

A REPLY  
TO  
LORD STRANGFORD'S "OBSERVATIONS,"  
ETC., ETC.

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I AM told Lord Strangford's observations upon my work require an answer. I think not, but yield to advice.

I deny being instigated by any party spirit. Lord Strangford will find in the Edinburgh Review, April, 1808, how party writers handle the subject. That article has never been controverted, and might be used as historical; but I rest my reply upon the analysis of his lordship's observations. He has admitted most of the essential points in my historical notice of the Portuguese emigration; and his apparent contradictions are so unskilfully, or rather so skilfully managed, as to avoid the object they seem to aim at.

Page 4, he says his "*despatches* relating to the Portuguese emigration *were* originally written, as their date proclaims, on board the Hibernia," and he adduces Mr. Elgar's letter as confirmatory of the fact; but my reference was not to *despatches*, but that *single despatch*, which being dated "29th of November, 1808, H.M.S. Hibernia, off the Tagus," was nevertheless written in Mr. Canning's house, Bruton-street, on the 19th of December: hence neither Mr. Elgar's letter nor Lord Strangford's assertion touch the question.

Lord Strangford says, "*no* despatch was written at Salt Hill, nor in the presence of Sir James Yeo;" and "it is absolutely untrue that, either there or at any other place, *from the day he left the Tagus* to that of *his arrival in London*, he ever wrote one line relating to public business." Mr. Sylvester's letter is, he says, conclusive on that head. Now, of these two assertions the latter may be strictly true, yet not conclusive, any more than is Mr. Sylvester's letter; because Lord Strangford arrived in London the same day\* that he arrived at Salt Hill, yet he wrote on that

\* Lord Strangford says he arrived in Bruton-street on Saturday night. Captain Yeo thought it was Sunday morning that Lord Strangford and himself were together at Salt Hill. Can his lordship have made a mistake of a day in this instance, such as he has evidently made in his despatch relative to his arrival in Lisbon the 27th of November †

day and in Mr. Canning's house, the despatch dated "29th November, H.M.S. Hibernia, off the Tagus."

"*Sir James*"\* Yeo's presence during the writing at Salt Hill is explicitly denied by Lord Strangford; but my words were "*confidently asserted*," meaning thereby, confidently asserted by others, not by me. I repeat, the fact has been so asserted by many persons; a written assertion of it was before me at the time of penning the expression. I knew Sir James Yeo was the original authority, and farther information to the same purport has reached me since (see Appendix A); nevertheless I considered as Sir James Yeo was dead, some misconstruction of his words might have arisen, and it would be more just to leave that matter doubtful; hence the qualifying expression, "it is confidently asserted."

Lord Strangford's denial is, however, sufficient. I believe Sir James was mistaken. I believe the letter written in his presence, and sent off by a King's messenger, related to private, not to public business: and if my work should reach a second edition, the text shall run thus: Lord Strangford's despatch, dated the 29th November, H.M.S. Hibernia, off the Tagus, but really written the 19th December at Mr. Canning's house, Bruton-street, London.

Lord Strangford assures me that, with the exception of "*some passages tending to compromise the safety of individuals, to give notice to his Majesty's enemies of intended operations, or that might prove offensive to the government to which he was about to be re-accredited*," a reasonable bill of exceptions truly! no essential fact contained in the original despatches was suppressed in the revised one. Perhaps not; but the question in discussion is, whether that despatch, or narrative, or composition, or whatever it may be called, did or did not faithfully relate the events which had taken place? Whether it gave a true or an erroneous *imprssion* of Lord Strangford's exertions upon the occasion of the Portuguese emigration? A few extracts from the despatch itself, placed in juxtaposition with the statement now put forth by his lordship, will set this matter in a fair light.

*Lord Strangford in Despatch.*

"I accordingly requested an audience of the Prince Regent, together with due assurances of protection and security; and upon receiving H. R. Highness's an-

*Lord Strangford in Observation*

Page 22, paragraph 46. "I arrived at Lisbon on the *night of the 28th instant*, and almost *immediately* saw Mr. A'Aranjo, who was already on board ship.

\* He was then only Captain Yeo. Lord Stranford weighs his words very nicely.

swer I proceeded to Lisbon on the 27th, in his Majesty's ship *Confiance*, bearing a flag of truce. I had immediately most interesting communications with the court of Lisbon, the particulars of which shall be fully detailed in a future despatch. It suffices to mention in this place that the Prince Regent wisely directed all his apprehensions to a French army, and all his hopes to an English fleet; that he received the most explicit assurances from me, that his Majesty would generously overlook those acts of unwilling and momentary hostility, &c., &c., and that the British squadron before the Tagus should be employed to protect his retreat from Lisbon, and his voyage to the Brazil."

I then proceeded to the vessel in which the Prince Regent was embarked, and notwithstanding the assertion to the contrary in Colonel Napier's note, I had a long and most confidential interview with his Royal Highness: I had then, as Colonel Napier truly states, no power either to advance or retard the emigration; but when did I ever assume that I had, or take any credit to myself for anything that passed at that interview with his Royal Highness.

To Lord Strangford's question I reply, that I never accused him of taking credit for his exertions at an interview had the night of the 28th, with the Prince Regent on board ship; but I did assert that his Bruton-street despatch conveyed an erroneous impression as to his personal proceedings. I assert it again. A despatch, stating that the Lord Strangford proceeded to Lisbon the 27th, and immediately had most interesting communications with the court of Lisbon, does not convey the idea that Lord Strangford arrived in the night of the 28th, and saw the Prince Regent on board ship. This goes to the pith of the question, because the embarkation of the royal family took place on the 27th; which, coupled with the "apprehensions directed to a French army," the "hopes to an English fleet," and the explicit assurance that the British squadron "would protect" the prince's "retreat from Lisbon," inevitably led to the conclusion, that his lordship's "immediate communications" produced the resolution to embark: than which nothing could be more erroneous.

But it seems, notwithstanding my assertion to the contrary, Lord Strangford had a long and most confidential interview with the prince regent on board ship on the night of the 28th. The expression "any official interview," taken singly, may be construed

to mean, that Lord Strangford had no interview whatever with the Portuguese prince; but taken with its context, plainly refers only to an interview demanded for the purpose of urging the emigration, and in that sense Lord Strangford admits its truth.

Comparing the relative merits of Lord Strangford and Sir Sydney Smith, with reference to the emigration, I acknowledge that the words "*kept a naval force off Lisbon*" do imply greater activity and zeal by the English ministers than the facts, as stated by Lord Strangford, will justify. I will substitute the word "*sent a naval force.*"

Lord Strangford rests his claim on a long series of previous negotiations. I do not deny his lordship's perseverance in these negotiations; but I deny that his perseverance was successful. All that can be said is, that in despite of the confiscation of English property, and the detainer of English subjects, and although he was himself driven, as it were ignominiously out of Lisbon and forced to join the fleet in an open boat; and although these insults were put forward by the Portuguese prince as a peace-offering to the French monarch, Lord Strangford still *had hopes!*

The prince regent was timid and irresolute, and there was a powerful court faction opposed to the emigration; but Lord Strangford thought fear would prevail over indolence, that the prince would finally emigrate, and he did emigrate! Lord Strangford *guessed well!* In America this might be a positive merit, but there they have not red ribands. Let us, however, examine a little closer into the facts, as given by his lordship.

Early in August, the prince regent, speaking through his minister, solemnly assured Lord Strangford he would not consent to the demand for confiscating British property in Portugal.

The 19th of August, the prince wrote an autograph letter to the king of England, in which he declared his fixed resolution to emigrate, rather than sacrifice his honor by consenting to the French and Spanish demands.

The 2d of September, a council being held at *Mafra*, it was agreed the emigration should take place in either of the following cases. 1st, If the French should attempt to compel the prince to violate the rights of British subjects in their persons or property. 2d, If an overwhelming French force should cross the frontier and take possession of the Portuguese fortresses.

