during the interval, had succeeded Lord Castlereagh in the war department.

Adverting to the actual state of the French troops in the Peninsula, he observed, that unless the Spanish armies met with some great disaster, the former *could not then make an attack upon Portugal;* yet, if events should enable them to do so, that the forces at that moment in the latter might defend it.* "But the peace in Germany," he said, "might enable France to reinforce her armies in Spain largely, when the means of invading Portugal would be increased, not only in proportion to the additional troops then poured in, but also in proportion to the effect which such a display of additional strength would necessarily have upon the spirit of the Spaniards. Even in that case, *until Spain should have been conquered and rendered submissive*, the French would find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain possession of Portugal, *provided England employed her armies in defence of that country, and that the Portuguese military service was organized to the full extent of which it was capable.* But the number of British forces employed should not be less than thirty thousand effective men, although the Portuguese regular force, actually enrolled, consisted of thirty-nine thousand infantry, three thousand artillery, and three thousand cavalry, and the militia amounted to forty-five thousand, exclusive of the ordenanzas."

The next point of consideration was the probable expense. "The actual yearly cost of the British army in Portugal, exclusive of the hire of transport vessels, was about £1,800,000, being only half a million sterling more than they would cost if employed in England. Hence the most important consideration was the expense of renovating and supporting the Portuguese military and civil services. The British government had already subsidized the Portuguese Regency, at the rate of six hundred thousand pounds yearly, being the expense of twenty thousand men, which the latter were bound by treaty to place at the service of the English Commander-in-Chief.

"But this was far from sufficient to render the Portuguese army efficient for the impending contest. The revenue of Portugal was between eight and nine millions of dollars, the expenses between fourteen and fifteen millions, leaving a deficiency of more than six millions of dollars. Hence, for that year the most pressing only of the civil and military demands had been paid, and the public debt and the salaries of the public servants were in arrear. The advances already made by Great Britain amounted to two millions of dollars; there remained a deficiency of four millions of dollars,

* Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Badajos, 14th Nov. 1809, MS.

which, after a careful inquiry, it appeared could not be made good by Portugal; and it was obvious that the administration would, when distressed, gradually appropriate the subsidy to support the civil authorities to the detriment of the military service. Nay, already money from the English military chest had been advanced to prevent the Portuguese army from disbanding from want of food.

"It was impossible to diminish the expenses of the Regency, and yet the French invasion and the emigration to the Brazils had so impoverished the country, that it was impossible to raise the revenue or to obtain money by loans. The people were unable to pay the taxes already imposed, and the customs, which formed the principal branch of Portuguese revenue, were reduced to nothing by the transfer of the Brazilian trade from the mother-country to Great Britain. This transfer, so profitable to the latter, was ruinous to Portugal, and therefore justice as well as policy required that England should afford pecuniary assistance to the Regency.

"Without it, nothing could be expected from the Portuguese army. The officers of that army had for many years done no duty, partly that their country having been, with some trifling exceptions, at peace nearly half a century, they had continued in the same garrisons, and lived with their families; and to these advantages, added others arising from abuses in the service. Now the severe but necessary discipline introduced by Marshal Beresford, had placed the Portuguese officers in a miserable situation. All abuses had been extirpated, additional expenses had been inflicted, and the regular pay was not only insufficient to support them in a country where all the necessaries of life were enormously dear, but it was far below the pay of the English, Spanish, and French officers, with whom or against whom they were to fight.

"If, therefore, the war was to be carried on, it was advisable to grant a subsidy of one hundred and thirty thousand pounds yearly, to enable the Regency to increase the pay of the Portuguese officers; and to this sum, for the reasons before mentioned, should be added a further subsidy of three hundred thousand pounds, to supply the actual deficiency in the Portuguese revenues. Or, if the English Cabinet preferred it, they might take ten thousand more Portuguese troops into pay, which could be done at an expense of two hundred and fifty thousand pounds. With such assistance the difficulties of the moment might be overcome; but, without it, he, Lord Wellington, felt assured, that the whole financial and military system of the Portuguese would break down at once; all the expense hitherto incurred would be cast away, and all hopes of defending the country extinguished. It was for the ministers to decide.

"There remained two other points to consider—the re-embarkation of the British army, in the event of failure, and the chances of the Portuguese nation continuing the contest alone. As to the first, he could carry off everything safely, except the horses of the cavalry and artillery; those could not be carried off, if the embarkation took place after a lost battle; and, if under other circumstances, the expense of horse transports would be more than the worth of the animals. As to the second point, if the British army evacuated Portugal, under any circumstances, he could not give hopes that the contest could be prolonged effectually by the natives. Although I," he said, "*consider the Portuguese government and army as the principals in the contest for their own independence, and that their success or failure must depend principally upon their own exertions and the bravery of their army, and that I am sanguine in my expectations of both, when excited by the example of British officers and troops; I have no hope of either, if his Majesty should now withdraw the army from the Peninsula, or if it should be obliged to evacuate it by defeat. There is no doubt that the immediate consequences will be the possession of Lisbon by the enemy, probably without a contest; and other consequences will follow, affecting the state of the war, not only in Portugal, but Spain.* If, therefore, it should be thought advisable now to withdraw, or if, eventually, the British army should be obliged to withdraw from Portugal, I would recommend a consideration of the means of carrying away such of the Portuguese military as should be desirous of emigrating, rather than continue by their means the contest in this country."

Peniche and Setuval offered secure points of embarkation in the event of failure, but neither was likely to come within the scope of the operations, and Lord Wellington's opinion as to the facility of carrying off the army from Lisbon was founded chiefly upon Admiral Berkeley's assurances that the embarkation would not take longer than four hours, during which time, even though the left bank of that river should be occupied by the enemy, the ships of war could sustain the fire and at the same time sweep with their own guns all the ground above Passo d'Arcos, which, from the circumstance of its having no surf, was thought preferable to St. Julian's for an embarkation. But the Admiral's views, as I shall have occasion to observe hereafter, were erroneous; the fleet could not remain in the Tagus, for the purpose of an embarkation, if the enemy were in possession of the left bank.

Although alarmed at the number of men demanded, a number which, from the recent loss sustained in the Walcheren expedition, they truly observed, would, in case of disaster, endanger the safety of England, the ministers assented to Lord Wellington's proposals;

they undertook to pay ten thousand additional Portuguese troops, and to advance money for the increased stipends to the officers; and being now pledged to an annual subsidy of nearly one million, they with justice required that the Portuguese Regency, under pain of the subsidy being stopped, should keep all that part of the military establishment which remained under their own direction in a state of complete efficiency.

Thus supported, Lord Wellington proceeded with vigorous intelligence to meet the impending contest. His troops, removed from the Guadiana, took healthy cantonments on the north-eastern frontier of Portugal. He expected a reinforcement of five thousand infantry and a regiment of cavalry from England, smaller detachments had already reached him, and the army when it commenced its march from the Guadiana was numerically thirty thousand strong; but those actually under arms scarcely amounted to twenty thousand, for nine thousand were in hospital, and many in the ranks were still tottering from the effects of past illness.

The 20th of January, the head-quarters and the artillery parc were established at Viseu, in Upper Beira. The cavalry was quartered, by single regiments, at Golegao, Punhete, Torres Novas, Celerico, and Santarem. General Hill was left with five thousand British, and a like number of Portuguese, at Abrantes; and the remainder of the infantry (one regiment, forming the garrison of Lisbon, excepted) was distributed along the valley of the Mondego.

