the troops under his immediate command to Los Santos on the upper Tormes, thus pointing towards the pass of Baños; and it was rumored he designed to march that way with a view to invade Portugal by the valley of the Tagus. Wellington disbelieved this rumor, but could not disregard it, because nearly all his channels of intelligence had been suddenly dried up by a tyrannical and foolish decree of the Cortes, which compelled every man to justify himself for having remained in a district occupied by the enemy; hence to avoid persecution those who used to transmit information had fled from their homes. Hill's division was therefore moved to the right as far as Robledo to cover the pass of Perales, the rest of the troops were ready to follow, and the fifth Spanish army occupied Coria.

Joseph, after hesitating whether he should leave the army of the south or the army of Portugal in Castile, finally ordered the head-quarters of the latter to be fixed at Valladolid and the former at Toledo; the one to maintain the country between the Tormes and the Esla; the other to occupy La Mancha with its left, the valley of the Tagus as far as the Tietar with its centre, Avila with its right. The army of the centre went to Segovia, where the King joined it with his guards, and when these movements were known the allies took the following winter quarters. The fifth Spanish army, crossing the Tagus at Alcantara, entered Estremadura. Hill occupied Coria and Placentia, holding the town of Bejar by a detachment. Two divisions were quartered behind Hill about Castello Branco and in the upper Beira. The light division remained on the Agueda, the rest of the infantry was distributed along the Douro from Lamego downwards. The Portuguese cavalry quartered in Moncorvo, and the British cavalry, with the exception of Victor Alten's brigade which was attached to the light division, occupied the valley of the Mondego. Carlos d'España's troops garrisoned Ciudad Rodrigo. The Gallicians marched through the Tras os Montes to their own country.

In these quarters the Anglo-Portuguese were easily fed, because the improved navigation of the Tagus, the Douro, and the Mondego, furnished water-carriage close to all their cantonments; moreover, the army could be quickly collected on either frontier, for the front line of communication from Estremadura passed by the bridge of Alcantara to Coria, and from thence through the pass of Perales to the Agueda; the second line ran by Penamacor and Guinaldo, and both were direct; but the post of Bejar, although necessary to secure Hill's quarters from a surprise, was itself exposed. A double and direct communication across the Gredos mountain was also made by the French. On their first line they had now com-

pletely restored the Roman road, leading from Horcajada on the upper Tormes by the Puerto de Pico to Monbeltran and Talavera. To ease their second line, they finished a road begun the year before by Marmont, leading from Avila by the convent of Guisando and Escalona to Toledo. But these communications were in winter so difficult, that Laval, in crossing the mountains from Avila, was forced to harness forty horses to a carriage; moreover, the allies, having the interior and shorter lines, had a more menacing position, and a more easy one for defence. Wellington had ordered all boats to be destroyed at Almaraz, Arzobispo, and other points where the great roads came down to the Tagus, and the French, as anxious to prevent him from passing that river as he was to prevent them, sent parties to destroy what had been overlooked. Each feared the other would move, yet there was no desire to continue the campaign; the allies wanted rest, and more than one-third were in the hospitals! the French could not feed, and had to refix their general base of operations, which had been broken up by the guerillas.

Wellington was, however, most at ease. He knew the best French officers thought it useless to continue the contest in Spain, unless the British army was first mastered; Soult's intercepted letters showed indeed how that Marshal desired to fix the war in Portugal, and there was now a most powerful force on the frontier; but Badajos, Rodrigo, and Almeida blocked the principal entrances; and though the two former were ill-provided, they were in little danger, because the last campaign had deprived the French of all their ordnance, arsenals, and magazines in Andalusia, Almaraz, Madrid, Salamanca, and Valladolid, and it was nearly impossible for them to make any impression upon Portugal until new establishments were formed. The Anglo-Portuguese could, therefore, take tranquil quarters to receive reinforcements, restore their equipments, and recover strength. It was not so with the French. Their secondary warfare, now to be again noticed, would have made the military reputation of any nation before Napoleon had enlarged the measure of glory; for when quit of their most formidable enemy, they had to chase the partidas, to form sieges, recover posts lost by concentration, and to send movable columns by long winter marches over a vast extent, seeking food, fighting for what they got, and living hard, because the magazines were reserved for operations against the Anglo-Portuguese. Certainly it was a great and terrible war for them, and formidable soldiers they were, to sustain it so manfully amidst the many errors of their generals.

CHAPTER VI.

Continuation of the partisan warfare—General Lameth made governor of Santona—Reille takes the command of the army of Portugal—Drouet, Count d'Erlon, commands that of the centre—Works of Astorga destroyed by the Spaniards—Mina's operations in Aragon—Villa Campa's operations—Empecinado and others enter Madrid—The Duke del Parque enters La Mancha—Elio and Bassecour march to Albacete and communicate with the Anglo-Sicilian army—The King enters Madrid—Soult's cavalry scour La Mancha—Suchet's operations—General Donkin menaces Denia—General W. Clinton takes the command of the Anglo-Sicilian army—Suchet intrenches a camp at Xativa—The Anglo-Sicilian army falls into disrepute—General Campbell takes the command—Inactivity of the army—The Frayle surprises a convoy of French artillery—Operations in Catalonia—Dissensions in that province—Eroles and Codrington menace Tarragona—Eroles surprises a French detachment at Arbeça—Lacy threatens Mattaro and Hostalrich—Returns to Vich—Manso defeats a French detachment near Molino del Rey—Decaen defeats the united Catalonian army and penetrates to Vich—The Spanish divisions separate—Colonel Villamil attempts to surprise San Felipe de Balaguer—Attacks it a second time in concert with Codrington—The place succored by the garrison of Tortosa—Lacy suffers a French convoy to reach Barcelona, is accused of treachery and displaced—The regular warfare in Catalonia ceases—The partisan warfare continues—England the real support of the war.

CONTINUATION OF THE PARTISAN WARFARE.

In the north, while Souham was gathering in front of Burgos, some of Mendizabel's bands had blockaded Santona by land, and Popham, after his failure at Gueteria, blockaded it by sea. It was not well provisioned, but Napoleon had sent an especial governor, Lameth, and a chosen engineer, D'Abadie, from Paris, to complete the works. By their activity, a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon were soon mounted, and including the crew of a corvette, the garrison was eighteen hundred strong. Lameth had to fight his way into the place in September, but he soon formed an armed flotilla, with which, when the English squadron was driven off the port by gales of wind, he made frequent captures. Meanwhile Mendizabel surprised the garrison of Briviesca, Longa captured a large convoy with its escort, near Burgos, and all the bands increased in numbers and boldness.

When Caffarelli returned from the Duero, Reille took command of the army of Portugal, Drouet assumed that of the army of the centre, and Souham returned to France. Reille then spread his troops over the country, Avila was occupied, Sarrut took possession of Leon, the bands of Marquinez and Salazar were beaten, and Foy, marching to seize Astorga, surprised and captured ninety men, employed to dismantle that fortress; but twenty breaches had been opened, and the place ceased to be of importance

Caffarelli, troubled by the care of a number of convoys, one of which, under General Frimont, although strongly escorted and having two pieces of cannon, fell into Longa's hands on the 30th of November, was unable to commence active operations until the 29th of December. Then his detachments chased the bands from Bilbao, while he marched himself to succor and provision Santona and Gueteria, and to re-establish his other posts along the coasts; but while near Santona, the Spaniards attacked St. Domingo in Navarre, and invested Logroño. Popham had, however, quitted the Bay of Biscay with his squadron, leaving a few vessels to continue the littoral warfare, which enabled Caffarelli to succor Santona, and important events followed, but the relation must be deferred, as belonging to the transactions of 1813.

Tracing the chain of guerilla operations from Biscay to the other parts, we find Abbé, who commanded in Pampeluna, Severoli, who guarded the right of the Ebro, and Paris, who had returned from Valencia to Zaragoza, continually and at times successfully attacked in the latter end of 1812; for after Chaplangarra's exploit near Jaca, Mina intercepted all communication with France, and on the 22d of November surprised and drove back to Zaragoza with loss a very large convoy. Then he besieged the castle of Huesca, and when a considerable force coming from Zaragoza forced him to desist, he re-appeared at Barbastro. Finally, in a severe action fought on the heights of Señora del Poya, towards the end of December, his troops were dispersed by Colonel Colbert; yet the French lost seventy men, and in a few weeks Mina took the field again with forces more numerous than he had ever before commanded.