On the 2d of November, Mr. de Lima, a Portuguese courtier, returned from Paris; he was adverse to the emigration, and the 8th of November *all British property was confiscated, and British subjects detained as prisoners.* Here then the first contingency on which the departure of the prince was to depend had taken place.



Did the emigration follow? No! but the British minister was driven from Lisbon. Nevertheless, the prince regent privately assured the latter he would emigrate *if the French army advanced*.

Meanwhile, a state of war commenced, Lord Strangford's functions ceased, and Sir Sydney's came into full activity. Lisbon and St. Ubes were blockaded, and Portuguese ships detained for adjudication. The 20th of November, Junot crossed the frontier; the 24th, a council was held by the prince regent; the second case had arrived, the emigration, says Lord Strangford, was resolved upon, the prince's promise redeemed. Not so fast, my lord. A resolution taken in the council of Mafra, was to emigrate rather than sacrifice British subjects and their property; yet when the push came, the first were detained, the second was confiscated. The prince regent also promised the king of England that he would emigrate rather than accede to the demands of France and Spain; yet he drove the king's representative from his court, confiscated British property, and made British subjects prisoners to please the French. Thus, according to Lord Strangford, he broke his public, solemn, voluntary promise to the sovereign of England, when he thought by so doing he could mollify the French monarch. Can it then be doubted that he would have broken his private promise to Lord Strangford, if there had been only the advance of the French army to induce him to keep it?

Those causes were, 1. The reception of a *Moniteur*, in which it was intimated by a man who rarely broke his political promises, that the *House of Braganza should not reign*. 2. The "*solitary letter*" of Sir Sydney Smith, which offered the assistance of the English fleet to forward the emigration, and menaced Lisbon with an attack if that measure was delayed.

Lord Strangford says, Sir Sydney's letter had no influence on the prince regent's decision, but there is good ground for believing the resolution of the 24th was not final; the prince desired to procrastinate; he would have accepted terms from Junot, if he could have got them, and it was not until the 26th that the resolution to emigrate was irrevocably fixed (See B.)

Lord Strangford asserts, that Sir Sydney's letter was written under his authority; Sir Sydney's story runs thus: "The whole question of their departure, or remaining prisoners to Junot, turned on my opening the door again, on my *single judgment*, after it had been shut by the expulsion of Lord Strangford from Lisbon, and the consequent beginning of a state of war, and my exercising my *single discretion* in not allowing that state to continue."

Between conflicting authorities, we may choose. I follow Sir Sydney's version. First, because Lord Strangford had *no autho-*

*riety*, his functions *had ceased*. Sir Sydney, acting under an Admiralty warrant, founded on the order in council of November, 1807, was entitled to seize all Portuguese vessels, even the royal fleet, as prizes, without reference to Lord Strangford, who, as I am informed, had actually applied to Sir Sydney for a frigate to convey him to England, previous to this letter having been written. Second, because the letters marked (D. E. F.) said by Lord Strangford to prove his having authorized the letter in question, relate, not to the letter conveying the threat of an attack on Lisbon, but one relating to the blockade of the Tagus and St. Ubes. Sir Sydney Smith may say whether his letter was not shown, *after signature*, by him to Lord Strangford, for the express purpose of proving to his lordship that his authority was at an end, and the admiral acting on his own responsibility.

Mr. Canning's speeches are triumphantly quoted by Lord Strangford in proof of his merits. The testimony would be more valuable if the despatch had not been composed in Bruton-street. Mr. Canning's *spoken speeches* upon Portuguese affairs, have not always been considered good authority even by himself; witness the alteration in the printed version of his celebrated oration delivered in 1827.

What is the amount of Mr. Canning's testimony? That Lord Strangford *had all along affirmed*, that he *had predicted* the emigration would take place; that he had been *employed to advise and to urge* that splendid and magnanimous emigration. Splendid and magnanimous! To abandon a brave and generous people is then splendid! To fly trembling from the face of an enemy is magnanimous! We often hear of a magnanimous death in defence of one's country—a magnanimous running away is new.

Lord Strangford predicted this magnanimous and splendid measure. So Lord Liverpool once talked of a march to Paris, and in due time it happened. I believe Lord Liverpool does not wear a Waterloo medal, and I believe Lord Strangford's predictions would have failed, if the *Moniteur*, containing the intimation relative to the House of Braganza had not been received, and if Sir Sydney Smith's "*solitary letter*" had not arrived to give full effect to the fear created by the *Moniteur*.

If the prince had really resolved to emigrate previously, why were his ships not prepared for the voyage? why all the confusion and distress to individuals from the want of previous arrangement when he did embark? why was the British property confiscated? why was the British minister driven from the court? why, if the prince was so friendly to the English, in such confidential intercourse with the British minister, why, I ask, did that minister leave

him in ignorance of the fact, that very valuable property and many British subjects were still in Portugal when he signed the decree of confiscation.

It is clear as a Lisbon sun, and Lord Strangford says as much in paragraph forty-five, that this weak prince would, between powerful contending factions, have vacillated until Junot reached his palace, had not the *Moniteur* put an end to his hopes of mollifying the French, and Sir Sydney's vigorous negotiation put an end to his indolence. If, therefore, the red riband was a reward for inducing the splendid and magnanimous running away of the prince regent, it should be cut into three parts, one for Lord Strangford, one for Sir Sydney, one for the writer of the *Moniteur*.

I do not ask Lord Strangford if the prince expressed his *surprise*, that the Bruton-street despatch represented him as influenced to emigrate by Lord Strangford's remonstrance; I do not ask if it be not a *mistake in his Bruton-street despatch* to say he accompanied the prince regent in his *passage over the bar of Lisbon*; I do not ask if the captain of the Hibernia was not the *first Englishman the prince met* from the time of his quitting Lisbon, until after he had cleared the mouth of the river. I know the prince said all this when in the Brazils; but I am content to establish the general accuracy of my own historical note. I have asserted positively only three essential facts. 1st, Lord Strangford's Bruton-street despatch did not do justice to Sir Sydney Smith. 2d, it gave an erroneous impression of his lordship's own proceeding. 3d, Lord Strangford got a red riband for it. I have shown it *did not* do justice to the admiral; Lord Strangford's own statements prove that *it did* give an erroneous account of his proceedings on the 27th; but it appears he got the red riband for his *predictions*.

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Lord Strangford has published a second Pamphlet in defence of himself. I would have answered it, had not his lordship caused criminal proceedings to be taken against Mr. Murdo Young, the editor of the *Sun*, for some peculiarly harsh and insulting observations upon Lord Strangford in this matter. Lord Brougham, counsel for Mr. Young, maintained the justice of his client's observations, and the result saved me the trouble of writing. For when Mr. Tyndal, attorney-general, defended Lord Strangford's proceedings, on the ground that it was usual to make the public despatch false, Mr. Justice Bayley pithily observed, that "*he liked honesty in all places*," and the court refusing his lordship a remedy, discharged the rule for a trial.

## APPENDIX.

(A.)

*Letter from Mr. Smith to Colonel G. Napier.*

DAWLISH, June 16, 1828.

DEAR SIR,—In reply to your inquiry, made on the part of your brother, I can safely say, that he is not the only person who has heard the report of a despatch having been written at Salt Hill; for I have heard it too, and my informant was Captain Yeo (afterwards Sir James Yeo).

He told me that he saw Lord Strangford write at Salt Hill what he conceived to be a despatch, and that what was then written was sent off by a king's messenger. This impression (whether mistaken or not) was what was on Sir James Yeo's mind, I am perfectly certain; but I can myself speak only to the fact of his having communicated it to me.

I remain, very sincerely yours,

C. D. SMITH.

(B.)

