

retreat at all? "Where," exclaimed this able warrior, "where is the harm though the allies should possess the centre of Spain?"

"Your Majesty," he continued, "should collect the army of the centre, the army of Aragon, and if possible the army of Portugal, and you should march upon Andalusia even though to do so should involve the abandonment of Valencia. If Marmont's army comes with you, one hundred and twenty thousand men will be close to Portugal; if it cannot or will not come, let it remain, because while Burgos defends itself that army can keep on the right of the Ebro, and the Emperor will take measures for its succor. Let Wellington then occupy Spain from Burgos to the Morena, it shall be my care to provide magazines, stores, and places of arms in Andalusia; and the moment eighty thousand French are assembled in that province, the theatre of war is changed! The English General must fall back to save Lisbon, the army of Portugal may follow him to the Tagus, the line of communication with France will be established by the eastern coast, the final result of the campaign turns in our favor, and a decisive battle may be delivered without fear at the gates of Lisbon. March then with the army of the centre upon the Despeñas Perros, unite all our forces in Andalusia, and all will be well! Abandon that province, and you lose Spain! you will retire behind the Ebro, and famine will drive you thence before the Emperor can from distant Russia provide a remedy; his affairs even in that country will suffer by the blow, and America dismayed by our misfortunes will perhaps make peace with England."

Neither the King's genius nor his passions would permit him to understand the grandeur and vigor of this conception. To change even simple lines of operations suddenly is at all times a nice affair, but thus to change the whole theatre of operations and regain the initial movement after a defeat belongs only to master spirits in war. Now the Emperor had recommended a concentration of force, and Joseph would not understand this save as applied to the recovery of Madrid; he was uneasy for the frontiers of France, as if Wellington could possibly have invaded that country while a great army menaced Lisbon! in fine he could see nothing but his lost capital on one side, a disobedient lieutenant on the other, and peremptorily repeated his orders. Then Soult, knowing his plan could only be effected by union and rapidity, and dreading the responsibility of further delay, took immediate steps to abandon Andalusia; but mortified by this blighting of his fruitful genius, and stung with anger at such a termination to all his political and military labors, his feelings overmastered his judgment. Instead of tracing the King's rigid counteraction of his scheme to

the narrowness of the monarch's military genius, he judged it part of a design to secure his own fortune at the expense of his brother. Joseph had after Ocaña, when irritated at being restricted in his plan of governing Spain as a Spaniard, indicated to Soult a vague design of making himself independent, but to betray his brother deliberately was quite foreign to his honest passionate nature. Soult gave more weight to the matter, and making known his opinion to six generals sworn to secrecy unless interrogated by the Emperor, expressed his doubts of the King's good faith to the Minister of War, founding them on the following facts:*

1. That the extent of Marmont's defeat had been made known to him only by the reports of the enemy, and the King, after remaining for twenty-three days without sending any detailed information of the operations in the north of Spain, although the armies were actively engaged, had peremptorily ordered him to abandon Andalusia, saying it was the only resource remaining for the French. To this opinion Soult said he could not subscribe, yet being unable absolutely to disobey the monarch, he was going to make a movement which must finally lead to the loss of all the French conquests in Spain, seeing that it would then be impossible to remain permanently on the Tagus, or even in the Castiles.

2. This operation, ruinous in itself, was insisted upon when the newspapers of Cadiz affirmed that Joseph's ambassador at the court of Petersburg had joined the Prussian army in the field,—that Joseph himself had made secret overtures to the government in the Isla de Leon,—that Bernadotte, his brother-in-law, had made a treaty with England and had demanded of the Cortes a guard of Spaniards, a fact confirmed by information obtained through an officer sent with a flag of truce to the English Admiral; finally, Moreau and Blucher were at Stockholm, and the aide-de-camp of the former in London.

Reflecting upon all these circumstances, he feared the object of the King's false movements might be to force the French army over the Ebro, in the view of making an arrangement for Spain separate from France; fears, which might be chimerical, but in such a crisis better be too fearful than too confident. This letter was sent by sea, but the vessel having touched at Valencia at the moment of Joseph's arrival there the despatch was opened; it was then in the first burst of his anger the King despatched Desprez on that mission to Moscow, the result of which has been already related. Soult's proceedings, offensive to the King and founded in error, because Joseph's letters, containing the information required, were intercepted, not withheld, were prompted by zeal for his

* Appendix 4.

master's service, and cannot be justly condemned; yet Joseph's indignation was natural and becoming. But the admiration of reflecting men must ever be excited by the greatness of mind and calm sagacity with which Napoleon treated this thorny affair. Neither the complaints of his brother, nor the hints of his Minister of War,—for the Duke of Feltre, a man of mean capacity and intriguing disposition, countenanced Joseph's suspicions that Soult designed to make himself King of Andalusia,*—could disturb the temper or judgment of the Emperor; and it was then, struck with the vigor of Soult's plan, he called him the only military head in Spain.

Wellington was attentive to the effect of these transactions. Anxiously he watched Soult's reluctant motions in Andalusia, and while seemingly enjoying his own triumph amidst feasts and rejoicings at Madrid, his eyes were fixed on Seville: the balls and bull-fights of the capital cloaked both the skill and apprehensions of the consummate captain. Before the allies crossed the Guadarama, Hill had been directed to keep close to Drouet and be ready to move into the valley of the Tagus if that General should hasten to the succor of the King. But when Joseph's retreat upon Valencia was known, Hill received orders to fight Drouet, and even to follow him into Andalusia; at the same time General Cooke was directed to prepare an attack, even though it should be an open assault, on the French lines before Cadiz, while Ballesteros operated on the flank from Gibraltar. By these means Wellington hoped to keep Soult from sending any succor to the King, and even to force him out of Andalusia without the necessity of marching there himself; yet if these measures failed, he was resolved to take twenty thousand men from Madrid, unite with Hill and drive the French from that province.

Previous to these instructions being given, Laval and Villatte had, as before narrated, pursued Ballesteros to Malaga, where he was in such danger of capture, that the maritime expedition already noticed was detached from Cadiz to carry him off. News of the battle of Salamanca then arrested the French, the Spanish General regained San Roque, the fleet went on to Valencia, and Soult, hoping the King would transfer the seat of war to Andalusia, caused Drouet to show a bold front against Hill, sending scouting parties towards Merida. Large magazines were also formed at Cordoba, a central point, equally suited for an advance by Estremadura, a march to La Mancha, or a retreat by Granada; and Hill, who had not then received his orders to advance, remained on the defensive. Nor would Wellington stir from Madrid, al-

* Appendix 5.

though his presence was urgently called for on the Duero, until he was satisfied that Joseph did not mean to join Soult, and that the latter meant to abandon Andalusia. The King finally forced this unwise measure; but the execution required extensive arrangements, for the quarters were distant, the convoys immense, the enemies numerous, the line of march wild, the journey long; and it was important to present the imposing appearance of a great and regular military movement, and not the disgraceful scene of a confused flight.

All the minor posts in the Condado de Niebla and other places were first called in, and then the lines before the Isla were abandoned; for Soult, in obedience to the King's first order, designed to move upon La Mancha, and it was only by accident and indirectly that he heard of Joseph's retreat to Valencia. At the same time he discovered that Drouet, who had received direct orders from the King, was going to Toledo; and it was not without difficulty, and only through the medium of his brother who commanded Drouet's cavalry, that he could prevent that destructive, isolated movement. The Murcian line was then adopted, but everything was hurried, because the works at the Isla were already broken up, in the view of retreating towards La Mancha, and the troops were in march for Seville when the safe assembling of the army at Granada required another arrangement. However, on the 25th of August, a thousand guns, stores in proportion, and all the immense works of Chiclana, St. Maria, and the Trocadero, had been destroyed; the long blockade was thus broken when the bombardment had become serious, and the opposition to English influence taking a dangerous direction—when the French intrigues were nearly ripe—the Cortes alienated from the cause of Ferdinand and the church—when the executive government was weaker than ever, because Henry O'Donnell, the only active regent, had resigned, disgusted that his brother had been superseded by Elio, and censured in the Cortes for the defeat at Castalla. This siege, or rather defence—for Cadiz was never, strictly speaking, besieged—was a curious episode in the war. Whether the Spaniards could have defended it without the aid of British troops is a matter of speculation; but it is certain that, notwithstanding Graham's glorious action at Barosa, Cadiz was always a heavy burthen upon Wellington. The forces there employed would have done better service under his immediate command, and many severe financial difficulties, to say nothing of political crosses, would have been spared.

