

the Olivo, killed and wounded two hundred men, and the next day a fruitless attempt was made to retake the lost ground; at the same time the fleet under Captain Codrington, consisting of three English ships of the line and three frigates, besides sloops and Spanish vessels of war, cannonaded the French right, and harassed their convoys then coming by the coast-road from the Col de Balagner. The investing troops, whose posts were very close to the Olivo, were also greatly incommoded by the heavy fire from that outwork, yet the line was maintained and perfected.

Habert's division, forming the right wing, extended from the sea to the bridge of the Francoli; General Frere's division connected Habert with Harispe's, whose troops occupied the ground before the Olivo; the Italian division prolonged Harispe's left to the road of Barcelona, which runs close to the sea on the east side of Tarragona; three regiments were placed in reserve higher up on the Francoli, where a trestle bridge was cast, and the parc, which was established on the right of that river, at the village of Canonja, contained sixty-six battering-guns and mortars, each furnished with seven hundred rounds. There were also thirty-six field pieces, two thousand artillery-men to serve the guns, seven hundred sappers and miners, fourteen hundred cavalry, and nearly fifteen thousand infantry. The head-quarters were fixed at the village of Constanti, a strong covering position, the dépôt at Reus was secured by fortified convents, and the works at Mora were defended by several battalions. Other troops, placed at Falcet, guarded the communications, which were farther secured by the escorts belonging to the convoys; and the French had cut off the water of the aqueducts from the Olivo, but this water, whose source was ten or twelve miles off, was also necessary to the besiegers on that sterile land, and was again cut off by the Somatenes, which obliged the French to guard its whole course during the siege.

Meanwhile Campo Verde, after his defeat at Figueras, had sent Sarsfield and Eroles to their former posts near Valls, Momblanch, and Igualada, and embarking at Mattaro himself, with four thousand men, came on the 10th to Tarragona, where the sudden appearance of the French had produced great consternation. Yet when Campo Verde arrived with this reinforcement, and when Colonel Green, the English military agent, arrived on the 15th from Cadiz; in the Merope, bringing with him fifty thousand dollars and two transports laden with arms and stores, Spanish apathy again prevailed, and the necessary measures of defence were neglected. Beyond the walls, however, the French post at Momblanch was attacked by two thousand Miguelètes, and the Somatenes assembled in the vicinity of Reus.*

* Appendix 5, § 1.

Suchet detached General Frere with four battalions to relieve the former place, where the attack had failed; the commandant of Reus also dispersed the Somatenes, and meanwhile Harispe pushed his patrols over the Gaya as far as Torre de Barra, where he found some wounded Spaniards. These men were within the protection of a convention, made by St. Cyr with Reding, by which the wounded men of both armies were to be left in the civil hospitals of the different towns, and mutually taken care of, without being made prisoners; and it is remarkable that this compact was scrupulously executed on both sides, while beyond those hospitals the utmost ferocity and a total disregard of civilized usages prevailed.

Sarsfield's arrival near Momb Blanch threatened the communications between Reus and Mora, and at the same time a Valencian column, acting in concert with Captain Adam of the Invincible, attacked the posts of Rapita and Amposta; the former was abandoned by the garrison, and the latter was surrounded by the Valencians, but a regiment sent from Tortosa, after disengaging Amposta, defeated the Valencians near Rapita; nevertheless Suchet, unwilling to lessen his already too small force, did not restore the latter post.

SIEGE OF TARRAGONA.

The French General, having resolved to attack the lower town, commenced his operations by constructing a fort and batteries, on the right of the Francoli, near the sea-shore, with a view to keep the English ships of war and the gun-boats at a distance from his projected trenches. These works, commenced in the night of the 7th, were successfully continued towards the mouth of the river under the fire of the vessels; a trench, lined with musketeers, was also carried from the left along the bank of the river to the bridge, but the Spaniards continually harassed the investing troops both from within and from without, and made some attempts against the camp; wherefore the brigade of General Salme, which was close to the Olivo, was obliged to intrench, and yet lost fifty or sixty men daily by the enemy's skirmishers.

On the night of the 13th, during a tempest, the French stormed two external intrenchments near the Olivo, and then turned them against the besieged; the next morning a vigorous attempt to retake them was repulsed with a loss of one hundred men, and on the Francoli side, a sally supported by the shipping failed in consequence of the cowardice of some Spanish officers. On the same day, besides this attack on the side of the Francoli, the garrison came out from the Barcelona gate, and six hundred Somatenes

from the upper Gaya fell on the patrols of the Italian division, whereupon Palombini secured the country on the 15th as far as Arbos.*

The 18th a powerful sortie from the lower town was made by Gonzales, who passed the bridge, and aided by a fire from the place, from the Olivo, and from the fleet, pressed Habert's division hard; Suchet however came down with his reserve, pushed between the river and the Olivo, and menaced the Spanish line of retreat, which obliged Gonzales to retire with loss. On the 20th three other sallies were made from the Olivo, and from the upper town, on the Barcelona side, but they were all in like manner repulsed; and that day Sarsfield took post with twelve hundred men on a high and rugged place near Alcover, thus menacing the dépôt at Reus. The French General therefore detached two battalions of infantry and some cavalry, under General Broussard, to dislodge him, which was effected with a loss of a hundred French; but three days later he appeared before Momblanch, and was only driven away by the united brigades of Frere and Palombini, who marched against him. Divers attempts were also made upon the line of Falcet, especially at Grattalopes, where the Spanish Colonel Villamil having attacked Morozinski, a Pole, the latter defended himself successfully, and with a bravery that has always distinguished the people of that heroic nation; a nation whose glory springs like an *ignis fatuus* from the corruption of European honor!

These repeated attacks having warned Suchet how difficult it would be to maintain, with his weak army, so great an extent of communication, he abandoned his post at Momblanch, and contented himself with preserving the lines of Falcet and of Felipe de Balaguer; a measure the more necessary, that the garrison of Tarragona was now greatly augmented: for on the 16th, the Blake had sailed for Valencia to seek reinforcements, and Carlos O'Donnell, who had succeeded Bassecour, gave him above two thousand infantry and two hundred cannoneers, who were safely landed at Tarragona on the 22d, two thousand stand of arms being, in return, delivered by Captain Codrington to O'Donnell, to equip-fresh levies. About twelve thousand men were thus collected in the fortress, but all the richest citizens had moved with their families and effects to Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and the people were dispirited.

Suchet broke ground before the Olivo in the night of the 21st, and carried on his approaches from both ends of the Spanish intrenchments which he had seized on the night of the 13th. His engineers wished to reach a round hill, close to the works, on which they proposed to plant their first breaching battery, and they

* Apper dix 5, § 1.

crowned it on the 22d, but with much loss, being obliged to carry the earth for the work up the hill in baskets, and they were continually interrupted by sallies. Three counter-batteries were, however, completed and armed on the 27th with thirteen pieces, of which six threw shells; but to effect this, the soldiers dragged the artillery over the rocks, under a heavy fire of grape, and the garrison, making a vigorous sally, killed General Salme, when he opposed them with the reserves.* The moment was dangerous to the French, but they were finally victorious, and the fire of the batteries having opened the same morning, was sustained until the evening of the 29th, when a breach being formed, the assault was ordered.

STORMING OF THE OLIVO.

Upon the success of this attack, Suchet thought, and with reason, that his chance of taking the town would depend, seeing that his army was too feeble to bear any serious check. Wherefore, having formed his columns of assault, he personally encouraged them, and at the same time directed the troops along the whole line of investment to advance simultaneously, and menace every part of the town. The night was dark, and the Spaniards were unexpected of an attack, because none of their guns had yet been silenced; but the French, full of hope and resolution, were watching for the signal. When that was given, the troops on the Francoli, and those on the Barcelona side, made a sudden discharge of musketry, beat all their drums, and with loud shouts approached the town at those opposite quarters; the rampart of the place was instantly covered with fire from within and from without; the ships in the offing threw up rockets, and amidst the noise of four hundred guns, the storming columns rushed upon the Olivo.

The principal force made for the breach; but a second column, turning the fort, got between it and the town, at the moment when fifteen hundred men, sent to relieve the old garrison, were entering the gates. Some of the French instantly fell on their rear, which hurrying forward, gave an opportunity to the assailants to penetrate with them before the gates could be closed, and thirty sappers with hatchets having followed closely, endeavored to break the door, while Papignay, their officer, attempted to climb over the wall; the Spaniards killed him and most of the sappers, but the other troops planted their ladders to the right and left, and cutting through the pointed stakes above, entered the place and opened the gate.†

* Suchet.

