

a good battering train in Almeida, and the works of that place were restored; secondly, the line of communication with Oporto was completely organized, and shortened by improving the navigation of the Douro; thirdly, Ciudad itself was very weakly garrisoned, and the ignorance of the French as to the state of the allies' preparations gave hope of a surprise. It was, however, only by a surprise that success could be expected, and it was not the least of Lord Wellington's merits that he so well concealed his preparations, and for so long a period. No other operation, promising any success, was open; and yet the General could no longer remain inactive, because around him the whole fabric of the war was falling to pieces from the folly of the governments he was serving. If he could not effect a blow against the French while Napoleon was engaged in the Russian war, it was clear that the Peninsula would be lost.

Now the surprise of a fortress, with a garrison of only seventeen hundred men, seems a small matter in such grave circumstances, but, in reality, it was of the very greatest importance, because it was the first step in a plan which saved the Peninsula when nothing else could have saved it. Lord Wellington knew that the valley of the Tagus could not long support both the army of Portugal and the army of the centre; he knew by intercepted letters, that Marmont and the King were already at open war upon the subject, and he judged that if he could surprise Ciudad Rodrigo, the army of Portugal would be obliged, for the sake of provisions, and to protect Leon, then weakened by the departure of the imperial guards, to concentrate in that province. This was the first step.

The French kept magazines in reserve for sudden expeditions, feeding meanwhile as they could upon the country, and, therefore, their distress for provisions never obstructed their moving upon important occasions. Nevertheless Lord Wellington thought the tempestuous season would render it very difficult for Marmont, when thus forced into Leon, to move with great masses; wherefore he proposed, when Rodrigo fell, to march by Villa Velha to Estremadura, and suddenly besiege Badajos also, the preparations to be previously made in Elvas, under the protection of Hill's corps, and unknown to the enemy. This was the second step, and in this surprise also he hoped to be successful, because of the jealousies of the marshals, the wet season, and his own combinations, which would impede the concentration of the French armies, and prevent them from keeping together if they did unite. He had hopes likewise that as Ballesteros' corps was now augmented, it would vex Soult's posts on the coast, while Hill and Morillo harassed him on the Guadiana; and if Badajos fell, the English General was resolved to leave a force to cover the captured place

against the army of the centre, and then fight Soult in Andalusia. For he judged that Marmont could not, for want of provisions, pass beyond the Guadiana, nor follow him before the harvest was ripe; neither did he fear him in Beira, because the torrents would be full, the country a desert, and the militia, aided by a small regular corps, and covered by Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, would, he thought, be sufficient to prevent any serious impression being made on Portugal during the invasion of Andalusia.

This was Lord Wellington's plan, and his firmness and resolution in conceiving it were the more signal because his own troops were not in good plight. The army had indeed received reinforcements, but the infantry had served at Walcheren, and exposure to night air, or even slight hardship, threw them by hundreds into the hospital, while the new regiments of cavalry, inexperienced, and not acclimated, were found, men and horses, quite unfit for duty, and were sent to the rear. The pay of the army was three months in arrear, and the supplies, brought up with difficulty, were very scanty; half and quarter rations were often served, and sometimes the troops were without any bread for three days consecutively, and their clothing was so patched, that scarcely a regiment could be known by its uniform. Chopped straw, the only forage, was so scarce that the regimental animals were dying of hunger; corn was rarely distributed save to the generals and staff, and even the horses of the artillery and of the old cavalry suffered; nay, the very mules of the commissariat were pinched by the scarcity, and the muleteers were eight months in arrears of pay. The cantonments on the Coa and Agueda were unhealthy from the continued rains; above twenty thousand men were in hospital; and, deduction made for other drains, only fifty-four thousand of both nations, including garrisons and posts of communication, were under arms. To finish the picture, the sulky apathy produced in the Portuguese Regency by the Prince Regent's letter, was now becoming more hurtful than the former active opposition.

But even these distresses, so threatening to the general cause, Wellington turned to the advantage of his present designs; for the enemy were aware of the misery in the army, and in their imagination magnified it; and as the allied troops were scattered, for relief, from the Gata mountains to the Douro, and from the Agueda to the Mondego, at the very moment when the battering train entered Almeida, both armies concluded that these guns were only to arm that fortress, as a cover to the extended country quarters which necessity had forced the British General to adopt. No person, not even the engineers employed in the preparations, knew more than that a siege or the simulation of a siege was in contem-

plation; but when it was to be attempted, or that it would be attempted at all, none knew; even the Quartermaster General Murray was permitted to go home on leave, with the full persuasion that no operation could take place before spring

In the new cantonments, however, abundance of provisions, and dry weather (for in Beira the first rains generally subside during December) stopped the sickness, and restored about three thousand men to the ranks; and it would be a great error to suppose that the privations had in any manner weakened the moral courage of the troops. The old regiments had become incredibly hardy and experienced in all things necessary to sustain their strength and efficacy; the staff of the army was well practised, and Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the military secretary, had established such an intercourse between the head-quarters and the commanders of battalions, that the latter had, so to speak, direct communication with the general-in-chief upon all the business of their regiments; a privilege which increased the enthusiasm and zeal of all in a very surprising manner. For the battalions being generally under very young men, the distinctions of rank were not very rigidly enforced, and the merits of each officer were consequently better known, and more earnestly supported when promotion and honors were to be obtained. By this method Lord Fitzroy acquired an exact knowledge of the true moral state of each regiment, rendered his own office at once powerful and gracious to the army, and yet, such was his discretion and judgment, did in no manner weaken the military hierarchy; thus also all the daring young men were excited, and being unacquainted with the political difficulties of their General, anticipated noble triumphs, which were happily realized.

The favorable moment for action so long watched for by Wellington came at last. An imperial decree had remodelled the French armies. That of Aragon was directed to give up four divisions to form a new corps, under Reille, called the "*army of the Ebro*," whose head-quarters were at Lerida. The army of the south was recomposed in six divisions of infantry and three of cavalry, besides the garrison of Badajos, and Marshal Victor returned to France, discontented, for he was one of those whose reputation had been abated by this war. His divisions were given to Generals Conroux, Carrois, Villatte, Laval, Drouet, Daricau, Peyremont, Digeon, and the younger Soult, Phillipon continuing governor of Badajos. The reserve of Monthion was broken up, and the army of the north, destined to maintain the great communications with France and to reduce the partidas on that line, was ordered to occupy the districts round Santander, Sebastian, Burgos, and Pampeluna, and to communicate by the left with the new army of the Ebro; it was

also exceedingly reduced in numbers, for the imperial guards, seventeen thousand strong, were required for the Russian war, and marched in December for France. And besides these troops, the Polish battalions, the skeletons of the cavalry regiments, and several thousand choice men, destined to fill the ranks of the old guard, were drafted; so that not less than forty thousand of the very best soldiers were withdrawn, and the maimed and worn-out men being sent back to France at the same time, the force in the Peninsula was diminished by sixty thousand.

The head-quarters of the army of the north arrived at Burgos in January, and a division was immediately sent to drive Mendizabel from the Montaña de Santander; but as this arrangement weakened the grand line of communication with France, Marmont was ordered to abandon the valley of the Tagus and fix his head-quarters at Valladolid or Salamanca. Ciudad Rodrigo, the sixth and seventh governments, and the Asturias, were also placed under his authority, by which Souham and Bonnet's divisions, forming together about eighteen thousand men, were added to his army; but the former General returned to France. These divisions, however, being pressed by want, were extended from the Asturias to Toledo, while Montbrun was near Valencia, and meanwhile Soult's attention was distracted by Tarifa, and by Hill's pursuit of Drouet. Thus the French armies, everywhere occupied, were spread over an immense tract of country; Marmont, deceived by the seemingly careless winter attitude of the allies, left Ciudad Rodrigo unprotected within their reach, and Wellington jumped with both feet upon the devoted fortress.

