

General Cuesta's intended march on that evening, leaving my hospital to its fate, were sufficient to induce me to pause and consider our situation, and, at least, not to move before daylight on the 4th; shortly after which time, General Cuesta arrived at Oropesa.

Upon considering our situation at that time, it was evident to me that the combined armies must retire across the Tagus, and that every moment's delay must expose them to the risk of being cut off from their only remaining point of retreat. A battle, even if it had been successful, could not have improved our situation; two battles, or probably three, must have been fought and gained before our difficulties, resulting from the increased strength of the enemy in Estremadura, could be removed. I did not consider the British army, at least, equal to such an exertion at that moment. It is unnecessary to make any observation upon the Spanish army; but the occurrences at Arzobispo, a few days afterwards, showed that they were not equal to any great contest.

M. de Garay complains of the alteration in the line of our operations, and of the sudden changes in the direction of our marches, to which he attributes the deficiency of our supplies, which, in this part of the note, he is disposed to admit that the British army experienced. I know of but one alteration in the plan of operations and in the direction of the march, which was occasioned by the circumstances to which I have just referred.

When intelligence was first received of the arrival of the enemy at Placentia, and of the retreat, without resistance, of the corps appointed to guard the Puerto de Baños, my intention was to move towards Placentia, to attack the enemy's corps which had passed through the Puerto. That intention was altered only when I heard of the numbers of which that corps consisted; and when I found that, by General Cuesta's movement from Talavera, the rear of the army was not secure, that the only retreat was liable to be cut off, and that the enemy had it in their power, and at their option, to join or to attack us in separate bodies.

It could not be attributed to me, that this large reinforcement was allowed to enter Estremadura, or that we had not earlier intelligence of their approach.

The Puerto de Baños was abandoned, without firing a shot, by the Spanish troops sent there to guard it; and the Junta of Castile, if they knew of the collection of the enemy's troops at Salamanca, sent no notice of it; and no notice was in fact received, till the accounts arrived that the enemy had ordered rations at Fuente Noble and Los Santos; and they arrived on the following day. But when the enemy arrived at Naval Moral, in Estremadura, in such strength, and the post of Talavera was abandoned, the Central Junta will find it difficult to convince this country and the world that it was not expedient to alter the plan of our operations and the direction of our march.

But this alteration, instead of aggravating the deficiency of our supplies, ought to have alleviated our distresses, if any measures had been adopted at Seville to supply the British army, in consequence of my letter of the 16th July. The alteration was from the offensive to the defensive: the march was retrograde; and if any supplies had been prepared and sent, the army must have met them on the road, and must have received them sooner. Accordingly, we did meet supplies on the road, but they were for the Spanish army; and although our troops were starving at the time, they were forwarded, untouched, to their destination.

I have sent to Marshal Beresford a copy of that part of M. de Garay's

note which refers to the supplies for the Portuguese army under his command, upon which he will make his observations, which I propose to forward to your Excellency. I shall here, therefore, only repeat that the want of magazines, and the apathy and disinclination of the magistrates and people in Spain to furnish supplies for the armies, even for payment, were the causes that the Portuguese army, as well as the British army, suffered great distress from want, while within the Spanish frontier.

Till the evils, of which I think I have reason to complain, are remedied, till I shall see magazines established for the supply of the armies, and a regular system adopted for keeping them filled, and an army, upon whose exertions I can depend, commanded by officers capable and willing to carry into execution the operations which may have been planned by mutual agreement, I cannot enter upon any system of co-operation with the Spanish armies. I do not think it necessary now to enter into any calculations to show the fallacy of M. de Garay's calculations of the relative numerical strength of the allies, and of the enemy, in the Peninsula; if the fallacy was not so great, as I am certain it is, I should be of the same opinion, respecting the expediency of co-operating with the Spanish troops. But if the British and the Portuguese armies should not actively co-operate with them, they will at least do them no injury; and if M. de Garay is not mistaken, as I believe he is, in his calculations of numbers; and if the Spanish armies are in a state of efficiency in which they are represented to be, and which they ought to be, to invite our co-operation, the deficiency of thirty-six thousand men, which the British and Portuguese armies might add to their numbers, can be no objection to their undertaking, immediately, the operations which M. de Garay is of opinion would give to his countrymen the early possession of those blessings for which they are contending. I have the honor to be, &c.,

(Signed)

WELLINGTON.

No. XIV.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL HILL TO SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Camp, August 17, 1809.

SIR,—I beg leave to report to you that the parties sent out by the officers of my division, yesterday, to procure forage, were, in more instances than one, opposed by the Spaniards. The following circumstances have been made known to me, and I take the liberty of repeating them for your Excellency's information.

My servants were sent about three leagues on the Truxillo road, in order to get forage for me; and after gathering three mule loads, a party of Spanish soldiers, consisting of five or six, came up to them with their swords drawn, and obliged them to leave the corn they had collected. My servants told me, that the same party fired two shots towards other British men employed in getting forage. The assistant-commissary of my division likewise states to me, that the

I have the honor to be, &c.,

(Signed)

R. HILL, Major-General.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM COLONEL STOPFORD TO LIEUT.-GEN. SHERBROOKE.

Jaraceijo, August 16, 1809.

SIR,—I beg leave to inform you that I have just received intimations of some Spaniards having fired at some of the guards, for taking some forage. As there is no forage given us by the commissary, I wish to know what I am to do, in order to get some for the horses.

(Signed) E. STOPFORD, Second Brigade of Guards.

No. XV.

SECTION I.—GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN THE PENINSULA,

EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS.

King Joseph commanding, 1st October, 1809.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Absent.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Hospital.	Prisoners.	Men.	Cavalry.	Draught.
180,814	28,091	10,407	8,165	46,109	4,124	237,330	23,196	8,060
		Deduct for the governments.....				10,407		8,165
		Real total.....				226,923		28,091

15th July, 1810.

273,408	52,336	29,462	7,846	47,107	4,915	349,972	41,848	18,334
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In march to join.

6,121	736	636	...	6,757		736
<u>279,524</u>	<u>53,072</u>	<u>29,462</u>	<u>7,846</u>	<u>47,743</u>	<u>4,915</u>	<u>356,729</u>		<u>60,918</u>

15th August, 1810.

279,639	52,063	25,340	6,017	46,982	5,995	351,961	41,446	16,634
In march to join						1,957	681	511
Total effective in Spain						353,918	42,127	17,145
Troops destined for Spain, quartered on the frontier						16,006	1,447	...
Grand total.....						369,924	43,574	17,145

Note.—By this state it appears that allowance being made for casualties, the reinforcements for Spain, in consequence of the peace with Austria, were not less than one hundred and fifty thousand men.

15th January, 1811.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Absent.</i>		<i>Effectives.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Hospital.		Men.	Cavalry.	Draught.
295,227	52,462	17,780	4,714	48,831		361,858	41,189	15,987

15th April, 1811.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Absent.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Hospital.	Men.	Cavalry.	Draught.
276,575	46,990	15,121	2,166	40,079	331,776	37,855	11,301

These states show a decrease of nearly thirty thousand men in three months. During this period the siege of Badajos, the retreat of Massena, the battles of the Gebora, Barosa, and Fuentes Onoro took place. Hence if the deaths in hospital be added to the losses sustained in those operations we shall find that, at the period of its greatest activity, the guerilla system was more harassing than destructive to the French army.

SECTION II.—STATE OF THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL.

April, 1810.—Head-quarters, Caceres. Massena, Prince of Esling, commanding.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hosp. Pris'nrs.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cavalry.	Draught.
2d corps d'armée....	13,372	4,449	1,119	132	1,623	7	21,126	3,520	1,061
6th ditto	33,759	10,159	496	110	5,086	349	39,690	7,140	3,129
8th ditto	28,045	7,070	25	..	5,976	99	34,145	5,312	1,758
Total active army...	80,176	21,678	1,640	242	12,690	455	94,961	15,972	5,948
Imperial guards	17,380	3,800	174	15	733	..	18,237	2,831	984
Province of St. Ander	13,464	752	276	..	1,774	377	15,891	752	..
Prov. of Valladolid..	4,509	124	123	..	359	145	6,136	..	124
Total under Mas- sena's command, }	115,529	26,354	2,213	257	16,056	977	135,275	19,555	7,056

15th May, 1810.

Etat major et gens-d'arme, }	229	241	229	241	..
2d corps Reynier..	16,903	2,921	992	231	1,337	42	19,232	2,186	966
6th do. Ney.....	28,883	5,421	1,224	964	4,940	357	35,067	2,152	4,233
8th do. Junot.....	20,782	4,223	7	30	5,642	75	26,431	2,142	2,116
Reserve of caval- ry, Montbrun,.. }	4,776	4,851	246	189	95	..	5,117	5,040	..
Total active army..	71,573	17,662	2,469	1,414	12,014	474	86,847	11,761	7,315

15th August, 1810.

Etat major, &c.....	199	222	3	..	202	222	..
2d corps.....	16,418	2,894	2,494	397	3,006	..	21,918	1,969	1,304
6th corps.....	23,456	2,466	1,655	577	5,541	193	30,862	1,701	1,372
8th corps.....	18,803	2,959	436	169	4,996	98	24,235	2,016	1,112
Reserve of cavalry	4,146	4,322	1,188	831	157	31	5,441	4,997	246
Artillerie et genie du siege,..... }	2,724	2,969	206	159	409	..	3,339	..	8,123
Total active army..	65,746	15,862	6,139	2,119	14,112	302	85,997	10,315	7,162
4th Government, Valladolid,....	12,693	3,045	639	20	1,775	641	15,107	2,931	134
Division Scrras, Asturias et St. An- der. Bonnet,.. }	12,913	..	1,394	15	1,578	107	14,885	434	..
Total under Mas- sena,	91,352	18,907	8,172	2,154	17,465	1,050	115,959	14,180	7,296
9th corps, Drouet, Comte D'Erlon, }	19,144	2,436	24	..	3,147	..	22,315	2,436	..
General total	110,496	21,343	8,196	2,154	20,612	1,050	138,304	16,616	7,296

Army of Portugal, 27th September, 1810. The 9th corps to the 15th October.