The plans of the English General were, at first, grounded upon the supposition that the French would follow the right or northern line, in preference to the centre or southern line of operations against the Peninsula, that is, *attack Portugal from the side of Old Castile*, rather than *Andalusia from the side of La Mancha*. In this he was mistaken. The movements were again directed by Napoleon; his views were as usual gigantic, and not Andalusia alone, but every part of the Peninsula, was destined to feel the weight of his arms. Fresh troops, flushed with their recent German victories, were crowding into Spain, reinforcing the corps to their right and left, scouring the main communications, and following the footsteps of the old bands, as the latter were impelled forward in the career of invasion. Hence, the operations against Andalusia so deeply affected the defence of Portugal, that, on the 31st of January, at the moment Seville was opening her gates, Lord Wellington demanded fresh instructions, reiterating the question, whether *Portugal should be defended at all;* but at the same time transmitting one of those clear and powerful statements, which he invariably drew up for the ministers' information previous to undertaking any great enterprise; statements in which, showing he bearings of past

and present events, and drawing conclusions as to the future with a wonderful accuracy, he has given irrefragable proofs, that envious folly has attributed to fortune, and the favor of the Cabinet, successes which were the result of his own sagacity and unalterable firmness.

"The enemy," he said, "aimed at conquering the south; he would no doubt obtain Seville with all its resources; and the defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies would be the consequences of any action, in which either their imprudence or necessity, or even expediency, might engage them. The armies might, however, be lost and the authorities dispersed, but the war of partisans would continue. Cadiz might possibly hold out, and the Central Junta even exist within its walls, but it would be without authority, because the French would possess all the provinces. This state of affairs left Portugal untouched; yet it was chiefly to that country he wished to draw the ministers' attention.

"They already knew its military situation and resources. If arms could be supplied to the militia, a gross force of ninety thousand men, regularly organized, could be calculated upon, exclusive of the armed population and of the British army. Much had been done within the last nine months, for the enrolment, organization, and equipment of this great force; but much remained to be done, and with very insufficient means, before the fifty thousand men, composing the militia, could possibly contend with the enemy; and although this should be effected, the whole army would still want that confidence in themselves and in their officers, which is only to be acquired by military experience.

"When the affairs of Spain should, as before supposed, be brought to that pass, *that a regular resistance would cease, no possibility existed of the contest in that country being renewed on such a scale as to afford a chance of success, although the possession of each part might be precarious, depending upon the strength of the French force holding it, and that the whole might prove a burthen rather than an advantage to the French government.* Thence arose this question, Will the continuation of the contest in Portugal afford any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy, or of benefit to the allies?

"It was impossible to calculate upon any certain grounds the degree of assistance to be expected from the Portuguese troops. For the regulars everything that discipline could effect had been done, and they had been armed and equipped as far as the means of the country would go. The militia also had been improved to the extent which the expense of keeping them embodied would permit. The Portuguese had confidence in the British nation and

army; they were loyal to their Prince; detested the French government, and were individually determined to do everything for the cause. Still they were not to be certainly calculated upon until inured to war, because the majority of their officers were of an inferior description and inexperienced in military affairs."*

Under these circumstances, and *adverting to the approaching subjection of Spain*, he demanded to know whether "*the enemy, bending the greatest part of his force against Portugal, that country should be defended, or measures taken to evacuate it, carrying off all persons, military and others, for whose conveyance means could be found.* But under any circumstances, (he said,) the British army could always be embarked in despite of the enemy."

Such being the view taken of this important subject by Lord Wellington, it may seem proper here to notice an argument which, with equal ignorance and malice, has often been thrust forward in disparagement of Sir John Moore, namely, that he declared Portugal could not be defended, whereas Lord Wellington did defend that country.† The former General, premising that he was not prepared to answer a question of such magnitude, observed, that the frontier being, although rugged, open, could not be defended against a superior force;‡ yet that Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico, and Viseu, might be occupied as temporary positions to check the advance of an enemy, and cover the embarkation of stores, &c., which could only be made at Lisbon. That the Portuguese in their own mountains would be of much use, and that he hoped that they could alone defend the Tras os Montes. That, if the French succeeded in Spain, it would be vain to resist them in Portugal, "*because the latter was without a military force*," and if it were otherwise, from the experience of Roriça and Vimiero, no reliance was to be placed on their troops. This opinion, hastily given, had reference only to the *state of affairs existing at that moment*, being expressly founded *on the miserable condition and unpromising character of the Portuguese military, Spain also being supposed conquered.*

Now Lord Wellington, after two campaigns in the country; after the termination of the anarchy which prevailed during Sir John Cradock's time; after immense subsidies had been granted to Portugal, her whole military force reorganized, and her regular troops disciplined, paid, and officered by England; after the war in Germany had cost Napoleon fifty thousand men, the campaign in the Peninsula at least fifty thousand more; in fine, after mature consideration, and when Spain was still fighting; when Andalusia, Cat-

* Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, 31st Jan. 1810, MS.
† Mr. James Moore's Narrative.
‡ Appendix 16.

alonia, Murcia, Valencia, Gallicia, and the Asturias were still uninvaded; when Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, most important posts with reference to this question, were still in possession of the Spaniards, and prepared for defence; Lord Wellington, I say, came to the conclusion, that Portugal might be defended against the army then in the Peninsula, provided *an enormous additional subsidy and a powerful auxiliary army were furnished by England, and that one earnest and devoted effort was made by the whole Portuguese nation.** And when Andalusia fell, he warned his government that, *although success could only be expected from the devotion and ardor of the Portuguese, their army could not even then be implicitly trusted.*† Lisbon, also, he considered as the only secure point of resistance, and he occupied Viseu, Guarda, Almeida, Belmonte, and Celerico, as temporary posts.

But, in all things concerning this war, there was between those generals a remarkable similarity of opinion and plan of action.

"*The French*," said Sir John Moore, "*will find the Spaniards troublesome subjects, but in the first instance they will have little more than a march to subdue the country.*"‡

"*The defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies will be*," said Lord Wellington, "*the probable consequence of any action in which either imprudence, necessity, or even expediency, may lead them to engage. The armies may be lost, the authorities dispersed, but the war of partisans will probably continue.*"§

And when the edge of the sword was, in 1810, as in 1808, descending on the unguarded front of Andalusia, Lord Wellington, on the first indication of Joseph's march, designed to make a movement similar in principle to that executed by Sir John Moore on a like occasion;¶ that is, by an irruption into Castile, to threaten the enemy's rear, in such sort that he should be obliged to return from Andalusia or suffer his forces in Castile to be beaten. Nor was he at first deterred from this project by the knowledge that fresh troops were entering Spain. The Junta, indeed, assured him that only eight thousand men had reinforced the French; but, although circumstances led him to doubt this assertion, he was not without hopes to effect his purpose before the reinforcements, whatever they might be, could come into line. He had even matured his plan, as far as regarded the direction of the march, when other considerations obliged him to relinquish it, and these shall be here examined, because French and Spanish writers then, and since,

* Letter to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 14, 1809, MS.
† Ibid, Jan. 31, 1810, MS.
‡ Mr. James Moore's Narrative.
§ Letter to Lord Liverpool, Jan. 31, 1810, MS.
¶ Appendix 16, § 3.

have accused him of looking on with indifference, if not with satisfaction, at the ruin of the Central Junta's operations, as if it only depended upon him to render them successful.

Why he refused to join in the Spanish projects has been already explained. He abandoned his own—

1. Because the five thousand men promised from England had not arrived, and his hospitals being full, he could not, including Hill's division, bring more than twenty thousand British soldiers into the field. Hill's division, however, could not be moved without leaving the rear of the army exposed to the French in the south,—a danger which success in Castile, by recalling the latter from Andalusia, would only increase.

2. The Portuguese had suffered cruelly during the winter from hunger and nakedness, the result of the scarcity of money before mentioned.* To bring them into line, was to risk a total disorganization, destructive alike of present and future advantages. On the other hand, the French in Castile, consisting of the sixth corps and the troops of Kellermann's government, Lord Wellington knew to be at least thirty thousand strong, of which twenty thousand were in one mass; and, although the rest were dispersed from Burgos to Avila, from Zamora to Valladolid, they could easily have concentrated in time to give battle, and would have proved too powerful. That this reasoning was sound shall now be shown.

