

were better calculated to create than to suppress insurrections. The people, exasperated by disorders and violence, and at the same time excited by the agents of their own and the British government, suddenly rose in arms, and Andalusia, like other parts of Spain, became the theatre of a petty and harassing warfare.*

The Granadans of the Alpuxaras were the first to resist, and this insurrection, spreading on the one hand through the Sierra de Ronda, and on the other towards Murcia, received succors from Gibraltar, and was aided by the troops and armed peasantry under the command of Blake. The communication between the first and fourth corps, across the Sierra de Ronda, was maintained by a division of the former, posted at Medina Sidonia, and by some infantry and hussars of the latter quartered in the town of Ronda. From the latter place, the insurgents, principally smugglers, drove the French, while at the other extremity Blake, marching from Almeira, took Arda and Motril, and at the same time the mountaineers of Jaen and Cordoba interrupted Dessolles' communications with La Mancha.

These movements took place in the beginning of March, and the King and Soult being then in the city of Granada, sent one column across the mountain by Orgiva to fall upon the flank of Blake at Motril, while a second, moving by Guadix and Ohanes upon Almeira, cut off his retreat. This obliged the Murcians to disperse, and at the same time, Dessolles defeated the insurgents on the side of Ubeda; and the garrison of Malaga, consisting of three battalions, marched to restore the communications with the first corps. Being joined by the detachment beaten at Ronda, they retook that post on the 21st of March; but during their absence the people from the Alpuxaras entered Malaga, killed some of the inhabitants as favorers of the enemy, and would have done more, but that another column from Granada came down on them, and the insurrection was thus strangled in its birth. It had, however, sufficed to prevent the march of the troops designed to co-operate with Suchet at Valencia, and it was of so threatening a character, that the fifth corps was recalled from Estremadura, and all the French troops at Madrid, consisting of the garrison and a part of the second corps, were directed upon Almagro in La Mancha, the capital itself being left in charge of some Spanish battalions in the invader's service.† The King, who feared the Valencian and Murcian armies would invade La Mancha, repaired thither, and after a time returned to Madrid. The Duke of Dalmatia then remained chief commander of Andalusia, and proceeded to organize a system of administration

* King Joseph's Correspondence, captured at Vittoria, MS.

† Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

so efficacious, that neither the efforts of the Spanish government, nor of the army in Cadiz, nor the perpetual incursions of Spanish troops issuing from Portugal, and supported by British corps on that frontier, could seriously shake his hold: but this will be better shown hereafter; at present, it is more convenient to notice

THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.

Marshal Victor, having declined an assault on the Isla, spread his army round the margin of the bay, and commenced works of contravallation on an extent of not less than twenty-five miles. The towns, the islands, castles, harbors, and rivers he thus inclosed are too numerous, and in their relative bearings too intricate, for minute description; yet, looking as it were from the French camps, I shall endeavor to point out the leading features.

The blockade was maintained in three grand divisions or intrenched positions, namely, Chiclana, Puerto Real, and Santa Maria. The first, having its left on the sea-coast near the Torre Bermeja, was from thence carried across the Almanza and the Chiclana rivers, to the Zuraque, on a line of eight miles, traced along a range of thickly wooded hills, and bordering a marsh from one to three miles broad. This marsh, traversed in its breadth by the above-mentioned rivers, and by a number of navigable water-courses or creeks, was also cut in its whole length by the Santi Petri, a natural channel connecting the upper harbor of Cadiz with the open sea. The Santi Petri, nine miles long, from two to three hundred yards wide, and of depth to float a seventy-four, received the waters of all the creeks crossing the marsh, and was the first Spanish line of defence. In the centre, the bridge of Zuaro, by which the only road to Cadiz passes, was broken and defended by batteries on both sides. On the right hand, the Caraccas, or Royal Arsenal, situated on an island just in the harbor mouth of the channel, and on account of the marsh inattackable, save by water or by bombardment, was covered with strong batteries and served as an advanced post. On the left hand, the castle of Santi Petri, also built on an island, defended the sea mouth of the channel.

Beyond the Santi Petri was the Isla de Leon, in form a triangle, the base of which rested on the channel, the right side on the harbor, the left on the open sea, and the apex pointing towards Cadiz. All this island was a salt marsh, except one high and strong ridge in the centre, about four miles long, upon which the large town of La Isla stands, and which, being within cannon shot of the Santi Petri, offered the second line of defence.

From the apex, called the Torre Gardo, a low and narrow isthmus about five miles long connected the island with the rocks upon

which Cadiz stood, and across the centre of this narrow isthmus, a cut called the Cortadura, defended by the large unfinished fort of Fernando, offered a third line of defence. The fourth and final line was the land front of the city itself, regularly and completely fortified.

On the Chiclana side therefore, the hostile forces were only separated by the marsh; and although the Spaniards commanded the Santi Petri, the French, having their chief dépôts in the town of Chiclana, could always acquire the mastery in the marsh and might force the passage of the channel; because the Chiclana, Zuraque, and Almanza creeks were navigable above the lines of contravallation. The thick woods behind afforded the means of constructing an armed flotilla; and such was the nature of the ground bordering the Santi Petri itself on both sides, that off the high road it could only be approached by water, or by narrow foot-paths, leading between the salt-pans of the marsh.

The central French or Puerto Real division, extending from the Zuraque on the left to the San Pedro, a navigable branch of the Guadalete on the right, measured about seven miles. From the Zuraque to the town of Puerto Real, the line was traced along a ridge skirting the marsh, so as to form, with the position of Chiclana, a half circle. Puerto Real itself was intrenched, but a tongue of land four miles long projected from thence perpendicularly on to the narrow isthmus of Cadiz. This tongue, cloven in its whole length by the creek or canal of Trocadero, separated the inner from the outer harbor, and at its extreme points stood the village of Trocadero and the fort of Matagorda, opposed to which there was on the isthmus of Cadiz a powerful battery called the Puntales. From Matagorda to the city was above four thousand yards, but across the channel to Puntales was only twelve hundred; it was therefore the nearest point to Cadiz and to the isthmus, and was infinitely the most important post of offence. From thence the French could search the upper harbor with their fire, and throw shells into the Caraccas and the fort of Fernando, while their flotilla, safely moored in the Trocadero creek, could make a descent upon the isthmus, and thus turn the Isla, and all the works between it and the city. Nevertheless, the Spaniards dismantled and abandoned Matagorda.

The third, or Santa Maria division of blockade, followed the sweep of the bay, and reckoning from the San Pedro on the left to the castle of Santa Catalina, the extreme point of the outer harbor on the right, was about five miles. The town of Santa Maria, built at the mouth of the Guadalete, in the centre of this line, was in-

trenched, and the ground about Santa Catalina was extremely rugged.

Besides these lines of blockade, which were connected by a covered way concealed by thick woods, and when finished armed with three hundred guns, the towns of Rota and San Lucar de Barameda were occupied. The first, situated on a cape of land opposite to Cadiz, was the northern point of the great bay or roadstead; the second commanded the mouth of the Guadalquivir. Behind the line of blockade, Latour Maubourg, with a covering division, took post at Medina Sidonia, his left being upon the upper Guadalete, and his advanced posts watching the passes of the Sierra de Ronda. Such was the position of the first corps. I shall now relate the progress of events within the blockaded city.

The fall of the Central Junta, the appointment of the Regency, and the proclamation for convoking the National Cortes have been already touched upon. Albuquerque, hailed as a deliverer, elected governor, commander-in-chief, and president of the Junta, appeared to have unlimited power, but in reality possessed no authority, except over his own soldiers, and did not meddle with administration. The Regency, appointed provisionally, and composed of men without personal energy or local influence, was obliged to bend and truckle to the Junta of Cadiz; and that imperious body, without honor, talents, or patriotism, sought only to obtain the command of the public revenue for dishonest purposes, and meanwhile privately trafficked with the public stores.*

Albuquerque's troops were in a deplorable state; the whole had been long without pay, and the greater part were without arms, accoutrements, ammunition, or clothes.† When he demanded supplies, the Junta declared that they could not furnish them; but the Duke affirming this to be untrue, addressed a memorial to the Regency, and the latter, anxious to render the Junta odious, yet fearing openly to attack them, persuaded Albuquerque to publish his memorial. The Junta replied by an exposition, false as to facts, base and ridiculous in reasoning; for although they had elected the Duke president of their own body, they accused him, amongst other things, with retreating from Carmona too quickly; and they finished with a menacing intimation that, supported by the populace of Cadiz, they were able and ready to wreak their vengeance on all enemies. Matters being thus brought to a crisis, both Albuquerque and the Regency gave way, and the former being sent ambassador to England, it was thought he meant to go to South America, but he died in London some months after, of a phrensy,

* Albuquerque's Manifesto.