The reserve of cavalry, and the artillery of siege to the 1st September only.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>		<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Cavalry.	Dranght.	
Etat major.....	192	219	4	196	219
2d corps.....	16,575	2,921	2,397	287	2,214	21,186	1,872	1,336	..
6th ditto.....	23,224	2,478	1,708	600	5,418	30,350	1,730	1,343	..
8th ditto.....	18,807	2,958	668	140	4,666	24,126	2,027	1,071	..
Reserve of cavalry.....	4,146	4,322	1,138	831	157	5,441	4,907	246	..
Artillery of siege.....	3,022	3,115	206	159	409	3,637	146	3,123	..
Battalion of march which quitted Bayonne the 22d of October.....	474	16	..	474	16
Total.....	65,966	16,013	6,586	2,033	12,858	85,410	10,917	7,129	..
9th corps.....	19,062	2,072	413	..	3,516	22,991	1,755	817	..
Division Serras.....	8,586	1,015	269	35	1,750	10,605	1,050
Grand total.....	93,614	19,100	7,268	2,068	18,124	119,006	13,722	7,446	..

Army of Portugal—1st January, 1811.

Head-quarters, Torres Novas.

Second corps, Head-quarters, Santarem.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>		<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Cavalry.	Dranght.	
Merle's division, 9 battalions.	4,368	..	150	..	1,549	6,067
Heudelet's do. 12 do.	5,718	..	451	..	2,646	8,815
Lt. cavalry, Sout, 15 squadr's	1,146	993	523	537	231	1,900	1,530
Artillery and engineers.....	1,284	1,121	52	9	89	1,425	112	1,018	..
Total.....	12,516	2,114	1,176	546	4,515	13,207	1,642	1,018	..

Sixth corps, Thomar.

Marchand, 11 battalions....	4,987	28	529	..	1,121	6,637	28
Mermet's, 11 do.....	6,252	..	743	..	1,077	8,104
Loison, 12 do.....	4,589	..	1,037	..	3,291	8,917
Light cavalry, Lamotte, 7 squadrans.....	652	651	663	663	117	1,432	1,314
Artillery and engineers, 23 companies.....	1,769	1,372	47	78	165	1,981	52	1,393	..
Total.....	18,249	2,051	3,019	741	5,771	27,071	1,394	1,393	..

Eighth corps, Pernes.

Clausel, 11 battalions.....	4,007	18	434	..	3,989	8,627	18
Solignac, 14 do.....	4,997	..	1,953	..	3,337	10,346
St. Croix's dragoons, 12 squadrans.....	981	1,024	698	698	233	1,917	1,722
Artillery and engineers.....	1,106	859	24	4	392	1,522	151	712	..
On leave.....	206
Total.....	11,091	1,901	3,159	702	7,956	22,618	1,891	712	..

Montbrun, Ourem.

Reserve of cavalry, 24 squadrans with artillery.....	2,729	2,871	1,486	1,466	178	4,533	4,337
Artillery, engineers and equipage of the army.....	1,546	614	283	2,090	614

Ninth corps Leiria.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>		<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cav.	Dr'ght.	
Claparede, 15 battalions, } Almeida.....	7,863	11	369	..	482	8,714	
Conroux, 12 do., Leiria....	7,592	27	447	..	1,299	9,388	27	
Fournier's cavalry, 7 squa- drons at Toro.....	1,698	1,591	60	67	114	1,872	1,658	
Artillery and engineers, Ciudad Rodrigo.....	670	464	..	72	742	..	464	
Total.....	17,823	2,093	876	189	2,637	19,924	2,149	

Note.—Salamanca constituted a government containing the towns of Alba de Tormes, Penaranda, and Salamanca, in which were deposited the sick men, stragglers, equipages, and dépôts of the army of Portugal. The total amounting to 2,354 men and 1,102 horses.

	<i>Present under arms.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.
General total of the army of Portugal in the position of Santarem.....	46,171	9,551
Ninth corps.....	17,823	2,093
Deduct troops of the ninth corps not in Portugal.....	63,994	11,644
* Real number under Massena.....	10,381	2,066
	53,763	9,573

Army of Portugal—1st April, 1811.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>		<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Horses.	
8th corps, Junot.....	13,448	..	992	..	5,719	20,159	
6th do. Marmont.....	13,934	..	1,374	..	1,576	16,934	
2d do. Reynier.....	10,837	..	1,350	..	4,318	16,505	
Artillery and Engineers, Mont-brun.	{ Dragoon, 23 squadrons.....	4,173	4,404	4,173	4,404	
	{ Light cavalry, 14 squadrons... 3,636	3,636	8,906	38	3,636	8,906	..	
	{ 1 squadron of gens-d'armes... 190	190	72	5	102	72	..	
	{ Foot ar- } Almeida and } tillery. } Rodrigo... }	936	88	1,055	
	{ Horse artillery.....	410	425	23	453	425	..	
	{ Artillery of the train.....	2,181	2,378	237	2,448	2,378	..	
	{ Workmen.....	259	25	295	
	{ Engineers.....	1,448	60	140	1,623	
	{ Military equipage.....	596	897	60	668	897	..	
	{ Total artilleries, engineers, &c.....	5,969	3,395	573	6,542	2,760	..	
Total of infantry.....	37,269	..	3,716	..	11,613	52,598		
Total of cavalry.....	7,999	8,382	43	7,911	8,382	..		
General total.....	51,237	11,717	8,716	..	12,229	68,051	11,142	

Note.—In the imperial rolls there was no state of the army of Portugal for May. Two divisions of the ninth corps, directed to be added to the army of Portugal, are included in the state for April, and the Prince of Esling was empowered to distribute the cavalry as he pleased, provided the brigade of General Fournier, from the ninth corps, was kept in the reserve. The detached men were in the government of Salamanca. On the 1st of June, however, the army of Portugal is returned as present under arms 44,548 men, 7,253 horses, and 4,620 men detached. Hence, I have estimated the number of fighting men and officers, including the imperial guards, at Fuentes Onoro, at 45,000, a number, perhaps, too great, when the artificers, engineers, &c., are deducted.

Note.—Since the above was published, Massena's letters in Belmas' Journals of Sieges have appeared; he calls his army only 35,000 of all

arms; because Clausel's division was detached to keep up the communication between Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca; the whole present must however have been stronger, if Bessières' troops be reckoned; yet I have certainly set the cavalry too high—there could not have been more than *four* thousand in the field.

SECTION III.—ARMY OF THE SOUTH—SOULT, DUKE OF DALMATIA,
COMMANDING.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>		<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Cav.	Dr'ght.		
1st of January	55,002	12,092	5,744	1,999	6,412	67,758	10,868	3,223		
15th of May	75,133	13,124	3,915	1,336	11,420	90,468	12,156	2,304		
Deduct the troops of the 9th corps in march from the north	11,917	1,619	13,310	1,220	899		
Real total of the army of the south	63,216	11,505	3,915	1,336	11,420	77,158	10,936	1,905		

SECTION IV.

Fifth corps, 15th January.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.
	18,766	6,153	3,035	640

16 Decembre, 1810, le duc de Dalmatie va faire le siège de Badajos, avec tout le 5^{me} corps d'armée, 3 regiments de cavalerie, formant 2,600 chevaux pris dans les 1^{ere} et 5^{me} corps d'armée sous les ordres de général Latour Maubourg, 900 hommes du 63^{me} regiment de ligne, 2 compagnies d'artillerie légère, 4 compagnies de sapeurs, 1 compagnie de mineurs, et trois escadrons de cavalerie Espagnol.

SECTION V.

First corps before Cadiz.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>		<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Cav.	Train.		
15th February, 1811	20,572	1,886	1,331	681	1,254	23,457	1,495	1,072		
Reinforcement in march from the Governments	5,209	775	743	5,952	712	63		
Total	25,781	2,661	1,331	681	1,997	29,409	2,207	1,035		
4th corps, 15th February	16,703	4,007	741	397	1,699	19,143	3,612	792		
Reinforcement in march from the Governments	6,020	1,457	873	6,890	1,457	..		
Total	22,723	5,464	741	397	2,572	26,033	5,069	792		

Note.—A reinforcement of more than one thousand men likewise joined the fifth corps while in front of Badajos.

SECTION VI.—ARMY OF THE NORTH—BESSIERES, DUKE OF ISTRIA,
COMMANDING.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>		<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cav.	Train.			
1st February, 1811	58,515	8,874	1,992	6,860	67,767	7,979	1,073			
15th April, 1811	53,143	6,930	2,221	5,350	60,719	6,065	879			

SECTION VII.—ARMÉE IMPÉRIALE DU MIDI DE L'ESPAGNE, 1^{re} CORPS.
Situation des présents sous les armes à l'époque du 22nd Mars, 1811.