In the night of the 26th, Soult quitted Seville, to commence his march towards Granada; but now Wellington's orders had set all

the allied troops of Andalusia and Estremadura in motion. Hill advanced against Drouet; Ballesteros moved by the Ronda mountains, to hang on the retreating enemy's flanks; the sea armament, sent to succor him, returned from Valencia; Skerrett and Cruz Murgeon disembarked with four thousand English and Spanish troops at Huelva, and on the 24th drove the French from St. Lucar. The 27th they fell upon the rear-guard at Seville, when the suburb of Triana, the bridge, and the streets beyond, were carried by the English guards and Downie's legion, and two hundred prisoners, several guns and many stores were captured. Downie, wounded and taken, was treated harshly, because the populace, rising in aid of the allies, had mutilated the French soldiers who fell into their hands. Scarcely was this action over, when seven thousand French infantry came up from Chiclana; yet, thinking all Hill's troops were before them, hastily followed their own army, leaving the allies masters of the city. This enterprise, though successful, was isolated and contrary to Wellington's desire. A direct and vigorous assault upon the lines of Chiclana, by the whole of the Anglo-Spanish garrison, was his plan; and such an assault, when the French were abandoning their works there, would have been a far heavier blow to Soult, who was now too strong to be meddled with.

Having issued eight days' bread to his army, he marched leisurely, picking up the garrisons and troops who came in to him from the Ronda and the coast. At Granada he halted eleven days for Drouet, who had quitted Estremadura and was marching by Jaen to Huescar. Ballesteros harassed Soult's march; yet, with an insignificant loss, the latter finally united seventy-two guns and forty-five thousand soldiers under arms, of which six thousand were cavalry. He was, however, still in the midst of enemies. On his left flank was Hill; on his right flank Ballesteros. Wellington himself might come down by the Despeñas Perros. The Murzians were in his front, Skerrett and Cruz Murgeon behind him; and he was clogged with enormous convoys—for his sick and maimed men alone amounted to nearly nine thousand; his Spanish soldiers were deserting daily, and it was necessary to provide for several hundreds of Spanish families attached to the French interests. To march upon the city of Murcia was the direct and the best route for Valencia, but the yellow fever raged there and at Carthagena; moreover, S. Bracco, the English consul at Murcia, a resolute man, declared his intention to inundate the country if the French advanced; wherefore he marched by the mountain-ways leading from Huescar to Cehejin and Calasparra, and then moving by Hellin, gained Almanza on the great road to Madrid, his flank

being covered by a detachment from Suchet's army, which skirmished with Maitland's advanced posts at San Vicente, close to Alicant. At Hellin he met the advanced guard of the army of Aragon, and on the 3d of October the military junction of all the French forces was effected.

Soult's difficult task was thus completed, and in a manner worthy of so great a commander; for it must be recollected that, besides the drawing together of the different divisions, the march itself was three hundred miles—great part through mountain roads, and the population every where hostile. Hill had menaced him with twenty-five thousand men, including Morillo and Penne Villemur's forces—Ballesteros, reinforced from Cadiz and by deserters, had nearly twenty thousand—there were fourteen thousand soldiers still in the Isla, Skerrett and Cruz Murgeon had four thousand, and the partidas were in all parts numerous: yet from the midst of these multitudes he had carried off his army, his convoys, and his sick, without any disasters. In this manner Andalusia, which had once been saved by the indirect influence of a single march made by Moore from Salamanca, was now, after three years' subjection, recovered by the indirect effect of a single battle, delivered by Wellington close to the same city.

Maitland's proceedings had been a source of uneasiness to Wellington; for though the recovery of Andalusia was politically and militarily a great gain, the result he saw must necessarily be hurtful to the ultimate success of his campaign by bringing together such powerful forces. He still thought regular operations would not so effectually occupy Suchet as littoral warfare; yet he was content that Maitland should try his own plan, and he advised him to march by the coast and have constant communication with the fleet, referring to his own campaign against Junot in 1808 as an example to be followed. But the coast roads were difficult, the access for the fleet uncertain; and though the same obstacles, and the latter in a greater degree, had occurred in Portugal, the different constitution of the armies, still more that of the generals, was a bar to like proceedings in Valencia. Maitland desired to quit his command, and the time appointed by Lord William for the return of the troops to Sicily was approaching. The moment was critical, but Wellington forbade their departure, and even asked the ministers to place them under his own command. And with gentleness and delicacy he showed to Maitland, who was a man of high honor, courage and feeling, although inexperienced in command, that his situation was not dangerous; that the entrenched camp of Alicant might be safely defended; that he was comparatively better off than Wellington himself had been when in the lines of Torres

Vedras; and that it was even desirable the enemy should attack him on such strong ground, because the Spaniards when joined with the English soldiers in a secure position would certainly fight. He also desired that Carthagená should be well looked to by Ross lest Soult should turn aside to surprise it. Then taking advantage of Elio's fear of Soult, he drew him with the army that had been O'Donnell's towards Madrid, and so got some control over his operations.

If Wellington had been well furnished with money, and the yellow fever had not raged in Murcia, it is probable he would have followed Joseph rapidly, and rallying all the scattered Spanish forces and Sicilian armament on his own army, have endeavored to crush the King and Suchet before Soult could arrive. Or he might have formed a junction with Hill at Despeñas Perros and so have fallen on Soult himself during his march, although such an operation would have endangered his line of communication on the Duero. But the fever and want of money induced him to avoid operations in the south, which would have involved him in new and immense combinations, until he had secured his northern line of operations by the capture of Burgos, meaning then with his whole army united to attack the enemy in the south. He could not however stir from Madrid unless assured that Soult would march on Valencia and not on La Mancha; and that was not clear until Cordoba was abandoned. Hence Hill was ordered to advance on Zalamea de la Serena, where he commanded the passes leading to Cordoba in front, those leading to La Mancha on the left, and those leading by Truxillo to the Tagus in the rear; he could thus at pleasure either join Wellington, follow Drouet towards Grenada, or interpose between Soult and Madrid, if the latter turned towards the Despeñas Perros; meanwhile Skerrett's troops were marching to join him, and the rest of the Anglo-Portuguese garrison of Cadiz sailed to Lisbon, with intent to join Wellington by the regular line of operations.

During these transactions the allies' affairs in Old Castile had been greatly deranged, for where Wellington was not the French warfare generally assumed a severe and menacing aspect. Castaños conducted the siege of Astorga with so little vigor, it appeared rather a blockade than a siege; but the forts at Toro and Zamora had been invested, the first by the partidas, the second by Silveira's militia, who with great spirit had passed their own frontier, although well aware they could not be legally compelled to do so. Thus all the French garrisons abandoned by Clausel's retreat were endangered, and though the slow progress of the Spaniards before Astorga was infinitely disgraceful to their military prowess, final

success seemed certain. For Clinton was at Cuellar, Santocildes occupied Valladolid, Anson's cavalry was in the valley of the Esqueva, and the front looked fair enough. But in the rear the line of communication as far as the frontier of Portugal was in disorder, the discipline of the army was deteriorating rapidly, and excesses were committed on all the routes. A detachment of Portuguese, not more than a thousand strong, either instigated by want or by their hatred of the Spaniards, had perpetrated such enormities on their march from Pinhel to Salamanca, that as an example five were executed, and many others severely punished by stripes; yet even this did not check the growing evil, the origin of which may be partly traced to the license at the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, principally to the sufferings of the soldiers.