About this time Villa Campa, who had intrenched himself near Segorbé to harass Suchet's rear, was driven from thence by Panetier, but being afterwards joined by Gayan, invested the castle of Daroca with three thousand men. Severoli succored the place, but Villa Campa re-assembled near Carineña behind Severoli, who was forced to fight his way back to Zaragoza. The Spaniards re-appeared at Almunia, and on the 22d of December another battle was fought, when Villa Campa, defeated with considerable slaughter, retired to New Castile, and there soon repaired his losses. In the centre of Spain, Elio, Bassecour, and Empecinado, having waited until the great French armies passed in pursuit of Hill, came down upon Madrid. Wellington, when at Salamanca, expected this would draw troops from the Tormes, but the only effect was to cause the garrison left by Joseph to follow the great army, which it rejoined between the Duero and the Tormes, with a great incumbrance of civil servants and families

The partidas then entered Madrid, and committed great excesses, treating the people as enemies.

Soult and Joseph had been earnest with Suchet to send a strong division by Cuença as a protection for Madrid, and that Marshal did move in person with a considerable body of troops as far as Requeña on the 28th of November; but being in fear for his line towards Alicant, soon returned to Valencia in a state of indecision, leaving only one brigade at Requeña. He had been reinforced by three thousand fresh men from Catalonia, yet he would not undertake any operation until he knew something of the King's progress, and at Requeña he had gained no intelligence even of the passage of the Tagus. The Spaniards being thus uncontrolled gathered in all directions.

Del Parque advanced with Ballesteros' army to Villa Nueva de los Infantes on the La Mancha side of the Sierra Morena, his cavalry entered the plains, and some new levies from Granada came to Alcaraz on his right. Elio and Bassecour, leaving Madrid to the partidas, marched to Albacete without hindrance from Suchet, and re-opened the communication with Alicant; hence, exclusive of the Sicilian army, nearly thirty thousand regular Spanish troops were said to be assembled on the borders of Murcia, and six thousand new levies came to Cordoba as a reserve. However, on the 3d of December Joseph drove the partidas from the capital, and re-occupied Guadalaxara and the neighboring posts; Soult then entered Toledo, and his cavalry advanced towards Del Parque, who immediately recrossed the Morena, whereupon the French horsemen swept La Mancha to gather contributions and fill the magazines at Toledo.

By these operations Del Parque, now joined by the Granadan troops from Alcaraz, was separated from Elio; Suchet was thus relieved from a danger which he had dreaded too much, and by his own inaction contributed to increase. It is true he had all the sick men belonging to the King's and to Soult's army on his hands, but he had also many effective men of those armies. The yellow fever had shown itself in some of his hospitals, and he was also uneasy for the security of his base in Aragon, where the partida warfare was reviving; yet with fifteen thousand infantry and a fine division of cavalry disposable, he should not have permitted Elio to pass his flank. He was afraid of the Sicilian army, and it had a great influence on all the preceding operations; for it is certain Suchet would otherwise have detached troops to Madrid by the Cuença road, and then Soult would probably have sought a battle between the Tagus and the Guadarama mountains; but this influence arose entirely from the position of

the Alicant army, not from its operations, which were feeble and vacillating.

Maitland had resigned in the beginning of October. His successor, Mackenzie, pushed some troops to the front, and there was a slight descent upon Xabea by the navy; but there was no plan or object, the only signs of vitality being a fruitless demonstration against the castle of Denia, where Donkin disembarked on the 4th of October with a detachment of the eighty-first regiment. The walls had been represented as weak, they were found high and strong, the garrison had been unexpectedly doubled that morning, and in the evening a second reinforcement arrived, whereupon the British re-embarked. The water was however full of pointed rocks, and it was by great exertions Lieutenant Penruddocke of the Fame got the boats in, when the soldiers, wading and fighting, got on board with little loss, but in confusion.

Soon after this General William Clinton came from Sicily to take the command, and Wellington, who was then before Burgos, thinking Suchet would weaken his army to help the King, recommended an attempt upon the city of Valencia either by a coast attack or by a land operation, warning Clinton however to avoid an action in a cavalry country. This was not very difficult, because the land was generally rocky and mountainous, but Clinton would not stir without first having possession of the citadel of Alicant, and thus all things fell into disorder and weakness. For the Spanish governor, avowing that he hated the English more than the French, would not suffer them to hold even a gate; and he sent Elio a large convoy of clothing and other stores with an escort of only twenty men, that he might retain two battalions to resist the attempt which he pretended to believe Clinton would make on the citadel. The latter, leaving Whittingham and Roche at Alcoy and Xixona, drew in his other troops from the posts previously occupied in front by Mackenzie; he feared Suchet's cavalry, but the Marshal, estimating the allied armies at more than fifty thousand men, would undertake no serious enterprise while ignorant of the King's progress in the north.* He however diligently strengthened his camp at St. Felipe de Xativa, threw another bridge over the Xucar, intrenched the passes in his front, covered Denia with a detachment, compelled Whittingham to abandon Alcoy, dismantled the extensive walls of Valencia, and fortified a citadel there.

In this state Elio came down to Albacete, and priding himself upon the dexterity with which he had avoided the French armies, proposed to Clinton a combined attack upon Suchet. But he exaggerated his own numbers, and giving out that Del Parque's

* Suchet's Correspondence, MS.

force was under his command, pretended he could bring forty thousand men into the field, four thousand being cavalry. The two Spanish armies united would, however, scarcely have produced twenty thousand effective infantry;* moreover Del Parque, a sickly, unwieldy, incapable person, with mutinous soldiers, had no intention of moving beyond Alcaraz. With such allies it was difficult for the English General to co-operate, yet something might have been effected while Suchet was at Requeña before Elio arrived, and more surely after he had reached Albacete. Clinton had twelve thousand men, five thousand being British, there was a fleet to aid, and Elio had ten thousand infantry. Nothing was attempted, and Napoleon assured Suchet, that however difficult his position was from the extent of country, the enemy in his front was not really formidable.† Events justified this observation. The French works were soon completed, and the British army fell into such disrepute, that the Spaniards, with sarcastic malice, affirmed it was to be put under Elio to make it useful.

Roche's and Whittingham's division continued to excite the utmost jealousy in the other Spanish troops, who asked very reasonably, what they did to merit such advantages? England paid and clothed them, the Spaniards were bound to feed them; they did not do so, and Canga Arguelles, the intendant of the province, said he had twice provided magazines for them in Alicant, which were twice plundered by the governor: yet the other Spanish troops were worse off.‡ But on every side intrigues, discontent, vacillation, weakness were visible, and if England was the stay of the Peninsula, Wellington alone supported the war.

On the 22d of November, the obstinacy of the governor being overcome, he gave up the citadel to the British, yet no offensive operations followed, though Suchet, on the 26th, drove Roche's troops out of Alcoy with loss, and defeated the Spanish cavalry at Yecla. On the 2d of December General Campbell came from Sicily with four thousand men, principally British, and assumed the command, making the fourth general-in-chief in the same number of months. His presence, the strong reinforcement he brought, and the intelligence that Lord William was to follow with another reinforcement, again raised the public expectation, and Elio desired the British to occupy the enemy on the lower Xucar while he attacked Requeña; but Campbell, after some feeble demonstrations, declared he would await Lord William's arrival. Then Elio, who had hitherto abstained from disputes with the

* General Donkin, MS.
† Duke of Feltre, MS.
‡ Appendix 17

British, became discontented and dispersed his army for subsistence, and Campbell complained that he was abandoned.

