friends the English," was a common phrase among them when conversing with the officers of Sir John Moore's army; "we thank them for their good-will, and we shall escort them through France to Calais; the journey will be pleasanter than a long voyage; we shall not give them the trouble of fighting the French, but will be pleased at having them spectators of our victories." This absurd confidence might have led to great things if it had been supported by wisdom, activity, or valor; but it was "a voice, and nothing more"

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

The Asturian deputies received with enthusiasm in England—Ministers precipitate—Imprudent choice of agents—Junot marches to Alcantara, joined by the Spanish contingent, enters Portugal, arrives at Abrantes, pushes on to Lisbon—Prince Regent emigrates to the Brazils; reflections on that transaction—Dangerous position of the French army—Portuguese Council of Regency—Spanish contingent well received—General Taranco dies at Oporto; is succeeded by the French General Quesnel—Solano's troops retire to Badajos—Junot takes possession of the Alemtejo and the Algarves; exacts a forced loan; is created Duke of Abrantes; suppresses the Council of Regency; sends the flower of the Portuguese army to France—Napoleon demands a ransom from Portugal—People unable to pay it—Police of Lisbon—Junot's military position; his character; political position—People discontented—Prophetic eggs—Sebastianists—The capture of Rossily's squadron known at Lisbon—Pope's nuncio takes refuge on board the English fleet—Alarm of the French.

THE uninterrupted success that, for so many years, attended the arms of Napoleon, gave him a moral influence doubling his actual force. Exciting at once terror, admiration, and hatred, he absorbed the whole attention of an astonished world, and, openly or secretly, all men acknowledged the power of his genius; the continent bowed before him, and in England an increasing number of absurd and virulent libels on his person and character indicated the growth of secret fear. Hence, his proceedings against the Peninsula were viewed, at first, with anxiety, rather than with the hope of arresting their progress; yet when the full extent of the injustice became manifest, the public mind was vehemently excited; a sentiment of some extraordinary change being about to take place in the affairs of the world, prevailed among all classes of society; and when the Spanish people rose against the man that all feared, the admiration which energy and courage exact, even from the base and timid, became enthusiastic in a nation conscious of the same virtues.

No factious feelings interfered to check this enthusiasm. The party in power, anxious to pursue a warlike system, necessary to their own political existence, saw with joy that the stamp of justice and high feeling would, for the first time, be affixed to their policy. The party out of power having always derided the impotence of the ancient dynasties, and asserted that regular armies

alone were insufficient means of defence, could not consistently refuse their approbation to a struggle originating with, and carried on entirely by the Spanish multitude. The people at large exulted that the superiority of plebeian virtue and patriotism was acknowledged.

The arrival of the Asturian deputies was, therefore, universally hailed as an auspicious event; their wishes were forestalled, their suggestions were attended to with eagerness, their demands were readily complied with; nay, the riches of England were so profusely tendered to them by the ministers, that it can scarcely be doubted the after arrogance and extravagance of the Spaniards arose from the manner in which their first applications were met. There is a way of conferring a favor that appears like accepting one, and this secret being discovered by the English cabinet, the Spaniards soon demanded as a right, what they had at first solicited as a boon. In politics it is a grievous fault to be too generous; gratitude, in state affairs, is unknown, and as the appearance of disinterested kindness never deceives, it should never be assumed.

The capture of the Spanish frigates had placed Great Britain and Spain in a state of hostility without a declaration of war; the invasion of Napoleon produced a friendly alliance between those countries without a declaration of peace; for the cessation of hostilities was not proclaimed until long after succors had been sent to the juntas. The ministers seemed, by their precipitate measures, to be more afraid of losing the assistance of the Spaniards, than prepared to take the lead in a contest which could only be supported by the power and riches of Great Britain. Instead of adopting a simple and decisive policy towards Spain—instead of sending a statesman of high rank and acknowledged capacity to sustain the insurrection, and to establish the influence of England by a judicious application of money and other supplies—the ministers employed a number of obscure men in various parts of the Peninsula, who, without any experience of public affairs, were empowered to distribute succors of all kinds at their own discretion. Instead of sifting carefully the information obtained from such agents, and consulting distinguished military and naval officers in the arrangement of some comprehensive plan of operations, which, being well understood by those who were to execute it, might be supported vigorously, the ministers formed crude projects, parcelled out their forces in small expeditions without any definite object, altered their plans with every idle report, and changed their commanders as lightly as their plans.

Entering into formal relations with every knot of Spanish poli-

ticians that assumed the title of a supreme junta, the government dealt, with unsparing hands, enormous supplies at the demand of those self-elected authorities; they made no conditions, took no assurance that the succors should be justly applied; and with affected earnestness disclaimed all intention of interfering with the internal arrangements of the Spaniards, when the ablest men in Spain expected and wished for such an interference to repress the folly and violence of their countrymen, and when England was entitled, both in policy and justice, not only to interfere, but to direct the councils of the insurgents.* The latter had solicited and obtained her assistance, the cause was become common to both nations; and for the welfare of both, a prudent, just, and vigorous interference on the part of the most powerful and enlightened, was necessary to prevent that cause from being ruined by a few ignorant and conceited men, accidentally invested with authority.

The numbers and injudicious choice of military agents were also the source of infinite mischief. Selected, as it would appear, principally because of their acquaintance with the Spanish language, few of those agents had any knowledge of war beyond the ordinary duties of a regiment, and there was no concert among them, for there was no controlling power vested in any; each did that which seemed good to him.† Readily affecting to consult men whose inexperience rendered them amenable, and whose friendship could supply the means of advancing their own interest in a disorganized state of society, the Spanish generals received the agents with a flattering and confidential politeness, that diverted the attention of the latter from the true objects of their mission. Instead of ascertaining the real numbers and efficiency of the armies, they adopted the inflated language and extravagant opinions of the chiefs with whom they lived; and their reports gave birth to most erroneous notions of the relative strength and situation of the contending forces in the Peninsula. Some exceptions there were, but the ministers seemed to be better pleased with the sanguine than with the cautious, and made their own wishes the measure of their judgments. Accordingly, enthusiasm, numbers, courage, and talent were gratuitously found for every occasion, but money, arms, and clothing were demanded incessantly, and supplied with profusion; the arms were, however, generally left in their cases to rot, or to fall into the hands of the enemy; the clothing seldom reached the soldier's back; and the money, in all instances misapplied, was in some embezzled by the authorities into whose hands it fell, in others employed to create disunion, and to forward the private

* Mr. Stuart's Letters. Lord W. Bentinck's ditto.

† Vide Instructions for Sir Tho. Dyer, &c. Parliamentary Papers, 1809.

views of the juntas, at the expense of the public welfare:* it is a curious fact, that from the beginning to the end of the war, an English musket was rarely to be seen in the hands of a Spanish soldier. But it is time to quit this subject, and to trace the progress of Junot's invasion of Portugal, by which the whole circle of operations in the Peninsula will be completed, and the reader can then take a general view of the situation of all parties, at the moment when Sir Arthur Wellesley, disembarking at the Mondego, commenced those campaigns which furnished the subject of this history.

INVASION OF PORTUGAL BY JUNOT.

Peremptory orders had obliged Junot to commence operations at an unfavorable time of year, before his preparations were completed, when the roads were nearly impracticable, and while some of his troops were still in the rear of Salamanca.† Hence his march from that town to Alcantara, where he effected his junction in the latter end of November, 1807, with the part of the Spanish force that was to act under his immediate orders, was very disastrous, and nearly disorganized his inexperienced army. The succors he expected to receive at Alcantara were not furnished, and the repugnance of the Spanish authorities to aid him was the cause of so much embarrassment, that his chief officers doubted the propriety of continuing operations under the accumulating difficulties of his situation; but Junot's firmness was unabated. He knew that no English force had landed at Lisbon; and as the cowardice of the Portuguese court was notorious, he without hesitation undertook one of those hardy enterprises which astound the mind by their success, and leave the historian in doubt if he should praise the happy daring, or stigmatize the rashness of the deed.