Designation des Divisions.	Regimens	Etat des présens sous les armes.		Dans les Forts et Redoutes.		Emplacement des Troupes dans les Forts et Redoutes.		Disponibles.
		9 ^{me} Infanterie ligne	1,000	400	1,000	Sta. Maria.		
1	24 ^{me} do.	do.	800	400	1,000	Sta. Maria.	
	96 ^{me} do.	do.	1,100	Depuis et compris le Fort St. Catharine jusqu'au Rio St. Petro.....	400	Do.	
	16 ^{me} do.	do.	350	850	1,100	Do. San Lucar, Est, Chiconia la Viala Atta.	
	8 ^{me} do.	do.	713	Xeres et la Cartuxa.....	713	Fort Reale au Trocadero.	
	45 ^{me} do.	do.	1,072	744	Depuis et compris le Fort Napoleon jusqu'à Chiese fe.....	328	Port Reale.
2	54 ^{me} do.	do.	820	820	Chiclana.	
	Bataillon d'Elite.....	do.	236	236	do.	
	27 ^{me} Infanterie ligne.....	do.	1,400	1,400	do.	
	63 ^{me} do.	do.	845	845	Port Reale.	
3	94 ^{me} do.	do.	1,500	650	Port Reale.	
	95 ^{me} do.	do.	1,414	472	Chiclana.	
Régiment de Marine.	43 ^{me} Bataillon de Marine	do.	900	900	do.	
	2 ^e do. d'Ouvriers	do.	615	615	do.	
Cavalerie.	5 ^e Chasseurs.....	do.	320	Vejer et Conil.	
	1 ^e de Dragons.....	do.	230	50	180 Xeres.	
	2 ^e do.....	do.	218	72	146 Arcos.	
Artillerie.	à pied à Cheval.....	do.	678	500	178 Santa Maria, Puerto	
	Sapeurs.....	do.	323	323	[Reale, et Chiclana.	
	Mineurs.....	do.	77	77	
			14,611	5,153			9,458

By this return, which is not extracted from the imperial rolls, but was found amongst Colonel Lejeune's intercepted papers, it appears that Victor had above nine thousand disposable troops seventeen days after the battle of Barrosa. He must, therefore, have had about eleven thousand disposable before that action, and Cassagne's detachment being deducted leaves about nine thousand for the battle.

SECTION VIII.—STATE OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN TROOPS ON THE COA, 25TH APRIL, 1811, EXTRACTED FROM THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S RETURNS.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Sick.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>	
	Men.		Men.		Men.	
Cavalry 4 regiments.....	1,525		274		542	
Infantry 41 battalions.....	20,700		8,880		3,214	
Artillery.....	1,378		144		1,156	
Total of all arms.....	23,603		9,298		4,912	
Guns.....24 British, 18 Portuguese.....					Total, 42	

Note.—There are no separate returns of the army engaged in the battle of Fuentes Onoro. Hence, the above is only an approximation to the numbers of British and German troops; but if the Portuguese and the partida of Julian Sanchez be added, the whole number in line will be about thirty-five thousand men of all arms.

No. XVI.

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

SECTION I.

“November 30, 1809.

“I inclose copies and extracts of a correspondence which I have had with Mr. Frere on the subject of the co-operation of the British army with the corps of the Duke of Albuquerque and the Duke del Parque in this plan of diversion.

“Adverting to the opinion which I have given to his Majesty's ministers and the ambassador at Seville, it will not be supposed that I could have encouraged the advance of General Areizaga, or could have held out the prospect of any co-operation by the British army.

“The first official information which I had from the government of the movement of General Areizaga was on the 18th, the day before his defeat, and I gave the answer on the 19th regarding the plan of which I now inclose a copy.

“I was at Seville, however, when the General commenced his march from the Sierra Morena, and in more than one conversation with the Spanish ministers and members of the Junta, I communicated to them my conviction that General Areizaga would be defeated. The expectation, however, of success from this large army, stated to consist of fifty thousand men, was so general and so sanguine that the possibility of disappointment was not even contemplated, and accordingly your Lordship will find that, on the 10th only, the government began to think it necessary to endeavor to make a diversion in favor of General Areizaga, and it is probable that it was thought expedient to make this diversion only in consequence of the fall of the General's own hopes, after his first trial with the enemy on the night of the 10th instant.”—“I am anxious to cross the Tagus with the British army and to station it on the frontiers of Old Castile, from thinking that the point in which I can be of most use in preventing the enemy from effecting any im-

portant object, and which best answers for my future operations in the defence of Portugal. With this view, I have requested Mr. Frere to urge the government to reinforce the Duke d'Albuquerque's corps, in order to secure the passage of the lower part of the Tagus. And, although the state of the season would render it desirable that I should make the movement at an early period, I do not propose to make it till I shall see most clearly the consequences of that defeat, and some prospect that the city of Seville will be secure after I shall move."

SECTION II.

"December 7, 1809.

"——— I had urged the Spanish government to augment the army of the Duke d'Albuquerque to twenty thousand men, in order that it might occupy, in a sufficient manner, the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz and the passes through the mountains leading from Arzobispo to Truxillo, in which position they would have covered effectually the province of Estremadura, during the winter at least, and would have afforded time and leisure for preparations for farther opposition to the enemy, and I delayed the movement, which I have long been desirous of making, to the northward of the Tagus, till the reinforcements could be sent to the Duke d'Albuquerque, which I had lately recommended should be drawn from the army of the Duke del Parque. During the discussions upon the subject, the government have given orders to the Duke d'Albuquerque to retire with his corps behind the Guadiana, to a position which he cannot maintain, thus leaving open the road into Estremadura, and incurring the risk of the loss of that province whenever the enemy choose to take possession of it."

SECTION III.

"January 31, 1810.

"——— There is no doubt that, if the enemy's reinforcements have not yet entered Spain, and are not considerably advanced within the Spanish frontiers, the operation which they have undertaken is one of some risk, and I have maturely considered of the means of making a diversion in favor of the allies, which might oblige the enemy to reduce his force in Andalusia, and would expose him to risk and loss in this quarter. But the circumstances, which are detailed in the inclosed copy of a letter to Mr. Frere, have obliged me to refrain from attempting this operation at present. I have not, however, given up all thoughts of it, and I propose to carry it into execution hereafter, if circumstances will permit."

SECTION IV.

"January 12, 1811.

"My former despatch will have informed your Lordship that I was apprehensive that the Spanish troops in Estremadura would not make any serious opposition to the progress which it was my opinion the enemy would attempt to make in that province; but as they had been directed to destroy the bridges on the Guadiana, at Merida and Medellin, and preparations had been ordered for that purpose, and to defend the passage of the Guadiana as long as was practicable, I was in hopes that the enemy would have been delayed at least for some days before he should be allowed to pass that river. But I have been disappointed in that expectation, and the town and bridge of Merida appear to have been given up to an advanced guard of cavalry."

SECTION V.

"January 19, 1811.

"At the moment when the enemy entered Estremadura from Seville General Ballesteros received an order from the Regency, dated the 21st December last, directing him to proceed with the troops under his command into the Condado de Niebla. The force in Estremadura was thus diminished by one-half, and the remainder are considered insufficient to attempt the relief of the troops in Olivenza.

"The circumstances which I have above related will show your Lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate operations with corps so ill-organized, in possession of so little intelligence, and upon whose actions so little reliance can be placed. It will scarcely be credited that the first intelligence which General Mendizabel received of the assembly of the enemy's troops at Seville was from hence; and if any combination was then made, either for retreat or defence, it was rendered useless, or destroyed by the orders from the Regency, to detach General Ballesteros into the Condado de Niebla, which were dated the 21st December, the very day on which Soult broke up from Cadiz, with a detachment of infantry, and marched to Seville."

SECTION VI.

"February 2, 1811.

"The various events of the war will have shown your Lordship that no calculation can be made on the result of any operation in which the Spanish troops are engaged. But if the same number of troops of any other nation (ten thousand) were to be employed on this operation, (the opening the communication with Badajos,) I should have no doubt of their success, or of their ability to prevent the French from attacking Badajos with the forces which they have now employed on this service."

SECTION VII.

"February 9, 1811.

"General Mendizabel has not adhered to the plan which was ordered by the late Marquis de la Romana, which provided for the security of the communication with Elvas before the troops should be thrown to the left of the Guadiana. I don't believe that the strength of the enemy, on either side of the Guadiana, is accurately known, but if they should be in strength on the right of that river, it is to be apprehended that the whole of the troops will be shut up in Badajos, and I have reason to believe that this place is entirely unprovided with provisions, notwithstanding that the siege of it has been expected for the last year."

SECTION VIII.

"February 23, 1811.

"Although experience has taught me to place no reliance upon the effect of the exertions of the Spanish troops, notwithstanding the frequent instances of their bravery, I acknowledge that this recent disaster has disappointed and grieved me much. The loss of this army and its probable consequences, the fall of Badajos, have materially altered the situation of the allies in this part of the Peninsula, and it will not be an easy task to place them in the situation in which they were, much less in that in which

they would have been, if the misfortune had not occurred. I am concerned to add to this melancholy history, that the Portuguese brigade of cavalry did not behave much better than the other troops. Brigadier-General Madden did every thing in his power to induce them to charge, but in vain."—"The operations of the guerillas continue throughout the interior; and I have proofs that the political hostility of the people of Spain towards the enemy is increasing rather than diminishing. But I have not yet heard of any measure being adopted to supply the regular funds to pay and support an army, or to raise one."

SECTION IX.

March 21, 1811.

"It (Campo Mayor) had been given over to the charge of the Marquis of Romana, at his request, last year. But, lately, the Spanish garrison had been first weakened and then withdrawn, in a manner not very satisfactory to me, nor consistent with the honorable engagements to defend the place into which the Marquis entered when it was delivered over to his charge. I am informed, however, that Marshal Bessières has collected at Zamora about seven thousand men, composed principally of the imperial guard, and of troops taken from all the garrisons in Castile. He thus threatens an attack upon Galicia, in which province there are, I understand, sixteen thousand men under General Mahi; but, from all I hear, I am apprehensive that that General will make no defence, and that Galicia will fall into the hands of the enemy."

SECTION X.

May 7, 1811.

"Your Lordship will have observed, in my recent reports of the state of the Portuguese force, that their numbers are much reduced, and I don't know what measure to recommend which will have the effect of restoring them. All measures recommended to the existing government in Portugal are either rejected, or are neglected, or are so executed as to be of no use whatever; and the countenance which the Prince Regent of Portugal has given to the governors of the kingdom, who have uniformly manifested this spirit of opposition to every thing proposed for the increase of the resources of the government and the amelioration of their military system, must tend to aggravate these evils. The radical defect, both in Spain and Portugal, is want of money to carry on the ordinary operations of the government, much more to defray the expenses of such a war as that in which we are engaged."

