days to do all this! with a junta which had kept Sir David's troops seventeen days in harbor ere it would suffer them even to land!—a junta that made a trading profit of his necessities; and after extracting nearly half a million of dollars from him, had at last so scantily furnished him with transport, that he was obliged to leave

his spare ammunition behind, and to march his troops by *half battalions*, to lessen the burden of provisioning them!

Authorities.—*Sir J. Moore to Lord Castlereagh.* 13th November.—“I am sorry to say, from Sir David I have nothing but complaints of the junta of Coruña, who afford him no assistance. They promise everything, but give nothing.”

Do. 24th Nov.—“The 500,000 dollars your lordship mentions, Sir David Baird considered as sent to him; he detained them, and has nearly expended them.”

Sir David Baird to Sir J. Moore. 19th Nov.—“Every possible effort has been made to complete the equipment of this division: but owing the total want of assistance which we have experienced in Galicia from the local authorities, our success has not been great.”

Do. 21st Nov.—“We are at this moment destitute of spare ammunition.”

But Romana's army was to defend the Asturias! Romana's army which is thus described by Colonel Symes, by himself, and by Moore.

Colonel Symes to Sir D. Baird. Dec. 14.—“It is morally impossible that they can stand before a line of French infantry. A portion, of at least one-third, of the Spanish muskets will not explode: and a French soldier will load and fire his piece with precision three times before a Spaniard can fire twice.”

Romana to Sir J. Moore. 14th Dec.—“I have begun to clothe and to organize, but much is wanting. There are still at least two-thirds who are in want of clothing from head to foot. Almost the whole army are without haversacks, cartouche-boxes, and shoes; and notwithstanding all the exertions I have made, I have not been able to succeed,—the country offering so few resources.”

Moore to Lord Castlereagh. 31st Dec.—“Nobody can describe Romana's troops to be worse than he does, and he complains as much as we do at the indifference of the inhabitants.”

Was ever so wild, so visionary a proposition made by a general, as this of Sir David Baird's, if we are to suppose he made it with a knowledge of the real state of affairs, and with a reference to a permanent state of defence? But it is evident he suggested it with reference to an enemy not much superior in numbers; it was so considered by Sir J. Moore; and those writers who lament its non-adoption, understood Baird's views as little as they did Moore's and Napoleon's.

“Suppose “Lugo fortified,” and “the army judiciously posted” by the 25th December.

What system, what arrangements, could have obliged the poor

mountaineers of Galicia to bring in provision and means of transport for stores? Was this part of the plan to be effected by the contemptible junta; or by the people themselves? Was it to be effected by force or by money? If by money, where was it to be had? If by force, where was the force? Would these writers have Sir J. Moore detach from his 25,000 men, to raise contributions in a friend's country, when Napoleon, with 90,000 men was in his front? Finally, what is meant by a "judicious distribution of the troops?"

There were two, only two points, where a maritime base of operations could have been established, namely, Vigo, and Coruña which includes Betanzos and Ferrol. Now let us examine in succession the different positions of defence which an army could take up with reference to those bases.

1. *Manzanal or Rodrigatos*.—This position is immediately behind Astorga.* It is strong to the front, but unfavorable for a retreat to Villa Franca; it is turned by the whole road of Foncebadon, which comes into the new road at Calcabellos near Villa Franca. The British must therefore have retired to Calcabellos, or occupied that place in force. If the latter, 25,000 men would have been spread over thirty miles of ground; the enemy, 90,000 strong, could have thrown his whole force against either extremity of the line, and Calcabellos once carried, there was no retreat for the troops at Rodrigatos.

2. *Calcabellos or Villa Franca*.—To hold this position permanently, magazines must have been established at Lugo, and strong corps of observation placed, one at Orense to cover the establishments of Vigo; one at Mondonedo to cover those at Coruña; one at Lugo. The first, because from Benevente the French could move a force against Orense and Vigo by the Puebla de Senabria; the second, because they might do the same through the Asturias to Betanzos and Coruña; the third, partly to connect these detachments, but principally to watch the road of Concija de Ibas, leading from the Asturias directly upon Lugo. From whence were these three detachments to be drawn?—would these writers have had the British army depend upon the peasants of the mountains for the protection of its flanks, its magazines, and base of operations—or upon Romana's army, such as he described it—or would they have had Moore to divide the 25,000 British into four parts on a line of one hundred and fifty miles, when Napoleon had 90,000 men massed in his front?