Without money, without transport, without ammunition sufficient for a general action, and with an auxiliary force of Spaniards by no means well disposed to aid him, Junot, at the head of a raw army, penetrated the mountains of Portugal on the most dangerous and difficult line by which that country can be invaded. He was ignorant of what was passing in the interior, he knew not if he was to be opposed, nor what means were prepared to resist him, but trusting to the inertness of the Portuguese government, to the rapidity of his own movements, and to the renown of the French arms, he made his way through Lower Beira, and suddenly appeared in the town of Abrantes, a fearful and unexpected guest. There he obtained the first information of the true state of affairs. Lisbon was tranquil, and the Portuguese fleet was ready to sail, but the

* Appendix, No. 13, 5th Section.
† Thiebault.

court still remained on shore. On hearing this, Junot, animated by the prospect of seizing the Prince Regent, pressed forward, and reached Lisbon in time to see the fleet, having the royal family on board, clearing the mouth of the Tagus. One vessel dragged astern within reach of a battery; the French General himself fired a gun at her, and on his return to Lisbon, meeting some Portuguese troops, he resolutely commanded them to form an escort for his person, and thus attended, passed through the streets of the capital. Nature alone had opposed the progress of the invaders, yet such were the hardships endured, that of a column which numbered twenty-five thousand at Alcantara, two thousand tired grenadiers only entered Lisbon with their General; fatigue, and want, and tempests had scattered the remainder along two hundred miles of rugged mountains, inhabited by a warlike and ferocious peasantry, well acquainted with the strength of their fastnesses, and proud of the many successful defences made by their forefathers against former enemies. Lisbon itself contained three hundred thousand inhabitants, and fourteen thousand regular troops were collected there; a powerful British fleet was at the mouth of the harbor, and the commander, Sir Sidney Smith, had urged the court to resist, offering to land his seamen and marines to aid in the defence of the town, but his offers were declined; and the people, disgusted with the pusillanimous conduct of their rulers, and confounded by the strangeness of the scene, evinced no desire to impede the march of events. Thus three weak battalions sufficed to impose a foreign yoke upon this great capital, and illustrated the truth of Napoleon's maxim,—*that in war the moral is to the physical force as three parts to one.*

The Prince Regent, after having, at the desire of the French government, expelled the British factory, sent the British minister plenipotentiary away from his court, sequestered British property, and shut the ports of Portugal against British merchants; after having degraded himself and his nation by performing every submissive act which France could devise to insult his weakness, was still reluctant to forego the base tenure by which he hoped to hold his crown. Alternately swayed by fear and indolence, a miserable example of helpless folly, he lingered until the reception of a Moniteur which, dated the 13th of November, announced, in startling terms, that the "*house of Braganza had ceased to reign.*" Lord Strangford, the British plenipotentiary whose efforts to make the royal family emigrate had entirely failed, was then on board the squadron, with the intention of returning to England; but Sir Sidney Smith, seizing the favorable moment, threatened to bombard Lisbon if the Prince Regent hesitated any longer; and thus urged on both sides, the latter embarked with his whole court, and sailed

for the Brazils on the 29th of November, a few hours before Junot arrived.

Lord Strangford's despatch, relating this event, although dated the 29th of November, on board the Hibernia, was written the 19th December, in London, and was so worded as to create a notion that his exertions during the 27th and 28th had caused the emigration, a notion quite contrary to the fact. For the Prince Regent of Portugal, yielding to the united pressure of the Admiral's menaces and the annunciation in the Moniteur, had embarked on the 27th, before Lord Strangford reached Lisbon; and actually sailed on the 29th, without having had an interview with that nobleman, who consequently had no opportunity to advance or retard the event in question. Nevertheless, Lord Strangford received the red riband, and Sir Sidney Smith was neglected.

This celebrated emigration was beneficial to the Brazils in the highest degree, and of vast importance to England in two ways, for it insured great commercial advantages, and it threw Portugal completely into her power in the approaching conflict; but it was disgraceful to the Prince, insulting to the brave people he abandoned, and impolitic, inasmuch as it obliged men to inquire how far subjects were bound to a monarch who deserted them in their need; how far the nation could belong to a man who did not belong to the nation? It has been observed by political economists, that where a gold and paper currency circulate together, if the paper be depreciated it will drag down the gold with it, and deteriorate the whole mass; but after a time, the metal revolts from this unnatural state, and asserts its own intrinsic superiority: so a privileged class, corrupted by power and luxury, drags down the national character. Yet there is a point when the people, like the gold, no longer suffering such a degradation, will separate themselves with violence from the vices of their effeminate rulers, and until that time arrives, a nation may appear to be sunk in hopeless lethargy, when it is really capable of great and noble exertions; and thus it was with the Portuguese who were at this time unjustly despised by enemies, and mistrusted by friends.

The invading army, in pursuance of the convention of Fontainebleau, was divided into three corps.* The central one, composed of the French troops and a Spanish division under General Caraffa, had penetrated by the two roads which from Alcantara lead, the one by Pedragoa, the other by Sobreira Formosa; but at Abrantes, Caraffa's division had separated from the French and took possession of Thomar, and meantime the right, under General Taranco, marching from Gallicia, had established itself at Oporto, while the

* Thiebault Foy.

Marquis of Solano, with the left, entered the Alemtejo, and fixed his quarters at Setuval. The Spanish troops did not suffer on their route: but such had been the distress of the French army, that three weeks afterwards it could only muster ten thousand men under arms, and the privations encountered on this march led to excesses, which first produced that rancorous spirit of mutual hatred, so remarkable between the French and Portuguese. Young soldiers always attribute their sufferings to the ill-will of the inhabitants, it is difficult to make them understand that a poor peasantry have nothing to spare; old soldiers, on the contrary, blame nobody, but know how to extract subsistence, and in most cases without exciting enmity.

Junot passed the month of December in collecting his army, securing the great military points about Lisbon, and in preparations to supplant the power of a Council of Regency, to whom the Prince at his departure had delegated the sovereign authority. As long as the French troops were scattered on the line of march and the fortresses held by Portuguese garrisons, it would have been dangerous to provoke the enmity, or to excite the activity of this Council, hence the members were treated with studious respect; yet they were of the same leaven as the court they emanated from, and the quick resolute proceedings of Junot soon deprived them of any importance conferred by the critical situation of affairs during the first three weeks.

The Spanish auxiliary forces were well received in the north and in the Alemtejo, and as General Taranco died soon after his arrival at Oporto, the French General Quesnel was sent to command that province. Junot had meanwhile taken possession of Elvas, and detached General Maurin to the Algarves, with sixteen hundred men; and when Solano was ordered by his court to withdraw from Portugal, nine French battalions and the cavalry, under the command of Kellermann, took possession of the Alemtejo, and occupied the fortress of Setuval.* At the same time Caraffa's division, being replaced at Thomar by a French force, was distributed in small bodies at a considerable distance from each other on both sides of the Tagus, immediately round Lisbon.† As the provisions of the treaty of Fontainebleau were unknown to the Portuguese, the Spanish troops met with a better reception than the French, and the treaty itself was disregarded by Junot, whose conduct plainly discovered that he considered Portugal to be a possession entirely belonging to France. For when all the stragglers were come up, and the army recovered from its fatigues, and

* Return of the French Army. Appendix, No. 28.
† Foy.

when a reinforcement of five thousand men had reached Salamanca, on its march to Lisbon, the French General assumed the chief authority.* Commencing by a forced loan of two hundred thousand pounds, he interfered with the different departments of state, and put Frenchmen into all the lucrative offices, while his promises and protestations of amity became loud and frequent in proportion to his encroachments.†

At, last being by Napoleon created Duke of Abrantes, he threw off all disguise, suppressed the Council of Regency, seized the reins of government, and while he established many useful regulations, made the nation sensibly alive to the fact that he was a despotic conqueror. The flag and the arms of Portugal were replaced by those of France; eight thousand men were selected and sent from the kingdom under the command of the Marquis d'Alorna and Gomez Frere, two noblemen of the greatest reputation for military talent among the native officers; five thousand more were attached to the French army, and the rest were disbanded. An extraordinary contribution of four millions sterling, decreed by Napoleon, was then demanded under the curious title of a ransom for the state, but this sum was exorbitant, and Junot prevailed on the Emperor to reduce it one half.‡ He likewise, on his own authority, accepted the forced loan, the confiscated English merchandise, the church plate, and the royal property, in part payment; yet the people were still unable to raise the whole amount, for the court had before taken the greatest part of the church plate and bullion of the kingdom, and had also drawn large sums of money from the people, under the pretext of defending the country; and with this treasure they departed, leaving the public functionaries, the army, private creditors, and even domestic servants, unpaid.