*Letter from Vice-Admiral Sir Graham Moore, K. C. B., to Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. Napier.*

COBHAM, Surrey, June 4, 1828.

MY DEAR NAPIER,—I have a perfect recollection of having been informed by different Portuguese gentlemen amongst those who accompanied the late King of Portugal (at that time prince regent) to the Brazils, that his embarking on the 27th day of November, 1807, was a measure not resolved upon until the day previous to its taking place; that the prince had always entertained some hopes of being able to accommodate matters with the French; that he never would have ventured on the step he did, had the British squadron not appeared; and that a letter sent in by Sir Sydney Smith turned the scale. He had long been wavering and changing, according to the news and reports of the day, and scarcely

anybody at Lisbon thought that he would put his declared intention into execution, which, in a great degree, accounts for the unprepared state the fleet was in when it run out of the Tagus, which, for confusion, dirt, and disorder, exceeded any scene I ever beheld. From all that I learned in the Brazils, and from what passed off Lisbon and on the passage, my opinion has ever been, that the presence of the British squadron off Lisbon, the message sent in by Sir Sydney Smith, and the rapid advance of the French army under Junot, thus placing him, as one might say, between the devil and the deep sea, were the real causes of the emigration of the prince regent and the royal family of Portugal to the Brazils. I have also a perfect recollection of the disgust which everybody, at Rio de Janeiro, felt when the despatch signed Strangford, and dated "His Majesty's ship Hibernia, off the Tagus, Nov. 29, 1807," appeared there. It seems to me of very little importance whether that despatch were written at Salt Hill or in Mr. Canning's apartments in London.

I am, &c., &c.,

GRAHAM MOORE.



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## REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS,

WITH

OBSERVATIONS ILLUSTRATING SIR J. MOORE'S CAMPAIGNS.

ANONYMOUS periodical criticisms are like wasps, they sting and die; but elaborate writings, argumentative, and imputing inaccuracy, are different. I speak only of English works; to meet Spanish writers would be endless labor. Sir Hew Dalrymple's excellent Memoirs, published after my second volume had appeared, show I have not strained my authorities; and if they are not sufficient, I have no other justification as regards Spain.

The English publications which I propose to notice, are—

1. Notes on the Campaign of 1808-9 in the North of Portugal. By Colonel Sorrel.
2. Narrative of the Peninsular War. By Major Leith Hay.
3. Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns. By the Author of Cyril Thornton.
4. Strictures upon Colonel Napier's History of the Peninsular War. Anonymous.
5. Life of the Duke of Wellington. By Major Moyle Sherer.

*Colonel Sorrel's Notes.*—These were dictated by Sir David Baird in the notion that I and other authors aimed to lower his reputation; a design not to be discovered in what I have said of that brave officer. But history would indeed be "an old almanac," if, out of respect to persons, errors influencing great events were suppressed. In this view only have I censured Sir D. Baird, and I will now justify my censures, yet my own mistakes acknowledge, with a sincere wish that they were fewer.

1. It is charged as a fault, that I said, "*the rear of Sir D. Baird's column extended beyond Lugo on the 26th November, 1808.*"

The simple fact Colonel Sorrel does not deny, but says that

"the column was well closed up to Astorga by the 29th of November." Nevertheless, Sir D. Baird informed Sir John Moore that his troops *could not be concentrated at Astorga until the 4th of December.*\*

2. My work states, that previously to his knowing of the fatal battle of Tudela, "*Sir J. Moore proposed in case he could draw the extended wings of his army together in good time, to abandon all communication with Portugal, throw himself into the heart of Spain, and drawing round him all he could of the Spanish forces, defend the southern provinces, trusting to the effect which such an appeal to the patriotism and courage of the Spaniards would produce.*"

Colonel Sorrel thinks this "*must be a mistake.*" But Sir J. Moore's letter to Mr. Frere proves the fact.† "Had this army been united and ready to act at the time of General Castaños' defeat, much as I think it would have been risking it, yet it was my intention to have marched on Madrid, and to have shared in the fortunes of the Spanish nation. If I could not have sustained myself there, I thought by placing myself behind the Tagus, I might give the broken armies and the people of Spain, if they had any patriotism left, an opportunity to assemble round me and to march to the relief of the capital. That this was my intention is known to the officers with me who are in my confidence; it is known also to Lord Castlereagh, to whom I had imparted it in one of my late letters."

3. Colonel Sorrel corrects me for saying Sir D. Baird *retreated to Villa Franca without orders*, and that *stores were destroyed at Astorga.*

I admit the first to be an error. Nevertheless a retrograde movement without orders from Sir J. Moore was *commenced*. Crauford's brigade had passed Astorga before the retreat was countermanded; and I can assure Colonel Sorrel, I did myself walk ankle-deep in spirits poured into the streets.

4. It is hinted I should not have censured Sir D. Baird for sending an important despatch by a private dragoon, who got drunk and lost it. "*It is doubtful, also,*" Colonel Sorrel complains, "*whether the expression 'blameable irregularity,' is applied to the inattention of the general or the drunkenness of the dragoon.*"

He intimates also that to say Sir J. Moore personally directed the movements of Sir D. Baird's division in the battle, is derogatory of the latter's reputation. I cannot admit this. A general-in-chief must be somewhere; where he is he must direct. But

\* Vide Moore's Narrative, p. 79.

† Moore's Narrative, p. 156.

touching the matter of the dragoon, I imputed "*blameable irregularity*" to the general; and justify it by the following statement of Sir J. Moore's aide-de-camp who carried the despatch.

"On the night that the rear of the army passed through Villa Franca, and halted at a small village about two leagues and a half from that town, Sir J. Moore sent Captain George Napier, one of his *aides-de-camp*, about two o'clock in the morning, with despatches for Sir D. Baird, enclosing orders to Lieutenant-generals Hope and Fraser, the nature of which orders was to prevent Lieutenant-general Fraser's division proceeding on the road towards Vigo, and to make them halt at Lugo, as Sir J. Moore had, owing to many circumstances, altered his intention of proceeding with the army to Vigo. When Sir John delivered these despatches to Captain Napier, he said, "Have you a good horse, Napier? you must get to Nogales to Sir D. Baird before five o'clock this morning, if possible, as otherwise Sir David will have marched and then you must follow him." Sir John also gave Captain N. particular orders to be very careful of the despatches as they were of the greatest consequence; and to tell Sir David "*to forward those which were enclosed to Generals Hope and Fraser as quick as possible.*"

"When Captain Napier arrived at Nogales, which he did a few minutes after five o'clock, he found Sir David in bed, and delivered him *the despatches and orders*. Sir David asked, "If he (Captain N.) was to go on with those for Generals Hope and Fraser?" "No, sir, unless you have no other person to send; in that case, of course I will proceed, but I must first get a fresh horse." Sir David then said, "Were you ordered by Sir J. Moore to proceed with these letters to General Hope?" Captain N. replied, "My orders were to deliver the despatches to you, and you were to forward those for Lieut.-Generals Hope and Fraser, *with all care and despatch.*" On this he said, "Very well;" *and in about two hours after, or perhaps not quite so long*, he sent the despatches off by an orderly dragoon of the fifteenth regiment. Sir David marched soon afterwards, with his division, to some heights on the road towards Lugo, about two or three short leagues from Nogales; and towards the evening he came back himself to Nogales, and said to Captain Napier, who was waiting there until Sir J. Moore should arrive, "By God, the rascal of a dragoon by whom I sent those despatches this morning, has got drunk, and lost them." Upon which Captain N. immediately mounted his horse and went off to report the circumstance to Sir J. Moore, whom he met on the hill coming down into Nogales. "He seemed quite astonished and displeased with Sir D. Baird for having sent despatches by an orderly dragoon, which were of such consequence that the commander of the forces

thought it necessary to send one of his own aides-de-camp with them."