† Suchet. Vacani.

At the main attack the French boldly assailed the narrow breach, but the ditch was fifteen feet deep, the Spaniards firm, and the fire heavy, and they were giving way, when the historian, Vacani, followed by some of his countrymen, (it is a strange error to think the Italians have not a brave spirit!) cut down the paling which blocked the subterranean passage of the aqueduct, and thus got into the ditch and afterwards into the fort. Then the Spaniards were driven from the ramparts on all sides, back to the little works of refuge, before noticed, as being at each end of the Olivo, from whence they fired both musketry and guns; but the French and Italian reserves, followed by Harispe with a third column, now entered the place, and with a terrible slaughter ended the contest. Twelve hundred men perished, some escaped, a thousand were taken, and amongst them their commander, who had received ten wounds.

In the morning three thousand Spaniards came out of Tarragona, yet retired without attacking, and Suchet demanded a suspension of arms to dispose of the dead; this was, however, treated with scorn, and the heaps were burned, for the sterile rocks afforded no earth to bury them. Campo Verde now gave General Senens de Contreras the command of Tarragona, and went himself to the field-army, which was about ten thousand strong, including some new levies made by the Junta of Catalonia.

Suchet's investment having been precipitated by the fall of Figueras, his stores were not all collected until the 1st of June, when trenches were opened to embrace the whole of the lower town, including the fort of Francoli and its chain of connecting works running along the sea-shore; that is to say, 1. The Nun's bastion and a half-moon called the King's, which formed, on the Spanish right, a sort of hornwork to the royal fort or citadel. 2. The bastion of San Carlos and a half-moon called the Prince's, which stood on the left, in the retiring angle where the sea-line joined the body of the place, and served as a counter-guard to the bastion of San Carlos. 3. The sea-line itself and the Francoli fort.

The 2d of June, the besieged made a fruitless sally, and in the night of the 3d, some advanced Spanish intrenchments were destroyed by the French. Sarsfield then entered Tarragona with a detachment, and took the command of what was called the Port, which included the Mole, the works leading to the Francoli, and the suburb or lower town, Contreras still remaining governor of all, although reluctantly, for he expected no success.

In the night of the 4th, the approaches were carried forward by the sap, the second parallel was commenced, and on the 6th, the besiegers were within twenty yards of the Francoli fort, which had

a wet ditch, and was of regular construction. The breaching batteries, which had been armed as the trenches proceeded, opened their fire against it on the 7th. The fresh masonry crumbled away rapidly, and at ten o'clock that night, the fort being entirely destroyed, three hundred chosen men in three columns, one of which forded the Francoli river, attacked the ruins, and the defenders retired fighting towards the half-moon of the Prince. The assailants then made a disorderly attempt to enter with them, but were quickly repulsed with a loss of fifty men, yet the lodgment was under a heavy fire secured; and the next night a battery of six pieces was constructed there, with a view to silence the guns of the Mole, which, together with that of the place, endeavored to overwhelm the small space, thus occupied, with shot.

In the nights of the 8th and 9th, under terrible discharges from both the upper and lower town, the second parallel was prolonged to fort Francoli on the right, and on the left, carried to within seventy yards of the Nun's bastion.

The 11th, Sarsfield making a sally, killed some men, and retarded the works; but before the 15th, three approaches by the sap were conducted against the Nun's bastion, where the besiegers crowned the glacis, and against the half-moon of the King and Prince. Fresh batteries were also constructed, whose fire embraced the whole front from the Prince to the Nun's bastion.

On the morning of the 16th, fifty-four guns opened from the French batteries, and the Spaniards placing sand-bags along the parapets, endeavored by musketry to kill the gunners, who were much exposed, while all the cannon of the place which could be directed upon the trenches were employed to crush the batteries. Towards evening this fire had in a great degree mastered that of the besiegers, destroyed the centre of their second parallel, and silenced a battery on their right; but the loss and damage was great on both sides, for two consumption magazines exploded in the town, and the Nun's bastion was breached. The engineers also observed that the ditch of the Prince was not carried round to the sea, and hence Suchet, who feared a continuation of this murderous artillery battle, resolved to storm that point at once, hoping to enter by the defect in the ditch.

At nine o'clock, two columns, supported by a reserve, issued from the trenches, and, after a short resistance, entered the work, both by the gap of the ditch and by escalade; the garrison fought well, and were put to the sword, a few only escaping along the quay. These were pursued by a party of the French, who, passing a ditch and drawbridge which cut off the road from the bastion of San Carlos, endeavored to maintain themselves there, but being unsuccess-

ported, were mostly destroyed. The lodgment thus made was immediately secured and included in the trenches.

During the night of the 17th, the old batteries were repaired, and the construction of a new one, to breach the bastion of San Carlos, was begun upon the half-moon of the Prince; the saps and other approaches were also pushed forward, a lodgment was effected in the covered way of the Nun's bastion, and the third parallel was commenced; but on the right of the trenches, in advance of the Prince, the workmen came upon water, which obliged them to desist at that point.

The 18th, the third parallel was completed, and the descent of the ditch at the Nun's bastion was commenced by an under-ground gallery; yet the fire from the upper town plunged into the trenches, and thirty-seven shells, thrown very exactly into the lodgment on the counterscarp, obliged the besiegers to relinquish their operations there during the day. At this time also the gun-boats, which hitherto had been of little service in the defence, were put under the direction of the British navy, and worked with more effect; yet it does not appear that the enemy ever suffered much injury from the vessels of war, beyond the interruption sometimes given to their convoys on the Col de Balaguer road.

During the nights of the 19th and 20th all the French works were advanced, and the morning of the 21st the new battery in the Prince being ready, opened its fire against San Carlos, and was followed by all the other batteries. The explosion of an expense magazine silenced the Prince's battery after a few rounds; the damage was, however, repaired, and at four o'clock in the evening, nearly all the Spanish guns being overcome and the breaches enlarged, Suchet resolved to storm the lower town. But previous to describing this terrible event, it is necessary to notice the proceedings within and without the place, that a just idea of the actual state of affairs on both sides may be formed.

Macdonald had continued the blockade of Figueras with unceasing vigilance; and as the best of the Migueletes were shut up there, and as the defeat of Campo Verde on the 3d of May had spread consternation throughout the province, the operations to relieve it were confined to such exertions as Rovira, Manso, and other chiefs could call forth. In like manner Francisco Milans was left in the Hostalrich district, and by his local popularity amongst the people of the coast between Palamos and Barcelona, was enabled to keep up an irregular force; but his object was to be made Captain-General of the province, and his desire of popularity, or some other motive, led him to favor the towns of his district at the expense of the general cause. Mattaro and Villa Nueva

de Sitjes trafficked in corn with Barcelona, and one of their secret convoys was detected at a later period passing the outposts with Milans' written authority. He put the men to death who permitted the convoy to pass, but he did not succeed in removing the suspicion of corruption from himself.* This traffic was very advantageous for the French, and Maurice Mathieu being either unwilling to disturb it, or that having recently suffered in a skirmish at Mattaro, he feared to risk his troops, made no movement to aid the siege of Tarragona, which, it would appear, he might have done, by taking possession of Villa Nueva de Sitjes.

Such was the state of eastern Catalonia, and in the western parts, the infantry of Sarsfield and of Eroles, who had come down to the vicinity of Valls, and the cavalry under Caro, which was a thousand strong, formed, with the new levies ordered by the Junta, an army of seven or eight thousand men. This force might have done much if Campo Verde, a man of weak character, and led by others, had not continually changed his plans. At the opening of the siege, Sarsfield had acted, as we have seen, with some success on the side of Momblanch and Reus; but when he was sent into the lower town, the active army being reduced to Eroles' division, the cavalry could do no more than supply small detachments to watch the different French convoys and posts. Campo Verde, however, fixed his quarters at Igualada, sent detachments to the Gaya and Villa Franca, and holding Villa Nueva de Sitjes as his post of communication with the fleet, demanded assistance from Murcia and Valencia, and formed a general plan for the succor of the place. But in Tarragona his proceedings were viewed with dislike, and discord and negligence were rendering the courage of the garrison of no avail.

