

flank march by his right to Santa Cruz de la Zarza, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique, turn the French left, and penetrate to the capital by the eastern side; but during his delay at Dos Barrios the French forces had been concentrated from every quarter, and although to the south of Ocaña the ground is open and undulating, on the north, the ramifications of the Cuença mountains, leading down the left bank of the Tagus, presented, at Santa Cruz, ridges which, stretching strong and rough towards Aranjuez, afforded good positions for Sebastiani to cover that place.

Soult was awake to his adversary's projects, yet could not believe that he would dare such a movement unless certain of support from the British army, and therefore kept the different corps quiet on the 11th, waiting for Heudelet's report from Oropesa.* In the night it arrived, stating that rumors of a combined Spanish and English army being on the march were rife, but that the scouts could not discover that the allied force was actually within several marches. Soult, now judging that, although the rumors should be true, his central position would enable him to defeat Areizaga and return by the way of Toledo in time to meet the allies in the valley of the Tagus, put all his masses again into activity. The first corps was directed to hasten its march to Aranjuez; the fifth corps to concentrate at Toledo; the second corps to abandon Oropesa, Calzada and Arzobispo, and replacing the fifth corps at Talavera, to be in readiness to close upon the main body of the army. Finally, information being received of the Duke Del Parque's retreat from Salamanca to Bejar and of the re-occupation of Salamanca by the sixth corps, Dessolle's division was recalled to Madrid.

During the 12th, while the first, second, and fifth corps were in march, General Liger Belair's brigade continued to watch the banks of the Tajuna, and the fourth corps preserved its offensive positions on the height in front of Aranjuez, having fifteen hundred men in reserve at the bridge of Bayona. The 14th, the general movement was completed. Two corps were concentrated at Aranjuez to assail the Spaniards in front; one at Toledo to cross the Tagus and fall upon their left flank, and the King's guards at Madrid formed a reserve for the fourth and first corps. The second corps was at Talavera, and Dessolle's division was in the Guadarama, on its return to the capital. In fine, all was prepared for the attack of Dos Barrios, when Areizaga's flank march to Santa Cruz de la Zarza occasioned new combinations.

In the evening of the 15th, it was known that the Spaniards had made a bridge at Villa Maurique, and passed two divisions and some cavalry over the Tagus. The Duke of Belluno was imme-

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

diately ordered to carry the first and fourth corps (with the exception of a brigade left in Aranjuez) up the left bank of the Tagus, operating so as to fix Areizaga, and force him to deliver battle; and, with a view of tempting the Spaniard by an appearance of timidity, the bridges of La Reyna and Aranjuez were broken down.

While these dispositions were making on the French side, the Spanish General commenced a second bridge over the Tagus; and part of his cavalry, spreading in small detachments, scoured the country, and skirmished on a line extending from Arganda to Aranjuez. The *partidas* also, being aided by detachments from the army, obliged the French garrison to retire from Guadalaxara upon Arganda, and occupied the former town on the 12th; but, in the night of the 13th, eight French companies and some troops of light cavalry, by a sudden march, surprised them, killed and wounded two or three hundred men, and took eighty horses and a piece of artillery.

The 16th, the infantry of the first and fourth corps was at Morata and Bayona, the cavalry at Perales and Chinchon, and during this time the fifth corps, leaving a brigade of foot and one of horse at Toledo, marched by Illescas towards Madrid, to act as a reserve to the Duke of Belluno.

The 17th, Areizaga continued his demonstrations on the side of the Tajuna, and hastened the construction of his second bridge; but on the approach of the Duke of Belluno with the first corps, he stayed the work, and withdrew his divisions from the right bank of the Tagus, and on the 18th (the cavalry of the first corps having reached Villarejo de Salvanes) he destroyed his bridges, called in his parties, and drew up for battle on the heights of Santa Cruz de la Sarza.

Hitherto the continual movements of the Spanish army, and the unsettled plans of the Spanish General, rendered it difficult for the French to fix a field of battle, but now Areizaga's march to St. Cruz had laid his line of operations bare. The French masses were close together, the Duke of Belluno could press on the Spanish front with the first corps, and the King, calling the fourth corps from Bayona, could throw twenty-five or thirty thousand men on Areizaga's rear, by the road of Aranjuez and Ocaña. It was calculated that no danger could arise from this double line of operations, because a single march would bring both the King and Victor upon Areizaga, and if the latter should suddenly assail either, each would be strong enough to sustain the shock. Hence, when Soult knew that the Spaniards were certainly encamped at Santa Cruz, he caused the fifth corps, then in march for Madrid, to move during the night of the 17th upon Aranjuez, and the fourth corps

received a like order. The King himself, quitting Madrid, arrived there on the evening of the 18th, with the royal French guards, two Spanish battalions of the line, and a brigade of Dessolle's division which had just arrived; in all about ten thousand men. The same day the Duke of Belluno concentrated the first corps at Villarejo de Salvanes, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique, and attack the Spanish position on the 19th.

A pontoon train, previously prepared at Madrid, enabled the French to repair the broken bridges near Aranjuez in two hours; and about one o'clock on the 18th, a division of cavalry, two divisions of infantry of the fourth corps, and the advanced guard of the fifth corps, passed the Tagus, part at the bridge of La Reyna, and part at a ford. General Milhaud with the leading squadrons immediately pursued a small body of Spanish horsemen, and was thus led to the table-land between Antiguuela and Ocaña, where he suddenly came upon a front of fifteen hundred cavalry supported by three thousand more in reserve. Having only twelve hundred dragoons, he prepared to retire, but at that moment General Paris arrived with another brigade, and was immediately followed by the light cavalry of the fifth corps; the whole making a reinforcement of about two thousand men. With these troops Sebastiani came in person, and took the command at the instant when the Spaniards, seeing the inferiority of the French, were advancing to the charge.

CAVALRY COMBAT AT OCANA.

The Spaniards came on at a trot, and Sebastiani directed Paris, with a regiment of light cavalry and the Polish lancers, to turn and fall upon the right flank of the approaching squadrons, which being executed with great vigor, especially by the Poles, caused considerable confusion, which the Spanish General endeavored to remedy by closing to the assailed flank. But to effect this he formed his left centre in one vast column, whereupon Sebastiani charged headlong into the midst of it with his reserve, and the enormous mass yielding to the shock got into confusion, and finally gave way. Many were slain, several hundred wounded, and eighty troopers and above five hundred horses were taken. The loss of the French bore no proportion in men, but General Paris was killed, and several superior officers were wounded.

This unexpected encounter with such a force of cavalry, led Soult to believe that the Spanish General, aware of his error, was endeavoring to recover his line of operations. The examination of the prisoners confirmed this opinion, and in the night, information from the Duke of Belluno and the reports of officers sent towards Villa Maurique arrived, all agreeing that only a rear-guard was to

be seen at Santa Cruz de la Zarza. It then became clear that the Spaniards were on the march, and that a battle could be fought the next day. In fact Areizaga had retraced his steps by a flank movement through Villa Rubia and Noblejas, with the intention of falling upon the King's forces as they opened out from Aranjuez. He arrived on the morning of the 19th at Ocaña, but judging from the cavalry action that the French could attack first, he drew up his whole army on the same plain, in two lines, a quarter of a mile asunder.