Mortier's march from Seville would not have terminated at Badajos, if the British force at Abrantes, instead of advancing to Portalegre, had been employed in Castile. The invasion of Andalusia was only part of a general system throughout Spain; and when the King placed himself at the head of the army, to force the Morena, Kellermann marched from Salamanca to Miranda del Castanar and Bejar, with the sixth corps, and thus secured the defiles leading into the valley of the Tagus; at the same time, the second corps, coming down that valley, communicated with the sixth by the pass of Baños, and with the fifth by Seradillo and Caceres. Hence, without losing hold of Andalusia, three *corps d'armée*, namely, the sixth, second, and fifth, amounting to fifty thousand men, could, on an emergency, be brought together to oppose any offensive movement of Lord Wellington's. Nor was this the whole of the French combinations; in rear of all these forces, Napoleon was crowding the Peninsula with fresh armies, and not eight thousand, as the Central Junta asserted, but one hundred thousand men, rendered disposable by the peace with Austria and the evacuation of Walcheren, were crossing, or to cross, the Western Pyrenees.†

* Lord Wellington's correspondence, MS.
† Rolls of the French army.

Of these, the first detachments reinforced the divisions in the field, but the succeeding troops formed an eighth and ninth corps, and the former, under the command of the Duke of Abrantes, advancing gradually through Old Castile, was actually in the plains of Valladolid, and would, in conjunction with Kellermann, have overwhelmed the British army, but for that sagacity which the French, with derisive but natural anger, and the Spaniards, with ingratitude, have termed "*the selfish caution of the English system.*"

Truly, it would be a strange thing, to use so noble and costly a machine as a British army, with all its national reputation to support, as lightly as those Spanish multitudes, collected in a day, dispersed in an hour, reassembled again without difficulty, and incapable of attaining, and consequently incapable of losing, any military reputation.

CHAPTER II.

Greatness of Lord Wellington's plans—Situation of the belligerents described—State of the French—Character of Joseph—Of his ministers—Disputes with the Marshals—Napoleon's policy—Military governments—Almenara sent to Paris—Curious deception executed by the Marquis of Romana, Mr. Stuart and the historian Cabanes—Prodigious force of the French army—State of Spain—Inertness of Gallicia—Secret plan of the Regency for encouraging the Guerillas—Operations of those bands—Injustice and absurdity of the Regency, with respect to South America—England—State of parties—Factious injustice on both sides—Difficulty of raising money—Bullion Committee—Wm. Cobbett—Lord King—Mr. Vansittart—Extravagance of the Ministers—State of Portugal—Parties in that country—Intrigues of the Patriarch and the Souzas—Mr. Stuart is appointed Plenipotentiary—His firmness—Princess Carlotta claims the Regency of the whole Peninsula, and the succession to the throne of Spain.

THE greatness of the French reinforcements having dispelled the idea of offensive operations, Lord Wellington turned his whole attention to Portugal, and notwithstanding the unfavorable change of circumstances, the ministers consented that he should undertake its defence; yet the majority yielded to the influence of his brother rather than to their own conviction of its practicability, and threw the responsibility entirely on the shoulders of the General. The deep designs, the vast combinations, the mighty efforts by which he worked out the deliverance of that country, were beyond the compass of their policy; and even now, it is easier to admire than to comprehend the moral intrepidity which sustained him under so many difficulties, and the sagacity which enabled him to overcome them; for he had an enemy with a sharp sword to fight, the follies and fears of several weak cabinets to correct, the snares of unprin-

cipled politicians to guard against, and finally to oppose public opinion. Failure was everywhere anticipated, and there were but few who even thought him serious in his undertaking.

But having now brought the story of the war down to that period when England, setting Portugal and Spain as it were aside, undertook the contest with France, it will be well to take a survey of the respective conditions and plans of the belligerents; and to show how great the preparations, how prodigious the forces on both sides, and with what a power each was impelled forward to the shock.

State of the French.—France, victorious, and in a state of the highest prosperity, could with ease furnish the number of men required to maintain the struggle in the Peninsula for many years. The utmost strength of the Spaniards had been proved, and it was evident that if the French could crush the British armies, disorder and confusion might indeed be prolonged for a few years, yet no effectual resistance made; and as in the war of succession, the people would gradually have accommodated themselves to the change of dynasty, especially as the little worth of Ferdinand was now fully demonstrated by an effort to effect his release. For when Baron Kolli, the agent employed on this occasion, was detected and his place supplied by one of the French police to ascertain the intentions of the captive King, the latter, *influenced by personal fears alone*, not only refused to make the attempt, but dishonorably denounced Kolli to the French government. The only real obstacles then to the entire conquest of the Peninsula were Cadiz and Portugal. The strength of the former was precarious, and the enormous forces assembled to subdue the latter appeared to be equal to the task. Yet in war there are always circumstances which, though extraneous to the military movements, influence them as much as the wind influences the sailing of a ship; and amongst the most important of these, must be reckoned the conduct of the intrusive King.

Joseph was a man of so amiable a nature, that even the Spaniards never accused him of anything worse than being too convivial; but it is evident that he was unequal to his task, and mistook his true situation, when, resisting Napoleon's policy, he claimed the treatment of an independent King. He should have known that he was a tool, and in Spain could only be a tool of the Emperor's. To have refused a crown like his brother Lucien, would have been heroic firmness, but like his brother Louis, first to accept and then to resist the hand that conferred it, was a folly that, without ameliorating the condition of the Spaniards, threw fatal obstacles in Napoleon's path. Joseph's object was to create a

Spanish party for himself by gentle and just means, but the scales fell from the hands of justice when the French first entered the Peninsula, and while the English supported Spain, it was absurd to expect even a sullen submission, much less attachment, from a nation so abused; neither was it possible to recast public feeling until the people had passed through the furnace of war. The French soldiers were in Spain for conquest, and without them the intrusive monarch could not keep his throne.

Now Joseph's Spanish ministers were men who joined him upon principle, and who, far from showing a renegado zeal in favor of the French, were as ardently attached to their own country as any of those who shouted for Ferdinand VII.; and whenever Spanish interests clashed (and that was constantly) with those of the French armies, they as well as the King invariably supported the former; and so strenuously, that in Paris it was even supposed that they intended to fall on the Emperor's troops.* Thus civil contention weakened the military operations, and obliged Napoleon either to take the command in person, or to adopt a policy which, however defective, will perhaps be found to have been the best adapted to the actual state of affairs.

He suffered, or as some, eager to lower a great man's genius to their own level, have asserted, he fomented disputes between the marshals and the King; but the true question is, could he prevent those disputes? A wise policy does not consist in pushing any one point to the utmost perfection of which it may be susceptible, but in regulating and balancing opposing interests, in such a manner, that the greatest benefit shall arise from the working of the whole. To arrive at a sound judgment of Napoleon's measures, therefore, it would be necessary to weigh all the various interests of his political position, and there are not sufficient materials yet before the world to do this correctly; yet we may be certain that his situation, with respect both to foreign and domestic policy, required extraordinary management. It must always be remembered that he was not merely a conqueror; he was also the founder of a political structure too much exposed to storms without, to bear any tampering with its internal supports. If money be the sinew of war, it is also the vital stream of peace, and there is nothing more remarkable in Napoleon's policy than the care with which he handled financial matters, avoiding as he would the plague that fictitious system of public credit, so fatuitously cherished in England. He could not, without hurting France, transmit large quantities of gold to Spain, and the only resource left was to make "*the war maintain the war.*" Now Joseph's desire of popularity, and the feelings of his ministers, were opposed to this system; nor were

* Appendix 18, § 1.

the proceeds of the contributions always applied for the benefit of the troops. This demanded a remedy; yet openly to declare the King of no consideration would have been impolitic in the highest degree. The Emperor adopted an intermediate course, and formed what were called "*particular military governments*," such as Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia and Andalusia, in which the marshal or general named governor possessed both the civil and military power; in short, he created viceroys as he threatened to do when at Madrid, and, though many disadvantages attended this arrangement, it appears to have been wise and consistent with the long reach which distinguishes all Napoleon's measures.