"I have not received the consent of Castaños and Blake to the plan of co-operation which I proposed for the siege of Badajos; and I have been obliged to write to Marshal Beresford to desire him to delay the siege till they will positively promise to act as therein specified, or till I can go to him with a reinforcement from hence."

"Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be, upon which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are to be offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commander must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish authorities; by which means alone he will be enabled to draw some resources from the country, and some assistance from the Spanish armies."

SECTION XI.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Stuart to Lord Wellesley, relative to Disputes with the Patriarch and Souza.

“Sept. 8, 1810.

“I could have borne all this with patience, if not accompanied by a direct proposal that the fleet and transports should quit the Tagus, that the Regency should send an order to Marshal Beresford to dismiss his Quarter-master-General and military secretary, followed by a reflection on the persons composing the family of that officer, and by hints to the same purpose respecting the Portuguese who are attached to Lord Wellington.”

SECTION XII.

Letter from Sir J. Moore to Major-General M'Kenzie, commanding in Portugal.

Salamanca, 29th November, 1808.

SIR,—The armies of Spain, commanded by Generals Castaños and Blak, the one in Biscay and the other in Aragon, have been beaten and dispersed. This renders my junction with Sir David Baird's corps impracticable, but if it were, I cannot hope, with the British alone, to withstand the formidable force which France has brought against this country; and there is nothing else now in Spain to make head against it.

I have ordered Sir David Baird to fall back on Coruña, re-embark, and proceed to the Tagus; I myself, with the corps which marched from Lisbon, mean to retire by Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida, and, by taking up such positions as offer, endeavor to defend, for a time, the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon. But, looking forward that this cannot be done for any considerable time against superior numbers, it becomes necessary for me to give you this notice, that you may embark the stores of the army, keeping on shore as little as possible that may impede a re-embarkation of the whole army both now with you and that which I am bringing.

We shall have great difficulties on the frontier for subsistence; Colonel Murray wrote on this subject to Colonel Donkin yesterday, that supplies might be sent to us to Abrantes and Coimbra. Some are already at Oporto, and more may be sent. I have desired Sir D. Baird, if he has with him a victualler, of small draft of water, to send her there. On the subject of provisions the Commissary-General will write more in detail, and I hope you will use your influence with the government of Portugal to secure its aid and assistance. It will be right to consider with the Portuguese officers and engineers what points may be immediately strengthened and are most defensible, and what use you can make of the troops with you to support me in my defence of the frontiers, and I shall be glad to hear from you upon this subject. I cannot yet determine the line I shall take up, but generally it will be Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico, Viseu. The Portuguese, on their own mountains, can be of much use, and I should hope, at any rate, that they will defend the *Tras os Montes*. Mr. Kennedy will probably write to Mr. Erskine, who now had better remain at Lisbon; but, if he does not write to him, this, together with Colonel Murray's letter to Colonel Donkin, will be sufficient for you and Mr. Erskine to take means for securing to us not only a supply of biscuit and salt provisions, but the supplies of the country for ourselves and horses, &c. In order to alarm as little as possible, it may be said that more troops are expected from England,

to join us through Portugal; this will do at first, but gradually the truth will, of course, be known. I am in great want of money, and nothing else will secure the aid of the country.

I have the honor to be, &c.

J. MOORE.

P. S. Elvas should be provisioned.

No. XVII.

EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF VARIOUS PERSONS RELATIVE TO CADIZ, MSS.

SECTION I.

*Extract of a Letter from Mr. C. B. Vaughan, Secretary of Legation at
Cadiz, to Mr. C. Stuart.*

“March 6, 1810.

“I received your letter of 22d February. It was indeed time that a little common sense should be substituted in that country (Portugal) for that supreme humbug with which the Portuguese have hitherto been treated.”*

“When the French *passed the Morena*, 20th January, the Supreme Junta gave orders for the provincial Juntas to *provide for the defence of the provinces, and permitted the demolition of the forts commanding the bay of Cadiz*; at the same time the Junta stole away from Seville for Isla de Leon. Romana and Bartholomew Frere remained till 24th January, Seville being in commotion, demanding that the Supreme Junta should be abolished. Montijo and Palafox released from prison, and the former sent an order to Romana to appear before the revolutionary Junta. He was desired to take the command of Seville; according to B. Frere’s account a most perilous post, as the people had no arms. Why was this fact not known after the defeat of Ocaña? And why also were the immense stores of cannon, ammunition, &c., &c., accumulated at Seville, not moved to Cadiz? Romana, to avoid the defence of Seville, got appointed to bring down Del Parque’s army to the defence of the city, and the people appointed a military Junta, namely, Castaños, Montijo, Palafox, and Romana.

“Frere set off for Cadiz, and at Xeres found the *President, Vice-President* and Cornel, imprisoned by order of the people of Seville. January 26th, the authority of the Supreme Junta of Seville was disavowed at Cadiz, and a Junta of defence elected, and on the 30th, the Supreme Junta assembled to nominate a Regency, namely, Castaños, Escano, Savaedra, Bishop of Orense, and Lardizabal, a deputy to the Cortes recently arrived from Mexico. 3rd. Cadiz saved from being surprised by the French by the arrival of Albuquerque. 4th. The French appeared at the bridge of Zuazo.”—“I never felt so little hope of Spanish independence as at this moment. It is not the rapid advance of the French into Andalusia that makes me despair, but *the manner in which they have been received by the people*. Seville, Cordoba, Jaen, Granada, and Malaga surrendered to them without firing a shot, by the inhabitants, Joseph Bonaparte studiously endeavoring to profit from this dispirited state of the people to conciliate them. Three thousand Spaniards, well paid, well clothed, and well fed, *at this moment doing duty at Seville*

* This refers to Mr. Canning’s system of diplomacy.

in his service; while upon this last spot of ground that remains, a government has been established professing indeed to act upon very different principles to the last, but without having yet accomplished one single act that can tend to procure them the confidence of the people; protected by a Spanish force, wretchedly clothed, their pay in arrear to an immense amount, and by no means well fed. We now hear of disciplining an army, but very little has been done towards it since the arrival of the troops in the Sota. Depend upon it *Cadiz must be defended by the English.*"

SECTION II.

Mr. C. B. Vaughan to Mr. C. Stuart.

"Cadiz, March 28, 1810.

"The quarrel between the Duke of Albuquerque and the Junta has ended. The Duke is going to England on a special mission, and Whittingham proposes to go with him. Depend upon it they will do their best to get out to South America. But the Duke is so weak a man, so hasty, and so much the dupe of others, that I cannot think it prudent to give him any assistance in such views."

SECTION III.

Mr. C. B. Vaughan to Mr. C. Stuart.

"The pontoon ran upon the French coast with 34 staff-officers, 337 officers, and 348 soldiers, French prisoners of war. The boats were under the *bestly* necessity of firing into her, while the poor devils were attempting to escape, and at last she was set fire to before all the prisoners had been able to get ashore. To me this is a most disgusting event in war; there were also eleven officers' wives on board!"

General Graham to Mr. Stuart.

"May 18, 1810.

"You will hear of the escape of a great number of French officers by the pontoon, they were confined in going adrift in a gale the other night."—*"The Spaniards are very angry, and regret that this hulk was not set on fire before the prisoners got on shore. I am afraid our gun-boats fired into her, but I was glad to hear that our officer of artillery at Puntales, who had the care of the upper batteries, (where the only two guns of the fort that could be brought to bear on the hulk were,) refused to fire on the poor devils, many of them most unjustly confined since the battle of Baylen!"*

Mr. Vaughan to Mr. Stuart.

"June 2, 1810.

"Another pontoon went on shore a few days ago, on the French side of the bay. It was the hospital-ship, and so severe a fire was kept up on it by our boats that few of the prisoners escaped, and many were burnt to death when the hulk took fire. I like not such scenes, but we always continue to get the greatest possible share of odium for the least possible good."

SECTION IV.

Extract from the Correspondence of an Officer of Engineers employed at Cadiz.

"May 7, 1810.

"We have at last broke ground for some works, but I am almost at a loss

to explain to you the cause of our delay. The truth is, we left England so ill provided with tools and other requisites for beginning works, that till lately it has been positively impossible to commence, even on a small scale, from our own resources and number of men. These facts, with the backwardness of the Spaniards to contribute either stores or workmen to the general cause, have kept us so long inactive. We have now one thousand three hundred men at work, and the Board of Ordnance has supplied us with more tools."

SECTION V.

"Isla, June 1, 1810.

"We might defy the power of France to expel us by force from hence, if all were done that might be done, or even what is projected, but we have only British troops at work on this important position, and our numbers will not permit the progress which the exigency of affairs requires."—"We have in our respected General (Graham) a confidence which is daily on the increase. He has a mind and temper well adapted to encounter difficulties which less favored dispositions could not bear. We may possibly maintain our ground. If we do, although our success may have none of the brilliancy of victory, yet his merits, who, by patience, prudence, and self-possession, shall have kept all quiet within our lines, preserved tolerable harmony, and kept an enterprising enemy off with very inadequate means, should be rewarded by his country's good opinion, although none but those who have witnessed can fully estimate the value of his exertions. On the whole, our situation may be said to inspire hope, though not security; to animate resistance, though not to promise victory."

SECTION VI.

"June 29, 1810.