Ocaña is covered on the north by a ravine, which, commencing gently half a mile eastward of the town, runs deepening and with a curve to the west, and finally connects itself with gullies and hollows, whose waters run off to the Tagus. Behind the deepest part of this ravine the Spanish left was posted, crossing the main road from Aranjuez to Dos Barrios; one flank rested on the gullies, the other on Ocaña. The centre was in front of the town, which was occupied by some infantry as a post of reserve, but the right wing stretched in the direction of Noblejas along the edge of a gentle ridge *in front* of the shallow part of the ravine. The cavalry was on the flank and rear of the right wing. Behind the army there was an immense plain, but closed in and fringed towards Noblejas with rich olive woods, which were occupied by infantry to protect the passage of the Spanish baggage, still filing by the road from Zarza. Such were Areizaga's dispositions.

Joseph passed the night of the 18th in reorganizing his forces. The whole of the cavalry, consisting of nine regiments, was given to Sebastiani. Four divisions of infantry, with the exception of one regiment left at Aranjuez to guard the bridge, were placed under the command of Marshal Mortier, who was also empowered, if necessary, to direct the movements of the cavalry. The artillery was commanded by General Senarmont. The royal guards remained with the King, and Marshal Soult directed the whole of the movements.

Before daybreak, on the 10th, the monarch marched with the intention of falling upon the Spaniards wherever he could meet with them. At Antiguuela his troops, quitting the high road, turned to their left, gained the table-land of Ocaña, somewhat beyond the centre of the Spanish position, and discovered Areizaga's army in order of battle. The French cavalry, instantly forming to the front, covered the advance of the infantry, which drew up in successive lines as the divisions arrived on the plain. The Spanish out-posts fell back, and were followed by the French skirmishers, who spread along the hostile front and opened a sharp fire.

About forty-five thousand Spanish infantry, seven thousand

cavalry, and sixty pieces of artillery were in line. The French force was only twenty-four thousand infantry, five thousand sabres and lances, and fifty guns, including the battery of the royal guard. But Areizaga's position was miserably defective. The whole of his left wing, fifteen thousand strong, was paralyzed by the ravine; it could neither attack nor be attacked; the centre was scarcely better situated, and the extremity of his right wing was uncovered, save by the horsemen, who were, although superior in number, quite dispirited by the action of the preceding evening. These circumstances dictated the order of the attack.

BATTLE OF OCANA.

At ten o'clock, Sebastiani's cavalry, gaining ground to his left, turned the Spanish right. General Leval, with two divisions of infantry in columns of regiments, each having a battalion displayed in front, followed the cavalry, and drove General Zayas from the olive-woods. General Girard, with his division arranged in the same manner, followed Leval in second line, and General Dessolles menaced the centre with one portion of his troops, while another portion lined the edge of the ravine to support the skirmishers and awe the Spanish left wing. The King remained in reserve with his guards. Thus the French order of battle was in two columns; the principal one flanked by the cavalry, directed against and turning the Spanish right, the second keeping the Spanish centre in check, and each being supported by reserves.

These dispositions were completed at eleven o'clock, at which hour Senarmont, massing thirty pieces of artillery, opened a shattering fire on Areizaga's centre. Six guns, detached to the right, played at the same time across the ravine against the left, and six others swept down the deep hollow, to clear it of the light troops. The Spaniards were undisciplined and badly commanded, but discovered no appearance of fear; their cries were loud and strong, their skirmishing fire brisk, and, from the centre of their line, sixteen guns opened with a murderous effect upon Leval's and Girard's columns, as the latter were pressing on towards the right. To mitigate the fire of this battery, a French battalion, rushing out at full speed, seized a small eminence close to the Spanish guns, and a counter battery was immediately planted there. Then the Spaniards gave back, their skirmishers were swept out of the ravine by a flanking fire of grape, and Senarmont immediately drawing the artillery from the French right, took Ocaña as his pivot, and prolonging his fire to the left, raked Areizaga's right wing in its whole length.

During this cannonade, Leval, constantly pressing forward,

obliged the Spaniards to change their front, by withdrawing the right wing *behind* the shallow part of the ravine, which, as I have before said, was in its rear when the action commenced. By this change, the whole army, still drawn up in two lines, at the distance of a quarter of a mile asunder, was pressed into somewhat of a convex form with the town of Ocaña in the centre, and hence Senar-mont's artillery tore their ranks with a greater destruction than before. Nevertheless, encouraged by observing the comparatively feeble body of infantry approaching them, the Spaniards suddenly retook the offensive, and their fire, redoubling, dismounted two French guns; Mortier himself was wounded slightly, Leval severely; the line advanced, and the leading French divisions wavered and gave back.

The moment was critical, and the Duke of Treviso lost no time in exhortations to Leval's troops, but, like a great commander, instantly brought up Girard's division through the intervals of the first line, and displayed a front of fresh troops, keeping one regiment in square on the left flank; for he expected that Areizaga's powerful cavalry, which still remained in the plain, would charge for the victory. Girard's fire soon threw the Spanish first line into disorder, and meanwhile Dessolles, who had gained ground by an oblique movement, seeing the enemy's right thus shaken, seized Ocaña itself, and issued forth on the other side. The light cavalry of the King's guard, followed by the infantry, then poured through the town, and on the extreme left Sebastiani, with a rapid charge, cut off six thousand infantry, and obliged them to surrender. The Spanish cavalry, which had only suffered a little from the cannonade, and had never made an effort to turn the tide of battle, now drew off entirely, and the second line of infantry gave ground as the front fell back upon it in confusion; Areizaga, confounded and bewildered, ordered the left wing, which had scarcely fired a shot, to retreat, and then quitted the field himself.

For half an hour after this, the superior officers who remained endeavored to keep the troops together in the plain, and strove to reach the main road leading to Dos Barrios; but Girard and Dessolles' divisions being connected after passing Ocaña, pressed on with steady rapidity, while the Polish lancers and a regiment of chasseurs, outflanking the Spanish right, continually increased the confusion: finally, Sebastiani, after securing his prisoners, came up again like a whirlwind, and charged full in the front with five regiments of cavalry. Then the whole mass broke, and fled each man for himself across the plain; but, on the right of the routed multitude, a deep ravine leading from Yepes to Dos Barrios, in an

oblique direction, continually contracted the space, and the pursuing cavalry arriving first at Barrios, headed nearly ten thousand bewildered men, and forced them to surrender. The remainder turned their faces to all quarters, and such was the rout, that the French were also obliged to disperse to take prisoners, for, to their credit, no rigorous execution was inflicted, and hundreds, merely deprived of their arms, were desired, in raillery, "to return to their homes, and abandon war as a trade they were unfit for." This fatal battle commenced at eleven o'clock; before two, thirty pieces of artillery, a hundred and twenty carriages, twenty-five stand of colors, three generals, six hundred inferior officers, and eighteen thousand privates were taken, and the pursuit was still hot. Seven or eight thousand of the Spaniards contrived to make away towards the mountain of Tarancon, others followed the various routes through La Mancha to the Sierra Morena, and many saved themselves in Valencia and Murcia.

Meanwhile the first corps, having passed the Tagus by a ford, re-established the bridge at Villa Maurique before ten o'clock in the morning, and finding Santa Cruz de la Zarza abandoned, followed Areizaga's traces; at Villatobas, the light cavalry captured twelve hundred carriages, and a little farther on, took a thousand of the fugitives who were making for Tarancon. The Duke of Belluno, being thus apprised of the result of the battle, halted at Villatobas, but sent his cavalry forward to La Guardia, where they joined Sebastiani's horsemen, and the whole continuing the pursuit to Lillo, made five hundred more prisoners, together with three hundred horses. This finished the operations of the day; only eighteen hundred cannon-shot had been fired, and an army of more than fifty thousand men had been ruined. The French lost seventeen hundred men, killed and wounded; the Spaniards five thousand, and before night-fall, all the baggage and military carriages, three thousand animals, forty-five pieces of artillery, thirty thousand muskets, and twenty-six thousand captives, were in the hands of the conquerors!*

Areizaga reached Tembleque during the night, and La Carolina the third day after. On the road, he met General Benaz with a thousand dragoons that had been detached to the rear before the battle commenced; this body he directed on Madrilejos to cover the retreat of the fugitives, but so strongly did the panic spread that when Sebastiani approached that post on the 20th, Benaz's men fled, without seeing an enemy, as fearfully as any who came

* S. Journal of Operations, MS. Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30, 1809, MS.

from the fight. Even so late as the 24th, only four hundred cavalry, belonging to all regiments, could be assembled at Manzanares; and still fewer at La Carolina.*

CHAPTER VI.