The principal disadvantages were, that it mortally offended the King, by thwarting his plans for establishing a national party; that many of the governors were wantonly oppressive, and attentive only to their own situation, without regarding the general objects of the war; that both the Spanish ministers and the people regarded it as a step towards dismembering Spain, and especially with respect to the provinces beyond the Ebro; and, indeed, the annexing those parts to France, if not resolved upon, was at one time contemplated by the Emperor.* On the other hand, experience proved that Joseph was not a general equal to the times. Napoleon himself admits that, at this period, the marauding system necessary to obtain supplies, joined to the guerilla warfare, had relaxed the discipline of the French armies, and introduced a horrible license, while the military movements were feebly pushed.† Hence, perhaps, the only effectual means to obtain the resources of Spain for the troops, with least devastation, was to make the success of each "*corps d'armée*," and the reputation of its commander, dependent upon the welfare of the province in which it was fighting. And, although some of the governors had neither the sense nor the justice to fulfil this expectation, others, such as Soult and Suchet, did tranquillize the people, and yet provided all necessary things for their own troops; results which would certainly not have been attained under the supreme government of the King, because he knew little of war, loved pleasure, was of an easy obliging disposition, and had a court to form and maintain.

I am aware that the first named generals, especially Soult, were included by Joseph amongst those who, by oppressing the people, extended the spirit of resistance; but this accusation was the result of personal enmity, and facts, derived from less interested quarters, as well as the final results, prove that those officers had a longer reach in their policy than the King could understand.

There is yet another view in which the matter may be consid-

* Appendix 18, § 2, 3. † Mémoires de St. Helène.

ered. Napoleon says he left many provinces of Italy under the harsh government of Austria, that the spirit of jealousy, common to the small states of that country, might be broken, and the whole rendered amenable and ready to assimilate, when he judged the time ripe to re-form one great kingdom. Now the same policy may be traced in the military governments of Spain. The marshal's sway, however wisely adapted to circumstances, being still the offspring of war and violence, was of necessity onerous and harsh; but the Peninsula once subdued, this system would have been replaced by the peaceful government of the King, who would then have been regarded as a deliverer. Something of this nature was also necessary to sweep away the peculiar privileges which many provinces possessed, and of which they were extremely tenacious; and the iron hand of war, only, could introduce that equality which was the principal aim and scope of the constitution of Bayonne.

Nevertheless, the first effects of the decree establishing this system were injurious to the French cause.* Fresh contributions were exacted to supply the deficiency occasioned by the cessation of succors from France; and, to avoid these, men, who would otherwise have submitted tranquilly, fled from the military governments. The partidas also suddenly and greatly increased, and a fresh difficulty arose about their treatment when prisoners. These bodies, although regardless of the laws of war themselves, claimed all the rights of soldiers from their adversaries, and their claim was supported by the Spanish government. Thus, when Soult, as Major-General for the King, proclaimed that military execution would be done on the bands in Andalusia, as assassins, and beyond the pale of military law, the Regency answered by a retaliatory declaration; and both parties had strong grounds for what they did: the Junta, because the defence of the country now rested chiefly on the partidas; Joseph, because the latter, while claiming the usages of war, did not act upon them, and were, by the Junta, encouraged in assassination. Mina, and indeed all the chiefs, put their prisoners to death whenever it became inconvenient to keep them; and Saraza publicly announced his hope of being able to capture Madame Suchet when she was pregnant, that he might destroy the mother and the infant together!† And such things were common during this terrible war. The difficulties occurring in argument were, however, overcome in practice; the question of the treatment of prisoners was generally decided by granting no quarter on either side.

Joseph, incensed at the edict establishing the governments, sent the Marquis of Almenara to Paris, to remonstrate with his brother,

* King Joseph's Correspondence, MS.
† Suchet's Memoirs.

and to complain of the violence and the injustice of the French generals, especially Ney and Kellermann;* and he denounced one act of the latter, which betrayed the most wanton contempt of justice and propriety; namely, the seizure of the national archives at Simancas, by which infinite confusion was produced, and the utmost indignation excited, without obtaining the slightest benefit, political or military. Another object of Almenara's mission was to ascertain if there was really any intention of seizing the provinces beyond the Ebro; and this gave rise to a curious intrigue; for his correspondence, being intercepted, was brought to Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, and he, in concert with Romana, and Cabanes the Spanish historian, simulating the style and manner of Napoleon's state papers, composed a counterfeit "*senatus consultum*" and decree for annexing the provinces beyond the Ebro to France, and transmitted them to Joseph, whose discontent and fears were thereby greatly increased. Meanwhile, his distress for money was so extreme, that his ministers were at times actually destitute of food.

These political affairs impeded the action of the armies, but the intrinsic strength of the latter was truly formidable; for, reckoning the King's French guards, the force in the Peninsula was not less than *three hundred and seventy thousand men, and eighty thousand horses.* Of these, forty-eight thousand men were in hospital, four thousand prisoners, and twenty-nine thousand detached; leaving nearly two hundred and eighty thousand fighting men actually under arms, ready either for battle or siege: and moreover, a fresh reserve eighteen thousand strong was in march to enter Spain.† In May, this prodigious force had been re-organized; and in July was thus distributed:—

Governments or Armies in the 2d Line.

			Total Strength,
1. Catalonia	Seventh corps	Duke of Tarento	55,647
2. Aragon	Third corps	Gen. Suchet	33,007
3 Navarre	Detachments and a division of the Imperial Guards	Gen. Reille	21,887
4. Biscay	Detachments	Gen. Caffarelli	6,570
5. Old Castile, comprising Burgos, Aranda, and Soria	Divisions of the Imperial Guards and cavalry	Gen. Dorsenne	10,303
6. Valladolid, &c.	Detachments	Gen. Kellermann	6,474
7. Asturias	One division	Gen. Bonnet	9,893
		Total for the governments	143,786

Armies in the 1st Line.

Army of the South, composed of the first, fourth, and fifth corps, under the command of Soult	72,769
Army of the Centre, composed of the Royal Guards, two divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry, under the personal command of the King	24,187
Army of Portugal, composed of a reserve of cavalry and the second, sixth, and eighth corps, under the command of Massena	86,896
The ninth corps, commanded by General Drouet, distributed by divisions along the great line of communication from Vittoria to Valladolid	23,815
A division under General Serras, employed as a movable column to protect the rear of the army of Portugal	10,605
	218,272

* Appendix 18, § 1. † Appendix 15, § 1.

Thus the plan of invasion was determined in three distinct lines, namely, the third and seventh corps on the left; the army of the south in the centre; the army of Portugal on the right. But the interior circle was still held by the French, and their lines of communication were crowded with troops.

State of Spain.—On the right, the armies of Valencia and Catalonia were opposed to the third and seventh corps; and their utmost efforts could only retard, not prevent the sieges of Tarragona and Tortosa. In the centre, the Murcian troops, and those assembled at Cadiz, were only formidable by the assistance of the British force under General Graham. On the left, Romana, supported by the frontier fortresses, maintained a partisan warfare from Albuquerque to Ayamonte, but looked to Hill for safety, and to Portugal for refuge. In the north, the united forces of Gallicia and Asturia did not exceed fifteen thousand men; and Mahi declared his intention of retiring to Coruña if Bonnet advanced beyond the frontiers. Indeed, the Gallicians were so backward to join the armies, that, at a later period, Contreras was used to send through the country movable columns, attended by an executioner, to oblige the villages to furnish their quota of men.* Yet, with all this severity, and with money and arms continually furnished by England, Gallicia never was of any signal service to the British operations.