Suchet, expecting an attack, had withdrawn his outposts to concentrate at Xativa; but when he found Campbell as inactive as his predecessors, and saw the Spanish troops scattered, he surprised one Spanish post at Onteniente, another in Ibi, and re-occupied all his former offensive positions in front of Alicant. Soult's detachments were now also felt in La Mancha, wherefore Elio retired into Murcia, and Del Parque went over the Morena. Thus the storm menacing the French was dissipated, for Campbell, following his instructions, refused rations to Whittingham's corps and desired it to separate for subsistence;* and as the rest of the Spanish troops were actually starving, no danger was to be apprehended from them: Habert even marched up to Alicant, killing and wounding men almost under the walls, and the Anglo-Italian soldiers deserted to him by whole companies when opportunity offered.

Suchet feared nothing in front, but was unquiet for his rear, where, besides the operations of Villa Campa, Gayan, Duran and Mina in Aragon, the Frayle and other partida chiefs continually vexed his communications with Tortosa. Fifty men had been surprised near Segorbe, the 22d of November, by Villa Campa, and Panetier, though he destroyed that chief's intrenched camp, could not hinder him attacking Daroca, as before shown. The Frayle surprised an ordnance convoy, took several guns and four hundred horses, and killed in cold blood, after the action, a hundred artillerymen and officers. A movable column destroyed his dépôts and many of his men, but the Frayle himself escaped, and soon reappeared upon the communications. The loss of this convoy was the first disgrace of the kind which had befallen the army of Aragon, and to use Suchet's expression, a battle would have cost him less.†

Nor were the Spaniards quite inactive in Catalonia, although the departure of Maitland had so dispirited them that the regular warfare was upon the point of ceasing altogether. The army was indeed called twenty thousand, and the tercios of reserve forty-five thousand; yet a column of nine hundred French controlled the sea-line, and cut off all supplies landed for the interior.‡ Lacy being about Vich with seven thousand men, affirmed that he could not feed his army on the coast; Codrington said that nineteen feluccas laden with flour had, in two nights, landed their cargoes between

* Appendixes 17, 18.
† Suchet to the King, MS.
‡ Codrington, MS.

Mattaro and Barcelona for the supply of the latter city, and these, and many other ventures of the same kind, might have been captured without difficulty,—that Claros and Milans continued corruptly to connive at the passage of French convoys,—that the rich merchants of Mattaro and Arens invited the enemy to protect their contraband convoys going to France, and yet accused him publicly of interrupting their lawful trade, when he was only disturbing a treasonable commerce, so openly followed that he had to declare a blockade of the whole coast.

A plot to deliver the Medas islands was also discovered, and Lacy, when pressed to call out the somatenes, a favorite project with the English naval officers, said he could scarcely feed and provide ammunition for the regular troops. He also observed that the efforts of that nature hitherto made, and under more favorable circumstances, had produced only a waste of life, of treasure, of provisions, of ammunition, and of arms, and now the French possessed all the strong places. But so bitter were party dissensions that Sir Edward Pellew anticipated the ruin of the principality from that cause alone. Lacy, Sarsfield, Eroles and Codrington continued their old disputes, and Sarsfield, then in Aragon, had also quarrelled with Mina,—Lacy demanded Codrington's recall, and the Junta demanded Lacy's removal,—and such was the misery of the soldiers, the officers of one regiment actually begged at the doors of private houses to obtain old clothing for their men, and were denied! A few isolated efforts by some of the partisans were the only signs of war, when the victory of Salamanca again raised the public spirit. Then, for the first time, the new constitution was proclaimed in Catalonia, the Junta was suppressed, Eroles obtained greater powers, and had hope of becoming Captain-General, for the Regency agreed to recall Lacy. Many thousand English muskets and other weapons were by Sir Edward Pellew then given to the partisans as well as the regular troops, which enabled them to receive cartridges from the ships, instead of the loose powder formerly demanded on account of the difference in the bore of the Spanish muskets.

The effect of these happy coincidences was soon displayed. Eroles, who had raised a new division of three thousand men, contrived in concert with Codrington a combined movement in September against Tarragona. Marching in the night of the 27th from Reus to the mouth of the Francoli, he was met by the boats of the squadron, and repulsing a sally from the fortress, drove some Catalans in the French service from the ruins of the Olivo, while the boats swept the mole, taking five vessels. After this affair he encamped on the hills separating Lerida, Tarragona, and Tortosa.

meaning to intercept the communication between those places and keep up an intercourse with the fleet; the more necessary because Lacy had lost this advantage eastward of Barcelona. While thus posted he heard that a French detachment had come from Lerida to Arbeça, upon which, making a forced march over the mountains, he destroyed the greatest part on the 2d of October, and then returned to his former quarters. Meanwhile Lacy, embarking scaling-ladders and battering guns on board the English ships, made a pompous movement against Mattaro with his whole force, yet at the moment of execution changed his plan and attempted to surprise Hostalrich; but he kept no secresy, the enemy obtained succor, and he returned to Vich. Manso defeated two hundred French near Molino del Rey, gained some advantage over one Pelligri, a French miguelete partisan, and captured some French boats at Mattaro after Lacy's departure; but Sarsfield's mission to raise an army in Aragon failed, and Decaen, desiring to check the reviving spirit of the Catalans, made a combined movement against Vich in the latter end of October. Lacy immediately drew Eroles, Manso, and Milans towards that point, and thus the fertile country about Reus was again resigned to the French, the intercourse with the fleet totally lost, and the garrison of Tarragona, which had been greatly straitened by the previous operations of Eroles, was relieved. Yet the defence of Vich was not secured, for on the 3d of November one division of the French forced the main body of the Spaniards under Lacy and Milans, at the passes of Puig Gracioso and Congosto; and though the other divisions were less successful against Eroles and Manso at St. Filieu de Codenas, Decaen reached Vich on the 4th. The Catalans, who had lost all together above five hundred men, then separated: Lacy went to the hills near Momblanch, Milans and Rovira towards Olot, Manso to Montserrat.

Eroles returned to Reus, and was like to have surprised the Col de Balaguer; for he sent a detachment under Villamil, dressed in Italian uniforms, which had been taken by Rovira in Figueras, and his men were actually admitted within the palisade of the fort before the garrison perceived the deceit. A lieutenant with sixteen men, placed outside, were taken, and this loss was magnified so much to Eroles, that he ordered Villamil to make a more regular attack. To aid him, Codrington brought up the Blake and landed some marines; yet no impression was made on the garrison, and the allies retired on the 17th at the approach of two thousand men sent from Tortosa. Eroles and Manso then vainly united near Manresa to oppose Decaen, who, coming down from Vich, forced his way to Reus, seized a vast quantity of corn, supplied Tarragona, and then marched to Barcelona.

These operations indisputably proved that there was no real power of resistance in the Catalan army. But an absurd notion prevailed that Soult, Suchet, and Joseph were retiring with their armies in one body to France by Catalonia; and Lacy, to cover his inactivity, pretended a design to raise a large force in Aragon, with which to watch this retreat, and act as a flanking corps to Wellington, who was believed to be then approaching Zaragoza.* Such rumors served to amuse the Catalans for a short time, but the sense of their real weakness soon returned. In December, Bertoletti, the governor of Tarragona, marched upon Reus, and defeated some hundred men who had re-assembled there; and at the same time a French convoy for Barcelona, escorted by three thousand men, passed safely in the face of six thousand soldiers desirous to attack, yet prevented by Lacy. On this occasion the anger of the people and of the troops was loudly expressed; he was accused of treachery, and soon after recalled. Eroles, who had come to Cape Salou to obtain succor from the squadron for his suffering soldiers, now acknowledged that the resources of Catalonia were worn out, the spirit of the people broken by Lacy's misconduct, and the army, reduced to less than seven thousand men, was naked and famishing. Affairs were indeed so bad that he was reluctant to accept the office of Captain-General, and the regular warfare was in fact extinguished, for Sarsfield was now acting as a partisan on the Ebro. But at this time the French were greatly dismayed at the disasters in Russia; their force was weakened by drafts to fill up the ranks of Napoleon's new army, and the partida warfare continued; especially along the banks of the Ebro, where Sarsfield, at the head of Eroles' ancient division, acted in concert with Mina, Duran, Villa Campa, the Frayle, Pendencia, and other chiefs, who were busy upon Suchet's communication between Tortosa and Valencia.