3. *Lugo*. Here was the first position in which a small army could pretend to make a permanent stand. The communication

* See Captain C. Smith's Report, § 11, Appendix 13, Napier's History, Vol. I.

with Betanzos is good, not above thirty miles; the army could have moved between those two points, and delivered battle at either, with good retreat to Coruña, or by St. Jago to Vigo; that is, if the French operated only from Astorga and the Asturias. But the roads to Vigo were still open by the Val des Orres and by Puebla Senabria, and the position of Lugo and Betanzos could be taken in reverse. What was to be the gain of all this? To preserve an unsteady footing in a barren corner of the Peninsula, while the French rioted in the conquest of the south of Spain and Portugal!

Reference to Sir John Cradock's papers in my Appendix, second volume, will show that Lisbon must have fallen the moment the 4th corps arrived there; from Lisbon the French would have sped to Oporto and Minho, thus opening another line of operation against Vigo. Galicia has no geographical advantages for defence by an inferior force; it is, when an enemy possesses the Asturias and Portugal, indefensible, especially by a maritime power. 1. It offers a salient angle to the adversary. 2. The harbors at its base are wide apart, situated on a dangerous coast, and the lines of communication from them to Villa Franca are separated by difficult mountains. 3. The lines of communication run along the frontiers of Asturias and Portugal; the enemy, embracing as it were the whole country, would be nearer to the harbors at the base on both sides than the army to whom they belonged, and could attack any point he pleased. It would be impossible, then, to remain about Villa Franca, and this was proved in after-times; for the Gallician army, although Portugal was in the possession of the allies, was always brought back to Lugo by the slightest demonstration of Bonnet's division from the Asturias. To call such a district strong in any other view than when the contending parties are equal in numbers, or as it affords a fugitive native force shelter in its mountains, is to discover a total ignorance of war.

Shall it be said Napoleon had not troops enough to operate in this extended manner? The 1st corps was left in La Mancha, and proved more than sufficient to beat all the Spanish forces that rallied in the south. 10,000 men garrisoned Madrid. The 4th corps was on its way to Portugal. 90,000 men were collected at Astorga the 30th of December, and 60,000 of those actually followed Moore to Coruña. Lapisse, with 12,000, was sent to Salamanca, and could have marched upon Orense by the Puebla Senabria road. Bonnet's division was already in the eastern passes of the Asturias. The 5th corps was actually drawn off from Zaragoza, and could have been sent into the Asturias also. The reserve of heavy cavalry could have occupied all the plains of Leon, and the

imperial guards, the only troops Napoleon withdrew when he returned to France, remained for two months near Vittoria guarding the line of communication. The withdrawal of the guards and departure of the emperor himself were all the changes consequent upon the announcement of the Austrian war. Napoleon's absence was doubtless an immense event, yet he did not know he was to depart until he reached Astorga; Sir John Moore therefore could not before that period have foreseen both the event and its consequences.

Colonel Sorrel refers me to Lord Wellington's campaigns, and dwells upon the population of Galicia, which he estimates at a million and a half, as if all the population had been actually in arms and organized to give battle—or as if they could have been so armed and organized in ten days! Lord Wellington's campaigns! Why, there it is I find the illustration I want! Portugal had three millions of inhabitants; Portugal had fine harbors; Portugal had a regular government; Portugal had an army organized and disciplined; Portugal had an armed militia; Portugal had an established vigorous system for forcing the people to defend the country; Portugal had strong mountains, difficult roads, great rivers; Portugal had actually in the field a regular force of 40,000 men, a militia of 45,000, an auxiliary British army of 30,000 men; Portugal had more than a year to prepare—and yet when Portugal was invaded by 70,000 French, Lord Wellington retired from the frontier, and would have retired from the country altogether, if he had not had time, and money, and means, to fortify a position which could neither be turned by the flanks nor stormed in front. Without any of these advantages either as to time, or system, or numbers, or local advantages, these writers would have had Sir John Moore defend Galicia against more than double the number of troops which invaded Portugal. In defending Portugal Lord Wellington also defended the cause of the Peninsula. Spain was prostrate—he relinquished nothing. But when Moore retreated, the south of Spain and Portugal were not even invaded, and they offered a thousand times the advantages of Galicia!