King Joseph's return to Madrid—Del Parque's operations—Battle of Alba de Tormes—Dispersion of the Spanish troops—Their great sufferings and patience—The Supreme Junta treat Sir A. Wellesley's counsels with contempt—He breaks up from the Guadiana and moves to the Mondego—Vindication of his conduct for having remained so long on the Guadiana—French remain torpid about Madrid—Observations.

JOSEPH halted at Dos Barrios the night of the battle, and the next day directed Sebastiani, with all the light cavalry and a division of infantry, upon Madrilejos and Consuegra; the first corps, by St. Juan de Vilharta, upon the Sierra Morena; the fifth corps, by Tembleque and Mora, upon Toledo. One division of the fourth corps guarded the spoil and the prisoners at Ocaña. A second division, reinforced with a brigade of cavalry, was posted, by detachments, from Aranjuez to Consuegra. The monarch himself, with his guards and Dessolles' first brigade, returned on the 20th to Madrid.

Three days had sufficed to dissipate the storm on the side of La Mancha, but the Duke Del Parque still menaced the sixth corps in Castile, and the reports from Talavera again spoke of Albuquerque and the English being in motion. The second brigade of Dessolles' division had returned from Old Castile on the 19th, and the uncertainty with respect to the British movements obliged the King to keep all his troops in hand. Nevertheless, fearing that, if Del Parque gained upon the sixth corps, he might raise an insurrection in Leon, Gazan's division of the sixth corps was sent from Toledo through the Puerto Pico, to Marchand's assistance, and Kellermann was again directed to take the command of the whole.

During these events, the British army remained tranquil about Badajos; but Albuquerque, following his orders, had reached Peralada de Garbin, and seized the bridge of Arzobispo, in expectation of being joined by the Duke Del Parque. That General, however, who had above thirty thousand men, thought, when Dessolles' division was recalled to Madrid, that he could crush the sixth corps, and therefore advanced from Bejar towards Alba de

* Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30, 1809, MS.

Tormes on the 17th, two days before the battle of Ocaña. Thus, when Albuquerque expected him on the Tagus, he was engaged in serious operations beyond the Tormes, and having reached Alba the 21st, sent a division to take possession of Salamanca, which Marchand had again abandoned. The 22d, he marched towards Valladolid, and his advanced guard and cavalry entered Fresno and Carpio. Meanwhile Kellermann, collecting all the troops of his government, and being joined by Marchand, moved upon Medina del Campo, and the 23d, fell with a body of horse upon the Spaniards at Fresno. The Spanish cavalry fled at once, but the infantry stood firm and repulsed the assailants.

The 24th, the Duke carried his whole army to Fresno, intending to give battle; but on the 26th imperative orders to join Albuquerque having reached him, he commenced a retrograde movement.* Kellermann, without waiting for the arrival of Gazan's division, instantly pursued, and his advanced guard of cavalry overtook and charged the Spanish army at the moment when a part of their infantry and all their horse had passed the bridge of Alba de Tormes; being repulsed, the French retired upon their supports, and the Duke, seeing that an action was inevitable, brought the remainder of his troops, with the exception of one division, back to the right bank.

BATTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES.

Scarcely was the line formed when Kellermann came up with two divisions of dragoons and some artillery, and, without hesitating, sent one division to outflank the Spanish right, and with the other charged fiercely in upon the front. The Spanish horsemen, flying without a blow, rode straight over the bridge, and the infantry of the right being thus exposed, were broken and sabred; those on the left stood fast and repulsed the enemy. The Duke rallied his cavalry on the other side of the river, and brought them back to the fight; but the French were also reinforced, and once more the Spanish horse fled without a blow. By this time it was dark, and the infantry of the left wing, under Mendizabel and Carrera, being unbroken, made good their retreat across the river, yet not without difficulty, and under the fire of some French infantry, which arrived just in the dusk. During the night the Duke retreated upon Tamames unmolested, but at daybreak, when a French patrol came up with his rear, his whole army threw away their arms and fled outright. Kellermann, having meanwhile entered Salamanca, did not pursue, yet the dispersion was complete.

* Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, MS.

After this defeat, Del Parque rallied his army in the mountains behind Tamames, and, in ten or twelve days, again collected about twenty thousand men; they were however without artillery, scarcely any had preserved their arms, and such was their distress for provisions, that two months afterwards, when the British arrived on the northern frontier, the peasantry still spoke with horror of the sufferings of those famished soldiers. Many actually died of want, and every village was filled with sick. Yet the mass neither dispersed nor murmured! Spaniards, though hasty in revenge and feeble in battle, are patient to the last degree in suffering.

This result of the Duke Del Parque's operation had amply justified Sir Arthur Wellesley's advice to the Portuguese Regency. In like manner the battle of Ocaña, and the little effect produced by the Duke of Albuquerque's advance to Arzobispo, had justified that which he gave to the Central Junta. It might therefore be imagined that the latter would have received his after-counsels with deference; but the course of that body was never affected by either reason or experience. Just before the rout of Alba de Tormes, Sir Arthur Wellesley proposed that ten thousand men, to be taken from the Duke Del Parque, should *reinforce Albuquerque, that the latter might maintain the strong position of Meza-d'Ibor, and cover Estremadura for the winter.** Meanwhile Del Parque's force, thus reduced one-third, could, he said, be more easily fed, and might keep aloof from the enemy until the British army should arrive on the northern frontier of Portugal, a movement long projected, and, as he informed them, only delayed *to protect Estremadura until the Duke of Albuquerque had received the reinforcement.* The only reply of the Junta was an order, directing Albuquerque *immediately to quit the line of the Tagus, and take post at Llerena, behind the Guadiana;* thus abandoning Estremadura to the enemy, and exposing his own front in a bad position to an army coming from Almaraz, and his right flank and rear to an army coming from La Mancha.

This foolish and contemptuous proceeding being followed by Del Parque's defeat, which endangered Ciudad Rodrigo, Sir Arthur at once commenced his march for the north. He knew that twenty thousand Spanish infantry and six thousand mounted cavalry were again collected in La Carolina; and that the troops (eight thousand) who escaped from Ocaña, on the side of Tarancon, were at Cuença, under General Echevaria; and as the numbers reassembled in the Morena were (the inactivity of the French after the battle of Ocaña considered) sufficient to defend the passes and cover Seville for the moment, there was no reason why the British army should remain

* Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dec. 7, 1809, MS.

in unhealthy positions to aid people who would not aid themselves. Albuquerque's retrograde movement was probably a device of the Junta to oblige Sir Arthur to undertake the defence of Estremadura, but it only hastened his departure. It did not comport with his plans to engage in serious operations on that side, yet to have retired when that province was actually attacked would have been disreputable; wherefore, seizing this unhappily favorable moment to quit Badajos, he crossed the Tagus, and marched into the valley of the Mondego, leaving General Hill, with a mixed force of ten thousand men, at Abrantes.