† Private Correspondence of Officers from Cadiz, 1810, MS.

brought on, as it is said, by grief and passion at the unworthy treatment he received. He was judged to be a brave and generous man, but weak and hasty, and easy to be duped.*

The misery of the troops, the great extent of the positions, the discontent of the seamen, the venal spirit of the Junta, the apathy of the people, the feebleness of the Regency, the scarcity of provisions, and the machinations of the French, who had many favorers, and those amongst the men in power, all combined to place Cadiz in the greatest jeopardy; and this state of affairs would have led to a surrender, if England had not again filled the Spanish storehouses, and if the Regency had not consented to receive British troops into the city. Their entrance saved it, and at the same time General Colin Campbell (who had succeeded Sir John Cradock as governor of Gibraltar) performed a great service to his country, for by persevering negotiation, he obtained that an English garrison should likewise enter Ceuta, and that the Spanish lines of San Roque and the forts round the harbor of Algesiras should be demolished.† Both measures were very essential to the present and permanent interests of England, and the last especially so, because it cleared the neighborhood of the fortress, and gave it a secure harbor. Gibraltar at this time contained a mixed and disaffected population of more than twelve thousand persons, and merchandise to the value of two millions sterling, which could have been easily destroyed by bombardment. Ceuta, which was chiefly garrisoned by condemned troops, and filled with galley-slaves, and its works miserably neglected, had only six days' provisions, was at the mercy of the first thousand French that could cross the straits; and the possession of it would have availed the enemy in many ways, especially in obtaining provisions from Barbary, where his emissaries were exceedingly active.

General William Stewart arrived in Cadiz on the 11th of February, with two thousand men, a thousand more joined him from Gibraltar, and the whole were received with an enthusiasm that proved Sir George Smith's perception to have been just, and that Mr. Frere's unskilful management of the Central Junta had alone prevented a similar measure the year before. The 17th, a Portuguese regiment, thirteen hundred strong, was also admitted into the city; Spanish troops came in daily in small bodies; two ships of war, the *Euthalion* and *Undaunted*, arrived from Mexico with six millions of dollars; and another British battalion, a detachment of artillery, and more native troops having joined the garrison, the whole force assembled behind the *Santi Petri* was not less than

* Appendix 17, § 2. † Gen. Campbell's Correspondence, MS.

four thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and fourteen thousand Spaniards * Yet there was little of enthusiasm amongst the latter; and in all this time, not a man among the citizens had been enrolled or armed, or had volunteered, either to labor or to fight. The ships recovered at Ferrol had been transferred to Cadiz, so there were in the bay twenty-three men of war, of which four of the line and three frigates were British; and thus, money, troops, and a fleet, in fine, all things necessary to render Cadiz formidable, were collected, yet to little purpose, because procrastination, jealousy, ostentation, and a thousand absurdities were the invariable attendants of Spanish armies and governments.

General Stewart's first measure was to recover Matagorda, the error of abandoning which was to be attributed as much to Admiral Purvis as to the Spaniards. In the night of the 22d, a detachment consisting of fifty seamen and marines, twenty-five artillery-men, and sixty-seven of the ninety-fourth regiment, the whole under the command of Captain M'Lean, pushed across the channel during a storm, and taking possession of the dismantled fort, before morning effected a solid lodgment; and although the French cannonaded the work with field artillery all the next day, the garrison, supported by the fire of Puntales, was immovable.

The remainder of February passed without any event of importance, yet the people suffered from the want of provisions, especially fresh meat; and from the 7th to the 10th of March, a continued tempest, beating upon the coast, drove three Spanish and one Portuguese sail of the line, and a frigate and from thirty to forty merchantmen, on shore, between San Lucar and St. Mary's. One ship of the line was taken, the others burnt and part of the crews brought off by boats from the fleet; but many men, and amongst others a part of the fourth English regiment, fell into the hands of the enemy, together with an immense booty.

Early in March, Mr. Henry Wellesley, minister plenipotentiary, arrived, and on the 24th of that month, General Graham coming from England assumed the chief command of the British, and immediately caused an exact military survey of the Isla to be made. It then appeared, that the force hitherto assigned for its defence was quite inadequate, and that to secure it against the utmost efforts of the enemy, twenty thousand soldiers, and a system of redoubts and batteries, requiring the labor of four thousand men for three months, were absolutely necessary.† Now, the Spaniards had only worked beyond the Santi Petri, and that without judgment; their batteries in the marsh were ill-placed, their intrenchments on the tongue of land at the sea mouth of that channel were of contempt-

* Official Abstract of Operations at Cadiz, 1810, MS.

† Appendix 17, § 1.

ible strength, and the Caraccas, which they had armed with one hundred and fifty guns, being full of dry timber, could be easily burned by carcasses. The interior defences of the Isla were quite neglected, and while they had abandoned the important posts of Matagorda and the Trocadero, they had pushed their advanced batteries to the junction of the Chiclana road with the royal causeway, in the marsh, that is to say, one mile and a half beyond the bridge of Zuazo, and consequently exposed, without support, to flank attacks both by water and land.

It was in vain that the English engineers presented plans, and offered to construct the works; the Spaniards would never consent to pull down a house, or destroy a garden; their procrastination paralyzed their allies, and would have lost the place, had the French been prepared to press it vigorously. They were indifferent to the progress of the enemy, and, to use General Graham's expression, they wished the English would drive away the French, *that they might go and eat strawberries at Chiclana*. Nor were the British works (when the Spaniards would permit any to be constructed) well and rapidly completed, for the Junta furnished bad materials, there was a paucity of engineer-officers, and, from the habitual negligence of the ministerial departments at home, neither the proper stores nor implements had been sent out. Indeed, an exact history, drawn from the private journals of commanders of British expeditions, during the war with France, would show an incredible carelessness of preparation on the part of the different cabinets. The generals were always expected to "make bricks without straw," and thus the laurels of the British army were for many years blighted. Even in Egypt, the success of the venerable hero, Abercrombie, was due more to his perseverance and unconquerable energy before the descent, than to his daring operations afterwards.

Additional reinforcements reached Cadiz on the 31st, and both sides continued to labor, but the allies slowly and without harmony, and the supplies being interrupted, scarcity increased; many persons were forced to quit Cadiz, two thousand men were sent to Ayamonte to collect provisions on the Guadiana; and notwithstanding this, so strange a people were the Junta, that they deceived Mr. Wellesley by assurances that the magazines were full, and thus induced him to suffer them to send wheat and flour away from the city, which was actually done, at the very time they were thus pressed by want!*

But now Matagorda, which, though frequently cannonaded, had been held fifty-five days, impeded the completion of the enemy's

* General Graham's Correspondence, MS.

works at the Trocadero point. This small fort, of a square form, with one angle projecting towards the land, without a ditch, and without bomb-proofs sufficient for the garrison, was little calculated for resistance; and, as it could only bring seven guns to bear, a Spanish seventy-four and an armed flotilla were moored on the flanks, to co-operate in the defence. The French had however raised great batteries behind some houses on the Trocadero, and, as daylight broke on the 21st of April, a hissing shower of heated shot, falling on the seventy-four, and in the midst of the flotilla, obliged them to cut their cables and take shelter under the works of Cadiz. Then the fire of forty-eight guns and mortars, of the largest size, was concentrated upon the little fort of Matagorda, and the feeble parapet disappeared in a moment before this crashing flight of metal. The naked rampart and the undaunted hearts of the garrison remained, but the troops fell fast, the enemy shot quick and close, a staff, bearing the Spanish flag, was broken six times in an hour, and the colors were at last fastened to the angle of the work itself, while the men, especially the sailors, besought the officers to hoist the British ensign, attributing the slaughter to their fighting under a foreign flag. Thirty hours this tempest lasted, and sixty-four men out of one hundred and forty were down, when General Graham, finding a diversion he had projected impracticable, sent boats to carry off the survivors. The bastion was then blown up, under the direction of Major Lefebre, an engineer of great promise, but he also fell, the last man whose blood wetted the ruins thus abandoned. Here I must record an action of which it is difficult to say whether it were most feminine or heroic. A sergeant's wife, named Retson, was in a casemate with the wounded men, when a very young drummer was ordered to fetch water from the well of the fort; seeing the child hesitate, she snatched the vessel from his hand, braved the terrible cannonade herself, and although a shot cut the bucket-cord from her hand, she recovered it, and fulfilled her mission.*