CHAPTER III.

Means collected for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—Major Sturgeon throws a bridge over the Agueda—Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—Colonel Colborne storms fort Francisco—The scarcity of transport balks Lord Wellington's calculations—Marmont collects troops—Plan of the attack changed—Two breaches are made and the city is stormed—Observations.

SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

THE troops disposable for the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo were about thirty-five thousand, including cavalry. The materials for the siege were established at Gallegos, Villa del Ciervo, and Espeja, on the left of the Agueda, and the ammunition was at Almeida.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various positions in the office of the Secretary of the Board of Education, for the year ending June 30, 1908.

Secretary: [Name]

Assistant Secretary: [Name]

Director of Schools: [Name]

Director of Technical Schools: [Name]

Director of Normal Schools: [Name]

Director of Industrial Schools: [Name]

Director of Agricultural Schools: [Name]

Director of Marine Schools: [Name]

Director of Art Schools: [Name]

Director of Music Schools: [Name]

Director of Physical Education: [Name]

Director of Vocational Training: [Name]

Director of Special Education: [Name]

Director of Adult Education: [Name]

Director of Evening Schools: [Name]

Director of Summer Schools: [Name]

Director of Correspondence Schools: [Name]

Director of Distance Education: [Name]

Director of Open Schools: [Name]

Director of Home Schools: [Name]

Director of Community Schools: [Name]

Director of Neighborhood Schools: [Name]

Director of Family Schools: [Name]

Director of Individual Schools: [Name]

Director of Self-paced Schools: [Name]

Director of Flexible Schools: [Name]

Director of Modular Schools: [Name]

Director of Competency-based Schools: [Name]

Director of Outcome-based Schools: [Name]

Director of Personalized Schools: [Name]

Director of Customized Schools: [Name]

Director of Individualized Schools: [Name]

Director of Differentiated Schools: [Name]

Director of Personalized Learning: [Name]

Director of Customized Learning: [Name]

Director of Individualized Learning: [Name]

Director of Differentiated Learning: [Name]

Director of Personalized Instruction: [Name]

Director of Customized Instruction: [Name]

Director of Individualized Instruction: [Name]

Director of Differentiated Instruction: [Name]

Director of Personalized Education: [Name]

Director of Customized Education: [Name]

Director of Individualized Education: [Name]

Director of Differentiated Education: [Name]

Director of Personalized Learning and Instruction: [Name]

Director of Customized Learning and Instruction: [Name]

Director of Individualized Learning and Instruction: [Name]

Director of Differentiated Learning and Instruction: [Name]

Director of Personalized Education and Instruction: [Name]


Director of Customized Education and Instruction: [Name]

Director of Individualized Education and Instruction: [Name]

Director of Differentiated Education and Instruction: [Name]



SEIGE OF
CIUDAD RODRIGO
1812



From those places the hired carts and mules were to bring up the stores to the parc, and seventy pieces of ordnance had been collected at Villa de Ponte. But from the scarcity of transports, only thirty-eight guns could be brought to the trenches, and these would have wanted their due supply of ammunition, if eight thousand shot had not been found amidst the ruins of Almeida.

On the 1st of January the bridge was commenced at Marialva, near the confluence of the Azava with the Agueda, about six miles below Ciudad, and piles were driven into the bed of the river, above and below, to which the trestles were tied to render the whole firm. The fortress was to have been invested on the 6th, but the native carters were two days moving over ten miles of flat and excellent road, with empty carts; the operation was thus delayed, and it was dangerous to find fault with these people, because they deserted on the slightest offence. Meanwhile, the place being closely examined, it was found that the French, in addition to the old works, had fortified two convents, which flanked and strengthened the bad Spanish intrenchments round the suburbs. They had also constructed an inclosed and palisadoed redoubt upon the greater Teson; and this redoubt, called Francisco, was supported by two guns and a howitzer placed on the flat roof of the convent of that name.

The soil around was exceedingly rocky, except on the Teson itself; and though the body of the place was there better covered by the outworks, and could bring most fire to bear on the trenches, it was more assailable, according to the English General's views; because elsewhere the slope of the ground was such that batteries must have been erected on the very edge of the counterscarp before they could see low enough to breach. This would have been a tedious process, whereas the smaller Teson furnished the means of striking over the crest of the glacis at once, and a deep gully near the latter offered cover for the miners. It was, therefore, resolved to storm Fort Francisco, form a lodgment there, and, opening the first parallel along the greater Teson, to place thirty-three pieces in counter-batteries, with which to ruin the defences, and drive the besieged from the convent of Francisco; then working forward by the sap, to construct breaching batteries on the lesser Teson, and blow in the counterscarp, while seven guns, by battering a weak turret on the left, opened a second breach, with a view to turn any retrenchment behind the principal breach.

The first, third, fourth, and light divisions, and Pack's Portuguese, were destined for the siege; but as the country on the right bank of the Agueda was destitute of fuel and cover, these troops were still to keep their quarters on the left bank; and although

there was a very severe frost and fall of snow, yet one division, carrying a day's provisions ready cooked, was to ford the river every twenty-four hours, either above or below the town, and thus alternately carry on the works. Meanwhile, to cover the siege, Julian Sanchez and Carlos d'España were posted on the Tormes in observation of the enemy.

To obviate the difficulty of obtaining country transport, the English General had previously constructed eight hundred carts, drawn by horses, and these were now his surest dependence for bringing up ammunition; yet so many delays were anticipated from the irregularity of the native carters and muleteers, and the chances of weather, that he calculated upon an operation of twenty-four days, and yet hoped to steal it from his adversaries; sure, even if he failed, that the clash of his arms would again draw their scattered troops to that quarter, as tinkling bells draw swarming bees to an empty hive.

The 8th of January, the light division and Pack's Portuguese forded the Agueda near Caridad, three miles above the fortress, and making a circuit, took post beyond the great Teson, where they remained quiet during the day, and as there was no regular investment, the enemy believed not that the siege was commenced. But in the evening the troops stood to their arms, and Colonel Colborne, commanding the fifty-second, having assembled two companies from each of the British regiments of the light division, stormed the redoubt of Francisco. This he did with so much fury, that the assailants appeared to be at one and the same time in the ditch, mounting the parapets, fighting on the top of the rampart, and forcing the gorge of the redoubt, where the explosion of one of the French shells had burst the gate open.

Of the defenders a few were killed, not many, and the remainder, about forty in number, were made prisoners. The post being thus taken, with the loss of only twenty-four men and officers, working parties were set to labor on the right of it, because the fort itself was instantly covered with shot and shells from the town. This tempest continued through the night, but at daybreak the parallel, six hundred yards in length, was sunk three feet deep and four wide, the communication over the Teson to the rear was completed, and the progress of the siege was thus hastened several days by this well-managed assault.

The 9th, the first division took the trenches in hand. The place was encircled by posts to prevent any external communication, and at night twelve hundred workmen commenced three counter-batteries, for eleven guns each, under a heavy fire of shells and grape. Before daylight the laborers were under cover, and a ditch was

also sunk in the front to provide earth ; for the batteries were made eighteen feet thick at the top, to resist the very powerful artillery of the place.

On the 10th, the fourth division relieved the trenches, and a thousand men labored, but in great peril, for the besieged had a superabundance of ammunition, and did not spare it. In the night the communication from the parallel to the batteries was opened, and on the 11th the third division undertook the siege.

This day the magazines in the batteries were excavated, and the approaches widened, but the enemy's fire was destructive, and the shells came so fast into the ditch in front of the batteries, that the troops were withdrawn, and the earth was raised from the inside. Great damage was also sustained from salvos of shells, with long fuses, whose simultaneous explosion cut away the parapets in a strange manner, and in the night the French brought a howitzer to the garden of the convent of Francisco, with which they killed many men, and wounded others.

