

Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves. It was for this reason that I marched to Sahagun. As a diversion it has succeeded. I brought the whole disposable force of the French against this army, and it has been allowed to follow it, without a single movement being made by any of what the Spaniards call armies to favor its retreat."

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No. XV.

This despatch from the Count of Belvedere to the Count of Florida Blanca, relative to the battle of Gamonal, is an example of the habitual exaggerations of the Spanish generals:

[Translation.]

Since my arrival at Burgos I have been attacked by the enemy; in two affairs I repulsed him; but to-day, after having sustained his fire for thirteen hours, he charged me with double my force, besides cavalry, as I believe he had three thousand of the latter, and six thousand infantry at least, and I have suffered so much that I have retired on Lerma, and mean to assemble my army at Aranda de Duero. I have sustained a great loss in men, equipage, and artillery; some guns have been saved, but very few. Don Juan Henestrosa, who commanded in the action, distinguished himself, and made a most glorious retreat; but as soon as the cavalry attacked, all was confusion and disorder. I shall send your Excellency the particulars by an officer when they can be procured. The volunteers of Zafra, of Sezena, of Valencia, and the first battalion of infantry of Truxillo, and the provincials of Badajos, had not arrived at Burgos, and consequently I shall be able to sustain myself at Aranda, but they are without cartridges and ammunition. I lament that the ammunition at Burgos could not be brought off. The enemy followed me in small numbers: I am now retiring (10 p. m.), fearing they may follow me in the morning. I yesterday heard from General Blake, that he feared the enemy would attack him to-day, but his dispositions frustrated the enemy's designs, beginning the action at eleven at night.

(Signed)

CONDE DE BELVEDERE

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No. XVI.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM THE DUKE OF DALMATIA  
TO THE AUTHOR.

"Dans la même lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire, vous me priez aussi, Monsieur, de vous donner quelques lumières sur la poursuite de Mr. le général Sir John Moore, quand il fit sa retraite sur la Corogne en 1809. Je ne pense pas que vous desiriez des détails sur cette opération, car ils doivent vous être parfaitement connus, mais je saisirai avec empressement l'occasion que vous me procurez pour rendre à la mémoire de Sir John Moore le témoignage que ses dispositions furent toujours les plus convenables aux circonstances, et qu'en profitant habilement des avantages que les localités pouvaient lui offrir pour seconder sa valeur, il m'opposa partout

la resistance la plus énergique et la mieux calculée; c'est ainsi qu'il trouva une mort glorieuse devant la Corogne au milieu d'un combat qui doit honorer son souvenir.

*"Paris, ce 15 Novembre, 1824."*

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No. XVII.

LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE.

*London, Dec. 10, 1808.*

SIR,—The messenger, Mills, arrived here yesterday with your despatches, No. 19 to 26 inclusive; and at the same time advices were received from Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird, dated on the 29th ultimo, at Astorga, which state that General to have received intelligence from Sir John Moore of the complete defeat of General Castaños' army, and of the determination taken by Sir John Moore, in consequence, to fall back upon Portugal, while Sir David Baird is directed by Sir John Moore to re-embark his troops, and to proceed to the Tagus. Thus, at the same moment at which I receive from you the caution entertained in your No. 20, that a retreat into Portugal would be considered by the Central Junta as indicating an intention to abandon the cause of Spain, his Majesty's government receive the information that this measure has actually been adopted, but under circumstances which, it is to be supposed, could not have been in the contemplation of the Central Junta. To obviate, however, the possibility of such an impression as you apprehend being produced upon the Spanish government by the retreat of the British armies, I lose no time in conveying to you his Majesty's commands, that you should forthwith give the most positive assurance, that the object of this retreat is no other than that of effecting in Portugal the junction which the events of the war have unfortunately rendered impracticable in Spain, with the purpose of preparing the whole army to move forward again into Spain, whenever and in whatever direction their services may be best employed in support of the common cause. In proof of this intention, you will inform the Spanish government, that an additional reinforcement of cavalry is at this moment sailing for Lisbon, and that the British army in Portugal will be still further augmented, if necessary, so as to make up a substantive and effective force, adequate to any operation for which an opportunity may be offered in the centre or south of Spain, according to the course which the war may take. But while you make this communication to the Spanish government, it is extremely necessary that you should accompany it with a distinct and pressing demand for the communication to you and to the British General of whatever be the plan of operations of the Spanish armies. Sir John Moore complains that he had not received the slightest intimation of any such plan at the date of his last despatch of the 20th ultimo; and I am afraid the appointment which you mention in your No. 20, of General Morla, to discuss with the British commanders the mode of co-operation between the British and Spanish armies, will not have taken place till after the defeat of the Spanish armies will have entirely disposed of that question for the present. The language of Sir David Baird, with respect to defect of information, is precisely the same as that of Sir John Moore. Sir David Baird has indeed had the advantage of some intercourse with the Marquis de la Romana; but the Marquis de la Romana himself does not appear to have been in possession of any part of

the views of his government, nor to have received any distinct account of the numbers, state, or destination even, of either of the armies which he was himself appointed to command. The British government has most cautiously and scrupulously abstained from interfering in any of the councils of the Junta, or presuming to suggest to them by what plan they should defend their country. But when the question is as to the co-operation of a British force, they have a right and it is their duty to require that some plan should have been formed, and being formed, should be communicated to the British commander, in order that he may judge of, and (if he shall approve) may be prepared to execute the share intended to be assigned to him. You will recollect, that the army which has been appropriated by his Majesty to the defence of Spain and Portugal is not merely a considerable part of the disposable force of this country; it is, in fact, the British army. The country has no other force disposable. It may, by a great effort, reinforce the army for an adequate purpose; but another army it has not to send. The proposals, therefore, which are made, somewhat too lightly, for appending parts of this force, sometimes to one of the Spanish armies, sometimes to another, and the facility with which its services are called for, wherever the exigency of the moment happens to press, are by no means suited to the nature of the force itself, or consonant to the views with which his Majesty has consented to employ it in Spain. You are already apprised by my former despatch (inclosing a copy of General Moore's instructions), that the British army must be kept together under its own commander, must act as one body for some distinct object, and on some settled plan.

It will decline no difficulty, it will shrink from no danger, when, through that difficulty and danger, the commander is enabled to see his way to some definite purpose. But, in order to this, it will be necessary that such purpose should have been previously arranged, and that the British army should not again be left, as that of Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird have recently been, in the heart of Spain, without one word of information, except such as they could pick up from common rumor, of the events passing around them. Previously, therefore, to General Sir John Moore's again entering Spain, it will be expected that some clear exposition should be made to him of the system upon which the Spaniards intend to conduct the war; the points which they mean to contest with the advancing enemy, and those which, if pressed, by a series of reverse, they ultimately propose to defend.