After the evacuation of Matagorda, the war languished at Cadiz, but Sebastiani's cavalry infested the neighborhood of Gibraltar, and he himself entered the capital of Murcia on the 23d, when Blake retired upon Alicant and Carthage. Meanwhile the French covered Matagorda point with batteries; but they were pressed for provisions, and General Campbell, throwing a detachment into Tarifa, drove their foragers from that vicinity, which abounds with

* An interesting account of this noble-minded woman is to be found in a small volume, entitled "*Sketches of a Soldier's Life in Ireland*," by the author of "*The Eventful Life of a Soldier*." This last work was erroneously designated, in the former part of this work, as "*The Life of a Sergeant*."

cattle.* The Spaniards at San Roque promised to reinforce this detachment, yet by their tardiness enabled the enemy to return with four hundred foot and some cavalry, and although the former were repulsed, the horse foraged the country, and drove off several herds of cattle during the action. General Campbell then increased the detachment to five hundred men, with some guns, and placed the whole under the command of Major Brown of the 28th.

In May, the French prisoners, cutting the cables of two hulks, drifted in a heavy gale to the French side of the bay; and the boats sent against them being beat off by throwing cold shot from the decks, above fifteen hundred men saved themselves in despite of the fire from the boats of the allied fleet, and from the batteries, which was continued after the vessels had grounded; although the miserable creatures, thus struggling for life, had been treated with horrible cruelty, and, being all of Dupont's or Vedel's corps, were prisoners only by a dishonorable breach of faith!† Meanwhile, in Cadiz, disorder was daily increasing. The Regency having recalled Cuesta to their military councils, he published an attack on the deposed Central Junta, and was answered so as to convince the world that the course of all parties had been equally detrimental to the state. Thus fresh troubles were excited. The English General was hampered by the perverse spirit of the authorities, and the Spanish troops were daily getting more inefficient from neglect, when the departure of Albuquerque enabled Blake to take the chief command in the Isla, and his presence produced some amelioration in the condition and discipline of the troops. At his instance, also, the Municipal Junta consented, although reluctantly, that the British engineers should commence a regular system of redoubts for the defence of the Isla.

English reinforcements continued to arrive, and four thousand Spaniards from Murcia joined the garrison, or rather army, now within the lines; yet such was the state of the troops, and the difficulty of arranging plans, that hitherto the taking of Matagorda had been the only check given to the enemy's works. It was, however, necessary to do something; and, after some ill-judged plans of the Regency had been rejected by Graham, General Lacy was embarked, with three thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, to aid the armed peasants, or *Seraños*, of the Ronda.‡ These people had been excited to arms, and their operations successfully directed by Captain Cowley and Mr. Mitchel, two British artillery-officers, sent from Gibraltar. General Campbell also offered to reinforce Lacy, from Gibraltar, if he would attack Malaga, where

* General Campbell's Correspondence, MS. † Appendix 17, § 1.

‡ General Graham's Despatches, MS.

there were twenty thousand males fit to carry arms, and the French were only two thousand, and cooped in the citadel, a Moorish castle, containing but twelve guns, and dependent for water on the town, which was itself only supplied by aqueducts from without. Lacy rejected this enterprise, and demanded that eight hundred men from Gibraltar should make a diversion to the eastward, while he, landing at Algeiras, moved on Ronda; this being assented to, the English armament sailed under the command of General Bowes.

Lacy made good his movement upon Ronda the 18th of June; but the French, having fortified it, were too strong at that point, or rather Lacy, a man of no enterprise, durst not act, and, when he was joined by many thousand mountaineers, he arrested their leaders for some offence, which so disgusted the men that they disbanded. The enemy, alarmed by these operations, which were seconded from the side of Murcia, and by an insurrection at Baeza, put all their disposable troops in motion; the insurrection at Baeza was quickly crushed, and General Rey, marching from Seville against Lacy, entirely defeated and cut him off from Gibraltar, so that he was forced to re-embark with a few men at Estipona, and returned to Cadiz in July. Here it is impossible not to reflect on the little use made of the naval power, and the misapplication of the military strength in the southern parts of Spain. The British, Portuguese, and Spanish soldiers at Cadiz were, in round numbers, 30,000, the British in Gibraltar 5000, in Sicily 16,000, forming a total of more than fifty thousand effective troops, aided by a great navy, and favorably placed for harassing that immense, and, with the exception of the Valencian and Murcian coasts, uninterrupted French line of operations, which extended from the south of Italy to Cadiz; for, even from the bottom of Calabria, troops and stores were brought to Spain. Yet a Neapolitan rabble, under Murat, in Calabria, and from fifteen to twenty thousand French around Cadiz, were allowed to paralyze this mighty power.

It is true that vigilance, temper, and arrangement, and favorable localities, are all required, in the combined operations of a fleet and army, and troops disembarking also require time to equip for service. But Minorca offered a central station, and a place of arms for the army, and a spacious port for the fleet; the coast of Catalonia and Valencia is so pacific and safe, that seldom or never does a gale blow on shore; the operations would always have been short, and independent of the Spanish authorities, and Lord Collingwood was fitted, by his talents, discretion, zeal, experience, and accurate knowledge of those coasts, successfully to direct such a floating armament. What coast-siege, undertaken by the seventh or third corps, could have been successfully prosecuted, if the gar-

rison had been suddenly augmented with fifteen or twenty thousand men from the ocean? After one or two successful descents, the very appearance of a ship of war would have checked the operations of a siege, and obliged the enemy to concentrate: whereas, the slight expeditions of this period were generally disconcerted by the presence of a few French companies.

In July the British force in Cadiz was increased to eight thousand five hundred men, and Sir Richard Keats arrived to take the command of the fleet. The enemy, intent upon completing his lines, and constructing flotillas at Chiclana, Santa Maria, and San Lucar de Barameda, made no attacks, and his works have been much censured, as ostentatiously extended, and leading to nothing. This is however a rash criticism; for the Chiclana camp was necessary to blockade the Isla, and, as the true point for offensive operations was at the Trocadero, the lines of Puerto Real and Santa Maria were necessary to protect that position, to harass the fleet, to deprive the citizens of good water, which in ordinary times was fetched from Puerto Maria, and finally to enable the flotilla constructing at San Lucar, to creep round the coast. The chances from storms, as experience proved, almost repaid the labor, and it is to be considered that Soult contemplated a serious attack upon Cadiz, not with a single corps, generally weaker than the blockaded troops, but, when time should ripen, with a powerful army. Events in other parts of the Peninsula first impeded, and finally frustrated this intention, yet the lines were, in this view, not unnecessary or ostentatious.

Neither was it a slight political advantage, that the Duke of Dalmatia should hold sway in Seville for the usurper's government, while the National Cortes, and the Regency, were cooped up in a narrow corner of the province. Moreover, the preparations at Matagorda constantly and seriously menaced Cadiz, and a British division was necessarily kept there, for the English generals were well assured, that otherwise, some fatal disaster would befall the Spaniards. Now if a single camp of observation at Chiclana had constituted all the French works, no mischief could have been apprehended, and Graham's division, consisting of excellent soldiers, would have been set free, instead of being cooped up, without any counterbalance in the number of the French troops at the blockade; for the latter aided indirectly, and at times directly, in securing the submission of Andalusia, and if not at Cadiz, they must have been covering Seville as long as there was an army in the Isla.

CHAPTER VI.

Continuation of the operations in Andalusia—Description of the Spanish and Portuguese lines of frontier south of the Tagus—Situation of the armies in Estremadura—Complex operations in that province—Soul's policy.