All the hospitals in the rear were crowded. Salamanca, in which there were six thousand sick and wounded, besides French prisoners, was the abode of misery. The soldiers endured much during the first two or three days after the battle, and the inferior officers' sufferings were still more heavy and protracted. They had no money, and many sold their horses and other property to sustain life; some actually died of want, and though Wellington, hearing of this, gave orders they should be supplied from the purveyor's stores in the same manner as the soldiers, the relief came late. It is a common yet erroneous notion, that the English system of hospitals in the Peninsula was admirable, and the French hospitals neglected. Strenuous and unceasing exertions were made by Wellington and the chiefs of the medical staff to form good hospital establishments, but the want of money, and still more the want of previous institutions, foiled their utmost efforts. Now there was no point of warfare which more engaged Napoleon's attention than the care of his sick and wounded; and he being monarch as well as general, furnished his hospitals with all things requisite, even with luxuries. Under his fostering care also, Larrey, justly celebrated were it for this alone, organized the establishment called the hospital "*Ambulance*," that is to say, wagons of a peculiar construction, well horsed and served by men trained and incorporated as soldiers, who being rewarded for their courage and devotion like other soldiers were always at hand, and whether in action or on a march, ready to pick up, to salve, and to carry off wounded men. The astonishing rapidity with which the fallen French soldiers disappeared from a field of battle attested the excellence of this institution.

In the British army, the carrying off the wounded depended partly upon the casual assistance of a weak wagon train very badly disciplined, furnishing only three wagons to a division and

not originally appropriated to that service ; partly upon the spare commissariat animals, but principally upon the resources of the country, whether of bullock carts, mules, or donkeys, and hence the most doleful scenes after a battle or when a hospital was to be evacuated. The increasing numbers of the sick and wounded as the war enlarged pressed on the limited number of regular medical officers, and Wellington complained that when he demanded more, the military medical board in London neglected his demands, and thwarted his arrangements. Shoals of hospital mates and students were indeed sent out, and they arrived for the most part ignorant alike of war and their own profession ; while a heterogeneous mass of purveyors and their subordinates, acting without any military organization or effectual superintendence, baffled the exertions of those medical officers, and they were many, whose experience, zeal, and talents would, with a good institution to work upon, have rendered this branch of the service most distinguished. Nay, many even of the well-educated surgeons sent out were for some time of little use, for superior professional skill is of little value in comparison of experience in military organization ; where one soldier dies from the want of a delicate operation, hundreds perish from the absence of military arrangement. War tries the strength of the military frame-work ; it is in peace the frame-work itself must be formed, otherwise barbarians would be the leading soldiers of the world. A perfect army can only be made by civil institutions, and those, rightly considered, would tend to confine the horrors of war to the field of battle, which would be the next best thing to the perfection of civilization that would prevent war altogether.

Such was the state of affairs on the allies' line of communication, when, on the 14th of August, Clausel suddenly came down the Pisuerga. Anson's cavalry immediately recrossed the Duero at Tudela. Santocildes, following Wellington's instructions, fell back to Torrelabaton, but left behind four hundred prisoners and all the guns and stores which had been captured there by the allies. On the 18th, the French assembled at Valladolid to the number of twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and fifty guns well provided with ammunition ; and five thousand stragglers, who in the confusion of defeat had fled to Burgos and Vittoria, were also collected and in march to join.* Clausel's design was to be at hand when Joseph, reinforced from the south, should drive Wellington from Madrid, for he thought the latter must then retire by Avila and the Valle de Ambles, and he purposed to gain the mountains of Avila himself and harass the English General's flank. While awaiting this opportunity, Foy proposed, with two divisions

* Clausel's Correspondence, MS.

of infantry and sixteen hundred cavalry, to succor the garrisons of Toro, Zamora, and Astorga; and Clausel consented, though he was somewhat fearful of this dangerous experiment, and did not believe Astorga near its fall.* His hesitation ruined the scheme. Foy wished to march the 15th by Placentia, but was not despatched until the evening of the 17th and then by the line of Toro, the garrison of which place he carried off in passing. The 19th he sabred some of the Spanish rear-guard at Castro Gonzalo on the Esla; the 20th, at three o'clock in the evening, he reached La Baneza, but was mortified to learn that Castaños had by artful negotiation persuaded the garrison of Astorga, twelve hundred good troops, to surrender, although there was no breach. The Gallicians had then retired to their mountains, and Foy marched upon Carvajales, hoping to inclose Silveira's militia between the Duero and the Esla, to sweep them off in his course, and then relieving Zamora, to penetrate to Salamanca and seize the trophies of the Arapiles. And this would infallibly have happened but for the judicious activity of Douglas, who divining Foy's object sent Silveira with timely notice into Portugal;† yet so critical was the movement that Foy's cavalry skirmished with the Portuguese rear-guard near Constantin at daybreak on the 24th. The 25th the French entered Zamora, but Wellington was now in movement upon Arevalo, and Clausel recalled Foy at the moment when his infantry was actually in march upon Salamanca to seize the trophies, and his cavalry was moving by Ledesma to break up the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo.

That Foy was thus able to disturb the line of communication was Clinton's error. Wellington left eighteen thousand men, exclusive of the troops besieging Astorga, to protect his flank and rear, and he had a right to think it enough, because he momentarily expected Astorga to fall, and the French army, a beaten one, was then in full retreat. It is true none of the French garrisons yielded before Clausel returned, but Clinton alone had eight thousand good troops, and might with the aid of Santocildes and the partidas have baffled the French; he might even have menaced Valladolid after Foy's departure, which would have certainly brought that General back. And if he dared not venture so much, he should, following his instructions, have regulated his movements, along the left of the Duero, so as to be always in a condition to protect Salamanca; that is, he should have gone to Olmedo when Clausel first occupied Valladolid, but he retired to Arevalo, which enabled Foy to advance. The mere escape of the garrisons from

* Foy's Correspondence, MS.

† Sir H. Douglas's MSS.

Toro and Zamora was thought no misfortune. It would have cost a long march and two sieges in the hottest season to have reduced them, which was more than they were worth; yet to use Wellington's words, "*It was not very encouraging to find that the best Spanish army was unable to stand before the remains of Marmont's beaten troops; that in more than two months, it had been unable even to breach Astorga, and that all important operations must still be performed by the British troops.*" The Spaniards, now in the fifth year of the war, were still in the state described by Sir John Moore, "*without an army, without a government, without a general.*"

While these events were passing in Castile, Popham's armament remained on the Biscay coast, and the partidas thus encouraged became so active, that with the exception of Santona and Gueteria all the littoral posts were abandoned by Caffarelli. Porlier, Renvalles, and Mendizabel, the nominal commanders of all the bands, immediately took possession of Castro, Santander, and even of Bilbao. Rouget, who came from Vittoria to recover the last, was after some sharp fighting compelled to retire again to Durango; and Reille, deluded by a rumor that Wellington was marching through the centre of Spain upon Zaragoza, abandoned several important outposts; Aragon, hitherto so tranquil, then became unquiet, and all the northern provinces were ripe for insurrection.

CHAPTER III.