Two forced marches were thus imposed upon M'Kenzie Fraser's division, which occasioned great distress and loss. Here I must observe that I never meant, nor did attribute blame to that general, whose conduct was strictly in unison with his orders; yet I have heard that his friends were hurt; perhaps at the lightness of the expression, "Pilgrimage to St. Jago," a trifling conceit, unsuitable to the occasion.

*Narrative of the Peninsular War.*—Major Leith Hay is pleased so to term a narrative of his personal adventures during about half the period that war lasted. He seems offended that I should have exposed the foolish conduct of the military agents employed at the commencement of the Spanish insurrection; yet he has not, and could not, disprove my statements, seeing they are supported by the letters of the agents themselves; the public voice has proclaimed their justice.\* He says, indeed, "that to include the whole of the agents, with exception only of Colonel Coxe and Lord William Bentinck, in one sweeping and unqualified censure, appears as little worthy of history as it probably will be hereafter considered of notice;" and that to answer me he has only to mention the names of "*Colonels Paisley, Jones, Lefevre, and Birch.*" But I have not included the whole in one sweeping censure; and the last-named officers, whose talents I acknowledge, and one of whom, Colonel Birch, I especially quoted as giving good intelligence, were not agents, but on the staff of an agent. Their just views place in disadvantageous light the errors of General Leith, under whom they acted.

Major Leith Hay decries my work, but says his own is founded on authentic documents, meaning, his own memoranda. They will scarcely guide posterity. For treating of the battle of Busaco, he says,† "on the forenoon of the 26th Sept. I was directed to advance in front with a squadron of Portuguese cavalry, and report the movements of the enemy on the roads close to the right bank of the Mondego, directly communicating with the valley of Laranzeira. In the execution of this service we proceeded two leagues without encountering an enemy."—"As we rode forward, a cannonade and fire of musketry was heard in the direction of St. Combadao, where the Duke of Elchingen and General Regnier were forcing back upon the position the advance of the allied army.' Now St. Combadao is twenty miles from Busaco; the light division

\* Narrative, vol. i. p. 18.

† Ibid., p. 231.

and Pack's brigade formed "the advance of the army;" the former never were within ten miles of Combadao, and Pack retired from thence, without an action, on the 22d. Moreover, on the 26th of September, when Major Hay heard this wonderful firing at Combadao,\* the Duke of Elchingen and General Reynier were, and had been from one o'clock of the 25th, immediately in front of Busaco, and their light troops were actually skirmishing with the British in that position which the major had just left two leagues in his rear! It would appear that Major Hay has trusted to very bad memoranda.

*Strictures upon Colonel Napier's History.*—Although anonymous, I notice this pamphlet, written in defence of Lord Beresford, because the writer would have it understood that he is Lord Beresford, or that he writes from his lordship's dictation. I, however, think Lord Beresford's knowledge would reject the inaccuracy of this work, and his modesty shrink from dictating such gross praise of himself.† It is not credible, Lord Beresford should describe himself "as a wise, firm and conciliatory person,"—"A man whose qualifications eminently fitted him for high important trusts,"—"An officer of zeal, temper, discretion, and intelligence,"—"A distinguished commander, capable of the greatest things,"—"A person evincing a knowledge of mankind, a skill in the various principles by which the human heart is actuated, and a facility in influencing and directing them, ranked amongst the exclusive characteristics of the highest class of mankind."‡

This anonymous author gives me credit for "very considerable qualities as an historian," and believes "my errors are unintentional," arising from "inaccurate information." And he answers my statements "lest a work of such pretensions to consideration should bias posterity."§ Alas for posterity! He fears it will be biased by "an adopter and propagator of foolish and trumpery reports,"—"A person of easy credulity,"—"Of extraordinary ignorance of facts and of topography,"—"Writing from *ex parte* and false information,"—"Presumptuous,"—"Inexperienced,"—"A caviller,"—"A mere soldier of theory, presuming to discuss the abilities, the opinions, and the conduct of so able and distinguished an officer as Lord Beresford,"—"An historian without literary integrity or fairness,"—"A special pleader,"—"An illogical reasoner,"—"An intrepid assertor,"—"Excessively deficient in the most essential qualities,"—*and* whose

\* Napier's History.

† Pages 7, 8, 9, et passim.

‡ Pages 1 and 126.

§ Pages 5, 7, 8, et passim.



*“Intellectual vision is thickly affuscated by the mist of party prejudices.”*

As indications of “galled withers,” this may pass, but in the same vein I am told I “*know nothing of Lord Beresford whatever,*” had “*given myself no trouble to inquire into his military services or his personal character,*”—“*Did not know when, or where, or how, that distinguished officer had been employed,*”—and with “*a common and most senseless prejudice, which is often found in connexion with a certain class of political opinions, took it for granted that because Lord Beresford was highly allied, he must necessarily be deficient in professional skill; and because he possessed that family patronage which might bring his merits into notice, it must follow as an inevitable consequence, that he could not be in possession of the merit that might deserve it.*”

Being at least as nobly connected as Lord Beresford, I leave his “high alliances” to those whom they concern; his family patronage is more to the purpose, and for his military services I will give some tokens of inquiry about them. This pamphleteer calls me a “mere soldier of theory,” yet I have seen more and harder campaigns than Lord Beresford saw, before he attained the command of the Portuguese army. I begin with his lordship’s expedition to Buenos Ayres, his first essay as a general-in-chief. Many curious details of that event have been related to me by eye-witnesses, but suffice it to say, Lord Beresford was there completely beaten, and laid down his arms.

His next appearance was as commandant of the island of Madeira, secretly delivered to England in trust by the Prince of Portugal. The Portuguese declare, that, in violation of this trust, Lord Beresford made the authorities swear allegiance to George III. I will not dwell on that. He governed the island well or ill for some months.

At Coruña, he commanded the brigade covering the embarkation. There was nothing to do, but if a conversation, such as I have heard, did really take place between him and an eminent staff-officer, his lordship did not then rate the honor so high as his defender does now.

These indications that I am not entirely ignorant of Lord Beresford’s services, *before* he commanded the Portuguese forces, are only given in answer to the writer of this pamphlet; and for my knowledge of his services *after* he attained that command, let my work vouch. I may have seen them with a jaundiced eye. I may have been “*incapable from the circumstances of my military life, to form an adequate conception of the difficulties which the general of a large corps has to contend with.*” I may have had my

"*intellectual vision affuscated by the mists of party prejudice*;" but my opinion still is, that Marshal Beresford was not "*a distinguished commander*,"—not an "*enterprising general*,"—not "*capable of the greatest things*." If I am wrong, his deeds are before the world to obviate my conclusions; great actions cannot be smothered with ink. The author of this pamphlet is, however, unjustifiable in saying I have "*hinted at professional backwardness*." I have strictly confined myself to measuring Marshal Beresford's military capacity by the standard of his exploits. Nor will it serve to cry out—political prejudice! I have nowhere attacked Lord Wellington, Lord Hill, Lord Lynedoch, Lord Stuart de Rothesay, Sir Edward Paget, and others whose political opinions were the same as Lord Beresford's. I proceed to examine my opponent's arguments.

I. Treating of Lord Beresford's appointment, I said:—"The Portuguese regency, whether spontaneously, or brought thereto by previous negotiation, offered the command of all the native troops to an English general, with power to alter and amend the military discipline, to appoint British officers to the command of regiments, and to act without control in any measure he should judge fitting to ameliorate the condition of the Portuguese army."

"It is said, Sir J. Doyle, Sir J. Murray, General Beresford, and even the Marquis of Hastings, then Earl of Moira, sought for the appointment. The last was undoubtedly well fitted by his courtly manners, his high rank, and his talents, in the cabinet and the field, for such an office; but powerful parliamentary interest prevailing, Major-general Beresford was appointed, to the great discontent of many officers of superior rank, who were displeased that a man without any visible claim to superiority should be placed over their heads."