As Aragon was now unquiet, Navarre and Biscay in a state of insurrection, the French in the interior of Spain were absolutely invested. Their front was opposed by regular armies, their flanks annoyed by the British squadrons, their rear, from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean, plagued and stung by partidas and insurrections. And England was the cause of all this. England was the real deliverer of the Peninsula. It was her succors thrown into Biscay that had excited the new insurrection in the northern provinces, and enabled Mina and the other chiefs to enter Aragon, while Wellington drew the great masses of the French towards Portugal. It was that insurrection, so forced on, which, notwithstanding the cessation of the regular warfare in Catalonia, gave life and activity to the partidas of the south. It

* Codrington, MSS.

was the army from Sicily which induced Suchet to keep his forces together, instead of hunting down the bands on his communications. In fine, it was the troops of England who had shocked the enemy's front of battle, the fleets of England which had menaced his flanks with disembarkations, the money and stores of England which had supported the partidas. Every part of the Peninsula was pervaded by her influence or her warriors, and a trembling sense of insecurity was communicated to the French wherever their armies were not united in masses.

Such, then, were the various military events of the year 1812, and the English General, taking a view of the whole, judged that however anxious the French might be to invade Portugal, they would be content during the winter to gather provisions and wait for reinforcements from France wherewith to strike a decisive blow at his army. But these reinforcements never came. Napoleon, unconquered of man, had been vanquished by the elements The fires and the snows of Moscow combined had shattered his strength, and in confessed madness nations and rulers rejoiced that an enterprise, at once the grandest and most provident, the most beneficial ever attempted by a warrior-statesman, had been foiled—they rejoiced that Napoleon had failed to re-establish unhappy Poland as a barrier against the most formidable and brutal, the most swinish tyranny that has ever menaced and disgraced European civilization.

CHAPTER VII.

General observations—Wellington reproaches the army—His censures indiscriminate—Analysis of his campaign—Criticisms of Jomini and others examined—Errors of execution—The French operations analyzed—Sir John Moore's retreat compared with Lord Wellington's.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

WHEN the campaign terminated, Wellington, exasperated by the conduct of the army, and the many crossings he had experienced during the campaign, gave vent to his indignation in a circular letter, addressed to the superior officers, which, being ill-received by the army at the time, has been frequently referred to since with angry denunciations of its injustice. In substance it declared, "that discipline had deteriorated during the campaign *in a greater degree than he had ever witnessed or ever read of in any army,*

and this without any disaster, any unusual privation or hardship, save that of inclement weather,—that the officers had lost all command over their men, and excesses, outrages of all kinds, and inexcusable losses had occurred,—that no army had ever made shorter marches in retreat or had longer rests,—no army had ever been so little pressed by a pursuing enemy, and this unhappy state of affairs was to be traced to the habitual neglect of duty by the regimental officers."

These severe reproaches were partially unjust, and the statements on which they were founded were in some particulars inaccurate, especially as regarded the retreat from Salamanca. The marches, though short as to distance after quitting the Tormes, were long as to time; and it is the time an English soldier bears his burthen, for like the ancient Roman he carries the load of an ass, that crushes his strength. Some regiments had come from Cadiz without halting; and as long garrison duty had weakened their bodies, their constitutions and inexperience were too heavily taxed. The line of march from Salamanca was through a flooded clayey country, not much easier to the allies than the marshes of the Arnus were to Hannibal's army; and mounted officers, as that great man well knew, when he placed the Carthaginian cavalry to keep up the Gallic rear, never judge correctly of a foot-soldier's exertions; they measure his strength by their horses' powers. On this occasion, the troops, stepping ankle-deep in clay, mid-leg in water, lost their shoes, and with strained sinews heavily made their way, and withal they had but two rations in five days. Their General thought otherwise. He knew not that the commissariat stores which he had ordered up did not arrive regularly, because of the extreme fatigue of the animals who carried them; and those that did arrive were not available for the troops, because, as the rear of an army, and especially a retreating army, is at once the birth-place and the recipient of false reports, the subordinate commissaries and conductors of the temporary dépôts were alarmed with rumors that the enemy's cavalry had carried off or destroyed the field-stores; the soldiers were actually feeding on acorns when supposed to have good rations!

The destruction of the swine may be thus in some measure palliated, but there is neither palliation nor excuse to be offered for the excesses and outrages committed on the inhabitants, nor for many officers' habitual inattention to their duty. Intolerable disorders had marked the retreat, and great part of the sufferings arose from these and previous disorders; for it is too common with soldiers to break up the arrangements of their general by want of discipline, and then complain of the misery which those arrange-

ments were designed to obviate. Neverthetless, this circular was not strictly just, because it excepted none from blame, though in conversation Wellington admitted the reproach did not apply to the light division, nor to the guards. With respect to the former, indeed, the proof of its discipline was easy, though so much had not been said; for how could those troops be upbraided, who held together so closely with their colors that, exclusive of the killed in action, they did not leave thirty men behind? Never did the extraordinary vigor and excellence of their discipline merit praise more than in this retreat. But it seems to be a drawback to the greatness of Lord Wellington's character, that while capable of repressing insubordination by firmness or dexterity, as the case may require; capable also of magnanimously disregarding or dangerously resenting injuries, his praises and his censures are yet bestowed indiscriminately, or so directed as to acquire partisans and personal friends rather than the attachment of the multitude. He did not make the hard-working military crowd feel that their honest, unobtrusive exertions were appreciated. In this he differs not from many other great generals and statesmen, but he thereby failed to influence masses, and his genius falls short of that sublime flight by which Hannibal in ancient, and Napoleon in modern times, commanded the admiration of the world. But it is only by such great men that he can be measured, nor will any slight examination of his exploits suffice to convey a true notion of his intellectual power and resources. Let this campaign be taken as an example.

It has been by English writers called his easy and triumphant march to Madrid, yet nothing happened according to the original plan; the operations were one continual struggle to overcome obstacles occasioned by the enemy's numbers, the insubordinaion of the troops, the slowness, incapacity, and unfaithful conduct of the Spanish commanders, the want of money, and the active folly of the different governments. For first, the design was to menace the French in Spain, so as to bring their forces from other parts, and then retire into Portugal, again to issue forth when want should cause them to disperse. Wellington was not without hope indeed to strike a decisive blow, yet he was content, if the occasion came not, to wear out the French by continual marching, and trusted the frequent opportunities thus given to the Spaniards would finally urge them to a general effort. But he found his enemy from the first too powerful for him, even without drawing succor from distant parts, and he would have fallen back at once were it not for Marmont's rashness. Nor would the victory of the Arapiles itself have produced any proportionate effect but for the

errors of the King, and his rejection of Soult's advice. Those errors caused the evacuation of Andalusia, but only to concentrate an overwhelming force, with which the French finally drove the victors back to Portugal.

Wellington designed to finish his campaign in the southern provinces, and circumstances compelled him to remain in the northern provinces. He would have taken Burgos, and he could not; he would have rested longer on the Carrion, and his flanks were turned by the bridges of Palencia and Baños; he would have rested behind the Duero, to profit of his central position, but the bridge at Tordesillas was ravished from him, and the sudden reparation of that at Toro forced him to retire. He would have united with Hill on the Adaja, and he could only unite with him behind the Tormes; and on this last river also he desired either to take his winter quarters or to deliver a great battle, with a view to regain Madrid, and he could do neither. Finally, he endeavored to make an orderly and easy retreat to Rodrigo, but his army was like to have dissolved altogether. And yet in all these varying circumstances, his sagacity as to the general course of the war, his promptness in taking advantage of particular opportunities, were conspicuous. These are the distinguishing characteristics of real genius.

Passing over that master-stroke, the battle of Salamanca, the reader would do well to mark how this great commander after that event separated the King's army from Marmont's, forcing the one to retreat upon Burgos, and driving the other from Madrid,—how he thus broke up the French combinations, which it required many weeks to restore,—how he posted Clinton's division and the Gallicians to repress any light excursion by the beaten army of Portugal,—how, foreseeing Soult's plan to establish a new base of operations in Andalusia, he was prepared to drive Soult himself from that province,—how promptly, when the siege of Burgos failed, and his combinations were ruined by the fault of others, he commenced his retreat, sacrificing all his high-wrought expectation of triumph in a campaign which he burned to finish, and otherwise would have finished even with more splendor than it had commenced.