But, although great discontent and misery prevailed, the tranquillity of Lisbon, during the first month after the arrival of the French, was remarkable; no disturbance took place, and the populace were completely controlled by the activity of a police, first established under the Prince Regent's government by the Count de Novion, a French emigrant, and continued by Junot on an extended scale. No capital city in Europe suffers so much as Lisbon from the want of good police regulations, and the French General conferred an unmixed benefit on the inhabitants by giving more effect to Novion's plans; yet, so deeply rooted is the prejudice in favor of ancient customs, that no act gave the Portuguese more offence than the having the streets cleansed, and the wild dogs, who

* Foy.
† Thiebault.
‡ Foy.

infested them by thousands, killed. A French sergeant, distinguished by his zeal in destroying those disgusting and dangerous animals, was in revenge assassinated.

In the course of March and April, Junot's military system was completed.* The arsenal of Lisbon, one of the finest establishments in Europe, contained all kinds of naval and military stores in abundance, and ten thousand workmen excellent in every branch of business appertaining to war; hence the artillery, the carriages, the ammunition, with all the minor equipments of the army, were soon renewed and put in the best possible condition, and the hulks of two line-of-battle ships, three frigates, and seven lighter vessels of war, were refitted, armed, and moored across the river to defend the entrance, and to awe the town. The army itself, perfectly recovered from its fatigues, reinforced, and better disciplined, was grown confident in its chief from the success of the invasion, and being well fed and clothed, was become a fine body of robust men, capable of any exertion. It was re-organized in three divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry. General La Borde commanded the first, General Loison the second, General Travot the third, General Margaron the fourth, and General Taviel directed the artillery. General Kellermann commanded in the Alemtejo, General Quesnel in Oporto, General Maurin in the Algarves, and Junot himself in Lisbon.

The fortresses of Faro in Algarves, of Almeida, of Elvas, La Lippe, St. Lucie, Setuval, Palmela, and those between Lisbon and the mouth of the Tagus, of Ericia and Peniche, were furnished with French garrisons; Estremos, Aldea-Gallegos, Santarem, and Abrantes were occupied, and put in such a state of defence as their decayed ramparts would permit.

The whole army, including the French workmen and marines attached to it, amounted to above fifty thousand men, of which above forty-four thousand were fit for duty;† that is to say, fifteen thousand five hundred Spaniards, five thousand Portuguese, and twenty-four thousand four hundred French.

Of the latter, 1000 were in Elvas and La Lippe,
1000 in Almeida,
1000 in Peniche,
1600 in the Algarves,
2892 in Setuval,
750 in Abrantes,
450 cavalry were kept in Valencia d'Alcantara, in Spanish Estremadura,
and 350 distributed in the proportion of fifteen men

* Thiebault.

† Return of the French Army. Appendix, No. 28.

to a post, guarded the lines of communication which were established from Lisbon to Elvas, and from Almeida to Coimbra. Above fifteen thousand men remained disposable.

Lisbon, containing all the civil, military, naval, and greatest part of the commercial establishments, the only fine harbor, two-eighths of the population, and two-thirds of the riches of the whole king dom, formed a centre which was secured by the main body of the French, while on the circumference a number of strong posts gave support to the operations of their movable columns. The garrison in Peniche secured the only harbor between the Tagus and the Mondego, in which a large disembarkation of English troops could take place; the little port of Figueras, held by a small garrison, blocked the mouth of the latter river; the division at Thomar secured all the great lines of communication to the north-east, and in conjunction with the garrison of Abrantes commanded both sides of the Zezere. From Abrantes to Estremos and Elvas, and to Setuval, the lines of communication were short, and through an open country, suitable for the operations of the cavalry, which was all quartered on the south bank of the Tagus. Thus, without breaking up the mass of the army, the harbors were sealed against the English; a great and rich tract was inclosed by posts, and rendered so pervious to the troops, that any insurrection could be reached by a few marches, and immediately crushed; the connection between the right and left banks of the Tagus at Lisbon was secured, and the entrance to the port defended by the vessels of war which had been refitted and armed. A light squadron was also prepared to communicate with South America, and nine Russian line-of-battle ships and a frigate, under the command of Admiral Siniavin, which had taken refuge some time before from the English fleet, were of necessity engaged in the defence of the harbor, forming an unwill ing, but not an unimportant auxiliary force.

These military arrangements were Junot's own, and suitable enough if his army had been unconnected with any other; but they clashed with the general views of Napoleon, who regarded the force in Portugal only as a division of troops to be rendered subservient to the general scheme of subjecting the Peninsula; wherefore, in the month of May he ordered that General Avril, with three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and ten guns, should co-operate with Dupont in Andalusia; and that General Loison, with four thousand infantry, should proceed to Almeida, and from thence co-operate with Bessières in the event of an insurrection taking place in Spain. General Thiebault complains of this order as injurious to Junot, ill combined, and the result of a foolish vanity that prompted the Emperor to direct all the armies himself; yet it

would be difficult to show that the arrangement was faulty. Avril's division, if he had not halted at Tavora, for which there was no reason, would have insured the capture of Seville; and if Dupont's defeat had not rendered the victory of Rio Seco useless, Loison's division would have been eminently useful in controlling the country behind Bessières, in case the latter invaded Gallicia; moreover, it was well placed to intercept the communication between the Castilian and the Estremaduran armies. The Emperor's combinations, if they had been fully executed, would have brought seventy thousand men to bear on the defence of Portugal.

Such was the military attitude of the French in May, but their political situation was far from being so favorable. Junot's natural capacity, though considerable, was neither enlarged by study nor strengthened by mental discipline.* Of intemperate habits, indolent in business, prompt and brave in action, quick to give offence yet ready to forget an injury, he was at one moment a great man, the next below mediocrity, and at all times unsuited to the task of conciliating and governing a people like the Portuguese, who, with passions as sudden and vehement as his own, retain a sense of injury or insult with incredible tenacity. He had many difficulties to encounter, and his duty towards France was in some instances incompatible with good policy towards Portugal; yet he was not without resources for establishing a strong French interest, if he had possessed the ability and disposition to soothe a nation that, without having suffered a defeat, was suddenly bowed to a foreign yoke.

But the pride and the poverty of the Portuguese, and the influence of ancient usages, interfered with Junot's policy. The monks, and most of the nobility, were inimical to it, and all the activity of the expelled British factory, and the secret warfare of spies and writers in the pay of England, were directed to undermine his plans, and to render him and his nation odious. On the other hand, he was in possession of the government and of the capital, he had a fine army, he could offer novelty, so dear to the multitude, and he had the name and the fame of Napoleon to assist him. The promises of power are always believed by the many, and there were abundance of grievances to remedy, and wrongs to redress, in Portugal. Among the best educated men, especially at the universities, there existed a strong feeling against the Braganza family, and such an earnest desire for reformed institutions, that steps were actually taken to have Prince Eugene declared King of Portugal;† nor was this spirit extinguished at a much later date.

* Napoleon, in Las Casas. Foy.
† Foy

With these materials and the military vanity of the Portuguese to work upon, Junot might have established a powerful French interest; under an active government, the people would not long have regretted the loss of an independence that had no wholesome breathing amidst the corrupt stagnation of the old system. But the arrogance of a conqueror, and the necessities of an army, which was to be subsisted and paid by an impoverished people, soon gave rise to all kinds of oppression; private abuses followed close upon the heels of public rapacity, and insolence left its sting to rankle in the wounds of the injured. The malignant humors broke out in quarrels and assassinations, and the severe punishments that ensued, many of them unjust and barbarous in the highest degree, created rage, not terror, for the nation had not tried its strength in battle, and would not believe that it was weak. Meanwhile the ports being rigorously blockaded by the English fleet, and the troubles in Spain having interrupted the commerce in grain, by which Portugal had been usually supplied from that country, the unhappy people suffered under the triple pressure of famine, war-contributions, and a foreign yoke.* With all external aliment thus cut off, and a hungry army gnawing at its vitals, the nation could not remain tranquil; yet the first five months of Junot's government was, with the exception of a slight tumult at Lisbon, when the arms of Portugal were taken down, undisturbed by commotion. Nevertheless the whole country was ripe for a general insurrection.