On the 12th, the light division resumed the work, and the riflemen, taking advantage of a thick fog, covered themselves in pits, which they digged in front of the trenches, and from thence picked off the enemy's gunners ; but in the night the weather was so cold, and the besieged shot so briskly, that little progress was made.

The 13th, the first division being on duty, the same causes impeded the laborers, and now also the scarcity of transport balked the General's operations. One-third only of the native carts expected had arrived, and the drivers of those present were very indolent ; much of the twenty-four-pound ammunition was still at Villa de Ponte, and intelligence arrived that Marmont was collecting his forces to succor the place. Wellington, therefore, changing his first plan, resolved to open a breach with his counter-batteries, which were not quite six hundred yards from the curtain, and then to storm the place without blowing in the counter-scarp ; in other words, to overstep the rules of science, and sacrifice life rather than time ; for such was the capricious nature of the Agueda, that in one night a flood might enable a small French force to relieve the place.

The whole army was immediately brought up from the distant quarters, and posted in the villages on the C6a, ready to cross the Agueda and give battle ; and it was at this time that Hill, who was then at Merida, returned to Portalegre, and sent a division across the Tagus, lest Marmont, in despair of uniting his force in the north in time to save Ciudad, should act against the line of communication by Castello Branco and Villa Velha.

In the night of the 13th the batteries were armed with twenty-

eight guns, the second parallel and the approaches were continued by the flying sap, and the Santa Cruz convent was surprised by the Germans of the first division, which secured the right flank of the trenches.

The 14th the enemy, who had observed that the men in the trenches always went off in a disorderly manner on the approach of the relief, made a sally and overturned the gabions of the sap; they even penetrated to the parallel, and were upon the point of entering the batteries, when a few of the workmen, getting together, checked them until a support arrived, and thus the guns were saved. This affair, together with the death of the engineer on duty, and the heavy fire from the town, delayed the opening of the breaching batteries; but at half-past four in the evening, twenty-five heavy guns battered the "*fausse braye*" and rampart, and two pieces were directed against the convent of Francisco. Then was beheld a spectacle at once fearful and sublime. The enemy replied to the assailants' fire with more than fifty pieces, the bellowing of eighty large guns shook the ground far and wide, the smoke rested in heavy volumes upon the battlements of the place, or curled in light wreaths about the numerous spires, the shells, hissing through the air, seemed fiery serpents leaping from the darkness, the walls crashed to the stroke of the bullet, and the distant mountains, faintly returning the sound, appeared to moan over the falling city. And when night put an end to this turmoil, the quick clatter of musketry was heard like the pattering of hail after a peal of thunder; for the fortieth regiment assaulted and carried the convent of Francisco, and established itself in the suburb on the left of the attack.

The next day the ramparts were again battered, and fell so fast that it was judged expedient to commence the small breach at the turret; and in the night of the 15th five more guns were mounted. The 16th at daylight the besiegers' batteries recommenced, but at eight o'clock a thick fog obliged them to desist; nevertheless the small breach had been opened, and the place was now summoned, but without effect. At night the parallel on the lower Teson was extended, and a sharp musketry was directed from thence against the great breach. The breaching battery, as originally projected, was also commenced, and the riflemen of the light division, hidden in the pits, continued to pick off the enemy's gunners.

The 17th the fire on both sides was very heavy, and the wall of the place was beaten down in large cantles; but several of the besiegers' guns were dismounted, their batteries injured, and many of their men killed; General Borthwick, the commandant of artillery, was wounded, and the sap was entirely ruined. Even the riflemen in the pits were at first overpowered with grape; yet

towards evening they recovered the upper hand, and the French could only fire from the more distant embrasures. In the night the battery intended for the lesser breach was armed, and that on the lower Teson raised so as to afford cover in the day-time.

On the 18th the besiegers' fire was resumed with great violence. The turret was shaken at the small breach, the large breach became practicable in the middle, and the enemy commenced retrenching it. The sap however could make no progress, the superintending engineer was badly wounded, and a twenty-four-pounder, having bursted in the batteries, killed several men. In the night the battery on the lower Teson was improved, and a field-piece and howitzer being placed there, kept up a constant fire on the great breach to destroy the French retrenchments.

On the 19th both breaches became practicable. Major Sturgeon closely examined the place, and a plan of attack was formed on his report; the assault was then ordered, and the battering guns were turned against the artillery of the ramparts.

ASSAULT OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

This operation, which was confined to the third and light divisions and Pack's Portuguese, was organized in four parts :

1. *The right attack.* The light company of the eighty-third and the second caçadores, which were posted in the houses beyond the bridge on the Agueda, were directed to cross that river, and escalate an outwork in front of the castle, where there was no ditch, but where two guns commanded the junction of the counterscarp with the body of the place. The fifth and ninety-fourth regiments, posted behind the convent of Santa Cruz, and having the seventy-seventh in reservé, were to enter the ditch at the extremity of the counterscarp, then to escalate the "*fausse braye*," and scour it on the left as far as the great breach.

2. *The centre attack or assault of the great breach.* One hundred and eighty men, protected by the fire of the eighty-third regiment, and carrying hay-bags to throw into the ditch, were to move out of the second parallel and to be followed by a storming party, which was again to be supported by General Mackinnon's brigade of the third division.

3. *Left attack.* The light division, posted behind the convent of Francisco, was to send three companies of the ninety-fifth to scour the "*fausse braye*" to the right, and so connect the left and centre attacks. At the same time a storming party, preceded by the third caçadores carrying hay-sacks, and followed by Vandeleur's and Andrew Barnard's brigades, was to make for the small breach, and, when the "*fausse braye*" was carried, to detach to their right, to

assist the main assault, and to the left to force a passage at the Salamanca gate.

4. *The false attack.* This was an escalade to be made by Pack's Portuguese on the St. Jago gate at the opposite side of the town.

The right attack was commanded by Colonel O'Toole of the caçadores.

Five hundred volunteers, commanded by Major Manners of the seventy-fourth, with a forlorn hope under Mr. Mackie of the eighty-eighth, composed the storming party of the third division.

Three hundred volunteers, led by Major George Napier of the fifty-second, with a forlorn hope of twenty-five men under Mr. Gurwood of the same regiment, composed the storming party of the light division.

All the troops reached their different posts without seeming to attract the attention of the enemy ; but before the signal was given, and while Lord Wellington, who in person had been pointing out the lesser breach to Major Napier, was still at the convent of Francisco, the attack on the right commenced, and was instantly taken up along the whole line.* Then the space between the army and the ditch was covered with soldiers, and ravaged by a tempest of grape from the ramparts. The storming parties of the third division jumped out of the parallel when the first shout arose ; but so rapid had been the movements on their right, that before they could reach the ditch, Ridge, Dunkin, and Campbell, with the fifth, seventy-seventh, and ninety-fourth regiments, had already scoured the "*fausse braye*," and were pushing up the great breach, amidst the bursting of shells, the whistling of grape and muskets, and the shrill cries of the French, who were driven fighting behind the retrenchments. There, however, they rallied, and, aided by the musketry from the houses, made hard battle for their post ; none would go back on either side, and yet the British could not get forward ; and men and officers, falling in heaps, choked up the passage, which from minute to minute was raked with grape from two guns flanking the top of the breach at the distance of a few yards ; thus striving and trampling alike upon the dead and the wounded, these brave men maintained the combat.