"*This short extract*," says the pamphleteer, "*contains as many fallacies as lines*." "*It would be difficult, perhaps, to find in any other historian a passage equally short, and equally abounding in misstatements and mistakes*." He then proceeds to show that Marshal Beresford *never applied for the appointment*; doubts if the other officers named did so; is indignant it should be supposed *parliamentary interest* influenced the matter; and taking advantage of a piece of bad composition, endeavors to convict me of "*arguing upon a rumor as if it were a certainty, with a view to draw an unfair conclusion against Lord Beresford*."

Rigorously speaking, he is entitled to prefer this last charge, because the notice of Lord Moira's qualifications separates the members of my sentence in a slovenly manner; take that away, or put it in a parenthesis, and the whole passage will, as intended,

rest on the rumor. This writer, indeed, rebukes me for noticing rumor; but the fact being interesting and probable, why should I have suppressed it? And what are the misstatements? What the fallacies of which I am accused?

1. *Marshal Beresford never asked for the office, and therefore parliamentary interests could have had nothing to do with the affair.*

It is the essential business of a government, conducted on a system of patronage, to solicit men of powerful families to accept great offices; and who more powerful than the Beresfords? This system is now declared to be on its death-bed, but was it in its infancy in 1809?

2. *The Portuguese Regency never offered Lord Beresford full power.*

I confess my error here, and will explain how it arose. In Lord Castlereagh's instructions to Sir J. Cradock, I found the regency had applied for an "English general to *organize and command their army.*" I knew that twelve days after Lord Beresford arrived at Lisbon, he did in fact exercise a complete control over the Portuguese army. It appears, those twelve days were devoted to difficult negotiations;\* that the marshal and Mr. Villiers had "*a world of difficulties*" to obtain the necessary powers, which were "*most reluctantly conceded to the determined representations of the British Minister.*" Of those negotiations I found no trace in Lord Castlereagh's despatches, nor in Lord Wellington's letter, nor in Sir J. Cradock's correspondence; hence my error, insignificant in itself, was difficult to avoid: nevertheless I stated the fact with some doubt, as the expression "*whether spontaneously or brought thereto by previous negotiation*" sufficiently proves. This is the only foundation for the abuse so liberally bestowed.

I will now show that this writer has greatly exaggerated the difficulty of the negotiations; and when he states that one of Marshal Beresford's qualifications for the command was his being "*perfectly conversant with the language of the people,*"† he states that which a better authority than he can be contradicts.

*Extract of a letter from Marshal BERESFORD to Lord WELLINGTON, Chamusca, 4th Jan., 1811.*

"On Lord Castlereagh's communicating to me his Majesty's pleasure that I should proceed to Portugal to fill the situation I now hold, it was my duty to point out to his lordship what my experience in the country had made me think absolutely necessary to fulfil with any prospect of advantage, the views of his Majesty,

\* Page 12.

† Page 8.

and of his royal highness the prince regent, in giving to a British general the command of the Portuguese army; and, amongst other things, I represented it as necessary that in all things respecting the organization and discipline of the army, the commander-in-chief should be perfectly independent of the government, and that it was absolutely necessary rewards and punishments should be exclusively with him. These claims Lord Castlereagh told me Mr. Canning would give directions to his Majesty's envoy here to stipulate for, and that I need not undertake the task until they were granted. I consequently, on my arrival, declined accepting the command, on waiting on the regency, till Mr. Villiers should have made these necessary stipulations, and in consequence of which, *after he had some conference with the regency*, I put down, at his desire in English, something to the purport (for it appears a very bad translation or ill-copied) of the propositions in one of the papers enclosed, and to which the answer annexed to it was given. *I was not then very much master of the Portuguese*, but I recollect observing to Mr. Villiers that the answer appeared to me ambiguous, and wishing further explanation. He, however, assured me that it was quite proper, and that the *government intended fully to accede to my desires*, and to support me fully in everything, and I remained with the understanding that though for the dignity of the government it might desire particular forms, that virtually the power in everything respecting the formation, organization, and discipline of the army remained with me; and on this principle I have ever since acted, with the full acquiescence and sanction of government."

Here we find no reluctance, and no difficulty, except that which the marshal, from his imperfect knowledge of the language, experienced in trying to read the answer of the regency.

3. The pamphleteer says, "That although many officers at a later period, wanted Lord Beresford's situation, none were discontented at the time: and only Sir J. Murray objected to the local rank of lieutenant-general which accompanied it."

But this local rank was a necessary adjunct to the command of the Portuguese troops, and any discontent occasioned thereby was a discontent at Lord Beresford's appointment. Sir J. Murray's displeasure is admitted; and the following letter from General Sherbroke to Sir John Cradock speaks for itself:—

"Lisbon, March 12.

"SIR,—Hearing, upon my landing here this day, that his Majesty has been pleased to confer upon Major-general Beresford the local rank of Lieutenant-general in Portugal, I wish to submit to

your excellency that I am three years a senior major-general in the British army; and although I shall, under the present circumstances, perform with the greatest cheerfulness the duties which you may require of me; yet I think on reference to the customs of the service you will see my present situation in such a point of view as shall induce your excellency, to lay my humble request before his royal highness the commander-in-chief, that he will be graciously pleased to move his Majesty to confer on me the local rank of lieutenant-general also, while serving in this country.”\*

Thus it appears, the discontent, even at the moment, was not, as this author *positively asserts*, confined to Sir John Murray; and though he labors hard to show Lord Beresford's superior claims were at the time “*very visible to any person whose intellectual eye was not blinded by prejudice,*” I have yet to learn that in the opinion of the army, his lordship's merits, though they should even be enhanced by his share of glory of Albuera, were greater than General Sherbrooke's.

II. The writer is angry at my saying Lord Beresford could never have overcome the difficulties of his situation if he had not been *directed, sustained, and shielded, by the master spirit under whom he worked.*

Whether I am correct, or otherwise, will be made manifest in the course of my work; but this author discovers irritable haste in commenting upon the expression; he supposes it applied wholly to the difficulties of discipline, whereas it evidently refers to political obstacles. Yet I will say, even the discipline of the troops was not more indebted to Lord Beresford's than it was to the excellent English officers who served under him. Madden, Harvey, Ashworth, Elder, Oliver, Douglas, and others like them, were the spirits animating the system that raised the Portuguese troops so high in the scale of European armies; those officers were not instructed by Marshal Beresford—some of them were capable of instructing him.

III. The pamphleteer denies the truth of the following passage in my History.—“*In time, almost all the military situations of emolument and importance were held by Englishmen.*”

The word emolument is used in its simple sense. The nation was at war for its existence, the whole population in arms, the country lately ravaged by an enemy, the treasury quite empty. In such a crisis all military situations were more or less places of “*emolument and importance,*” England paying the greatest part of the army. Lord Wellington, Admiral Berkeley, and Mr. Stuart were members of the regency. The first was also captain-general

\* Sir John Cradock's Correspondence, MSS.



of the Portuguese forces, regular or irregular ;—that is to say, of the whole population able to bear arms. The second was admiral of the fleet in the European waters. Marshal Beresford commanded the regular land armies. Sir Thomas Hardy was commandant of the port and arsenal of Lisbon. To all these places salaries were attached. Lord Wellington, indeed, gave his Portuguese as he also did his Spanish pay, to the military chest ; but this was a private act of disinterestedness. I believe his example was not followed.

Let us proceed.