The part assigned to the British army in the combined operation must be settled with Sir John Moore, and he will be found not unambitious of that in which he may be opposed most directly to the enemy. The courage and constancy displayed by the Junta, under the first reverses, are in the highest degree worthy of admiration.\* And if they shall persevere in the same spirit, and can rouse the country to adequate exertions, there is no reason to despair of the ultimate safety of Spain. But it is most earnestly to be hoped that the same confidence which they appear to have placed in the ability of their armies, under Blake and Castaños, to resist the attacks of the enemy, will not be again adopted as their guide, again to deceive them in the ulterior operations of the war. It is to be hoped that they will weigh well their really existing means of defence against the means of attack on the part of the enemy, and that if they find them unequal to maintain a line of defence as extended as they have hitherto attempted to main-

\* The extract which follows this letter furnishes a curious comment on this passage.

tain, they will at once fall back to that point, wherever it may be, at which they can be sure that their stand will be permanent and their resistance effectual. It is obvious, that unless they can resist effectually in the passes of the Guadarama, or in the Sierra Morena, the ultimate point of retreat, after a series of defeats more or less numerous and exhausting, according as they shall the sooner or the later make up their minds to retreat, is Cadiz. Supported by Cadiz on one side, and by the fortress of Gibraltar on the other, the remaining armies of Spain might unquestionably make such a stand, as no force which France could bring against them could overpower; and the assistance of the British army would be in this situation incalculably augmented by the communication with Gibraltar and the sea. I am aware of the jealousy with which the mention of a British force of any sort, coupled with the name of Cadiz, will be received. But the time seems to be arrived at which we must communicate with each other (the Spanish government and England) without jealousy or reserve. His Majesty has abjured, in the face of the world, any motive of interested policy,—you are authorized to repeat in the most solemn manner, if necessary, that abjuration. But if, in the midst of such sacrifices and such exertions as Great Britain is making for Spain—if, after having foregone all objects of partial benefit, many of which the state of Spain (if we had been so ungenerous as to take that advantage of it) would have brought within our reach, the fair opinion of the British government cannot be received without suspicion; there is little hope of real cordiality continuing to subsist under reverses and misfortunes, such as Spain must but too surely expect, and such as are at all times the tests of sincerity and confidence. It is the opinion of the British government, that the last stand (if all else fail) must be made at Cadiz. It is the opinion of the British government, that this stand will be made in vain *only* if the necessity of resorting to it is too late acknowledged, and the means of making it effectually not providently prepared. It is the opinion of the British government, that on no account should the naval means of Spain be suffered to fall into the hands of France, or those of France to be recovered by her. It is their opinion that this may be prevented; but to prevent it, the object must be fairly looked at beforehand; and it is hoped that a spirit of distrust unworthy both of those who entertain it, and of those with respect to whom it is entertained, will not be suffered to interfere between an object of so great importance and the means of insuring its accomplishment. It is absolutely necessary to lose no time in bringing this subject fairly before the Spanish government; and if, in doing so, you should see either in M. Cevallos, or in Count Florida Blanca, marks of that distrust and suspicion which must fatally affect any measure of co-operation between the British and Spanish forces, it will be right that you should at once anticipate the subject, and you are at liberty to communicate this despatch *in extenso*, as the surest mode of proving the openness with which the British government is desirous of acting, and the disdain which it would feel of any imputation upon its disinterestedness and sincerity. But while this object is thus to be stated to the Central Government, it is not to this object alone that the services of the British army are to be appropriated. The Commander-in-Chief will have both the authority and the inclination to listen to any proposal for any other practical undertaking. And it is only in the event of no such object or undertaking being presented to him in Spain, that he is directed to confine himself to the defence of Portugal.

I am, &c. &c. &c.,

(Signed)

GEORGE CANNING.

## EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE OF THE SAME DATE AS THE ABOVE.

December 10, 1808

"The timely preparation of the fleets of France and Spain, now in the harbor of Cadiz, is also a point to be pressed by you with earnestness, but, at the same time, with all the delicacy which belongs to it. In the event of an emigration to America, it is obvious that this preparation should be made beforehand. And in the case of this project not being adopted, and of a resolution being taken to defend Cadiz to the utmost, it would still be desirable that the fleets should be prepared for removal to Minorca, in order to be out of the reach of any use which the disaffected in Cadiz (of whom General Morla is represented to have expressed considerable apprehension) might be disposed to make of them for compromise with the enemy."

## EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE.

December 11, 1808.

"Sir,—Complaints have been justly made of the manner in which the British troops, particularly those under Sir David Baird, have been received in Spain.

"The long detention of Sir David Baird's corps on board the transports at Coruña may but too probably have contributed to render the difficulties of a junction between the two parts of the British army insurmountable, by giving the enemy time to advance between them. In addition to this, it is slated, that there was a total want of preparation for supply of any sort, and the unwillingness with which those supplies appeared to have been administered, have undoubtedly occasioned as much disappointment as inconvenience to the British commanders. Unless some change is effected in these particulars when the army again moves into Spain, the advance of the British troops through that country will be attended with more difficulty than a march through a hostile country."

## No. XVIII.

## ABSTRACT OF THE MILITARY FORCE OF GREAT BRITAIN IN 1808.

Extracted from the Adjutant-General's returns.

Cavalry.....	30,000
Foot guards.....	6,000
Infantry of the line.....	170,000
Artillery.....	14,000
Total.....	220,000

Of these, between 50 and 60,000 were employed in the Colonies in India, the remainder were disposable, because from 80 to 100,000 militia, differing from the regular troops in nothing but the name, were sufficient for the home duties. If to this force we add 30,000 marines, the military power of England must be considered prodigious.