Meanwhile the stormers of the light division, who had three hundred yards of ground to clear, would not wait for the hay-bags, but with extraordinary swiftness running to the crest of the glacis, jumped down the scarp a depth of eleven feet, and rushed up the "*fausse braye*" under a smashing discharge of grape and musketry. The bottom of the ditch was dark and intricate, and the forlorn hope took too much to their left ; but the storming party went straight to the breach, which was so contracted that a gun placed

* Appendix 11, § 2.

lengthwise across the top nearly blocked up the opening. Here the forlorn hope rejoined the stormers, but when two-thirds of the ascent were gained, the leading men, crushed together by the narrowness of the place, staggered under the weight of the enemy's fire; and such is the instinct of self-defence, that although no man had been allowed to load, every musket in the crowd was snapped. The commander, Major Napier, was at this moment stricken to the earth by a grapeshot which shattered his arm, but he called on his men to trust to their bayonets, and all the officers simultaneously sprang to the front, when the charge was renewed with a furious shout, and the entrance was gained. The supporting regiments coming up in sections abreast, then reached the rampart, the fifty-second wheeled to the left, the forty-third to the right, and the place was won. During this contest, which lasted only a few minutes after the "*fausse braye*" was passed, the fighting had continued at the great breach with unabated violence, but when the forty-third and the stormers of the light division came pouring down upon the right flank of the French, the latter bent before the storm; at the same moment, the explosion of three wall magazines destroyed many persons, and the third division with a mighty effort broke through the intrenchments. The garrison indeed still fought for a moment in the streets, but finally fled to the castle, where Mr. Gurwood, who, though wounded, had been amongst the foremost at the lesser breach, received the governor's sword.

The allies now plunged into the streets from all quarters, for O'Toole's attack was also successful, and at the other side of the town Pack's Portuguese, meeting no resistance, had entered the place, and the reserves also came in. Then throwing off the restraints of discipline the troops committed frightful excesses. The town was fired in three or four places, the soldiers menaced their officers, and shot each other; many were killed in the market-place, intoxication soon increased the tumult, disorder everywhere prevailed, and at last, the fury rising to an absolute madness, a fire was wilfully lighted in the middle of the great magazine, when the town and all in it would have been blown to atoms, but for the energetic courage of some officers and a few soldiers who still preserved their senses.

Three hundred French had fallen, fifteen hundred were made prisoners, and besides the immense stores of ammunition, above one hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, including the battering train of Marmont's army, were captured in the place. The whole loss of the allies was about twelve hundred soldiers and ninety officers, and of these above six hundred and fifty men and sixty officers had been slain or hurt at the breaches. General Craufurd

and General Mackinnon, the former a man of great ability, were killed, and with them died many gallant men, amongst others a captain of the forty-fifth, of whom it has been felicitously said, that "three generals and seventy other officers had fallen, but the soldiers fresh from the strife only talked of Hardyman."* General Vandaleur, Colonel Colborne, and a crowd of inferior rank were wounded; and unhappily the slaughter did not end with the battle, for the next day, as the prisoners and their escort were marching out by the breach, an accidental explosion took place, and numbers of both were blown in the air.

To recompense an exploit so boldly undertaken and so gloriously finished, Lord Wellington was created Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo by the Spaniards, Earl of Wellington by the English, and Marquis of Torres Vedras by the Portuguese; but it is to be remarked that the Prince Regent of Portugal had previous to that period displayed great ingratitude in the conferring of honors upon the British officers.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The duration of this siege was twelve days, or half the time originally calculated upon by the English General, and yet the inexperience both of the engineer and soldier, and the very heavy fire of the place, had caused the works to be more slowly executed than might have been expected; the cold also had impeded the laborers, and yet with a less severe frost the trenches would have been overflowed, because in open weather the water rises everywhere to within six inches of the surface. But the worst obstacle was caused by the disgraceful badness of the cutting tools furnished from the storekeeper-general's office in England: the profits of the contractor seemed to be the only thing respected; the engineers eagerly sought for French implements, because those provided by England were useless.

2. The audacious manner in which Wellington stormed the redoubt of Francisco, and broke ground on the first night of the investment; the more audacious manner in which he assaulted the place before the fire of the defence had been in any manner lessened, and before the counterscarp had been blown in, were the true causes of the sudden fall of the place. Both the military and political state of affairs warranted this neglect of rules. The final success depended more upon the courage of the troops than the skill of the engineer; and when the General terminated his order for the assault, with this sentence, "Ciudad Rodrigo *must* be stormed this evening," he knew well that it would be nobly under-

* Captain Cook's Memoirs, vol. i.

stood. Yet the French fought bravely on the breach, and by their side many British deserters, desperate men, were bayoneted.

3. The great breach was cut off from the town by a perpendicular descent of sixteen feet, and the bottom was planted with sharp spikes, and strewn with live shells; the houses behind were all looped-holed, and garnished with musketeers, and on the flanks there were cuts, not indeed very deep or wide, and the French had left the temporary bridges over them, but behind were parapets so powerfully defended that it was said the third division could never have carried them, had not the light division taken the enemy in flank; an assertion perhaps easier made than proved.

4. The rapid progress of the allies on this occasion has been contrasted with the slow proceedings of Massena in 1810, and the defence of Herrasti has been compared with that of Barrié. But Massena was not pressed for time, and he would have been blamable to have spared labor at the expense of blood. Herrasti also had a garrison of six thousand men, whereas Barrié had less than two thousand, of which only seventeen hundred were able to bear arms, and he had additional works to guard. Nevertheless, his neglect of the lesser breach was a great error; it was so narrow and high that a very slight addition to its defences would have rendered it quite impracticable; and as the deserters told him in the morning of the 19th that the light division was come up, out of its turn, he must have expected the assault and had time to prepare for it. Moreover, the small breach was flanked at a very short distance by a demi-bastion with a parapet, which, though little injured, was abandoned when the head of the storming party had forced their way on to the rampart. But the true way of defending Ciudad was by external operations, and it was not until it fell that the error of Marmont at Elbodon could be judged in its full extent. Neither can that Marshal be in any manner justified for having left so few men in Ciudad Rodrigo; it is certain that with a garrison of five thousand the place would not have been taken, for when there are enough of men the engineer's art cannot be overcome by mere courage.

5. The excesses committed by the allied troops were very disgraceful. The Spanish people were allies and friends, unarmed and helpless, and all these claims were disregarded. "The soldiers were not to be controlled." That excuse will, however, scarcely suffice here, because Colonel Macleod, of the forty-third, a young man of a most energetic spirit, placed guards at the breach, and did constrain his regiment to keep its ranks for a long time after the disorders commenced; but as no previous general mea-

asures had been taken, and no organized efforts made by higher authorities, the men were finally carried away in the increasing tumult.*

CHAPTER IV.

Execution of the French partisans and English deserters found in Ciudad Rodrigo—The works are repaired—Marmont collects his army at Salamanca—Bonnet abandons the Asturias—Souham advances to Matilla—Hill arrives at Castello Branco—The French army harassed by winter marches and by the partidas—Marmont again spreads his divisions—Agueda overflows, and all communication with Ciudad Rodrigo is cut off—Lord Wellington prepares to besiege Badajos—Preliminary measures—Impeded by bad weather—Difficulties and embarrassments arise—The allied army marches in an unmilitary manner towards the Alentejo—Lord Wellington proposes some financial measures—Gives up Ciudad to the Spaniards—The fifth division is left in Beira—Carlos d'España and General Victor Alten are posted on the Yeltes—The Portuguese militia march for the Coa—Lord Wellington reaches Elvas—He is beset with difficulties—Falls sick, but recovers rapidly.

IN Ciudad Rodrigo, papers were found by which it appeared that many of the inhabitants were emissaries of the enemy; all these people Carlos d'España slew without mercy, but of the English deserters, who were taken, some were executed, some pardoned, and the rigor of the Spanish generals was thought to be overstrained.

When order had been restored, workmen were set to repair the breaches and to level the trenches, and arrangements were made to provision the place quickly, for Marmont's army was gathering at Valladolid; that general was however still ignorant that Ciudad had fallen. In the latter end of December, rumor, anticipating the fact, had indeed spoken of an English bridge on the Agueda, and the expedition to Alicant was countermanded; yet the report died away, and Montbrun recommenced his march. But though the bridge was cast on the 1st and the siege commenced on the 8th, on the 12th nothing was known at Salamanca.