The harvest proved abundant, and Junot hailed the prospect of returning plenty as a relief from his principal difficulty; but as one danger disappeared, another presented itself. The Spanish insurrection excited the hopes of the Portuguese, and agents from the neighboring juntas communicated secretly with the Spanish generals in Portugal; the capture of the French fleet in Cadiz became known, assassinations multiplied, the Pope's nuncio fled on board the English fleet, and all things tended to an explosion. The English agents were, of course, actively engaged in promoting this spirit, and the appearance of two English fleets at different points of the coast, having troops on board, produced great alarm among the French, and augmented the impatient fierceness of the Portuguese.

Among the various ways in which the people discovered their hatred of the invaders, one was very characteristic: an egg being, by a chemical process, marked with certain letters, was exhibited in a church, and the letters were interpreted to indicate the speedy coming of Don Sebastian, King of Portugal, who, like Arthur of

* Thiebault.

romantic memory, is supposed to be hidden in a secret island, waiting for the destined period to re-appear and restore his country to her ancient glory. The trick was turned against the contrivers; other eggs prophesied in the most unpatriotic manner, yet the belief of the Sebastianists lost nothing of its zeal; many people, and those not of the most uneducated classes, were often observed upon the highest points of the hills, casting earnest looks towards the ocean, in the hope of descrying the island in which their long-lost hero is detained.

CHAPTER II.

The Spanish General Bellesta seizes General Quesnel and retires to Gallicia—Insurrection at Oporto—Junot disarms and confines the Spanish soldiers near Lisbon—General Avril's column returns to Estremos—General Loison marches from Almeida against Oporto; is attacked at Mezam Frias; crosses the Douro; attacked at Castro d'Airo; recalled to Lisbon—French driven out of the Algarves—The fort of Figueras taken—Abrantes and Elvas threatened—Setuval in commotion—General Spencer appears off the Tagus—Junot's plan—Insurrection at Villa Viciosa suppressed—Colonel Maransin takes Beja with great slaughter of the patriots—The insurgents advance from Leiria, fall back—Action at Leiria—Loison arrives at Abrantes—Observations on his march—French army concentrated—The Portuguese General Leite, aided by a Spanish corps, takes post at Evora—Loison crosses the Tagus; defeats Leite's advanced guard at Montemor—Battle of Evora—Town taken and pillaged—Unfriendly conduct of the Spaniards—Loison reaches Elvas; collects provisions; is recalled by Junot—Observations.

THE first serious blow was struck at Oporto. The news of what had taken place all over Spain was known there in June, and General Bellesta, the chief Spanish officer, immediately took an honorable and resolute part. He made the French General Quesnel, with his staff, prisoners; after which, calling together the Portuguese authorities, he declared that they were free to act as they judged most fitting for their own interests, and then marched to Gallicia with his army and captives. The opinions of the leading men at Oporto were divided upon the great question of resistance, but, after some vicissitudes, the boldest side was successful; the insurrection, although at one moment quelled by the French party, was finally established in Oporto, and soon extended along the banks of the Douro and the Minho, and to those parts of Beira which lie between the Mondego and the sea-coast.

Junot being informed of this event, perceived that no time was to be lost in disarming the Spanish regiments quartered in the neighborhood of Lisbon, which was not an easy operation. Ca-

raffa's division was above six thousand men, and without employing the garrisons of the citadel and forts of Lisbon, it was difficult to collect an equal force of French; the suspicions of the Spanish regiments had been already excited, they were reluctant to obey the French generals, and one, quartered at Alcacer do Sal, had actually resisted the orders of the General-in-Chief himself.* To avoid a tumult was also a great object, because in Lisbon fifteen thousand Gallicians were ordinarily engaged as porters and water-carriers, and if a popular movement had been excited, these men would naturally have assisted their countrymen. Notwithstanding these difficulties, Junot, in the night of that day upon which he received the information of Bellesta's defection, arranged all his measures, and the next day the Spanish troops, being under various pretexts assembled in such numbers and in such places that resistance was useless, were disarmed, and placed on board the hulks in the Tagus, with the exception of eight hundred of the regiment of Murcia and three hundred of that of Valencia, who escaped. Thus, in the course of twenty-four hours, and with very little bloodshed, Junot, by his promptness and dexterity, averted a very serious danger.

Although this stroke produced considerable effect, it did not prevent the insurrection from becoming general; all couriers and officers carrying orders or commanding small posts of communications were suddenly cut off. Junot, reduced by a single blow from fifty to twenty-eight thousand men, found himself isolated, and dependent upon his individual resources and the courage of his soldiers for the maintenance of his conquest, and even for the preservation of his army. The Russian squadron, indeed, contained six thousand seamen and marines; but while they consumed a great quantity of provisions, it was evident from certain symptoms that they could not be depended upon as useful allies, except in the case of an English fleet attempting to force the entrance of the river. In this situation the Duke of Abrantes would have seized Badajos, but was deterred by the assembling of an Estremaduran army, then under the command of General Galuzzo. However, Avril's column, having failed to join Dupont, returned to Estremos; and it is probable that Junot never intended that it should do otherwise.

Meanwhile Loison, then in Upper Beira, was ordered to march upon Oporto.† He had reached Almeida on the 5th of June, one day previous to Bellesta's defection, and on the 12th, when he read the order, partly by menace, partly by persuasion, got possession of Fort Conception, a strong but ill-placed Spanish work on that

* Thiebault.
† Ibid.

frontier. He first attempted to penetrate the Entre-Minho e Douro by Amarante, but as his division was weak, and as it was possible that Bellesta might return and fall upon his flank, he advanced timidly. At Mezam Frias he was opposed, and his baggage was at the same time menaced by other insurgents; whereupon he fell back to Villa Real, and after a trifling skirmish at that place, crossed the Douro at Lamego, and marched to Castro d'Airo, where he turned and defeated the armed peasants of the mountains, who had particularly harassed his flanks. From Castro d'Airo he moved upon Coimbra, whence he dislodged a body of insurgents and was about to scour the country, when he received one of twenty-five despatches—the rest had been intercepted—sent by Junot to recall him to Lisbon. He immediately united his columns, placed his sick and weakly men in Almeida, raised the garrison up to twelve hundred and fifty men, and then, having ruined the defences of Fort Conception, commenced his march to Lisbon, by the way of Guarda.

But while these events were passing in the Beira an insurrection also broke out in the Algarves, where General Maurin commanded. It began near Faro, and Maurin himself, lying sick in that town, was made prisoner. Some Portuguese troops attached to the French force then joined the insurgents, the Spaniards from Andalusia prepared to cross the Guadiana, and General Spencer appeared off Ayamonte with five thousand British troops. The French Colonel Maransin, who had succeeded Maurin, immediately retired to Hertola, leaving his baggage, military chest, and above a hundred prisoners, besides killed and wounded, in the hands of the patriots, who, finding that Spencer would not land, did not pursue beyond the Algarve mountains.

The circle of insurrection was now fast closing round Junot. Emissaries from Oporto excited the people to rise as far as Coimbra, where a French post was overpowered, and a junta was formed, whose efforts spread the flame to Condeixa, Pombal, and Leira. A student named Zagalo, mixing boldness with address, obliged a Portuguese officer and a hundred men to surrender the fort of Figueras, at the mouth of the Mondego; Abrantes was threatened by the insurgents of the valley of the Zezere, and the Spaniards, under Galuzzo, crossing the Guadiana at Juramenha, occupied that place and Campo Mayor. Thus a great, although confused body of men, menaced Kellermann at Elvas; yet, supported by the strength of the town and Fort La Lippe, he easily maintained himself. Avril remained unmolested at Estremos, and Evora, held by a small garrison, was tranquil; but the neighborhood of Setuval was in commotion, the populace of Lisbon was un-

* Thiebault.

quiet; and at this critical moment General Spencer, who had quitted Ayamonte, and whose force report magnified to ten thousand men, appeared at the mouth of the Tagus.*

Junot held a council of war, and after hearing the opinions of the principal general officers, decided on the following plan: 1. To collect the sick in such hospitals as could be protected by the ships of war. 2. To secure the Spanish prisoners by mooring the hulks in which they were confined as far as possible from the city. 3. To arm and provision the forts of Lisbon and remove the powder from the magazines to the ships. 4. To abandon all other fortresses in Portugal, with the exception of Setuval, Almeida, Elvas and Peniche, and to concentrate the army in Lisbon. In the event of bad fortune, the Duke of Abrantes determined to defend the capital as long as he was able, and then crossing the Tagus, move upon Elvas, and from thence retreat to Madrid, Valladolid, or Segovia, as he might find it expedient. This well conceived plan was not executed: the first alarm soon died away, Spencer returned to Cadiz, and when the insurrection was grappled with it proved to be more noisy than dangerous.