Wellington's combinations described—Foolish arrangements of the English ministers relative to the Spanish clothing—Want of Money—Political persecution in Madrid—Miserable state of that city—Character of the Madrilenos—Wellington marches against Clausel—Device of the Portuguese Regency to avoid supplying their troops—Wellington enters Valadolid—Waits for Castaños—His opinion of the Spaniards—Clausel retreats to Burgos—His able generalship—The allies enter Burgos, which is in danger of destruction from the partidas—Reflections upon the movements of the two armies—Siege of the castle of Burgos.

WHILE the various military combinations described in the foregoing chapter were thickening, Wellington watched very eagerly the right moment for striking. The problem to be solved was one of time, which, to be turned to account, depended upon the activity of the Spaniards in cutting off all correspondence between the French armies. The manner in which Suchet and Caffarelli were paralyzed by the Anglo-Sicilian armies and by Popham's armament has been shown; but Clausel's force, though re-organized,

was still little more than a wreck ; and to render it powerless by taking Burgos was the English General's design. Meanwhile, to oppose Soult and the King, required extensive arrangements. Hence, when it was known that Andalusia was absolutely abandoned, Hill was directed upon Toledo, by the bridge of Almaraz ; for Sturgeon's genius had rendered that stupendous ruin, although more lofty than Alcantara, also passable for artillery. Elio was then induced to bring the Murcian army to the same quarter, and Ballesteros was ordered to take post on the mountain of Alcaraz, and guard the neighboring fortress of Chinchilla, which, being situated on the confines of Murcia and La Mancha, and perched on a rugged, isolated hill, in a vast plain, was peculiarly strong, both from construction and site, and was the knot of all the great lines of communication. Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado, were desired to enter La Mancha with their bands. Hill could bring up twenty thousand men, and the third, fourth, and light divisions, two brigades of cavalry, and Carlos d'España's troops, were to remain near Madrid, while the rest of the army marched into Old Castile. Thus sixty thousand men, thirty thousand being excellent troops, well commanded, and having the Chinchilla fortress in front, would have been assembled before Soult could unite with the King ; and there was still the army of Estremadura, eight thousand strong, lying about Badajoz in reserve.

The British troops at Carthagen were directed, when Soult should have passed that city, to leave small garrisons in the forts there and join the army at Alicant, which, with the reinforcements from Sicily, would then be sixteen thousand strong, seven thousand being British troops ; and while this force was at Alicant, Wellington judged the French could not bring more than fifty thousand against Madrid, without risking the loss of Valencia itself. Not that he expected the heterogeneous mass he had collected to resist, on a fair field, the veteran and powerfully constituted army which would finally be opposed to them ; but he calculated that, ere the French generals could act seriously, the rivers would be full, and Hill could then hold his ground long enough for the army to come back from Burgos : indeed, he had little doubt of reducing that place, and being again on the Tagus in time to take the initial movements himself.

By these dispositions, the allies had several lines of operations. Ballesteros, from the mountains of Alcaraz, could harass the flanks of the advancing French, and, when they passed, could unite with Maitland to overpower Suchet. Hill could retire, if pressed, by Madrid or by Toledo, and could gain the passes of the Guadarama or the valley of the Tagus. Elio, Villa Campa, Bassecour, and

the Empecinado, could act by Cuença and Requeña against Suchet, or against Madrid if the French followed Hill obstinately; or they could join Ballesteros: and, besides all these forces, there were ten or twelve thousand new Spanish levies in the Isla, waiting for clothing and arms, which, under the recent treaty, were to come from England. The English ministers had nominally confided the distribution of these succors to Wellington, but following their usual vicious manner of doing business, they also gave Mr. Stuart a control without Wellington's knowledge; hence the stores, expected by the latter at Lisbon or Cadiz, were by Stuart unwittingly directed to Coruña, with which place the English General had no secure communication; moreover there were very few Spanish levies there, and no confidential person to superintend the delivery of them. Other political crosses, which shall be noticed in due time, were also experienced, but it will suffice here to say the want of money was now become intolerable. The army was many months in arrears, those officers who went to the rear sick suffered the most cruel privations, those who remained in Madrid, tempted by the pleasures of the capital, obtained some dollars at an exorbitant premium from a money-broker, and it was grievously suspected that his means resulted from the nefarious proceedings of an under commissary; the soldiers, equally tempted and having no such resource, plundered the stores of the Retiro. In fine, discipline became relaxed throughout the army, and the troops kept in the field were gloomy, envying those who remained at Madrid.

The city exhibited a sad mixture of luxury and desolation. When it was first entered a violent, cruel, and unjust persecution of those who were called "*Afrancesados*" was commenced, and continued until the English General interfered, and as an example made no distinction in his invitations to the palace feasts. Truly it was not necessary to increase the sufferings of the miserable people, for though the markets were full of provisions there was no money wherewith to buy; and though the houses were full of rich furniture there were neither purchasers nor lenders; even noble families secretly sought charity that they might live. At night the groans and stifled cries of famishing people were heard, and every morning emaciated dead bodies, cast into the streets, showed why those cries had ceased. The calm resignation with which these terrible sufferings were borne was a distinctive mark of the national character; not many begged, none complained, there was no violence, no reproaches, very few thefts; the allies lost a few animals, nothing more, and these were generally thought to be taken by robbers from the country. But with this patient endurance of calamity the *Madridenos* discovered a deep and unaffected gratitude for kindness

received at the hands of the British officers who contributed, not much for they had it not, but enough of money to form soup charities by which hundreds were succored. It was in the third division the example was set, and by the forty-fifth regiment, and it was not the least of the many honorable distinctions those brave men have earned.


Wellington, desirous of sheltering his troops from the extreme heat, had early sent four divisions and the cavalry to the Escorial and St. Ildefonso, from whence they could join Hill by the valley of the Tagus, or Clinton by Arevalo; but when he knew the King's retreat upon Valencia was decided, that Soult had abandoned Cordoba, and Clinton was falling back before Clausel, he ordered the first, fifth, and seventh divisions, Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese brigades, Ponsonby's light horsemen, and the heavy German cavalry, to move rapidly upon Arevalo, and on the first of September quitted Madrid himself to take the command. Yet his army had been so diminished by sickness that only twenty-one thousand men, including three thousand cavalry, were assembled in that town. He could scarcely feed the Portuguese soldiers, who were also very ill equipped, and their government, instead of transmitting money and stores, endeavored to throw off the burthen by an ingenious device. For having always a running account with the Spanish government, they now made a treaty, by which the Spaniards were to feed the Portuguese troops and check off the expense on the national account, which was then in favor of the Portuguese; that is, the soldiers were to starve under the sanction of this treaty, because the Spaniards could not feed their own men, and would not, if they could, have fed the Portuguese. Neither could the latter take provisions from the country, because Wellington demanded the resources of the valleys of the Duero and Pisuerga for the English soldiers, as a set-off against the money advanced by Sir Henry Wellesley to the Spanish Regency at Cadiz. To stop this shameful expedient, he refused payment of the subsidy from the chest of aids, whereupon the old discontents and disputes revived and acquired new force, the Regency became intractable, and the whole military system of Portugal was like to fall to pieces.