WHILE the blockade of Cadiz proceeded, Seville was guarded by a few thousand men of the fifth corps, left by Mortier when he advanced against Badajos; and even from this small body six hundred infantry, under General Remond, and two hundred cavalry, were sent to attack the Viscount De Gand, who was still at Ayamonte, vainly demanding a refuge in Portugal. The latter had four thousand troops, but declining an engagement, passed by his left through Gibrleon into the Sierra de Aroche, bordering on the Condado de Niebla, and the French immediately occupied Moguer and Huelva, towns situated at the mouths of the Odiel and Tinto rivers, from whence Cadiz had hitherto drawn supplies. Meanwhile the Viscount, returning to Ayamonte, sailed with his troops to Cadiz, and was replaced by General Copons, who came with two thousand men to gather provisions on the lower Guadiana, and in the Tinto and Odiel districts.

On the other side of Seville, Sebastiani had an uneasy task. The vicinity of Gibraltar and of the Murcian army, the continued descents on the coast, and the fierceness of the Moorish blood, rendered Granada the most disturbed portion of Andalusia; a great part of that fine province, visited by the horrors of insurrectional war, was ravaged and laid waste.

In the northern parts of Andalusia, about Jaen and Cordoba, Dessolles reduced the struggle to a trifling guerilla warfare; but it was different in La Mancha, where the partidas became so numerous and the war so onerous, that one of Joseph's ministers, writing to a friend, described that province as peopled with beggars and brigands. It remains to speak of Estremadura, which was become the scene of various complicated movements and combats, producing no great results, indeed, but important as being connected with and bearing on the defence of Portugal.

The Spanish and Portuguese line of frontier south of the Tagus may be divided into three parts:

1. From the Tagus to Badajos on the Guadiana.
2. From Badajos to the Morena.
3. From the Morena to the sea.

Each of these divisions is about sixty miles. Along the first, two-thirds of which is mountainous and one-third undulating plains and thick

woods, a double chain of fortresses guard the respective frontiers. Alcantara, Valencia de Alcantara, Albuquerque, and Badajos are the Spanish; Montalvao, Castello de Vide, Marvao, Aronches, Campo Mayor, and Elvas, the principal Portuguese places. The three first on either side are in the mountains, the others in the open country, which spread from the Guadiana to Portalegre, a central point, from whence roads lead to all the above-named fortresses.

From Badajos to the Morena forms the second division of the country; it is rugged, and the chain of fortresses continued. On the Portuguese side, Juramenha, Mourao and Moura; on the Spanish, Olivenza (formerly Portuguese), Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Aroche.

From the Morena to the sea, the lower Guadiana separates the two kingdoms. The Spanish side, extremely rugged, contained the fortresses of San Lucar de Guadiana, Lepe, and Ayamonte; the Portuguese frontier, Serpa, Mertola, Alcontin, and Castro Marin; and, although the greater number of these places were dismantled, the walls of all were standing, some in good repair, and those of Portugal for the most part garrisoned by militia and ordenanza.

When Mortier attempted Badajos, on the 12th of February, Romana was near Truxillo, and the place was so ill provided, that a fortnight's blockade would have reduced it;* but the French General, who had only brought up eight thousand infantry and a brigade of cavalry, could not invest it in face of the troops assembling in the vicinity, and therefore retired to Zafra, leaving his horsemen near Olivenza. In this position he remained until the 19th of February, when his cavalry was surprised at Valverde, and the commander Beauregard slain. Romana then returned to Badajos the 20th; and the 27th, Mortier, leaving some troops in Zafra, marched to Merida, to connect himself with the second corps, which had arrived at Montijo, on the Guadiana.

It will be remembered that this corps, commanded by General Mermet, occupied the valley of the Tagus in its whole length during the invasion of Andalusia, and communicating with the sixth corps through the pass of Baños formed an intermediate reserve between Mortier and Kellermann. The latter was at Bejar and Miranda de Castanar, watching the Duke Del Parque, in the early part of January, but withdrew to Salamanca when the British army arrived in the valley of the Mondego. The Duke Del Parque then left Martin Carrera with a weak division in the Sierra de Gata, marched, with thirteen thousand men, through the pass of

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

Perales, crossed the Tagus at Barca de Alconete on the 10th of February, and on the 12th, the day Mortier summoned Badajos, was in position with his right at Albuquerque and his left on the Guadiana.

When Mermet, whose advanced guard was at Placentia, knew of this movement, he first detached three thousand men across the Tagus, by Seradillo, to observe Del Parque, and soon afterwards Soult's brother, with four thousand men from Talavera, crossed the bridge of Arzobispo, advanced by Caceres, surprised some Spanish troops at Villa del Rey, and reaching Montijo, pushed patrols close to Badajos. The remainder of the second corps arrived at Caceres by degrees; General Reynier took the command, and, as I have said, was joined by Mortier, who immediately commenced defensive works at Merida, and prepared gabions and fascines as if to besiege Badajos.

These demonstrations attracted the notice of General Hill, who advanced with ten thousand men from Abrantes to Portalegre; and then Romana, finding himself, by the junction of the Duke Del Parque's army, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, resolved to act against the communications of the French. His first division, commanded by Charles O'Donnell, brother to the Catalan General, occupied Albuquerque. The second, under Mendizabel, was posted near Castello de Vide. The third, consisting of five thousand Asturians, was sent under Ballesteros to Olivenza, and the fourth remained at Badajos. The fifth, under Contreras, was detached to Monasterio, with orders to interrupt Mortier's communications with Seville.

Contreras reached Xeres de los Cavalleros the 1st of March, but a detachment from Zafra soon drove him thence, and Romana retired to Campo Mayor with three divisions, leaving Ballesteros with the fourth at Olivenza. On the other hand, Mortier, uneasy about Contreras' movements, repaired to Zafra, leaving the second corps at Merida. The 10th, Romana advanced again towards Albuquerque, and having pushed a detachment beyond the Salor river, it was surprised by General Foy. The 14th, O'Donnell endeavored to surprise Foy in return, but the latter, with very inferior numbers, fought his way through the Puerto de Trasquillon, and the Spaniards took possession of Caceres.

At this period the insurrections in Granada, the movements of the Murcian army, and the general excitement of Valencia, in consequence of Suchet's retreat, caused Joseph to recall Mortier for the defence of Andalusia; wherefore the latter, after holding a council of war with Reynier, destroyed the works at Merida on the 19th, and retired to Seville, leaving Gazan's division at Monasterio.

Reynier having sent his stores to Truxillo drove the Spaniards out of Caceres the 20th, and followed them to the Salor, but afterwards took post at Torremocha, and O'Donnell returned to Caceres.

There are two routes leading from Merida and Badajos to Seville: 1. The Royal Causeway, which passes the Morena by Zafra, Los Santos, Monasterio, and Ronquillo. 2. A shorter, but more difficult road, which, running westward of the causeway, passes the mountains by Xeres de los Cavalleros, Fregenal, and Araceña. These parallel routes have no cross communications in the Morena, but on the Estremaduran side, a road runs from Xeres de los Cavalleros to Zafra, and on the Andalusian side, there is one from Araceña to Ronquillo. Now when Mortier retired, Ballesteros marched from Olivenza to Xeres de los Cavalleros, and being joined by Contreras, their united corps, amounting to ten thousand men, gained the Royal Causeway by Zafra, and, on the evening of the 29th, coming up with Gazan, fought an undecided action; the next day it was renewed, and the Spaniards having the worst, Ballesteros retired to Araceña and Contreras to the high mountains above Ronquillo. From Araceña, Ballesteros marched to Huerva, within a few leagues of Seville, but Girard drove him back again to Araceña, yet again entering the Condado de Neibla, he established himself at Zalamea de Real on the Tinto river.

Meanwhile, Romana detached a force to seize Merida, and cut the communication of the fifth corps with Reynier; but that General marched with eight thousand men from Torremocha, passed through to Medellin before the Spaniards arrived, and pushed troops, the 2d of April, into the Morena, intending to take Contreras in rear, while Gazan attacked him in front; and this would have happened, but that O'Donnell immediately threatened Merida, and so drew Reynier back. Nevertheless, Contreras was attacked by Gazan, at Pedroche, and so completely defeated, that he regained Zafra in the night of the 14th, with only two thousand men; Ballesteros also, assailed by a detachment from Seville, retired to Araceña.