Having thus shown how little these writers have considered their subject, I take the opportunity of correcting an involuntary error of my own, and explaining how it arose. When narrating Charmilly's mission at Salamanca, I said Sir John Moore "*tore the letter in pieces.*" It was not so. The story was first published by Charmilly to create a notion, which has been greedily received and propagated by Moore's enemies, that, oppressed by the difficulties of his situation, he was peevish and irritable. Mr. James Moore, "*disdaining,*" as he says, "*to answer the knave,*" not only

did not in his Narrative contradict this misstatement, but rather confirmed it by his mode of treating the matter. The story was repeated, and I adopted it without further examination. Yet it is certain that the original letter is at this moment in existence without a rent or injury! Moore's enemies foiled even on this trifling point, must therefore continue to draw upon their imaginations for facts, upon their prejudices for arguments, and their malice for conclusions: and when they have done so, there will always be persons willing and able to defend him.

SEQUEL
 OF
 NAPIER'S REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS,
 CONTAINING SOME
 NEW AND CURIOUS FACTS RELATIVE TO
 THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

"There was a man in Islington,
 And he was wondrous wise,
 He jumped into a quickset hedge,
 And scratched out both his eyes."

IN my *Reply to various Opponents*, I pledged myself to give authorities for certain important facts disputed by the author of the work entitled, *Further Strictures on Colonel Napier's History of the Peninsular War*. I now redeem that pledge, which I gave, not as thinking it necessary to take more notice of a writer whose ill-founded pretensions to authority, and whose incorrectness I had so thoroughly exposed in my Reply, but to show that no weakness then withheld me from dissecting his second production as completely as I had done his first; and also because I thought it due to my readers to substantiate the accuracy of my third volume before the publication of a fourth. In this view, I will now take the disputed facts in the order of events, and, placing my own statement first, in each case support it by authority.

Almeida.—The Lieutenant-Governor Da Costa was tried and shot. "The only evidence against him was an explanatory letter, written to Lord Liverpool by Colonel Cox, when a prisoner at Verdun."—*History*.

Authority.—Mr. STUART to Lord CASTLEREAGH, Lisbon, July 25th, 1812.

“MY LORD,—It may not be irrelevant to mention to your lordship that, upon the evidence of a despatch which General Cox, the late Governor of Almeida, while a prisoner in France, addressed to Lord Liverpool, relating the circumstances which led to the fall of that fortress in 1810, the person who exercised the functions of lieutenant-governor at the time of the capture has been condemned to death by a court-martial.”

Battle of Busaco.—“The eighth Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces.”—*History.*

Authorities.—1. Extract from a memoir drawn up by Colonel Waller, staff-officer of the second division, and an eye-witness. “As the French formed on the plateau, they were cannonaded from our position, and a regiment of Portuguese, either the eighth or sixteenth infantry, which were formed in advance of the seventy-fourth, threw in some volleys, but was quickly driven into the position.”

2. Extract of a letter from an officer of the ninth British regiment, also an eye-witness. “The eighth Portuguese regiment is extolled, which I know gave way to a man, save their commanding officer and ten or a dozen men at the outside; but he and they were amongst the very foremost of the ranks of the ninth British.”

Before quitting this point, I will notice an accusation made by the author of the *Further Strictures*, namely, that I have, from partial motives, been silent upon a gallant charge made by the nineteenth Portuguese regiment. To which I answer, on my own authority as an eye-witness, that *no such charge as this writer has described took place.* The nineteenth Portuguese were not posted in front of the convent, that ground was occupied by the light division in first line and by the Germans in second line. There was indeed a Portuguese regiment (possibly the nineteenth) which was posted on the mountain, nearly a mile to the right of the convent, and in front of the brigade of guards. When the skirmishers of Marchand’s division pushed back their opponents, this regiment made an advance in support of the covering light troops; it was a handsome demonstration, but it is exaggeration to call it a fine charge; the line never was nearer to the enemy’s skirmishers than a hundred yards; for the truth of this I appeal to the light division, and especially to the artillery, who were at the time firing upon the main body of the French troops said to have been charged.