On the 11th Marmont arrived at Valladolid; on the 15th he for the first time heard of the siege. His army was immediately ordered to concentrate at Salamanca. Bonnet quitted the Asturias, Montbrun hastened back from Valencia, Dorsenne sent a detachment to aid, and on the 25th six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, being about forty-five thousand in all, were assembled at Salamanca, from whence to Ciudad was four marches.

* Captain Cook's Memoirs, vol. I., p 122.

On the 23d Souham had advanced to Matilla to ascertain the fate of the fortress, but meanwhile five thousand of Hill's troops had reached Castello Branco, and the allies were therefore strong enough to fight beyond the Agueda. Hence, if the siege had even lasted twenty-four days, the place might still have been taken.

The 26th Marmont knew that the fortress was lost, and unable to comprehend his adversary's success, retired to Valladolid. His divisions were thus harassed by ruinous marches in winter; for Montbrun had already reached Arevalo on his return from Valencia, and Bonnet in repassing the Asturian mountains had suffered much from cold and fatigue, and more from the attacks of Porlier, who harassed him without cessation. Sir Howard Douglas immediately sent money and arms to the Asturians, on one flank, and on the other flank, Morillo, who had remained at Horcajo in great peril after his flight from Almagro, took the opportunity to escape by Truxillo; meanwhile Saornil's band cut off a French detachment at Medina del Campo, other losses were sustained from the partidas on the Tietar, and the operations of those in the Rioja, Navarre, and New Castile were renewed. The regular Spanish troops were likewise put in movement. Abadia and Cabrera, advancing from Galicia, menaced Astorga and La Baneza, but the arrival of Bonnet at Benevente soon obliged them to retire again to Puebla de Senabria and Villa Franca; and Silveira, who had marched across the frontier of *Tras os Montes* to aid them, also fell back to Portugal.

Marmont's operations were here again ill judged. He should have taken post at Tamames, or St. Martin de Rio, and placed strong advanced guards at Tenebron and St. Espiritus, in the hills immediately above Ciudad. His troops could have been concentrated at those places the 28th, and on that day such a heavy rain set in, that the trestle bridge at Marialva could not stand, and the river rose two feet over the stone bridge at the town. The allies were then on the left bank, the communication with the town was entirely cut off, the repair of the breaches was scarcely complete, and Ciudad being entirely exposed for several days might have been retaken. But the greatest warriors are the very slaves of fortune!

The English General's eyes were now turned towards Badajos, which he was desirous to invest in the second week of March; because then the flooding of the rivers in Beira would enable him to carry nearly all his forces to the Alemtejo, without risk, and the same rains would impede the junction of the enemy's force in Estremadura. Green forage was to be had in the last province considerably earlier than on the Agueda, and the success of the

contemplated campaign in Andalusia depended upon the operations taking place before the harvest upon the ground should ripen, which was the enemy's resource, and would happen much earlier there than in Leon.

Preliminary measures were already in progress. In December a pontoon bridge, escorted by military artificers and some Portuguese seamen, had been ordered from Lisbon to Abrantes, where draft bullocks were collected to draw it to Elvas. After the fall of Ciudad stores and tools were sent from Lisbon to Setuval, and thence in boats to Alcacer do Sal; and a company of the military artificers, then at Cadiz, were disembarked at Ayamonte to proceed to Elvas, where an engineer officer secretly superintended the preparations for the siege. Meanwhile the repairs of Ciudad went on, two new redoubts were traced out upon the Tesons, the old one was enlarged, and the suburbs were strengthened; but the heavy storms before mentioned impeded these works, and having entirely stopped all communication by sea and land, delayed for many days the preparations for the ulterior operations. When the weather cleared they were renewed, yet other obstacles were not wanting.

The draft bullocks, sinking from want, were unable to drag the whole battering train by the way of Villa Velha, and only sixteen twenty-four pounders and twenty spare carriages could be moved on that line. To supply the deficiency sixteen twenty-four-pounders, then in vessels in the Tagus, were ordered up to Abrantes, and Admiral Berkeley was applied to for twenty ship-guns. He had none of that calibre, and offered eighteen-pounders, which were accepted; but when Major Dickson, who superintended the arrangements for the artillery service, arrived at Lisbon, he found that these were Russian pieces whose bore was too large for English shot, and the Admiral refused to give guns from his own ship, the *Barfleur*, in their place. This apparently capricious proceeding produced both difficulty and delay, because the artillery-men were in consequence obliged to cull the Portuguese shot in the arsenal to obtain a sufficient supply. However, the energy of Major Dickson overcame every obstacle, and in the beginning of March the battering guns, fifty-two in number, the pontoons from Abrantes, and most of the stores from Alcacer do Sal, were parked at Elvas, where also gabions and fascines were piled in great numbers.

Marmont having lost his emissaries at Ciudad Rodrigo, and being unable to measure his adversary's talent and energy, had during these transactions again spread his troops that he might the more easily feed them. Three divisions of infantry and part of the cavalry returned to Talavera and Toledo. Souham occupied

the country from Zamora and Toro to the banks of the Tormes ; and Bonnet, after driving the Gallicians back to Senabria and Villa Franca, remained about Benevente and Astorga. The army of Portugal appeared to dread no further operations on the part of the allies, yet from some secret misgiving, Marmont caused General Foy to march through the Guadalupe, by the pass of St. Vincente, to ascertain whether an army could march by that line from the Tagus to the Guadiana.

This scattering of the French relieved Lord Wellington from a serious embarrassment. The constant difficulty of land transport had prevented him from bringing up the clothing of the army, and he was now obliged to send the regiments to those points on the Mondego, the Douro, and the Tagus, where the clothing had arrived by boats ; hence the march to the Alentejo was necessarily long and unmilitary, and would have been too dangerous to attempt, if Marmont had kept his troops together on the Tormes, with advanced posts pushed towards Ciudad Rodrigo. The weather was now, however, extremely favorable to the allies, and the new Portuguese commissariat supplied the troops on this march well, and without any of those exactions and oppressions which had always before marked the movements of the native troops ; nevertheless, the scarcity was so great that rations of cassava root were served to the Portuguese instead of bread.


The talents of Lord Wellington always rose with his difficulties, but the want of specie crippled every operation. A movement into Spain, such as that now intended against Andalusia, could not be effected without magazines, when there was no harvest on the ground, except by paying ready money ; because it was certain that the Spaniards, however favorably disposed, would never diminish their own secret resources for mere promises of payment. The English General and Mr. Stuart, therefore, endeavored to get British bank notes accepted as cash, by the great merchants of Lisbon and Oporto ; and Lord Wellington, reflecting that, from the enormous sums spent in Portugal, many persons must needs have secret hoards which they would be glad to invest, if they could do it safely, asked for English exchequer-bills to negotiate in the same manner ; intending to pay the interest punctually and faithfully, however inconvenient it might prove at the moment. This plan could not be adopted with Portuguese paper, because the finances were faithlessly managed by the Regency ; but some futile arguments against the proposition were advanced by Lord Liverpool, and money became so scarce that we shall find, even in the midst of victory, the war was more than once like to stop altogether from absolute inability to proceed.

On the 5th of March, the army being well on the way to the Alemtejo, Lord Wellington, who had maintained his head-quarters on the Coa to the last moment, that the enemy might not be awakened to his real designs, gave up Ciudad Rodrigo to Castaños. He also in person, and on the spot, explained to Vives, the governor, the plan and intention of the new works; he supplied him with money to complete them; furnished him with six weeks' provision remaining from the field stores of the British troops, and gave him the reserved store at St. Joa de Pesquiera, on the Douro, from whence Carlos d'España undertook to transport them to the fortress.