RETURN OF BRITISH TROOPS EMBARKED FOR PORTUGAL  
AND SPAIN IN 1808.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	
357	349	8688	9394	Commanded by Sir A. Wellesley; embarked at Cork the 15th, 16th, and 17th June, 1808; sailed 12th of July; landed at Mondego, August 1st.
379	...	4323	4702	Commanded by Generals Acland and Anstruther; embarked at Harwich, July 18th and 19th; landed at Maceira, Aug. 20th, 1808.
66	...	4647	4713	Commanded by Gen. Spencer; embarked at Cadiz; landed at Mondego, Aug. 3d.
712	563	10,049	11,324	Commanded first by Sir John Moore; secondly by Sir Harry Burrard; embarked at Portsmouth, April, 1808; sailed to the Baltic; returned, and sailed to Portugal, July 31st; landed at Maceira, August 29th.
...	672	...	672	Landed at Lisbon, Dec. 31st, 1808.
186	...	943	1129	Embarked at Gibraltar; sailed Aug. 14; landed at the Tagus in September.
94	...	929	1023	Commanded by General Beresford; embarked at Madeira, sailed Aug. 17th; landed at the Tagus in September.
...	672	...	672	Commanded by General C. Stewart; embarked at Gravesend; landed at Lisbon, September 1st.
798	...	10,271	11,069	Commanded by Sir D. Baird; embarked at Falmouth, sailed Oct. 9; arrived at Coruña 19th Oct.; landed 29th do.
...	...	1622	1622	Two regiments sent round to Lisbon from Sir D. Baird's force.
...	2021	...	2021	Commanded by Lord Paget; embarked at Portsmouth; landed at Coruña, Oct. 30th.
2592	4277	41,472	46,719	
			1,622	Add two regiments sent to Lisbon from Coruña.
			48,341	Grand total, of which 800 were artificers, wagon train, and commissariat.

## No. XIX.

RETURNS OF KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING, OF THE ARMY  
UNDER THE COMMAND OF SIR A. WELLESLEY.

1808, August.	OFFICERS.			MEN.			Total.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
15th—Brillos .....	1	1	0	1	5	21	29
17th—Rorica .....	4	19	4	66	316	70	479
21st—Vimiero .....	4	35	2	131	499	49	720
Grand total for the campaign } ..	9	55	6	198	820	140	1228

## No. XX.

BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE. RORICA, 17th AUGUST, 1808.

Extracted from the Adjutant-General's states.

		Regiments.		
Right Wing.	1st brigade, Major-General Hill....	5th	} 2780	} 7246
		9th		
		38th		
	3d ditto, Major-General Nightingale.	29th	} 1722	
		82d		
5th ditto, C. Crawford.....	45th	} 2744		
	50th			
	91st			
Left Wing.	4th brigade, Brigadier-Gen. Bowes..	6th	} 1829	} 5846
		32d		
	2d ditto, Major-General Ferguson...	36th	} 2681	
		40th		
		71st		
6th ditto (light), Brigadier-General Fane.....	95th, 2d bn.	} 1336		
	60th, 5th bn.			
Artillery, 18 guns, 6 and 9 lbs.....		660	660	
Cavalry.....		240	240	
Total British.....			13,992	
Portuguese, Colonel Trant... {	Infantry of the line.....	1000	} ...	1,650
	Light troops.....	400		
	Cavalry.....	250		
Grand total, British and Portuguese, including sick men, &c. &c... {			} 15,642	

## No. XXI.

## BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE. VIMIERO, 21st AUGUST, 1808.

Extracted from the Adjutant-General's states.

		Regiments.			
Right wing.	1st brigade, General Hill.....	5th	}	2780	2780
		9th			
		38th			
Centre.	6th ditto, Brigadier-General Fane...	50th	}	2293	} 4953
		60th			
	7th ditto, Brigadier-General Anstruther.....	95th, 2d bn.	}	2660	
		9th			
		43d, 2d bn.			
Left wing.	2d brigade, Major-General Ferguson..	52d, 2d bn.	}	1380	} 7612
		97th			
		36th			
	3d ditto, Major-General Nightingale..	40th	}	2681	
		71st			
	4th ditto, Brigadier-General Bowes...	29th	}	1722	
		82d			
8th ditto, Major-General Acland.....	6th	}	1829		
	32d				
Reserve 5th brigade Brig.-Gen. C. Crawford..	2d	}	2744	2744	
	20th				
	45th				
Artillery, 18 guns, 6 and 9 lbs.....	50th		240	660	660
Cavalry, 20th light dragoons.....	91st			240	240
Total British.....				18,989	
Portuguese, Colonel Trant.....	} Infantry, 1,400 }	}	250	1,650	
Grand total, including sick, wounded, and missing.....				20,639	

## No. XXII.

## RETURN OF SIR HEW DALRYMPLE'S ARMY, OCT. 1, 1808.

Head-quarters, Bemfica.

	Fit for duty.	Hospital.	Detached.	Total.
Cavalry.....	1,402	128	28	1,558
Artillery.....	2,091	146	6	2,243
Infantry.....	25,678	3196	454	29,328
Total.....	29,171	3470	488	

Grand total, including artificers, wagon train, &amp;c., &amp;c..... 33,129



No. XXIII.

EMBARKATION RETURN OF THE FRENCH ARMY UNDER GENERAL JUNOT.

	PRESENT UNDER ARMS.			DETACHED.			ABSENT WITHOUT PAY.				TOTAL.			CRIMINALS.
	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Hospital Prisons.				Officers.	Men.	Horses.	
							Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.				
Infantry.....	273	15,860	.....	52	2078	0 46	3281	17	895	..	22,635	..	13	
Cavalry.....	48	1,722	1176	..	1	1	195	1	.....	..	1,974	..	..	
Artillery.....	21	1,015	472	..	6	..	..	3	.....	..	1,121	..	..	
Engineers.....	14	.....	.....	..	.....	..	.....	.....	.....	..	17	..	..	

Guns.....10 8 lbs. }  
 Ditto.....16 4 lbs. } 30  
 Howitzers.....4 6 inch. }

Grand total, 25,747 men, 1655 horses, and 30 pieces of artillery.

NOTE.—On the staff of each division there are—

- |                        |                            |
|------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1 General of division. | 1 Inspector of reviews.    |
| 2 Generals of brigade. | 1 Commissary of engineers. |
| 7 Aides-de-camp.       | 2 Officers of engineers.   |
- 
- |                |                         |                                   |
|----------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Artillery..... | { 1 General.            |                                   |
|                | { 4 Colonels.           |                                   |
|                | { 2 Chefs-de-bataillon. |                                   |
| Engineers..... | { 1 Colonel.            | } The remainder in the divisions. |
|                | { 2 Captains.           |                                   |

No. XXIV.

THE FOLLOWING EXTRACT FROM A MINUTE MADE BY HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK IN 1808

Proves that sixty thousand men could have been provided for the campaign of 1808–9 in *Spain*, without detriment to other services:

“ There are at present in Portugal	{ Cavalry..... 1,640 } { Infantry, 34 battalions. 29,806 }	31,446
“ Under orders to embark.....	{ Cavalry..... 3,410 } { Infantry..... 11,419 }	14,829
Total.....		46,275

"Of this force the 20th dragoons and eight battalions should remain in Portugal. The disposable force would then be—

	Cavalry.	Infantry.
From Portugal.....	1,313	23,575
Under orders.....	3,200	11,419
Force to be drawn from Sicily.....		8,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>4,513</b>	<b>42,994</b>
"To this may be added, four regiments of cavalry and the two brigades of guards.....	} 2,560	2,434
<b>Grand total.....</b>	<b>7,073</b>	<b>45,428</b>

"When to this you add four battalions of infantry, which may be spared, and the artillery, it will form a corps of about sixty thousand rank and file."