The Guadiana pestilence had been so fatal that many officers blamed him for stopping so long, but it was his last hold on Spain, and the safety of the southern provinces was involved in his proceedings. It was not his battle of Talavera, but the position maintained by him on the frontier of Estremadura, which, in the latter part of 1809, saved Andalusia from subjection, and this is easy of demonstration. Joseph, having rejected Soult's project against Portugal, dared not invade Andalusia, by Estremadura, with the English army on his right flank; neither could he hope to invade it by the way of La Mancha, without drawing Sir Arthur into the contest. But Andalusia was, at this period, the last place where the intrusive King desired to meet a British army. He had many partisans in that province, who would necessarily be overawed if the course of the war carried Sir Arthur beyond the Morena; nor could the Junta, in that case, have refused Cadiz, as a place of arms, to their ally. Then the whole force of Andalusia and Murcia would have rallied round the English army behind the Morena; and, as Areizaga had sixty thousand men, and Albuquerque ten thousand, it was no exaggeration to assume that a hundred thousand could have been organized for defence, and the whole of the troops in the south of Portugal would have been available to aid in the protection of Estremadura. Thus, including thirty thousand English, there would have been a mass of at least one hundred thousand soldiers, disposable for active operations, assembled in the Morena.

From La Carolina to Madrid is only ten marches, and while posted at the former, the allied army could have protected Lisbon as well as Seville, because a forward movement would oblige the French to concentrate round the Spanish capital. Andalusia would thus have become the principal object of the invaders; but the allied armies, holding the passes of the Morena, their left flank protected by Estremadura and Portugal, their right by Murcia and Valencia, and having rich provinces and large cities behind them, and a free

communication with the sea, and abundance of ports, could have fought a fair field for Spain.

It was a perception of these advantages that caused Sir John Moore to regret the ministers had not chosen the southern instead of the northern line for his operations.* Lord Wellesley, also, impressed with the importance of Andalusia, urged his brother to adopt some plan of this nature, and the latter, sensible of its advantages, would have done so, but for the impossibility of dealing with the Central Junta. Military possession of Cadiz and the uncontrolled command of a Spanish force were the only conditions upon which he would undertake the defence of Andalusia, conditions they would not accede to, but without which he could not be secured against the caprices of men whose proceedings were one continued struggle against reason.* This may seem inconsistent with a former assertion, that Portugal was the true base of operations for the English, but political as well as physical resources and moral considerations weighed in that argument.

For the protection, then, of Andalusia and Estremadura, during a dangerous crisis of affairs, Sir Arthur persisted, at such an enormous sacrifice of men, to hold his position on the Guadiana, yet it was reluctantly, and more in deference to his brother's wishes than his own judgment, that he remained after Areizaga's army was assembled. Having proved the Junta by experience, he was more clear-sighted, as to their perverseness, than Lord Wellesley, who, being in daily intercourse with the members, obliged to listen to their ready eloquence in excuse for past errors, and more ready promises of future exertion, clung longer to the notions that Spain could be put in the right path, and that England might war largely in conjunction with the united nations of the Peninsula, instead of restricting herself to the comparatively obscure operation of defending Lisbon. He was finally undeceived, and the march from Badajoz for ever released the British General from a vexatious dependence on the Spanish government.

Meanwhile the French, in doubt of his intentions, appeared torpid. Kellermann remained at Salamanca, watching the movements of the Duke Del Parque, and Gazan returned to Madrid. Milhaud, with a division of the fourth corps, and some cavalry, was detached against Echevaria, but on his arrival at Cuença, finding that the latter had retreated by Toboado to Hellin in Murcia, combined his operations with General Suchet, and as I have before related, assisted to reduce the towns of Albaracin and Teruel. Other movements there were none, but, as the Spanish regiment

* Sir J. Moore's Correspondence.

† Lord Wellesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.

of the guard had fought freely against their countrymen, and many of the prisoners taken at Ocaña had offered to join the invaders' colors, the King conceived hopes of raising a national army. French writers assert that the captives at Ocaña made a marked distinction between Napoleon and Joseph. They were willing to serve the French Emperor, but not the intrusive King of Spain. Spanish authors assume that none entered the enemy's ranks save by coercion and to escape; and that many did so with that view, and were successful, must be supposed, or the numbers said to have reassembled in the Morena, and at Cuença, cannot be reconciled with the loss sustained in the action. However, the battles of Ocaña and Alba de Tormes terminated the series of offensive operations, which the Austrian war and the reappearance of a British army in the Peninsula had enabled the allies to adopt, in 1809. Those operations had been unsuccessful, the enemy again took the lead, and the fourth epoch of the war commenced.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Although certain that the British army would not co-operate in this short campaign, the Junta openly asserted that it would join Albuquerque in the valley of the Tagus. The improbability of Areizaga's acting without such assistance, gave currency to the fiction, and an accredited fiction is, in war, often more useful than the truth; in this, therefore, they are to be commended; but when deceiving their own General, they permitted Areizaga to act under the impression that he would be so assisted, they committed not an error, but an enormous crime. Nor was the General much less criminal for acting upon the mere assertion that other movements were combined with his, when no communication, no concerting of the marches, no understanding with the allied commander, as to their mutual resources and intentions, had taken place.

2. A rushing wind, a blast from the mountains, tempestuous, momentary, such was Areizaga's movement on Dos Barrios, and assuredly it would be difficult to find its parallel. There is no post so strong, no town so guarded, that, by a fortunate stroke, may not be carried; but who, even on the smallest scale, acts on this principle, unless aided by some accidental circumstance applicable to the moment? Areizaga obeyed the orders of his government! no general is bound to obey orders (at least without remonstrance) which involve the safety of his army; to that he should sacrifice everything but victory; and many great commanders have sacrificed even victory, rather than appear to undervalue this vital principle.

3. At Dos Barrios the Spanish General, having first met with

opposition, halted for three days, evidently without a plan, and ignorant both of the situation of the first corps on his left flank, and of the real force in his front; yet this was the only moment in which he could hope for the slightest success. If, instead of a feeble skirmish of cavalry, he had borne forward, with his whole army, on the 11th, Sebastiani must have been overpowered and driven across the Tagus, and Areizaga, with fifty thousand infantry and a powerful cavalry, would, on the 12th, have been in the midst of the separated French corps, for their movement of concentration was not completely effected until the night of the 14th. But such a stroke was not for an undisciplined army, and this was another reason against moving from the Morena at all, seeing that the calculated chances were all against Areizaga, and his troops not such as could improve accidental advantages.

4. The flank march, from Dos Barrios to Santa Cruz, although intended to turn the French left, and gain Madrid, was a circuitous route of at least a hundred miles, and, as there were three rivers to cross, namely, the Tagus, the Tajuña and Henares, only great rapidity could give a chance of success; yet Areizaga was slow, so late as the 15th he had passed the Tagus with only two divisions of infantry. Meanwhile the French, moving on the inner circle, got between him and Madrid, and the moment one corps, out of the three opposed to him, approached, he recrossed the Tagus and concentrated again on the strong ground of Santa Cruz de la Zarza. The King by the way of Aranjuez had, however, already cut his line of retreat, and then Areizaga, who, on the 10th, had shrunk from an action with Sebastiani when the latter had only eight thousand men, sought a battle on the same ground with the King, who was at the head of thirty thousand, the first corps being also in full march upon the Spanish traces and distant only a few miles. Here it may be remarked that Victor, who was now to the eastward of the Spaniards, had been on the 9th to the westward at Yébenes and Mora, having moved in ten days, on a circle of a hundred and fifty miles, completely round this Spanish General, who pretended to treat his adversaries as if they were blind men.