As Marmont was at this time in Salamanca, and still ignorant of the allies' march, General Victor Alten's brigade of cavalry was posted on the Yeltes, to screen the allies' movements as long as possible, and he was instructed if Marmont advanced to retire on Beira, and cover the magazines at Castello Branco, by disputing all the rivers and defiles with the enemy's advanced parties. At the same time Silveira was directed to fall back upon the Douro to cover Oporto; the militia, under Trant and J. Wilson, were ordered to concentrate about Guarda, and those of Beira to unite about Castello Branco under Colonel Lecor; the orders of all being the same, namely, to dispute the passage of the rivers and defiles. Trant was to defend those of the Estrella, and Lecor those of Castello Branco, on which town Victor Alten's cavalry was finally to retire if pressed. With these forces, and the Spaniards under Sanchez and España, and with the two fortresses, for Almeida was now capable of defence, Marmont's efforts were not much to be dreaded in that season, after he had lost his battering train in Ciudad.

These things arranged, Wellington set off for Elvas, which he reached the 11th, and prepared to invest Badajos, although neither the troops nor the stores were all arrived; but even this was ten days later than he had designed, and threw his operations into the violent equinoctial rains, by which the difficulties were augmented twofold. This was one of the evils produced by the incredibly vexatious conduct of the Portuguese Regency. There was no want of transport in the country, but as the government would not oblige the magistrates to do their duty, the latter either refused to procure carts for the army, or obliged the poorer classes to supply them, from which oppression the peasants naturally endeavored to escape by flight. Thus, all the arrangements for the investment of Badajos on the 6th of March had been made, but the rich town of Evora, which had not seen the face of an enemy for more than three years, refused to supply any carriages at all, and the operation was necessarily put off till the 17th.





SIEGE OF
BADAJOS
1812.



Drawn by Gen^l Napier

But it was in vain that Wellington threatened and remonstrated, in vain that he employed his time and wasted his mental powers in devising new laws, or remedies for bad ones; it was in vain that Mr. Stuart exerted himself, with equal vigor, to give energy to this extraordinary government; for whether in matters of small or vital importance, insolent anger and falsehood, disgraceful subterfuges and stolid indifference, upon the part of all civil functionaries, from the highest to the lowest, met them at every turn. The responsibility even in small matters became too great for subordinate officers, and the English General was forced to arrange the most trifling details of the service himself; thus the iron strength of his body and mind was strained, until all men wondered how they held, and in truth he did fall sick, but recovered after a few days. The critical nature of the war may be here judged of, for no man could have taken his place at such a moment; no man, however daring or skilful, would have voluntarily plunged into difficulties which were like to drive Wellington from the contest.

CHAPTER V.

The allies cross the Guadiana—Beresford invests Badajos—Generals Graham and Hill command the covering army—Drouet retires to Hornaches in the Llerena—Third English siege of Badajos—Sally of the garrison repulsed—Works impeded by the rain—The besieged rake the trenches from the right bank of the Guadiana—The fifth division is called up to the siege—The river rises and carries away the bridge, and the siege is upon the point of being raised—Two flying bridges are established—The fifth division invest San Christoval and the bridge-head—The Picurina is stormed—The batteries open against the San Roque and the body of the place—The covering army drive General Drouet from the Serena into the Morena on the side of Cordova—Marmont collects his forces in Leon—The Spanish officers and the Portuguese government neglect the supplies of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida—Soult advances from Cordova towards Llerena—The fifth division is brought over the Guadiana—The works of the siege are pressed—An attempt to blow up the dam of the inundation fails—The two breaches become practicable—Soult effects his junction with Drouet and advances to the succor of the place—Graham and Hill fall back—The bridge of Merida is destroyed—The assault is ordered, but countermanded—A third breach is formed—The fortress is stormed with a dreadful slaughter, and the city is sacked by the allies.

THE 15th, the pontoons were laid over the Guadiana, about four miles from Elvas, at a place where the current was dull, two large Spanish boats were arranged as flying bridges; and the 16th, Beresford, who had again joined the army, crossed the river, drove in the enemy's posts, and invested Badajos with the third, fourth,

and eighth divisions, and a brigade of Hamilton's Portuguese ; in all fifteen thousand men.

Soult was then before the Isla, Drouet's division of five thousand men was at Villafranca, and Daricau, with a like force, was at Zalamea de Serena, near Medellin ; wherefore General Graham, passing the Guadiana with the first, sixth, and seventh divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry, directed his march by Valverde and Santa Martha, upon Llerena, while Hill moved from Albuquerque by Merida upon Almendralejos. These covering corps were together thirty thousand strong, nearly five thousand, including the heavy Germans who were at Estremos, being cavalry ; and as the fifth division was now on the march from Beira, the whole army presented about fifty-one thousand sabres and bayonets, of which twenty thousand were Portuguese.* Castaños had repaired to Galicia, but the fifth Spanish army under Morillo and Penne Villemur, being about four thousand strong, passed down the Portuguese frontier to the lower Guadiana, intending to fall on Seville when Soult should advance to the succor of Badajos.

As the allies advanced, Drouet marched by his right to Hornaches, in the direction of La Serena and Medellin, with a view to keep open the communication with Marmont by Truxillo. Hill then halted at Almendralejos, and Graham took post at Zafra, placing Slade's cavalry at Villafranca ; but Marmont had moved his sixth division from Talavera towards Castile, through the Puerto de Pico, on the 9th, and the four divisions and cavalry quartered at Toledo had recrossed the Tagus and marched over the Guadarama, the whole pointing for Valladolid. Thus it was already manifest that the army of Portugal would not act in conjunction with that of the south.

THIRD ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

This fortress has before been described. The garrison, composed of French, Hessian, and Spanish troops, was now near five thousand strong, including sick. Phillipon had since the last siege made himself felt in all directions, for he had continually scourged the vicinity of the place, destroyed many small bands, carried off cattle, almost from under the guns of Élvás and Campo Mayor, and his spies extended their researches from Ciudad Rodrigo to Lisbon, and from Lisbon to Ayamonte.

He had also greatly improved the defences of the place. An interior retrenchment was made in the castle, and many more guns were there mounted ; the rear of fort Christoval was also better secured, and a covered communication from the fort itself to the

* Appendix 13, § 1.

work at the bridge-head was nearly completed. Two ravelins had been constructed on the south side of the town, and a third was commenced, together with counterguards for the bastions; but the eastern front next to the castle, which was in other respects the weakest point, was without any outward protection save the stream of the Rivillas. A "*cunette*" or second ditch had been dug at the bottom of the great ditch, which was also in some parts filled with water; the gorge of the Pardaleras was inclosed, and that outwork was connected with the body of the place, from whence powerful batteries looked into it. The three western fronts were mined, and on the east, the arch of the bridge behind the San Roque was built up to form an inundation, two hundred yards wide, which greatly contracted the space by which the place could be approached with troops. All the inhabitants had been obliged, on pain of being expelled, to lay up food for three months, and two convoys with provisions and ammunition had entered the place on the 10th and 16th of February; but Phillipon's stores of powder were still inadequate to his wants, and he was very scantily supplied with shells.

As the former system of attack against Christoval and the castle was now impracticable, Lord Wellington desired to assail one of the western fronts, which would have been a scientific operation; but the engineer represented that he had neither mortars nor miners, nor enough of guns, nor the means of bringing up sufficient stores for such an attack. Indeed, the want of transport had again obliged the allies to draw the stores from Elvas, to the manifest hazard of that fortress, and hence, here, as at Ciudad Rodrigo, time was necessarily paid for by the loss of life; or rather the crimes of politicians were atoned for by the blood of the soldiers.