We have seen that Captain Codrington landed two thousand five hundred Valencians on the 22d of May; besides that reinforcement, vessels loaded with powder and other stores, and additional mortars for the batteries, came from Carthagená and from Cadiz in the beginning of June. From Murcia also came reinforcements; but such was the perversity of some authorities, and the want of arrangement in all, that the arms of these men were taken away from them before they sailed; and yet in Tarragona there were already two thousand men without arms, a folly attributed by some to the Spanish authorities of Murcia, by others to Colonel Roche, the English military agent.† Nor did the confusion end here; for Captain Codrington, when he sailed from Tarragona to Peniscola in the latter end of May, supplied O'Donnell with arms for two thousand recruits, who were to replace the Valencians then embarked; and a few days afterwards he delivered so many more at

* Appendix 5, § 4.

† Ibid. § 1.

the city of Valencia that Villa Campa and the Empecinado, whose troops, after their dispersion in April by Abbé and Paris, had remained inactive, were enabled again to take the field. Thus it appears that, while men were sent without arms from Valencia to Tarragona, arms were being conveyed from the latter place to Valencia.*

The troops in Tarragona had, by these different reinforcements, been augmented to near seventeen thousand men; however, that number was never available at one time, for the Murcians were sent to Montserrat to be armed, and the losses during the operations, including those caused by sickness, had reduced the garrison at this period to less than twelve thousand.† Several colonels of regiments, and many other officers, feigning sickness, or with open cowardice running away, had quitted the town, leaving their battalions to be commanded by captains; the general of artillery was incapable, and Contreras himself, unknown to the inhabitants, unacquainted with the place or its resources, was vacillating and deceitful to those serving under him. He was very unwilling to undertake the defence, and he was at variance with Campo Verde outside, and jealous of Sarsfield inside. In the fleet also some disagreement occurred between Captain Codrington and Captain Bullen, and the commanders of the Diana and Prueba, Spanish ships of war, were accused of gross misconduct.

Carlos O'Donnell and his brother, the Conde de Abispa, at the desire of Captain Codrington, had permitted Miranda to embark with four thousand of the best Valencian troops for Tarragona, there to join in a grand sally; but they exacted from Codrington a pledge to bring those who survived back, for they would not suffer this, their second aid in men, to be shut up in the place when the object was effected. These troops landed the 12th at Tarragona, yet the next day, at Campo Verde's order, Miranda, instead of making a sally, as had been projected, carried them off by the sea to Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and from thence marched to meet a detachment of horse coming from Villa Franca; and on the 15th two squadrons of cavalry, issuing from Tarragona by the Barcelona gate, passed the French line of investment without difficulty, and also joined Miranda, who then marched to unite with Campo Verde at Igualada.

This movement was in pursuance of a grand plan to succor the place; for the Junta of Catalonia, having quitted Tarragona after the fall of the Olivo, repaired with the archives to Montserrat, and as usual, made their clamors for succor ring throughout the Peninsula: they had received promises of co-operation from O'Donnell,

* Appendix 5, § 1.

† Report of Contreras.

from Villa Campa, and from the partisans, and Campo Verde proposed that the English ships of war should keep between the Col de Balaguer and Tarragona, to cannonade the French convoys on that route; that a detachment should take post at Ordal, to watch the garrison at Barcelona, and that he, with the remainder of his forces, which, including Miranda's division, amounted to ten thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry, should take some commanding position near Reus. In this situation he designed to send a detachment towards San Felipe de Balaguer to communicate with the fleet, and, avoiding any serious action, to operate by small corps against the French line of supply, and thus oblige them to raise the siege, or if they came out of their lines, to fight them in strong positions.

Contreras treated this plan with contempt. He said it would cause the loss both of the place and of the army; that the French would not raise the siege except for a general battle, and that within their lines the best mode of fighting them would be in concert with the garrison; wherefore he desired the General-in-chief to attack them in conjunction with himself, and the Junta, who were at variance with Campo Verde, backed this proposal.

Neither of these plans, however, appears sound; for though it is certain, that if the generals could have depended upon their troops, such was the reduced state of Suchet's force, and so extensive was his line of investment, that it would have been easy to break through, yet unless the French were put entirely to the rout, which was unlikely, no great advantage would have followed, because the communication was already open by sea. On the other hand, Campo Verde's plan was only proposed on the 13th, and would have been too slow for the critical nature of the case. It would have been more in accord with that great maxim of war, which prescribes the *attack of an enemy's weakest point, with the greatest possible numbers*, to have marched with his whole force upon Mora, or upon Reus, to beat the troops there and destroy the dépôts; and then seizing some strong posts on the hills close to the besieger's lines, to have intrenched it and operated daily and hourly against their rear. If Campo Verde had destroyed either of these dépôts, the siege must have been raised; and if he was unable to beat two or three thousand infantry at those places, he could not hope, even with the assistance of the garrison, to destroy sixteen thousand of all arms in the intrenchments before Tarragona. Suchet did not fear a battle on the Francoli river; but so tender was he of the dépôts, that when Campo Verde sent an officer to raise the Somatenes about Mora, he called Abbé with three thousand infantry from Teruel, and that General, who was active and experienced in the guerilla warfare,

soon dispersed the Spanish levies, and took their chief with many other prisoners, after which he joined the besieging army.

Suchet required this reinforcement. He had lost a general, two hundred inferior officers, and above two thousand five hundred men during the siege, and had not more than twelve thousand infantry fit for duty; but Colonel Villamil, a partisan of Campo Verde's, taking advantage of Abbé's absence, marched with a thousand men to attack Mora, and being beaten on the 16th was succeeded by Eroles, who came with his whole division to Falcet on the 20th, and captured a convoy of loaded mules, driving back the escort with some loss to Mora. The design was to tempt Suchet to send a strong detachment in pursuit of Eroles, in which case the latter was by a rapid march to rejoin Campo Verde near Alcover, when the whole army was to attack Suchet thus weakened. However, the French General would not turn from his principal object, and his magazines at Reus were still so full that the loss of the convoy did not seriously affect him.

Such was the situation of affairs on the 21st of June, when the order to assault the lower town was given to an army small in number, but full of vigor, and confident of success; while in the place there was confusion, folly, and cowardice. Contreras indeed acted a shameful part; for during Captain Codrington's absence, Sarsfield had concerted with the navy, that in the case of the lower town being stormed, the ships should come to the mole and the garrison would retire there, rather than to the upper town. Meanwhile, Campo Verde recalled him to the active army, intending that General Velasco should replace him; but at three o'clock on the 21st, the breaches being then open, and the assault momentarily expected, Contreras commanded Sarsfield instantly to embark, falsely averring that such was the peremptory order of Campo Verde. Sarsfield remonstrated in vain, and a boat from the Cambrian frigate carried him and his personal staff and his effects on board that vessel; thus the command of the troops was left to an inefficient subordinate officer, the assault took place at that moment, and when Velasco arrived, he found only the dead bodies of those he was to have commanded. Contreras then assured Captain Codrington and the Junta, that Sarsfield had acted without his consent, and had in fact betrayed his post!*

STORMING OF THE LOWER TOWN.

This calamitous event happened in the evening of the 21st. Two breaches had been made in the bastions, and one in the Fort Royal; they were not wide, and a few Spanish guns still answered the

* Appendix 5, § 1.

French fire; nevertheless the assault was ordered, and as some suppose, because Suchet had secret intelligence of Sarsfield's removal, and the consequent confusion in the garrison.*

Fifteen hundred grenadiers, destined for the attack, were assembled under Palombini in the trenches; a second column was formed to support the storming troops, and to repel any sally from the upper town; and while the arrangements were in progress, the French guns thundered incessantly, and the shouts of the infantry, impatient for the signal, were heard between the salvos, redoubling as the shattered walls gave way. At last Harispe's division began to menace the ramparts on the side of Barcelona, to distract the attention of the Spaniards, and then Suchet, exhorting the soldiers to act vigorously, gave the signal and let them loose while it was still day. In an instant the breaches were crowned, and the assailants swarmed on the bastions, the ramparts, and the Fort Royal; the Spaniards without a leader, were thrown into confusion, and falling in heaps broke and fled towards the port, towards the mole, and towards the upper town, and a reserve stationed under the walls of the latter was overthrown with the same shock. Then some of the fugitives, running towards the mole, were saved by the English launches, others escaped into the upper town, a few were made prisoners, and the rest were slaughtered.

At eight o'clock the lower town was in the possession of the enemy. Fifteen hundred bodies, many of whom were inhabitants, lay stretched upon the place, and the mercantile magazines of the port being set on fire, the flames finished what the sword had begun. When the carnage ceased, the troops were rallied, working parties were set to labor; and ere the confusion in the upper town had subsided, the besiegers were again hidden in their trenches and burrowing forward to the walls of the upper town.

