

pardiel. The 27th the army entered Olmedo. General Ferey had died there of his wounds, and the Spaniards tearing his body from the grave were going to mutilate it, when the soldiers of the light division who had so often fought against this brave man rescued his corpse; they re-made his grave, and heaped rocks upon it for more security, yet with little need, for the Spaniards, with whom the sentiment of honor is always strong when not stifled by the violence of their passions, immediately applauded the action.

On the 26th Clausel, finding the pursuit had slackened, sent Colonel Fabvier to advise the King of it, and then passing his right wing across the Duero by the ford near Boecillo to cover the evacuation of Valladolid, marched with the other wing towards the bridge of Tudela; he remained however still on the left bank in the hope that Fabvier's mission would bring the King back. Joseph had then passed the Puerta de Guadarama, but immediately repassed it and made a flank movement to Segovia, which he reached the 27th and pushed his cavalry to Santa Maria de Nieva. There he remained until the 31st, expecting Clausel would join him, for he resolved not to quit his hold of the passes over the Guadarama, nor to abandon his communication with Valencia and Andalusia. During these movements Wellington had brought Santocildes across the Duero to the Zapardiel, and crossing the Eresma and Ciga with the 1st and light divisions and the cavalry, compelled Clausel to go over the Duero in the night of the 29th. And that General, fearing the British would then gain Aranda and Lerma while the Gallicians seized Dueñas and Torquemada, retreated in three columns up the valleys of the Arlanza, the Duero and the Esquiva, towards Burgos, in great disorder; for the soldiers, encouraged even by officers of high rank, spread over the whole country pillaging and assassinating the country people: Clausel was forced to shoot fifty marauders ere the wide-spreading anarchy could be checked.*

Valladolid was occupied by the allies amidst the rejoicings of the inhabitants, and eight hundred sick and wounded men were captured there with seventeen pieces of artillery and large stores. Three hundred other prisoners were taken by the guerilla chief Martinez, and a large convoy on its way to Soult was forced to retrograde to Burgos. The left wing of the allies then pursued the enemy up the Arlanza, while the right wing moving against the King reached Cuellar the 1st of August. On the same day the garrison of Tordesillas surrendered to the Gallicians, and Joseph having first dismantled the castle of Segovia and raised a contri-

* Clausel's Letter to the Minister of War, 18th August, 1812.

bution of money and church plate retreated through the Puerta de Guadarama, leaving a rear-guard of cavalry which escaped by the Ildefonso pass on the approach of the allied horsemen. Thus the army of the centre was irrevocably separated from the army of Portugal, the operations against the latter were terminated, and new combinations were made conformable to the altered state of affairs; but to understand these it is necessary to look at the transactions in other parts of the Peninsula.

In Estremadura, after Drouet's retreat to Azagua, General Hill had placed a strong division of infantry at Merida ready to cross the Tagus, but no military event occurred until the 24th of July, when General Lallemand made a fresh incursion with three regiments of cavalry. The third and fourth Portuguese dragoons under Colonel John Campbell retired before him in good order, skirmishing, to the high ground between Ribera and Villa Franca, and being there supported by Long's British cavalry and Wynate's horse artillery, turned and charged with success. Lallemand then repassed the defile of Hinojosa under fire of the guns, and being menaced on both flanks by Long and Slade was driven with a loss of fifty men to Llera. Drouet, desirous to retaliate, immediately executed a flank march towards Merida, and Hill fearing for his detachments there made a corresponding movement, whereupon the French General returned to the Serena; but though he received positive orders from Soult to give battle, no action followed, and the affairs of that part of the Peninsula remained balanced.*

In Andalusia Ballesteros had surprised Colonel Beauvais at Ossuna, taking three hundred prisoners and ruining the French dépôt there, after which he moved against Malaga. He was opposed by Laval in front, and Villatte being detached from the blockade of Cadiz cut off his retreat to San Roque; the road to Murcia was still open to him and he escaped, but his rashness, though of less consequence since the battle of Salamanca, gave Wellington great disquietude, and the more so that Joseph O'Donnell had just sustained a serious defeat near Alicant. This disaster, to be described in a more fitting place, was counterbalanced by information that the revived expedition from Sicily had reached Majorca, had been joined by Whittingham's division, and had received the stores and guns sent from Portugal. In the north, Popham's armament had drawn Caffarelli's troops to the coast, and although this littoral warfare was not followed up the diversion was effectual.

In Castile the siege of Astorga lingered, but Santocildes was

* Intercepted Correspondence.

now in full communication with Wellington, and Silveira was on the Duero; Clausel remained at Burgos, and the King being joined by two thousand men from Suchet's army could concentrate twenty thousand to dispute the passes of the Guadarama. Hence Wellington, having nothing immediate to fear from Soult, nor from the army of Portugal, nor from the army of the north, nor from Suchet, menaced as that Marshal was by the Sicilian expedition, resolved to attack the King in preference to following Clausel. For the latter could not be pursued without exposing Salamanca and the Gallicians to Joseph, who was strong in cavalry; but that monarch might be assailed without risking much in other quarters, seeing that Clausel could not soon renew the campaign, and the immediate fall of Astorga was expected, which would let loose eight thousand additional men. A strong British division could also be spared to co-operate with Santocildes, Silveira, and the partidas, to watch Clausel while Wellington gave the King a blow or forced him to abandon Madrid; and it seemed probable the moral effect of regaining the capital would excite the Spaniards' energy everywhere, and prevent Soult from attacking Hill: if he did attack him the allies, choosing this line of operations, would be at hand to give succor.

These reasons being weighed, Clinton was left at Cuellar with the sixth division increased to eight thousand men by the addition of some sickly regiments and by Anson's cavalry; Santocildes was put in communication with him, and the partidas of Marquez, Saornil, and El Principe agreed to act with Anson on a prescribed plan. Thus, exclusive of Silveira's militia and the Gallicians about Astorga, eighteen thousand men were left on the Duero, and the English General was still able to march against Joseph with twenty-eight thousand old troops, exclusive of Carlos d'España's Spaniards. He had also assurance from Lord Castlereagh that a considerable sum in hard money, to be followed by other remittances, had been sent from England, a circumstance of the utmost importance, because grain could be purchased in Spain at one-third the cost of bringing it up from Portugal.

When the King regained Madrid he expected to hear that ten thousand of the army of the south were at Toledo, instead of which he received letters from Soult positively refusing to send that detachment; and from Clausel saying the army of Portugal was in full retreat to Burgos.* This retreat he regarded as a breach of faith, because Clausel had promised to hold the line of the Duero if the allies marched upon Madrid; but Joseph, unable to appreciate Wellington's military combinations, did not perceive

* King's Correspondence, MS.

that before he marched against Madrid the English General had forced Clausel to seek a distant point to re-organize his army. Nor was the King's perception of his own situation much clearer. He had the choice of several lines of operations; that is, he might defend the passes of the Guadarama while his court and enormous convoys evacuated Madrid and marched upon Zaragoza, Valencia or Andalusia; or he might retire, army and convoy together, in one of those directions. Rejecting the defence of the passes, lest the allies should then march by their right to the Tagus and so intercept his communication with the south, he resolved to march towards the Morena; and from Segovia he had ordered Soult to evacuate Andalusia and meet him on the frontier of La Mancha. But to avoid the disgrace of seeming to fly before a detachment he occupied the Escorial mountain, and placed his army across the roads leading from the passes of the Guadarama to Madrid. While in this position, Wellington's advanced guard, composed of D'Urban's Portuguese, a troop of horse artillery, and a battalion of infantry, passed the Guadarama, and the 10th the whole army was over the mountains. Then the King, retaining only eight thousand men in position, sent the rest of his troops to protect the march of his court, which quitted Madrid the same day with two or three thousand carriages of different kinds and nearly twenty thousand persons of all ages and sexes.