The plan finally fixed upon was to attack the bastion of Trinidad, because the counterguard there being unfinished, that bastion could be battered from the hill on which the Picurina stood. The first parallel was therefore to embrace the Picurina, the San Roque, and the eastern front, in such a manner that the counter-batteries there erected might rake and destroy all the defences of the southern fronts which bore against the Picurina hill. The Picurina itself was to be battered and stormed, and from thence the Trinidad and Santa Maria bastions were to be breached; after this all the guns were to be turned against the connecting curtain, which was known to be of weak masonry, that a third breach might be made, and a storming party employed to turn any retrenchments behind the breaches in the bastions. In this way the inundation could be avoided; and although a French deserter declared, and truly, that the ditch was there eighteen feet deep, such was the

General's confidence in his troops, and in his own resources for aiding their efforts, that he resolved to storm the place without blowing in the counterscarp.

The battering train, directed by Major Dickson, consisted of fifty-two pieces. This included sixteen twenty-four-pound howitzers, for throwing Shrapnell shells; but this species of missile, much talked of in the army at the time, was little prized by Lord Wellington, who had early detected its insufficiency, save as a common shell; and partly to avoid expense, partly from a dislike to injure the inhabitants, neither in this, nor in any former siege, did he use mortars. Here indeed he could not have brought them up, for besides the neglect of the Portuguese government, the peasantry, and even the ordenanza employed to move the battering train from Alcacér do Sal, although well paid, deserted.

Of nine hundred gunners present, three hundred were British, the rest Portuguese; and there were one hundred and fifty sappers, volunteers from the third division, who were indeed rather unskilful, but of signal bravery. The engineer's parc was established behind the heights of St. Michael's, and the direction of the siege was given to General Picton. General Kempt, General Colville, and General Bowes alternately commanded in the trenches.

In the night of the 17th, eighteen hundred men, protected by a guard of two thousand, broke ground one hundred and sixty yards from the Picurina. A tempest stifled the sound of their pickaxes, and though the work was commenced late, a communication four thousand feet in length was formed, and a parallel of six hundred yards, three feet deep, and three feet six inches wide, was opened. However, when the day broke the Picurina was reinforced, and a sharp musketry, interspersed with discharges from some field-pieces, aided by heavy guns from the body of the place, was directed on the trenches.

In the night of the 18th two batteries were traced out, the parallel was prolonged both on the right and left, and the previous works were improved. On the other hand, the garrison raised the parapets of the Picurina, and having lined the top of the covered way with sand-bags, planted musketeers there to gall the men in the trenches, who replied in like manner.

The 19th, Lord Wellington, having secret intelligence that a sally was intended, ordered the guards to be reinforced. Nevertheless, at one o'clock some cavalry came out by the Talavera gate, and thirteen hundred infantry, under General Vielland, the second in command, filed unobserved into the communication between the Picurina and the San Roque; a hundred men were prepared to sally from the Picurina itself; and all these troops jumping out at

once, drove the workmen before them, and began to demolish the parallel. Previous to this outbreak, the French cavalry, forming two parties, had commenced a sham fight on the right of the parallel, and the smaller party pretending to fly, and answering Portuguese to the challenge of the piquets, were allowed to pass. Elated by the success of their stratagem, they then galloped to the engineer's parc, which was a thousand yards in the rear of the trenches, and there cut down some men, not many, for succor soon came, and meanwhile the troops at the parallel having rallied upon the relief which had just arrived, beat the enemy's infantry back even to the castle.

In this hot fight the besieged lost above three hundred men and officers, the besiegers only one hundred and fifty; but Colonel Fletcher, the chief engineer, was badly wounded, and several hundred intrenching tools were carried off, for Phillipon had promised a high price for each; yet this turned out ill, because the soldiers, instead of pursuing briskly, dispersed to gather the tools. After the action a squadron of dragoons and six field-pieces were placed as a reserve-guard behind St. Micheal, and a signal-post was established on the Sierra de Venta to give notice of the enemy's motions.

The weather continued wet and boisterous, and the labor of the works was very harassing, but in the night of the 19th the parallel was opened in its whole length, and the 20th it was enlarged; yet a local obstacle, and the flooding of the trenches, rendered the progress slow.

In the night of the 20th the parallel was extended to the left, across the Seville road, and three counter-batteries were commenced; but they were traced in rear of the parallel, partly because the ground was too soft in front to admit of the guns moving, partly for safety, because the batteries were within three hundred yards of the San Roque; and as the parallel, eighteen hundred yards long, was only guarded by fourteen hundred men, a few bold soldiers might, by a sudden rush, have succeeded in spiking the guns if they had been placed in front of the trench. A slight sally was this day repulsed, and a shoulder was given to the right of the parallel, to cover that flank.

The 21st, the enemy placed two field-pieces on the right bank of the Guadiana, designing to rake the trenches; but the shoulder, made the night before, baffled the design, and the riflemen's fire soon sent the guns away. Indications of a similar design against the left flank, from the Pardaleras hill, were also observed, and a guard of three hundred men with two guns was posted on that side in some broken ground.

In the night another battery against the San Roque was commenced, and the battery against the Picurina finished; but heavy rain again retarded the works, and the besiegers having failed in an attempt to drain the lower parts of the parallel by cuts, made an artificial bottom of sand-bags. On the other hand the besieged, thinking the curtain adjoining the castle was the true object of attack, threw up an earthen intrenchment in front, and commenced clearing away the houses behind it. A covered communication from the Trinidad gate to the San Roque, intended to take this supposed attack in reverse, was also commenced; but the labor of digging being too great, it was completed by hanging up brown cloth, which appeared to be earth, and by this ingenious expedient the garrison passed unseen between those points.*

Vauban's maxim, that a perfect investment is the first requisite in a siege, had been neglected at Badajos to spare labor, but the great master's art was soon vindicated by his countrymen. Philipon, finding the right bank of the Guadiana free, made a battery in the night for three field-pieces, which at daylight raked the trenches, and the shots pitching into the parallel, swept it in the most destructive manner for the whole day; there was no remedy, and the loss would have been still greater but for the soft nature of the ground, which prevented the touch and bound of the bullets. Orders were immediately sent to the fifth division, then at Campo Mayor, to invest the place on that side; but these troops were distant, and misfortunes accumulated. In the evening heavy rain filled the trenches, the flood of the Guadiana ran the fixed bridge under water, sank twelve of the pontoons, and broke the tackle of the flying bridges; the provisions of the army could not then be brought over, and the guns and ammunition being still on the right bank, the siege was upon the point of being raised. In a few days, however, the river subsided, some Portuguese craft were brought up to form another flying-bridge, the pontoons saved were employed as row-boats, and in this manner the communication was secured for the rest of the siege without any accident.

The 23d, the besieged continued to work at the intrenchments covering the front next the castle, and the besiegers were fixing their platform, when, at three o'clock, the rain again filled the trenches, the earth being completely saturated with water fell away, the works everywhere crumbled, and the attack was entirely suspended.

The 24th, the fifth division invested the place on the right bank of the Guadiana, the weather was fine, and the batteries were armed with ten twenty-fours, eleven eighteens, and seven five-and-

* Lamarre's Siege of Badajos.

a-half-inch howitzers. The next day, at eleven o'clock, these pieces opened, but they were so vigorously answered, that one howitzer was dismantled, and several artillery and engineer officers were killed. Nevertheless the San Roque was silenced, and the garrison of the Picurina was so galled by the marksmen in the trenches, that no man dared look over the parapet; hence, as the external appearance of that fort did not indicate much strength, General Kempt was charged to assault it in the night.

The outward seeming of the Picurina was, however, fallacious; the fort was very strong; the fronts were well covered by the glacis, the flanks were deep, and the rampart, fourteen feet perpendicular from the bottom of the ditch, was guarded with thick slanting pales above, and from thence to the top there were sixteen feet of an earthen slope. A few palings had, indeed, been knocked off at the covered-way, and the parapet was slightly damaged on that side; but this injury was repaired with sand-bags, and the ditch was profound, narrow at the bottom, and flanked by four splinter-proof casemates. Seven guns were mounted on the works, the entrance to which by the rear was protected with three rows of thick paling, the garrison was above two hundred strong, and every man had two muskets. The top of the rampart was garnished with loaded shells to push over, a retrenched guard-house formed a second internal defence, and finally, some small mines and a loop-holed gallery, under the counterscarp, intended to take the assailants in rear, were begun but not finished.