The front before them consisted of four bastions with curtains, but without a ditch. The bastion of St. Paul was opposite their left, and of St. John opposite their centre, and that of Jesus opposite their right; but the bastion of Cervantes, which covered the principal landing place of the Milagro, although on the same front of defence, was somewhat retired and not included within the attack. A hollow piece of ground, serving as a trench, had enabled the French to establish their left in a side bastion of the wall, connecting the upper with the lower town; and their right was strongly protected by some houses lining the road, for between the two parts of the city there were four hundred yards of open garden ground interspersed with single houses. A battery was constructed to play upon the landing places of the Milagro, two mortars

* Rogniat. Vacani. Suchet. Captain Codrington's Papers, MS.

which were on the hill of the fort Loretto concurred in this object, and the light troops were pushed close up to the wall; but at daylight the ships of war passed the port delivering their broadsides in succession. Contreras then showed the heads of columns as if for a sally, and the French skirmishers retired; whereupon the Spanish General, contented with having thus cleared his front, re-entered the place.

The men saved from the mole, by the ships, were now relanded in the upper town, and the second reinforcement from Murcia arrived, but being like the first detachment without arms only added to the confusion and difficulties of the governor. Nevertheless, as the loss of the French in the storming was about six hundred, and that of the Spaniards not more than two thousand, the besieged had still nine thousand fighting men, a number nearly equal to the whole infantry of Suchet's army; and hence Contreras, far from quailing beneath the blow, would not even receive a flag of truce by which the French General offered honorable conditions.

Suchet's position was becoming more embarrassing every moment: he had now delivered four assaults, his force was diminished nearly one fifth of its original number, and the men's strength was spent with laboring on his prodigious works: his line of communication with Lerida was quite intercepted and that with Mora interrupted, and he had lost a large convoy of provisions together with the mules that carried it. The resolution of the besieged seemed in no manner abated, and their communication with the sea, although partially under the French fire, was still free; the sea itself was covered with ships of war, overwhelming reinforcements might arrive at any moment, and Campo Verde with ten thousand men was daily menacing his rear. The Valencian army, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, Duran who had defeated a French detachment near Mirando del Ebro, Mina who had just then taken the convoy with Massena's baggage at the Puerto de Arlaban, in fine all the partidas of the mountains of Albaracin, Moncayo, and Navarre, were in motion, and menacing his position in Aragon. This rendered it dangerous for him to call to his aid any more troops from the right of the Ebro, and yet a single check might introduce despondency amongst the soldiers of the siege, composed as they were of different nations, and some but lately come under his command; indeed, their labors and dangers were so incessant and wearing, that it is no small proof of the French General's talent, and the men's spirit, that the confidence of both was still unshaken.

On the 24th, the crisis seemed at hand, intelligence arrived in the French camp that the Spanish army was coming down the Gaya river to fight, at the same time the garrison got under arms,

and an active interchange of signals took place between the town and the fleet. Suchet immediately placed a reserve to sustain the guards of his trenches, and marched with a part of his army to meet Campo Verde. That General, pressed by the remonstrances of Contreras and the Junta, had at last relinquished his own plan, recalled Eroles, and united his army at Momblanch on the 22d, and then moving by Villardoña, had descended the hills between the Gaya and the Francoli; he was now marching in two columns to deliver battle, having directed Contreras to make a sally at the same moment. But Miranda, who commanded his right wing, found, or pretended to find, some obstacles and halted, whereupon Campo Verde instantly relinquished the attack and marched to Vendril before the French General could reach him.

The 25th, he again promised Contreras to make a decisive attack, and for that purpose desired that three thousand men of the garrison should be sent to Vendril, and the remainder be held ready to cut their way through the enemy's lines during the action. He likewise assured him that four thousand English were coming by sea to aid in this project, and it is probable some great effort was really intended, for the breaching batteries had not yet opened their fire, and the wall of the place was consequently untouched; ten thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry under Campo Verde were within a few miles of the French camp on the Barcelona side; eight thousand men accustomed to fire were still under arms within the walls; and on the 26th, Colonel Skerrett appeared in the roadstead, not with four thousand, but with twelve hundred British soldiers, sent from Cadiz and from Gibraltar to succor Tarragona.

The arrival of this force, the increase of shipping in the roadstead, and the promises of Campo Verde, raised the spirits of the garrison from the depression occasioned by the disappointment of the 27th; and they were still more elated when in the evening Colonel Skerrett and his staff, accompanied by General Doyle, Captain Codrington, and other officers of the navy, disembarked, and proceeded to examine the means of defence. But they were struck with consternation when they heard that the British commander, because his engineers affirmed that the wall would give way after a few salvos from the breaching batteries, had resolved to keep his troops on board the transports, idle spectators of the garrison's efforts to defend the important places which he had been sent to succor.*

Contreras, thus disappointed on all sides, and without dependence on Campo Verde, resolved, if the French delayed the storm until the 29th, to make way by a sally on the Barcelona road, and so

* Contreras' Report. Appendix 5, § 1.

join the army in the field; meanwhile to stand the assault if fortune so willed it. And he had good reason for his resolution, for the ground in front of the walls was high and narrow; and although there was neither ditch nor covered way, a thick hedge of aloe trees, no small obstacle to troops, grew at the foot of the rampart, which was also cut off from the town, and from the side works, by an internal ditch and retrenchment. Behind the rampart the houses of the great street called the Rambla were prepared for defence, furnishing a second line of resistance; and although the cuts on the flanks hindered the making of sallies in force, which at such a period was a good mode of defence, the reduced state of the French army gave reason to believe that eight thousand brave men could resist it effectually.

The 28th, a general plan for breaking out on the Barcelona side, the operation of the fleet, and a combined attack of the Spanish army, was arranged; and Eroles embarked for the purpose of re-landing at Tarragona, to take the leading of the troops destined to sally forth on the 29th. The French General had however completed his batteries on the night of the 27th, and in the morning of the 28th they opened with a crashing effect. One magazine blew up in the bastion of Cervantes; all the guns in that of San Paulo were dismounted; the wall fell away in huge fragments before the stroke of the batteries, and from the Olivo, and from all the old French trenches, the guns and mortars showered bullets and shells into the place. This fire was returned from many Spanish pieces, still in good condition, and the shoulders of the French batteries were beaten down; yet their gunners, eager for the last act of the siege, stood to their work uncovered, the musketry rattled round the ramparts, the men on both sides crowded to the front, and while opprobrious words and mutual defiance passed between them, the generals, almost within hearing of each other, exhorted the soldiers to fight with the vigor that the crisis demanded.

STORMING OF THE UPPER TOWN.

At five o'clock in the evening the French fire suddenly ceased, and fifteen hundred men led by General Habert, passing out from the parallel, went at full speed up against the breach; twelve hundred under General Ficatier followed in support, General Montmarie led a brigade round the left, to the bastion of Rosario, with a view to break the gates there during the assault, and thus penetrating, to turn the interior defence of the Rambla.* Harispe took post on the Barcelona road, to cut off the retreat of the garrison.

* Suchet. Roguiat. Vacani. Codrington's papers, MS.

The columns of attack had to pass over an open space of more than a hundred yards before they could reach the foot of the breach; and when within twenty yards of it, the hedge of aloes obliged them to turn to the right and left, under a terrible fire of musketry and of grape, which the Spaniards, who were crowding on the breach with apparent desperation, poured unceasingly upon them. The destruction was great, the head of the French column got into confusion, gave back, and was beginning to fly, when the reserves rushed up, and a great many officers coming forward in a body, renewed the attack. At that moment one Bianchini, an Italian soldier who had obtained leave to join the column as a volunteer, and whose white clothes, amidst the blue uniforms of the French, gave him a supernatural appearance, went forth alone from the ranks, and gliding silently and sternly up the breach, notwithstanding many wounds reached the top, and there fell dead. Then the multitude bounded forward with a shout, the first line of the Spaniards fled, and the ramparts were darkened by the following masses of the French.