If Burgos, a mean fortress of the lowest order, had fallen early, the world would have seen a noble stroke. For the Gallicians, aided by a weak English division and the reinforcements making up from Coruña, would, covered by Burgos, have sufficed to keep the army of Portugal in check, and Popham's armament would have fomented a general insurrection of the northern provinces. Meanwhile Wellington, gathering forty-five thousand Anglo-Portuguese and fifteen thousand Spaniards on the Tagus, would have

marched towards Murcia; Ballesteros' army, and the sixteen thousand men composing the Alicant army, could there have joined him; and then with a hundred thousand soldiers he would have given such a battle to the united French armies, if indeed they could have united, as would have shaken all Europe with the martial clangor. To exchange this glorious vision for the cold desolate reality of a dangerous winter retreat, was for Wellington but a momentary mental struggle; and it was simultaneous with that daring conception, the passage of the bridge of Burgos under the fire of the castle.

Let him be traced then in retreat. Pursued by a superior army and seeing his cavalry defeated, he turned as a savage lion at the Carrion; nor would he have removed so quickly from that lair, if the bridges at Palencia and Baños had been destroyed according to his order. Neither is his cool self-possession to be overlooked; for when both his flanks were thus exposed, instead of falling back in a hurried manner to the Duero, he judged exactly the value of the rugged ground on the left bank of the Pisuerga, in opposition to the double advantage obtained by the enemy at Palencia and Baños; nor did the difficulty which Souham and Caffarelli, independent commanders and neither of them accustomed to move large armies, would find in suddenly changing their line of operations, escape him. His march to Cabeçon and his position on the left of the Pisuerga was not a retreat, it was the shift of a practised captain.

When forced to withdraw Hill from the Tagus, he on the instant formed a new combination to fight that great battle on the Adaja which he had intended to deliver near the Guadalaviar; and though the splendid exploit of Captain Guingret at Tordesillas baffled this intent, he in return baffled Souham by that ready stroke of generalship, the posting of his whole army in front of Rueda, thus forbidding a passage by the restored bridge. Finally, if he could not maintain the line of the Duero nor that of the Tormes, it was because rivers can never be permanently defended against superior forces; and yet he did not quit the last without a splendid tactical illustration, namely, the movement from the Arapiles to the Valmusa—a movement made not in confusion and half flight, but in close order of battle, the columns ready for action, the artillery and cavalry skirmishing, passing the Junguen without disorder, filing along the front of and winding into the rear of a French force the largest ever collected in one mass in the Peninsula, an army having twice as many guns as the allies, and twelve thousand able horsemen to boot! And all these great and skilful actions were executed with an army composed of different nations; soldiers, fierce indeed

and valiant, terrible in battle, but characterized by himself as more deficient in good discipline than any army of which he had ever read!

Men engaged only in civil affairs, especially book-men, are apt to undervalue military genius, talking as if simple bravery were the highest qualification of a general; and they have another mode of appeasing an inward sense of inferiority, namely, to attribute the successes of a great captain to the prudence of some discreet adviser, who in secret rules the general, amends his errors, and leaves him all the glory. Thus Napoleon had Berthier, Wellington Sir George Murray! but in this, the most skilful if not the most glorious of Wellington's campaigns, Murray was not present, and the staff of the army was governed by three young lieutenant-colonels, namely, Lord Fitzroy Somerset, Waters, and Delancey; for though Sir Willoughby Gordon joined the army as Quarter-master-General after the battle of Salamanca, he was inexperienced, and some bodily sufferings impeded his personal exertions.

Such then were the principal points of skill displayed; yet so vast and intricate an art is war, that the apothegm of Turenne will always be found applicable: "*He who has made no mistakes in war, has seldom made war.*" Some military writers, amongst them the celebrated Jomini, blame the English General, that with a conquering army and an insurgent nation at his back he should in three months after his victory have attempted nothing more than the unsuccessful siege of Burgos. This censure is not entirely unfounded; the King certainly escaped very easily from Madrid; yet there are many points to be argued ere the question can be decided. The want of money, progressively increasing, had become almost intolerable. The army was partly fed from Rodrigo, partly from the valley of the Pisuerga; Hill's troops were fed from Lisbon, the Portuguese in their own country; the Spaniards always lived like the French by requisition; the British professed to avoid that mode, and made it a national boast; the movements were therefore subservient to this principle, and must be judged accordingly: want of money was want of motion.

Now four modes of operation were open.

1. *After the victory of Salamanca to follow the King to Valencia, and unite with the Alicant army, then, having separated Soult from Joseph and Suchet, to act according to events.*

To have thus moved without money into Valencia or Murcia, new countries where he had no assured connections and which were scarcely able to feed the French armies, would have exposed him to great difficulties; and he must have made extensive arrangements with the fleet ere he could have acted vigorously, if, as was

probable, the French concentrated all their forces behind the Guadalaviar. Then the distance between him and the troops left in the north being considered, the latter must have been strengthened at the expense of those in the south, unless the army of Portugal joined the King, whereby the allies would have been overmatched in Valencia; that is, if Soult also joined the King, and if not he would have placed the army between two fires. If a force was not left in the north, the army of Portugal could march to the King's assistance by Zaragoza, or relieve Astorga, seize Salamanca, recover the prisoners and trophies of the Arapiles, and destroy all the great line of magazines and dépôts even to the Tagus. Moreover the yellow fever raged in Murcia, and this would have compelled the English General to depend upon the contracted base of operations offered by Alicant; because Clausel could have rendered it impossible to keep it on the Tagus. Time therefore was required to arrange the means of operating in this manner, and meanwhile the army was not unwisely turned another way.

2. *To march directly against Soult in Andalusia.*

This project Wellington was prepared to execute when the King's orders rendered it unnecessary; but if Joseph had adopted Soult's plan, a grand field for the display of military art would have been opened. The King going by the Despeñas Perros, and having the advantage of time in the march, could have joined Soult with the army of the centre before the English General could have joined Hill. The sixty thousand combatants thus united could have kept the field until Suchet had also joined; but they could scarcely have maintained the blockade of Cadiz also; and hence the error of Wellington seems to have been that he did not make an effort to overtake the King either upon or beyond the Tagus—for the army of the centre would certainly have joined Soult by the Despeñas Perros if Maitland had not at the moment landed at Alicant.

3. *To follow the army of Portugal after the victory of Salamanca.*

The reasons for moving upon Madrid instead of adopting this line of operations need not be here repeated; yet it may be added, that the destruction of the great arsenal and dépôt of the Retiro was no small object with reference to the safety of Portugal.

4. *The plan actually followed.*

The English General's stay in the capital was unavoidable, seeing that to observe the development of the French operations in the south was of such importance. It only remains therefore to trace him after he quitted Madrid. The choice of the line by Valladolid appears common-place and deficient in vigor, but was probably

decided by the want of money and means of transport; to which may be added the desire to bring the Gallicians forward, which he could only attain by putting himself in actual military communication with them and covering their advance. Yet this will not excuse the feeble pursuit of Clausel's retreating army up the valley of the Pisuerga. The Spaniards would not the less have come up if that General had been defeated, nor would the want of their assistance have been much felt in the action. Considerable loss would no doubt have been suffered by the Anglo-Portuguese, and they could ill bear it, but the result of a victory would have amply repaid the damage received; for the time gained by Clausel was employed by Caffarelli to strengthen the castle of Burgos, which contained the greatest French dépôt in this part of Spain. A victory therefore would have entirely disarranged the enemy's means of defence in the north, and would have sent the twice-broken and defeated army of Portugal behind the Ebro; then neither the conscript reinforcements nor the junction of Caffarelli's troops would have enabled Clausel to re-appear in the field before Burgos would have fallen. But that fortress would probably have yielded at once, and the English General might have returned to the Tagus, perhaps in time to meet Soult as he issued forth from the mountains in his march from Andalusia.