Operations in the Alemtejo.—Here it is scarcely necessary to notice the special pleading in the *Further Strictures* relative to Captain Squire and the batteries constructed on the left of the Tagus during Massena's stay at Santarem. Both that officer and Colonel Jones say the batteries were meant *to command the mouth of the Zezere*.* It is ridiculous to suppose Captain Squire, who constructed them, did not know the object, or whether they could effect it. Let that suffice. On other points my answers shall be full.

I. "Beresford arrived at Portalegre with 20,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 18 guns."—*History*.

Authority.—Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Louzao, March 16, 1811.

"I heard of the fall of Badajos on the night of the 13th and 14th, and Major-general Cole's division was moved on Espinhal on the 14th, in order afterwards to continue its route into the Alemtejo, and it marched in that direction yesterday. We shall have in that province 22,000 men, of which nearly 2200 will be cavalry."

In Sir B. D'Urban's memoir it is also stated that *after the passage of the Guadiana* the army was still 21,400 strong, with 18 guns.

2. *Combat of Campo Mayor.*—The French and the thirteenth dragoons charged through each other twice.—*History*.

My authority was an eye-witness, whose testimony is confirmed in the following memoir, the production of an officer of the thirteenth dragoons who was one of those engaged. I give it entire, because it confirms my account of the affair in other important points also.

"On the morning of the 25th March, 1811, the army moved from its bivouac position towards Campo Mayor, the thirteenth light dragoons in its proper place in the column of march, until the ground in front was found sufficiently open for the operations of cavalry, when the whole were ordered to the front. The cavalry consisted of the third dragoon guards, and fourth dragoons, under the command of Colonel De Grey; the first and seventh regiments of Portuguese cavalry, under the command of Colonel Otway; and the thirteenth dragoons, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Head and Brigadier-general Long.

"On gaining the front, contiguous columns of half squadrons were formed, and the whole moved forward at a brisk trot, under the guidance of General Long who directed the movements of the cavalry on that morning. A troop from the thirteenth dragoons, and

* V. de Jones's *History of the War*, p. 444.

detachments from the other regiments, were sent to act as skirmishers on the rising ground on the right, and to protect the right flank of the column. At this period the strength of the thirteenth dragoons was reduced to two squadrons, having one squadron detached with the light division under the command of Colonel Colborne, a troop with a Portuguese infantry brigade under the command of Colonel Colliers, and the troop employed as skirmishers; in consequence, the actual strength of the two squadrons did not exceed forty-eight file each squadron, making a total of 192 men.

“General Long having found a fit opportunity, ordered a line to be formed, which moved on and gained the top of the rising ground, when the enemy were perceived on the plain below, formed up and presenting three strong bodies of cavalry. From an intelligent troop-sergeant-major of the enemy, who was this day wounded and taken prisoner, and who, from being employed in the office of the French adjutant-general, had a perfect knowledge of the force now opposite; it was learned that it consisted of the following numbers and regiments:—second hussars, 300 men; tenth hussars, 350; twenty-sixth heavy dragoons, 150; and fourth Spanish chasseurs, 80: making a total of 880 men. The Portuguese regiments formed on the left of the thirteenth and received orders to support; the heavy brigade was formed at some distance in the rear of the thirteenth and outflanked it on the right; the British and Portuguese infantry and artillery were forming as fast as they arrived on the ground, coming up in double quick time.

“On the thirteenth being formed, which was done with as much regularity and precision as on a field-day, General Long gave his final orders to Colonel Head to attack the enemy; and the two squadrons moved forward, receiving the words, march, trot, canter, charge, from their respective leaders. The enemy came on in a gallant and determined style, and on the word charge being given, every horse was let out, and the men cheered; the enemy did the same. The crash was tremendous; both parties passed each other, and at some short distance in the rear of the enemy, the thirteenth came about; the enemy did the same, and a second charge took place with equal violence, when the conflict became personal with the sabre. After some hard fighting in this manner, the enemy gave way and the pursuit commenced. During this time, two battalions of French infantry, which were in the rear of their cavalry, formed line; and on their cavalry clearing their front, pursued by the thirteenth, they opened a heavy fire of musketry on the latter, by which many men and horses fell: in this pursuit, the two regiments of Portuguese cavalry under the

command of Colonel Otway joined. For some time on the road, the French dragoons in small parties made fight, but being at length totally dispersed, they no longer made resistance and surrendered when come up with.