Note.—The details of names and strength of the regiments are omitted to save space.

## No. XXV.

### SIR JOHN MOORE'S ORDER OF BATTLE.

<i>Third division.</i>	<i>Second division.</i>	<i>First division.</i>
Lt.-Gen. M'Kenzie Fraser.	Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope.	Lieut.-Gen. Sir David Baird.
79th, 38th, 3d, 43d, 23d, 9th, 6th.	76th, 59th, 51st, 92d, 71st, 36th, 32d, 14th, 5th, 2d.	81st, 26th, 1st, 50th, 42d, 4th, 1st, & 3d battalion guards, Bean's brigade of artillery, 6 pieces.
Wilmot's brig. of artillery, 6 pieces.	Drummond's brigade of art., 6 pieces.	
<i>Second Flank Brigade.</i>	<i>Reserve.</i>	<i>First Flank Brigade.</i>
Brigadier-General C. Alten.	Major-General E. Paget.	Colonel R. Crawford.
1st battalion K.G.L.      2d battalion K.G.L.	21st, 28th, 1st battal'n 95th, 52d, 20th.	2d bat. 95th, 2d bat. 52d, 1st battalion 43d.
	Carthew's brigade of artil- lery, 6 pieces.	
	<i>Cavalry.</i>	
	Lieutenant-General Lord Paget.	
3d light dragoons K.G.L., 15th light dragoons, 10th, 18th, 7th hussars. Dowman's and Evelin's troops of horse artillery, 12 pieces.		
<i>Artillery Parc and Reserve.</i>		
Colonel Harding.		

5 brigades.....	30 pieces
6 ditto, attached to the divisions.....	36 "
	66

## RETURN OF SIR JOHN MOORE'S ARMY, DECEMBER 19, 1808.

Extracted from the Adjutant-General's morning state of that day.

	Fit for Duty.	Hospital.	Detached.	Total.
Cavalry.	2,278	182	794	3,254
Artillery.	1,358	97	...	1,455
Infantry.	22,222	3,756	893	26,871
	25,858	4,035	1,687	31,580
Deduct.	2,275	{ Men composing four bat- talions, viz: .....		{ 3d regt. left in Portugal. { 76th } Between Villa { 51st } Franca and Lugo. { 59th }
	23,583	Total number under arms.		

Note.—Of 66 guns, 42 were attached to the divisions, the remainder in reserve, with the exception of one brigade of 3 lbs.

## No. XXVI.

THE following General Return, extracted from especial regimental reports, received at the Horse Guards, contains the whole number of non-commissioned officers and men, cavalry and infantry, lost during Sir John Moore's campaign:—

Lost at or previous to the arrival of the army at the position of Lugo.....	{ Cavalry..... 95	} Total. 1397
	{ Infantry..... 1302	
Of this number 200 were left in the wine-vaults of Bembibre, and nearly 500 were stragglers from the troops that marched to Vigo.		
Lost between the departure of the army from Lugo and the embarkation at Coruña .....	{ Cavalry..... 9	} 2636
	{ Infantry..... 2627	
Grand total.....		4033

Of the whole number, above 800 contrived to escape to Portugal, and being united with the sick left by the regiments in that country, they formed a corps of 1876 men, which being re-embodied under the name of the battalions of detachments, did good service at Oporto and Talavera.

The pieces of artillery abandoned during the retreat were six 3-pounders.

These guns were landed at Coruña without the General's knowledge: they never went beyond Villa Franca, and not being horsed, they were thrown down the rocks when the troops quitted that town.

The guns used in the battle of Coruña were spiked and thrown into the sea.

N. B. Some trifling errors may possibly have crept into the regimental states in consequence of the difficulty of ascertaining exactly where each man was lost, but the inaccuracies could not affect the total amount above fifty men more or less.

## No. XXVII.

THE following states of the Spanish armies are not strictly accurate, because the original reports from whence they have been drawn were generally very loose, often inconsistent, and sometimes contradictory: nevertheless, it is believed that the approximation is sufficiently close for any useful purpose.

## STATE I.

*Army of Andalusia.*

		Armed Peasantry.	Regulars.
1808.			
19th July,	Baylen.....	Unknown	29,000
1st Sept.	{ Madrid La Mancha Sierra Morena } .....	—	30,600

## STATE II.

Numbers of the Spanish armies in October, 1809, according to the reports transmitted to Sir John Moore by the military agents.

	Regulars.	Armed peasantry incorporated with the regular troops.	
Troops upon the Ebro, and in Biscay....	75,300	70,000	145,000
In Catalonia.....	20,000	....	20,000
In march from Aragon to Catalonia....	10,000	....	10,000
Ditto new levies from Granada.....	....	10,000	10,000
In the Asturias.....	18,000	....	18,000
Total.....	123,000	80,000	203,000
Grand total.....			203,000

## STATE III.

Real numbers of the Spanish armies in line of battle, in the months of October, November, and December, 1808.

*1st Line.*

	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Guns.	
Army of Palafox.....	550	17,500	20	} Defeated and dispersed at Tudela.
Army of Castaños.....	2200	24,500	48	
Army of Blake.....	100	30,000	26	} Ditto at the battles of Zornosa and Espinosa.
Army of Romana.....	1404	8,000	25	
Asturians.....	....	8,000	..	} Ditto at Gamonal.
Army of Count Belvedere.....	1150	11,150	30	
Total.....	5404	99,150	149	
Deduct Romana's cavalry and guns, which never came into the line of battle.....	1404	....	25	
Total brought into first line of battle.....	4000	99,150	124	.....103,150

## 2d Line.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.			
General St. Juan's division.....	12,000	..	} Were beaten at the Somosierra, 30th November; murdered their General at Talavera, December 7th, and dispersed.		
Fugitives from Gamonal, commanded by General Heredia. }	4000	..		} Fled from Segovia and Sepulveda, Dec. 2d, and dispersed at Talvera, 7th.	
Fugitives from Blake's army re-organized by Romana... }	6000	1400			} Beaten at Mancilla, 20th Dec.; retired into Galicia. Infantry dispersed there.
Asturian levies under Ballesteros..... }	5000	..		Were not engaged.	
Fugitives assembled by Galluzzo behind the Tagus.... }	6000	..		} Defeated and dispersed, 24th Dec., by the 4th corps, at Almaraz.	
Total, brought into 2d line...	33,000	1400			
To cover Moore's advance there were on the Ebro, in Biscay, and in the Asturias, according to the Spanish and the military agents' reports.....			} 173,000		
The real number brought into the field was.....				103,150	
Exaggeration.....				69,850	
Note.—The real amount includes the sick in the field hospitals					

## No. XXVIII.

## SECTION I.—STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY, CALLED "THE FIRST PART OF THE ARMY OF SPAIN," OCT. 1, 1808.