Kellermann, having recalled Maransin from Mertola, was preparing to march on Lisbon, when the inhabitants of the town of Villa Viciosa rose on a company of French troops and drove them into an old castle; yet when Avril came from Estremos to their succor the Portuguese fled, and a very few were killed in the pursuit. The town of Beja followed the example of Villa Viciosa, but Colonel Maransin, who was ready to retire from Mertola, marched in that direction with such rapidity that he passed over forty miles in eighteen hours, and falling suddenly upon the patriots, defeated them with considerable slaughter, and pillaged the place. He had eighty men killed or wounded, and General Thiebault writes that an obstinate combat took place in the streets. But the Portuguese never made head for a moment against a strong body during the whole course of the insurrection; how, indeed, was it possible for a collection of miserable peasants, armed with scythes, pitchforks, a few old fowling pieces, and a little bad powder, under the command of some ignorant countryman or fanatic friar, to maintain a battle against an efficient and active corps of French soldiers? For there is this essential difference to be observed in judging between the Spanish and Portuguese insurrections: the Spaniards had many great and strong towns free from the presence of the French, and large provinces in which to collect and train forces at a distance from the invaders, while in Portugal the naked peasants were forced to go to battle the instant even of assembling. The loss which

* Thiebault.

Maransin sustained must have arisen from the stragglers, who in a consecutive march of forty miles would have been numerous, having been cut off and killed by the peasantry.

This blow quieted the Alemtejo for the moment; and Kellermann, having cleared the neighborhood of Elvas of all Spanish parties, placed a commandant in La Lippe, concentrated the detachments under Maransin and Avril, and proceeded himself towards Lisbon, where the Duke of Abrantes was in great perplexity. The intercepting of his couriers and isolated officers, being followed by the detection of all his spies, had exposed him without remedy to every report which the fears of his army or the ingenuity of the people could give birth to; and there are few nations that can pretend to vie with the Portuguese and Spaniards in the fabrication of plausible reports. Among those current, the captivity of Loison was one; but as nothing was certainly known, except that the insurgents from the valley of the Mondego were marching towards Lisbon, General Margaron was ordered to disperse them, and if possible to open a communication with General Loison. He advanced with three thousand men and six pieces of artillery to Leiria, whither the patriots had retired in disorder when they heard of his approach. The greater part dispersed at once; but those who remained were attacked on the 5th of July, and a scene similar to that of Beja ensued;* the French boasted of victory, the insurgents called it massacre and pillage. In a combat with armed peasantry, it is difficult to know where the fighting ceases and the massacre begins; men dressed in peasants' clothes are observed firing and moving about without order from place to place—when do they cease to be enemies? They are more dangerous when single than together; they can hide their muskets in an instant and appear peaceable; the soldier passes, and is immediately shot from behind.

The example at Leiria did not, however, deter the people of Thomar from declaring against the French, and the neighborhood of Alcobaça rose at the same time. Margaron was thus placed between two new insurrections at the moment he had quelled one; English fleets, with troops on board, were said to be hovering off the coast, and as the most alarming reports relative to Loison were corroborated, his safety was despaired of, when, suddenly, authentic intelligence of his arrival at Abrantes revived the spirits of the general-in-chief and the army.

After arranging all things necessary for the security of Almeida, he had quitted that town the 2d of July, at the head of three thousand four hundred and fifty men, and arrived at Abrantes upon the 8th; having in seven days passed through Guarda, Attalaya, Sar-

* Thiebault. Accursio de Nèves.

sedas, Corteja, and Sardoval. During this rapid march he dispersed several bodies of insurgents that were assembled on the line of his route, especially at Guarda and Attalaya, and it has been said that twelve hundred bodies were stretched upon the field of battle near the first town; but twelve hundred slain would give five thousand wounded, that is to say, six thousand two hundred killed and wounded by a corps of three thousand four hundred and fifty men in half an hour! and this without cavalry or artillery, and among fastnesses that vie in ruggedness with any in the world! The truth is, that the peasants, terrified by the reports that Loison himself spread to favor his march, fled on all sides, and if two hundred and fifty Portuguese were killed and wounded during the whole passage, it was the utmost. The distance from Almeida to Abrantes is more than a hundred and eighty miles; the greatest part is a mountain pathway rather than a road, and the French were obliged to gather their provisions from the country as they passed: to forage, to fight several actions, to pursue active peasants well acquainted with the country so closely as to destroy them by thousands, and to march a hundred and eighty miles over bad roads, and all in seven days, is impossible.

The whole French army was now concentrated. But though Kellermann had quelled the insurrection at Alcobaça, and that of Thomar was quieted, the insurgents from Oporto were gathering strength at Coimbra, and the last of the native soldiers deserted the French colors; the Spanish troops at Badajos, strengthened by a body of Portuguese fugitives, and commanded by one Moretti, were also preparing to enter the Alemtejo, and that province was again in commotion;* for the English Admiral had opened a communication with the insurgents on the side of Setuval, and the patriots were assembled in considerable numbers at Alcacer do Sal.

In this dilemma Junot resolved to leave the northern people quiet for a while, and attack the Alemtejo, because that was his line of retreat upon Spain; from thence only he could provision the capital, and there also his cavalry could act with the most effect. Accordingly, Loison, with seven thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry, and eight pieces of artillery, crossed the Tagus the 25th of July, and marched by Os Pegoens, Vendanovas, and Montemor. At the latter place he defeated an advanced guard, which fled to Evora, where the Portuguese General Leite had assembled the mass of the insurgents, and, assisted by three or four thousand Spanish troops under Moretti, had taken a position to cover the town. When Loison discovered them, he directed Margaron and Solignac to turn their flanks, and fell upon their centre himself.

* Ibid. Parliamentary Papers, 1809.

The battle was short, for the Spanish auxiliaries performed no service, and the Portuguese soon took to flight; but there was a great and confused concourse, a strong cavalry was let loose upon the fugitives, and many, being cut off from the main body, were driven into the town, which had been deserted by the principal inhabitants; there, urged by despair, they endeavored to defend the walls and the streets for a few moments, but were soon overpowered, the greater part slain, and the houses pillaged. The French lost two or three hundred men, and the number of the Portuguese and Spaniards that fell was very considerable;* disputes also arose between them, and the latter ravaged the country in their retreat with more violence than the French.†

Loison, after resting two days at Evora, proceeded to Elvas, and drove away the numerous Spanish parties which had again infested the neighborhood of that fortress, and were become obnoxious alike to Portuguese and French. He then scoured the country round, and was accumulating provisions to form magazines at Elvas, when he was suddenly interrupted by a despatch from the Duke of Abrantes, recalling him to the right bank of the Tagus, for the British army, so long expected, had, at last, descended upon the coast, and manly warfare reared its honest front amidst the desolating scenes of insurrection.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Loison's expedition to the Alemtejo was an operation of military police, rather than a campaign. Junot wished to repress the spirit of insurrection by sudden and severe examples, and hence the actions of his lieutenant were of necessity harsh; but they have been represented as a series of massacres and cruelties of the most revolting nature, and Loison disseminated such stories to increase the terror which it was the object of his expedition to create. The credulity of the nation that produced the Sebastianists was not easily shocked; the Portuguese eagerly listened to tales so derogatory to their enemies, and so congenial to their own revengeful dispositions; but the anecdotes of French barbarity current for two years after the convention of Cintra were notoriously false, and the same stories being related by persons remote from each other is no argument of their truth. The report that Loison was captured, on his march from Almeida, reached Junot through fifty different channels; there were men to declare that they had beheld him bound with cords;‡ others to tell how he had been entrapped; some named the places he had been carried through in triumph, and his

* Thiebault.
† Appendix, No. 12.
‡ Thiebault.

habitual and characteristic expressions were quoted; the story was complete, and the parts were consistent, yet the whole was not only false, but the rumor had not even the slightest foundation of truth.