The 20th, Reynier marched to Montijo, and O'Donnell retired from Caceres, but his rear-guard was defeated at La Rocca the 21st, and his division would have been lost, if Mendizabel, and Hill also, had not come to his aid, whereupon Reynier, declining a general action, retired to Merida. The insurrection in the Alpuxaras was now quelled, the Valencians remained inactive, Joseph reentered Madrid, Soult assumed the government of Andalusia, and Mortier returned to Estremadura. On the Spanish side, Contreras was displaced, and Imas, his successor, advanced to Ronquillo, in Mortier's rear; Ballesteros remained at Aroche; Hill returned to Portalegre, and Romana encamped, with fourteen thousand men,

near Badajos, where a Spanish plot was formed to assassinate him. It was discovered, but the villain who was to have executed the atrocious deed escaped.*

Notwithstanding Romana's presence, Reynier and the younger Soult passed the Guadiana below Badajos, with only four hundred cavalry, and closely examined the works of that fortress, in despite of the whole Spanish army; at the same time Mortier's advanced guards arrived on the Guadiana, and a reinforcement of four thousand men joined the second corps from Toledo; however the want of provisions would not permit the French to remain concentrated, and Mortier returned to the Morena, to watch Imas. The 14th of May a French detachment again came close up to Badajos, then took the road to Olivenza, and would have cut off Ballesteros, if Hill had not by a sudden march to Elvas arrested its movement. Meanwhile, Ballesteros again menaced Seville, and was again driven back upon Aroche, with a loss of three hundred men.

To check these frequent incursions, the French threatened the frontier of Portugal, by the lower Guadiana, sometimes appearing at Gibraleon and Villa Blanca, sometimes towards Serpa, the possession of which would have lamed Ballesteros' movements; yet the advantages were still chequered. A Portuguese flotilla intercepted, at the mouth of the Guadiana, a convoy of provisions going to the first corps; and O'Donnell having made an attempt, during Reynier's absence, to surprise Truxillo, was repulsed, and regained Albuquerque with great difficulty. It would be perplexing to trace farther and in detail all the movements on the line from Badajos to Ayamonte, yet two circumstances there were, of historical importance. In the beginning of July, Lacy being in the Sierra de Ronda, Ballesteros near Aroche, and Copons in the Condado Neibla, the French marched against Lacy, leaving Seville garrisoned solely by Spaniards in Joseph's service; and while this example was furnished by the enemy, the Portuguese and Spanish troops on the frontier, complaining, the one of inhospitality, the other of robbery and violence, would, but for the mediation of the British authorities, have commenced a regular war, and their mutual jealousy and hatred was extended to the governments on both sides.

Hitherto, Hill had not meddled in the Spanish operations, save when Romana was hardly pressed, but the latter's demands for aid were continual, and most of his projects were ill-judged, and contrary to Lord Wellington's advice. On the 26th of June, however, Reynier, passing the Guadiana, foraged all the country about Campo Mayor, and then turned by Montijo to Merida; it was known also that his corps belonged to the army assembling in Cas-

* Mr. Stuar's Correspondence, MS.

tile for the invasion of Portugal, that he had collected mules and other means of transport in Estremadura; and the spies asserted that he was going to cross the Tagus. Hill therefore gathered his divisions well in hand, ready to move as Reynier moved, to cross the Tagus if he crossed it, and by parallel operations to guard the frontier of Beira. The march of the second corps was, however, postponed, and the after operations, belonging to greater combinations, will be treated of in another place.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Although apparently complicated, the movements in Estremadura were simple in principle. The valley of the Guadiana, as far as Badajos, is separated from the valley of the Tagus by a range of heights, connecting the Guadalupe mountains with those of Albuquerque; and the country between those hills and the Tagus contained fertile valleys, and considerable towns, such as Valencia de Alcantara and Caceres. To profit from their resources was an object to both parties. Reynier, whose base was at Truxillo, could easily make incursions as far as Caceres, but beyond that town, the Salor presented a barrier, from behind which the Spaniards, supported by the fort of Albuquerque, could observe whether the incursion was made in force, and act accordingly; hence O'Donnell's frequent advances and retreats.

2. Reynier could not operate seriously, unless in unison with the fifth corps, and by the valley of the Guadiana, and Merida, on account of its stone bridge, was the key of his movements. But Mortier's base of operations being in Andalusia, his front was spread from Zafra to Merida, to cover his line of retreat, and to draw provisions from about Lerena; now the road of Xeres de los Cavalleros was always open to the Spaniards, and the frequent advances of Ballesteros and Contreras were to harass Mortier's line of communication. Wherefore the clue of affairs was this: Romana, holding Badajos, and being supported by Hill, acted on both flanks of the French, and the Portuguese frontier furnished a retreat from every part of his lines of operation; but, as his projects were generally vague and injudicious, Lord Wellington forbade Hill to assist, except for definite and approved objects.

3. To stop Romana's movements, Mortier had only to unite the 2d and 5th corps and give battle, or, if that was refused, to besiege Badajos, which, from its influence, situation, and the advantage of its stone bridge, was the key to the Alemtejo; and this he ardently desired.* Soult, however, would not permit him to undertake any decisive operation while Andalusia was exposed to sudden insurrections and descents from Cadiz; and to say that either Marshal

* Appendix 19, § 1.

was wrong would be rash, because two great interests clashed. Mortier and Reynier united could have furnished twenty thousand infantry, fifty guns, and more than three thousand cavalry, all excellent troops. Romana, having garrisoned Badajos, Olivenza, and Albuquerque, could not bring more than fifteen thousand men into line, and must have joined Hill. But with a mixed force and divided command, the latter could not have ventured a battle in the plain country beyond Portalegre. A defeat would have opened Lisbon to the victor, and Lord Wellington must then have detached largely from the north; the King and Soult could have reinforced Mortier, and the ultimate consequences are not to be assumed.

On the other hand, Soult, judging that ere future conquests were attempted, the great province of Andalusia should be rendered a strong hold, and independent of extraneous events, bent all his attention to that object. An exact and economical arrangement provided for the current consumption of his troops, and vast reserve magazines were filled without overwhelming the people. The native municipal authorities, recognized and supported in matters of police and supply, acted zealously, yet without any imputation upon their patriotism; for those who see and feel the miseries flowing from disorderly and wasting armies, may honestly assist a general laboring to preserve regularity. All this could not be the work of a day, and meanwhile the marshals under Soult's orders, being employed only in a military capacity, desired the entire control of their own corps, and to be engaged in great field operations, because thus only could they be distinguished. But the Duke of Dalmatia, while contributing to the final subjugation of Spain, by concentrating the elements of permanent strength in Andalusia, was also well assured that, in fixing a solid foundation for future military operations, he should obtain reputation as an able administrator and pacificator of a conquered country.

4. Soult's views, however, clashed, not more with those of the generals, than with the wishes of the King, whose poverty forced him to grasp at all the revenues of Andalusia, and who having led the army in person across the Morena, claimed both as monarch and conqueror. He who wields the sword will always be first served. Soult, guided by the secret orders of Napoleon, resisted the King's demands, and thus excited the monarch's hatred to an incredible degree; nevertheless, the Duke of Dalmatia never lost the Emperor's confidence, and his province, reference being had to the nature of the war, was admirably well governed. The people were gradually tranquilized, the military resources of the country drawn forth, and considerable bodies of native troops raised, and even successfully employed, to repress the efforts of the partisan

chiefs. The arsenal of construction at Seville was put into full activity; the mines of lead at Lenares were worked; the copper of the river Tinto gathered for the supply of the foundries, and every provision for the use of a large army collected; privateers also were fitted out; a commerce was commenced with neutral nations in the ports of Granada; and finally, a secret, but considerable traffic, carried on with Lisbon itself, demonstrated the administrative talents of Soult.* Andalusia soon became the most powerful establishment of the French in Spain.

5. Both Marshals appear to have entertained sound views, and the advantages of either plan being considered, leads to the reflection that they might have been reconciled. A reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men in Estremadura during the months of June and July, would have left scarcely a shadow of defence for Portugal; and it would seem that Napoleon had an eye to this, as we find him directing Suchet in July to co-operate with fifteen thousand men in Massena's invasion whenever Tortosa should fall. The application of this reasoning will, however, be better understood as the narrative advances; and whether Napoleon's recent marriage with the Austrian princess drew him away from business; or that, absorbed by the other many and great interests of his empire, he neglected Spanish affairs; or whether, deceived by exaggerated accounts of successes, he thought the necessity for more troops less than it really was, I have not been able to ascertain. Neither can I find any good reason why the King, whose army was increased to twenty thousand men before the end of June, made no movement to favor the attack on Portugal. It is, however, scarcely necessary to seek any other cause than the inevitable errors that mar all great military combinations not directed by a single hand.