5. Baron Crossand, it is said, urged Areizaga to intrench himself in the mountains, to raise the peasantry, and to await the effect of Albuquerque's and Del Parque's operations. If so, his military ideas do not seem of a higher order than Areizaga's, and the proposal was but a repetition of Mr. Frere's former plan for Albuquerque; a plan founded on the supposition, that the rich plains of La Mancha were rugged mountains. In taking a permanent position at Santa Cruz or Tarancon, Areizaga must have resigned all direct communication with Andalusia, and opened a fresh line

of communication with Valencia, which would have been exposed to the third corps from Aragon. Yet without examining whether either the Spanish General or army were capable of such a difficult operation, as adopting an accidental line of operations, the advice, if given at all, was only given on the 18th, and on the 16th the first corps, the fourth, the greatest part of the fifth, the reserve and the royal guards, forming a mass of more than fifty thousand fighting men, would have taught Areizaga that men and not mountains decide the fate of a battle. But in fact, there were no mountains to hold: between Zarza and the borders of Valencia, the whole country is one vast plain, and on the 18th there was only the alternative of fighting the weakest of the two French armies, or of retreating by forced marches through La Mancha. The former was chosen, Areizaga's army was destroyed, and in the battle he discovered no redeeming quality. His position was ill chosen, he made no use of his cavalry, his left wing never fired a shot, and when the men, undismayed by the defeat of the right, demanded to be led into action, he commanded a retreat, and quitted the field himself at the moment when his presence was most wanted.

6. The combinations of the French were methodical, well arranged, effectual, and it may seem misplaced to do aught but commend movements so eminently successful; yet the chances of war are manifold enough to justify the drawing attention to some points of this short campaign. Areizaga's rush from the mountains was so unexpected and rapid, that it might well make his adversaries hesitate, and hence perhaps the reason why the first corps circled round the Spanish army, and was singly to have attacked the latter in front at Zarza, on the 19th, whereas, reinforced with the division of the fourth corps from Toledo, it might have fallen on the rear and flank from Mora a week before; and this, during the three days Areizaga remained at Dos Barrios, from whence Mora is only four hours' march.

7. The 11th, the King knew the English army had not approached the valley of the Tagus; Areizaga did not quit Dos Barrios until the 13th, and he remained at Zarza until the 18th. During eight days, therefore, the Spanish General was permitted to lead, and had he been a man of real enterprise he would have crushed the troops between Dos Barrios and Aranjuez on the 10th or 11th. Indeed, the boldness with which Sebastiani maintained his offensive position beyond Aranjuez, from the 9th to the 14th, was a master-piece. It must, however, be acknowledged that Soult could not at once fix a general, who marched fifty thousand men about like a patrol of cavalry, without the slightest regard to his adversary's positions or his own line of operations.

8. In the battle, nothing could be more scientific than the mode in which the French closed upon and defeated the right and centre, while they paralyzed the left of the Spaniards; the disparity of numbers engaged, and the enormous amount of prisoners, artillery, and other trophies of victory prove it to have been a fine display of talent. But Andalusia was laid prostrate by this sudden destruction of her troops! why then was the fruit of victory neglected? Did the King, unable to perceive his advantages, control the higher military genius of his advising general? or was he distracted by disputes amongst the different commanders? or did the British army at Badajos alarm him? An accurate knowledge of these points is essential in estimating the real share Spain had in her own deliverance.

9. Sir Arthur Wellesley absolutely refused to co-operate in this short and violent campaign. He remained a quiet spectator of events at the most critical period of the war; and yet on paper the Spanish projects promised well. Areizaga's army exceeded fifty thousand men, Albuquerque's ten thousand, and thirty thousand were under Del Parque, who, at Tamames, had just overthrown the best troops in the French army. Villa Campa also, and the partida bands on the side of Cuença, were estimated at ten thousand; in fine, there were a hundred thousand Spanish soldiers ready. The British army at this period, although much reduced by sickness, had still twenty thousand men fit to bear arms, and the Portuguese under Beresford were near thirty thousand, making a total of a hundred and fifty thousand allies. Thirty thousand to guard the passes of the Sierra de Gredos and watch the sixth corps, a hundred and twenty thousand to attack the seventy thousand French covering Madrid! Why, then, was Sir Arthur Wellesley, who only four months before so eagerly undertook a like enterprise with fewer forces, now absolutely deaf to the proposals of the Junta? "*Because moral force is to physical force, as three to one in war.*" He had proved the military qualities of Spaniards and French, and he foresaw, to use his own expressions, "*that after one or two battles, and one or two brilliant actions by some, and defeats sustained by others, all would have to retreat again;*"* yet this man, so cautious, so sensible of the enemy's superiority, was laying the foundation of measures that finally carried him triumphant through the Peninsula. False then are the opinions of those who, asserting Napoleon might have been driven over the Ebro in 1808-9, blame Sir John Moore's conduct. Such reasoners would as certainly have charged the ruin of Spain on Sir Arthur Wellesley, if at this pe-

* Letter to Lord Liverpool, MS.

riod the chances of war had sent him to his grave. But in all times the wise and brave man's toil has been the sport of fools.

Alba de Tormes ended the great military transactions of 1809. In the beginning, Napoleon broke to atoms and dispersed the feeble structure of the Spanish insurrection; after his departure the invasion stagnated amidst the bickerings of his lieutenants. Sir Arthur Wellesley turned the war back upon the invaders for a moment, but the jealousy and folly of his ally soon obliged him to retire to Portugal. The Spaniards then tried their single strength, and were trampled under foot at Ocaña, and notwithstanding the assistance of England, the offensive passed entirely from their hands. In the next book we shall find them everywhere acting on the defensive, and everywhere weak.

BOOK X.

CHAPTER I.

Joseph prepares to invade Andalusia—Distracted state of affairs in that province—Military position and resources described—Invasion of Andalusia—Passes of the Morena forced by the French—Foolish deceit of the Supreme Junta—Tumult in Seville—Supreme Junta dissolved—Junta of Seville reassembles, but dispersed immediately after—The French take Jaen—Sebastiani enters Granada—King Joseph enters Cordoba, and afterwards marches against Seville—Albuquerque's march to Cadiz—Seville surrenders—Insurrection at Malaga put down by Sebastiani—Victor invests Cadiz—Faction in that city—Mortier marches against Badajos—The Visconde de Gand flies to Ayamonte—Inhospitable conduct of the Bishop of Algarve.

NAPOLEON, victorious in Germany, and ready to turn his undivided strength once more against the Peninsula, complained of the past inactivity of the King, and Joseph prepared to commence the campaign of 1810 with vigor. His first operations, however, indicated great infirmity of purpose. When Del Parque's defeat on one side and Echevaria's on the other had freed his flanks, and while the British army was still at Badajos, he sent the fourth corps towards Valencia, but immediately afterwards recalled it, and also the first corps, which, since the battle of Ocaña, had been at Santa Cruz de Mudela. The march of this last corps through La Mancha had been marked by this peculiarity, that, for the first time since the commencement of the war, the peasantry, indignant at the flight of the soldiers, guided the pursuers to the retreats of the fugitives.

Joseph's vacillation was partly occasioned by the insurrection in Navarre, under Renovalles and Mina; partly because Lord Wellington, previous to quitting the Guadiana, had informed the Junta of Badajos, as a matter of courtesy, that he was about to evacuate their district, and his confidential letter being published in the town gazette, and ostentatiously copied into the Seville papers, made Joseph suspect it to be a cloak to some offensive project. However, the false movements of the first and fourth corps distracted the Spaniards, and emboldened the French partisans, who were

very numerous both in Valencia and Andalusia. When the troubles in Navarre were quieted by Suchet, and the distribution of the British army in the valley of the Mondego known, Joseph seriously prepared for the conquest of Andalusia. This enterprise, less difficult than an invasion of Portugal, promised immediate pecuniary advantages, which was no slight consideration to a sovereign whose ministers were reduced to want from the non-payment of their salaries, and whose troops were thirteen months in arrears of pay. Napoleon, a rigid stickler for the Roman maxim, that "war should support war," paid only the corps near the frontiers of France, and rarely recruited the military chest.