2. The Portuguese accounts of the events of this period are angry amplifications of every real or pretended act of French barbarity and injustice; the crimes of individuals are made matter of accusation against the whole army. The French accounts are more plausible, yet scarcely more safe as authorities, seeing that they are written by men who, being for the most part actors in the scenes they describe, are naturally concerned to defend their own characters; their military vanity also has had its share in disguising the simple facts of the insurrection; for, willing to enhance the merit of the troops, they have exaggerated the number of the insurgents, the obstinacy of the combats, and the loss of the patriots. English party writers, greedily fixing upon such relations, have changed the name of battle into massacre; and thus prejudice, conceit, and clamor have combined to violate the decorum of history, and to perpetuate error.

3. It would, however, be an egregious mistake to suppose that, because the French were not monsters, there existed no cause for the acrimony with which their conduct has been assailed. The Duke of Abrantes, although not cruel, nor personally obnoxious to the Portuguese, was a sensual and violent person, and his habits were expensive. Such a man is always rapacious; and as the character of the chief influences the manners of those under his command, it may be safely assumed that his vices were aped by many of his followers.* Now the virtuous General Travot was esteemed and his person respected, even in the midst of tumult, by the Portuguese, while Loison was scarcely safe from their vengeance when surrounded by his troops. The execrations poured forth at the mere mention of "the bloody Maneta," as, from the loss of his hand, he was called, proves that he must have committed many heinous acts; and Kellermann appears to have been as justly stigmatized for rapacity as Loison was for violence.

4. It has been made a charge against the French generals, that they repressed the hostility of the Portuguese and Spanish peasants by military executions; but, in doing so, they only followed the custom of war, and they are not justly liable to reproof, save where they may have carried their punishments to excess, and displayed a wanton spirit of cruelty. All armies have an undoubted right to protect themselves when engaged in hostilities. An insurrection of armed peasants is a military anarchy; and men in such circum-

* Napoleon in Las Casas.

stances cannot be restrained within the bounds of civilized warfare. They will murder stragglers, torture prisoners, destroy hospitals, poison wells, and break down all the usages that soften the enmities of modern nations; they wear no badge of an enemy, and their devices cannot, therefore, be guarded against in the ordinary mode; their war is one of extermination, and it must be repressed by terrible examples, or the civilized customs of modern warfare must be discarded, and the devastating system of the ancients revived. The usage of refusing quarter to an armed peasantry, and burning their villages, however unjust and barbarous it may appear at first view, is founded upon a principle of necessity, and is in reality a vigorous infliction of a partial evil, to prevent universal calamity; but, however justifiable it may be in theory, no wise man will hastily resort to it, and no good man will carry it to any extent.

CHAPTER III.

Political and military retrospect—Mr. Fox's conduct contrasted with that of his successors—General Spencer sent to the Mediterranean—Sir John Moore withdrawn from thence; arrives in England; sent to Sweden—Spencer arrives at Gibraltar—Ceuta, the object of his expedition—Spanish insurrection diverts his attention to Cadiz; wishes to occupy that city—Spaniards averse to it—Prudent conduct of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Lord Collingwood—Spencer sails to Ayamonte; returns to Cadiz; sails to the mouth of the Tagus; returns to Cadiz—Prince Leopold of Sicily and the Duke of Orleans arrive at Gibraltar—Curious intrigue—Army assembled at Cork by the Whig administration, with a view to permanent conquest in South America, the only disposable British force—Sir A. Wellesley takes the command—Contradictory instructions of the ministers—Sir John Moore returns from Sweden; ordered to Portugal—Sir Hew Dalrymple appointed commander of the forces—Confused arrangements made by the ministers.

THE subjugation of Portugal was neither a recent nor a secret project of Napoleon's. In 1806, Mr. Fox, penetrating this design, had sent Lord Rosslyn, Lord St. Vincent, and General Simcoe, on a politico-military mission to Lisbon, instructing them to warn the court that a French army destined to invade Portugal was assembling at Bayonne, and to offer the assistance of a British force to meet the attack.* The cabinet of Lisbon affected to disbelieve the information, Mr. Fox died during the negotiation, and as the war with Prussia diverted Napoleon's attention to more important objects, he withdrew his troops from Bayonne. The Tory administration, which soon after overturned the Grenville party, thought no further

* Parliamentary Papers, 1809.

of this affair, or at least did not evince as much foresight and ready zeal as its predecessors. They, indeed, sent Sir Sidney Smith with a squadron to Lisbon, but their views seem to have been confined to the emigration of the royal family, and they intrusted the conduct of the negotiation to Lord Strangford, a young man of no solid influence or experience.

But the Russian squadron, under Admiral Siniavin, suddenly entered the Tagus, and this unexpected event produced in the British cabinet an activity which the danger of Portugal had not been able to excite. It was supposed that, as Russia and England were in a state of hostility, the presence of the Russian ships would intimidate the Prince Regent, and prevent him from passing to the Brazils; wherefore Sir Charles Cotton, an admiral of higher rank than Sir Sidney Smith, was sent out with instructions to force the entrance of the Tagus, and attack Siniavin.* General Spencer, then upon the point of sailing with five thousand men upon a secret expedition, was ordered to touch at Lisbon, and ten thousand men, under Sir John Moore, were withdrawn from Sicily to aid this enterprise;† but before the instructions for the commanders were even written, the Prince Regent was on his voyage to the Brazils, and Junot ruled in Lisbon. When Sir John Moore arrived at Gibraltar, he could hear nothing of Sir Sidney Smith, nor of General Spencer, and proceeded to England, which he reached the 31st of December, 1807. From thence, after a detention of four months on ship-board, he was despatched upon that well-known and eminently foolish expedition to Sweden, which ended in such an extraordinary manner,‡ and which seems from the first to have had no other object than the factious one of keeping an excellent general and a superb division of troops at a distance from the only country where their services were really required.

Meanwhile General Spencer's armament, long baffled by contrary winds, and once forced back to port, was finally dispersed in a storm, and a part arrived at Gibraltar, by single ships, the latter end of January, 1808. Sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of that fortress, hearing, on the 5th of February, that a French fleet had just passed the Strait and run up the Mediterranean, became alarmed for Sicily, and caused the first comers to proceed to that island on the 11th; but Spencer himself, whose instructions included an attack on Ceuta, did not arrive at Gibraltar until the 10th of March, when the deficiency in his armament was supplied by a draft from the garrison, and a council was held to arrange the

* Parliamentary Papers, 1809.
† Sir John Moore's Journal, MS.
‡ Ibid.

plan of attack on Ceuta. The operation was however finally judged impracticable.

The objects of Spencer's expedition were manifold: he was to co-operate with Moore against the Russian fleet in the Tagus, he was to take the French fleet at Cadiz, he was to assault Ceuta, and he was to make an attempt on the Spanish fleet at Port Mahon! But the wind which brought Moore to Lisbon blowed Spencer from that port, and a consultation with Admiral Purvis convinced him that the French fleet in Cadiz was invulnerable to his force, Ceuta was too strong, and it only remained to sail to Port Mahon, when the Spanish insurrection breaking out, drew him back to Cadiz with altered views. In the relation of Dupont's campaign, I have already touched upon Spencer's proceedings at Cadiz; but in this place it is necessary to give a more detailed sketch of those occurrences, which fortunately brought him to the coast of Portugal at the moment when Sir Arthur Wellesley was commencing the campaign of Vimiero.