On the 11th D'Urban drove back Trielhard's cavalry posts and entered Majadahonda, whilst some German infantry, Bock's heavy cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, occupied Las Rozas, about a mile in his rear. In the evening, Trielhard, reinforced by Schiazzetti's Italian dragoons and the lancers of Berg, returned, and D'Urban having called up the horse artillery would have charged the enemy's leading squadrons, but the Portuguese cavalry fled, and three of the guns being overturned on the rough ground were taken. The victorious cavalry then passed through Majadahonda in pursuit. The German dragoons, although surprised in their quarters, mounted and stopped the leading French squadrons until Schiazzetti's Italians came up, when the fight would have ended badly if Ponsonby's cavalry and the seventh division had not arrived, whereupon Trielhard abandoned Majadahonda, leaving the captured guns behind him, yet carrying away the Portuguese General Barbacena, the Colonel of the German cavalry, and others of less rank. The whole loss of the allies was above two hundred, and when the infantry passed through Rozas a few hours after the combat the German dead were then lying thickly in the streets, many of them in their shirts and trousers were stretched on the sills of the doors, furnishing proof at once of the sudden-

ness of the action and of their own bravery. Had the King been prepared to follow up the blow with his whole force, the allies must have suffered severely, for Wellington trusting to the advanced guard had not kept his divisions very close together.

After this combat the King retired to Valdemoro, where he met his convoy from Madrid, and when the troops of the three different nations forming his army thus came together a horrible confusion arose; the convoy was plundered, and the miserable people who followed the court were made prey of by the licentious soldiers. Marshal Jourdan, a man at all times distinguished for the noblest sentiments, immediately threw himself into the midst of the disorderly troops, and aided by the other generals, with great personal risk arrested the mischief and succeeded in making the multitude file over the bridge of Aranjuez. The procession was however lugubrious and shocking, for the military line of march was broken by crowds of weeping women and children and despairing men; courtiers of the highest rank were to be seen in full dress desperately struggling with savage soldiers for the possession of even the animals on which they were endeavoring to save their families. The cavalry of the allies could have driven the whole before them into the Tagus, yet Wellington did not molest them, either from ignorance of their situation, or what is more probable, compassionating their misery; he knew that the troops by abandoning the convoy could easily escape over the river, and he would not strike where the blow could only fall on helpless people without affecting the military operations: perhaps also he thought it wise to leave Joseph the burthen of his court.

In the evening of the 13th the whole multitude was over the Tagus, the garrisons of Aranjuez and Toledo joined the army, order was restored, and the King received letters from Soult and Suchet. The first opposed the evacuation of Andalusia; the second gave notice that the Sicilian expedition had landed at Alicante and a considerable army was forming there. Irritated with Soult and alarmed for the safety of Suchet, the King then relinquished his march towards the Morena and commenced his retreat to Valencia. The 15th the advanced guard moved with the sick and wounded who were heaped on country cars, the convoy followed under charge of the infantry, while the cavalry, spreading to the right and left, endeavored to collect provisions. But the people, remembering the wanton devastation committed a few months before by Montbrun's troops on their return from Alicante, fled with their property; and as it was the hottest time of the year and the deserted country was sandy and without shade, this march of one hundred and fifty miles to Almanza was one of continual

suffering. The partida chief Chaleco hovered constantly on the flanks and rear, killing without mercy all persons, civil or military, who straggled or sunk from exhaustion; and while this disastrous journey was in progress another misfortune befell the French on the side of Requeña. For the hussars and infantry belonging to Suchet's army having left Madrid to succor Cuença before the King returned from Segovia, carried off the garrison of that place in despite of the Empecinado and made for Valencia; but Villa Campa crossing their march on the 25th of August, at the passage of a river near Utiel, took all their baggage, their guns, and three hundred men. And then the Empecinado invested Guadalaxara, which had a garrison of seven hundred men.

Wellington seeing that the King had crossed the Tagus in retreat entered Madrid, a very memorable event were it only from the affecting circumstances attending it. He, a foreigner, marching at the head of a foreign army, was met and welcomed to the capital of Spain by the whole remaining population. The multitude who before that hour had never seen him came forth to hail his approach, not with feigned enthusiasm, not with acclamations extorted by the fear of a conqueror's power, nor yet excited by the natural proneness of human nature to laud the successful, for there was no tumultuous exultation; famine was amongst them and long-endured misery had subdued their spirits; but with tears and every other sign of deep emotion they crowded around his horse, hung upon his stirrups, touched his clothes, and throwing themselves upon the earth blessed him aloud as the friend of Spain. His triumph was as pure and glorious as it was uncommon, and he felt it to be so.

Madrid was however still disturbed by the presence of the enemy. The Retiro contained enormous stores, twenty thousand stand of arms, more than one hundred and eighty pieces of artillery, and the eagles of two French regiments; it had a garrison of two thousand fighting men besides invalids and followers, but its inherent weakness was soon made manifest. The works consisted of an interior fort called La China, with an exterior intrenchment; but the fort was too small, the intrenchment too large, and easily deprived of water. In the lodgings of a French officer also was found an order directing the commandant to confine his real defence to the fort; and accordingly in the night of the 13th, he abandoned the intrenchment, and next day accepted honorable terms, because La China was so contracted and filled with combustible buildings that his fine troops would with only a little firing have been smothered in the ruins; yet they were so dissatisfied that many broke their arms, and their commander was like to have

fallen a victim to their wrath. They were immediately sent to Portugal, and French writers with too much truth assert that the escort basely robbed and murdered many of the prisoners. This disgraceful action was perpetrated on the frontier of Portugal by the Spanish garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo; the British troops, who furnished no escorts after the first day's march from Madrid, are guiltless, and Lord Wellington made strenuous but unsuccessful efforts to have the Spanish criminals punished.

Coincident with the fall of the Retiro was that of Guadalaxara, which surrendered to the Empecinado. This mode of wasting an army and its resources was designated by Napoleon as the most glaring and extraordinary of all the errors committed by the King and by Marmont. And surely it was so. For including the garrisons of Toro, Tordesillas, Zamora and Astorga, which were now blockaded, six thousand men had been delivered as it were bound to the allies; and with them stores and equipments sufficient for a new army. These forts had been designed by the Emperor to resist the partidas, but his lieutenants exposed them to the British army, and thus the positive loss of men from the battle of Salamanca was doubled.

Napoleon had notice of Marmont's defeat as early as the 2d of September, a week before the great battle of Borodino; the news was carried by Fabvier, who made the journey from Valladolid in one course, and having fought on the 22d of July at the Arapiles, was wounded on the heights of Moskowa the 7th of September! Marmont, suffering alike in body and in mind, had excused himself with so little strength or clearness, that the Emperor, contemptuously remarking that the despatch contained more complicate stuffing than a clock, desired his war minister to demand why Marmont had delivered battle without the orders of the King? why he had not made his operations subservient to the general plan of the campaign? why he broke from defensive into offensive operations before the army of the centre joined him? why he would not even wait two days for Chauvel's cavalry, which he knew were close at hand? "From personal vanity," said the Emperor with seeming sternness, "the Duke of Ragusa has sacrificed the interests of his country and the good of my service, he is guilty of the crime of insubordination, and is the author of all this misfortune."

But Napoleon's wrath, so just and apparently so dangerous, could not even in its first violence overpower his early friendship. With a kindness, the recollection of which should now pierce Marmont's inmost soul, twice in the same letter he desired that these questions might not even be put to his unhappy lieutenant until his wounds were cured and his health re-established. Nor was this generous feel-

ing shaken by the arrival of the King's agent, Colonel Desprez, who reached Moscow the 18th of October, just after Murat had lost a battle at the outposts and when all hopes of peace with Russia were at end.* Joseph's despatches, bitter against all the generals, were especially so against Marmont and Soult; the former for having lost the battle, the latter because of his resistance to the royal plan. Soult's recall was demanded imperatively, because he had written a letter to the Emperor extremely offensive to the King; and it was also hinted that he designed to make himself King of Andalusia. Idle stories of that Marshal's ambition seem always to have been resorted to when his skilful plans were beyond the military judgment of his accusers; but Marmont was deeply sunk in culpable misfortune, and the King's complaints against him were not unjust. Napoleon had however then seen Wellington's despatch, which was more favorable to the Duke of Ragusa than Joseph's report; for the latter was founded on a belief that the unfortunate General knew the army of the centre was close at hand and would not wait for it; whereas the partidas had intercepted so many of Joseph's letters, it is doubtful if any reached Marmont previous to the battle. It was in vain therefore that Desprez pressed the King's discontent on the Emperor; that great man with unerring sagacity had already disentangled the truth, and Desprez was thus roughly interrogated as to the conduct of his master:

Why was not the army of the centre in the field a month sooner to succor Marmont? Why was the Emperor's example, when in a like case he marched from Madrid against Sir John Moore, forgotten? Why after the battle was not the Duero passed and the beaten troops rallied on the army of the centre? Why were the passes of the Guadarama so early abandoned? Why was the Tagus crossed so soon? Finally, why were not stores and gun-carriages in the Retiro burned, the eagles and the garrison carried off?