"I have been attending a committee of Spanish engineers and artillery-officers, to settle some determinate plan for taking up the ground near the town of La Isla; but they will enter into no views which include the destruction of a house or garden. They continue to propose nothing but advanced batteries upon the marsh in front of the town, the evident object of which is to keep the shells of the enemy rather farther from the houses. At a general attack, all this would be lost and carried, by small parties coming in on the flanks and gorges. Instead of deepening the ditches and constructing good redoubts at every seven hundred yards, this is what they propose, although we offer to perform the labor for them. On a barren spot they will agree to our working; but of what service is one redoubt, if unsupported by a collateral defence, and if a general system is not attended to? We have now been here three months, and although they have been constantly urged to construct something at that weak tongue of low land, St. Petri, still nothing of importance is begun upon, nor do I imagine they will agree to any work of strength at that point. I am almost in despair of seeing this place strongly fortified, so as to resist an army of from fifty to one hundred thousand men, which I am convinced it is capable of."—"We have now one thousand three hundred laborers of the line, and eighty carpenters, but, for the latter, the timber we are supplied with from our ally is so bad that these artificers produce not more than one-fifth or one-sixth what they would be capable of if the materials were good. To judge from their conduct, it is impossible to suppose them determined to oppose a vigorous resistance even in La Isla, and I have no idea of there ever being a siege of Cadiz itself."—"Of our seven subalterns of engineers, two are generally

ill; we are obliged, therefore, to get assistance from the line. The consequence is that the work is neither so well nor so speedily executed. We ought to have many more (engineers). It is not economy in the governments; and with Lord Wellington they have hardly any with the army."

EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF MILITARY REPORTS FROM THE
BRITISH COMMANDERS AT CADIZ.

SECTION VII.

General William Stewart, March 13, 1810.

"The enemy's force was supposed to be diminished, but no advantage could be taken of it, on account of the inefficient state of the Spanish troops."

General Graham, March 26, 1810.

"The Isle of Leon required for its defence a larger force than had been assigned. Its tenure was, in the then state of the defences, very precarious."

May, 1810.

"General Blake, appointed to command the Spanish forces, introduced some degree of activity and co-operation, in which the Spaniards have been very deficient."

October, 1810.

"The progress made by the enemy at Trocadero assumed a very formidable character, while the Spaniards persisted in their apathy, and neglected to fortify the most vulnerable points of their line."

January 2, 1811.

"—— As far as the exertions of the British engineers and soldiers under my command have been concerned, I have every reason to be satisfied. I can by no means say the same of the Spaniards, for, besides the reluctance with which some of the most essential measures of the defence were agreed to, our people were not permitted to carry into execution the plan for the intrenchment of the left part of the Cortadura de St. Fernando until after much delay and very unpleasant contests."

No. XVIII.

EXTRACTS FROM KING JOSEPH'S CORRESPONDENCE.

SECTION I.

The Duke of Santa Fé to the King, Paris, June 20, 1810.

[Translation from the Spanish.]

"Will your Majesty believe that some politicians of Paris have arrived at saying, that in Spain there is preparing a new revolution, very dangerous for the French; and they assert that the Spaniards attached to your Majesty will rise against them. Let your Majesty consider if ever was heard a more absurd chimera, and how prejudicial it might be to us if it

succeeded in gaining any credit. I hope that such an idea will not be believed by any person of judgment, and that it will soon subside, being void of probability."

SECTION II.

Ministerial letter from the King to the Marquis of Almenara.

[Translated from the Spanish.]

"September 21, 1810.

"The impolitic violence of the military governors has attacked not only men, and fields, and animals, but even the most sacred things in the nation, as the memorials and the actions of families, in whose preservation those only are interested to whom they belong, and from which strangers cannot reap the least fruit. In this class are the general archives of the kingdom, called the archives of Simancas, which are found in the province of Valladolid; the Governor, Kellermann, has taken possession of them. Those archives, from the time of their institution, for centuries past, have contained the treaties of the kings since they were known in Castile; also, ancient manuscripts of the kindred of the princes, the descents and titles of families, pleadings in the tribunals, decisions of the Cortes; in short, all that is publicly interesting to the history of the nation, and privately to individuals."

SECTION III.

The Spanish Secretary of State to the Duke of Santa Fè.

"Madrid, September 12, 1812.

"—— Si l'Andalousie n'est pas entièrement pacifiée; si la junte de Cadix existe encore, et si les Anglais y exercent leur fatale influence, on doit l'attribuer en grande partie aux machinations, et aux trames ourdies par la junte et l'Angleterre au moment où parvint à leur connaissance le décret du 8 Fevrier, qui établit des gouvernemens militaires dans la Navarre, la Biscaye, l'Arragon, et la Catalogne. Quelques gouverneurs Français ayant traité ces provinces comme si elles étaient absolument détachées de la monarchie."

"—— Mais combien n'est il pas dementi par la conduite de certains gouverneurs qui paraissent s'obstiner à prolonger l'insurrection d'Espagne plutôt qu'à la soumettre! Car dans plusieurs endroits on ne se contente pas d'exclure toute idée de l'autorité du roi, en faisant administrer la justice au nom de l'empereur, mais ce qui est pire, on a exigé que les tribunaux civils de Valladolid et de Palencia pretassent serment de fidélité et d'obéissance à sa majesté impériale comme si la nation Espagnole n'avoit pas de roi."

SECTION IV.

Memorial from the Duke of Santa Fè and Marquis of Almenara to the Prince of Wagram.

[Translation from the Spanish.]

"Paris, September 16, 1810.

"—— The decrees of his Majesty the Emperor are the same for all the generals. The Prince of Esling, who has traversed all the provinces to

the borders of Portugal, who appears to be forming immense magazines, and has much greater necessities than the governors of provinces, has applied to the Spanish prefects, who have made the arrangements, and supplied him with even more than he required; and this speaks in favor of the Spanish people, for the Prince of Esling receives the blessings of the inhabitants of the provinces through which his troops pass. Such is the effect of good order and humanity amongst a people who know the rules of justice, and that war demands sacrifices, but who will not suffer dilapidations and useless vexations."

SECTION V.

Intercepted letter of Comte de Casa Valencia, Counsellor of State, written to his wife, June 18. 1810.

"Il y a six mois que l'on ne nous paie point, et nous perissons.

"—— Avant hier j'écrivis à Almenara lui peignant ma situation et le priant de m'accorder quelque argent pour vivre; de me secourir, si non comme ministre, du moins comme ami. Hier je restai trois heures dans son antichambre espérant un réponse, je le vis enfin et elle fut qu'il n'avait rien.

"—— Rien que la faim m'attend aujourd'hui."

No. XIX.

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON, MSS.

SECTION I.

"Celerico, May 11, 1810.

"—— I observe that the Minister Don Miguel Forjas considers the inconvenience, on which I had the honor of addressing you, as of ordinary occurrence, and he entertains no doubt that inconveniences of this description will not induce me to desist from making the movements which I might think the defence of the country would require. It frequently happens that an army in operation cannot procure the number of carriages which it requires, either from the unwillingness of the inhabitants to supply them, or from the deficiency of the number of carriages in the country. But it has rarely happened that an army, thus unprovided with carriages, has been obliged to carry on its operations in a country in which there is literally no food, and in which, if there was food, there is no money to purchase it; and, whenever that has been the case, the army has been obliged to withdraw to the magazines which the country had refused or been unable to remove to the army. This is precisely the case of the allied armies in this part of the country; and however trifling the difficulty may be deemed by the Regency and the Ministers, I consider a starving army to be so useless in any situation, that I shall certainly not pretend to hold a position or to make any movement in which the food of the troops is not secured. I have no doubt of the ability or the willingness of the country to do all that can be required of them, if the authority of the government is properly exerted to force individuals to attend to their public duties rather than to their private interests in this time of trial. I have written this same sentiment to the government so frequently, that they must be as tired of reading it as I am

of writing it. But if they expect that individuals of the lower orders are to relinquish the pursuit of their private interests and business to serve the public, and mean to punish them for any omission in this important duty, they must begin with the higher classes of society. They must be forced to perform their duty, and no name, however illustrious, and no protection, however powerful, should shield from punishment those who neglect the performance of their duty to the public in these times. Unless these measures are strictly and invariably followed, it is vain to expect any serious or continued exertion in the country, and the Regency ought to be aware, from the sentiments of his Majesty's government, which I have communicated to them, that the continuance of his Majesty's assistance depends not on the ability or the inclination, but on the actual effectual exertions of the people of Portugal in their own cause. I have thought it proper to trouble you so much at length upon this subject, in consequence of the light manner in which the difficulties which I had stated to exist were noticed by Monsieur de Forjas. I have to mention, however, that since I wrote to you, although there exist several causes of complaint of different kinds, and that some examples must be made, we have received such assistance as has enabled me to continue till this time in our positions, and I hope to be able to continue as long as may be necessary. I concur entirely in the measure of appointing a special commission to attend the head-quarters of the Portuguese army, and I hope that it will be adopted without delay. I inclose a proclamation which I have issued, which I hope will have some effect. It describes nearly the crimes, or rather the omissions, of which the people may be guilty in respect to the transport of the army; these may be as follows:—1st, refusing to supply carts, boats, or beasts of burthen, when required; 2dly, refusing to remove their articles or animals out of the reach of the enemy; 3dly, disobedience of the orders of the magistrate to proceed to and remain at any station with carriages, boats, &c. ; 4th, desertion from the service either with or without carriages, &c. ; 5th, embezzlement of provisions or stores which they may be employed to transport. The crimes or omissions of the inferior magistrates may be classed as follows:—1st, disobedience of the orders of their superiors; 2d, inactivity in the execution of them; 3d, receiving bribes, to excuse certain persons from the execution of requisitions upon them.”

SECTION II.

Lord Wellington to M. Forjas.

“Gouvea, September 6, 1810.

“MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,—I have received your letter of the 1st of this month, informing me that you have placed before the government of this kingdom my despatch of the 27th of August, announcing the melancholy and unexpected news of the loss of Almeida, and that the government had learned with sorrow that an accident unforeseen had prevented my moving to succor the place, hoping, at the same time, that the depression of the people, caused by such an event, will soon vanish, by the quick and great successes which they expect with certainty from the efforts of the army. I have already made known to the government of the kingdom that the fall of Almeida was unexpected by me, and that I deplored its loss and that of my hopes, considering it likely to depress and afflict the people of this kingdom. It was by no means my intention, however, in that letter, to state whether it had or had not been my intention to have succored the

place, and I now request the permission of the government of the kingdom to say that, much as I wish to remove the impression which this misfortune has justly made on the public, I do not propose to alter the system and plan of operations which have been determined, after the most serious deliberation, as best adequate to further the general cause of the allies, and, consequently, Portugal. I request the government to believe that I am not insensible to the value of their confidence as well as that of the public; as, also, that I am highly interested in removing the anxiety of the public upon the late misfortune; but I should forget my duty to my sovereign, to the Prince Regent, and to the cause in general, if I should permit public clamor or panic to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan of operations which I have adopted, after mature consideration, and which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a good end.