Meanwhile Montmarie's sappers cut away the palisades at Rosario, and his light troops finding a rope hanging from the wall, mounted by it, at the moment when the assailants at the breach broke the Spanish reserves with one shock, and poured into the town like a devastating torrent. At the Rambla a momentary stand was indeed made, but the impulse of victory was too strong to be longer resisted, and a dreadful scene of slaughter and violence ensued. Citizens and soldiers, maddened with fear, rushed out in crowds by the Barcelona gate, while others, throwing themselves over the ramparts, made for the landing-places within the Milagro; but that way also had been intercepted by General Rogiat with his sappers, and then numbers throwing themselves down the steep rocks were dashed to pieces, while they who gained the shore were still exposed to the sword of the enemy. Those that went out by the Barcelona gate were met by Harispe's men, and some being killed, the rest, three thousand in number, were made prisoners. But within the town all was horror; fire had been set to many houses, Gonzales, fighting manfully, was killed, Contreras, wounded with the stroke of a bayonet, was only saved by a French officer; and though the hospitals were respected by the soldiers, in every other part their fury was unbounded. When the assault first commenced, the ship-launches had come close into the Milagro, and now saved some of the fugitives, but their guns swept the open space beyond, killing friends and enemies, as, mixed together, they rushed to the shore; and the French dragoons, passing through the flaming streets at a trot, rode upon the fugitives, sabring those who had

outstripped the infantry. In every quarter there was great rage and cruelty, and although most of the women and children had, during the siege, been removed from Tarragona by the English shipping, and that the richest citizens had all gone to Sitjes, this assault was memorable as a day of blood. Only seven or eight hundred miserable creatures, principally soldiers, escaped on board the vessels; nine thousand, including the sick and wounded, were made prisoners; more than five thousand persons were slain, and a great part of the city was reduced to ashes.

CHAPTER VI.

Suchet marches against Campo Verde—Seizes Villa Nueva de Sitjes and makes fifteen hundred prisoners—Campo Verde retires to Igualada—Suchet goes to Barcelona—A council of war held at Cervera by Campo Verde—It is resolved to abandon the province as a lost country—Confusion ensues—Lacy arrives and assumes the command—Eroles throws himself into Montserrat—Suchet sends detachments to the valley of Congosta and that of Vich, and opens the communication with Maedonald at Figueras—Returns to Reus—Created a Marshal—Destroys the works of the lower town of Tarragona—Takes Montserrat—Negotiates with Cuesta for an exchange of the French prisoners in the island of Cabrera—Stopped by the interference of Mr. Wellesley—Mischief occasioned by the privateers—Lacy reorganizes the province—Suchet returns to Zaragoza, and chases the partidas from the frontier of Aragon—Habert defeats the Valencians at Amposta—The Somatenes harass the French forts near Montserrat—Figueras surrenders to Maedonald—Napoleon's clemency—Observations—Operations in Valencia and Murcia.

SUCHET had lost in killed and wounded during the siege between four and five thousand men, yet scarcely had the necessary orders to efface the trenches, secure the prisoners, and establish order in the ruined city been given, than the French General was again in movement to disperse Campo Verde's force. In the night of the 29th, Frere's division marched upon Villa Franca, Harispe's upon Villa Nueva, being followed by Suchet himself with Abbé's brigade and the heavy cavalry. Campo Verde then abandoned Vendril, and Harispe's column, although cannonaded by the English squadron, reached Villa Nueva, where a great multitude, military and others, were striving to embark in the vessels off the port. The light cavalry sabred some and made fifteen hundred prisoners, including the wounded men who had been carried there from Tarragona during the siege; and Frere's column in a like manner dispersed the Spanish rear-guard at Vendril and Villa Franca. Campo Verde then fled with the main body to Igualada, and Suchet

pushed on with the reserve to Barcelona, where he arranged with Maurice Mathieu a plan to prevent the Valencian division from re-embarking, or marching to aid the blockade of Figueras.

Distrust, confusion, and discord now prevailed amongst the Catalans. The people were enraged against Campo Verde, and the Junta sent to Cadiz to demand the Duke of Infantado as a chief. Milans, who had assembled some Migueletes and Somatenes about Arens de Mar, openly proposed himself, and Sarsfield, whose division was the only one in any order, was at variance with Eroles. The country people desired to have the latter made Captain-General, and a junta of general officers actually appointed him; yet he would not accept it while Campo Verde remained, and that General had already reached Agramunt, whence, overwhelmed with his misfortune, he meant to fly towards Aragon.* He was, however, persuaded to return to Cervera and call a council of war, and then it was proposed to abandon Catalonia as a lost country, and embark the army; and this disgraceful resolution, although opposed by Sarsfield, Santa Cruz, and even Campo Verde himself, was adopted by the council, and spread universal consternation. The Junta remonstrated loudly, all the troops who were not Catalans deserted, making principally for the Segre and Cinca rivers, in hope to pass through Aragon into New Castile, and so regain their own provinces; every place was filled with grief and despair.

In this conjuncture Captain Codrington refused to embark any Catalans, but he had promised to take back the Valencians, and although the conditions of his agreement had been grossly violated by Campo Verde and Miranda, he performed his contract; yet even this was not arranged without a contest between him and Doyle on the one side, and Miranda and Caro on the other. Meanwhile Colonel Green, instead of remaining at the Spanish head-quarters, returned to Peniscola with all the money and arms under his control; and the captain of the Prueba frigate, having under his command several Spanish vessels of war loaded with wounded men, the archives of the municipality, ammunition, stores, and money, all belonging to Catalonia, set sail for Majorca under such suspicious circumstances that Captain Codrington thought it necessary to send a ship to fetch him back by force.

In the midst of these afflicting scenes Suchet brought up his troops to Barcelona, and Maurice Mathieu, with a part of his garrison, marching upon Mattaro, dispersed a small body of men that Eroles had collected there; but the Valencian infantry, to the number of two thousand four hundred, escaped to Arens de Mar, and being received on board the English vessels, were sent back to their own country. The cavalry, unwilling to part with their horses,

* Appendix 5, §§ 2, 3.

would not embark, and menaced their General, Caro, who fled from their fury; nevertheless, Eroles rallied them, and having gathered some stores and money from the smaller dépôts, marched inland. Campo Verde then embarked privately in the Diana to avoid the vengeance of the people, and General Lacy, who had arrived from Cadiz, took the command; yet he would have been disregarded if Eroles had not set the example of obedience. Suchet, however, moved against him, and first scouring the valley of the Congosta and that of Vich, spread his columns in all directions, and opened a communication with Macdonald at Figueras. Lacy, thus pressed, collected the cavalry and a few scattered Catalonian battalions remaining about Solsona, Cardona, Seu d'Urgel, and took refuge in the hills, while Eroles threw himself into Montserrat, where large magazines had been previously formed.

Suchet, unable to find subsistence in the valleys, resolved to attack this celebrated place, and for this purpose, leaving Frere and Harispe at Vich and Moya, with orders to move at a given time upon Montserrat, returned himself with the reserve to Reus. Here he received despatches from Napoleon, who had created him a marshal, and had sent him orders to take Montserrat, to destroy the works of Tarragona, with the exception of a citadel, and finally to march against Valencia. He therefore preserved the upper town of Tarragona, ruined the rest of the works, carried the artillery to Tortosa, and marched against Montserrat on the 22d of July by the way of Mombanch and San Coloma to Igualada. At the same time Harispe and Frere moved by Manresa, and Maurice Mathieu entered Esparaguera with a part of the garrison of Barcelona.

TAKING OF MONTSERRAT.

This stronghold was occupied by fourteen or fifteen hundred Migueletes and Somatenes, inadequate, as it proved, to defend it against a great body of men such as Suchet was bringing up. But Eroles was daily raising recruits and adding works to the natural strength, and it would soon have been impregnable; for on all sides the approaches were through the midst of steeps and precipices, and high upon a natural platform, opening to the east, and overlooking the Llobregat, stood the convent of "*Nuestra Señora de Montserrat*," a great edifice, and once full of riches, but the wary monks had removed their valuables to Minorca early in the war. It was now well stored and armed, and above its huge peaks of stone shot up in the clouds so rude, so naked, so desolate, that, to use Suchet's expressive simile, "It was like the skeleton of a mountain."

There were three ways of ascending to this convent; one from Igualada, which wound up on the north from Casa Mansana between a perpendicular rock and a precipice; this road, which was the only one supposed practicable for an attack, was defended by two successive batteries, and by a retrenchment immediately in front of the convent itself. The other two ways were, a footpath on the south leading to Colbato, and a narrow road crossing the Llobregat and running by Monistrol on the east, but both so crossed and barred by precipices as to be nearly inaccessible to troops.