To these questions the King's agent could only reply by excuses which must have made the energetic Emperor smile; but when, following his instructions, Desprez harped upon Soult's demeanor, his designs in Andalusia, and still more upon the letter so personally offensive to the King, which shall be more noticed hereafter, Napoleon replied sharply, that he could not enter into such pitiful disputes while he was at the head of five hundred thousand men, and occupied with such immense operations. With respect to Soult's letter, he said he knew his brother's real feelings, but those who judged Joseph by his language could only think with Soult, whose suspicions were natural and partaken by the other generals; where-

* Appendixes, 11, 12, 13.

fore he would not by recalling him deprive the armies in Spain of the only military head they possessed. And then in ridicule of Soult's supposed treachery he observed that the King's fears on that head must have subsided, as the English newspapers said the Duke of Dalmatia was evacuating Andalusia, and he would of course unite with Suchet and with the army of the centre to retake the offensive. Nevertheless the Emperor without hesitation admitted all the evils arising from these disputes between the generals and the King, but said at such a distance he could not give precise orders for their conduct. He had foreseen the mischief, and regretted more than ever that Joseph had disregarded his counsel not to return to Spain in 1811; thus saying, he finished the conversation, but this expression about Joseph not returning to Spain is very remarkable. Napoleon spoke of it as of a well known fact, yet Joseph's letters show that he not only desired but repeatedly offered to resign the crown of Spain and live a private man in France! Did the Emperor mean that he wished his brother to remain a crowned guest at Paris? or had some subtle intriguers misrepresented the brothers to each other? The noblest buildings are often defiled in secret by vile and creeping things.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. *Menace your enemy's flanks, protect your own, and be ready to concentrate on the important points.*

This maxim contains the spirit of Napoleon's instructions to his generals after Badajos was succored in 1811. At that time he had ordered the army of Portugal to occupy the valley of the Tagus and the passes of the Gredos mountains, in which position it covered Madrid and could readily march to aid either the army of the south or the army of the north. Dorsenne who commanded the latter could bring twenty-six thousand men to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Soult could bring a like number to Badajos, but Wellington could not move against one or the other without having Marmont upon his flank; he could not move against Marmont without having the others on both flanks, and he could not turn his opponent's flanks save from the ocean. He took Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos notwithstanding, but by surprise, and because the French did not concentrate on the important points; this proved his superiority, but in no manner affected the principle of Napoleon's plan.

When the exigency of the Russian war had weakened the army of the north, the Emperor giving Marmont two additional divisions ordered him to occupy Castile, not as a defensive position but as a central offensive one from whence he could keep the Gallicians in check, and by prompt menacing movements bar Wellington from

serious operations elsewhere. Marmont was forbidden to invade Portugal while Wellington was on the frontier of Beira, that is, when he could not assail him in flank; and he was directed to guard the Asturias carefully as a protection to the great line of communication with France. In May also he was rebuked for having withdrawn Bonnet from Oviedo, and for delaying to re-occupy the Asturias when the incursion against Beira terminated. But neither then nor afterwards did he comprehend the spirit of the Emperor's views, and that extraordinary man, whose piercing sagacity seized every chance of war, was so disquieted by his lieutenant's want of perception, that all the pomp and vast political and military combinations of Dresden could not put it from his thoughts.

"Twice," said he, "has the Duke of Ragusa placed an interval of thirty leagues between his army and the enemy, contrary to all the rules of war; the English General goes where he will, the French General loses the initial movements, and is of no weight in the affairs of Spain. Biscay and the north are exposed by the evacuation of the Asturias, Santona and St. Sebastian are endangered, and the guerillas communicate freely with the coast. If the Duke of Ragusa has not kept some bridges on the Agueda, he cannot know what Wellington is about, and he will retire before light cavalry instead of operating so as to make the English General concentrate his whole army. The false direction already given to affairs makes it necessary that Caffarelli should keep a strong corps always in hand; that the commander of the reserve at Bayonne should look to the safety of St. Sebastian, holding three thousand men always ready to march; finally that the provisional battalions and dépôts of the interior should reinforce the reserve at Bayonne, be encamped on the Pyrenees, exercised and formed for service. *If Marmont's oversights continue, these troops will prevent the disasters from becoming extreme.*"*

Napoleon was supernaturally gifted in warlike matters. It has been recorded in praise of Cæsar's generalship, that he foretold the cohorts mixed with his cavalry would be the cause of victory at Pharsalia. This letter was written by the French Emperor on the 28th of May, before the allies were collected on the Agueda, and when a hundred thousand French troops were between the English General and Bayonne, and its prescience was vindicated at Burgos in October!

2. To meet the Emperor's views, Marmont should, as Scult advised, have left one or two divisions on the Tormes, have encamped near Baños and on the upper Agueda to watch the allies. Caffarelli's divisions could have joined those on the Tormes, and

* Appendix 9.

then Napoleon's plan for 1811 would have been exactly renewed; Madrid would have been covered, a junction with the King secured, and Wellington could scarcely have moved beyond the Agueda. Marmont, apparently because he would not have the King in his camp, run counter to the Emperor and to Soult. He kept no troops on the Agueda, which might be excusable if to feed them there was difficult; but then he did not concentrate behind the Tormes to sustain his forts, neither did he abandon his forts when he abandoned Salamanca; thus eight hundred men were sacrificed merely to secure his concentration behind the Duero. His line of operations was perpendicular to the allies' front, instead of lying on their flank—he abandoned sixty miles of country between the Tormes and the Agueda—he suffered Wellington to take the initial movement—he withdrew Bonnet from the Asturias, whereby he lost Caffarelli's support and realized the Emperor's fears. He regained the initial however by passing the Dueró on the 18th, and had he deferred the passage until the King was over the Guadarama, Wellington must have gone back upon Portugal with some show of dishonor. But if Castaños, instead of keeping fifteen thousand Gallicians before Astorga, a weak place with a garrison of only twelve hundred men, had blockaded it with three or four thousand, and detached Santocildes with eleven thousand down the Esla to co-operate with Silveira and D'Urban, sixteen thousand men would have been acting upon Marmont's right flank in June; and as Bonnet did not join until the 8th of July he could scarcely have kept the line of the Duero.

3. The secret of Wellington's success is to be found in the extent of country occupied by the French armies and the impediments to their military communication, while from Portugal, an impregnable central position, he could rush out unexpectedly against any point. This strong post was however of his own making, he had chosen it, had fortified it, had defended it, knew its full value and availed himself of all its advantages. The battle of Salamanca was accidental in itself, but the tree was planted to bear such fruit, and Wellington's combinations must be estimated from the general result. He had only sixty thousand disposable troops, and one hundred thousand were especially appointed to watch and control him; yet he passed the frontier, defeated forty-five thousand in a pitched battle, and drove twenty thousand others from Madrid in confusion, without risking a single strategic point. His campaign up to the conquest of Madrid was therefore strictly in accord with the rules of art, although his means and resources have been shown to be precarious, shifting and uncertain; want of money alone would have prevented him from following up his victory if he had

not persuaded the Spanish authorities in the Salamanca country to yield him the revenues of the government in kind, under a promise of repayment at Cadiz. No general was ever more entitled to the honors of victory.

4. The allies' success indicates a fault in the French plan of invasion. The army of the south, numerous, of approved valor and well commanded, was of so little weight in this campaign as to prove that Andalusia was a point pushed beyond the true line of operations. Its conquest in 1811 was the King's plan, and it was not liked by Napoleon, though he did not absolutely condemn it. The question was indeed a grave one. While the English held Portugal and Cadiz was unsubdued, Andalusia was a burthen rather than a gain. Had the communication with France been first established by the southern line of invasion, to attack Andalusia would have been methodical; or to have held it partially by detachments for the sake of the resources, keeping the base of the army in Estremadura, would have been regularly within the northern system of invasion. For in Estremadura Soult would have covered the capital, been more connected with the army of the centre, and his co-operation with Massena in 1810 would probably have compelled the English to quit Portugal. Reinforcing the army of the south with thirty or forty thousand men would have had the same effect if Soult could have fed such a number. And in favor of the invasion of Andalusia it may be observed, that Seville was the great arsenal of Spain, and the English without abandoning Portugal might have been located in strength at Cadiz, which would have compensated for the loss of Lisbon: finally the English ministers were not then determined to defend Portugal.