Head-quarters, Vittoria. King Joseph, Commander-in-Chief. General Jourdan, Major-General. General Belliard, Chief of the Staff. Recapitulation, extracted from the Imperial states, signed by the Prince of Neufchatel.

Officers included, present under arms.

	Men.	Horses.
Division imperial guard, commanded by General Dorsenne.	2,423	786
Do. reserve cavalry, imperial gendarmes, and other troops..... }	5,417	944
Corps of Marshal Bessières.....	15,595	2,923
Corps of Marshal Ney.....	13,756	2,417
Corps of Marshal Moncey.. 16,636 }	22,640	3,132
Garrison of Pampeluna.... 6,004 }		
Garrisons of Vittoria, Bilbao, St. Sebastian, Tolosa, Montdragon, Salinas, Bergara, Villa Real, Yrun, and other places of less note..... }	8,479	1,458
To carry over.....	68,310	11,660

	Men.	Horses.
Brought over.....	68,310	11,660
Troops disposable at Bayonne and vicinity or in march upon that place.....	20,005	5,196
Troops employed as movable columns in the defence of the frontier from Bayonne to Belgarde..	6,042	261
In Catalonia, General Duhesme.....	10,142	1,638
Fort of Fernando, Figueras, General Reille.....	4,027	557
Division of General Chabot.....	1,434	....
Total.....	109,960	19,312

*Note.*—At this period the Spaniards and the military agents always asserted that the French had only from 35 to 45,000 men of all weapons.

#### STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY CALLED THE "SECOND PART OF THE ARMY OF SPAIN," OCTOBER 1, 1808.

This army, composed of the troops coming from the grand army and from Italy, was by an imperial decree, dated 7th September, divided into six corps and a reserve.

Present under arms.		
	Men.	Horses.
1st corps, Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno . . . . .	29,547	5,552
5th do. " Mortier, Duke of Treviso . . . . .	24,405	3,495
6th do., destined for Ney, Duke of Elchingen . . . . .	22,694	3,945
Infantry of the Viceroy of Spain's guards . . . . .	1,213	....
Cavalry ditto . . . . .	456	551
1st division of dragoons . . . . .	3,695	3,994
2d ditto . . . . .	2,940	3,069
3d ditto . . . . .	2,020	2,238
4th ditto . . . . .	3,101	3,316
5th ditto . . . . .	2,903	3,068
Division of General Sebastiani . . . . .	5,808	185
5th regiment of dragoons . . . . .	556	531
German division . . . . .	6,067	381
Polish ditto . . . . .	6,818	...
Dutch brigade . . . . .	2,280	751
Westphalian light horse . . . . .	522	559
General Souham's division . . . . .	7,259	...
General Pino's ditto . . . . .	6,803	...
24th regiment of dragoons . . . . .	664	731
Regiment of royal Italian chasseurs . . . . .	560	512
Regiment of Napoleon's dragoons . . . . .	500	474
Artillery and engineers in march for Perpignan . . . . .	1,706	1,430
Total of second part . . . . .	132,517	34,782
Total of first part . . . . .	109,960	19,312
Grand total . . . . .	242,477	54,094

SECTION II.—GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY, OCTOBER 10th, 1808.

	PRESENT UNDER ARMS.		DETACHED.		HOSPITAL.		PRI-SONERS.		EFFECTIVE.		
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Art. Hor.	
									Cav. Hor.		
1st corps, Duke of Belluno .....	28,797	5,615	2,201	219	2,939		...		33,937	3,329	2,501
2d ditto, — Istria .....	20,093	3,219	7,394	1,199	5,536		30		33,054	3,616	802
3d ditto, — Corneigliano .....	18,867	3,186	11,082	2,472	7,522		219		37,690	4,537	821
4th ditto, — Dantzic .....	22,859	2,410	955	40	2,170		...		25,984	1,791	659
5th ditto, — Treviso .....	24,552	3,833	188	6	1,971		2		26,718	1,805	2,084
6th ditto, — Eichingen .....	29,568	4,304	3,381	257	5,051		33		38,033	2,465	2,096
7th ditto, General St. Cyr .....	35,657	5,254	1,302	198	4,948		200		42,107	4,045	1,404
8th ditto, Duke of Abrantes .....	19,059	2,247	2,137	1	3,528		1,006		25,730	1,776	472
Reserve .....	34,924	23,604	3,533	733	3,553		392		42,382	21,225	3,112
1st hussars and 27th chasseurs .....	1,424	1,463	256	208	74		...		1,754	1,675	...
Artillery and engineers in march, coming from Germany .....	3,446	958	107	...	...		...		3,446	...	958
Movable columns for defence of the frontiers of France .....	8,588	477	107	...	146		...		8,860	268	209
Total .....	247,834	56,670	32,643	5,333	37,438		1,901		319,690	46,822	15,068

  

Of this number { French ..... Auxiliaries.	UNDER ARMS.		DETACHED.		HOSPITAL.		PRI-SONERS.		EFFECTIVE.		
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Art. Hor.	
									Cav. Hor.		
Artillery .....	17,868	15,107	29,647	5,052	81,401		1,771		267,629	41,565	14,253
Cavalry .....	1,503	968	2,889	277	6,018		130		52,061	5,263	815
Total .....	19,371	16,075	32,536	5,329	37,419		1,901		319,690	46,828	15,068

Grand total.....319,690 men and 61,896 horses.

SECTION III.—STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY OF SPAIN, THE  
EMPEROR NAPOLEON COMMANDING IN PERSON,  
25th OCTOBER, 1808.

1148 Officers of the Staff.		298 Battalions.		184 Squadrons.				
<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital. Prisoners.</i>		<i>Total.</i>		
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cav. H.	Art. H.
249,046	55,759	33,438	4,943	34,558	1,892	318,934	45,242	15,498
Grand total.....318,934 men and 60,740 horses.								

STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, THE EMPEROR  
NAPOLEON COMMANDING, 15th NOVEMBER, 1808.