(Signed)

WELLINGTON."

SECTION III.

"Gowea, September 7, 1810.

" ——— In order to put an end at once to these miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform the government that *I will not stay* in the country, and that I will advise the King's government to withdraw the assistance which his Majesty affords them, if they interfere in any manner with the appointment of Marshal Beresford's staff, for which he is responsible, or with the operations of the army, or with any of the points which, with the original arrangements with Marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management. I propose, also, to report to his Majesty's government, and refer to their consideration, what steps ought to be taken, if the Portuguese government refuse or delay to adopt the civil and political arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with the military operations which I am carrying on. The preparatory measures for the destruction of, or rather rendering useless the mills, were suggested by me long ago, and Marshal Beresford did not write to government upon them till I had reminded him a second time of my wishes on the subject. I now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory measures may be adopted not only in the country between the Tagus and the Mondego, lying north of Torres Vedras, as originally proposed, but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all parts of Portugal, and that the magistrates and others may be directed to render useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so from the military officers. I have already adopted this measure with success in this part of the country, and it must be adopted in others in which it is probable that the enemy may endeavor to penetrate; and it must be obvious to any person who will reflect upon the subject, that it is only consistent with all the other measures which, for the last twelve months, I have recommended to government to impede and make difficult, and if possible prevent, the advance and establishment of the enemy's force in the country. But it appears that the government have lately discovered that we are all wrong: they have become impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the Central Junta, call out for a battle and early success. If I had had the power, I would have prevented the Spanish armies from attending to this call; and if I had, the cause would now have been safe; and, having the power now in my hands, I will not lose the only chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese government. I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in the government; and, as I must attribute it to

the persons recently introduced into the government, it affords additional reason with me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall write upon the subject to the Prince Regent, if I should hear any more of this conduct. I leave you to communicate the whole or any part of this letter that you may think proper to the Regency.

(Signed) "WELLINGTON."

SECTION IV.

"Rio Mayor, October 6, 1810.

"—— You will do me the favor to inform the Regency, and above all the Principal Souza, that his Majesty and the Prince Regent having intrusted me with the command of their armies, and likewise with the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or anybody else, to interfere with them. That I know best where to station my troops, and where to make a stand against the enemy, and I shall not alter a system formed upon mature consideration, upon any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they are not; and I recommend to them to look to the measures for which they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them, viz., to provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army and of the people, while the troops will be engaged with the enemy. As for Principal Souza, I beg you to tell him, from me, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since he has been a member of the government; that, being embarked in a course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall continue to carry them on to the end, but that no power on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one moment after I shall have obtained his Majesty's leave to resign my charge, if Principal Souza is to remain either a member of the government or to continue at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country or I will; and, if I should be obliged to go, I shall take care that the world, or Portugal at least, and the Prince Regent shall be made acquainted with my reasons. From the letter of the 3d, which I have received from Monsieur Forjas, I had hoped that the government was satisfied with what I had done, and intended to do, and that, instead of endeavoring to render all further defence fruitless, by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of the town; but I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they add duplicity to their weakness, and that their expressions of approbation, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure.

"WELLINGTON.

"P. S.—All I ask from the Portuguese Regency is tranquillity in the town of Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops while they will be employed in this part of the country. I have but little doubt of success; but as I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know that the result of any one is not certain, even with the best arrangements, I am anxious that the government should adopt preparatory arrangements, and take out of the enemy's way those persons and their families who would suffer if they were to fall into their hands."

SECTION V.

"Pero Negro, October 28, 1810.

The cattle, and other articles of supply, which the government have been informed have been removed from the island of Lizirias, are still on the island, and most probably the Secretary of State, Don M. Forjas, who

was at Alhandra yesterday, will have seen them. I shall be glad to hear whether the government propose to take any and what steps to punish the magistrates who have disobeyed their orders and have deceived them by false reports. The officers and soldiers of the militia, absent from their corps, are liable to penalties and punishments, some of a civil, others of a military nature; first, they are liable to a forfeiture of all their personal property, upon information that they are absent from their corps without leave; secondly, they are liable to be transferred to serve as soldiers in the regiments of the line, upon the same information; and, lastly, they are liable to the penalties of desertion inflicted by the military tribunals. The two first are penalties which depend upon the civil magistrate, and I should be very glad to have heard of one instance in which the magistrates of Lisbon, or in which the government had called upon the magistrates at Lisbon to carry into execution the law in either of these respects. I entreat them to call for the names of the officers and soldiers absent without leave from any one of the Lisbon regiments of militia, to disgrace any one or more of the principal officers, in a public manner, for their shameful desertion of their posts in the hour of danger, and to seize and dispose of the whole property of the militia soldiers absent without leave, and to send these men to serve with any of the regiments of the line. I entreat them to adopt these measures without favor or distinction of any individuals in respect to any one regiment, and to execute the laws *bonâ fide* upon the subject; and I shall be satisfied of their good intentions, and shall believe that they are sincerely desirous of saving the country; but if we are to go on as we have hitherto, if Great Britain is to give large subsidies and to expend large sums in support of a cause in which those most interested sit by and take no part, and those at the head of the government, with laws and powers to force the people to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is placed, are aware of the evil but neglect their duty and omit to put the laws in execution, I must believe their professions to be false, that they look to a little dirty popularity instead of to save their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and persons in whom his allies can place no confidence. In respect to the military law, it may be depended upon that it will be carried into execution, and that the day will yet come on which those military persons who have deserted their duty in these critical times will be punished as they deserve. The governors of the kingdom forget the innumerable remonstrances which have been forwarded to them on the defects in the proceedings of courts martial, which, in times of active war, render them and their sentences entirely nugatory. As an additional instance of these defects, I mention that officers of the Olivera regiment of militia, who behaved ill in the action with the enemy at Villa Novo de Fosboa, in the beginning of August last, and a court martial was immediately assembled for this trial, are still, in the end of October, under trial, and the trial will, probably, not be concluded till Christmas. In like manner, the military trial of those deserters of the militia, after assembling officers and soldiers at great inconvenience for the purpose, cannot possibly be concluded till the period will have gone by in which any benefit might be secured from the example of the punishment of any one or number of them. The defect in the administration of the military law has been repeatedly pointed out to the government, and a remedy for the evil has been proposed to them, and has been approved of by the Prince Regent. But they will not adopt it; and it would be much better if there were no law for the government of the army than that the existing laws should continue without being executed.

WELLINGTON."

SECTION VI.

“ October 29, 1810.

“ ——— In answer to Lord Wellesley's queries respecting the Portuguese Regency, my opinion is that the Regency ought to be appointed by the Prince Regent, but during his pleasure; they ought to have full power to act in every possible case, to make appointments to offices, to dismiss from office, to make and alter laws, in short every power which the Prince himself could possess if he were on the spot. They ought to report, in detail, their proceedings on every subject, and their reasons for the adoption of every measure. The Prince ought to decline to receive any application from any of his officers or subjects in Portugal not transmitted through the regular channels of the government here, and ought to adopt no measure respecting Portugal not recommended by the Regency. The smaller the number of persons composing the Regency the better; but my opinion is that it is not advisable to remove any of the persons now composing it excepting Principal Souza, with whom I neither can nor will have any official intercourse. The Patriarch is, in my opinion, a necessary evil. He has acquired a kind of popularity and confidence through the country which would increase if he was removed from office, and he is the kind of man to do much mischief if he was not employed. If we should succeed in removing the Principal (which *must* be done), I think the Patriarch will take warning, and will behave better in future. In respect to military operations, there can be no interference on the part of the Regency or anybody else. If there is, I can no longer be responsible. If our own government choose to interfere themselves, or that the Prince Regent should interfere, they have only to give me their orders in detail, and I will carry them strictly into execution, to the best of my abilities; and I will be responsible for nothing but the execution; but, if I am to be responsible, I must have full discretion and no interference on the part of the Regency or anybody else. I should like to see Principal Souza's detailed instructions for his '*embuscados*' on the left bank of the Tagus. If Principal Souza does not go to England, or somewhere out of Portugal, the country will be lost. The time we lose in discussing matters which ought to be executed immediately, and in the wrong direction given to the deliberation of the government, is inconceivable. The gentlemen destined for the Alemtejo ought to have been in the province on the evening of the 24th, but, instead of that, three valuable days of fine weather will have been lost, because the government do not choose to take part in our arrangements, which, however undeniably beneficial, will not be much liked by those whom it will affect; although it is certain that, sooner or later, these persons must and will be ruined, by leaving behind them all their valuable property, and, as in the case of this part of the country, everything which can enable the enemy to remain in the country. In answer to M. de Forjas' note of the 22d, inclosed in yours (without date), I have to say that I know of no carriages employed by the British army excepting by the Commissary-General, and none are detained that I know of. I wish that the Portuguese government, or its officers, would state the names of those who have detained carriages, contrary to my repeated orders; or the regiment, or where they are stationed; but this they will never do. All that we do with the carriages is to send back sick in them, when there are any. It will not answer to make an engagement that the wheel-carriages from Lisbon shall not come farther than Bucellas, Montachique, &c.; many articles required by the army cannot be carried by mules, and the carriages must come on with them here. In many cases the Portuguese troops in particular are ill provided with mules, therefore this

must be left to the Commissary-General of the army, under a recommendation to him, if possible, not to send the Lisbon wheel-carriages beyond the places above mentioned. I wish, in every case, that a regulation made should be observed, and the makers of regulations should take care always to frame them as that they can be observed, which is the reason of my entering so particularly into this point.