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

CHAPTER VII.

Situation of the armies north of the Tagus—Operations in old Castile and the Asturias—Ney menaces Ciudad Rodrigo—Loison repulsed from Astorga—Kellermann chases Carrera from the Gata mountains—Obscurity of the French projects—Siege of Astorga—Mahi driven into Galicia—Spaniards defeated at Mombuey—Ney concentrates the sixth corps at Salamanca—The ninth corps and the imperial guards enter Spain—Massena assume the command of the army of Portugal and of the northern provinces—Ney commences the first siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—Julian Sanchez breaks out of the town—Massena arrives and alters the plan of attack—Daring action of three French soldiers—Place surrenders—Andreas Herrasti—His fine conduct—Reflections upon the Spanish character.

THE operations south of the Tagus having been described, those which occurred north of that river shall now be traced; for previous to the invasion of Portugal, the French stretched in one great line across the Peninsula from Cadiz to Gihon, and eagerly discussed the remnants of the Spanish armies.

It will be remembered that the Duke Del Parque left Martin Carrera in the Gata mountains to interrupt the communication between the Salamanca country and the valley of the Tagus. Julian Sanchez also, issuing from time to time out of Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off the French foragers in the open country between the Agueda and the Douro; and beyond the Douro the Gallician army, under Garcia, (in number about ten thousand,) occupied Puebla de Senabria, Puente Ferrada, Villa Franca, and Astorga, menacing the right flank and rear of the sixth corps. Mahi was organizing a second army at Lugo, and in the Asturias the Captain-General D'Arco commanded seven thousand men, three thousand of which were posted at Cornellana, under General Ponte. Thus an irregular line of defence, six hundred miles long, was offered to the invaders, but without depth or substance, save at Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, behind which the British and Portuguese troops were lying.

On the other hand, the French, holding the interior line, kept their masses only on the principal routes, communicating by movable columns, and thus menaced all the important points without scattering their forces. The influx of fresh troops from France continually added to their solidity, especially in Old Castile, where Ney had resumed the command, being supported by Kellermann with the force of his government, and by an eighth corps under the Duke of Abrantes.

The invasion of Andalusia was the signal for a general movement of all the French in Spain; and while Victor and Mortier

menaced Cadiz and Badajos, Ney summoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and Bonnet, entering the Asturias, threatened Galicia by the Concija d'Ibas. At the same time, Loison, with eight thousand fresh men, occupied Leon and Medina del Campo, and the advanced guard of the eighth corps passed Valladolid. Loison gave out that he would invade Galicia by Puebla de Senabria, and on the 15th of February his cavalry cut to pieces five hundred Spanish troops at Alcanizas, but he finally marched against Astorga, and at the same time Bonnet destroyed Ponte's force at Potes de Sierra, and advanced to Nava de Suarna. These movements alarmed the Spaniards. Garcia, menaced at once by Bonnet and by Loison, and fearing equally for Astorga and Lugo, threw two-thirds of his army into the former, and carried the remainder to Villa Franca to support Mahi.

Ney, however, made only a feint of escalading Ciudad Rodrigo, and Loison, although supported by the men from Leon who advanced to Puente Orbijo, was repulsed from Astorga. Junot then concentrated the eighth corps at Benevente, intending to besiege Astorga in form; but he was suddenly called towards Madrid, lest disorders should arise in the capital during the King's absence. Mahi and Garcia being apprised of this, immediately brought up the new levies to the edge of the mountains, thinking to relieve the Asturians by threatening an irruption into the plains of Leon; but as Loison still remained at Benevente, they were unable to effect their object, and after drawing off five thousand men from Astorga, retired to Villa Franca.

Bonnet did not pass Nava de Suarna, and when General Arco had rallied the Asturian fugitives at Louarca, Garcia, leaving Mahi to command in Galicia, marched himself with the remnant of the old army of the left, to join Romana at Badajos. Meanwhile Kellermann advanced to Alba de Tormes, and detachments from his and Ney's force chased Carrera from the Gata and Bejar mountains, driving him sometimes over the Alagon, sometimes into Portugal. It is unnecessary to trace all these movements, because the French, while preparing for greater operations, were continually spreading false reports, and making demonstrations in various directions, to mislead the allies and to cover their own projects.

Those projects were at first obscure. It is certain that the invasion of Portugal by the northern line was not finally arranged until a later period; yet it seems probable, that while Bonnet drew the attention of the Gallician army towards Lugo, the Duke of Abrantes designed to penetrate by Puebla Senabria; not as Loison announced, for the invasion of Galicia, but to turn the Tras os Montes and descend by the route of Chaves upon Oporto, while Ney, calling the second corps to the aid of the sixth, should invest

Ciudad Rodrigo. Whatever designs might have been contemplated, they were frustrated, partly by the insurrection in Granada and the failure of Suchet against Valencia, partly by disunion amongst the generals, for here also Ney and Junot complained reciprocally; and everywhere it was plainly seen that the French corps d'armée, however formidable in themselves, would not, in the absence of Napoleon, act cordially in the general system.

When the commotions in the south subsided, Junot returned to Old Castile; Loison joined the sixth corps on the Tormes; Kellermann retired to Valladolid; detachments placed on the Douro maintained the communications between Ney and Junot; and the latter, having drawn a reinforcement from Bonnet, invested Astorga with ten thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, eighteen field-guns, six twenty-four pounders, and two mortars. His covering divisions were placed, one at Benevente, to watch the road to Mombuey, one near Puebla de Serabria, and one at Puente Ferrada. Mahi immediately concentrated the Gallician army at Villa Franca and Foncebadon, and detached fifteen hundred men, under Echevaria, to Mombuey and Puebla, to harass the flank and rear of the investing army; yet his force was weak; the Gallician authorities had frequently assured Lord Wellington that it amounted to twenty thousand well-organized troops; it now appeared that only eight thousand were in the field, and those ill provided, and prone to desertion.*

SIEGE OF ASTORGA.

Santocildes, the governor, was an officer of courage; his garrison consisted of two thousand five hundred infantry, besides cannoneers and armed peasantry, and the Moorish ramparts had been strengthened by fresh works; but there was little ammunition, scarcely twenty days' rations, and nothing outside the walls capable of seriously disturbing the enemy. The town stood in an open plain, and had three suburbs: Puerto de Hierro to the north, St. Andreas to the east, and Retebia to the west. On the two last Junot made false attacks, and conducted his real approaches against the front between Puerto de Hierro and Retebia.

The place was invested the 22d, and Puerto de Hierro was carried by storm, two sallies were repulsed, and the trenches opened, before the end of the month. A breach was then commenced, but the battering guns soon became unserviceable, and the line of approach was flanked by the houses of Retebia, which were filled with Spanish infantry. Nevertheless, the town suffered from shells, the wall was broken on the 20th of April, an assault was

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

ordered, and although a previous attack on Retebia had failed, Santocildes was so distressed for ammunition, that he offered to capitulate.

Junot refused the terms demanded, and, at five o'clock in the evening of the 21st, some picked troops ran up to the breach, which was well retrenched and stockaded, and defended with great obstinacy, while the flank fire from Retebia stopped the supporting columns. The storming party, thus abandoned to its own exertions, was held at bay on the summit of the breach; and being plied on both flanks and in front with shot from the houses of the town, and in rear by the musketry from Retebia, it would have been totally destroyed, but for the scarcity of ammunition, which paralyzed the Spanish defence. Three hundred French were said to have fallen on the breach itself, but the remainder finally effected a lodgment in the ruins. During the night, a second attack on Retebia proving successful, a communication was opened from the parallels to the lodgment, and strong working parties were sent forward, who cut through the stockade into the town, when the governor surrendered.

Mahi, who had advanced to the edge of the mountains, as if he would have succored the place, hearing of this event, retired to Bembibre, where his rear was overtaken and defeated by General Clausel on the 24th. He then fell back to Lugo, and recalled his detachment from Mombuey; but the French from Benevente were already in that quarter, and, on the 25th, totally defeated Echevaria at Castro Contrijo. Meanwhile, Junot placed garrisons in Astorga and Leon, and restored Bonnet his division. That General, who had retired to Santander during the siege, then reoccupied Oviedo and Gihon, defeated the Asturians, and once more menaced Galicia by the road of Concija, and by that of Sales; several slight actions ensued; the French penetrated no farther, and the Junta of Galicia reinforced the Asturians with three thousand men.