Officers of the Staff, 1064.		Battalions, 290.		Squadrons, 181.				
<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital. Prisoners.</i>		<i>Total.</i>		
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cav. H.	Art. H.
255,876	52,430	32,245	8,295	45,107	1,995	335,223	43,920	16,808
Grand total.....335,223 men and 60,728 horses.								

SECTION IV.—STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN PORTUGAL,  
1st JANUARY, 1808.

[Extracted from the Imperial returns.]

General Junot, Commander-in-Chief.	General Thiebault, Chief of the Staff.						
1st division, General De Laborde	} 26 battalions, 7 squadrons.						
2d " " Loison							
3d " " Travot							
Cavalry " Kellermann							
	} 36 pieces.						
10 guns of 8 lbs.							
22 guns of 4 lbs. 4 6-inch howitzers							
				<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>	
				Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses
At Salamanca, or in march to join the	} 4,795			16,190	1,114	27,735	1,377
army in Portugal.....		1,296			4,795	1,296	
Total.....				20,985	2,310	29,530	2,673

STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN PORTUGAL,  
23d MAY, 1808.

		<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>	
		Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Horses.	Art
French.....	} 9,281	24,446	2,789	...	...	2,449	29,684	3,586	629
Spanish division of		101	1,087	...	651	11,019	...	...	...
Gen. Quesnel... }		6,399	844	174	13	141	6,624	13	...
Do. Gen. Caraffa... }		4,621	483	570	234	116	5,307	234	...
Portuguese troops.. }									
Total.....		44,657	4,217	1,831	247	3,357	52,634	3,833	629
Grand total.....52,634 men, 4454 horses, and 36 guns.									



## SECTION V.—STATE OF "THE SECOND ARMY OF OBSERVATION OF THE GIRONDE," 1st FEB., 1808, SPAIN.

General Dupont commanding.

20 battalions and 1 division of cavalry.

Headquarters, Valladolid.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
20,729	2,884	1,303	334	2,277	24,309	3,218
Total....24,309 men and 3,218 horses.						

## SECTION VI.—STATE OF "THE ARMY OF OBSERVATION DE COTE D'OCEAN," 1st FEB., 1808, SPAIN.

Marshal Monecy, commanding.

Head-quarters, Vittoria.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
21,878	2,547	2,144	...	4,464	28,486	2,547
Train of the guard.....					225	509
Grand total....28,711 men and 3,391 horses.						

## No. XXIX.

THE following letters from Lord Collingwood did not come into my possession before the first edition of the present volume was in the press. It will be seen that they corroborate many of the opinions and some of the facts that I have stated, and they will doubtless be read with the attention due to the observations of such an honorable and able man.

To SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

*Ocean, Gibraltar, 30th August, 1808.*

MY DEAR SIR,—I have been in great expectation of hearing of your progress with the army, and hope the first account will be of your success whenever you move. I have heard nothing lately of Junot at Cadiz; but there have been accounts, not very well authenticated, that Joseph Bonaparte, in his retiring to France, was stopped by the mass rising in Biscay, to the amount of fourteen thousand well-armed men, which obliged him to return to Burgos, where the body of the French army was stationed.

At Zaragoza, the French, in making their fourteenth attack upon the town, were defeated, repulsed with great loss, and had retired from it. There is a deputy here from that city with a commission from the Marquis de Palafox to request supplies. The first aid upon their list is for ten or fifteen thousand troops. The deputy states they have few regulars in the province, and the war has hitherto been carried on by all being armed. In this gentleman's conversation I observe, what I had before remarked in others, that he had no view of Spain beyond the kingdom of Aragon; and in reply to the observations I made on the necessity of a central government, he had little to say, as if that had not yet been a subject of much

consideration. I have great hope that General Castaños, Cuesta, and those captains-general who will now meet at Madrid, will do something effectual in simplifying the government. In a conversation I had with Morla on the necessity of this, he seemed to think the Juntas would make many difficulties, and retain their present power as long as they could.

I hope, my dear sir, you will give some directions about this puzzling island (*Perexil*), which it appears to me will not be of any future use; but the people who are on it will suffer much in the winter, without habitations, except tents; I conceive the purpose for which it was occupied is past, and will probably never return; whenever they quit it, they should bring the stores away as quietly as possible; for, if I am not mistaken, the Emperor has an intention to keep them, and will remonstrate against their going. I hope you have received good accounts from Lady Dalrymple, &c.

\* \* \* \* \*

I am to sail to-day for Toulon, where everything indicates an intention in the French to sail. Mr. Duff brought a million of dollars to Seville, and has instructions to communicate with the Junta; but he appears to me to be too old to do it as Major Cox has done; he is still there, and I conclude will wait for your instructions. Mr. Markland would accept with great thankfulness the proposal you made to him to go to Valencia.

I beg my kind regards, &c.

COLLINGWOOD.

P.S. Prince Leopold is still here, and I understand intends to stay until he hears from England. I have given passports for Dupont and a number of French officers to go to France on parole, ninety-three in number. General Morla was impatient to get them out of the country. The Spaniards were much irritated against them; they were not safe from their revenge, except in St. Sebastian's castle.

TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

*Ocean, off Toulon, October 18, 1808.*

MY DEAR SIR,—I have received the favor of your letters of the 27th August and 5th September, and beg to offer you my sincere congratulations on the success of the British army in Portugal, which I hope will have satisfied the French that they are not those invincible creatures which Bonaparte had endeavored to persuade them they were.

It is a happy event to have rescued Portugal from the government of France; and their carrying off a little plunder is a matter of very secondary consideration; perhaps it may have the good effect of keeping up the animosity of the Portuguese who suffer, and incite them to more resistance in future.

The great business now is to endeavor to establish that sort of government, and organize that sort of military force, which may give security to the country; and the great difficulty in Portugal will be to find men who are of ability, to place at the head of the several departments, who have patriotism to devote themselves to its service, and vigor to maintain its independence. In a country exhausted like Portugal, it will require much ingenious expedient to supply the want of wealth and of everything military. If it is not found in the breasts of those to whom the people look up, Portugal will remain in a hapless and uncertain state still.

I have not heard from Sir Charles Cotton how he settled his terms with the Russian Admiral; but as he has got possession of the ships to be sent to England, they cannot but be good. The hoisting of the English flag on the

fort which surrendered to our troops, I conclude, would be explained to the Portuguese as not to be understood as taking possession by England for other purpose than to be restored to its Prince, as was done at Madeira; but in this instance it ought to have been thought necessary to deprive Siniavin of the argument he would have used of the neutrality of the Portuguese flag, with whom his nation was not at war.

I left Cadiz the moment everything in that quarter was pacific; and Mr. Duff arrived there with a million of dollars for their use; this money was sent to the Junta of Seville, where I am afraid there are many members unworthy of the trust.