Suchet disposed one brigade at Colbato to menace that front, and to intercept the retreat of the Spaniards; he then occupied the roads of Igualada and Monistrol with Harispe's and Frere's divisions, and directed Abbé's brigade to attack from the convent by the northern line. The 24th, Abbé drove the Spaniards from Casa Mansana, and the 25th, advanced up the mountain, flanked by some light troops, and supported by Suchet in person with the Barcelona troops, but exposed to the fire of the Somatenes, who had gathered round the peaks above. In a short time the first Spanish battery opened upon the head of the column as it turned an angle, but more light troops being sent out, they climbed the rough rocks, and getting above the battery shot down upon the gunners, while the leading companies of the column rushed forward in front, and before a second discharge could be made, reached the foot of the battery beneath the line of fire. The Spaniards then threw down large stones upon the French until the fire of the light troops above became so galling that the work was abandoned. The French, however, followed close, and the men above continued clambering along with that energy which the near prospect of success inspires; thus the Spaniards, unable to rally in time, were overtaken and bayoneted in the second battery, and the road was opened.

Abbé now re-formed his troops and marched on to assail the intrenchments of the convent, but as he advanced a sharp musketry was heard on the opposite quarter, and suddenly the Spanish garrison came flying out of the building pursued by French soldiers, who were supposed to be the brigade from Colbato; they however proved to be the light troops first sent out to keep off the Somatenes from the right flank; for when the column advanced up the mountain, these men, about three hundred in number, had wandered too far to the right, and insensibly gaining ground up hill, had seized one or two of the hermitages with which the peaks are furnished; then growing more daring, they pressed on unopposed, until they gained the rock immediately overhanging the convent itself, and perceiving their advantage, with that intelligence which belongs only to veterans, immediately attacked the Spanish reserves. Their

commanding position, the steep rocks, and the narrow staircases, compensated for their inferiority of numbers, and in a little time they gained one of the doors, entered, and fought the defenders amongst the cloisters and galleries, with various turns of fortune, until the fugitives from the batteries, followed by Abbé, arrived, and then the whole garrison gave way and fled down the eastern precipices to the Llobregat, where from their knowledge of the country they easily avoided Harispe's men.

The loss of this place, which by Eroles and others was attributed to Colonel Green's having carried off the money destined for strengthening it, was deeply felt from its military importance, and from the superstitious veneration in which it was held: several towns then offered their submission, many villages gave up their arms, and a general fear of Suchet's prowess began to spread all over Spain; but the Catalans, a fierce and constant race, were not yet conquered. The anarchy attendant upon the fall of Tarragona and the after movements of Suchet had indeed been great; and as we have seen, most of the persons who might have aided to restore order, acted so as to increase the general confusion, and their bad example was followed by the authorities in other provinces who were most immediately connected with Catalonia: thus Cuesta, at this time governor of the Balearic isles, Bassecour, who was at Cuença, and Palacios, who had just been made Captain-General of Valencia, did in no manner comport themselves as the occasion required. Cuesta, who had neglected to send from Minorca the guns wanted in Catalonia, now entered into a negotiation to exchange the prisoners at Cabrera against those of Tarragona, a praiseworthy thing, if, as Suchet asserts, it arose from humanity; and not an ill-judged measure in itself, because the Catalonian soldiers to be exchanged were the best in Spain, and the French prisoners were ruined in constitution by their hard captivity. But at this period of distress it was impolitic, and viewed with suspicion by the Catalonians, as tending to increase the French force. At the desire of Mr. Wellesley this exchange was, however, peremptorily forbidden by the Regency, and Cuesta refused to receive any more prisoners at Cabrera, which, while those already there were so tormented, was, from whatever motive arising, a meritorious act, and the last important one of his life, for he soon after died. The prisoners remained, therefore, a disgrace to Spain and to England; for if her envoy interfered to prevent their release, she was bound to insist that thousands of men, whose prolonged captivity was the result of her interference, should not be exposed on a barren rock, naked as they were born, and fighting for each other's miserable rations to prolong an existence inconceivably wretched.*

* Appendix 4, § 4.

This untoward state of affairs in Catalonia was aggravated by the English, Spanish, and French privateers, who taking advantage of the times, plundered the people along the coast in concert; and they were all engaged in the smuggling of tobacco, the monopoly of which here as in other parts of Spain formed the principal resource of the revenue. Yet there were many considerable resources left to the Catalans. The chief towns had fallen, but the mountainous districts were not subdued and scarcely crossed by the French lines of invasion. The Somatenes were numerous, more experienced, and still ready to come forward, under a good general, if arms were provided for them, and the English squadron was always at hand to aid them; Admiral Keats brought three thousand muskets from Gibraltar, Sir E. Pellew, who had succeeded to the command of the Mediterranean fleet, was anxious to succor the province to the full extent of his means, and Minorca was a great *dépôt* of guns, stores, and even men. Lacy, Eroles, Rovira, and others, therefore, raised fresh levies; and while the blockade of Figueras continued to keep all Macdonald's army employed, the Spaniards seized the opportunity to operate partially on the side of Besalu and Bispal, and even in the French Cerdaña, which being unprotected, was invaded by Lacy.

Suchet, whose posts now extended from Lerida to Montserrat on one side, and on the other from Tarragona to Mequinenza, foresaw that a new and troublesome Catalonian war was preparing; but he was obliged to return to Zaragoza, partly to prepare for the invasion of Valencia, partly to restore tranquillity in Aragon, which had been disturbed by the passage of the seceders from Campo Verde's army. The Valencian cavalry also, when Eroles threw himself into Montserrat, had under the conduct of General Gasca endeavored to push through Aragon towards Navarre; and although they were intercepted by General Reille, and followed closely by Chlopiski, they finally reached Valencia without much loss, and the rest of the fugitives gained the Moncayo mountains and afterwards joined Mina. That chief was then in a very low state; he had been defeated on the 14th at Sanguessa, by Chlopiski, and Reille, who using the reinforcements then pouring into Spain, had pursued and defeated him again at Estella on the 23d of July, at Sorlada on the 24th, and at Val de Baygory on the 25th; yet he finally escaped to Motrico on the Biscay coast, where he received fresh arms and stores from the English vessels; but he was again defeated by Caffarelli, and finally driven for refuge to the district of Leibana; here the soldiers flying from Tarragona and Figueras joined him, and he soon reappeared more fierce and powerful than before.

Meanwhile Villa Campa, whose division had been re-equipped

from the supplies given by Captain Codrington, concerted his operations with the partida chiefs Duran and Campillo;* and their combined forces being eight thousand strong, having advanced from different quarters on the right bank of the Ebro, invested Calatayud, and sought to carry off grain, which was now very scarce. This delayed the invasion of Valencia, for Suchet would not undertake it until he had again secured the frontier of Aragon, and many of his battalions were then escorting the prisoners to France. But when they returned, he directed numerous columns against the partidas, and at the same time troops belonging to the army of the centre came down by the way of Medina Celi; whereupon the Spaniards retired to their fastnesses in the mountains of Soria on one side, and in those of Albaracin on the other.

Four thousand of the Valencian army had meanwhile marched against Rapita and Amposta, for the former post was re-established after the fall of Tarragona; but although Habert, marching out of Tortosa with seven or eight hundred men, defeated them with a considerable loss, the embarrassments of the third corps were not removed; for while these successes were obtained on the right of the Ebro the Catalans began to harass the posts between Lerida and Montserrat. On the 9th of August the Somatenes fell on some Italians placed in Monistrol, and were with difficulty repulsed; and a few days after, a convoy coming from Igualada to Montserrat, was attacked by fifteen hundred insurgents, and was unable to proceed until Palombini arrived with a battalion and dislodged the Catalans, but he lost more than a hundred of his own men in the action. Suchet, finding from these events that he could not safely withdraw his main body from Catalonia until the fall of Figueras should let loose the army of the upper province, sent fresh troops to Montserrat, and ordered Palombini to move with his garrison to aid Macdonald in the blockade; that place had, however, surrendered before Palombini had passed Barcelona.

General Martinez, after making many vain efforts to break the line of blockade, and having used every edible substance, prepared on the 16th of August to make a final effort, in concert with Rovira who came down to Llers. An officer deserting from the garrison betrayed the project, and Rovira was beaten in the morning before the garrison sallied; nevertheless, in the night Martinez endeavored to cut his way through the lines on the side of Rosas, but was driven back with a loss of four hundred men. Three days after, the place was given up and three thousand famished men were made prisoners. Thus ended the fourth great effort of the Catalonians. The success of the French was not without alloy: more than a fourth

* Mr. Stuart's Papers, MS.

part of the blockading troops had died of a pestilent distemper ; Macdonald himself was too ill to continue in the command, and the remainder of his army was so weakened, that no further active operations could be undertaken ; Suchet was still occupied in Aragon, and Lacy thus obtained time and means to reorganize troops for a fifth effort.