On the 4th the allies quitted Arevalo, the 6th they passed the Duero by the ford above Puente de Duero, the 7th they entered Valladolid, and the Gallicians, who had returned to the Escla when Foy retreated, were ordered to join the Anglo-Portuguese army. Clausel abandoned Valladolid in the night of the 6th, and though closely followed by Ponsonby's cavalry, crossed the Pisuerga and destroyed the bridge of Bercial on that river. The 8th the allies

halted for rest and to await the arrival of Castaños; but seldom during the war did a Spanish general deviate into activity, and Wellington observed that in his whole intercourse with that people he had not met with an able man, while amongst the Portuguese he had found several. The Gallicians came not, Santocildes even avoided a junction, and the French retreated slowly up the Pisuerga and Arlanzan valleys, which, in denial of the stories about French devastation, were carefully cultivated, and filled to repletion with corn, wine, and oil. Nor were they deficient in military strength. Off the high road, on both sides, ditches and rivulets impeded the troops, while cross ridges continually furnished strong parallel positions flanked by the lofty hills on either side. In these valleys Clausel baffled his great adversary in the most surprising manner. Each day he offered battle, yet on ground which Wellington was unwilling to assail in front, partly because he momentarily expected the Gallicians up, chiefly because of the declining state of his own army from sickness, which, combined with the hope of ulterior operations in the south, made him unwilling to lose men. By flank movements he dislodged the enemy, yet each day darkness fell ere they were completed, and the morning's sun always saw Clausel again in position. At Cigales and Dueñas in the Pisuerga valley,—at Magoz, Torquemada, Cordobilla, Revilla, Vallejera, and Pampliega in the valley of the Arlanzan, the French General thus offered battle, and finally covered Burgos on the 16th by taking the strong position of Cellada del Camino.

But eleven thousand Spanish infantry, three hundred cavalry, and eight guns had now joined the allies, and Wellington would have attacked frankly on the 17th, had not Clausel, alike wary and skilful, observed the increased numbers and retired in the night to Frandovinez; his rear-guard was however next day pushed sharply back to the heights of Burgos, and in the following night he passed through that town, leaving behind him large stores of grain. Caffarelli, who had come down to place the castle of Burgos in a state of defence, now joined him, and the two generals retreated upon Briviesca, where they were immediately reinforced by that reserve which, with such an extraordinary foresight, the Emperor had directed to be assembled and exercised on the Pyrenees in anticipation of Marmont's disaster. The allies entered Burgos amidst great confusion, for the garrison of the castle had set fire to some houses impeding the defence of the fortress, the conflagration spread widely, and the partidas, who were already gathered like wolves around a carcass, entered the town for mischief. Mr. Sydenham, an eye-witness and not unused to scenes





Sketch
of the
SIEGE OF BURGOS
1812.

Drawn by Genl. Napier

of war, thus describes their proceedings: "What with the flames and the plundering of the guerillas, who are as bad as Tartars and Cossacks of the Kischack or Zagatay hordes, I was afraid Burgos would be entirely destroyed, but order was at length restored by the manful exertions of Don Miguel Alava."

Clausel's beautiful movements merit every praise, but it may be questioned if the English General's marches were in the true direction, or made in good time; for though Clinton's retreat upon Arevalo influenced, it did not absolutely dictate the line of operations. Wellington had expected Clausel's advance to Valladolid, it was therefore no surprise, and on the 26th of August Foy was still at Zamora. At that period the English General might have had his army, Clinton's troops excepted, at Segovia; and as the distance from thence to Valladolid is rather less than from Valladolid to Zamora, a rapid march upon the former, Clinton advancing at the same time, might have separated Clausel from Foy. Again, Wellington might have marched upon Burgos by Aranda de Duero and Lerma, that road being as short as by Valladolid; he might also have brought forward the third and light divisions by the Somosierra from Madrid, and directed Clinton and the Spaniards to close upon the French rear. He would thus have turned the valleys of the Pisuerga and the Arlanzan, and could from Aranda or Lerma have fallen upon Clausel while in march. That General, having Clinton and the Gallicians on his rear, and Wellington reinforced by the divisions from Madrid on his front or flank, would then have had to fight a decisive battle under every disadvantage. In fine, the object was to crush Clausel, and this should have been effected though Madrid had been entirely abandoned to secure success. It is however probable that want of money and means of transport decided the line of operations, for the route by the Somosierra was savage and barren, and the feeding of the troops even by Valladolid was from hand to mouth, or painfully supported by convoys from Portugal.

SIEGE OF THE CASTLE OF BURGOS.

Caffarelli had placed eighteen hundred infantry, besides artillerymen, in this place, and the governor Dubreton was of such courage and skill that he surpassed even the hopes of his sanguine and warlike countrymen. The castle and its works inclosed a rugged hill, between which and the river the city of Burgos was situated. An old wall with a new parapet and flanks constructed by the French offered the first line of defence; the second line was earthen, of the nature of a field retrenchment and well palisaded; the third line was similarly constructed, and contained the two most

elevated points of the hill, on one of which was an intrenched building called the White Church, and on the other the ancient keep of the castle: this last was the highest point, intrenched and surmounted with a heavy casemated work called the Napoleon battery.* Thus there were five separate inclosures, and the Napoleon battery commanded everything around it, save to the north, where at the distance of three hundred yards there was a second height scarcely less elevated than that of the fortress. This point, called the hill of San Michael, was defended by a large horn-work with a hard sloping scarp forty-five feet high, and a counterscarp not less than ten feet high; it was unfinished and only closed by strong palisades, but it was under the fire of the Napoleon battery, was well flanked by the castle defences, and covered in front by slight intrenchments for the out piquets. Nine heavy guns, eleven field-pieces, and six mortars or howitzers were mounted in the fortress; Clausel's reserve artillery and stores were also deposited there, and the armament could therefore be increased.

FIRST ASSAULT.

All the bridges and fords over the Arlanzan were commanded by the batteries, and two days elapsed ere the allies could cross; but on the 19th, the passage of the river being effected above the town by the first division, Major Somers Cocks, supported by Pack's Portuguese, drove in the French outposts on the hill of San Michael. In the night, the same troops, reinforced with the forty-second regiment, stormed that horn-work, and the conflict was murderous. The Highlanders, who bore the ladders under the command of the engineer, Pitt, placed them very well, splicing them together to meet the great height of the scarp, yet the stormers were beaten back with great loss, and would have failed if the gallant Cocks had not forced an entrance by the gorge, with the seventy-ninth.† The garrison was thus cut off, and must have surrendered if Cocks had been well supported; but he was only followed by the second battalion of the forty-second, and the French, being still five hundred, broke through and escaped. The affair was censured, the troops complained of each other, and the loss was above four hundred, whilst that of the enemy did not exceed one hundred and fifty.

Wellington was now enabled to examine the defences of the castle. He found them feeble and incomplete, and yet his means were so scant, he relied more upon the enemy's weakness than his own power; for it was said the garrison wanted water and that

* Jones's Sieges.

† Memoir by Colonel Reid, R.E.

their provision magazines could be burned. Upon this information, he adopted the following plan of attack.

Twelve thousand men, composing the first and sixth divisions and the two Portuguese brigades, were to undertake the works; the rest of the troops, twenty thousand exclusive of the partidas, were to form the covering army. The trenches were to be opened from the suburb of San Pedro, and a parallel formed in the direction of the hill of San Michael. A battery for five guns was to be established close to the right of the captured horn-work. A sap was to be pushed from the parallel as near the first wall as possible without being seen into from the upper works, and from thence the engineer was to proceed by gallery and mine.*

When the first mine should be completed, the battery on the hill of San Michael was to open against the second line of defence, and the assault was to be given on the first line. If a lodgment was formed, the approaches were to be continued against the second line, and the battery on San Michael was to be turned against the third line in front of the White Church, because the defences there were exceedingly weak. Meanwhile, a trench for musketry was to be dug along the brow of San Michael, and a concealed battery was to be prepared within the horn-work itself, with a view to the final attack of the Napoleon battery. Head-quarters were fixed at Villa Toro; Colonel Burgoyne conducted the operations of the engineers, Robe and Dickson those of the artillery, which consisted of three eighteen-pounders and the five iron twenty-four-pound howitzers used at the siege of the Salamanca forts; and it was with regard to these slender means, rather than the defects of the fortress, that the line of attack was chosen.