I have only heard once from Cox since I left that quarter. After getting the money, Father Gil seemed to have dropped his communications with Major C., and their discussions were not of a nature to excite much public interest; they consisted more in private bickerings than of grave consult for the public weal. Tilly seems to have been entirely disappointed in his project, both in respect to the annexation of Southern Portugal to Andalusia, and the pensisn of 12,000 dollars for his service in the Supreme Council; of those you will be informed by Major Cox. I am afraid I related the proceedings to his Majesty's ministers of events which were passing almost under my eye, and gave my opinion on them with too great freedom; I mean with a freedom that is not usual; but they were facts of which, without being possessed, his Majesty's ministers could not have a knowledge of the real state of affairs in Spain; and the sentiments those facts inspired were necessary to explain my motives, and the rule of conduct which I pursued. And still I consider the great and only danger to which Spain is now exposed, is the supposition that the whole nation is possessed of the same patriotism which, in Andalusia, Aragon, and Valencia, led to such glorious results. It is far otherwise. There are not many Castañoses, nor Cuestas, nor Palafoxes; and take from Spain the influence of the clergy, and its best source of power would be lost; wherever this influence is least, the war is languid.

I wrote to you, some time since, to represent the state of Catalonia. Nothing can be more indifferent to the cause than they appear to be; yet the common peasantry have not less spirit nor less desire to repel their enemy. They have no leaders. Palacios, the Captain-General, stays at Villa Franca, west of Barcelona, talking of what he intends to do; and the people speak of him as either wanting zeal in their cause or ability to direct them; while the French from Barcelona and Figueras do just what they please. When the French attacked Gerona, he did nothing to succor it. The greatest discomfiture they suffered was from Lord Cochrane, who, while they were employed at the siege, blew up the road, making deep trenches in a part where the fire of his ships could be brought upon; and when they came there he drove them from their guns, killed many, and took some cannon.

The French fleet is here quite ready for sea, and I am doing all that is in my power to meet them when they do come out. It is an arduous service; the last ten days we have had gales of wind incessantly; the difficulty of keeping a sufficient squadron is very great. I think the storms from those Alpine mountains are harder than in England, and of more duration.

I beg my best regards to Captain Dalrymple, and my sincerest wishes for every success to attend you.

I am, my dear Sir Hew,

Your obedient and most humble servant,

COLLINGWOOD.

P.S. In the letter which I wrote to you on the state of Catalonia I represented the necessity of sending a body of British troops to Catalonia. There is no other prospect of the French being kept in any bounds. The avenues to France are as open now as at any time they have been. I have kept a ship always at Rosas Bay; her marines have garrisoned the castle, and her company assisted in repairing the works. The French appear to have designs on that place. The presence of the English alone prevents them. If 18,000 men were here of our army, I think they would make Mr. Palacio come forward, and put the whole country into activity, which till then I don't think they ever will be.

COLLINGWOOD.

They want an English resident at Gerona, that they may have somebody to apply to for succor . . . . .

[The rest torn off in the original.]

To SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

*Ocean, off Minorca, April 8, 1809.*

MY DEAR SIR,—I received the favor of your letter a few days ago, which gave me great pleasure, after all the trouble and vexations you have had, to hear you were all well.

I was exceedingly sorry when I saw the angry mood in which the convention in Portugal was taken up, even before the circumstances which led to it were at all known. Before our army landed in Portugal, the French force was reported to be very small. I remember its being said that a body of 5000 troops was all that was necessary to dispossess Junot. I conclude the same sort of report went to England; and this, with the victory that was obtained, led people to expect the extermination of the few French which were supposed to be there; and when once the idea is entertained, people shut their eyes to difficulties.

I remember what you told me the last time I saw you off Cadiz, of the communication which might be made to you by an officer who possessed the entire confidence of ministers. I thought then, that whatever ministers had to communicate to a commander-in-chief, could not be done better than by themselves; for intermediate communications are always in danger of being misunderstood, and never fail to cause doubts and disturb the judgment. I hope now it is all over, and your uneasiness on that subject at an end.

My labors I think will never cease. I am worn down by fatigue of my mind, with anxiety and sorrow; my health is very much impaired; and while our affairs require an increased energy, I find myself less able to conduct them from natural causes. I give all my thoughts and time, but have interruptions, from my weak state of body, which the service will scarcely admit of. I never felt the severity of winter more than this last. They were not gales of wind, but hurricanes; and the consequence is, that the fleet has suffered very much, and many of the ships very infirm. I would not have kept the sea so long, because I know the system of blockading must be ruinous to our fleet at last, and in no instance that I can recollect has prevented the enemy from sailing. In the spring we are found all rags, while they, nursed through the tempest, are all trim. I would not have done it; but what would have become of me if, in my preserving the ships, the French had sailed, and effected anything in any quarter! The clamor would have been loud, and they would have sought only for the cause in my treachery or folly, for none can understand that there is any bad weather in the Mediterranean. The system of blockade is ruinous; but it

has continued so long, and so much to the advantage of the mercantile part of the nation, that I fear no minister will be found bold enough to discontinue it. We undertake nothing against the enemy, but seem to think it enough to prevent him taking our brigs; his fleet is growing to a monstrous force, while ours every day gives more proof of its increasing decrepitude.

Of the Spaniards I would not say much; I was never sanguine in the prospect of success, and have no reason to change my opinion; the lower class of people, those who are under the influence of priests, would do anything were they under proper direction; but directors are difficult to be found. There is a canker in the state; none of the superior orders are serious in their resistance to the French, and have only taken a part against them thus far from the apprehension of the resentment of the people. I believe the Junta is not free from the taint of the infection, or would they have continued Don Miguel Vives in high and important command after such evident proofs as he gave of want of loyalty? I do not know what is thought of Infantado in England; but in my mind, the man, the Duke (for his rank has a great deal to do with it), who would seat himself in Bonaparte's council at Bayonne, sign his decrees, which were distributed in Spain, and then say he was forced to do it, is not the man who will do much in maintaining the glory or the independence of any country; no such man should be trusted now. The French troops are mostly withdrawn from Spain, except such as are necessary to hold certain strong posts, and enable them to return without impediment. Figueras, Barcelona, and Rosas, are held here in Catalonia, and of course the country quite open to them. Will the Spaniards dispossess them? The Junta does not seem to know anything of the provinces at a distance from them. At Tarragona the troops are ill-clothed, and without pay; on one occasion they could not march against the enemy, having no shoes, and yet at Cadiz they have fifty-one millions of dollars. Cadiz seems to be a general dépôt of everything they can get from England. If they are not active the next two months, Spain is lost.