5. When the Emperor declared that Soult possessed the only military head in the Peninsula, he referred to a scheme by that Marshal to be noticed in the next chapter; but having regard merely to the disputes between him, Marmont and the King, Suchet's talents not being in question, the justice of the remark may be demonstrated. Napoleon always enforced the military principle of concentration on the important points; but the King and Marshals, though harping continually upon this maxim, desired to apply each in his own sphere. Now to concentrate on a wrong point is to hurt yourself with your own sword, and as each French general desired to be strong, the army at large was scattered instead of being concentrated. The failure of the campaign was attributed to Soult's disobedience, inasmuch as the passage of the Tagus by Drouet would have enabled the King to act before Palombini's division arrived. But it has been shown that Hill could have brought Wellington an equal or superior reinforcement

in less time, whereby the latter could have made head until the French dispersed for want of provisions, or by a rapid counter-movement have fallen upon Andalusia. If the King had menaced Ciudad Rodrigo it would have been no diversion, for he had no battering-train; still less could he have marched on Lisbon, for Wellington would then have overpowered Soult and entered Cadiz before such an operation could become dangerous. Oporto might have been taken, but Joseph would have hesitated to exchange Madrid for that city. The ten thousand men required of Soult by the King on the 19th of June could have been at Madrid before August, and the passes of the Guadarama thus defended until Marmont's army was re-organized! Ay! but Hill could have entered the valley of the Tagus, or being reinforced could have invaded Andalusia while Wellington kept the King in check. Joseph's plan of operations, if exactly executed, might have prevented Wellington's progress on some points; but then the French would have been concentrated in large masses without striking any decisive blow, which it was the pith and marrow of the English General's policy to make them do. It follows that Soult made a true, Joseph a false application of the principle of concentration.

6. If the King had judged well he would have merged the monarch in the general, exchanged the palace for the tent. Holding only the Retiro and a few posts near Madrid, he would have organized a pontoon train, established magazines at Segovia, Avila, Toledo, and Talavera, kept his army constantly united, and employed to open roads through the mountains, and chase the partidas while Wellington remained quiet. Thus acting, he would have been ready to succor any menaced point. By enforcing discipline in his own army he would have given a useful example, and by vigilance and activity have insured the preponderance of force wherever he marched: he would have acquired the esteem of the French, and the Spaniards would more readily have submitted to a warlike monarch. A weak man can wear an inherited crown—it is of gold, the people support it: it requires the strength of a warrior to bear the weight of a usurped diadem—it is of iron.

7. If Marmont and the King were at fault in the general plan of operations, they were not less so in the particular tactics of the campaign. On the 18th of July the army of Portugal passed the Duerc in advance. On the 30th it repassed that river in retreat, having in twelve days marched two hundred miles, fought three combats and a general battle.* One marshal, seven generals, twelve thousand five hundred men and officers, had been killed, wounded, or taken; and two eagles, besides those captured in the

* Appendixes 19, 20.

Retiro, several standards, twelve guns and eight carriages, exclusive of the artillery and stores found at Valladolid, fell into the victor's hands. In the same period, the allies marched one hundred and sixty miles, and had one field-marshal, four generals, and nearly six thousand officers and soldiers killed or wounded.

This comparison proves Wellington's sagacity when he determined not to fight except at great advantage. The French army, although surprised in the midst of an evolution and instantly swept from the field, killed and wounded six thousand of the allies,—the eleventh and sixty-first regiments of the sixth division had not together more than one hundred and sixty men and officers left standing at the end of the battle; twice six thousand then would have fallen in a more equal contest, and as Chauvel's cavalry and the King's army were both at hand, a retreat into Portugal would have followed a less perfect victory. The battle ought not, and would not have been fought but for Marmont's false movement on the 22d. Yet it is certain, if Wellington had retired, the murmurs of his army, already louder than was seemly, would have been heard in England; and if an accidental shot had terminated his career, all would have been terminated. The Cortes, ripe for a change, would have accepted the intrusive King, and the American war just declared against England would have so complicated affairs that no new man could have continued the contest. Then the cries of disappointed politicians would have been raised. It would have been said that Wellington, desponding and distrusting his brave troops, dared not venture a battle on even terms, hence these misfortunes! His name would have been made, as Sir John Moore's was, a butt for the malice and falsehood of faction, and his military genius would have been measured by the ignorance of his detractors.

8. In the battle Marmont had forty-two thousand sabres and bayonets; Wellington, who had received some detachments on the 19th, had above forty-six thousand, but the excess was principally Spanish.* The French had seventy-four guns, the allies, including a Spanish battery, had only sixty pieces. Thus Marmont, over-matched in cavalry and infantry, was superior in artillery, and the fight would have been most bloody if the generals had been equal, for courage and strength were in even balance until Wellington's genius struck the beam. Scarcely can a fault be detected in his conduct. It might indeed be asked why the cavalry reserves were not, after Le Marchant's charge, brought up to sustain the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions and keep off Boyer's dragoons; but it would seem ill to cavil at an action which was decried at the time

* Appendixes 19, 20.

by a French officer, as the "*beating of forty thousand men in forty minutes.*"

9. In the description of the battle, Marmont's own account of his views and the time when he was wounded has been adopted; but there are other versions which tend to place his errors in a stronger light. It is affirmed he twice sent orders to Maucune, once by Fabvier, once by Colonel Richemont his aide-de-camp, to assemble four divisions and press the English army, which was, he said, in full retreat by the Ciudad Rodrigo road. Maucune replied that he was more likely to be attacked himself, and in fact Pakenham fell upon him very soon afterwards.* That so far from wishing or ordering his left wing to fall back on their centre, Marmont was satisfied the allies were retiring; that being at dinner and in the act of holding his plate, he was struck by a shell just before Pakenham's attack commenced. That after the battle he had a violent altercation with Maucune, whom he reproached for having extended the left so rashly, and when the latter pleaded the orders received by Fabvier, Marmont exclaimed against that officer and denied that he had sent any orders to pursue the allies. However that may be, the battle of Salamanca, remarkable in many points of view, was not least so in this, that it was the first decided victory gained by the allies in the Peninsula. In former actions the French had been repulsed, here they were driven headlong as it were before a mighty wind without help or stay, and the results were proportionate. Joseph's secret negotiations with the Cortes were crushed, his partisans were everywhere abashed, the sinking spirit of the Catalans revived, the clamors of the opposition in England were checked, the provisional government of France was dismayed, the secret plots against the French in Germany were resuscitated, and the shock, reaching even to Moscow, heaved and shook the colossal structure of Napoleon's power to its very base.

10. Great battles are often accidental; few generals are able or indeed willing to fix the place and hour where they shall fight. Salamanca was an accident seized with astonishing vigor and quickness, but still an accident. Even its results were accidental; for the French could never have repassed the Tormes if Carlos d'España had not withdrawn the garrison from Alba, hiding the fact from Wellington; and this would have ruined the latter's campaign but for another of those chances which, recurring so frequently in war, make bad generals timid, and great generals trust fortune in adverse circumstances. Joseph was at Blasco Sancho the 24th, and notwithstanding his numerous cavalry, the army of

* Declarations by Colonel Girard, chief of Maucune's staff, and Mercier, engineer of Bonnet's division, MSS.

Portugal passed in retreat across his front at the distance of a few miles without his knowledge; he thus missed one opportunity of effecting his junction with Clausel. On the 25th this junction could still have been made at Arevalo, and Wellington, as if to mock the King's generalship, halted that day behind the Zapardiel; but Joseph retreated towards the Guadarama, wrathful that Clausel made no effort to join him, and forgetful that as a beaten and pursued army must march it was for him to join Clausel. But the true causes of these errors were the secret inclinations of the generals. Joseph, determined to keep his communication with the capital and with Andalusia, wished to draw the beaten army to Madrid, and Marmont was willing to do so; but Clausel desired to have the King behind the Duero, and if he had succeeded the result may be thus traced.