“The pursuit now continued at a rapid rate, it being the object to gain their front, and capture the whole, as well as the enormous quantity of baggage on the road, with their artillery; it was taken for granted a proper support would have been sent after the regiment, and that there was not anything to be apprehended from the enemy's infantry, which was behind; we supposed a good account would be given of them, when we considered the force of British and Portuguese that was left on the ground. The pursuit did not cease till stopped at the bridge of Badajos, when, on consultation being held, it was judged prudent to fall back on the support and secure all prisoners and captures. Sixteen pieces of artillery, each drawn by eight mules, numbers of wagons, immense quantities of baggage of all descriptions, provisions, stores, horses and mules; in short, the whole of the stores which the enemy had collected in Campo Mayor, and which, on that morning, were removed from thence to be placed at Badajos, were, owing to the rapidity of the pursuit, captured.

“On nearing Badajos, some of the drivers, supposing themselves safe when within the fire of the guns on the fortifications, refused to surrender, and kept whipping on their mules; those were sabred and the mules mounted by men of the thirteenth. The retreat was continued for some miles in the most orderly manner, the men in high spirits, until information not to be doubted was received, that the French infantry, which was left on the ground, were coming forward, supported by a considerable body of that cavalry which had surrendered, but which, on seeing their infantry coming on, recovered their horses and arms. To attack this force was considered so imprudent, that it was decided (as there appeared no hopes of support) to abandon all the captures, make a detour to the right of the road, and endeavor to join the army. It can only be felt by those in similar situations, what the feelings of all were, when this decision was found to be absolutely necessary.”

To this authentic statement, I add the following observations by Captain Arthur Gregory and Colonel William Light, both serving at the time in the fourth dragoons. “The surprise of the French troops at Campo Mayor was so complete, that when the cavalry had got abreast of the fortress the enemy's infantry were only just turning out on their alarm post outside, arriving by twos and threes.* The heavy brigades were bringing up their right shoulders

* Captain Gregory.

to charge, when *the marshal himself rode up and stopped them.* The artillery which had opened its fire on the retiring column, were ordered to cease after a very few rounds, and the enemy allowed to retire, unfollowed and unmolested, to Badajos, over a perfectly open and flat country."

"As they (the French infantry) were retreating in close column, a very short distance in advance and on our left, I* had a better opportunity of seeing them than those in the centre or right of our brigade, as I was on the left of the left half squadron of the whole brigade; consequently, nearer to them than any one else. We were so near, that the whole nearly of the rear rank and some officers of the flank turned round, made a sudden stop, and it appeared to me they were going to lay down their arms. I recollect saying to the sergeant next to me: 'If we go on a few yards further, they will throw down their arms, for, look, they are ready to do so now.' At this very moment we were halted, the French shouldered their arms again, gave a shout of joy, faced about, and marched off."

This testimony, joined to the acknowledged fact that the French did triumphantly carry off their recovered guns to Badajos, verifies the main points in my account of the affair of Campo Mayor; and with respect to the presence of Colonel Colborne, which the author of the *Strictures* so flippantly denies, I reaffirm it upon the authority of Colonel Colborne.

The author of the *Strictures*, although equivocally, denies that the thirteenth dragoons were reprimanded by Marshal Beresford for pursuing the French; the fact was notorious, and the actual reprimand, a very severe one, has been published by Mr. C. E. Long, in reply to this writer's aspersions on the late Lieutenant-General Long. In my work, it is said they were, perhaps, *justly* reprimanded. I retract that assertion. More full information leads me to think they were *unjustly* reprimanded; they deserved praise, and the "unsparing admiration of the whole army" was well founded.

3. "The breach of Badajos was not closed," &c., &c.

4. "Beresford should have marched upon Merida."

5. "Beresford believed that Soult would only act on the defensive."—*History.*

These assertions involve matter of opinion and matter of fact. The opinions I leave to others. The matters of fact are as follows:—

1. If Beresford had moved by Merida or been less slow in his after operations, *Badajos was in no condition to resist.*

2. The road to Merida *was practicable for troops.*

3. The fear created by the sudden appearance of so large a

* Colonel Light.