When the horn-work fell, a lodgment was commenced in the interior, and continued vigorously, although under a destructive fire from the Napoleon battery, because the besiegers feared the enemy would at daylight endeavor to retake the work by the gorge: good cover was however obtained in the night, and the first battery was also begun.

The 21st the garrison mounted several fresh field-guns, and at night kept up a heavy fire of grape and shells on the workmen, who were digging the musketry trench in front of the first battery. The 22d, the fire of the besieged was redoubled, but the besiegers worked with little loss, and their musketeers galled the enemy. In the night, the first battery was armed with two eighteen-pounders and three howitzers, and the secret battery within the horn-work was commenced. Wellington, deviating from his first plan, then resolved to try an escalade against the first line of defence,

* Jones's Sieges.

and selected a point half-way between the suburb of San Pedro and the horn-work. At midnight four hundred men, provided with ladders, marched from under the hill on which the horn-work stood, to the attack of the wall, which was from twenty-three to twenty-five feet high, but had no flanks; this was the main column, and a Portuguese battalion was also assembled in the town of Burgos, to make a combined flank attack on that side.

SECOND ASSAULT.

It was commenced by the Portuguese, but they were repelled by the fire of the common guard alone; and the principal escalading party, composed of detachments from different regiments under Major Lawrie, seventy-ninth regiment, although acting with great resolution, got disordered in passing a hollow way fifty yards from the wall, and had no success. The ladders were indeed placed, and the troops entered the ditch, yet confusedly; Lawrie was killed, the bravest soldiers who first mounted were met hand to hand and bayoneted, and the ladders were reared and overturned several times; combustibles were also cast down in abundance, and the British, giving way, left half their number behind. The wounded were brought off next day under a truce, and it was said the French found on a dead officer a plan of the siege; certain it is, that this disastrous attack augmented the enemy's courage and produced a bad effect on the allies, some of whom had been also greatly dispirited by the previous assault on the horn-work.

The hollow way which had disordered the escaladers, and which at fifty yards' distance ran along the front of defence, was converted into a parallel and connected with the suburb of San Pedro; the trenches were made deep and narrow, to secure them from the plunging shot of the castle, and musketeers were planted to keep down the enemy's fire; but heavy rains incommoded the troops, and though the allied marksmen got the mastery over those of the French immediately in their front, the latter, having a raised and palisaded work on their own right which in some measure flanked the approaches, killed so many of the besiegers that the latter were finally withdrawn. In the night a flying sap was commenced from the right of the parallel, and was pushed within twenty yards of the enemy's first line of defence; but the directing engineer was killed, and with him many men, for the French plied their musketry sharply, and rolled large shells down the steep side of the hill. The head of the sap was indeed so commanded, as it approached the wall, that a six-foot trench, added to the height of the gabion above, scarcely protected the workmen: the gallery of the mine was therefore opened, and worked as rapidly as the inexpe-

rience of the miners, who were merely volunteers from the line, would permit.

A concealed battery within the horn-work of San Michael being now completed, two eighteen-pounders were removed from the first battery to arm it, and they were replaced by two iron howitzers, which opened upon the advanced palisade below to drive the French marksmen from that point; when they had fired one hundred and forty rounds without success this project was abandoned, for ammunition was so scarce the soldiers were paid to collect the enemy's bullets. This day also a zigzag was commenced in front of the first battery down the face of San Michael, to obtain footing for a musketry trench to overlook the enemy's defences below; and though the workmen were exposed to the whole fire of the castle at the distance of two hundred yards, and were knocked down fast, the work went steadily on.

On the 26th the gallery of the mine was advanced eighteen feet, and the soil was found favorable, yet the men in passing the sap were hit fast by the French marksmen, and an assistant engineer was killed. In the night the parallel was prolonged on the right within twenty yards of the enemy's ramparts, with a view to a second gallery and mine, and musketeers were planted there to oppose the enemy's marksmen and to protect the sap; at the same time the zigzag on the hill of San Michael was continued, and the musket trench there was completed under cover of gabions, and with little loss, although the whole fire of the castle was concentrated on the spot.

On the 27th the French were seen strengthening their second line, and they had already cut a step along the edge of the counterscarp for a covered way, and had palisaded the communication. The besiegers likewise finished the musketry trench on the right of their parallel, and opened the gallery for the second mine; but the first mine went on slowly, the men in the sap were galled and disturbed by stones, grenades, and small shells which the French threw into the trenches by hand: the artillery fire also knocked over the gabions of the musketry trench on San Michael so fast that the troops were withdrawn during the day.

In the night, a trench of communication, forming a second parallel behind the first, was begun, and nearly completed, from the hill of San Michael towards the suburb of San Pedro, and the musketry trench on the hill was deepened. Next day an attempt was made to perfect this new parallel of communication, but the French fire became heavy, and the shells which passed over came rolling down the hill again into the trench, so the work was deferred until night and was then perfected. The back roll of the

shells continued to gall the troops, yet the whole of this trench, that in front of the horn-work above, and that on the right of the parallel below, were filled with men whose fire was incessant; and as the first mine was now loaded with more than a thousand weight of powder, the gallery strongly tamped for fifteen feet with bags of clay and all ready for explosion, Wellington ordered the

THIRD ASSAULT.

At midnight the hollow road, fifty yards from the mine, was lined with troops to fire on the defences, and three hundred stormers were assembled there, attended by others who carried tools and materials to secure the lodgment when the breach should be carried: the mine was then exploded, the wall fell, and an officer with twenty men rushed forward to the assault. The explosion was not so efficacious as it ought to have been, yet it brought the wall down, the enemy was stupefied, and the forlorn hope, consisting of a sergeant and four daring soldiers, gained the summit of the breach and there stood until the French, recovering, drove them down pierced with bayonet wounds. Meanwhile the officer and twenty men, who were to have been followed by a party of fifty and those by the remainder of the stormers, missed the breach in the dark, and finding the wall unbroken, retired and reported there was no breach; the main body immediately regained the trenches, and before the sergeant and his men returned with streaming wounds to tell their tale, the enemy was reinforced. Scarcity of ammunition stopped the artillery practice against the breach during the night, and the French raised a parapet behind it, placing obstacles sufficient to deter the besiegers from renewing the assault at daylight.

This failure arose from the darkness and the want of a conducting engineer; out of four regular officers of that branch engaged in the siege, one had been killed, one badly wounded, and one was sick; wherefore the remaining one was necessarily reserved for the conducting of the works. The aspect of affairs was gloomy. Twelve days had elapsed since the siege commenced, one assault had succeeded, two had failed; twelve hundred men had been killed or wounded, little progress made, and the troops generally showed symptoms of despondency, especially the Portuguese, who seemed to be losing their ancient spirit. Discipline was relaxed, the soldiers wasted ammunition, the work in the trenches was avoided or neglected both by officers and men, insubordination was gaining ground, and reproachful orders were issued, the guards only being noticed as presenting an honorable exception. In this state it was essential to make some change in the

operations, and as the French marksmen in the advanced palisaded work below were now so expert as to hit everything seen, the howitzer battery on San Michael was reinforced with a French eight-pounder, by the aid of which this mischievous post was at last demolished. The gallery of the second mine was also pushed forward, and a new breaching-battery for three guns was constructed behind it, so close to the enemy's defences that the latter screened the work from the artillery fire of their upper fortress; but the parapet of the battery was only made musket-proof, because the besieged had no guns on the lower line of this front.