Clausel during the first confusion wrote that only twenty thousand men could be re-organized; this certainly did not include stragglers and marauders; for a reference to the French loss shows nearly thirty thousand fighting men left, and in fact Clausel did in a fortnight re-organize twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and fifty guns, besides gaining a knowledge of five thousand stragglers and marauders. No soldiers rally quicker after a defeat than the French, and as Joseph brought to Blasco Sancho thirty guns and fourteen thousand men, two thousand being horsemen, forty thousand infantry, and more than six thousand cavalry with a powerful artillery, might have been rallied behind the Duero, exclusive of Caffarelli's divisions. Nor would Madrid have been exposed to an insurrection, nor to the operation of a weak detachment from Wellington's army; for two thousand men sent by Suchet had arrived in that capital on the 30th, and there were in the several fortified points of the vicinity six or seven thousand more, who could have been united at the Retiro to protect that dépôt and the families attached to the intrusive court.

Wellington would then have found a more powerful army than Marmont's again on the Duero. But his own army would have been less powerful than before, for the reinforcements from England had not sufficed to replace the current consumption of men; and neither the fresh soldiers nor the old Walcheren regiments were able to sustain the toil of the recent operations. Three thousand troops had joined since the battle, yet the general decrease, including the killed and wounded, was above eight thousand, and the sick were rapidly augmenting from the extreme heat. It may therefore be said that if Marmont was stricken deeply by Wellington, the King poisoned the wound. The English General had fore-calculated all these superior resources of the enemy, and it was

only Marmont's flagrant fault on the 22d that could have wrung the battle from him; yet he fought it as if his genius disdained such trial of its strength. I saw him late in the evening of that great day, when the advancing flashes of cannon and musketry stretching as far as the eye could command showed in the darkness how well the field was won; he was alone, the flush of victory was on his brow, and his eyes were eager and watchful, but his voice was calm and even gentle. More than the rival of Marlborough, since he had defeated greater generals than Marlborough ever encountered, with a prescient pride he seemed only to accept his glory as an earnest of greater things.

BOOK XIX.

CHAPTER I.

State of the war—Eastern operations—Lacy's bad conduct—French army of the Ebro dissolved—Lacy's secret agents blow up the magazines in Lerida—He is afraid to storm the place—Calumniates Sarsfield—Suchet comes to Reus—The hermitage of St. Dimas surrendered to Decaen by Colonel Green—The French General burns the convent of Montserrat and marches to Lerida—General Maitland with the Anglo-Sicilian army appears off Palamos—Sails for Alicant—Reflections on this event—Operations in Murcia—O'Donnell defeated at Castalla—Maitland lands at Alicant—Suchet concentrates his forces at Zativa—Intrenches a camp there—Maitland advances to Alcoy—His difficulties—Returns to Alicant—The King's army arrives at Almanza—The remnant of Maupoint's brigade arrives at Cuença—Suchet reoccupies Alcoy—O'Donnell comes up to Yecla—Maitland is reinforced from Sicily and intrenches a camp under the walls of Alicant.

WELLINGTON'S operations deeply affected the French in the distant provinces, and it is necessary again to revert to the general progress of the war lest the true bearings of his military policy should be overlooked. The battle of Salamanca, by clearing all the centre of Spain, reduced the invasion to its original lines of operation. Caffarelli had concentrated the scattered troops of the army of the north, and when Clausel led back his vanquished troops to Burgos, the whole French host was divided in two distinct parts, each having a separate line of communication with France, and a circuitous, uncertain, attenuated line of correspondence with each other by Zaragoza, instead of a sure and short one by Madrid. But Wellington was also forced to divide his army, and though his central position gave him the initial power, his lines of communication were long and weak, and the enemy powerful at either flank. On his own simple strength in the centre of Spain he could not rely, and the diversions he had projected against the enemy's rear and flanks became more important than ever. To these we must now turn.

EASTERN OPERATIONS.

The narrative of Catalonian affairs was interrupted when the French General Decaen, after fortifying the coast line and opening some new roads beyond the reach of shot from the English ships, was gathering the harvest of the interior. Lacy was then confined

to the mountain chain which separates the coast territory from the plains of Lerida, and from the Cerdaña; and the insurrectionary spirit was only upheld by Wellington's successes and the hope of succor from Sicily.* Lacy, devoted to the republican party in Spain, had now been made Captain-General as well as commander-in-chief, and sought to keep down the people who were generally of the priestly and royal faction. He publicly spoke of exciting a general insurrection, yet to the English naval officers avowed his wish to repress the patriotism of the somatenes. Not ashamed to boast of his assassination plot, he received with honor a man who had murdered the aid-de-camp of Maurice Mathieu; he sowed dissensions amongst his own generals, intriguing against all of them in turn; and when Eroles and Manso, the people's favorites, raised any soldiers, he transferred the latter as soon as they were organized to Sarsfield's division, at the same time calumniating that General to repress his influence. He quarrelled incessantly with Codrington, and had no desire to see an English force in Catalonia, lest a general insurrection should take place; for he feared the multitude, once gathered and armed, would drive him from the province and declare for the opponents of the Cortes.† And in this view the constitution itself, although emanating from the Cortes, was long withheld from the Catalans, because the newly declared popular rights might have interfered with the arbitrary power of the chief.

When the Anglo-Sicilian expedition reached Mahon, the hopes of the Spaniards and the fears of the French were alike excited, and the coast became the object of interest to both. The Catalans opened a communication with the English fleet by Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and sought to collect the grain of the Campo de Tarragona; but Decaen, then coming to meet Suchet who had arrived at Reus, drove them to the hills again. The Lerida district was however open to the enterprises of Lacy, because it was at this period Reille had detached General Paris from Zaragoza to succor the Italians under Palombini; and that Severoli's division was broken up to reinforce the garrisons of Lerida, Tarragona, Barcelona, and Zaragoza. When the army of the Ebro was dissolved, Lacy resolved to march upon Lerida, where he had engaged certain Spaniards in the French service to explode the powder magazine when he should approach; and this odious scheme, which necessarily involved the destruction of hundreds of his own countrymen, was vainly opposed by Eroles and Sarsfield. Their divisions were in-

* Codrington, MSS.

† History of the conspiracies against the French army in Catalonia, published at Barcelona, 1813.

corporated with other troops at Guisona, and the whole journeying day and night reached Tremp. Lacy, having thus turned Lerida, would have resumed the march at mid-day, intending to attack next morning at dawn, but the men were without food and so exhausted that fifteen hundred had fallen behind. A council of war was held, and Sarsfield would have returned, observing that all communication with the sea was abandoned, that the harvests of the Campo de Tarragona and Valls being left to be gathered by the enemy, the loss of the corn would seriously affect the whole principality.* Displeased at the remonstrance, Lacy sent him back to the plain of Urgel with some infantry and the cavalry to keep the garrison of Balaguer in check, but in the night of the 16th made him return to Limiana on the Noguera. Lacy himself had meanwhile advanced by Agen towards Lerida, the explosion of the magazine took place, many houses were thrown down, two hundred inhabitants and one hundred and fifty soldiers were destroyed, two bastions fell, and the place was laid open.

Henriod the governor, though ignorant of the vicinity of the Spaniards, immediately manned the breaches, the garrison of Balaguer hearing the explosion marched to the succor, and when the Catalan troops appeared, the citizens, enraged by the destruction of their habitations, aided the French; Lacy then fled back to Tremp, bearing the burthen of a crime which he had not feared to commit, but wanted courage to turn to his country's advantage. To lessen the odium thus incurred he insidiously attributed the failure to Sarsfield's disobedience; and as that General, to punish the people of Barbastro for siding with the French and killing twenty of his men, had raised a heavy contribution of money and corn in the district, he became so hateful, that some time after, when seeking to raise soldiers in those parts, the people threw boiling water at him from the windows as he passed.†

Before this event Suchet had returned to Valencia, and Decaen and Maurice Mathieu marched against Green, who was intrenched in the hermitage of St. Dimas, one of the highest of the peaked rocks overhanging the convent of Montserrat. Manso raised the somatenes to aid him,‡ he had provisions, and the inaccessible strength of his post seemed to defy capture; yet he surrendered in twenty-four hours, and when the enemy despairing of success was going to relinquish the attack. He was, he said, forced by his own people, yet he signed the capitulation. Decaen set fire to the convent, and the flames seen for miles around was the signal that

* Sarsfield's Vindication, MS.