Both the military and political affairs of Andalusia were now at the lowest ebb. The calm produced by the promise to convoke the National Cortes had been short-lived. The disaster of Ocaña revived all the passions of the people, and afforded the old Junta of Seville, the Council of Castile, and other enemies of the Central Junta, an opportunity to pull down a government universally obnoxious, and the general discontent was increased by the measures adopted to meet the approaching crisis. The Marquis of Astorga had been succeeded by the Archbishop of Laodicea, under whose presidency the Junta published a manifesto, assuring the people that there was no danger,—that Areizaga could defend the Morena against the whole power of France,—that Albuquerque would, from the side of Estremadura, fall upon the enemy's rear,—and that a second Baylen might be expected. But, while thus attempting to delude the public, they openly sent property to Cadiz, and announced that they would transfer their sittings to that town on the 1st of February. Meanwhile, not to seem inactive, a decree was issued for a levy of a hundred thousand men, and for a forced loan of half the jewels, plate, and money belonging to individuals; sums left for pious purposes were also appropriated to the service of the state.

To weaken their adversaries, the Junta offered Romana the command of the army in the Morena, and imprisoned the Conde de Montijo and Francisco Palafox. The Marquis of Lazan, accused of being in league with his brother, was confined in Peniscola, and the Conde de Tilly, detected in a conspiracy to seize the public treasure and make for America, was thrown into a dungeon, where it is believed his infamous existence terminated. The celebrated Padre Gill was sent on a mission to Sicily. While on his passage he told an English gentleman, "*They have sent me on this embassy to get rid of my never ceasing remonstrances; and I have submitted to this banishment for fear I might be got rid of in another way!*" Romana refused to serve, and Blake, recalled from Catalonia, was


appointed to command the troops re-assembled at La Carolina; most of the other generals kept aloof, and in Galicia the Conde de Noronha, resigning his command, issued a manifesto against the Junta. The public hatred increased, and the partisans of Palafox and Montijo, certain that the people would be against the government under any circumstances, only waited for a favorable moment to commence violence. Andalusia generally, and Seville in particular, were but one remove from anarchy, when the intrusive monarch reached the foot of the Morena with a great and well organized army.

The military preparation of the Junta was in harmony with their political conduct. The decree for levying a hundred thousand men, issued when the enemy was but a few marches from the seat of government, was followed by an order to distribute a hundred thousand poniards, as if assassination were the mode in which a great nation could or ought to defend itself, especially when the regular forces at the disposal of the Junta were still numerous enough if well directed to have made a stout resistance. Areizaga had twenty-five thousand men in the Morena; Echevaria, with eight thousand, was close by at Hellin; five or six thousand were spread over Andalusia, and Albuquerque had fifteen thousand behind the Guadiana. The troops at Carolina were, however, dispirited and disorganized. Blake had not arrived, and Albuquerque, distracted with contradictory orders transmitted almost daily by the Junta, could contrive no reasonable plan of action, until the movements of the enemy enabled him to disregard all instructions. Thus amidst a whirlpool of passions, intrigues, and absurdities, Andalusia, although a mighty vessel, and containing all the means of safety, was destined to sink.

This great province, composed of four kingdoms, namely, Jaen and Cordoba in the north, Granada and Seville in the south, was protected on the right by Murcia and on the left by Portugal. The northern frontier only was accessible to the French, who could attack it either by La Mancha or Estremadura; but, between those provinces, the Toledo and Guadalupe mountains forbade all military communication until near the Morena, where, abating somewhat of their surly grandeur, they leave a space through which troops could move from one province to the other in a direction parallel to the frontier of Andalusia.

Towards La Mancha, the Morena was so savage that only the royal road to Seville was practicable for artillery. This road entering the hills, a little in advance of Santa Cruz de Mudela, at a pass of wonderful strength, called the Despenas Perros, led by La Carolina and Baylen to Andujar. On the right, indeed, another





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1810.

Drawn by Genl. Napier.

route passed through the Puerto del Rey, but fell into the first at Navas Toloza, a little beyond the Despenas Perros, and there were other passes also, but all falling again into the main road, before reaching La Carolina. Santa Cruz de Mudela was therefore a position menacing the principal passes of the Morena from La Mancha.

To the eastward of Santa Cruz the town of Villa Nueva de los Infantes presented a second point of concentration for the invaders. From thence, roads practicable for cavalry and infantry penetrated the hills by La Venta Quemada and the Puerto de San Esteban, conducting to Baeza, Ubeda, and Jaen.

In like manner, on the westward of Santa Cruz, roads, or rather paths, penetrated into the kingdoms of Cordoba. One, entering the mountains by Fuen Caliente, led upon Montoro; a second, called the La Plata, passed by La Conquista to Adamuz, and it is just beyond these roads that the ridges separating La Mancha from Estremadura begin to soften down, permitting military ingress to the latter by the passes of Mochuello, Almaden de Azogues, and Agudo.

If entering Estremadura by these passes an army should then invade Andalusia, the Morena must still be passed, and the only military communications between those provinces were by three great roads, namely, one from Medellin and Llerena to Guadalcanal; another from Badajos to Seville, by the defiles of Monasterio and Ronquillo; a third by Xeres de los Caballeros, Fregenal, and Araceña. From Almaden, there was also a way, through Belalcazar, to Guadalcanal; but all these routes, except that of Araceña, whether from La Mancha or Estremadura, after crossing the mountains led into the valley of the Guadalquivir, a river whose waters, drawn from a multitude of sources, at first roll westward, washing the foot of the Morena as far as the city of Cordoba, then, bending gradually towards the south, flow by Seville, and are finally lost in the Atlantic.

To defend the passage of the Morena, Arcizaga posted his right in the defiles of San Esteban and Montizon, covering the city of Jaen, the old walls of which were armed. His left occupied the passes of Fuen Caliente and Mochuello, covering Cordoba. His centre was established at La Carolina and in the defiles of the Despenas Perros and Puerto del Rey, which was intrenched, but with so little skill and labor as to excite the ridicule rather than the circumspection of the enemy. And here it may be well to notice an error relative to the strength of mountain defiles, common enough even amongst men who, with some experience, have taken a contracted view of their profession.

From such persons it is usual to hear of narrow passes, in which the greatest multitudes may be resisted. Now, without stopping to prove that local strength is nothing, if the flanks can be turned by other roads, we may be certain that there are few positions so difficult as to render superior numbers of no avail. Where one man can climb another can, and a good and numerous infantry, crowning the acclivities on the right and left of a disputed pass, will soon oblige the defenders to retreat, or to fight upon equal terms. If this takes place at any point of an extended front of defiles, such as those of the Sierra Morena, the dangerous consequences to the whole of the beaten army are obvious. Hence such passes should only be considered as fixed points, around which an army should operate freely in defence of more exposed positions, for defiles are doors, the keys of which are on the summits of the hills around them. A bridge is a defile, yet troops are posted, not in the middle, but behind a bridge, to defend the passage. By extending this principle, we shall draw the greatest advantages from the strength of mountain passes. The practice of some great generals may, indeed, be quoted against this opinion; nevertheless, it seems more consonant to the true principles of war to place detachments in defiles, and keep the main body in some central point behind, ready to fall on the heads of the enemy's columns as they issue from the gorges of the hills.