Colonel Trant was governor of Oporto ; Colonel Cox, governor of Almeida ; Colonel Austen, of Algarve ; General Blunt, of Peniché. Sir Robert Wilson commanded the Lusitanian Legion ; Trant, John Wilson, and Miller were at the head of different brigades of militia and ordenança ; Colonel Grant and Major Fenwick commanded smaller bodies of the same species of troops ; Colonel D'Urban, Colonel John Campbell, and Colonel Madden, had high commands in the cavalry ; Generals Hamilton, Spry, Harvey, Pack, Ashworth, and Collins, commanded divisions or brigades of the regular infantry ; others held commands in the artillery ; Hardinge, Arbuthnot, Warre, &c., were on the staff ; and nearly all the regiments of the line were commanded by Englishmen, or had English majors, captains, and subalterns ; nor were these names, which readily occur to me, the whole. Situations of importance were held by Englishmen without any particular title ; thus a British engineer, especially appointed, had a voice in the council of war at Abrantes, so potential the governor could make no capitulation without his consent. No doubt all this was necessary—I never said or thought otherwise—but it shocked Portuguese pride, and this was clearly shown when the crisis of danger had passed away.

IV. I come now to the most elaborate portion of this pamphlet, where the writer seeks to uphold the superiority of Marshal Beresford in a discussion with Sir John Cradock on a military movement, and to expose the partiality and hollowness of my observations in a contrary sense.

The argument is thus commenced. “ It is difficult to understand why the consideration of this difference between two general officers, from which Colonel Napier intimates, though I think erroneously, that no results ensued, should occupy so large a space in his History.”

I have intimated nothing of the kind, and the difficulty is removed by my opponent himself, because, in the same page, he says,

“It must be owned that the subject is in itself a fair theme of historical discussion.”

Proceeding in the same vein, he affirms that I “sought for and procured all the arguments on one side, and never took the trouble to inquire for any on the other.” Subsequently he says, “with the aid of these four documents, I shall, I think, be enabled to set aside the arguments of the historian, and consequently overthrow the conclusion he has founded upon them.”

But those “four documents” are extracted from my History; two of them are letters of Sir John Cradock and Marshal Beresford discussing the very movement in question! They were printed at full length in my Appendix; the substance of each fairly given in the body of the work; they tell their own story; the only help given by me to Sir John Cradock’s view is, an opinion that Marshal Beresford’s proposition was, for certain stated reasons, “unsound.” How, then, can this writer venture to assert, that I “sought for and procured only the arguments on one side,” that I have “descended from the seat of calm and impartial judgment, to exercise my powers of special pleading in favor of the views of one party?”

The point of dispute was, whether the allied army should *move to the succor of Oporto, or remain near Lisbon?* I condemned Beresford’s arguments in favor of the first, partly because Cradock’s appeared to me conclusive; partly from my after-acquired knowledge of the real state of affairs. The pamphleteer, changing the proposition, asserts, I censured Beresford for proposing a *march to Leiria*, when my observations were expressly directed against a *march to Oporto*. I will set down what I did write and my authority.

History.—“While thus engaged, intelligence arrived that Victor had suddenly forced the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, and was in pursuit of Cuesta on the road to Merida: that Soult, having crossed the Minho and defeated Romana and Silveira, was within a few leagues of Oporto; that Lapisse had made a demonstration of assaulting Ciudad Rodrigo. The junta of Oporto now vehemently demanded aid from the regency; and the latter, although not much inclined to the bishop’s party, proposed that Sir John Cradock should unite a part of the British forces to the Portuguese troops under Marshal Beresford, and march to the *succor of Oporto*.”

“Beresford was averse to trust the Portuguese under his immediate command among the mutinous multitudes in that city; but he thought the whole of the British army should move in a body to Leiria, and from thence either push on to Oporto, or return,

according to the events that might occur in the latter town, and he endeavored to persuade Cradock to follow this plan.

“ Marshal Beresford’s plan, founded on the supposition that Cradock could engage Soult at *Oporto*, and yet quit him and return at his pleasure to Lisbon, if Victor advanced, was certainly fallacious: the advantages rested on conjectural, the disadvantages on positive data; it was conjectural that they could *relieve Oporto*, it was positive they would endanger Lisbon.”

*Authorities.*—1. Extracts from Marshal Beresford’s letter to Sir John Cradock, 29th March, 1809.

“ Upon the subject of marching a British force to *Oporto* under the actual circumstances, and under the consideration of the various points from which the enemy at present threaten us, we had yesterday a full discussion, and which renders it unnecessary for me now to recapitulate the several reasons which induced me to submit to your excellency’s consideration the propriety of advancing the British force to Leiria, to be thence pushed on to *Oporto*, or otherwise, as the information from different parts may render expedient. But my principal reason was, that as there appeared an intention of co-operation (*of which, however, there is no certainty*) between the Marshals Victor and Soult, it would be most desirable, by either driving back or overcoming one, before the other could give his co-operating aid, to defeat their plan, and if we should, or not, be able to do this, would be merely a matter of calculation of time; as, supposing on our arrival at Leiria, *Oporto* offered a prospect of holding out till we could reach it, and that Victor continued his southern pursuit of Cuesta, he would get so distant from us, as to permit the army pushing from Leiria to *Oporto* without apprehension from the army of Victor.”—“ It is for your excellency to judge, under the actual circumstances, of the propriety of *this movement towards Oporto.*”

2. Extracts from Sir John Cradock’s reply to the above, 29th March, 1809.

“ I have the honor to acknowledge at the earliest moment, your excellency’s letter of this evening, conveying a copy of the request from the regency, &c., that I should move the British troops to the *succor of Oporto,*” &c.—“ To venture upon an advance to *Oporto*, two hundred miles from Lisbon, when the very object is perhaps at this moment lost, seems to be a point only to gratify the good feeling of every soldier, but quite opposed to the sober dictates of the understanding. If the British army sets out with the declared object to *succor Oporto*, or expel the enemy, the impression on the public mind is the same. Nothing but the accomplishment will suit the English character!”

These extracts contradict the pamphleteer's assertions that I "completely misunderstood the nature of Marshal Beresford's views and intentions," and "strangely perverted his meaning by making him say it was doubtful if Victor and Soult intended to co-operate on a single plan." It is most disingenuous, also, to assume that I objected to a march upon Leiria, and then argue on that false assumption in the following manner:

"This same military movement cannot be both right and wrong, politic and impolitic, correct and erroneous."—"If the proposal of advancing the army to Leiria was evidently unsound when suggested by Marshal Beresford, the movement itself ought, in impartial justice, to have been condemned by the historian as at least equally unsound when put in execution by Sir John Cradock."

How was it the same military movement? Every circumstance was different.—1. It was a movement to Leiria—not to Oporto. 2. It took place ten or twelve days later, during which time, 5000 British infantry, and 300 artillery horses, had reinforced Cradock's army, and a regiment of dragoons was hourly expected. "Since the present accession of strength," says Sir J. Cradock, "it may be advisable to make a short movement in advance as far as Leiria."\* 3. Victor, instead of threatening Portugal, as the reports of the 26th March represented him, had engaged with Cuesta, and just fought the battle of Medellin; moreover a march to *Leiria only* did not open Lisbon to that marshal. 4. Lapisse, instead of joining Soult, was moving towards the Tagus by the passes of the Gredos; thus, the French were weakened by a diversity of plans, while the allies were become stronger. And what more absurd than this writer's notion that the same military movements must be equally good at one time as at another? After all, Cradock's march to Leiria was made entirely at the request of Lord Beresford: "I consented to General Beresford's wish to make a movement in advance, as he said it would give confidence to the body of Portuguese troops assembled at Thomar, and enable him to undertake the defence of the bridge and station at Abrantes."—Sir John Cradock to General Richard Stewart, April 8, 1808.

The author having made this use of the march to Leiria, changes his ground to magnify Lord Beresford's military genius in recommending a *march to Oporto*.