But, as in the human body livid spots and blotches appear as the vital strength decays, so, in Spain, the partidas suddenly and surprisingly increased as the regular armies disappeared. Many persons joined these bands, as a refuge from starvation; others from a desire to revenge the licentious conduct of the marauding French columns; and, finally, the Regency, desirous of pushing the system to its utmost extent, established secret guerilla juntas in each province, enjoining them diligently to collect stores and provisions in secure places. District inspectors and paymasters, selected by the nearest general officer in command of regular troops, were also appointed, as superintendents of details relative to the discipline and payment of the partidas, and particular tracts were charged with the supplies, each according to its means.† Lastly, every province was divided into three parts, each part, following its population, being to furnish seven, eight, or nine squadrons of this irregular force; and the whole, whenever circumstances required it, to unite and act in mass.

The first burst of these bands occasioned the French considerable loss, impeded their communications, and created great alarm. It was a second insurrection of the whole country. The Murcians,

* Memoirs of Contreras, published by himself.
† Mr. Stuart's Papers, MS.

in concert with the peasants of Granada and Jaen, waged war in the mountains of Andalusia. Franquisetto and Palarea beset the neighborhood of Ciudad Real and Toledo in La Mancha. El Principe, Saornil, Temprano, and Juan Abril, keeping the circuit of the Carpentino mountains, from the Somosierra to Avila, and descending sometimes on the side of New, sometimes on the side of Old Castile, sometimes in Estremadura, carried off small French posts even close to the capital, and slew the governor of Segovia, at the very gates of that town. On the other side of Madrid, Duran with two thousand men, and the Empecinado with twelve hundred cavalry and infantry, kept the hills above Guadalaxara, as far as Cuença, and ventured sometimes to give battle in the plain. Espoz y Mina was formidable in Navarre. Longa and Campillo, at the head of more than two thousand men, harassed Biscay and the neighborhood of Vittoria, and the chain of communication between these great bands and the Empecinado was maintained by Amor, Merino, and the Friar Sapia; the two first acting about Burgos, and the third holding the mountains above Soria. In the Asturias, Escaidron, continually hanging upon the flanks and rear of Bonnet, between Santander and Oviedo, acted in concert with Campillo on one side, and with Porlier on the other, and this last chief, sometimes throwing himself into the mountains on the borders of Gallicia, and sometimes sailing from Coruña, constantly troubled the Asturias by his enterprises. To curb these bands, the French fortified all their own posts of communication and correspondence, and slew numbers of the guerillas, many of whom were robbers that, under pretence of acting against the enemy, merely harassed their own countrymen; few were really formidable, though all were vexatious. Enough has been said upon this point.

But, while reduced to this irregular warfare for preventing the entire submission of Old Spain, the Regency, with inconceivable folly and injustice, were alienating the affections of their colonies, and provoking civil war, as if the terrible struggle in the Peninsula were not sufficient for the ruin of their country. The independence of Spain was with them of subordinate interest to the continuance of oppression in South America. Money, arms, and troops were withdrawn from the Peninsula, to subdue the so-called rebellious colonists; nor was any reflection made on the inconsistency of expecting Napoleon's innumerable hosts to be beaten close to their own doors by guerilla operations, and yet attempting with a few divisions to crush whole nations acting in the same manner at three thousand miles distance. Such being the state of French and

Spanish affairs, it remains to examine the condition of England and Portugal, as affecting the war in the Peninsula.

England.—The contentions of party were vehement, and the ministers' policy resolved itself into three principal points: 1. The fostering the public inclination for the war; 2. The furnishing money for the expenses; 3. The recruiting of the armies. The last was provided for by an act passed in the early part of 1809, which offered eleven guineas bounty to men passing from the militia to the line, and ten guineas bounty to recruits for the militia; this was found to furnish about twenty-four thousand men in the year; but the other points were not so easily disposed of. The opposition in Parliament was powerful, eloquent, and not very scrupulous. The desperate shifts which formed the system of the ministers were indeed justly attacked, but when particulars touching the contest in Portugal were discussed, faction was apparent. The accuracy of Beresford's report of the numbers and efficiency of the native forces was most unjustly questioned, and the notion of successful resistance assailed by arguments and by ridicule, until gloom and doubt were widely spread in England, and disaffection wonderfully encouraged in Portugal; nor was the mischief thus caused one of the smallest difficulties encountered by the English General.

On the other side, the ministers, trusting to their majorities in Parliament, reasoned feebly and ignorantly, yet wilfully, and like men expecting that fortune would befriend them, they knew not why or wherefore; and they dealt also more largely than their adversaries in misrepresentations to mislead the public mind. Every treasury newspaper teemed with accounts of battles which were never fought, plans which were never arranged, places taken which were never attacked, and victories gained where no armies were. The plains of the Peninsula could scarcely contain the innumerable forces of the Spaniards and Portuguese; cowardice, weakness, treachery, and violence were the only attributes of the enemy; if a battle was expected, his numbers were contemptible, if a victory was gained, his host was countless. Members of Parliament related stories of the enemy which had no foundation in truth, and nothing that consummate art of intrigue could bring to aid party spirit and to stifle reason, was neglected.

But the great and permanent difficulty was to raise money. The country, inundated with bank notes, was destitute of gold. Napoleon's continental system burthened commerce, the exchanges were continually rising against England, and all the evils which sooner or later are the inevitable result of a factitious currency, were too perceptible to be longer disregarded in Parliament. A committee appointed to investigate the matter, made early in the session of

1810 a report in which the evils of the existing system and the causes of the depreciation were elaborately treated, and the necessity of returning to cash payments enforced; but the authors did not perceive, or at least did not touch upon the injustice and the ruin attending a full payment in coin of sterling value, of debts contracted in a depreciated paper currency. The celebrated writer, William Cobbett, did not fail, however, to point out this very clearly, and subsequent experience has confirmed his views.* The government at first endeavored to stave off the bullion question; but finding that they must either abandon the prosecution of the war in the Peninsula or deny the facts adduced by the committee, adopted the latter. On the motion of Mr. Vansittart, the house voted in substance that a pound note and a shilling were equal in value to a golden guinea of full weight, although light guineas were then openly sold at twenty-eight shillings each. Lord King, by demanding gold from those of his tenants whose leases were drawn before the depreciation of bank notes, exposed all the fraud and the hollowness of the ministers' system; and the vote of the Commons, although well calculated to convince the ministers' opponents that no proposition could be too base or absurd to meet with support in the existing Parliament, did not remove the difficulties of raising money; hence no resource remained but that of the desperate spendthrift, who, never intending to pay, cares not on what terms he supplies his present necessities. The peculiar circumstances of the war had, however, given England a monopoly of the world's commerce by sea, and the ministers, affirming that the country was in a state of unexampled prosperity, began a career of expense, the like of which no age or nation had ever seen; yet without one sound or reasonable ground for expecting ultimate success, save the genius of their General, which they but half appreciated, and which the first bullet might have extinguished forever.

State of Portugal.—In this country three parties were apparent: —that of the *people*, ready to peril body and goods for independence,—that of the *fidalgos*, who thought to profit from the nation's energy without any diminution of ancient abuses,—that of the *disaffected*, who desired the success of the French, some as thinking that an ameliorated government must follow, some from mere baseness of nature. This party looked to have Alorna, Pamplona, and Gomez Freire, as chiefs if the enemy triumphed. Those noblemen, in common with many others, had entered the French service in Junot's time, under the authority of the Prince Regent's edict to that effect; Freire, more honorable than his companions, refused

* Paper against Gold.

to bear arms against his country; the two others had no scruples, and Pamplona even sketched a plan of invasion, which is at this day in the military archives at Paris.