† Codrington, MSS.

‡ Lafaille.

the warfare on that holy mountain was finished. After this the French General marched to Lerida to gather corn, and Lacy again spread his troops in the mountains.

During his absence Eroles had secretly prepared a general insurrection, to break out when the British army should arrive, and it was supposed he designed to change the government of the province. Lacy himself again spoke of embodying the somatenes if arms were given to him by Sir Edward Pellew; but there was really no want of arms; the demand was a deceit to prevent the muskets being given to the people. A general desire for the arrival of the British troops was now prevalent. The miserable people turned anxiously towards any quarter for aid, and this expression of conscious helplessness was given in evidence by the Spanish chiefs, and received as proof of enthusiasm by the English naval commanders, who were more sanguine of success than experience would warrant. All eyes were now turned towards the ocean; the French looked in fear, the Catalans in hope; and the British armament did appear off Palamos, but after three days spread its sails again and steered for Alicant, leaving the principality stupefied with grief and disappointment.

This unexpected event was the natural result of previous errors on all sides, errors which invariably attend warlike proceedings when not directed by a superior genius, and even then not always avoided. It has been shown how ministerial vacillation marred Lord William Bentinck's first intention of landing in person with ten or twelve thousand men on the Catalonian coast; and how, after much delay, Maitland had sailed to Palma with a division of six thousand men, Calabrians, Sicilians and others, troops of no likelihood save that some three thousand British and Germans were amongst them. This force was afterwards joined by vessels from Portugal, having engineers and artillery officers on board, and the honored battering-train which had shattered the gory walls of Badajos. Wellington hoped much from this expedition; he had himself sketched the general plan of operations; and his own campaign was conceived in the expectation that Lord William, a general of rank and reputation, having ten thousand good troops, aided with at least as many Spanish soldiers disciplined under the two British officers Whittingham and Roche, would have early fallen on Catalonia to the destruction of Suchet's plans. And when this his first hope was quashed, he still expected that a force would be disembarked of strength sufficient, in conjunction with the Catalan army, to take Tarragona.

Roche's corps was most advanced in discipline, but the Spanish government hesitated to place it under Maitland; it first sailed

from the islands to Murcia, then returned without orders, again repaired to Murcia, and at the moment of Maitland's arrival off Palamos was, under the command of Joseph O'Donnell, involved in a terrible catastrophe already alluded to, and hereafter to be particularly narrated. Whittingham's levy remained, but when inspected by the Quartermaster-General Donkin was found in a raw state,* scarcely mustering four thousand effective men, amongst which were many French deserters from the island of Cabrera. The sumptuous clothing and equipments of Whittingham's and Roche's men, their pay regularly supplied from the British subsidy, and very much exceeding that of the other Spanish corps, excited envy and dislike; there was no public inspection, no check upon the expenditure or the delivery of stores; and Roche's conduct in this last matter, justly or unjustly, was generally and severely impugned. Whittingham acknowledged that he could not trust his people near the enemy without the aid of British troops; and though the Captain-General Coupigny desired their departure, his opinion was against a descent in Catalonia. Maitland hesitated, but Sir Edward Pellew urged this descent so strongly that he finally assented, and reached Palamos with nine thousand men of all nations on the 31st of July, yet in some confusion as to the transport service, which the staff-officers attributed to the injudicious meddling of the naval chiefs.

Maitland's first care was to open a communication with the Spanish commanders. Eroles came on board at once, and vehemently and unceasingly urged an immediate disembarkation, declaring the fate of Catalonia and his own existence depended upon it;† the other generals showed less eagerness, and their accounts differed greatly with respect to the relative means of the Catalans and the French. Lacy estimated the enemy's disposable troops at fifteen thousand; his own at seven thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry, which he could with difficulty feed or provide with ammunition.‡ Sarsfield judged the French to be, exclusive of Suchet's movable column, eighteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry; he thought it rash to invest Tarragona with a less force, and that a free and constant communication with the fleet was absolutely essential in any operation. Eroles rated the enemy at thirteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, including Suchet's column; but the reports of the deserters gave twenty-two thousand infantry, exclusive of Suchet's column, and of the garrisons and migueletes in the enemy's service.

* General Donkin's Papers, MS.

† Notes by General Maitland, MS.

‡ Donkin, MSS.

No insurrection of the somatenes had yet taken place, nor was there any appearance of such an event; the French were descried conducting convoys along the shore with small escorts, and concentrating their troops for battle without molestation. The engineers demanded from six to ten days to reduce Tarragona after investment. Decaen and Maurice Mathieu were then near Montserrat with seven or eight thousand good troops, and could double them in a few days; the Catalans could not so soon join Maitland's force, and there was a general, apparently an unjust notion, abroad, that Lacy was a Frenchman at heart. It was feared the Toulon fleet might come out and burn the transports at their anchorage during the siege, and thus the battering-train, and even the safety of the army, would be involved in an enterprise promising little success. A full council of war was unanimous not to land, and the reluctance of the people to rise, attributed by Codrington to the machinations of traitors, was visible; Maitland also was further swayed by the generous and just consideration, that as the somatenes had not voluntarily taken arms, it would be cruel to excite them to such a step when a few days might oblige him to abandon them to the vengeance of the enemy. Wherefore, as Palamos appeared too strong for a sudden assault, the armament sailed towards Valencia to attack that place on a plan furnished by the Quartermaster-General Donkin, in unison also with Wellington's scheme of operations; but Maitland during the voyage changed his mind, and proceeded at once to Alicant.

The Catalans were not more displeased than the British naval commanders at seeing the principality thus shaken off; yet the judgment of the latter seems to have been swayed partly from having given stronger hopes of assistance than circumstances warranted, partly from that confidence which, inspired by continual success, is strength on their own element but rashness on shore. Captain Codrington, from the great interest he took in the struggle, was peculiarly discontented; yet his own description of the state of Catalonia at the time shows his hopes rested more on vague notions of the somatenes' enthusiasm, than on facts which a general could calculate upon.* Lord Wellington indeed said, he could see no reason why the plan he had recommended should not have been successful; an observation made however when he was angrily excited by the prospect of having Suchet on his own hands, and probably under some erroneous information. He had been deceived about the strength of the forts at Salamanca, although close to them; and as he had only just established a sure channel of intelligence in Catalonia, he might have been deceived

* Codrington, MSS.

as to Tarragona, which, if not strong in regular works, was well provided, commanded by a very bold, active governor, and offered very great resources for interior retrenchments.

Wellington's information as to the strength of the Catalans came indeed chiefly from Sir E. Pellew, and his from Eroles, who exaggerated. Maitland could scarcely be called a commander-in-chief, for Lord William forbade him to risk the loss of his division lest Sicily should be endangered; and to avoid mischief from the winter season he was instructed to quit the Spanish coast in the second week of September. Lord William and Lord Wellington were therefore not agreed in the object to be attained. The first considered the diversion on the Spanish coast as secondary to the wants of Sicily. Wellington looked only to the Peninsula, and thought Sicily in no danger until the French should reinforce their army in Calabria. Desiring vigorous combined efforts of military and naval forces, his plan was that Tarragona should be attacked—if it fell the warfare he said would be once more established on a good base in Catalonia—if it was succored by a concentration of French troops Valencia would necessarily be weak; the armament could then proceed to attack that place, and if unsuccessful could return to assail Tarragona again.

This was a shrewd plan, but Napoleon never lost sight of that great principle of war so concisely expressed by Sertorius, when he told Pompey a good general should look behind him rather than before. The Emperor, acting on the proverb that fortune favors the brave, often urged his lieutenants to dare desperately with a few men in front; but he invariably covered their communications with heavy masses, and there is no instance of his plan of invasion being shaken by a flank or rear attack, except where his instructions were neglected. His armies made what are called points, such as Massena's invasion of Portugal, Moncey's attack on Valencia, Dupont's on Andalusia; but the general plan of operation was invariably supported by heavy masses protecting the communications. Had his instructions sent from Dresden been strictly obeyed, the walls of Lerida and Tarragona would have been destroyed, and the citadels of each occupied with small garrisons easily provisioned for a long time. The field army would thus have been increased by at least three thousand men, the movable columns spared many harassing marches, and Catalonia would have offered little temptation for a descent.