Five hundred men of the third division being assembled for the attack, General Kempt ordered two hundred, under Major Rudd, of the 77th, to turn the fort on the left; an equal force, under Major Shaw, of the 74th, to turn the fort by the right; and one hundred from each of these bodies were directed to enter the communication with San Roque, and intercept any succors coming from the town. The flanking columns were to make a joint attack on the fort, and the hundred men remaining were placed under Captain Powis, of the 83d, to form a reserve. The engineers, Holloway, Stanway, and Gips, with twenty-four sappers bearing hatchets and ladders, guided these columns, and fifty men of the light division, likewise provided with axes, were to move out of the trenches at the moment of attack.

ASSAULT OF THE PICURINA.

The night was fine, the arrangements clearly and skilfully made, and about nine o'clock the two flanking bodies moved forward. The distance was short, and the troops quickly closed on the fort, which, black and silent before, now seemed one mass of fire; then

the assailants, running up to the palisades in the rear, with undaunted courage endeavored to break through; and when the destructive musketry of the French, and the thickness of the pales, rendered their efforts nugatory, they turned against the faces of the work, and strove to break in there; but the depth of the ditch, and the slanting stakes at the top of the brick-work, again baffled them.

At this time, the enemy shooting fast and dangerously, the crisis appeared imminent, and Kempt sent the reserve headlong against the front. Thus the fight was continued strongly, the carnage became terrible, and a battalion coming out from the town to the succor of the fort, was encountered and beaten by the party on the communication. The guns of Badajos and of the castle now opened, the guard of the trenches replied with musketry, rockets were thrown up by the besieged, and the shrill sound of alarm bells, mixing with the shouts of the combatants, increased the tumult. Still the Picurina sent out streams of fire, by the light of which dark figures were seen furiously struggling on the ramparts; for Powis first escalated the place in front where the artillery had beaten down the pales, and the other assailants had thrown their ladders on the flanks in the manner of bridges, from the brink of the ditch to the slanting stakes, and all were fighting hand to hand with the enemy. Meanwhile the axe-men of the light division, compassing the fort like prowling wolves, discovered the gate, and hewing it down, broke in by the rear. Nevertheless the struggle continued. Powis, Holloway, Gips, and Oates, of the 88th, fell wounded on or beyond the rampart; Nixon, of the 52d, was shot two yards within the gate; Shaw, Rudd, and nearly all the other officers had fallen outside; and it was not until half the garrison were killed, that Gasper Thierry, the commandant, and eighty-six men, surrendered, while some, not many, rushing out of the gate, endeavored to cross the inundation, and were drowned.

The French Governor hoped to have delayed the siege five or six days by the resistance of Picurina, and had the assault been a day later, this would have happened; for the loop-holed gallery in the counterscarp, and the mines, would then have been completed, and the body of the work was too well covered by the glacis to be quickly ruined by fire. His calculations were baffled by this heroic assault, which lasted an hour, and cost four officers and fifty men killed, fifteen officers and two hundred and fifty men wounded; and so vehement was the fight throughout, that the garrison either forgot, or had not time to roll over the shells and combustibles arranged on the ramparts. Phillipon did not conceal the

danger accruing to Badajos from the loss of the Picurina, but he stimulated his soldiers' courage by calling to their recollection how infinitely worse than death it was to be the inmate of an English hulk! an appeal which must have been deeply felt, for the annals of civilized nations furnish nothing more inhuman towards captives of war than the prison ships of England.

When the Picurina was taken, three battalions of reserve advanced to secure it, and although a great turmoil and firing from the town continued until midnight, a lodgment in the works, and a communication with the first parallel, were established, and the second parallel was commenced. However, at daylight the redoubt was so overwhelmed with fire from the town, that no troops could remain in it, and the lodgment was entirely destroyed. In the evening the sappers effected another lodgment on the flanks, the second parallel was then opened in its whole length, and the next day the counter-batteries on the right of the Picurina exchanged a vigorous fire with the town; but one of the besiegers' guns was dismounted, and the Portuguese gunners, from inexperience, produced less effect on the defences than was expected.

In the night of the 27th a new communication from the first parallel to the Picurina was made, and three breaching batteries were traced out. The first, to contain twelve twenty-four-pounders, occupied the space between the Picurina and the inundation, and was to breach the right face of the Trinidad bastion. The second, to contain eight eighteen-pounders, was on the site of the Picurina, and was to breach the left flank of the Santa Maria bastion. The third, constructed on the prolonged line of the front to be attacked, contained three Shrapnel howitzers, to succor the ditch and prevent the garrison working in it; for Phillipon had now discovered the true line of attack, and had set strong parties in the night to raise the counter-guard of the Trinidad and the imperfect ravelin covering the menaced front.

At daybreak these works, being well furnished with gabions and sand-bags, were lined with musketeers, who severely galled the workmen employed on the breaching batteries, and the artillery practice was also brisk on both sides. Two of the besiegers' guns were dismounted, the gabions placed in front of the batteries to protect the workmen were knocked over, and the musketry then became so destructive, that the men were withdrawn and threw up earth from the inside.

In the night of the 27th the second parallel was extended to the right, with the view of raising batteries to ruin the San Roque, to destroy the dam which held up the inundation, and to breach the curtain behind; but the Talavera road proved so hard, and the

moon shone so brightly, that the laborers were quite exposed, and the work was relinquished.

On the 28th the screen of gabions before the batteries was restored, and the workmen resumed their labors outside; the parallel was then improved, and the besieged withdrew their guns from San Roque; but their marksmen still shot from thence with great exactness, and the plunging fire from the castle dismounted two howitzers in one of the counter-batteries, which was therefore dismantled. The enemy had also during the night observed the tracing string which marked the direction of the sap in front of San Roque, and a daring fellow, creeping out just before the workmen arrived, brought it in the line of the castle fire, whereby some loss was sustained ere the false direction was discovered.

In the night the dismantled howitzer battery was re-armed with twenty-four-pounders, to play on the San Roque, and a new breaching battery was traced out on the site of the Picurina, against the flank of the Santa Maria bastion. The second parallel was also carried by the sap across the Talavera road, and a trench was digged for riflemen in front of the batteries.

The 29th a slight sally, made on the right bank of the river, was repulsed by the Portuguese; but the sap at the San Roque was ruined by the enemy's fire, and the besieged continued to raise the counter-guard and ravelin of the Trinidad, and to strengthen the front attacked. On the other hand, the besiegers during the night carried the sap over the Talavera road, and armed two breaching batteries with eighteen-pounders, which the next day opened against the flank of Santa Maria; but they made little impression, and the explosion of an expense magazine killed many men and hurt others.

While the siege was thus proceeding, Soult, having little fear for the town, but expecting a great battle, was carefully organizing a powerful force to unite with Drouet and Daricau. Those generals had endeavored to hold the district of La Serena, with the view of keeping open the communication with Marmont by Medellin and Truxillo; but Graham and Hill marched against their flanks, and forced them into the Morena by the Cordova roads; and on the other side of the country, Morillo and Penne Villemur were lying close on the lower Guadiana, waiting their opportunity to fall on Seville when Soult should advance. Nor were there wanting other combinations to embarrass and delay the French Marshal; for in February General Montes, being detached by Ballesteros from San Roque, had defeated Maransin on the Guadajore river, driving him from Cartama into Malaga. After this the whole of the Spanish army was assembled in the Ronda hills, with a view to fall on Seville by the left of the Guadiana, while Morillo assailed