The great body of the people, despising both their civil governors and military chiefs, relied on the British General and army; but the fidalgos or cast of nobles, working in unison with, and supported by the Regency, were a powerful body, and their political proceedings after the departure of Sir John Cradock demand notice. The Patriarch, formerly Bishop of Oporto, the Marquis de Olhao, Conteiro Mor, and the Marquis of Das Minas, composed the Regency; and they, and every other member of the government, were jealous of each other, exceedingly afraid of their superiors in the Brazils, and, with the exception of the secretary, Miguel Forjas, unanimous in support of abuses. As the military organization carried on by Beresford was only a restoration of the ancient institutions of the country, it was necessarily hateful to the Regency, and to the fidalgos, who profited by its degeneracy. The opposition of these people, joined to unavoidable difficulties in finance and other matters, retarded the progress of the regular army towards efficiency during 1809, and rendered the efforts to organize the militia and ordenanza nearly nugatory. Nevertheless, the energy of Lord Wellington and of Beresford, and the comparatively zealous proceedings of Forjas, proved so disagreeable to Das Minas, who was in bad health, that he resigned, and immediately became a centre, round which all discontented persons, and they were neither few nor inactive, gathered. As the times obliged the government to permit an unusual freedom of discussion in Lisbon, it naturally followed that the opinions of designing persons were most obtruded, and those opinions being repeated in the British Parliament, were printed in the English newspapers, and re echoed in Lisbon. Thus a picture of affairs was painted in the most glaring colors of misrepresentation at the moment when the safety of the country depended upon the devoted submission of the people.

After Das Minas' resignation, Mr. Stuart and three Portuguese, namely, Antonio, called Principal Souza, the Conde de Redondo, and Doctor Noguiera, were added to the Regency by an intrigue which shall be hereafter noticed. The last was a man of honesty, talent and discretion, but Souza, daring, restless, irritable, indefatigable, and a consummate intriguer, created the utmost disorder. Seeking constantly to thwart the proceedings of the British generals, he was strenuously assisted by the Patriarch, whose violence and ambition were no way diminished, and whose influence amongst the people was still very considerable. An exceedingly powerful cabal

was thus formed, whose object was to obtain the supreme direction of the civil and military affairs, and to control both Wellington and Beresford. The Conde Linhares, head of the Souza family, was Prime Minister in the Brazils; the Principal was in the Regency at Lisbon; the Chevalier Souza was envoy at the British Court, and a fourth of the family, Don Pedro de Souza, was in a like situation near the Spanish Regency; playing into each others hands, and guided by the subtle Principal, they concocted very dangerous intrigues, and their proceedings, as might be expected, were at first supported with a high hand by the cabinet of Rio Janeiro. Lord Wellesley's energetic interference reduced the latter indeed to a reasonable disposition, yet the cabal secretly continued their machinations, and what they durst not attempt by force they sought to attain by artifice.

In the latter end of the year 1809, Mr. Villiers had, fortunately for the cause, been replaced as envoy by Mr. Charles Stuart, and this gentleman, well experienced in the affairs of the Peninsula, and disdaining the petty jealousies which had hitherto marked the intercourse of the principal political agents with the generals, immediately applied his masculine understanding and resolute temper to forward the views of Lord Wellington. It is undoubted that the dangerous political crisis which followed his arrival, could not have been sustained, if a diplomatist less firm, less able, or less willing to support the plans of the commander, had been employed.

To resist the French was the desire of two of the three parties in Portugal, but with the fidalgos it was a question of interest more than of patriotism. Yet less sagacious than the clergy, the great body of which, perceiving at once that they must stand or fall with the English army, heartily aided the cause, the fidalgos clung rather to the Regency. Now the caballers in that body, who were the same people that had opposed Sir Hew Dalrymple, hoped not only to beat the enemy, but to establish the supremacy of the northern provinces (of which they themselves were the lords) in the administration of the country, and would therefore consent to no operations militating against this design. Moreover the natural indolence of the people, being fostered by the negligence and fears of the Regency, rendered it most difficult to obtain the execution of any work or the fulfilment of any agreement in which the Portuguese government or the civil authorities were concerned.

Another spring of political action was the hatred and jealousy of Spain common to the whole Portuguese nation. It created difficulties during the military operations, but it had a visibly advantageous effect upon the people, in their intercourse with the British. For when the Spaniards showed a distrust of their allies,

the Portuguese were more minded to rely implicitly on the latter, to prove that they had no feeling in common with their neighbors. Yet notwithstanding this mutual dislike, the Princess Carlotta, wife to the Prince Regent, and sister to Ferdinand, claimed not only succession to the throne of Spain in the event of her brother's death or perpetual captivity, but the immediate government of the whole Peninsula as hereditary Regent; and to persuade the Spanish tribunals to acknowledge her claims, was the object of Pedro Souza's mission to Cadiz.

Although the Council of Castile, always ready to overthrow the Spanish Regency, readily recognized Carlotta's pretensions in virtue of the decision of the secret Cortes of 1789 which abolished the Salique law of Philip the Fifth, the regents would pay no attention to them; yet Souza, renewing his intrigues when the Cortes assembled, by corruption obtained from the majority of the members a secret acknowledgment of the Princess's claim. His further progress was however promptly arrested by Lord Wellington, who foresaw that his success would affect, not only the military operations in Portugal, by placing them under the control of the Spanish government, but the policy of England afterwards, if power over the whole Peninsula was suffered thus to centre in one family. Moreover, although at first he thought it might prove beneficial in the event of the Peninsula being conquered, he soon judged it a scheme concocted at Rio Janeiro to embarrass himself and Beresford; for it was at first kept secret from the British Cabinet, and it was proposed that the Princess should reside at Madeira, where, surrounded by the contrivers of the plan, she could only have acted under their directions. Thus it is plain that arrogance, deceit, negligence in business, and personal intrigues were common to the Portuguese and Spanish governments; and why they did not produce the same fatal effects in the one as in the other country, will be shown in the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER III.

Lord Wellington's scheme for the defence of Portugal—Vastness of his designs —Number of his troops—Description of the country—Plan of defence analyzed —Difficulty of supplying the army—Resources of the belligerents compared— Character of the British soldier.

When Lord Wellington required thirty thousand British troops to defend Portugal, he considered the number that could be fed and managed with such an inexperienced staff and civil administration as that of the English army, rather than what was necessary to fight the enemy; and hence it was that he declared success would depend upon the exertions and devotion of the native forces. Yet knowing from his experience in Spain how passions, prejudices, and abuses would meet him at every turn, he would trust neither the simple enthusiasm of the people, nor the free promises of their governors, and insisted that his own authority as *Marshal-General of Portugal* should be independent of the local government, and absolute over all arrangements concerning the English and Portuguese forces, whether regulars, militia, or "ordenanzas;" for his designs were vast, and such as could only be effected by extraordinary means.*

Armed with this power, and with the influence derived from the money supplied by England, he first called upon the Regency to revive and enforce the ancient military laws of the realm, by which all men were to be enrolled and bear arms. That effected, he demanded that the people should be warned and commanded to destroy their mills, to remove their boats, break down their bridges, lay waste their fields, abandon their dwellings, and carry off their property, on whatever line the invaders should penetrate; and that this might be deliberately and effectually performed, he designed, at the head of all the allied regular forces, to front the enemy in such sort, that without bringing on a decisive battle, the latter should yet be obliged to keep constantly in a mass, while the whole population, converted into soldiers and closing on the rear and flanks, should cut off all resources, save those carried in the midst of the troops.

But it was evident that if the French could find or carry supplies sufficient to maintain themselves until the British commander, forced back upon the sea, should embark, or giving battle be defeated, the whole of this system must necessarily fall to pieces, and the miserable ruined people submit without further struggle. To avoid such a calamitous termination, it was necessary to find a

* Appendix 19, § 9.

position covering Lisbon where the allied forces could neither be turned by the flanks, nor forced in front by numbers, nor reduced by famine, and from which a free communication could be kept up with the irregular troops closing round the enemy. The mountains filling the tongue of land upon which Lisbon is situated, furnished this keystone to the arch of defence. Accurate plans of all the positions had been made under the directions of Sir Charles Stuart in 1799, and, together with the French Colonel Vincent's minutes, showing how they covered Lisbon, were in Lord Wellington's possession. From these documents the original notion of the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras are said to have been derived; but the above named officers only contemplated such a defence as might be made by an army in movement before an equal or a greater force. It was Lord Wellington who first conceived the design of turning those vast mountains into one stupendous and impregnable citadel, wherein to deposit the independence of the whole Peninsula.