It may be objected, that as Burgos did not yield, it would not have yielded under any circumstances without a vigorous defence. This is not so certain: the effect of a defeat would have been very different from the effect of such a splendid operation as Clausel's retreat; and the prolonged defence of the castle was due to some errors of detail in the attack as well as to want of sufficient artillery means. In respect of the great features of the campaign, it may be assumed that Wellington's judgment on the spot, and with a full knowledge both of his own and his adversaries' situation, is of more weight than Jomini's, however able and acute, for he knew nothing of the difficulties.

In the details of the siege there was something of error exceedingly strange. It is said Sir Howard Douglas, on being consulted, objected to the proceeding by gallery and mine against an outward, a middle and an inward line of defence, as likely to involve a succession of tedious and difficult enterprises, which even if successful would still leave the White Church and the upper castle to be carried;—that this castle, besides other artillery armament, was surmounted by a powerful battery of heavy guns, bearing directly upon the face of the horn-work of San Michael, the only point from which it could be breached; and until it was breached the governor, a gallant man, would certainly not surren-

der. It could not however be breached without a larger battering-train than the allies possessed, and would not, as he supposed, be effected by mines; wherefore, proposing to take the guns from two frigates then lying at Santander, he proffered to bring them up in time. In this reasoning Wellington partly acquiesced, but he expected success from the scarcity of water in the castle, and the facility of burning the provision magazines; nor was he without hope from his fortune. Towards the end of the siege he too late got the guns from Santander; but while Douglas counselled him on the spot, Sir Edward Pakenham, then in Madrid, assured the author of this history that he also, foreseeing the artillery means were too scanty, had proposed to send by the Somosierra twelve fine Russian battering-guns from the Retiro, pledging himself to procure, by an appeal to the officers in the capital, animals sufficient to transport them and their ammunition to Burgos in a few days. The offer was not accepted.

Something also may be objected to the field operations; for it is the rule, although not an absolute one, that the enemy's active army should first be beaten or driven beyond some strong line, such as a river or chain of mountains, before a siege is commenced. Now if Wellington had masked the castle after the horn-work was carried on the 19th, and had then followed Clausel, the French generals admitted they would have gone over the Ebro, perhaps even to Pampeluna and St. Sebastian.* Then all the minor dépôts must have been broken up, and the re-organization of the army of Portugal retarded at least a month, during which the guns from Santander would have arrived and the castle of Burgos have fallen. In Souham's secret despatches, it is said, of course on the authority of spies, that Castaños urged an advance beyond Burgos instead of a siege; and it is not unlikely, because to advance continually and surround an enemy constituted with Spanish generals the whole art of war. Howbeit, on this occasion the advice if given was not unreasonable; and it needed scarcely even to delay the siege while the covering army advanced, because one division of infantry might have come up from Madrid, still leaving two of the finest in the army and a brigade of cavalry at that capital, which was sufficient, because Hill was coming to Toledo, Ballesteros' disobedience was unknown, and the King in no condition to advance before Soult arrived.

A last error was stopping too long on the Tormes in hopes of fighting in the position of the Arapiles. It was a stirring thought indeed for a great mind, and the error was brilliantly redeemed;

* General Souham, MSS.

but the remedy does not efface the original fault; and this subject leads to a consideration of some speculative interest, namely, why Wellington, desirous as he was to keep the line of the Tormes, and knowing with what difficulty the French fed their large army, did not order everything in his rear to take refuge in Rodrigo and Almeida, and intrench himself on St. Christoval and in Salamanca. Thus posted, and having a bridge-head on the left bank by which to operate on either side, he might have waited until famine compelled the enemy to separate, which would have been in a very few days: perhaps the answer would be that the Spaniards had left Rodrigo in a defenceless state.

Turning now to the French side, they also will be found in error.

Souham's pursuit after the cavalry combat at Venta de Pozo was feeble. Wellington, speaking of his own army, said, "no troops were ever less pressed by an enemy." The King's orders were however positive not to fight, and as the English General continually offered Souham battle in strong positions, the man had no power to do mischief. Soult's too cautious pursuit of Hill had other motives. He was not desirous of a battle, and until the Guadarama was passed Hill had the larger force, for then only was the whole French army united. Soult wished to march in one great mass through La Mancha, leaving only a small corps or a detachment of Suchet's army on the Cuença road; but the King united the whole of the army of the centre, his own guards, and seven thousand men of the army of the south, on the Cuença line, and there were no good cross communications except by Tarancon. Soult therefore advanced towards the Tagus with only thirty-five thousand men, and from commissariat difficulties and other obstacles was compelled to move by successive divisions, at considerable distances; when his advanced guard was at Valdemoro his rear-guard was two marches distant. Hill might then have turned and driven him over the Tagus; or, after leaving a small corps on the upper Tagus to watch the King, have passed that river at Toledo, and without abandoning his line by the valley of the Tagus have attacked Soult while on the march towards Ocaña: the latter, in despite of his numerous cavalry, must then have fallen back to concentrate his forces, and this would have deranged the whole campaign.

Soult, thinking Ballesteros was with Hill, naturally feared to press his adversary under such a vicious disposition of the French army; neither could that disposition be changed during the operation, because of the want of good cross roads, and because Souham

had been told that the King would meet him on the side of Guadalaxara. In fine, Soult had learned to respect his adversaries, and with the prudence of a man whose mental grasp embraced all the machinery of the war, he avoided a doubtful battle when a defeat would from the unsettled state of the French affairs have lost the whole Peninsula. The allies had Portugal to fall back upon, the French armies must have gone behind the Ebro.

These seem to be the leading points of interest in this campaign, but it will not be uninteresting to mark the close affinities between Wellington's retreat and that of Sir John Moore. This last-named General marched to the north of Spain with the political object of saving Andalusia by drawing on himself the French power; having beforehand declared that he expected to be overwhelmed. Wellington moved into the same country to deliver Andalusia, and thus drew on himself the whole power of the enemy; like Moore declaring also beforehand that the political object being gained, his own military position would be endangered. Both succeeded, and both were, as they had foretold, overwhelmed by superior forces. Moore was to have been aided by Romana's Spanish army, and he found it a burthen; Wellington was impeded, not assisted, by the Gallicians, and both generals were without money.

Moore, having approached Soult and menaced Burgos, was forced to retreat, because Napoleon moved from Madrid on his right flank and towards his rear. Wellington, having actually besieged Burgos, was compelled to raise the siege and retire, lest the King, coming through Madrid, should pass his right flank and get into his rear. Moore was only followed by Soult to the Esla, Wellington was only followed by Souham to the Duero. The first General looked to the mountains of Gallicia for positions which he could maintain; but the apathy of the Spanish people in the south permitted Napoleon to bring up an overwhelming force so rapidly that this plan could not be sustained. Wellington had the same notion with respect to the Duero, and the defection of Ballesteros enabled the King to bring up such a power that further retreat became necessary.

Moore's soldiers at the commencement of the operation evinced want of discipline; they committed great excesses at Valderas and disgraced themselves by their inebriety at Bembibre and Villa Franca. In like manner Wellington's soldiers broke the bonds of discipline, disgraced themselves by drunkenness at Torquemada, and on the retreat from the Puente Larga to Madrid, and committed excesses everywhere. Moore stopped behind the Esla to check the enemy, restore order, and enable his commissariat to

remove the stores; Wellington stopped behind the Carrion for exactly the same purposes. The one General was immediately turned on his left because the bridge of Mancilla was abandoned unbroken to Franceschi; the other General was also turned on his left because the bridge of Palencia was abandoned unbroken to Foy. Moore's retreat was little short of three hundred miles; Wellington's was nearly as long, and both were in the winter season. The first halted at Benevente, at Villa Franca, and at Lugo; the last halted at Duenas, at Cabeçon, Tordesillas, and Salamanca. The principal loss sustained by the one was in the last marches between Lugo and Coruña; so also the principal loss sustained by the other was in the last marches between the Tormes and the Agueda. Some of Moore's generals murmured against his proceedings, some of Wellington's generals, as we have seen, went further: the first were checked by a reprimand, the second were humbled by a sarcasm. Finally, both Generals reproached their armies with want of discipline, both attributed it to the negligence of the officers generally, and in both cases the justice of the reproaches was proved by the exceptions. The reserve and the foot-guards in Moore's campaign, the light division and the foot-guards in Wellington's, gave signal proof that it was negligence of discipline, not hardships, though the latter were severe in both armies, that caused the losses. Not that it can be said, only those regiments preserved order; many others were eminently well conducted, but those were the troops named as exceptions at the time, and two regiments of the light division had been of Moore's reserve.