When the French first entered Spain, General Castaños commanded the Spanish troops at San Roque. In that situation he was an object of interest to Napoleon, who sent two French officers privately to sound his disposition. Castaños, who had secretly resolved to oppose the designs of the Emperor, thought those officers were coming to arrest him, and at first determined to kill them and fly to Gibraltar; but on discovering his mistake treated them civilly, and prosecuted his original plans.* Through the medium of one Viali, a merchant of Gibraltar, he opened a communication with Sir Hew Dalrymple, and the latter, who had been closely watching the progress of events, encouraged him in his views, and not only promised assistance, but recommended several important measures, such as the immediate seizure of the French squadron in Cadiz, the security of the Spanish fleet at Minorca, and a speedy communication with South America. However, before Castaños could mature his plans, the insurrection took place at Seville, and he acknowledged the authority of the Junta.

Meanwhile Solano arrived at Cadiz, and General Spencer, in conjunction with Admiral Purvis, pressed him to attack the French squadron, offering to assist if he would admit the English troops into the town. Solano, whose mind was not made up to resist the invaders, expressed great displeasure at this proposal to occupy Cadiz, and refused to treat at all with the British; an event not unexpected by Sir Hew, for he knew that most of the Spaniards were mistrustful of the object of Spencer's expedition, and the offer was made without his concurrence. Thus a double intercourse was

* Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence, MS.

carried on between the British and Spanish authorities—the one friendly and confidential between Sir Hew and Castaños, the other of a character proper to increase the suspicions of the Spaniards; and when it is considered that Spain and England were nominally at war,—that the English commanders were acting without the authority of their government,—that the troops which it was proposed to introduce into Cadiz were in that part of the world for the express purpose of attacking Ceuta, and had already taken the island of Perexil, close to that fortress,—little surprise can be excited by Solano's conduct. When he was killed, and Morla had succeeded to the command, Spencer and Purvis renewed their offers; but Morla also declined their assistance, and having himself forced the French squadron to surrender by a succession of such ill-directed attacks that some doubt was entertained of his wish to succeed, he commenced a series of low intrigues calculated to secure his own personal safety, while he held himself ready to betray his country if the French should prove the strongest.

After the reduction of the enemy's ships, the people were inclined to admit the English troops, but the local Junta, swayed by Morla's representations, were averse to it;* and he, while confirming this disposition, secretly urged Spencer to persevere in his offer, saying that he looked entirely to the British force for the future defence of Cadiz. Thus dealing, he passed with the people for an active patriot, yet made no preparations for resistance, and by his double falsehood preserved a fair appearance both with the Junta and the English General. With these affairs Sir Hew Dalrymple did not meddle; he early discovered that Morla was an enemy of Castaños, and having more confidence in the latter, carried on the intercourse at first established between them, without reference to the transactions at Cadiz. He also supplied the Spanish General with arms, and two thousand barrels of powder, and placing one English officer near him as a military correspondent, sent another in the capacity of political agent to the Supreme Junta at Seville.

When Castaños was appointed commander-in-chief of the Andalusian army, and had rallied Echevaria's troops, he asked for the co-operation of the British force, and offered no objection to their entering Cadiz, but he preferred having them landed at Almeria to march to Xeres. General Spencer confined his offers to the occupation of Cadiz, and when Morla pretended that to fit out the Spanish fleet was an object of immediate importance, Colonel Sir George Smith, an officer employed by General Spencer to conduct the negotiations, promised, on his own authority, money to pay the Spanish seamen, who were then in a state of

* Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence, MS.

mutiny. However, Lord Collingwood and Sir Hew Dalrymple refused to fulfil this promise, and the approach of Dupont causing Morla to wish Spencer's troops away, he persuaded that General to sail to Ayamonte, under the pretence of preventing Avril's division from crossing the Guadiana, although he knew well that the latter had no intention of doing so. The effect produced upon Colonel Maransin by the appearance of the British force off Ayamonte has been already noticed. General Thiebault says that Spencer might have struck an important blow at that period against the French; but the British troops were unprovided with any equipment for a campaign, and to have thrown five thousand infantry, without cavalry and without a single place of arms, into the midst of an enemy who occupied all the fortresses, and who could bring twenty thousand men into the field, would have been imprudent to the greatest degree. General Spencer, who had by this time been rejoined by his detachment from Sicily, only made a demonstration of landing, and having thus materially aided the insurrection, returned to Cadiz, from whence he was almost immediately summoned to Lisbon, to execute a new project, which proved to be both ill-considered and fruitless.

Sir Charles Cotton, being unable to force the entrance of the Tagus without troops, had blockaded that port with the utmost rigor, expecting to force the Russian squadron to capitulate for want of provisions. This scheme, which originated with Lord Strangford, never had the least chance of success, and only augmented the privations and misery of the wretched inhabitants.* Junot, therefore, had recourse to various expedients to abate the rigor of the blockade with regard to them, and among others employed a Portuguese named Sataro to make proposals to the English Admiral. This man, who at first pretended that he came without the privity of the French, led Sir Charles to believe that only four thousand French troops remained in Lisbon, and under that erroneous impression, the latter desired General Spencer might join him for the purpose of attacking the enemy while they were so weak. Spencer, by the advice of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Lord Collingwood, obeyed the summons, but on his arrival was led to doubt the correctness of the Admiral's information;† instead of four thousand, it appeared that there could not be less than fifteen thousand French in or near Lisbon, and the attack was of course relinquished.‡ Spencer returned to Cadiz: Castaños again pressed him to co-operate with the Spanish forces, and he so far consented

* Mr. Canning to Lord Castlereagh, 28th Dec., 1807.
† Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence.
‡ Parliamentary Papers, 1809.

as to disembark them at the port of St. Mary, and even agreed to send a detachment to Xeres; yet, deceived by Morla, who still gave him hopes of finally occupying Cadiz, he resolved to keep the greater part close to that city.*

At this period the insurrection of Andalusia attracted all the intriguing adventurers in the Mediterranean towards Gibraltar and Seville, and the confusion of Agramant's camp would have been rivalled, if the prudent firmness of Sir Hew Dalrymple had not checked the first efforts of those political pests. Among the perplexing follies of the moment, one deserves particular notice, on account of some curious circumstances that attended it, the full explanation of which I must, however, leave to other historians, who may, perhaps, find in that and the like affairs a key to that absurd policy which in Sicily so long sacrificed the welfare of two nations to the whims and follies of a profligate court. The introduction of the salique law had long been a favorite object with the Bourbons of Spain; but it had never been promulgated with the formalities necessary to give it validity, and the nation was averse to change the ancient rule of succession. This law was, however, now secretly revived by some of the Junta of Seville, who wished to offer the regency to the Prince of Sicily, because, Ferdinand and his brother dying without sons, the regent would then succeed, to the prejudice of the Princess Carlotta of Portugal. With this object in view, the Chevalier Robertoni, a Sicilian agent, appeared early at Gibraltar, and from thence, as if under the auspices of England, attempted to forward the views of his court, until Sir Hew Dalrymple, being accidentally informed that the British cabinet disapproved of the object of his mission, sent him away.†

Meanwhile Castaños, deceived by some person engaged in the intrigue, was inclined to support the pretensions of the Sicilian Prince to the regency, and proposed to make use of Sir Hew Dalrymple's name to give weight to his opinions,—a circumstance which would have created great jealousy in Spain, if Sir Hew had not promptly refused his sanction. The affair then seemed to droop for a moment; but in the middle of July an English man-of-war suddenly appeared at Gibraltar, having on board Prince Leopold of Sicily, a complete court establishment of chamberlains with their keys and ushers with their white wands;‡ and the Duke of Orleans, who attended his brother-in-law the Prince, making no secret of his intention to negotiate for the regency of Spain, openly demanded that he should be received into Gibraltar. Sir Hew, fore-

* Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence.
† Ibid.
‡ Ibid.

seeing all the mischief of this proceeding, promptly refused to permit the Prince or any of his attendants to land, and the captain of the ship, whose orders were merely to carry him to Gibraltar, refused to take him back to Sicily. Finally, to relieve his Royal Highness from this awkward situation, Sir Hew consented to receive him as a guest, provided that he divested himself of his public character, and that the Duke of Orleans departed instantly from the fortress.