Hereafter the lines shall be described more minutely; at present it must suffice to observe, that intrenchments, inundations and redoubts secured more than five hundred square miles of mountainous country lying between the Tagus and the ocean. Nor was this the most gigantic part of the English General's undertaking. He was a foreigner, ill supported by his own government, and holding power under that of Portugal by a precarious tenure, and he was vehemently opposed by the local authorities, by the ministers, and by the nobility of that country; yet, in this apparently weak position, he undertook at one and the same time to overcome the abuses engendered by centuries of misgovernment, and to oblige a whole people sunk in sloth to arise in arms, to devastate their own lands, and to follow him to battle against the most formidable power of modern times.

Notwithstanding the secret opposition of the Regency, and of the *fidalgos*, the ancient military laws were revived, and so effectually, that the returns for the month of May gave a gross number of more than four hundred and thirty thousand men in arms, of which about fifty thousand were regular troops, fifty-five thousand militia, and the remainder "ordenanzas;" but this multitude was necessarily subject to many deductions. The "*capitans mor*," or chiefs of districts, were at first exceedingly remiss in their duty, the fidalgos evaded service by the connivance of the government, and the total number of "ordenanzas" really assembled fell far short of the returns, and all were ill-armed. This also was the case with the militia, only thirty-two thousand of which had muskets and bayonets; and deserters were so numerous, and the native authorities connived at absence under false pretences, to such an extent,

that scarcely twenty-six thousand men ever remained with their colors. Of the regular troops the whole were in good condition; thirty thousand being in the pay of England, were completely equipped, clothed, disciplined, and for the most part commanded by British officers; but, deduction being made for sick men and recruits, the actual number under arms did not exceed twenty-four thousand infantry, three thousand five hundred cavalry, and three thousand artillery. Thus the disposable native force was about fifty-six thousand men, one half of which were militia.

At this period, the British troops employed in the Peninsula, exclusive of the garrison of Gibraltar, somewhat exceeded thirty-eight thousand men of all arms, of which six thousand were in hospital or detached, and above seven thousand were in Cadiz. The latter city was protected by an allied force of nearly thirty thousand men, while the army on whose exertions the fate of the Peninsula rested, was reduced to twenty-five thousand British, such was the policy of the English Cabinet; for this was the ministers' and not the general's arrangement. The ordenanzas being set aside, the actual force at the disposition of Lord Wellington cannot be estimated higher than eighty thousand men, and the frontier to defend, reckoning from Braganza to Ayamonte, four hundred miles long. The great military features, and the arrangements made to take advantage of them in conformity with the general plan of defence, shall now be described.

The Portuguese land frontier presents four great divisions open to invasion:

1. The northern line of the Entre Minho and the Tras os Montes, extending from the mouth of the Minho to Miranda on the Douro.

2. The eastern line of the Tras os Montes, following the course of the Douro from Miranda to Castel Rodrigo.

3. The frontier of Beira from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal on the Tagus.

4. The Alemtejo and the Algarve frontiers, stretching in one line from the Tagus to the mouth of the Guadiana.

But these divisions may be simplified with respect to the military aspect of the country; for Lisbon taken as the centre, and the distance from thence to Oporto as the radius, a sweep of the compass to Rosaminhal will trace the frontier of Beira; and the space lying between this arc, the Tagus, and the sea-coast, furnished the main body of the defence. The southern and northern provinces being considered as the wings, were rendered subservient to the defence of the whole; but each had a separate system for itself, based on the one general principle, that the country should be


Vol. 2 Plate II.
Face page 359.
S P A I N
Puebla Senabria
Benevente
Esla R.
Zamora
Valenca
ENTRE MINHO
Monterey
Braganza
Chaves
Miranda
TRAS os MONTES
E DOURO
Tormes R.
Salamanca
Ledesma
Douro R.
Oporto
Lamego
Agueda R.
S.t joa. Pesquiera
Coa R.
S. Felices
Moimento de Beira
Pinhel
Trancoso
Ciudad Rodrigo
Viseu
Almeida
R. Vouga
Lafoens
Tarouca
Penedono
Cea R.
Cinta M.
Sardao
Busaco
Cruz R.
Mondego R.
Alfayate
Subargal
Martin Trejo
Alva R.
Pereira
Coimbra
Aguieres
Pena Macor
Coria
Condeixa
Espinhal
Alfarelos
Zarza Mayor
Salvaterra
Pombal
Leiria
Ourem
Thomar
Torres Novas
Rio Mayor
Santarem
Peniche
Alenquer
Torres
LISBON
Defence of Salvaterra PORTUGAL 1810.
Drawn by Gen.l Napier.

wasted, and the best troops opposed to the enemy without risking a decisive action, while the irregular forces closed round the flanks and rear of the invaders.

The northern and southern provinces have been already described. Beira remains to be noticed. Separated by the Douro from the Entre Minho and Tras os Montes, it cannot well be invaded on that line, except one or both of those provinces be first subdued; but from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal, that is, from the Douro to the Tagus, the frontier touches upon Spain, and perhaps the clearest method to describe the conformation of the country will be to enter the camp of the enemy.

An invading army, then, would assemble at Ciudad Rodrigo, or at Coria, or at both those places. In the latter case, the communications could be maintained, directly over the Gata mountains by the pass of Perales, or circuitously, by Placentia and the pass of Baños; and the distance being by Perales not more than two marches, the corps could either advance simultaneously, or unite and force their way at one point only. In this situation, the frontier of Beira between the Douro and the Tagus would offer them an opening of ninety miles against which to operate. But in the centre, the Sierra de Estrella, lifting its snowy peaks to the clouds and stretching out its gigantic arms, would seem to grasp and claim the whole space; the summit is impassable, and streaming down on either hand, numerous rivers cleaving deeply, amidst ravines and bristled ridges, continually oppose the progress of an army. Nevertheless, the invaders could penetrate to the right and left of this mountain in the following directions:

From Ciudad Rodrigo.—1. By the valley of the Douro; 2. By the valley of the Mondego; 3. By the valley of the Zezere.

From Coria.—1. By Castello Branco and the valley of the Tagus; and, 2. By the mountains of Sobreira Formosa.

To advance by the valley of the Douro, would be a flank movement through an extremely difficult country, and would belong rather to an invasion of the northern provinces than of Beira, because a fresh base must be established at Lamego or Oporto, before the movement could be prosecuted against Lisbon.

To gain the valley of the Mondego there are three routes—the first passing by Almeida and Celerico, the second by Trancoso and Viseu, the third by Alfayates and Guarda over the high ridges of the Estrella. To gain the valley of the Zezere, the march is by Alfayates, Sabugal, and Belmonte, and whether to the Zezere or the Mondego, these routes, although rugged, are practicable for artillery; but between Guarda and Belmonte some high table-land offers a position where a large army (for a small one it is danger-

ous) could seal the passage on either side of the mountain, except by the Trancoso road. In fact, the position of Guarda may be called the breast-plate of the Estrella.

On the side of Coria, an invading army must first force or turn the passages of the Elga and Ponçul rivers, to reach Castello Branco, and that done, proceed to Abrantes by the valley of the Tagus or over the savage mountain of Sobreira Formosa. But the latter is impracticable for heavy artillery, even in summer, the ways broken and tormented by the deep channels of the winter torrents, the country desert, and the positions, if defended, nearly impregnable. Nor is the valley of the Tagus to be followed, save by light corps, for the villages are few, the ridges not less steep than those of Sobreira, and the road quite impracticable for artillery of any calibre.