Such were the resemblances of these two retreats. The differences were, that Moore had only twenty-three thousand men in the first part of his retreat, and nineteen thousand in the latter part, having detached four thousand to Vigo. Wellington had thirty-three thousand in the first part of his retreat, sixty-eight thousand in the latter part. Moore's army were all of one nation, and young soldiers; Wellington's were of different nations, but veterans. The first marched through mountains, where the weather was infinitely more inclement than in the plains over which the second moved; and, until he reached the Esla, Moore's flank was quite exposed, whereas Wellington's flank was covered by Hill's army until he gained the Tormes. Wellington, with veteran troops, was opposed to Souham, to Soult, to the King, and to Jourdan, men not agreeing in their views; and their whole army when united did not exceed the allies by more than twenty thousand men. Moore, with young soldiers, was at first opposed to four times, and latterly to three times his own numbers; for it is

remarkable, that the French army assembled at Astorga was above eighty thousand, including ten thousand cavalry, which is nearly the same as the number assembled against Wellington on the Tormes; but Moore had little more than twenty thousand men to oppose to this overwhelming mass, and Wellington had nearly seventy thousand. The partidas, abounding at the time of Wellington's retreat, were unknown in the time of Moore; and this General was confronted by Napoleon, who, despotic in command, was also unrivalled in skill, in genius, and in vigor. Wellington was not pressed by the enemy, and he made short marches; yet he lost more stragglers than Moore, who was vigorously pressed, made long marches, and could only secure an embarkation by delivering a battle, in which he died most honorably. His character was immediately vilified. Wellington was relieved from his pursuers by the operation of famine, and had therefore no occasion to deliver a battle; but he also was vilified at the time with equal injustice; and if he had then died it would have been with equal malice. His subsequent successes, his great name and power, have imposed silence upon his detractors, or converted censure into praise; for it is the nature of mankind, especially of the ignorant, to cling to fortune.

Moore attributed his difficulties to the apathy of the Spaniards; his friends charged them on the incapacity of the British government. Wellington attributed his ultimate failure to the defection of Ballesteros; his brother, in the House of Lords, charged it on the previous contracted policy of Perceval's government, which had crippled the General's means; and certainly Wellington's reasoning relative to Ballesteros was not quite sound. That General, he said, might have forced Soult to take the circuitous route of Valencia, Requeña, and Cuença, or leave a strong corps in observation, and then Hill might have detached men to the north. He even calculated upon Ballesteros being able to stop both Soult and Souham altogether; for as the latter's operations were prescribed by the King, and dependent upon his proceedings, Wellington thought he would have remained tranquil if Joseph had not advanced. This was the error. Souham's despatches clearly show, that the King's instructions checked instead of forwarding his movements; that it was his intention to have delivered battle at the end of four days, without regard to Joseph's orders;* and, so great was his force, Wellington admitted his own inability to keep the field. Ballesteros' defection therefore cannot be pleaded in bar of all further investigation. But whatever failures there

* Appendix, No. 8, A.

were, and however imposing the height to which the English General's reputation has since attained, this campaign—including the sieges of Rodrigo, Badajos, the forts of Salamanca and of Burgos, the assault of Almaraz and the fight of Salamanca—will probably be considered his finest illustration of the art of war. Waterloo may be called a more glorious exploit, because of the great man who was there vanquished; Assaye may be deemed a more wonderful action—one indeed to be compared with the victory which Lucullus gained over Tygranes—but Salamanca will always be referred to as the most skilful of Wellington's battles.

BOOK XX.

CHAPTER I.

Political affairs—Their influence on the war—Napoleon's invasion of Russia—Its influence on the contest in the Peninsula—State of feeling in England—Lord Wellesley charges the ministers and especially Mr. Perceval with imbecility—His proofs thereof—Ability and zeal of Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart shown—Absurd plans of the Count of Funchal—Mr. Villiers and Mr. Vansittart—The English ministers propose to sell the Portuguese crown and church lands—The folly and injustice of these, and other schemes, exposed by Lord Wellington—He goes to Cadiz—His reception there—New organization of the Spanish armies—Wellington goes to Lisbon, where he is enthusiastically received—His departure from Cadiz the signal for renewed dissensions—Carlotta's intrigues—Decree to abolish the Inquisition opposed by the clergy—The Regency aid the clergy—Are displaced by the Cortes—New Regency appointed—The American party in the Cortes adopt Carlotta's cause—Fail from fear of the people—Many bishops and church dignitaries are arrested, and others fly into Portugal—The Pope's nuncio Gravina opposes the Cortes—His benefices sequestered—He flies to Portugal—His intrigues there—Secret overtures made to Joseph by some of the Spanish armies.

WHILE the armies were striving, the political affairs continued complicated and unsteady. The evils of bad government in England, Spain and Portugal, the incongruous alliance of bigoted aristocracy with awakened democracy, and the inevitable growth of national jealousies as external danger seemed to recede, were becoming so powerful, that if relief had not been obtained from extraneous events, even the vigor of Wellington must have sunk under the pressure. The secret causes of disturbance shall now be laid bare, and it will then be seen that the catastrophe of Napoleon's Russian campaign was absolutely necessary to the final success of the British arms in the Peninsula. I speak not of the physical power which, if his host had not withered on the snowy wastes of Muscovy, the Emperor could have poured into Spain, but of those innumerable moral diseases which corrupted the very life-blood of the contest in the Peninsula. If Russia owed her safety in some degree to that contest, the fate of the Peninsula was in return decided on the plains of Russia; for had the French veterans who there perished returned victorious, the war could

have been maintained for years in Spain with all its waste of treasures and of blood, to the absolute ruin of England even though her army had been victorious in every battle. Yet who shall say with certainty what termination any war will ever have? Who shall prophesy of an art always varying, and of such intricacy that its secrets seem beyond the reach of human intellect? What vast preparations, what astonishing combinations were involved in the plan, what vigor and ability displayed in the execution of Napoleon's march to Moscow! Yet when the winter came, only four days sooner than he expected, the giant's scheme became a theme for children's laughter!

Nevertheless the political grandeur of that expedition will not be hereafter judged from the wild triumph of his enemies, nor its military merits from the declamation hitherto passed off as the history of that wondrous though unfortunate enterprise. It will not be the puerilities of Labaume, of Segur, and their imitators, nor even that splendid military and political essay of Jomini, called the "*Life of Napoleon*," which posterity will accept as the measure of a general who carried four hundred thousand soldiers across the Niemen, and a hundred and sixty thousand to Moscow. And with such a military providence, with such a vigilance, so disposing his reserves, so guarding his flanks, so guiding his masses, that while constantly victorious in front no post was lost in his rear, no convoy failed, no courier was stopped, not even a letter was missing: the communication with his capital was as regular and certain as if that immense march had been but a summer excursion of pleasure! However, it failed, and its failure was the safety of the Peninsula.