In the night, the three eighteen-pounders were brought from the hill of San Michael without being discovered, and at daylight, though a very galling fire of muskets thinned the workmen, they persevered until nine o'clock, when the battery was finished and armed. But at that moment the watchful Dureton brought a howitzer down from the upper works, and with a low charge threw shells into the battery; then making a hole through a flank wall, he thrust out a light gun, which sent its bullets whizzing through the thin parapet at every round, and at the same time his marksmen plied their shot so sharply, the allies were driven from their pieces without firing. More French cannon being now brought from the upper works, the defences of the battery were quite demolished, two of the gun-carriages were disabled, a trunnion was knocked off one of the eighteen-pounders, and the muzzle of another was split. It was in vain the besiegers' marksmen, aided by some officers who considered themselves good shots, endeavored to quell the enemy's fire; the French, being on a height, were too well covered and remained masters of the fight.

In the night, a second and more solid battery being formed a little to the left of the ruined one, the French observed it at daylight, and their fire plunging from above made the parapet fly off so rapidly that it was relinquished. Recourse was then again had to the galleries and mine and to the breaching battery on the hill of San Michael; the two guns still serviceable were therefore removed towards the upper battery to beat down a retrenchment formed by the French behind the old breach. It was intended to have placed them on this new position in the night of the 3d, but the weather was very wet and stormy, and the workmen, those of the guards only excepted, abandoned the trenches; hence at daylight the guns were still short of their destination, and nothing more could be done until the following night.

On the 4th, at nine o'clock in the morning, the two eighteen-pounders and three iron howitzers again opened from San Michael's, and at four o'clock in the evening, the old breach being

cleared of all incumbrances and the second mine strongly tamped for explosion, a double assault was ordered. The second battalion of the twenty-fourth British regiment under Captain Hedderwick being selected, was formed in the hollow way, having one advanced party under Lieutenant Holmes pushed forward as close to the new mine as it was safe to be, and a second party under Lieutenant Fraser in like manner pushed towards the old breach.

FOURTH ASSAULT.

At five o'clock the mine was exploded with a terrific effect, blowing many of the French into the air and breaking down one hundred feet of the wall; the next instant Holmes and his brave men went rushing through the smoke and crumbling ruins, and Fraser as quick and daring was already fighting on the summit of the old breach; opposed with spears, he was seen to tear one from the hands of an enemy, and leap into the midst of the hostile mass followed by his men.* The supports followed closely, and both breaches were carried, with a loss to the assailants of thirty-seven killed and two hundred wounded, seven of the latter being officers, and amongst them the conducting engineer. During the night lodgments were formed in advance of the old and on the ruins of the new breach, yet very imperfectly and under a destructive fire from the upper defences. This happy attack revived the spirits of the army, vessels with powder were coming coastwise from Coruña, a convoy was expected by land from Ciudad Rodrigo, a supply of ammunition sent by Sir Home Popham reached the camp, the howitzers continued to knock away the palisades in the ditch, and the battery on San Michael's was directed to open a third breach, at a point where the first line of defence was joined to the second.

This promising state of affairs was of short duration.

On the 5th, at five o'clock in the evening, while the working parties were extending the lodgments, three hundred French came swiftly down the hill, and sweeping away the laborers and guards from the trenches killed or wounded a hundred and fifty men, got possession of the old breach, destroyed the works, and carried off all the tools. In the night the allies repaired the damage and pushed saps from each flank, to meet in the centre near the second French line and serve as a parallel to check future sallies; the howitzers also continued their fire from San Michael against the palisades, and the breaching in the horn-work opened, but the guns being unable to see the walls sufficiently low soon ceased to speak and the embrasures were masked. On the other

* Memoir by Colonel Reid, R.E.

hand the besieged were unable, from the steepness of the castle hill, to depress their guns sufficiently to bear on the lodgment at the breaches in the first line, but their musketry was destructive, and they rolled down large shells to retard the approaches towards the second line.

On the 7th the besiegers got so close to the wall below that the howitzers above could no longer play without danger to the workmen, wherefore two French field-pieces taken in the horn-work were substituted and did good service. The breaching-battery on San Michael's being altered, also renewed its fire, and at five o'clock had broken fifty feet off the parapet of the second line, yet the enemy's return was heavy, and another eighteen-pounder lost a trunnion. In the night block carriages with supports for the broken trunnions were provided, and the disabled guns were enabled to recommence their fire with low charges. A constant rain now filled the trenches, the communications were injured, the workmen negligent, the approaches to the second line went on slowly, and again Dubreton came thundering down from the upper ground, driving the guards and workmen from the new parallel at the lodgments, levelling all the works, carrying off all the tools, and killing or wounding two hundred men. Colonel Cocks, promoted for his gallant conduct at the storming of San Michael, restored the fight and repulsed the French, but fell dead on the ground he had recovered. He was a young man of a modest demeanor, brave, thoughtful and enterprising; he lived and died as a good soldier.

After this severe check the approaches to the second line were abandoned, and the trenches were extended so as to embrace the whole of the fronts attacked. The battery on San Michael had meantime formed a practicable breach twenty-five feet wide, and the parallel at the old breach of the first line was prolonged by zigzags on the left towards this new breach, while a trench was opened to enable marksmen to fire upon the latter at thirty yards distance. Nevertheless another assault could not be risked, because the great expenditure of powder had again exhausted the magazines; and without a new supply, the troops might have found themselves without ammunition in front of the French army, which was now gathering head near Briviesca. Heated shot were however thrown at the White Church, with a view to burn the magazines; and the miners were directed to drive a gallery on the other side of the castle against the church of San Roman, which was pushed out a little beyond the French external line of defence on the side of the city.

On the 10th, when the besiegers' ammunition was nearly all gone, a fresh supply arrived from Santander, but no effect had

been produced upon the White Church, and Dubreton had strengthened his works to meet the assault; he had also isolated the new breach on one flank by a strong stockade extending at right angles from the second to the third line of defence. The fire from the Napoleon battery had compelled the besiegers again to withdraw their battering-guns within the horn-work, and the attempt to burn the White Church was relinquished, but the gallery against San Roman was continued. In this state things remained for several days with little change, save that the French, maugre the musketry from the nearest zigzag trench, had scarped eight feet at the top of the new breach and formed a small trench at the back.

On the 15th the battery in the horn-work was again armed, and the guns pointed to breach the wall of the Napoleon battery; they were however overmatched and silenced in three-quarters of an hour, and the embrasures were once more altered that the guns might bear on the breach in the second line. Some slight works and counter-works were also made on different points, the besiegers being principally occupied repairing the mischief done by the rain, and pushing the gallery under San Roman, where the French were now distinctly heard talking in the church; the mine was therefore formed and loaded with nine hundred pounds of powder.

On the 17th the battery of the horn-work was renewed, the fire of the eighteen-pounders cleared away the enemy's temporary defences at the breach, the howitzers damaged the rampart on each side, and a small mine was sprung on the extreme right of the lower parallel, with a view to take possession of a cavalier or mound which the French had raised there, and from which they had killed many men in the trenches; it was successful, and a lodgment was effected, yet the enemy returned in force and compelled the besiegers to abandon it again. On the 18th the new breach was rendered practicable, and Wellington ordered it to be stormed. The explosion of the mine under San Roman was to be the signal, the church was also to be assaulted, and at the same time a third detachment was to escalate the works in front of the ancient breach and thus connect the attacks.

FIFTH ASSAULT.

At half-past four o'clock the springing of the mine at San Roman broke down a terrace in front of that building, yet with little injury to the church itself; the latter was however resolutely attacked by Colonel Browne at the head of some Spanish and Portuguese troops, and though the enemy sprung a countermine which brought the

building down, the assailants lodged themselves in the ruins. Meanwhile two hundred of the foot-guards, with strong supports, poured through the old breach in the first line and escalated the second line, beyond which, in the open ground between the second and third lines, they were encountered by the French and a sharp musketry fight commenced. At the same time a like number of the German legion under Major Wurmb, similarly supported, stormed the new breach on the left of the guards so vigorously that it was carried in a moment, and some men mounted the hill above and actually gained the third line. Unhappily, at neither of these assaults did the supports follow closely; the Germans, cramped on their left by the enemy's stockade, extended their right towards the guards, and at that moment Dubreton came dashing like a torrent from the upper ground and in an instant cleared the breaches. Wurmb and many other brave men fell, and the French, gathering round the guards who were still unsupported, forced them beyond the outer line: more than two hundred men and officers were killed or wounded in this combat, and the next night the enemy recovered San Roman by a sally.