But notwithstanding this error of Suchet, Maitland's troops were too few and ill-composed to invest Tarragona. The imperial muster-rolls give more than eighty thousand men, including Reille's divisions at Zaragoza, for the armies of Aragon and Cata-

lonia; twenty-seven thousand of the first, thirty-seven thousand of the second, were actually under arms with the eagles; wherefore to say that Decaen could have brought at once ten thousand men to the succor of Tarragona, and, by weakening his garrisons, as many more in a very short time, is not to overrate his power; and this without counting Paris's brigade, three thousand strong, which belonged to Reille's division and was disposable. Suchet had just before come to Reus with two thousand select men of all arms, and as O'Donnell's army had since been defeated near Alicante, he could have returned with a still greater force to oppose Maitland. Now the English fleet was descried by the French off Palamos on the evening of the 31st of July, although it did not anchor before the 1st of August; Decaen and Maurice Mathieu, with some eight thousand disposable men, were then between Montserrat and Barcelona, that is to say, two marches from Tarragona; Lamarque with four or five thousand was between Palamos and Mataro, five marches from Tarragona; Quesnel with a like number was in the Cerdaña, seven marches off; Suchet and Paris could have arrived in less than eight days, and from the garrisons and minor posts smaller succors might have been drawn: Tortosa alone could have furnished two thousand. But Lacy's division was at Vich, Sarsfield's at Villa Franca, Eroles' divided between Montserrat and Urgel, Milan's in the Grao d'Olot; they required five days to assemble, they would not have exceeded seven thousand, and with their disputing captious generals would have been unfit to act vigorously; nor could they have easily joined the allies without fighting, when their defeat would have been almost certain.

Sarsfield judged ten days necessary to reduce Tarragona, and said the army must be entirely fed from the fleet, as the country could scarcely supply the Catalonian troops alone. Maitland therefore would have had to land his men, battering-train and stores, and form his investment in the face of Decaen's power, or, following the rules of war, have defeated that General first. But Decaen's troops, numerically equal without reckoning the garrison of Tarragona, were in composition vastly superior to the allies, seeing that only the British and German troops, three thousand, were to be depended upon in battle: neither does it appear that platforms, sand-bags, fascines and other materials were on board the vessels. Maitland indeed would, if he had been able to resist Decaen at first, which seems doubtful, have effected a great diversion, and Wellington's object would have been gained if a re-embarkation had been secure; but the naval officers, having reference to the nature of the coast, declared that it was not so.

The soundness of this opinion has however been disputed by many seamen well acquainted with the coast, who maintain, that even in winter the Catalonian shore is remarkably safe and tranquil; and that Cape Salou, a place in other respects admirably adapted for a camp, gives facility for re-embarking on one or other of its sides in any weather. To Maitland the coast of Catalonia was represented as unsafe, and this view of the question is also supported by able seamen likewise acquainted with that sea.

OPERATIONS IN MURCIA.

The Anglo-Sicilian armament arrived at Alicant at a critical moment; the Spanish cause was there going to ruin. Joseph O'Donnell, brother to the Regent, had with great difficulty organized a new Murcian army after Blake's surrender at Valencia. Having Alicant and Carthagenas as a base, he was independent of a division under Freire, which always hung on the frontier of Granada, and communicated through the Alpuxaras with the sea-coast. Suchet and Soult were paralyzed in some degree by the neighborhood of these armies, which were supported by fortresses, supplied by sea from Gibraltar to Cadiz, and had their existence guaranteed by Wellington's march into Spain, by his victory of Salamanca, and by his general combinations. For the two French commanders were forced to watch his movements, and to support at the same time, the one a blockade of the Isla de Leon, the other the fortresses in Catalonia; hence they were in no condition to follow up the prolonged operations necessary to destroy these Murcian armies, which were moreover supported by the arrival of General Ross with British troops at Carthagenas.

O'Donnell had been joined by Roche in July, and Suchet, after detaching Maupoint's brigade towards Madrid, departed himself with two thousand men for Catalonia, leaving Harispe with four thousand men beyond the Xucar. Ross immediately advised O'Donnell to attack him, and to distract his attention a large fleet with troops on board, which had originally sailed from Cadiz to succor Ballesteros at Malaga, now appeared off the Valencian coast. At the same time Bassecour and Villa Campa, being free to act in consequence of Palombini's and Maupoint's departure for Madrid, came down from their haunts in the mountains of Albaracin upon the right flank and rear of the French positions.* Villa Campa penetrated to Liria, Bassecour to Cofrentes on the Xucar; but ere this attack could take place, Suchet with his usual celerity returned from Reus. At first he detached men against Villa Campa, but when he saw the fleet, fearing it was the Sicilian armament,

* Plan 6.

he recalled them again, and sent for Paris's brigade from Zaragoza, to act by Teruel against Bassecour and Villa Campa. Then he concentrated his own forces at Valencia, but a storm drove the fleet off the coast, and meanwhile O'Donnell's operations brought on the

FIRST BATTLE OF CASTALLA.

Harispe's posts were established at Biar, Castalla, and Onil on his right; at Ibi and Alcoy on his left. This line was not more than one march from Alicant. Colonel Mesclop, with a regiment of infantry and some cuirassiers, held Ibi, and was supported by Harispe himself, with a reserve at Alcoy. General Delort was at Castalla with a regiment of infantry, having some cuirassiers at Onil on his left, and a regiment of dragoons, with three companies of foot, at Biar on his right. In this exposed situation the French awaited O'Donnell, who directed his principal force, consisting of six thousand infantry, seven hundred cavalry, and eight guns, against Delort; Roche, with three thousand men, was to move through the mountains of Xixona, so as to fall upon Ibi simultaneously with the attack at Castalla.* O'Donnell hoped thus to cut the French line, and during these operations, Bassecour, with two thousand men, was to come down from Cofrentes to Villena on the right flank of Delort.† Roche marched the night of the 19th, remained the 20th in the mountains, next night threaded a difficult pass eight miles long, reached Ibi at daybreak on the 21st, and sent notice of his arrival to O'Donnell; and when that General appeared in front of Delort the latter abandoned Castalla, which was situated in the same valley as Ibi, and about five miles distant from it.‡ But he only retired skirmishing to a strong ridge behind that town, which also extended behind Ibi;§ this secured his communication with Mesclop, of whom he demanded succor, and at the same time he called in his own cavalry and infantry from Onil and Biar. Mesclop, leaving some infantry, two guns, and his cuirassiers, to defend Ibi and a small fort on the hill behind it, marched at once towards Delort, and thus Roche, finding only a few men before him, got possession of the town after a sharp skirmish, yet he could not take the fort.

O'Donnell, advancing beyond Castalla, only skirmished with the French, for he had detached the Spanish cavalry by the plains of Villena to turn their right and communicate with Bassecour. While expecting the effects of this movement, he was astonished

* Plan 5.

† Suchet's Correspondence, MS.

‡ Roche's Correspondence, MS.

§ Delort's Report, MS.

to see the French dragoons come trotting through the pass of Biar on his left flank ; they were followed by some companies of infantry, and only separated from him by a stream, over which was a narrow bridge without parapets, and at the same moment the cuirassiers appeared on the other side, coming from Onil. The Spanish cavalry had not interrupted this march from Biar, nor followed it through the defile, nor made any effort.* O'Donnell turned two guns against the bridge, supporting them with a battalion of infantry, but the French dragoons, observing this battalion to be unsteady, braved the fire of the guns, and riding furiously over the bridge seized the battery and then broke the infantry. Delort's line advanced at the same moment, the cuirassiers charged into the town of Castalla, and the whole Spanish army fled outright. Several hundred sought refuge in an old castle and there surrendered ; of the others, three thousand were killed, wounded, or taken, yet the victors had scarcely fifteen hundred men engaged, and did not lose two hundred. O'Donnell attributed his defeat to the disobedience and inactivity of St. Estevan, who commanded his cavalry, but the great fault was the placing that cavalry beyond the defile of Biar, instead of keeping it in hand for the battle.