In England the retreat from Burgos was viewed with the angry fear which always accompanies the disappointment of high-raised public expectation; the people, taught to believe the French weak and dispirited, saw them so strong and daring that even victory had not enabled the allies to make a permanent stand beyond the frontiers of Portugal. Hence a growing distrust as to the ultimate result, which would not have failed to overturn the war faction, if the retreat of the French from Moscow, the defection of Prussia, and the strange unlooked-for spectacle of Napoleon vanquished, had not come in happy time as a counterpoise. And when the Parliament met Lord Wellesley did very distinctly show, that if the successes in the early part of the year had not been pushed to the extent expected, and had been followed by important reverses, the causes were clearly to be traced to the imbecile administration of Perceval and his coadjutors, whose policy he truly characterized as having in it "*nothing regular but confusion.*" With accurate know

ledge of facts he discussed the military question, and maintained that twelve thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry added to the army in the beginning of the year, would have rendered the campaign decisive; because the Russian contest, the incapacity of Joseph, and the dissensions of the French generals in Spain, had produced the most favorable crisis for striking a vital blow at the enemy's power. The cabinet, he said, knew this and in good time, but though there were abundance of soldiers idling at home when for the nation's welfare they should have been in the Peninsula, though the ministers had actually sent within five thousand as many men as were necessary, they had, with an imbecility marking all their proceedings, so contrived, that few or none should reach the theatre of war until the time for success had passed away. Then touching upon the financial question, with a rude hand he tore Perceval's pitiful pretexts, that the want of specie had necessarily put bounds to their efforts, and that the General himself did not complain. "No!" exclaimed Lord Wellesley, "he does not complain, because it is the sacred duty of a soldier not to complain. But he does not say that with greater means he could not do greater things, and his country will not be satisfied if these means are withheld by men who, having assumed the direction of affairs in such a crisis, have only incapacity to plead in extenuation of their failures."

This stern accuser, fresh from the ministry, versed in state matters and of unquestionable talent, was well acquainted with the actual resources and difficulties of the moment and sincere in his opinions, because he had abandoned office rather than be a party to such a miserable mismanagement of England's power. He was no mean authority against his former colleagues, even though the facts had not so clearly borne out his views, yet they did to the letter. That England possessed the troops, and that they were wanted by Wellington, is undeniable. Even in September, there were still between fifty and sixty thousand soldiers present under arms at home, and additional forces could certainly have been fed in Portugal, because the reserve magazines contained provisions for one hundred thousand men for nine months.* The only question was the procuring specie to purchase supplies which could not be had on credit. Wellington had made the campaign almost without specie, and a small additional force would not have overwhelmed his resources; but what efforts, what ability, what order, what arrangements were made by the government to overcome the difficulties of the time? Was there less extravagance in public offices, public works, public salaries, public contracts? The snuff-boxes

* Wellington, MSS.

and services of plate given to diplomatists, the gorgeous furniture of palaces, the gaudy trappings wasted on Whittingham's, Roche's, and Downie's divisions, would almost have furnished the wants of the additional troops. Where were the millions lavished in subsidies to the Spaniards? where the millions which South America had transmitted to Cadiz? where the sums spent by the soldiers during the war? Real money had nearly disappeared from England, and a base paper had usurped its place; but gold had not disappeared from the world, and an able ministry would have found it. Those men only knew how to squander.

The subsidy granted to Portugal was paid by the commercial speculations of Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, speculations which also fed the army, saved the whole population of Portugal from famine, and prevented the war from stopping in 1811; and so little could the ministers comprehend, much less make such arrangements, that they now rebuked their General for having adopted them, and after their own imbecile manner insisted upon a new mode of providing supplies.* On every side they gave proof of incapacity. Lord William Bentinck was allowed to plan an invasion of Italy when additional troops were wanted in Portugal; and suffered to bid in the money-market against Wellington and sweep away four millions of dollars at an exorbitant premium for a chimera, when the war in the Peninsula was nearly stopped in default of that very money which Wellington could have otherwise procured, nay, had actually been promised at a reasonable cost Nor was this the full measure of their folly.

Lord Wellesley affirmed, and they were unable to deny the fact that dollars might have been obtained from South America to any amount, if the government would have consented to pay the market-price for them; they would not do it, and yet afterwards sought to purchase the same dollars at a higher rate in the European markets! He told them, and they could not deny it, that they had empowered five different agents to purchase dollars for five different services, without any controlling head; that they were bidding against each other in every money-market, and the restrictions as to the price were exactly in the inverse proportion to the importance of the service: the agent for the troops in Malta was permitted to offer the highest price, Lord Wellington was restricted to the lowest! And besides this folly, he showed that they had, under their licensing system, permitted French vessels to bring French goods, silks and gloves, to England, and to carry bullion away in return. Napoleon thus paid his army in Spain with the very coin which should have subsisted the English troops.

* Mr. Stuart, MSS.

But incapable as the ministers were of making the simplest arrangements, and neglecting the most obvious means of supplying the army; incapable even of sending out a few bales of clothing and arms for the Spaniards without producing the utmost confusion, they were heedless of their General's counsels, prompt to listen to every intriguing adviser, and to plunge into absurd complicated measures to relieve that distress which their own imbecility had produced. When the war with the United States broke out, a war provoked by themselves, they suffered the Admiralty, contrary to the wishes of Mr. Stuart, to reduce the naval force at Lisbon, and neglect Wellington's express recommendations for the protection of the merchantmen bringing flour and stores to Portugal.* Then the American privateers, being unmolested, ran down the coast of Africa, intercepted the provision trade from the Brazils, one of the principal resources of the army, and emboldened by impunity infested the coast of Portugal, captured fourteen ships loaded with flour off the Douro, and a large vessel in the very mouth of the Tagus. These things happened when the ministers were censuring and interfering with the General's commercial transactions, and seeking to throw the feeding of his soldiers into the hands of British speculators; as if the supply of an army was like that of a common market! never considering that it would be the merchant's interest to starve the troops for the increase of profit; never considering that the commerce they would stop had paid the Portuguese subsidy for them, and had furnished the military chest with specie when their administrative capacity was unequal to the task.

Never was a government better served than the British government was by Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart. With abilities, vigilance, and industry seldom equalled, they had made themselves masters of the Portuguese policy, foreign, domestic, military, civil, and judicial; they knew all the causes of mischief, and faithfully represented them to the Portuguese and British governments, and had devised effectual remedies. By the former they were met with vexatious opposition; the latter, neglecting their advice, lent themselves to those foolish financial schemes before touched upon as emanating from Villiers, Vansittart, and the Count of Funchal; the first deficient as an ambassador and statesman, the second universally derided as a financier, the third, from his long residence in London, knowing little of Portugal, deriving that little from his brother the restless Principal, and in all his schemes having reference to his own intrigues in the Brazils. Their plans were necessarily absurd. Funchal revived the old project of an English loan, and in concert with his coadjutors desired to establish a bank after

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

the English manner, advancing several minor details and propositions, most of them suggested before by Principal Souza, but rejected by Wellington, and all designed to evade, not to remedy the evils. Finally they devised, and the English Cabinet actually entertained the plan, of selling the crown and church property of Portugal; and this spoliation of the Catholic Church was to be effected by commissioners, one of them to be Mr. Sydenham, an Englishman and a Protestant! Thinking, however, that the Pope would not readily yield consent, they resolved to apply to his nuncio, whom being in their power they expected to find more pliable.*

Having thus provided, in their way, for financial difficulties, the ministers concocted, for the supply of the army, what they called a modified system of requisitions, after the manner of the French! Their speeches, their manifestoes, their whole scheme of policy, which in the working had nearly crushed the liberties of England, and had plunged the whole world into war; that policy whose aim and scope was, they said, to support established religion, the rights of monarchs, and the independence of nations, was thus cast aside. Yea, these men, to remove difficulties caused by their own incapacity and negligence, were ready to adopt all they had before condemned and reviled in the French; they were eager to meddle in the most offensive manner with the Catholic religion, by getting from the nuncio, who was in their power, what they could not get from the Pope voluntarily; they were ready to interfere with the rights of the Portuguese crown by selling its property, and desired to adopt the very system of requisitions which they had so often denounced as rendering the name of France abhorrent to the world!

All these schemes were duly transmitted to Wellington and Mr. Stuart, and the former had in the field to unravel the intricacies, detect the fallacies, and combat the wild speculations of men who were giving a loose to their imaginations on such complicated questions of state. It was while preparing to fight Marmont he had to expose the futility of a loan,—it was on the heights of San Christoval, on the field of battle itself, that he demonstrated the absurdity of attempting to form a Portuguese bank,—it was in the trenches of Burgos he dissected Funchal's and Villiers's schemes of finance, and exposed the folly of attempting the sale of church property,—it was at the termination of the retreat, that with a mixture of rebuke and reasoning, he quelled the proposal to live by forced requisitions; and on each occasion he showed himself as well acquainted with these subjects as he was with the mechanism of

* Mr. Sydenham. Mr. Stuart, MSS.