WELLINGTON."

SECTION VII.

"*Pero Negro, October 31, 1810.*

"—— I am glad that the gentlemen feel my letters, and I hope that they will have the effect of inducing them to take some decided steps as well regarding the provisions in the Alentejo as the desertion of the militia. The *ordenança* artillery now begin to desert from the works, although they are fed by us with English rations and taken care of in the same manner as our own troops. Your note, No. — of 29th, is strictly true in all its parts; the French could not have stayed here a week if all the provisions had been removed, and the length of time they can now stay depends upon the quantity remaining of what they have found in places from which there existed means of removing everything, if the quantity had been ten times greater. They are stopped effectually; in front all the roads are occupied, and they can get nothing from their rear; but all the military arrangements which have been made are useless, if they can find subsistence on the ground which they occupy. For what I know to the contrary, they may be able to maintain their position till the whole French army is brought to their assistance. It is heart-breaking to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly!

WELLINGTON."

SECTION VIII.

"*Pero Negro, November 1, 1810.*

"I have no doubt that the government can produce volumes of papers to prove that they gave orders upon the several subjects to which the inclosures relate, but it would be very desirable if they would state whether any magistrate or other person has been punished for not obeying those orders. The fact is, that the government, after the appointment of Príncipe Souza to be a member of the Regency, conceived that the war could be maintained upon the frontier, contrary to the opinion of myself and of every military officer in the country, and, instead of giving positive orders preparatory to the event which was most likely to occur, viz, that the allied army would retire, they spent much valuable time in discussing with me the expediency of a measure which was quite impracticable, and omitted to give the orders which were necessary for the evacuation of the country between the Tagus and the Mondego by the inhabitants. Then, when convinced that the army would retire, they first imposed that duty on me, although they must have known that I was ignorant of the names, the nature of the offices, the places of abode of the different magistrates who were to superintend the execution of the measure, and, moreover, I have put one gentleman in my family to give me any assistance in writing the Portuguese language, and they afterwards issued the orders themselves, still making them referable to me, without my knowledge or consent, and still knowing that I had no means whatever of communicating with the country, and they issued them at the very period when the enemy was advancing from Almeida. If I had not been able to stop the enemy at Busaco he must have been in his present situation long before the

order could have reached those to whom it was addressed. All this conduct was to be attributed to the same cause, a desire to avoid to adopt a measure which, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, was likely to disturb the habits of idleness and ease of the inhabitants, and to throw the odium of the measure upon me and upon the British government. I avowed in my proclamation, that I was the author of that measure, and the government might have sheltered themselves under that authority, but the principle of the government has lately been to seek for popularity, and they will not aid in any measure, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, which may be unpopular with the mob of Lisbon. I cannot agree in the justice of the expression of astonishment by the Secretary of State that the measure should have been executed in this part of the country at all. The same measure was carried into complete execution in upper Beira, notwithstanding that the army was in that province, and the means of transport were required for its service; not a soul remained, and, excepting at Coimbra, to which town my personal authority and influence did not reach, not an article of any description was left behind; and all the mills upon the Coa and Mondego and their dependent streams were rendered useless. But there were no discussions there upon the propriety of maintaining the war upon the frontier. The orders were given, and they were obeyed in time, and the enemy suffered accordingly. In this part of the country, notwithstanding the advantage of having a place of security to retire to, notwithstanding the advantage of water-carriage, notwithstanding that the Tagus was fordable in many places at the period when the inhabitants should have passed their property to the left of the river, and fortunately filled at the moment the enemy approached its banks, the inhabitants have fled from their habitations as they would have done under any circumstances, without waiting orders from me or from the government; but they have left behind them everything that could be useful to the enemy and could subsist their army, and all the mills untouched; accordingly, the enemy still remain in our front, notwithstanding that their communication is cut off with Spain and with every other military body; and if the provisions which they have found will last, of which I can have no knowledge, they may remain till they will be joined by the whole French army in Spain. I believe that in Santarem and Villa Franca alone, both towns upon the Tagus, and both having the advantage of water-carriage, the enemy found subsistence for their army for a considerable length of time. Thus will appear the difference of a measure adopted in time, and the delay of it till the last moment; and I only wish that the country and the allies may not experience the evil consequences of the ill-fated propensity of the existing Portuguese Regency to seek popularity. In the same manner the other measure since recommended, viz., the removal of the property of the inhabitants of Alemtejo to places of security, has been delayed by every means in the power of the government, and has been adopted at last against their inclination: as usual, they commenced a discussion with me upon the expediency of preventing the enemy from crossing the Tagus; they then sent their civil officer to me to receive instructions, and afterwards they conveyed to him an instruction of the ———, to which I propose to draw the attention of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent and of his Majesty's government. His Royal Highness and his Majesty's government will then see in what manner the existing Regency are disposed to co-operate with me. The additional order of the 30th of October, marked 5 in the inclosures from M. Forjas, show the sense which the Regency themselves entertained of the insufficiency of their original in-

structions to the Disenbargador Jacinto Paes de Matos. I may have mistaken the system of defence to be adopted for this country, and Principal Souza and other members of the Regency may be better judges of the capacity of the troops and of the operations to be carried on than I am. In this case they should desire his Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of the army. But they cannot doubt my zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and they know that not a moment of my time, nor a faculty of my mind, that is not devoted to promote it; and the records of this government will show what I have done for them and their country. If, therefore, they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and want of confidence in the measures which I adopt by desiring that I should be removed, they are bound, as honest men and faithful servants to their Prince, to co-operate with me by all means in their power, and thus should neither thwart them by opposition, nor render them nugatory by useless delays and discussions. Till lately I have had the satisfaction of receiving the support and co-operation of the government; and I regret that his Royal Highness the Prince Regent should have been induced to make a change which has operated so materially to the detriment of his people and the allies. In respect to the operations on the left of the Tagus, I was always of opinion that the ordenana would be able to prevent the enemy from sending over any of their plundering parties; and I was unwilling to adopt any measure of greater solidity, from my knowledge, that, as soon as circumstances should render it expedient, on any account, to withdraw the troops, which I should have sent to the left of the Tagus, the ordenana would disperse. The truth is that, notwithstanding the opinion of some of the government, every Portuguese, into whose hands a firelock is placed, does not become a soldier capable of meeting the enemy. Experience, which the members of the government have not had, has taught me this truth, and in what manner to make use of the different descriptions of troops in this country; and it would be very desirable if the government would leave, exclusively, to Marshal Beresford and me, the adoption of all military arrangements. The conduct of the governor of Setuval is, undoubtedly, the cause of the inconvenience now felt on the left of the Tagus. He brought forward his garrison to the river against orders, and did not reflect, and possibly was not aware as I am, that if they had been attacked in that situation, as they probably would have been, they would have dispersed and thus Setuval, as well as the regiment which was to have been its garrison, would have been lost. It was necessary, therefore, at all events, to prevent that misfortune, and to order the troops to retire to Setuval, and the ordenana as usual dispersed, and the government will lose their five hundred stand of new arms, and, if the enemy can cross the Tagus in time, their 3-pounders. These are the consequences of persons interfering in military operations who have no knowledge of them, or of the nature of the troops which are to carry them on. I am now under the necessity, much to the inconvenience of the army, of sending a detachment to the left of the Tagus."

SECTION IX.

"December 5, 1810.

"All my proceedings have been founded on the following principles: first,—That by my appointment of Marshal-General of the Portuguese army with the same powers as those vested in the late Duc de la Fons, I hold the command of the army independent of the local government of Portugal. Secondly,—That, by the arrangements made by the governors of the king-

dom with the King's government, when Sir William Beresford was asked for by the former to command the Portuguese army, it was settled that the commander-in-chief of the British army should direct the general operations of the combined force. Thirdly,—That, supposing that my appointment of Marshal-General did not give me the independent control over the operations of the Portuguese army, or that, as commander-in-chief of the British army, I did not possess the power of directing the operation of the whole under the arrangement above referred to; it follows that either the operations of the two armies must have been separated, or the Portuguese government must have had the power of directing the operations of the British army. Fourthly,—It never was intended that both armies should be exposed to the certain loss, which would have been the consequence of a disjointed operation; and, undoubtedly, his Majesty's government never intended to give over the British army to the government of the kingdom to make ducks and drakes of. The government of the kingdom must, in their reply to my letter, either deny the truth of these principles, or they must prove that my charge against them is without foundation, and that they did not delay and omit to adopt various measures, recommended by me and Marshal Beresford, calculated to assist and correspond with the operations of the armies, upon the proposition and under the influence of Principal Souza, under the pretence of discussing with me the propriety of my military arrangements.

WELLINGTON."

SECTION X.

Cartaxo, January 18, 1811.