During the siege of Astorga, the sixth corps was concentrated at Salamanca; a strong detachment of Kellermann's troops seized the pass of Baños; and Martin Carrera, quitting the hills, joined the English light division near Almeida. In fine, the great operations were commencing, and the line of communication with France was encumbered with the advancing reinforcements. A large battering train, collected from Segovia, Burgos, and Pampeluna, arrived at Salamanca; General Martineau, with ten thousand men for the eighth corps, reached Valladolid; General Drouet passed the Pyrenees with a ninth corps, composed of the fourth battalions of regiments already in Spain; and these were followed by seventeen

thousand of the imperial guards, whose presence gave force to the rumor that the Emperor himself was coming to take the chief command.

Fortunately for the allies, this report, although rife amongst all parties, and credited both by Joseph's ministers and the French ambassador at Madrid, proved groundless; a leader for the projected operations was still to be named. I have been informed that Marshal Ney resumed the command of the sixth corps, under the impression that he was to conduct the enterprise against Portugal; that the intrigues of Marshal Berthier, to whom he was obnoxious, frustrated his hopes; that Napoleon, fatigued with the disputes of his lieutenants, had resolved to repair in person to the Peninsula; that his marriage, and some important political affairs, diverted him from that object, and that Massena, Prince of Esling, was finally chosen, partly for his great name in arms, partly that he was of higher rank than the other Marshals, and a stranger to all the jealousies and disputes in the Peninsula. His arrival was known in May amongst the allies, and Lord Wellington had no longer to dread the formidable presence of the French Emperor.

That Massena's base of operations might not be exposed to the interference of any other authority in Spain, the four military governments of Salamanca, Valladolid, Asturias, and Santander were placed under his temporary authority, which thus became absolute in the northern provinces. But previous to taking the command of the troops, he repaired to Madrid, to confer with the King, and it would seem that some hesitation as to the line of invasion still prevailed in the French councils; because in the imperial muster-rolls, the head-quarters of the army of Portugal are marked as being at Caceres in Estremadura, and the imperial guards are returned as part of that army, yet during the month of April only; a circumstance strongly indicating Napoleon's intention to assume the command himself. The northern line was, however, definitively adopted, and while the Prince of Esling was still in the capital the eighth corps passed the Tormes, and Ney commenced the

FIRST SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

The conduct of the governor of this fortress had in the beginning of the year appeared so suspicious, that Lord Wellington demanded his removal.* Don Andreas Herrasti, the actual governor, was a veteran of fifty years' service, whose silver hairs, dignified countenance, and courteous manners excited respect; and whose courage, talents, and honors were worthy of his venerable

* Lord Wellington's Correspondence, MS.

appearance. His garrison amounted to six thousand fighting men, besides the citizens; and the place, built on a height overhanging the northern bank of the Agueda river, was amply supplied with artillery and stores of all kinds. The works were, however, weak, consisting of an old rampart, nearly circular, about thirty feet in height, and without other flanks than a few projections containing some light guns: a second wall, about twelve feet high, called a "*fausse braie*," with a ditch and covered way, surrounded the first, yet was placed so low on the hill as scarcely to offer any cover to the upper rampart. There were no bomb-proofs, even for the magazine, and Herrasti was forced to place his powder in the church, which he secured as he might.

Beyond the walls, and totally severed from the town, the suburb of Francisco, defended by an earthen intrenchment, and strengthened by two large convents, formed an outwork to the north-east of the place. The convent of Santa Cruz served a like purpose on the north-west; and between these posts there was a ridge called the Little Teson, which, somewhat inferior in height to the town, was only a hundred and fifty yards from the body of the place. There was also a greater Teson, which, rising behind the lesser at the distance of six hundred yards from the walls, overlooked the ramparts; and saw into the bottom of the ditch.

The country immediately about Ciudad Rodrigo, although wooded, was easy for troops; especially on the left bank of the Agueda, to which the garrison had access by a stone bridge within pistol-shot of the castle-gate. The Agueda itself, rising in the Sierra de Francia, and running into the Douro, is subject to great and sudden floods; and six or seven miles below the town, near San Felices, the channel deepens into one continued and frightful chasm, many hundred feet deep, and overhung with huge desolate rocks.

During February and March, the French departed as lightly as they had advanced against Ciudad Rodrigo; but, on the 25th of April, a camp was pitched upon a lofty ridge five miles eastward of the city; and, in a few days, a second, and then a third, arose; and these portentous clouds continued to gather on the hills until June, when fifty thousand fighting men came down into the plain, and throwing two bridges over the Agueda, begirt the fortress.

This multitude, composed of the sixth and eighth corps, and a reserve of cavalry, was led by Ney, Junot, and Montbrun. The sixth corps invested the place, the eighth occupied San Felices Grande and other points, the cavalry swarmed on both sides of the river, but the battering train with a great escort was still two days' march in the rear, for the rains inundating the flat country between the Agueda and the Tormes rendered the roads impassable. The

bridges were established on the 2d and 7th of June, the one above, the other below the town, and on the 13th, ground was broken on the Greater Teson. The 22d, the artillery arrived, and preparations were made to contract the circle of investment on the left bank of the Agueda, which had hitherto been but slightly watched. That night Julian Sanchez, with two hundred horsemen, passed silently out of the castle-gate, and crossing the river, fell upon the nearest French posts, pierced their line in a moment, and reached the English light division, then behind the Azava, six miles from Ciudad Rodrigo. This event induced Ney to reinforce his troops on the left bank, and a movement, to be hereafter noticed, was directed against General Crawford the 25th, on which day, also, the French batteries opened.

Ney's plan was to breach the body of the place, without attending to the Spanish fire, and salvos from forty-six guns, constantly directed on one point, soon broke the old masonry of the ramparts; nevertheless the besieged, who could bring twenty-four guns to bear on the Teson, shot so well that three magazines blew up at once in the trenches, and killed above a hundred of the assailants. On the 27th the Prince of Esling arriving in the camp, summoned the governor to surrender, and Herrasti answered in the manner to be expected from so good a soldier. The fire was then resumed until the first of July, when Massena, sensible that the mode of attack was faulty, directed the engineers to raise counter-batteries, to push their parallels to the Lesser Teson, work regularly forward, blow in the counterscarp, and pass the ditch in form.* Meanwhile, to facilitate the progress of the new works, the convent of Santa Cruz, on the right flank, was carried after a fierce resistance; and, on the left, the suburb was attacked, taken, and retaken by a sally, in which great loss was inflicted on the French. Howbeit, the latter remained masters of everything beyond the walls.

During the cessation of fire, consequent upon the change in the French dispositions, Herrasti removed the ruins from the foot of the breach, and strengthened his flank defences. On the 9th of July, the besiegers' batteries, being established on the Lesser Teson, re-opened with a terrible effect. In twenty-four hours, the fire of the Spanish guns was nearly silenced, part of the town was in flames, a reserve magazine exploded on the walls, the counterscarp was blown in by a mine on an extent of thirty-six feet, the ditch was filled by the ruins, and a broad way made into the place. Three French soldiers, of heroic courage, then rushed out of the ranks, mounted the breach, looked into the town, and having thus, in broad daylight, proved the state of affairs, discharged their

* Intercepted French Correspondence, MS.

muskets, and, with matchless fortune, retired unhurt to their comrades.

The columns of assault immediately assembled. The troops, animated by the presence of Ney, and excited by the example of the three men who had so gallantly proved the breach, were impatient for the signal, and a few moments would have sent them raging into the midst of the city, when the white flag suddenly waved on the rampart, and the venerable governor was seen standing alone on the ruins, and signifying, by his gestures, that he desired to capitulate. He had stricken manfully, while reason warranted hope, and it was no dishonor to his silver hairs, that he surrendered when resistance could only lead to massacre and devastation.

Six months had now elapsed since the French, resuming the plan of conquest interrupted by the Austrian war and by the operations of Sir Arthur Wellesley, had retaken the offensive. Battle after battle they had gained, fortress after fortress they had taken, and sent the Spanish forces, broken and scattered, to seek for refuge in the most obscure parts: solid resistance there was none, and the only hope of deliverance for the Peninsula rested upon the British General. How he realized that hope shall be related in the next book. Meanwhile, the reader should bear in mind that the multifarious actions related in the foregoing chapters were contemporaneous, and that he has been led, as it were, round the margin of a lake, whose turbulent waters spread on every side. Tedious to read, and trifling many of the circumstances must appear, yet, as a whole, they form what has been called the Spanish military policy; and without accurate notions on that head, it would be impossible to appreciate the capacity of the man, who, like Milton's phantom, paved a broad way through their chaotic warfare.