Sir William Drummond, British envoy at Palermo, Mr. Viali, and the Duke of Orleans were the ostensible contrivers of this notable scheme, by which, if it had succeeded, a small party in a local junta would have appointed a regency for Spain, paved the way for altering the laws of succession in that country, established their own sway over the other juntas, and created interminable jealousy between England, Portugal and Spain. With whom the plan originated does not very clearly appear. Sir William Drummond's representations induced Sir Alexander Ball to provide the ship of war, nominally for the conveyance of the Duke of Orleans, in reality for Prince Leopold, with whose intended voyage Sir Alexander does not appear to have been made acquainted.* That the Prince should have desired to be regent of Spain was natural, but that he should have been conveyed to Gibraltar in a British ship of the line, when the English government disapproved of his pretensions, was really curious. Sir William Drummond could scarcely have proceeded such lengths in an affair of so great consequence without secret instructions from some member of his own government; yet Lord Castlereagh expressed unqualified approbation of Sir Hew's decisive conduct upon the occasion! Did the ministers act at this period without any confidential communication with each other? or was Lord Castlereagh's policy secretly and designedly thwarted by one of his colleagues? But it is time to quit this digression and turn to

THE PROCEEDINGS IN PORTUGAL.

The Bishop of Oporto, being placed at the head of the insurrectional junta of that town, claimed the assistance of England. "We hope," said he, "for an aid of three hundred thousand cruzado novas; of arms and accoutrements complete, and of cloth for forty thousand infantry and for eight thousand cavalry; three thousand barrels of cannon powder, some cargoes of salt fish, and other provisions, and an auxiliary body of six thousand men, at least, including some cavalry." This extravagant demand would lead to the supposition that an immense force had been assembled by the prelate, yet he could never at any time have put five thousand organ-

* Appendix, No. 8.

ized men in motion against the French, and had probably not even thought of any feasible or rational mode of employing the succors he demanded. The times were, however, favorable for extravagant demands, and his were not rejected by the English ministers, who sent agents to Oporto and other parts, with power to grant supplies. The improvident system adopted for Spain being thus extended to Portugal, produced precisely the same effects,—that is, cavils, intrigues, waste, insubordination, inordinate vanity and ambition, among the ignorant upstart men of the day. More than half a year had now elapsed since Napoleon first poured his forces into the Peninsula, every moment of that time was marked by some extraordinary event, and one month had passed since a general and terrible explosion, shaking the unsteady structure of diplomacy to pieces, had left a clear space for the shock of arms; yet the British cabinet was still unacquainted with the real state of public feeling in the Peninsula and with the Spanish character, and although possessing a disposable army of at least eighty thousand excellent troops, was totally unsettled in its plans, and unprepared for any vigorous effort.* Agents were indeed despatched to every accessible province, the public treasure was scattered with heedless profusion, and the din of preparation was heard in every department; but the bustle of confusion is easily mistaken for the activity of business, and time, removing the veil of official mystery covering those transactions, has exposed all their dull and meagre features. It is now clear that the treasure was squandered without judgment and the troops dispersed without meaning. Ten thousand exiled to Sweden proved the truth of Oxenstiern's address to his son; as many more idly kept in Sicily were degraded into the guards of a vicious court. Gibraltar was unnecessarily filled with fighting men, and General Spencer, with five thousand excellent soldiers, was doomed to wander between Ceuta, Lisbon, and Cadiz, seeking, like the knight of La Mancha, for a foe to combat.

A considerable force remained in England, but it was not ready for service, when the minister resolved to send an expedition to the Peninsula, and nine thousand men collected at Cork formed the only disposable army for immediate operations. The Grey and Grenville administration, so remarkable for unfortunate military enterprises, had assembled this handful of men with a view to permanent conquests in South America! upon what principle of policy it is not necessary to inquire, but such undoubtedly was the intention of that administration, perhaps in imitation of the Roman Senate, who sent troops to Spain when Hannibal was at the gates of the city. The Tory administration, relinquishing this scheme of

* Parl. Pap. Lord Castlereagh to Sir A. Wellesley, 21st June.

conquest, directed Sir Arthur Wellesley to inform General Miranda, the military adventurer of the day, not only that he must cease to expect assistance, but that all attempts to separate the colonies of Spain from the parent state would be discouraged by the English government; thus the troops assembled at Cork became available, and Sir Arthur Wellesley being appointed to command them, sailed on the 12th of July, to commence that long and bloody contest in the Peninsula which he was destined to terminate in such a glorious manner.*

Two small divisions were soon after ordered to assemble for embarkation at Ramsgate and Harwich, under the command of Generals Anstruther and Acland, yet a considerable time elapsed before they were ready to sail, and a singular uncertainty in the views of the ministers at this period subjected all the military operations to perpetual and mischievous changes.* General Spencer, supposed to be at Gibraltar, was directed to repair to Cadiz, and there await Sir Arthur's orders, and the latter was permitted to sail under the impression that Spencer was actually subject to his command;† other instructions empowered Spencer, at his own discretion, to commence operations in the south, without reference to Sir Arthur Wellesley's proceedings;‡ Admiral Purvis, who, after Lord Collingwood's arrival, had no separate command, was also authorized to undertake any enterprise in that quarter, and even to control the operations of Sir Arthur Wellesley by calling for the aid of his troops, that General being enjoined to "pay all due obedience to any such requisition!§ Yet Sir Arthur himself was informed, that "the accounts from Cadiz were bad;" that "no disposition to move either there or in the neighborhood of Gibraltar was visible;" and that "the Cabinet were unwilling he should go far to the southward, whilst the spirit of exertion appeared to reside more to the northward." Again, the Admiral, Sir Charles Cotton, was informed that Sir Arthur Wellesley was to co-operate with him in a descent at the mouth of the Tagus, but Sir Arthur himself had no definite object given for his own operations, although his instructions pointed to Portugal. Thus in fact no one officer, naval or military, knew exactly what his powers were, with the exception of Admiral Purvis, who, being only second in command for his own service, was really authorized to control all the operations of the land forces, provided he directed them to that quarter which had been declared unfavorable for any operations at all! These inconsistent orders

* Parliamentary Papers, 1808.
† Ibid.
‡ Lord Castlereagh to Sir A. Wellesley, 30th June.
§ Ibid. Ld. Castlereagh to Gen. Spencer, 28th and 30th June. Do. to Adm. Purvis, 28th June.

were calculated to create confusion and prevent all vigor of action, but more egregious conduct followed.

In recommending Portugal as the fittest field of action, the ministers were chiefly guided by the advice of the Asturian deputies. Yet having received Sir Hew Dalrymple's despatches to a late date, their own information must have been more recent and more extensive than any that they could obtain from those deputies, who had left Spain at the commencement of the insurrection, who were ill-informed of what was passing in their own province, utterly ignorant of the state of any other part of the Peninsula, and under any circumstances incapable of judging rightly in such momentous affairs.* But though Sir Arthur Wellesley's instructions were vague and confined with respect to military operations, he was expressly told that the intention of the government was to enable Portugal and Spain to throw off the French yoke, and ample directions were given to him as to his future political conduct in the Peninsula. He was informed how to demean himself in any disputes that might arise between the two insurgent nations, how to act with relation to the settlement of the supreme authority during the interregnum. He was directed to facilitate communications between the colonies and the mother country, and to offer his good offices to arrange any differences between them. The terms upon which Great Britain would acquiesce in any negotiation between Spain and France were imparted to him, and finally he was empowered to recommend the establishment of a paper system in the Peninsula, as a good mode of raising money, and attaching the holders of it to the national cause: the Spaniards were not, however, sufficiently civilized to adopt this recommendation, and barbarously preferred gold to credit, at a time when no man's life, or faith, or wealth, or power, was worth a week's purchase.

Sir Hew Dalrymple was also commanded to furnish Sir Arthur with every information that might be of use in the operations; and when the tenor of these instructions, and the great Indian reputation enjoyed by Sir Arthur Wellesley are considered, it is not possible to doubt that he was first chosen as the fittest man to conduct the armies of England at this important conjuncture.† Yet scarcely had he sailed when he was superseded, not for a man whose fame and experience might have justified such a change, but by an extraordinary arrangement, which can hardly be attributed to mere vacillation of purpose, he was reduced to the fourth rank in that army, for the future governance of which he had fifteen days before received the most extended instructions. Sir Hew Dalrymple

* Parl. Pap. Ld. Castlereagh to Sir A. Wellesley, 30th June.
† Parl. Pap. Ld. Castlereagh to Sir H. Dalrymple, 28th June.