"It is necessary that I should draw your attention, and that of the Portuguese government, upon the earliest occasion, to the sentiments which have dropped from the Patriarch, in recent discussions at the meeting of the Regency. It appears that his Eminence has expatiated on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, "which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom." It must be recollected that these discussions are not those of a popular assembly, they can scarcely be deemed those of a ministerial council, but they are those of persons whom his Royal Highness the Prince Regent has called to govern his kingdom in the existing crisis of affairs. I have always been in the habit of considering his Eminence the Patriarch as one of those in Portugal who are of opinion that all sacrifices are to be made, provided the kingdom could preserve its independence; and I think it most important that the British government, and the government of the Prince Regent, and the world, should be undeceived, if we have been mistaken hitherto. His Eminence objects to the adoption of measures which have for their immediate object to procure funds for the maintenance of his Royal Highness's armies, because a war may exist in the heart of the kingdom, but I am apprehensive the Patriarch forgets the manner in which the common enemy first entered this kingdom, in the year 1807, that in which they were expelled from it, having had complete possession of it in 1808, and that they were again in possession of the city of Oporto, and of the two most valuable provinces of the kingdom, in 1809, and the mode in which they were expelled from those provinces. He forgets that it was stated to him in the month of February, 1810, in the presence of the Marquis of Olhao, of Don M. Forjas, and of Don Joa Antonio Saltar de Mendoza, and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, that it was probable the enemy would invade this kingdom with such an army as that it would be necessary to concentrate all our forces to oppose him with any chance of success, and that this concentration could be made with safety

in the neighborhood of the capital only, and that the general plan of the campaign was communicated to him which went to bring the enemy into the heart of the kingdom; and that he expressed before all these persons his high approbation of it. If he recollected these circumstances he would observe that nothing had occurred in this campaign that had not been foreseen and provided for by measures of which he had expressed his approbation, of whose consequences he now disapproves. The Portuguese nation are involved in a war not of aggression, or even defence on their part, not of alliance, not in consequence of their adherence to any political system, for they abandoned all alliances and all political systems in order to propitiate the enemy. The inhabitants of Portugal made war purely and simply to get rid of the yoke of the tyrant whose government was established in Portugal, and to save their lives and properties; they chose this lot for themselves, principally at the instigation of his Eminence the Patriarch, and they called upon his Majesty, the ancient ally of Portugal, whose alliance had been relinquished at the requisition of the common enemy, to aid them in the glorious effort which they wished to make, and to restore the independence of their country, and to secure the lives and properties of its inhabitants. I will not state the manner in which his Majesty has answered the call, or enumerate the services rendered to this nation by his army; whatever may be the result of the contest, nothing can make me believe that the Portuguese nation will ever forget them; but when a nation has adopted the line of resistance to the tyrant under the circumstances under which it was unanimously adopted by the Portuguese nation in 1808, and has been persevered in, it cannot be believed that they intended to suffer none of the miseries of war, or that their government act inconsistently with their sentiments when they expatiate on the 'inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.' The Patriarch in particular forgets his old principles, his own actions which have principally involved his country in the contest, when he talks of discontinuing it, because it has again, for the third time, been brought into 'the heart of the kingdom.' Although the Patriarch, particularly, and the majority of the existing government approved of the plan which I explained to them in February, 1810, according to which it was probable that this kingdom would be made the seat of war, which has since occurred, I admit that his Eminence, or any of those members may fairly disapprove of the campaign and of the continuance of the enemy in Portugal. I have pointed out to the Portuguese government, in more than one despatch, the difficulties and risks which attended any attack upon the enemy's position in this country, and the probable success not only to ourselves but to our allies of our perseverance in the plan which I had adopted, and had hitherto followed so far successfully, as that the allies have literally sustained no loss of any description, and this army is, at this moment, more complete than it was at the opening of the campaign in April last. The inhabitants of one part of the country alone have suffered and are continuing to suffer. But without entering into discussions which I wish to avoid on this occasion, I repeat, that if my counsels had been followed these sufferings would at least have been alleviated, and I observe that it is the first time I have heard that the sufferings of a part, and but a small part of any nation have been deemed a reason for refusing to adopt a measure which had for its object the deliverance of the whole. The Patriarch may, however, disapprove of the system I have followed, and I conceive that he is fully justified in desiring his Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of these

armies. This would be a measure consistent with his former conduct in this contest, under the circumstances of my having unfortunately fallen in his opinion, but this measure is entirely distinct from the refusal to concur in laying those burthens upon the people which are necessary to carry on and to secure the object of the war. It must be obvious to his Eminence, and to every person acquainted with the real situation of the affairs of Portugal, unless a great effort is made to render the resources more adequate to the necessary expenditure, all plans and systems of operation will be alike, for the Portuguese army will be able to carry on none. At this moment, although all the corps are concentrated in the neighborhood of their magazines, with means of transport, easy, by the Tagus, the Portuguese troops are frequently in want of provisions because there is no money to pay the expense of transport, and all the departments of the Portuguese army, including the hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable them to defray the necessary expenditure, and to perform their duty. The deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have known the Portuguese army, and it is well known that it must have been disbanded more than once, if it had not been assisted by the provisions, stores and funds of the British army. It may likewise occur to his Eminence that in proportion as the operations of the armies would be more extended, the expense would increase, and the necessity for providing adequate funds to support it would become more urgent, unless, indeed, the course of their operations should annihilate at one blow both army and expenditure. The objection then to adopt measures to improve the resources of the government, go to decide the question whether the war should be carried on or not in any manner. By desiring his Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of their armies, his Eminence would endeavor to get rid of a person deemed incapable or unwilling to fulfil the duties of his situation. By objecting to improve the resources of the country he betrays an alteration of opinion respecting the contest, and a desire to forfeit its advantages, and to give up the independence of the country, and the security of the lives and properties of the Portuguese nation. In my opinion the Patriarch is in such a situation in this country that he ought to be called upon, on the part of his Majesty, to state distinctly what he meant by refusing to concur in the measures which were necessary to insure the funds to enable this country to carry on the war; at all events, I request that this letter may be communicated to him in the Regency, and that a copy of it may be forwarded to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in order that his Royal Highness may see that I have given his Eminence an opportunity of explaining his motives either by stating his personal objections to me, or the alteration of his opinions, his sentiments, and his wishes, in respect to the independence of his country.

WELLINGTON."

N^o. XX.

EXTRACT FROM A REPORT MADE BY THE DUKE OF DALMATIA TO THE PRINCE OF WAGRAM AND OF NEUFCHATEL.

SECTION I.

Seville, August 4th, 1810.

"PAR une décision de l'empereur du mois de Février dernier S. M. détermine qu'à compter du 1^{er} Janvier toutes les dépenses d'administration générale du génie et de l'artillerie seraient au compte du gouvernement Es-

pagnol ; aussitôt que j'en fus instruit je sollicitai S. M. C. d'assigner à cet effet une somme ; mais je ne pas obtenir que 2,000,000 de réaux (533,000f.) et encore le roi entendait il que les payemens ne remontassent qu'au mois de Fevrier ; cette somme était de beaucoup insuffisante. Je n'ai cessé d'en faire la representation, ainsi que Monsr. l'Intendant Général ; nos demandes n'ont pas été accueillies, et pour couvrir autant que possible la différence j'ai dû avoir recours aux recettes extraordinaires faites sans la participation des ministres Espagnols. J'espère que ce moyen réussira, déjà même il a produit quelques sommes. L'état que je mets ci joint fait connaître les recouvrements qui ont été opérés sur les fonds de 533,000f. du crédit mensuel à l'époque du 1^{er} Août lesquels forment la somme de 3,731,000f. mais indépendamment il y a eu des recettes extraordinaires pour au moins 500,000f. qui ont reçu la même destination (les dépenses d'administration générale) antérieurement à cette époque. J'avais fait mettre à la disposition de Monsr. l'Intendant Général, des valeurs pour plus d'un million qui devait servir à payer une partie de l'armée. Mr. l'Intendant Général justifie de l'emploi de toutes ces sommes dans ses comptes généraux. Les ministres de S. M. C. n'admettent pas les comptes que je présente ; d'abord ils ne veulent pas allouer la somme de 500,000f. qui a été reportée à l'article des dépenses d'administration générale, s'appuyant sur ce sujet la décision du roi qui ne fait remonter ces dépenses que jusqu'au mois de Fevrier, quoique l'empereur ait expressement entendu que le mois de Janvier devait aussi y être compris ; ils ne veulent pas non plus reconnaître les recettes extraordinaires, où ils prétendent en précompter le produit sur le crédit mensuel de 533,000f. ; il n'est pas dans mon pouvoir d'admettre leurs motifs ; la décision de l'empereur est expresse, et tant que je serai dans la situation délicate où je me trouve, mon devoir m'obligera de pourvoir aux besoins du service par tous les moyens praticables. Les recettes qui ont eu lieu en Andalousie ont servi à toutes les dépenses de l'artillerie, du génie, de l'état majors et de l'administration générale qui sont vraiment immenses, et quoiqu'on ait absolument rien reçu de France ni de Madrid, j'ai en même temps pu faire payer trois mois de solde à l'armée ; c'est sans doute bien peu quand il est du 8 à 10 mois d'arrière à la troupe et que l'insuffisance des moyens oblige à augmenter encore cet arrière, mais ne recevant rien je crois qu'il m'était impossible de mieux faire. V. A. en sera elle-même convaincue si elle veut s'arrêter un moment sur l'aperçu que je vais lui donner des charges que l'Andalousie supporte. On consomme tous les jour près de 100,000 rations de vivres et 20,000 rations de fourrage ; il y a 2000 malades aux hôpitaux. La forteresse de Jaen, le fort de Malaga, l'Alhambra de Granada, au dessus duquel on a construit un grand camp retranché ; tous les châteaux sur les bords de la mer depuis le cap de Gata jusqu'à Fuengirola, le château d'Alcala la Réal, la place de Ronda, les châteaux d'Olvera et de Moron, le château de Belalcazar, le château de Castillo de Los Guardias et plusieurs autres postes sur les frontières de l'Estremadura qu'on a dû aussi occuper. On a pourvu aux dépenses que les travaux devant Cadiz et la construction d'une flottille occasionnent. On a établi à Granada une poudrière et une fabrique d'armes, laquelle jusqu'à présent a peu donné, mais qui par la suite sera très utile. On a rétabli et mis dans une grande activité la fonderie et l'arsenal de Seville où journellement 1500 ouvriers sont employés. Nous manquions de poudre et de projectiles de feu et d'affûts. J'ai fait rétablir deux moulins à poudre à Seville et fait exploiter toutes les nitrières de l'Andalousie. A présent on compte aussi à Seville des projectiles de tous les calibres, jusqu'aux bombes de 12 pouces ; tout le vieux fer a été ramassé ; on a construit les affûts nécessaires pour l'armement des batteries devant Cadiz. On a