Such, and so difficult, being the lines of invasion through Beira, it would seem that a superior enemy might be met with advantage on the threshold of the kingdom; but it is not so. For, first, the defending army must occupy all the positions on this line of ninety miles, while the enemy, posted at Ciudad Rodrigo and Coria, could, in two marches, unite and attack on the centre, or at either extremity, with an overwhelming force. Secondly, the weakness of the Beira frontier consists in this: *the Tagus along its whole course is, from June till December, fordable as low down as Salvatierra, close under the lines.* A march through the Alemtejo and the passage of the river at any place below Abrantes would therefore render all the frontier positions useless; and although there were no enemy on the borders of the Alemtejo itself, the march from Ciudad Rodrigo by Perales, Coria, and Alcantara, and thence by the southern bank to the lowest ford in the river, would be little longer than the route by the valley of the Mondego or that of the Zezere. For these reasons *the frontier of Portugal must be always yielded to superior numbers.*

Both the conformation of the country, and the actual situation of the French corps, led Lord Wellington to expect that the principal attacks would be by the north of Beira and by the Alemtejo, while an intermediate connecting corps would move by Castello Branco upon Abrantes; and, under this impression, he made the following dispositions. Elvas, Almeida, and Valença, in the first, and Peniche, Abrantes, and Setuval, in the second line of fortresses, were garrisoned with native troops, part regulars, part militia.

General Baccellar, having Silveira and the British Colonels Trant, Miller, and J. Wilson, under his orders, occupied the provinces beyond the Douro, with twenty-one regiments of militia, including the garrison of Valença, on the Minho.

The country between Penamacor and the Tagus, that is to say, the lines of the Elga and the Ponçul, was guarded by ten regiments of militia, a regiment of native cavalry, and the Lusitanian legion. In the Alemtejo, including the garrisons, four regiments of militia were stationed, and three regiments held the fortresses of the Algarves. There remained in reserve twelve regiments of the fifty composing the whole militia force, and these were distributed in Estremadura on both sides of the Tagus, but principally about Setuval. The regular Portuguese troops, deducting those in garrison at Almeida, Elvas and Cadiz, were at Thomar and Abrantes.

The British, organized in five divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, were distributed as follows:

		Men.	
1st Division	General Spencer,	about	6,000 Viseu.
2d Division, including the 13th Dragoons	General Hill,	"	5,000 Abrantes and Portalegre.
3d Division	General Picton,	"	3,000 Celerico.
4th Division	General Cole,	"	4,000 Guarda.
Light Division	Robert Crawfurd,	"	2,400 Pinhel.
The Cavalry	General Cotton,	"	3,000 Valley of Mondego.
	Total		23,400 under arms.

Thus the wings of the defence were composed solely of militia and ordenanza, and the whole of the regular force was in the centre. The Portuguese at Thomar, and the four British divisions of infantry posted at Viseu, Guarda, Pinhel, and Celerico, formed a body of thirty-eight thousand men, the greater part of which could, in two marches, be united either at Guarda or between that position and the Douro. On the other side Beresford and Hill could, in as short a period, unite by the boat-bridge of Abrantes, and thus thirty-two thousand men would be concentrated on that line. If the enemy should attempt the passage of the Elga either direct from Coria, or by a flank movement of the second corps from Estremadura, across the Tagus, Beresford could succor the militia by moving over the Sobreira Formosa to Castello Branco, while Hill could reach that place much quicker than General Reynier, in consequece of an arrangement which merits particular attention.

It has been already said that the march from Abrantes to Castello Branco is over difficult mountains, and to have repaired the roads between these places would have been more useful to the enemy than to the allies, as facilitating a passage for superior numbers to penetrate by the shortest line to Lisbon. But Lord Wellington, after throwing boat-bridges over the Tagus and the Zezere, and fortifying Abrantes, established between the latter and Castello Branco a line of communication by the left bank of the Tagus. through Niza, to the pass of Villa Velha, where, by a flying bridge

the river was re-crossed, and from thence a good road led to Castello Branco. Now the pass of Villa Velha is prodigiously strong for defence, and the distance from Abrantes to Castello Branco being nearly the same by Niza as by the other bank of the river, the march of troops was yet much accelerated, for the road near Villa Velha, being reconstructed by the engineers, was excellent.

Thus all the obstacles to an enemy's march by the north bank were preserved. The line by Villa Velha enabled Hill to pass from Portalegre, or Abrantes, to Castello Branco by a flank movement in less time than Reynier; and also provided a lateral communication for the whole army, which we shall hereafter find of vital importance in the combinations of the English General, supplying the loss of the road by Alcantara and the pass of Perales, which otherwise would have been adopted. The French, also, in default of a direct line of communication between Estremadura and the Ciudad Rodrigo country, were finally forced to adopt the circuitous road of Almaraz and the pass of Baños, and it was in allusion to this inconvenience that I said both parties sighed over the ruins of Alcantara.

Notwithstanding this facility of movement and of concentration, the allies could not deliver a decisive battle near the frontier, because the enemy could unite an overwhelming force in the Alemtejo, before the troops from the north could reach that province, and a battle lost there would, in the dry season, decide the fate of Lisbon. To have concentrated the whole army in the south, would have been to resign half the kingdom and all its resources to the enemy; but to save those resources for himself, or to destroy them, was the very basis of Lord Wellington's defence, and all his dispositions were made to oblige *the French to move in masses*, and to *gain time himself;* time to secure the harvests, time to complete his lines, time to perfect the discipline of the native troops, and to give full effect to the arming and organization of the ordenanza: above all things, time to consolidate that moral ascendency over the public mind which he was daily acquiring. A closer examination of his combinations will show that they were well adapted to effect these objects.

1. The enemy dared not advance, except with *concentrated masses*, because, on the weakest line of resistance, he was sure to encounter above twenty thousand men.

2. If, choosing the Alemtejo, he suddenly dispersed Romana's troops and even forced back Hill's, the latter, passing the Tagus at Abrantes, and uniting with Beresford, could dispute the passage of the Tagus until the arrival of the army from the north; and no

regular and sustained attempt could be made on that side without first besieging Badajos or Elvas to form a place of arms.

3. A principal attack on the central line could not be made without sufficient notice being given by the collection of magazines at Coria, and by the passage of the Elga and Ponçul; Beresford and Hill could then occupy the Sobreira Formosa. But an invasion on this line, save by a light corps in connection with other attacks, was not to be expected; for, although the enemy should force the Sobreira, and reach Abrantes, he could not besiege the latter, in default of heavy artillery. The Zezere, a large and exceedingly rapid river, with rugged banks, would be in his front, the Tagus on his left, the mountains of Sobreira in his rear, and the troops from Guarda and the valley of the Mondego would have time to fall back.

4. An attack on Guarda could always be resisted long enough to gain time for the orderly retreat of the troops near Almeida, to the valley of the Mondego; the road from Belmonte towards Thomar by the valley of the Zezere was purposely broken and obstructed, and that from Thomar by Espinal to the Ponte de Murcella was repaired and widened; thus the inner and shorter line was rendered easy for the allies, while the outward and longer line was rendered difficult for the enemy, and to secure quick reports telegraphs were established from Lisbon to Elvas, to Abrantes, and to Almeida.

The space between Guarda and the Douro, an opening of about thirty miles leading into the valley of the Mondego, remains to be examined. Across this line of invasion, the Agueda, the Coa, and the Pinel run, in almost parallel directions from the Sierra de Francia and Sierra de Estrella, into the Douro, all having this peculiarity, that as they approach the Douro their channels invariably deepen into profound and gloomy chasms; and there are few bridges. But the principal obstacles were the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, both of which it was necessary to take before an invading army could establish a solid base of invasion. After this the lines of the Douro and of the Mondego would be open. If the French adopted the second, they could reach it by Guarda, by Alverca, and by Trancoso, concentrating at Celerico, where they would have to choose between the right and the left bank. In the latter case, they must march between the Mondego and the Estrella mountains, until they reached the Alva, a river falling at right angles into the Mondego, behind which they would find the allied army in a position of surprising strength. If, to avoid that, they marched by the right of the Mondego upon Coimbra, there were other obstacles to be hereafter noticed; but, in either case, the allied