"*It appears,*" he says, "*from the evidence afforded by Colonel Napier himself, that Lord Beresford had exactly divined the intention of the enemy—nay, that he had anticipated the very orders of Buonaparte, in which the three corps of Soult, Victor, and Lapisse are directed to co-operate—and yet his reasoning, the wisdom of*

\* Sir John Cradock to General Richard Stewart, 5th April, 1809.

which is proved by facts and by the documents recorded in the author's own volume, is condemned." "Colonel Napier, forsooth, with a very superficial knowledge of the circumstances of the time, and scarcely any of the localities, has the presumption to record that these views are evidently unsound."

Hard words these, if founded in reason; if otherwise, they are foolish words. Let us test them. Three invading corps were hanging on the frontier: "*There appeared,*" says Lord Beresford, "*an intention of co-operation.*"\* Here was no great divination; moreover other things were divined, such as the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, which did not happen. Let that pass. The preservation of Lisbon was the primary object of the allies. Beresford proposed to combine a march against one of the three invading corps, and he was bound to show,—1st, that while thus operating against one enemy, another could not take possession of Lisbon. 2d, that there should be some prospect of beating that body which the allies intended to fight. Were either of these things reasonably secure?

Victor, rated 35,000 strong, and having just defeated Cuesta, was at Merida and Caceres, the head of his columns reported to be pointing towards Portugal. Was the safety of Lisbon cared for, in a plan to march all the allied forces against Soult, who was two hundred miles from that capital, when Victor, a more powerful enemy, was threatening it from a nearer point?

The author of this pamphlet says yes, because "*Victor had no means of crossing the Tagus; he had with him neither pontoon nor bridge equipage of any kind, and the river from the frontier of Portugal was rolling down, as is always the case at this season of the year, a rapid, heavy, mighty, unfordable mass of water.*"

Indeed! What, then, is the meaning of the following extract from admiral Berkeley's correspondence with Sir John Cradock, April 6th, 1809?—"There is a circumstance upon which, if both yourself and General Beresford are absent from Lisbon, it may be necessary that some decisive knowledge should be obtained—I mean the *boats and craft upon the Tagus*, the disposal of which seems to be confided to the commissary-general. That gentleman, I suppose, will naturally attend the army, and, of course, if we should suddenly require them, or if the enemy made a rapid movement across the Alemtejo, *he might become master of the boats* before an express could reach the commissary-general to remove them." What also is the meaning of the following passages in Sir John Cradock's despatches to Lord Castelreagh, 12th April, 1809?—"There is a *ferry* at Salvatierra, near Alcantara, and

\* See his letter to Sir John Cradock, Appendix.



*another up the left bank of the Tagus, in the Alemejo, where there is also a ford and the river may be easily passed."*

It was soon found that, not the commissary-general but the reGENCY held the craft,—that no registry of the boats was made, and nothing useful was done or likely to be done in the matter. Wherefore, Victor could have passed the Tagus, and Lisbon was not secure during the march to Oporto.

Now, as to the chance of success against Soult, who had above 20,000 men, his cavalry numerous and excellent. Could 12,000 British infantry, having no cavalry, few guns, no transport, and embarrassed rather than assisted by an ill-disciplined Portuguese force, have brought Soult to battle? Could they have beaten him decisively and returned to cover Lisbon? Was Lapisse with his 12,000 men and thirty guns to remain passive? Would he not have joined Soult or marched on Coimbra in rear of the allies?

The writer intimates that Wellington did march to Oporto and defeated Soult. Yes! but five weeks later, when the English ministers' intentions were no longer doubtful—when, partly by Beresford's vigor, partly from the stunning effect of Soult's capture of Oporto, chiefly from the reputation of Wellington, the Portuguese troops had from a lawless mob become an orderly force—when the army was reinforced by 7000 English infantry, four regiments of cavalry, artillery, horses, money, and stores: more troops being on the voyage to Lisbon. It happened when Cradock's efforts, followed up by Wellington, had procured country supplies—when Lapisse, by a false movement to Lower Estremadura, had marred the French combinations, placing a whole nation with its fortresses and all its forces, regular and irregular, between Soult and Victor, leaving them no power of concert or communication. It happened when Victor, whose troops were suffering from the Guadiana fever, was forming an entrenched camp at Medellin, instead of moving on Portugal—when Cuesta, at the head of more numerous forces than before, had promised to follow Victor closely in any march towards Portugal—when intercepted letters of King Joseph's indicated Seville, not Portugal, as Victor's object—when Venegas was threatening La Mancha with a fresh army—when Soult, having lost time at Amarante and men at Chaves, had spread his troops over a wide extent of country and exhausted his offensive strength—when there was a conspiracy in his camp, the leaders being in communication with the English general, and when the real numbers of the French were unknown and underrated. Notwithstanding all this, the operation would have failed of any great result, but for the astonishing passage of the Douro, an action not to be expected from ordinary generals.

Different also were the measures taken to secure the Tagus. Beresford wanted Cradock *to move at once with the whole allied force*, depending only on some calculations of time. When Lord Wellington moved, the false march of Lapisse had enabled him to draw down the Lusitanian legion and the militia of the Beira frontier to defend the bridge of Alcantara, which was mined. Three English battalions, drafted from the army at Leiria, were united with two others and two regiments of cavalry just landed at Lisbon, and with 8000 Portuguese regulars forming together an army under one general, to defend the line of the Tagus from Abrantes to Lisbon. An additional corps of observation was also formed from the garrisons of Badajos and Elvas, to watch the movements of Victor on the Guadiana; and finally, the seamen, marines and the civic legions of Lisbon formed a reserve. Hence, it was truly said Wellington's plans were "neither hastily adopted, nor recklessly hurried forward." He made, indeed, a daring movement, but it was the daring of a great general; whereas Beresford proposed a rash march of two hundred miles to succor a place which had actually fallen the very day on which he made the proposal. Nor is this all. Marshal Beresford desired Cradock to march with the Portuguese and British troops combined; and the pamphleteer says: "The allied force would have been *in every respect superior to Soult's whole army*." Now this movement was proposed the 29th of March, and the British had two hundred miles to move; wherefore, allowing two days for preparations and unforeseen obstacles, the allies would have been in front of Soult about the ninth of April. At that period, however, Marshal Beresford thus described the Portuguese portion of this army, which, so "superior in every respect" to the enemy, was to drive Soult's veteran infantry and powerful cavalry out of the kingdom.

"I, this morning, met no less than three expresses, communicating to me the *horrible state of mutiny*—for I can call it no less—in which the *troops everywhere are*, and the *inhabitants are in equal insubordination*, and they encourage each other."† And what said Sir J. Cradock?

"No reliance whatever can be placed on the Portuguese troops. *If I said that the whole were ready to mutiny or revolt, I believe I speak General Beresford's sentiments.*"†

In fine, that Beresford could not control the Portuguese troops, nor Cradock procure equipments or supplies for the British, are proved by the letters of those generals. But Cradock's difficulties, the pamphleteer says, could not have been known to Marshal

\* Mr. Beresford to Sir John Cradock, Santarem, April 7, 1809.

† Sir John Cradock to Lord Castlereagh, April 3.

Beresford at the moment of suggesting the plan ; be it so ; his proposition, then, was founded in utter ignorance of the real state of affairs, and therefore "evidently unsound."

V. Of the points which I have enumerated above as marking the difference between Marshal Beresford's proposal and Sir Arthur Wellesley's operation, the following have been either denied, doubted, or ridiculed, by the writer of this pamphlet. 1. Cuesta's promise to wait on Victor's movements. 2. The amount of Cuesta's force. 3. That the conspiracy in Soult's army was known to the allies when Sir Arthur Wellesley decided to march against that general. 4. That a whole nation, with all its fortresses, &c., &c., was, by the false march of Lapisse, placed between Victor and Soult. 5. That Abrantes was a fortress. 6. That Soult's offensive was exhausted. 7. That the intention of the English cabinet to defend Portugal had been doubtful.

The following are, however, my authorities.