The siege was thus virtually terminated. The French were indeed beaten out of San Roman again, and a gallery was opened from that church against the second line; but these were mere demonstrations, and the contemporary events which compelled a victorious army to abandon the siege of a small fortress, strong in nothing but the skill and bravery of the governor and his gallant soldiers, shall now be related.

CHAPTER IV.

State of the war in various parts of Spain—Joseph's distress for money—Massena declines the command of the army of Portugal—Caffarelli joins that army—Reinforcements come from France—Mischief occasioned by the English newspapers—Souham takes the command—Operations of the partidas—Hill reaches Toledo—Souham advances to relieve the castle of Burgos—Skirmish at Monasterio—Wellington takes a position of battle in front of Burgos—Second skirmish—Wellington weak in artillery—Negligence of the British government on that head—The relative situation of the belligerents—Wellington offered the chief command of the Spanish armies—His reasons for accepting it—Contumacious conduct of Ballesteros—He is arrested and sent to Ceuta—Suchet and Jourdan refuse the command of the army of the south—Soulé reduces Chinchilla—The King communicates with Souham—Hill communicates with Wellington—Retreat from Burgos—Combat of Venta de Pozo—Drunkenness at Torquemada—Combat on the Carrion—Wellington retires behind the Pisuerga—Disorders in the rear of the army—Souham skirmishes at the bridge of Cabeçon—Wellington orders Hill to retreat from the Tagus to the Adaja—Souham fails to force the bridges of Valladolid and Simancas—The French Captain Guingret swims the Duero and surprises the bridge of Tordesillas—Wellington retires behind the Duero—Makes a rapid movement to gain a position in front of the bridge of Tordesillas, and destroys the bridges of Toro and Zamora, which arrests the march of the French.

At Valencia Joseph obtained three millions of francs from Suchet, but the pecuniary distress of the French generally was so great that Wellington at one time supposed it would drive them from Spain. The Anglo-Portuguese soldiers had not received pay for six months, the French armies of the south, the centre, and Portugal were a whole year behindhand; and the salaries of the ministers and civil servants were two years in arrears. Suchet's army, the only one which depended entirely on the country, was however through his excellent management regularly paid; its discipline was conformable; his troops refrained from plunder themselves, and repressed some excesses of Joseph's and Soulé's men so vigorously as to come to blows in defence of the inhabitants. Soldiers without pay must become robbers. Napoleon knew the King's necessity to be extreme, but the Russian war absorbed the resources of France; twenty thousand men chiefly conscripts, and a little money, were all he could send to Spain.

Clausel's army had during the siege been quartered at Pancorbo and along the Ebro as far as Logroño, an advance guard only remaining at Briviesca; there they were re-organized, and Massena was appointed with full powers to command all the northern provinces. A fine opportunity to avenge the retreat from Torres Vedras was thus furnished to the old warrior; but he, doubting the issue of affairs or tamed by age, pleaded illness and sent Souham

to command.* Then arose contention, for Marmont designated Clausel as the fittest to lead, Massena insisted that Souham was the abler general, and the King desired to appoint Drouet. Clausel's abilities were not inferior to those of any French general, and to more perfect acquaintance with the theatre of war he added better knowledge of the enemy, was more known to the soldiers, and had gained their confidence by his recent operations, no mean considerations in such a matter. However, Souham was appointed.

Caffarelli, anxious to succor Burgos which belonged to his command, had at last united at Vittoria a thousand cavalry, sixteen guns, and eight thousand infantry, of which three thousand were of the Young Guard. The army of Portugal, reinforced from France with twelve thousand men, had thirty-five thousand present under arms organized in six divisions, and by Clausel's vigor restored to its former excellent discipline; forty-four thousand good troops were therefore ready in the beginning of October to succor the castle; and the two generals were eager to do so, but were forced to await Souham's arrival, and news from the King.† But here Wellington's arrangements with the partidas interfered; they had no direct tidings from Valencia, because the circuitous lines of correspondence were so beset by the bands that the most speedy and certain communication was through the Minister of War at Paris; and he obtained his surest information from the English newspapers!‡ For the latter, while deceiving the public with stories of victories never gained, battles never fought, enthusiasm and vigor which had no existence, did most assiduously enlighten the enemy as to the numbers, situation, movements and reinforcements of the allies.§

Souham arrived the 3d of October with the last reinforcements from France, but he imagined Wellington had sixty thousand troops around Burgos exclusive of the partidas, and that three divisions were marching from Madrid to his aid;|| whereas none were coming from that capital, and little more than thirty thousand were near Burgos, eleven thousand being Gallicians scarcely so good as the partidas. The Anglo-Portuguese were not twenty thousand, and the sick were going to the rear faster than the recovered men came up. Some unattached regiments and escorts were about Segovia, and other points north of the Guadarama, and a reinforcement of five thousand men had been sent from England in Sep-

* Duke of Feltre to Joseph, Oct. 1812, MS.

† Souham's Report, MS.

‡ Appendix, No. 15, B.

§ Duke of Feltre's Correspondence, MS.

|| Souham's official Correspondence, MS.

tember; but the former belonged to Hill's army, and of the latter the life-guards and blues had gone to Lisbon. One regiment of foot guards and some detachments for the line, in all three thousand, were the only available force in the rear.

During the first part of the siege, the English General seeing the French scattered along the Ebro and only reinforced by conscripts, did not fear any interruption, and the less so that Popham was again menacing the coast line. Even now, when the French were beginning to concentrate, he cared little for them and was resolved to give battle; for he thought Popham and the guerillas would keep Caffarelli employed, and felt himself a match for the army of Portugal; nor did the partidas fail to harass the enemy. Mina having obtained three thousand stand of English arms domineered on the left bank of the Ebro, Duran with four thousand men was uncontrolled on the right bank. The Empecinado, Villa Campa, and Bassecour descended from Cuença against Requeña and Albacete. The Frayle interrupted the communications between Valencia and Tortosa. Saornil, Cuesta, Firmin, and others were in La Mancha and Estremadura. Juan Palarea, called the Medico, was near Segovia; and though Marquinez had been murdered by one of his own men, his partida and that of Julian Sanchez acted as regular troops with Wellington's army.

Sir Home Popham, in conjunction with Mendizabel, Porlier and Renovales, again assailed Gueteria, but they were driven thence with the loss of some guns on the 30th of September, and the Empecinado was also defeated at Requeña. Duran likewise was beaten at Catalatayud by Severoli, who withdrew the garrison of that place; but the Spanish chief next attacked Almunia, one march from Zaragoza, and when again driven away by Severoli, who dismantled the place, he fell on Borja and took it. Zaragoza was thus deprived of outposts on the right of the Ebro; and on the left bank Mina hovered close to the gates, while his lieutenant, Chaplangara, falling on three hundred Italians, killed forty, and would have destroyed the whole but for the timely succor of some mounted gens-d'armes. Reille, always thinking Wellington designed to march upon Zaragoza, had suffered these enterprises to avoid spreading his troops; now better informed, he restored his outposts—but the whole chain of partidas was in activity, and Bassecour had united with Villa Campa to harass Joseph's quarters at Albacete.

While Soult was on the march to Valencia, Elio reduced a small French post left at Consuegra. Hill, who had left three Portuguese regiments of infantry and one of cavalry at Almendralejos, and Truxillo to protect his line of supply, then entered Toledo,