The persons who had betrayed the place to Rovira were shot by Macdonald, and the commandant whose negligence had occasioned this misfortune was condemned to death ; but Napoleon, who has been so foully misrepresented as a sanguinary tyrant, Napoleon, who had commuted the sentence of Dupont, now pardoned General Guillot ; a clemency in both cases remarkable, seeing that the loss of an army by one, and of a great fortress by the other, not only tended directly and powerfully to the destruction of the Emperor's projects, but were in themselves great crimes ; and it is to be doubted if any other sovereign in Europe would have displayed such a merciful greatness of mind.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The Emperor was discontented with Macdonald's operations, and that general seems to have mistaken both the nature of mountain warfare in general, and that of Catalonia in particular. The first requires a persevering activity in seizing such commanding posts on the flanks or rear of an adversary as will oblige him to fight on disadvantageous terms ; and as the success greatly depends upon the rapidity and vigor of the troops, their spirits should be excited by continual enterprise, and nourished by commendation and rewards. Now Macdonald, if we may believe Vacani, an eye-witness, did neither gain the confidence of his soldiers, nor cherish their ardor ; and while he exacted a more rigid discipline than the composition of his troops and the nature of the war would bear, he let pass many important opportunities of crushing his enemies in the field. His intent was to reduce the ferocious and insubordinate disposition of his men, but the peculiar state of feeling with respect to the war on both sides did not permit this, and hence his marches appeared rather as processions and ceremonies than warlike operations. He won no town, struck no important blow in the field, gave no turn to the public feeling, and lost a most important fortress, which, with infinite pains and trouble, he could scarcely regain.

The plans of all the French generals had been different. St. Cyr used to remain quiet, until the Spaniards gathered in such numbers that he could crush them in general battles ; but then he lost all the fruit of his success by his inactivity afterwards. Au-

gereau neither fought battles nor made excursions with skill, nor fulfilled the political hopes which he had excited. Macdonald was in constant movement, but he avoided battles, although in every previous important attack the Catalans had been beaten, whether in strong or in weak positions. Suchet alone combined skill, activity, and resolution, and the success which distinguished his operations is the best comment upon the proceedings of the others. It is in vain to allege that this last Marshal was in a better condition for offensive operations, and that the Emperor required of the seventh corps exertions which the extreme want of provisions prevented it from making. Napoleon might have been deceived as to the resources at first, and have thus put it upon enterprises beyond its means; but after two years' experience, after receiving the reports of all the generals employed there, and having the most exact information of all occurrences, it is impossible to imagine that so consummate a captain would have urged Macdonald to undertake impracticable operations; and the latter gave no convincing proof that his own views were sound. Notwithstanding the continual complaints of St. Cyr, and other French writers, who have endeavored to show that Napoleon was the only man who did not understand the nature of the war in Spain, and that the French armies were continually overmatched, it is certain that, after Baylen, the latter never lost a great battle except to the English; that they took every town they besieged, and never suffered any reverse from the Spaniards which cannot be distinctly traced to the executive officers. It would be silly to doubt the general merit of a man who in so many wars, and for many years, has maintained the noblest reputation, amidst innumerable dangers, and many great political changes in his own country; but Macdonald's military talents do not seem to have been calculated for the irregular warfare of Catalonia.

2. The surprise of Figueras has been designated as a misfortune to the Spaniards, because it shut up a large body of their best Migueletes, who fell with the place; and because it drew off Campo Verde from Tarragona at a critical period. Let us, however, contrast the advantages, and, apart from the vigor and enterprise displayed in the execution, no mean help to the cause at the time, it will be seen that the taking of that fortress was a great gain to the Catalans; for, first, it carried away Macdonald from Barcelona, and thus the fall of Montserrat was deferred, and great danger of failure incurred by Suchet at Tarragona; a failure infallible, if his adversaries had behaved with either skill or courage. Secondly, it employed all the French army of Upper Catalonia, the national guards of the frontier, and even troops from Toulon, in a

blockade, during which the sword and sickness destroyed more than four thousand men, and the remainder were so weakened as to be incapable of field service for a long time; meanwhile Lacy reorganized fresh forces, and revived the war, which he could never have done if the seventh corps had been disposable. Thirdly, seeing that Campo Verde was incapable of handling large masses, it is doubtful if he could have resisted or retarded for any time the investment of Tarragona; but it is certain that the blockade of Figueras gave an opportunity to Catalonia to recover the loss of Tarragona; and it obliged Suchet, instead of Macdonald, to take Montserrat, which disseminated the former force, and retarded the invasion of Valencia. Wherefore Rovira's daring in the surprise, and Martinez' resolution in the maintaining of Figueras, were as useful as they were glorious.

3. The usual negligence and slowness of the Spaniards was apparent during this campaign; although resolution, perseverance, and talent were evinced by Suchet in all his operations, the success was in a great measure due to the faults of his opponents, and amongst those faults Colonel Skerrett's conduct was prominent. It is true that Captain Codrington and others agreed in the resolution not to land; that there was a heavy surf, and that the engineers predicted on the 27th that the wall would soon be beaten down; but the question should have been viewed in another light by Colonel Skerrett. Tarragona was the bulwark of the principality, the stay and hope of the war. It was the city of Spain whose importance was next to Cadiz, and before its walls the security or the ruin of Valencia as well as of Catalonia was to be found. Of the French scarcely fourteen thousand infantry were under arms, and those were exhausted with toil. The upper town, which was the body of the place, was still unbreached; it was only attacked upon one narrow front, and behind it the Rambla offered a second and a more powerful defence. There were, to use the governor's expression, within the walls "*eight thousand of the most warlike troops in Spain,*" and there was a succoring army without, equal in number to the whole infantry of the besiegers. Under these circumstances the stoutest assailants might have been repulsed, and a severe repulse would have been fatal to the French operations.

Captain Codrington asserts that in the skirmishes beyond the walls, the valor of the garrison was eminent; and he saw a poor ragged fellow endeavoring, such was his humanity and greatness of mind, to stifle the burning fuse of a shell with sand, that some women and children might have time to escape. Feeling and courage, the springs of moral force, were therefore not wanting, but the virtue of the people was diminished, and the spirit of the soldiery

overlaid, by the bad conduct of their leaders. The rich citizens fled early to Villa Nueva, and they were followed by many superior officers of regiments. Contreras, jealous of Sarsfield, had obliged him, as we have seen, to quit his post at a critical moment, and then represented it to the garrison as a desertion; the Valencians were carried off after being one day in the place, and the Murcians came without arms; and all this confusion and mischief were so palpable that the poor Spanish soldiers could anticipate nothing but failure if left to themselves, and it was precisely for this reason that the British should have been landed to restore confidence. And is there nothing to be allowed for the impetuous fury of an English column breaking out of the place at the moment of attack? Let it be remembered, also, that in consequence of the arrival of a seventy-four, convoying the transports, such was the number of ships of war, that a thousand seamen and marines might have been added to the troops; and who can believe that three or four thousand French and Italians, the utmost that could be brought to bear in mass on one point, and that not an easy point, for the breach was narrow and scarcely practicable, would have carried the place against eight thousand Spaniards and two thousand British? But then the surf and the enemy's shot at the landing place, and the opinion of General Doyle, and of Captain Codrington, and of the engineers! The enemy's shot might have inflicted loss, but could not, especially at night, have stopped the disembarkation; and the opinion of the engineers was a just report of the state of the walls, but in no manner touched the moral considerations.

When the Roman Pompey was adjured by his friends not to put to sea during a violent storm, he replied, "*It is necessary to sail—it is not necessary to live.*" It was also necessary to save Tarragona! Was no risk to be incurred for so great an object? Was an uncertain danger to be weighed against such a loss to Spain? Was the British intrepidity to be set at nought? Were British soldiers to be quiet spectators while Spaniards stood up in a fight too dangerous for them to meddle with? Is that false but common doctrine, so degrading to soldiers, that brick-and-mortar sentiment, that the courage of the garrison is not to be taken into account, to be implicitly followed? What if the Spaniards had been successful? The result was most painful! Tarragona strongly fortified, having at different periods above fifteen thousand men thrown into it, with an open harbor and free communication by sea, was taken by less than twenty thousand French and Italian infantry, in the face of a succoring army, a British brigade, and a British fleet!