1. *Cuesta's promise.*—*Mr. FRERE to Sir JOHN CRADOCK.*

*Seville, April 21st, 1809.*

"If General Victor should evacuate the country which he now occupies, and undertake a march to the relief of Marshal Soult, General Cuesta would advance in proportion, and endeavor to harass and detain him, as far as possible, without risking a general action. This latter part I consider as agreed."

There was a direct communication between Seville and Lisbon, and this letter reached Sir A. Wellesley either the 24th or 25th of April.

2. *Amount of Cuesta's force.*—This was rated by me at 35,000 in the gross, and 25,000 actually in his camp.

*Authorities.*—*Sir A. WELLESLEY to Lord CASTLEREAGH.*

*April 24th, 1809.*

"Cuesta is at Llerena collecting a force again, which it is said will soon be 25,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, a part of them good troops."

*Mr. FRERE to Sir A. WELLESLEY.*

*Seville, 4th May. .*

"We have here 3000 cavalry, considered as part of the army of Estremadura."—"General Cuesta has with him 4000 cavalry."

In addition to this, recruits were daily arriving in his camp, and he had several partisan detachments. Thus it appears I have underrated the actual force immediately in front of Victor.

3. *The conspiracy in Soult's army was known to the allies, when Sir Arthur Wellesley, &c. &c.*

This is proved by the following facts drawn from the original narrative of the English officer employed.

“John Viana, the agent of the conspirators, reached Thomar in the middle of April; and in consequence of his information, an English field-officer was sent to Aveiro to meet D'Argenton, the principal conspirator; he did so, and returned with the letter to Lisbon, whither Beresford had meanwhile repaired to meet Sir Arthur Wellesley.” It is evident, therefore, Beresford knew of the conspiracy before Sir Arthur Wellesley's arrival at Lisbon, and consequently, the latter knew it when he planned his operations.

4. *That a whole nation, with all its fortresses, &c. &c.*

When Victor was on the upper Guadiana, Soult was on the Douro; their most direct line of communication was by Alcantara, and coasting the Beira frontier. As long as Lapisse protected this line with a strong corps, their operations were connected; when that general joined Victor on the Guadiana, nearly all the central parts of Portugal and the allied armies were between the latter and Soult. The frontier line of Portugal, and the part of Spain adjoining it, immediately became insurgent, and the partisan corps before employed to watch Lapisse, guarded the bridge of Alcantara. My expressions are therefore strictly correct.

5. *Abrantes.*—The pamphleteer says: “*there was not the vestige of a fortification*” at this place in May, 1809.

*Authority.*—Major Patton, employed to examine and strengthen Abrantes, reported, 22d April, 1809, the castle as commanding all around, and secure from escalade; the town as having 4000, and requiring 6000 men as a garrison when completely fortified. The additional fortifications were then being made, and hence in May the state of the place was, as I said, “already capable of a short resistance.”

6. *Soult's offensive was exhausted.* This, the writer of the pamphlet says, was not more visible in May than in March. Now, in March, Soult was, in one compact mass, bearing down upon Oporto with the avowed intention of afterwards marching to Lisbon, having assurance from the emperor that Victor and Lapisse were co-operating. In May, Lapisse had abandoned all co-operation; so had Victor; both were cut off from any direct communication with Soult; the latter had remained five weeks inactive in Oporto; his troops were scattered, and he had shown, by feeling towards his left in force, that his views were no longer fixed upon Lisbon. It was therefore much more visible. Finally, Sir A. Wellesley judged it so, for in a letter to Mr. Frere, 24th April, he says,

“they (the *Portugals*) have not passed the Vouga to the south, nor have they extended themselves into *Tras os Montes* since the loss of *Chaves*; but they have made some movement towards the *Tamega*, which divides *Tras os Montes* from *Minho*; and it is supposed they intend to acquire for themselves the option of retreating into *Spain*.”—“It is probable, however, that *Soult* will not remain in *Portugal* when I shall pass the *Mondego*.”

7. *That the intentions of the English cabinet to defend Portugal had been doubtful.*

*Authorities.*—*Extract from Sir JOHN CRADOCK'S Correspondence, 1809.*

*January 19th.*—“We are determined to remain to the last proper moment, in the hopes of receiving orders from *England*.”

*February 9th.*—“The orders we daily expect may be either for immediate embarkation, or to maintain *Portugal*.” “We have but this one wish, to act for the credit of our country, and endeavor, under the want of all information, to discover what may be the object of the government we serve.”

*February 26th.*—“Since the 14th of *January* we are without instructions from *England*.”

*Extract of a despatch from Mr. CANNING to Mr. FRERE.*

*April 11th.*—“You will observe that in the alternative for which it is necessary to provide (though I trust nevertheless it is not likely to take place), of the evacuation of *Portugal* by his Majesty's forces, *Sir A. Wellesley* is directed to proceed with the army to *Cadiz*, to be landed there on the acceptance, by the Spanish government, of the condition which you have already been instructed to propose, of the admission of *British troops*,” &c. &c.

Other proofs also exist, but it is ridiculous to deny a fact which is continually complained of in *Sir John Cradock's* correspondence; and I have neither space nor inclination to unravel all the tedious confusion of this author's arguments. Having shown that he is inconsistent, and not very scrupulous in misrepresenting my statements, I proceed to point out his errors as to facts.

Page 40.—He asserts that “there is no other possible route from *Portugal* to *Madrid* than by the valley of the *Tagus*.”

*Answer.*—In 1812 *Lord Wellington* moved from the *Beira* frontier, through the pass of *Guadarama* to *Madrid*, without touching on the valley of the *Tagus*. In the same year *Lord Hill* moved from *Alemtejo*, passed through *Lower Estremadura*, entered *La Mancha*, and arrived at *Madrid* without moving along the valley of the *Tagus*.



Page 43.—“It is demanded, and with great apparent emphasis, by Colonel Napier, was it most desirable to protect Lisbon or Oporto?”

*Answer.*—This question is not put at all as if from myself, it is a part of the summary of Sir John Cradock’s arguments.

Page 45.—“He (Colonel Napier) conceives that Marshal Victor could pass the Tagus at any point, from its source to its mouth.”—“Indeed he appears to assert this as a fact.”

*Answer.*—I profess never to have conceived this; neither have I anywhere asserted it. I have, indeed, called the Tagus “a river fordable in almost all seasons,” and the pamphleteer says, “it exhibits a very culpable disregard of accuracy and precision in any military man, to speak thus generally of a river of such extent!” I have the utmost respect for the Tagus; but in an elaborate manuscript memoir on the defence of Portugal, drawn up by Dumouriez, that general, arguing like this writer, on the assumption that *the Tagus is a strong barrier*, says, “even if Alemtejo and Algarve fell into the hands of the enemy, it would not decide the war, which would become more dangerous for him, because all the means would be united in the four northern provinces.” Against this passage Lord Wellington has written the following marginal note:—“He does not seem to be aware of the real state of the Tagus at any season.”

I am thus well supported, but my expression was a general one. It is not found in reference to the dispute between Cradock and Beresford, but in another part of my work; and as this writer has been at the pains to search for it, let us see how accurate his own assertions with reference to this river are.

At page 47 he says I “err most widely in supposing that river has *any ford in any place* except during *the very height of summer*. From the time of the first rains, which fall towards the latter end of *September* to the month of *June*, it would be a very rare occurrence to find a ford below Abrantes, or indeed within the frontier of Portugal.”

I reply by an extract from a memoir upon the defence of Portugal, addressed to Admiral Berkeley by Lord Wellington, 26th October, 1809. “From what I have above stated, you will observe that in the event of an attack being made within the *months of June and November, when the Tagus is fordable*, the operations of the army would be carried on in a part of the country which would be cut off from Peniché,” &c. &c.

Here we have it fordable for six months, and November is certainly not *the very height of summer*. Further on, we shall find