I have been charged with incompetence to understand, and most unjustly, with a desire to underrate the Spanish resistance; but it is the province of history to record foolish as well as glorious deeds, that posterity may profit from all, and neither will I mislead those who read my work, nor sacrifice the reputation of my country's arms to shallow declamation upon the unconquerable spirit of independence. To expose the errors is not to undervalue the fortitude of a noble people. In their constancy, in the unexampled patience with which they bore the ills inflicted alike by a ruthless enemy and by their own sordid governments, the Spaniards were truly noble: but shall I say that they were victorious in their battles, or faithful in their compacts; that they treated their prisoners with humanity; that their Juntas were honest or wise; their generals skilful; their soldiers firm? I speak but the bare truth, when I assert, that they were incapable of defending their own

cause! Every action, every correspondence, every proceeding of the six years that the war lasted, rise up in support of this fact; and to assume that an insurrection so conducted did, or could possibly baffle the prodigious power of Napoleon, is an illusion. Spain baffle him! Her efforts were amongst the very smallest causes of his failure. Portugal has far greater claims to that glory. Spain furnished the opportunity; but it was England, Austria, Russia, or rather fortune, that struck down that wonderful man. The English, more powerful, more rich, more profuse, perhaps more brave than the ancient Romans; the English, with a fleet, for grandeur and real force, never matched; with a general equal to any emergency, fought as if for their own existence. The Austrians brought four hundred thousand good troops to arrest the conqueror's progress; the snows of Russia destroyed three hundred thousand of his best soldiers; and finally, when he had lost half a million of veterans, not one of whom died on Spanish ground, Europe, in one vast combination, could only tear the Peninsula from him, by tearing France along with it. What weakness, then, what incredible delusion to point to Spain, with all her follies, and her never-ending defeats, as a proof that a people fighting for independence must be victorious. She was invaded, because she adhered to the great European aristocracy; she was delivered, because England enabled that aristocracy to triumph, for a moment, over the principles of the French revolution.

BOOK XI.

CHAPTER I.

Lord Wellington's policy—Change of administration in England—Duel between Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning—Lord Wellesley joins the new ministry—Debates in Parliament—Factional violence on both sides—Lord Wellington's sagacity and firmness vindicated—His views for the defence of Portugal—Ministers accede to his demands—Grandeur of Napoleon's designs against the Peninsula—Lord Wellington enters into fresh explanation with the English Ministers—Discusses the state of the war—Similarity of his views with those of Sir John Moore—His reasons for not advancing into Spain explained and vindicated.

THE defence of Portugal was not the result of any fortuitous combination of circumstances, nor was Lord Wellington moved thereto by any hasty ambition to magnify his own reputation, but calmly and deliberately formed his resolution, after a laborious and cautious estimate of the difficulties and chances of success. Reverting then to the period when, by retreating upon Badajos, he divorced his operations from the folly of Spain, I shall succinctly trace his military and political proceedings up to the moment when, confident in the soundness of his calculations, he commenced his project, unmoved by the power of his enemy, the timidity of his friends, the imprudence of his subordinates, or the intrigues of discontented men who secretly, and with malignant perseverance, labored to thwart his measures and to ruin his designs.

After the retreat from Spain in 1809, he repaired to Seville, partly to negotiate with the Central Junta upon matters touching the war, but principally to confer with his brother, ere the latter quitted the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley's departure was caused by the state of politics in England, where a change in the administration was about to take place; a change, sudden indeed, but not unexpected, because the ineptitude of the government was, in private, acknowledged by many of its members, and the failure of the Walcheren expedition was only the signal for a public avowal of jealousies and wretched personal intrigues, which had rendered the Cabinet of St. James's the most inefficient, Spain excepted, of any

in Europe. Mr. Canning, the principal mover of those intrigues, had secretly denounced Lord Castlereagh to his colleagues, as a man incapable of conducting the public affairs, and exacted from them a promise to dismiss him.* Nevertheless, he permitted that nobleman, ignorant of the imputation on his abilities, to plan and conduct the fitting out of the most powerful armament that ever quitted England.† When it became evident that loss and ruin waited on this unhappy expedition, Mr. Canning claimed the fulfilment of the promise, and the intrigue, thus becoming known to Lord Castlereagh, was by him characterized as "*a breach of every principle of good faith, both public and private.*" This was followed by a duel! and by the dissolution of the administration. Mr. Perceval and Lord Liverpool being then empowered to form another Cabinet, after a fruitless negotiation with Lord Grey and Lord Grenville, assumed the lead themselves, and offered the department of foreign affairs to Lord Wellesley.

Contrary to the general expectation, he accepted it. His brother had opened to him those great views for the defence of Portugal, which were afterwards so gloriously realized; but which could never have been undertaken with confidence by that General, unless secure of some powerful friend in the administration, imbued with the same sentiments, bound by common interest, and resolute, to support him when the crisis of danger arrived. It was therefore wise and commendable in Lord Wellesley to sacrifice something of his own personal pretensions, to be enabled to forward projects promising so much glory to the country and his own family; and the first proceedings in Parliament justified his policy.

Previous to the change in the Cabinet, Sir Arthur Wellesley had been created Baron Douro, and Viscount Wellington; but those honors, although well deserved, were undoubtedly conferred as much from party as from patriotic feeling, and greatly excited the anger of the opposition members, who, with few exceptions, assailed the General personally, and with an acrimony not to be justified. His merits, they said, were nought; his actions silly, presumptuous, rash; his campaign one deserving not reward, but punishment.‡ Yet he had delivered Portugal, cleared Galicia and Estremadura, and obliged one hundred thousand French veterans to abandon the offensive and concentrate about Madrid!

Lord Grey, opposing his own crude military notions to the practised skill of Sir Arthur, petulantly censured the latter's dispositions at Talavera; others denied that he was successful in that

* Lord Castlereagh's statement.

† Mr. Canning's statement.

‡ See Parliamentary Debates.

action: and some, forgetting that they were amenable to history, even proposed to leave his name out of the vote of thanks to the army! That battle, so sternly fought, so hardly won, they would have set aside with respect to the commander as not warranting admission to a peerage always open to venal orators; and the passage of the Douro, so promptly, so daringly, so skilfully, so successfully executed, that it seemed rather the result of inspiration than of natural judgment, they would have cast away as a thing of no worth!

This spirit of faction was, however, not confined to one side: there was a ministerial person at this time, who in his dread of the opposition, wrote to Lord Wellington complaining of his inaction, and calling upon him to do something that would excite a public sensation: *anything provided blood were spilt!* A calm but severe rebuke, and the cessation of all friendly intercourse with the writer, discovered the General's abhorrence of this detestable policy. When such passions were abroad, it is evident that Lord Wellesley's accession to the government was essential to the success of Lord Wellington's projects.

Those projects delivered the Peninsula and changed the fate of Europe, and every step made towards their accomplishment merits attention, as much from the intrinsic interest of the subject, as that it has been common to attribute his success to good fortune and to the strenuous support he received from the Cabinet at home. Now it is far from my intention to deny the great influence of fortune in war, or that the Duke of Wellington has always been one of her peculiar favorites; but I will make it clearly appear, that if he met with great success, he had previously anticipated it, and upon solid ground; that the Cabinet did not so much support him as it was supported by him; and finally, that his prudence, foresight, and firmness were at least as efficient causes as any others that can be adduced.

Immediately after the retreat from Jaraceijo, and while the ministers were yet unchanged, Lord Castlereagh, brought by continual reverses to a more sober method of planning military affairs, had demanded Lord Wellington's opinion upon the expediency, the chance of success, and the expense of defending Portugal. This letter reached the General on the 14th of September, 1809; but the subject required many previous inquiries and a careful examination of the country; and at that period, any plan for the defence of Portugal was necessarily to be modified, according to the energy or feebleness of the Spaniards in Andalusia. Hence it was not until after his return from Seville, a few days previous to the defeat at Ocaña, that Lord Wellington replied to Lord Liverpool, who,