This part of the action over, Mesclop, who had not taken any share in it, was reinforced and returned to succor Ibi, to which place also Harispe was now approaching from Alcoy ; but Roche, favored by the strength of the passes, escaped and reached Alicant with little hurt, while the remains of O'Donnell's divisions, pursued by the cavalry on the road of Jumilla, fled to the city of Murcia. Bassecour, who had advanced to Almanza, was then driven back to his mountain haunts, where Villa Campa rejoined him. It was at this moment that Maitland's armament disembarked and the remnants of the Spanish force rallied. The King, then flying from Madrid, immediately changed the direction of his march from the Morena to Valencia, giving one more proof that England, not Spain, resisted the French ; for Alicant would have fallen, if not as an immediate consequence of this defeat, yet surely when the King's army had joined Suchet. That General, who had heard of the battle of Salamanca, the evacuation of Madrid, the approach of Joseph, and now saw a fresh army springing up in his front, hastened to concentrate his disposable force in the positions of San Felipe de Xativa and Moxente, which he intrenched, as well as the road to Almanza, with a view to secure his junction with the King. At the same time he established a new bridge and bridgehead at Alberique, in addition to that at Alcira on the Xucar ; and having called up Paris from Teruel and Maupoint from Cuença,

* Appendix 15.

resolved to abide a battle for which the slowness of his adversaries gave him full time to prepare.

Maitland arrived the 7th, and though his force was not all landed before the 11th, the French were still scattered on various points, and a vigorous commander would have found the means to drive them over the Xucar, and perhaps from Valencia itself; but he had scarcely set foot on shore when the usual Spanish vexations overwhelmed him. Three principal roads led towards the enemy. One on the left passed through Yecla and Fuente la Higuera, and by it the remnant of O'Donnell's army was coming up from Murcia; another passed through Elda, Sax, Villena, and Fuente de la Higuera; the third through Xixona, Alcoy, and Albayda. O'Donnell, whose existence as a general was redeemed by the appearance of Maitland, instantly demanded from the latter a pledge, that he would draw nothing by purchase or requisition, save wine and straw, from any of these lines, nor from the country between them: the English General assented, and instantly sunk under the difficulties thus created. He had designed to attack Harispe at Alcoy and Ibi on the 13th or 14th, but he was only able to get one march from Alicant so late as the 16th, and could not attack before the 18th, but that day Suchet had concentrated his army at Xativa. This delay had been a necessary consequence of the agreement with O'Donnell. For Maitland's commissariat being inefficient, and his field-artillery so shamefully ill-prepared in Sicily as to be nearly useless, he had hired mules at a great expense for the transport of his guns and provisions from Alicant, but the owners soon declared they could not fulfil their contract unless they were fed by the British, and this was barred by O'Donnell's restrictions as to the roads. Many of the muleteers also, after receiving their money, deserted with mules and provisions; and a convoy with six days' supply, being attacked by a partida, was plundered, dispersed, and lost.

Maitland, having no habitude of command, and suffering from illness, disgusted, and fearing for his troops, would have retired at once, perhaps have re-embarked, if Suchet had not gone back to Xativa; then, however, he advanced to Elda, and Roche entered Alcoy, both apparently without an object; for there was no intention of fighting, and the next day Roche retired to Xixona, and Maitland retreated to Alicant. To cover this retreat, Donkin pushed forward with a detachment of Spanish and English cavalry, through Sax, Ibi, and Alcoy, and giving out that an advanced guard of five thousand British was close behind him, coasted all the French line, captured a convoy at Olleria, and then returned through Alcoy. Suchet kept his camp of Xativa, but sent Harispe

to meet the King, who was now near Almanza, and on the 25th the junction of the two armies was effected; at the same time, Maupoint, escaping Villa Campa's assault, arrived from Cuenca with the remnant of his brigade. When Joseph arrived, Suchet pushed his outposts again to Villena and Alcoy; but, naturally a courtier, he was so much occupied with royalty as to neglect the allies, when he might have seriously hurt them. Meantime, O'Donnell, having drawn off Freire's division from Lorca, came to Yecla with five or six thousand men, and Maitland, reinforced with detachments from Sicily, commenced fortifying a camp outside Alicant. But his health was quite broken, and he earnestly desired to resign, being filled with anxiety at the near approach of Soult. That Marshal had abandoned Andalusia, and his manner of doing so shall be set forth in the next chapter, for it was a great event, leading to great results, and worthy of deep consideration by those who desire to know upon what the fate of kingdoms may depend.

CHAPTER II.

Operations in Andalusia—The King orders Soult to abandon that province—Soult urges the King to join him with the other armies—Joseph reiterates the order to abandon Andalusia—Soult sends a letter to the Minister of War expressing his suspicions that Joseph was about to make a separate peace with the allies—The King intercepts this letter, and sends Colonel Desprez to Moscow to represent Soult's conduct to the Emperor—Napoleon's magnanimity—Wellington anxiously watches Soult's movements—Orders Hill to fight Drouet, and directs General Cooke to attack the French lines in front of the Isla de Leon—Ballesteros, pursued by Leval and Villatte, skirmishes at Coin—Enters Malaga—Soult's preparations to abandon Andalusia—Lines before the Isla de Leon abandoned—Soult marches towards Granada—Colonel Skerrett and Cruz Murgeon land at Huelva—Attack the French rear-guard at Seville—Drouet marches upon Huescar—Soult moving by the mountains reaches Hellin, and effects his junction with the King and Suchet—Maitland desires to return to Sicily—Wellington prevents him—Wellington's general plans considered—State of affairs in Castile—Clausel comes down to Valladolid with the French army—Santocildes retires to Torrelabaton, and Clinton falls back to Arevalo—Foy marches to carry off the French garrisons in Leon—Astorga surrenders before his arrival—He marches to Zamora, and drives Silveira into Portugal—Menaces Salamanca—Is recalled by Clausel—The partidas get possession of the French posts on the Biscay coast—Take the city of Bilbao—Reille abandons several posts in Aragon—The northern provinces become ripe for insurrection.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

SUCHET found resources in Valencia to support the King's court and army without augmenting the pressure on the inhabitants, and a counter-stroke could have been made against the allies if the

French commanders had been of one mind and looked well to the state of affairs. Joseph, exasperated by the previous opposition of the generals and troubled by the distress of numerous Spanish families attached to him, was only intent upon recovering Madrid as soon as he could collect troops enough to give Wellington battle; he had in this view demanded from the French Minister of War, money, stores, and a reinforcement of forty thousand men, and imperatively commanded Soult to abandon Andalusia: That clear-sighted commander could not however understand why the King, who had given him no accurate details of Marmont's misfortunes or of his own operations, should yet order him to abandon at once all the results and all the interests springing from three years' possession of the south of Spain. He thought it a great question not to be treated lightly, and as his vast capacity enabled him to embrace the whole field of operations, he concluded that rumor had exaggerated the catastrophe at Salamanca, and to abandon Andalusia would be the ruin of the French cause.*

"To march on Madrid," he said, "would probably produce another pitched battle, which should be carefully avoided, seeing the whole frame-work of the French invasion was disjoined and no resource would remain after a defeat. Andalusia, hitherto a burthen, now offered means to remedy the present disasters, and to sacrifice that province with all its resources for the sake of regaining the capital of Spain appeared a folly: it was purchasing a town at the price of a kingdom. Madrid was nothing in the Emperor's policy, though it might be something for a King of Spain; yet Philip the Fifth had thrice lost it and preserved his throne. Why then should Joseph set such a value upon that city? The battle of the Arapiles was merely a grand duel which might be fought again with a different result; but to abandon Andalusia with all its stores and establishments,—to raise the blockade of Cadiz,—to sacrifice the guns, the equipments, the hospitals and the magazines, and render null the labors of three years, would be to make the battle of the Arapiles a prodigious historical event, the effect of which would be felt all over Europe and even in the new world. And how was this flight from Andalusia to be safely effected? The army of the south had been able to hold in check sixty thousand enemies disposed on a circuit round it; but the moment it commenced its retreat towards Toledo those sixty thousand men would unite to follow, and Wellington himself would be found on the Tagus in its front. On that line the army of the south could not march, and a retreat through Murcia would be long and difficult. But why

* Appendix 3. Joseph's Papers, MS.