Pierced by many roads, and defended by feeble dispirited troops, the Morena presented no great obstacle to the French; but, as they came up against it by the way of La Mancha only, there were means to render their passage difficult. If Albuquerque, placing his army either at Almaden de Azogues, or Agudo, had operated against their right flank, he must have been beaten, or masked by a strong detachment, before Areizaga could have been safely attacked.

Nor was Andalusia itself deficient of interior local resources for an obstinate defence. Parallel to the Morena, and at the distance of about a hundred miles, the Sierra Nevada, the Apulxaras, and the Sierra Ronda, extend from the borders of Murcia to Gibraltar, cutting off a narrow tract of country along the coast of the Mediterranean, while the intermediate space between these sierras and the Morena is broken by less extensive ridges, forming valleys which, gradually descending and widening, are finally lost in the open country about Seville. Andalusia may therefore be considered as presenting three grand divisions of country: 1. The upper or rugged, between the Sierra Morena and the Sierra Nevada. 2. The lower, or open country, about Seville. 3. The coast tract between the Nevada and Ronda, and the Mediterranean. This

last is studded, in its whole length, with seaport towns and castles, such as Malaga, Velez-Malaga, Motril, Ardra, Marbella, Estipona, and an infinity of smaller places.

No important line of defence is offered by the Guadalquivir. An army, after passing the Morena, would follow the course of its waters to gain the lower parts of Andalusia, and, thus descending, the advantage of position would be with the invaders. But, to reach the Mediterranean coast, not only the ridges of the Nevada or Ronda must be crossed, but most of the minor parallel ridges inclosing the valleys, whose waters run towards the Atlantic. Now all those valleys contain great towns, such as Jaen and Cordoba, Ubeda, Granada, and Alcala Real, most of which, formerly fortified, and still retaining their ancient walls, were capable of defence; wherefore the enemy could not have approached the Mediterranean, nor Granada, nor the lower country about Seville, without first taking Jaen, or Cordoba, or both. The difficulty of besieging those places, while a Spanish army was stationed at Alcala Real, or Ecija, while the mountains, on both flanks and in the rear, were filled with insurgents, and while Albuquerque hung upon the rear at Almada, is apparent. Pompey's sons, acting upon this system, nearly baffled Cæsar, although that mighty man had friends in the province, and, with his accustomed celerity, fell upon his youthful adversaries before their arrangements were matured.

But in this, the third year of the war, the Junta were unprovided with any plan of defence beyond the mere occupation of the passes in the Morena. Those once forced, Seville was open, and, from that great city, the French could penetrate into all parts, and their communication with Madrid became of secondary importance, because Andalusia abounded in the materials of war, and Seville, the capital of the province, and, from its political position, the most important town in Spain, was furnished with arsenals, cannon foundries, and all establishments necessary to a great military power.

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The number of fighting men destined for this enterprise was about sixty-five thousand. Marshal Soult directed the movements, but the King was disposed to take a more prominent part in the military arrangements than a due regard for his own interest would justify. To cover Madrid, and to watch the British army, the second corps was posted between Talavera and Toledo, with strong detachments pushed into the valley of the Tagus; two thousand men, drawn from the reserve, garrisoned the capital; as many were in Toledo, and two battalions occupied minor posts, such as

Arganda and Guadalaxara. Gazan's division was recalled from Castile, Milhaud's from Aragon; the first, fourth, and fifth corps, the King's guards, and the reserve, increased by some reinforcements from France, were directed upon Andalusia.

During the early part of January, 1810, the troops, by easy marches, gained the foot of the Morena, and there Milhaud's division, coming by the way of Benillo, rejoined the fourth corps. A variety of menacing demonstrations, being then made along the front of the Spanish line of defence, between the 14th and 17th, caused Areizaga to abandon his advanced positions and confine himself to the passes of the Morena; on the 18th, the King arrived in person at Santa Cruz de Mudela, and the whole army was collected in three distinct masses.

In the centre, the artillery, the King's guards, the reserve, and the fifth corps, under Marshal Mortier, were established at Santa Cruz and Elviso, close to the mouths of the Despenas Perros and the Puerto del Rey.

On the left, Sebastiani, with the fourth corps, occupied Villa Nueva de los Infantes, and prepared to penetrate, by Venta Quemada and Puerto San Esteban, into the kingdom of Jaen.

On the right, the Duke of Belluno, placing a detachment in Agudo, to watch Albuquerque, occupied Almaden de Azogues with the first corps, pushed an advanced guard into the pass of Mochuelo, and sent patrols through Benalcazar and Hinojosa towards Guadalcanal. By these dispositions, Areizaga's line of defence in the Morena, and Albuquerque's line of retreat from Estremadura, were alike threatened.

On the 20th, Sebastiani, after a slight skirmish, forced the defiles of Esteban, making a number of prisoners; and when the Spaniards rallied behind the Guadalen, one of the tributary torrents of the Guadalquivir, he again defeated them, and advancing into the plains of Ubeda, secured the bridges over the Guadalquivir.

In the centre Dessolles carried the Puerto del Rey without firing a shot, and Gazan's division, crowning the heights right and left of the Despenas Perros, turned all the Spanish works in that pass, which was abandoned. Mortier, with the main body and the artillery, then poured through, reached La Carolina in the night, and the next day took possession of Andujar, having passed in triumph over the fatal field of Baylen; more fatal to the Spaniards than to the French, for the foolish pride engendered by that victory, was one of the principal causes of their subsequent losses.

Meanwhile the Duke of Belluno pushed detachments to Montoro, Adamuz, and Pozzoblanco, and his patrols appeared close to Cordoba. His and Sebastiani's flanking parties communicated also

with the fifth corps at Andujar, and thus, in two days, by skilful combinations upon an extent of fifty miles, the lofty barrier of the Morena was forced, and Andalusia beheld the French masses portentously gathered on the interior slopes of the mountains.

In Seville all was anarchy: Palafox and Montijo's partisans were secretly preparing to strike, and the ancient Junta openly discovered a resolution to resume their former power. The timid, and those who had portable property, endeavored to remove to Cadiz, but the populace opposed this, and the peasantry came into the city so fast that above a hundred thousand persons were within the walls, and the streets were crowded with multitudes that, scarcely knowing what to expect or wish, only wanted a signal to break out into violence. The Central Junta, fearing alike the enemy and their own people, prepared to fly, yet faithful to their system of delusion, while their packages were actually embarking for Cadiz, assured the people that the enemy had indeed forced the pass of Almaden, leading from La Mancha into Estremadura, but that no danger could thence arise; because the Duke Del Parque was in full march to join Albuquerque, and those generals when united being stronger than the enemy would fall upon his flank, while Areizaga would cooperate from the Morena and gain a great victory.

It was on the 20th of January, and at the very moment when the Morena was being forced at all points, that this deluding address was published, and it was not until the day after that the Junta despatched orders for the Duke Del Parque (who was then in the mountains beyond Ciudad Rodrigo) to effect that junction with Albuquerque from which such great things were expected! Del Parque received the despatch on the 24th, and prepared to obey. Albuquerque, alive to all the danger of the crisis, had left General Contreras at Medellin with four thousand five hundred men, destined to form a garrison for Badajos, and marched himself on the 22d, with about nine thousand, towards Agudo, intending to fall upon the flank of the first corps; he had scarcely commenced his movement, when he learned that Agudo and Almaden were occupied, and that the French patrols were already at Benalcazar and Hinojosa, within one march of his own line of retreat upon Seville. In this conjuncture, sending Contreras to Badajos, and his own artillery through the defile of Monasterio, he marched with his infantry to Guadalcanal. During the movement, he continued to receive contradictory and absurd orders from the Junta, some of which he disregarded, and others he could not obey: wherefore, conforming to circumstances, when the Morena was forced, he descended into the basin of Seville, crossed the Guadal-

quivir a few leagues from that city, at the ferry of Cantillana, reached Carmona on the 24th, and immediately pushed with his cavalry for Ecija to observe the enemy's progress. Meanwhile the storm, so long impending over the Central Junta, burst at Seville.