4. The cruelty of the French General and the ferocity of his

soldiers have been dwelt upon by several writers, but Suchet has vindicated his own conduct, and it is therefore unnecessary here to enter into a close investigation of facts which have been distorted, or of reasoning which has been misapplied. That every barbarity, commonly attendant upon the storming of towns, was practised, may be supposed; there is in the military institutions of Europe nothing calculated to arrest such atrocities. Soldiers of every nation look upon the devastation of a town taken by assault as their right, and it would be unjust to hold Suchet responsible for the violence of an army composed of men from different countries, exasperated by the obstinacy of the defence, and by a cruel warfare; in Spanish towns also the people generally formed a part of the garrison.

OPERATIONS IN VALENCIA AND MURCIA.

The transactions in the first of these provinces during the siege of Tarragona have been already sufficiently noticed; and those in Murcia were of little interest, for the defeat of Blake at Collar in 1810, and the fever which raged at Carthagena, together with the frequent change of commanders and the neglect of the government, had completely ruined the Murcian army. The number of men was indeed considerable, and the fourth French corps, weakened by drafts for the expedition to Estremadura, and menaced by the Barossa expedition, could not oppose more than five or six thousand men; yet the province had never been touched by an enemy, and the circumstances were all favorable for the organization and frequent trial of new troops.

In February, 1811, Colonel Roche, the military agent, described the whole army as "ready to disperse on the first appearance of an enemy," and in the following June he says that "after being left to themselves for three years, the Murcian troops were absolutely in a worse state than they were at the commencement of the revolution; that General Freire, although at the head of sixteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, dared not attack the six thousand French before him, lest his men should disperse, and they thought as little of the General as he did of them; that indolence, lassitude, and egotism prevailed in all parts; that the establishment of the Cortes had proved but a slight stimulus to the enthusiasm, which was fast dying away, and that the most agreeable thing in the world at the moment to the Spaniards, would be to remain neuter, while England and France fought the battle and paid the expense." The Murcian force was increased after Mahi's arrival to twenty-two thousand men, but remained inactive until

August, when Blake assumed the command, and the events which followed will be treated of hereafter.

The petty warfare in the south of Granada and Andalusia deserves little notice, for during Blake's absence in Estremadura with the fourth army, it was principally confined to the Ronda, where the Serranos, aided at times by the troops from Algeiras, and by succors from Gibraltar, were always in arms; yet even there the extreme arrogance and folly of the Spanish generals so vexed the Serranos, that they were hardly prevented from capitulating in form with the French, and while Soult continued at Llerena after the battle of Albuera, the Escopeteros and civil guards sufficed to keep the partidas in check. Thus the blockade of the Isla remained undisturbed from without, and Cadiz itself, the seat of all intrigues and follies, was fed by English fleets and defended by English troops.

The narrative of the circle of secondary operations being now completed, and the fate of Spain proved to depend upon the British General alone, it will be proper in the next book to take a view of political affairs, showing how strongly they bore upon Lord Wellington's decisions; and if such an interruption of the military story should be distasteful to any reader, I would have him reflect that war is not so much a series of battles, as a series of difficulties in the preparations to fight them with success.

BOOK XIV.

CHAPTER I.

State of political affairs—Situation of King Joseph—His disputes with Napoleon—He resigns his crown and quits Spain—The Emperor grants him new terms and obliges him to return—Political state of France as regards the war.

POLITICAL SITUATION OF JOSEPH.

AFTER the conquest of Andalusia, the intrusive monarch pursued his own system of policy with more eagerness than before. He published amnesties, granted honors and rewards to his followers, took many of the opposite party into his service, and treated the people generally with mildness.* But he was guided principally by his Spanish ministers, who being tainted with the national weakness of character, were, especially Orquijo, continually making exaggerated reports, intriguing against the French generals, and striving, sometimes with and sometimes without justice, to incense the King against them. This course, which was almost the inevitable consequence of his situation, excited angry feelings in the military, which, joined to the natural haughtiness of soldiers in command, produced constant disputes. In the conquered provinces, Joseph's civil agents endeavored to obtain more of the spoil than comported with the wants of the armies, and hence bickering between the French officers and the Spanish authorities were as unceasing as they were violent.* The prefects, royal commissaries, and intendants would not act under military orders, with respect to the supplies, nor would they furnish sums for the military chests. On the other hand the generals often seized the King's revenue, raised extraordinary and forced contributions, disregarded legal forms, and even threatened to arrest the royal agents when they refused compliance with their wishes. Neither was Joseph's own conduct always free from violence, for in the latter part of 1811 he obliged the merchants of Madrid to draw bills, for two millions of

* Joseph's papers captured at Vittoria, MS.

† Appendix 6, § 1.

dollars, on their correspondents in London, to supply him with a forced loan.*

He was always complaining to the Emperor that the niggardly allowances from France, the exactions of the generals, and the misery of the country left him no means of existence as a monarch; and during the greatest part of 1810 and the beginning of 1811, Santa Fé, Almenara, and Orquijo, succeeding each other as ambassadors at Paris, were in angry negotiations with Napoleon's ministers relating to this subject, and to a project for ceding the provinces of the Ebro in exchange for Portugal.† Against this project Joseph protested, on the grounds that it was contrary to the constitution of Bayonne, that it would alienate the Spaniards, was degrading to himself, and unjust as a bargain; seeing that Portugal was neither so rich, so industrious, so pleasant, nor so well affected to him as the provinces to be taken away, and the well-known hatred between the Spaniards and the Portuguese would never allow the latter to be quiet subjects.‡

To these complaints, Napoleon answered with his usual force and clearness of judgment. He insisted that the cost of the war had drained the French exchequer; that he had employed nearly four hundred thousand men for the King's interest, and that rather than increase the expenses he would withdraw some of the troops. He reproached Joseph with the feebleness of his operations, the waste and luxury of his court, his ill-judged schemes of conciliation, his extravagant rewards, his too great generosity to the opposite party, and his raising, contrary to the opinion of the marshals, a Spanish army which would desert on the first reverse.§ The constitution of Bayonne, he said, was rendered null by the war; nevertheless, he had not taken a single village from Spain, and he had no wish to seize the provinces of the Ebro, unless the state of the contest obliged him to do so. He required, indeed, a guarantee for the repayment of the money France had expended for the Spanish crown, yet the real wishes of the people were to be ascertained before any cession of territory could take place, and to talk of Portugal before it was conquered was folly.|| As this last observation was Joseph's own argument, an explanation ensued, when it appeared that Almenara, thinking the seizure of the Ebro provinces a settled plan, had, of his own accord, asked for Portugal as an indemnification; a fact that marks the character of the Spanish cabinet.

* Mr. Stuart's Papers, MS.

† Joseph's papers captured at Vittoria, MS.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid.

|| Ibid.

Napoleon also assured the King that there must be a great deal of money in Spain, for, besides the sums sent from France, the plate of the suppressed convents, and the silver received by the Spaniards from America, there were the subsidies from England, and the enormous expenditure of her troops. Then, the seizure and sale of national domains, and of confiscated colonial produce, were to be taken into calculation, and if the King wanted more, he must exact it from the country, or go without. France would only continue her subsidy of two millions of francs monthly. The Emperor had always supported his wars by the resources of the territory in which it was carried on, and the King might do the same.

Joseph replied that his court was neither luxurious nor magnificent; that he recompensed services by giving bills on the contingent sales of national domains, which could not be applied to the wants of the soldiers; that he could scarcely keep the public servants alive, and that his own expenses were not greater than the splendor of the crown required. That many of the best generals approved of his raising a Spanish army; desertions from it were less frequent than was imagined, and were daily diminishing; and these native troops served to garrison towns while the French were in the field. He wished, he said, to obtain large loans rather than small gifts from the French treasury, and desired that the confiscated property of the Spanish noblemen who had been declared traitors in 1808, should be paid to him; but with regard to harsh measures, the people could not pay the contributions, and the proceedings of a king with his subjects should not be like those of a foreign general.* Lenity was necessary to tranquillize the provinces subdued, and as an example to those which resisted. The first thing was to conciliate the people's affections. The plate of the suppressed convents was not so valuable as it appeared at a distance; the greater part of it was already plundered by the guerillas, or by the French troops. The French marshals intercepted his revenues, disregarded his orders, insulted his government, and oppressed the country. He was degraded as a monarch, and would endure it no longer. He had been appointed to the throne of Spain without his own consent, and although he would never oppose his brother's will, he would not live a degraded king, and was therefore ready to resign unless the Emperor would come in person and remedy the present evils.†

Napoleon, while he admitted the reasonableness of some of the King's statements, still insisted, and with propriety of argument, that it was necessary to subdue the people before they could be

* Joseph's papers captured at Vittoria, MS.

† Ibid.