Early on the 24th a great tumult arose. Mobs traversing all the quarters of the city, called out, some for the deposition of the Junta, others for the heads of the members. Francisco Palafox and Montijo were released, and the Junta of Seville being re-established by acclamation, the Central Junta committed to their hands the fence of Andalusia, and endeavored themselves to reach Cadiz, each as he could; yet with the full intention of reuniting and resuming their authority. On the road, however, some of them were cast into prison by the people, some were like to be slain at Xerez, and the Junta of Seville had no intention that the Central Junta should ever revive. Saavedra, the President of the former, by judicious measures calmed the tumult in the city, restored Romana to the command of his old army, which was now under the Duke Del Parque, made some other popular appointments, and in conjunction with his colleagues sent a formal proposition to the Junta at Badajos, inviting them to take into consideration the necessity of constituting a regency, which was readily acceded to. The events of war crowding on, overlaid their schemes. Three days after the flight of the Central Junta, treason and faction being busy amongst the members of the Seville Junta, they also disbanded; some remained in the town, others, amongst them Saavedra, repaired to Cadiz. The tumults were then renewed with greater violence, and Romana was called upon to assume the command and defend the city, but he evaded this dangerous honor, and proceeded to Badajos.

Thus abandoned to themselves, the people of Seville elected a military Junta, and discovered the same disposition as the people of other towns in the Peninsula had done upon like occasions. If men like the Tios of Zaragoza had then assumed command, they might have left a memorable tale and a ruined city, but there were none so firm, or so ferocious; and finally, a feeling of helplessness producing fear in all, Seville was ready to submit to the invaders.

When the passage of the mountains was completely effected, the French corps again received their artillery, the centre and right wing remained stationary, and a detachment of the first corps, which had approached Cordoba, returned to Montoro. Areizaga rallied his troops at Jaen, but Sabastiani marching from Ubeda, drove him upon Alcala Real, and Jaen surrendered with forty-six guns mounted on the walls. The Spanish General then made one more stand, and being again beaten, all his artillery was captured, and his army

dispersed. Five thousand infantry and some squadrons of cavalry, throwing away their arms, escaped to Gibraltar, while Areizaga himself, with a remnant of horse, flying into the kingdom of Murcia, was there superseded by Blake. Meanwhile, Sebastiani having marched upon Granada, entered it the 28th of January, and was received with apparent joy, so entirely had the government of the Central Junta extinguished the former enthusiasm of the people.

The capture of Jaen having secured the left flank of the French, the King with the centre and right moved on Cordoba the 27th, and there also, as at Jaen and Granada, the invaders were received without any mark of aversion,* and thus the upper country was conquered. But the projects of Joseph were not confined to Andalusia; he had opened a secret communication with Valencia, where his partisans undertook to raise a commotion whenever a French force should appear before that city; hence, judging that no serious opposition would be made in Andalusia, he directed Sebastiani to cross the Sierra Nevada, and seize the Granadan coast, an operation that would enable him with greater facility to act against Valencia. To insure the success of the latter enterprise, he wrote from Cor

* Dupont's Proceedings at Cordoba, as related in my first volume, have been commented upon in a recent publication, entitled "*Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns.*" Upon the authority of General Foy, the author asserts that Cordoba was sacked, calls it "*a gratuitous atrocity,*" and "*an inhuman butchery,*" and no doubt, taking for fiction the stories of Agathocles, Marius, Sylla, and a thousand others, gravely affirms, that *capacity and cruelty are rarely united; that Dupont was a fool, and that Napoleon did not poison him in a dungeon, but that he must have "dragged on a miserable existence exposed to universal scorn and hatred."*

Unfortunately for the application of this nursery philosophy, Dupont, although a bad officer, was a man of acknowledged talents, and became Minister of War at the restoration of the Bourbons, a period fixed by the author of "*the Annals,*" as *the era of good government in France.*

I rejected Foy's authority, 1st, because his work, unfinished and posthumous, discovered more of the orator than the impartial historian, and he was politically opposed to Dupont. Secondly, because he was not an eye-witness, and his relation, at variance with the "*official Journal of Dupont's operations,*" was also contradicted by the testimony of a *British general of known talents and accuracy, who obtained his information on the spot a few months subsequent to the event.*

"Some time after the victory, order was restored, pillage was forbidden under pain of death, and the chosen companies maintained the police."—*Journal of Operations.*

Cordoba was not pillaged, being one of the few places where the French were well received.—Letters from a British General to Colonel Napier.

On this point, therefore, I am clear; but the author of the "*Annals,*" after contrasting my account with Foy's, thus proceeds, "It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given by Colonel Napier *without any quotation of authority.*"

A less concise writer might have thought it right to add that, *six months* previous to the publication of the *Annals,* Colonel Napier, hearing that some of his statements appeared inconclusive to the author of that work, *because there was no quotation of authority,* transmitted through a mutual friend, an assurance that he had authority for every statement, and that he would willingly furnish the author with *any or all of them:* no notice was taken of this offer.

doba to Suchet, urging him to make a combined movement from Aragon, and promising a powerful detachment from Andalusia, to meet him under the walls of Valencia.*

Dessolles, with the reserve, occupied Cordoba and Jaen, and the first and fifth corps, followed by the King's guards, proceeded without delay towards Ecija, where, it will be remembered, Albuquerque's cavalry had been posted since the night of the 24th. As the French approached, the Duke fell back upon Carmona, from whence he could retreat either to Seville or Cadiz, the way to the latter being through Utrera. But from Ecija there was a road through Moron to Utrera, shorter than that leading through Carmona, and along this road the cavalry of the first corps was pushed on the 27th. Albuquerque, despairing for Seville, resolved to make for Cadiz, and lest the enemy should reach Utrera before him, gained that town with great expedition, and thence moving through Lebrija and Xeres, by long marches, journeying day and night, reached Cadiz on the 3d of February. Some French cavalry overtook and skirmished with his rear at Utrera, but he was not pursued further, save by scouting parties; for the King had altered the original plan of operations, and ordered the first corps, which was then pushing for Cadiz, to change its direction and march by Carmona against Seville, and the 30th, the advanced guard came on that city.

Some intrenchments and batteries had been raised for defence; the mob still governing, fired upon the bearer of the first French summons, and announced in lofty terms a resolution to fight, and besides the populace, there were about seven thousand troops, composed partly of fugitives from the Morena, partly of the original garrison of the town. Nevertheless, the city, after some negotiation, surrendered on the 31st, with all its stores, foundries, and arsenals complete, and on the 1st of February the King entered in triumph. The lower country was thus conquered, and there remained only Cadiz, and the coast tract lying between the Mediterranean and the Sierra de Nevada to subdue.

The first corps was immediately sent against Cadiz, the fifth against Estremadura; and Sebastiani, having placed fifteen hundred men in the Alhambra, and incorporated among his troops a Swiss battalion, composed of those who had abandoned the French service in the battle of Baylen, seized Antequera. He was desirous to establish himself firmly in those parts before he crossed the Nevada, but his measures were precipitated by unexpected events. At Malaga, the people having imprisoned the members of the local Junta, were headed by a Capuchin friar, who resolved to fight the French, and collected a vast multitude armed in all manners above

* Suchet's Memoirs.