I hope Lady Dalrymple, &c., &c.

I ever am, my dear sir,

Your very faithful and obedient servant,

COLLINGWOOD.

### No. XXX.

#### SECTION I.—GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN,

EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS, SIGNED BY THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL.

Commanded by the Emperor Napoleon, in person, 15th Jan., 1809.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Prisoners.</i>	<i>Total.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
241,010	48,821	24,549	3,521	58,026	826	324,411	52,342

King Joseph commanding—15th Feb., 1809.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Prisoners.</i>	<i>Total effective.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
193,446	33,203	36,326	9,523	56,404	1,843	288,019	42,726

*Note.*—The imperial guards, the reserve of infantry, and several thousand non-commissioned officers and old soldiers, wanted for the war in Austria, in all about 40,000 men, were struck off the rolls since the last returns.

## NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR.

Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.		Prisoners and Stragglers.	Total effectives.	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Horses.	
201,082	31,537	19,596	4,513	60,785	7,301	288,766	36,050	
Deduct detached men comprised in governments						19,596	4,513	
Real total.....						269,170	31,537	
15th July, 1809.								
196,144	31,131	19,122	4,608	58,230	8,089	281,535	35,739	
Deduct detached in governments..						19,122	4,608	
Real total.....						262,463	31,131	
15th August, 1809.								
187,560	30,319	12,697	3,930	58,588	7,403	266,248	34,880	
Deduct for governments.....						12,697	3,930	
Real total.....						253,551	30,950	

## SECTION II.—RETURN OF THE FRENCH ARMY BY CORPS.

Troops immediately under the King—1st June, 1809.

The King's guards, about 5000 men, of all arms, are never borne on the rolls.

First corps, Marshal Victor commanding.

Head-quarters, Torremocha.

	Present under arms.		Total.
	Men.		Men.
4 divisions of infantry	41 battalions	21,268	32,819
2 do cavalry	27 squadrons	5,232	7,344
Artillery and equipage	40 companies	2,984	3,610
Number of guns, 48			
Total present under arms.....	29,484	Grand total	43,773

First corps—21st June, 1809.

Head-quarters, Almaraz.

3 divisions of infantry	33 battalions	18,367	25,633
2 do cavalry	20 squadrons	4,259	5,762
Artillery and equipage	"	2,535	2,860
Total present under arms.....	25,161	Grand total	34,255

First corps—15th July, 1809.

Head-quarters, Cazalegas.

3 divisions of infantry	33 battalions	18,890	26,373
2 do cavalry	18 squadrons	3,781	5,080
Artillery and equipage	"	2,586	3,005
Total present under arms.....	25,257	Grand total	34,458

## First corps—1st August, 1809.

## Head-quarters, Maqueda.

		Present under arms.		Total.
		Men.		Men.
3 divisions of infantry	33 battalions	15,066		25,068
2 do. cavalry	18 squadrons	4,987		4,983
Artillery and equipage	"	2,362		2,873
Total present under arms. . . .		22,415	Grand total	32,924

## Fourth corps, General Sebastiani—10th July, 1809.

## Head-quarters, Alcala.

3 divisions of infantry	27 battalions	17,100		25,960
2 do. cavalry	25 squadrons	3,670		5,859
Number of artillerymen omitted in the returns	"	"		"
30 guns.				
Total present under arms. . . .		20,770	Grand total	31,819

## 15th August, 1809.

3 divisions of infantry	27 battalions	14,259		25,801
2 do. cavalry	25 squadrons	3,420		5,801
Total present under arms. . . .		17,679	Grand total	31,602

## Division of Reserve, General Dessolles—15th July, 1809.

## Head-quarters, Madrid.

		Present under arms.		Total.
		Men.		Men.
1 division of infantry	10 battalions	7,681		10,254
Number of guns unknown.				

## Kellermann's division—21st April, 1809.

## Head-quarters, Astorga.

Total, composed of detachments	Men.	Horses.	Guns.
	8,753	805	8

## 10th June, 1809.

## Head-quarters, Oviedo.

		Under arms.		Total.	
		Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.
Total, composed of detachments		7,423	2,549	7,681	2,690

## 15th July, 1809.

## Head-quarters, Valladolid.

8 squadrons	2,291	2,360	2,469	2,393
6 guns				

## SECTION III.

## 1st February, 1809.

## Under arms—Men.

Division Lapisse infantry	12 battalions	7,692
Brigade Maupetit cavalry	6 squadrons	910

Total under General Lapisse at Salamanca 8,602 sabres and bayonets.

Number of guns and artillerymen unknown.

SECTION IV.—RETURN OF TROOPS UNDER THE IMMEDIATE COMMAND OF  
MARSHAL SOULT.

Second corps, Soult—15th July, 1809.

Head-quarters, Toro.

		Present under arms.	Total.
		Men.	Men.
4 divisions of infantry	47 battalions	16,626	35,188
3 do. cavalry	19 squadrons	2,883	4,540
Artillery	"	1,081	1,620
40 guns			
Total present under arms.....		20,590	Grand total 41,348

Fifth corps, Mortier.

Head-quarters, Valladolid.

2 divisions of infantry	24 battalions	15,036	19,541
1 brigade of cavalry	6 squadrons	896	1,491
Artillery	"	648	803
30 guns			
Total present under arms.....		16,580	Grand total 21,835

Sixth corps, Ney.

Head-quarters, Benevente.

2 divisions of infantry	24 battalions	13,700	17,587
1 do. cavalry	10 squadrons	1,446	2,092
Artillery	"	1,113	1,293
37 guns			
Total present under arms.....		16,259	Grand total 20,972

General total under Soult, 15th July, 1809.

95 battalions—35 squadrons	53,529	84,155
107 guns		

SECTION V.—TROOPS EMPLOYED IN THE SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA, UNDER MARSHAL  
LASNES.

15th January, 1809.

	Present under arms.	Detached.	Hospital.	Total effective.
	Men.	Men.		Men.
Third corps	17,406	5,789	13,668	36,863
Fifth corps	18,284	"	4,189	22,473
Total.....	35,690	5,789	17,857	59,336

15th February, 1809.

Third corps	16,035	5,891	13,259	35,269
Fifth corps	17,933	1,735	3,859	23,626
Total.....	33,968	7,626	17,118	58,895



## SECTION VI.—RETURN OF THE SEVENTH CORPS, GENERAL ST. CYR.

15th January, 1809.					
Present under arms.	Detached.	Hospital.	Prisoners.	Total.	
Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
41,386	“	6,589	543	48,518	3,403
15th May, 1809.					
42,246	2,341	10,243	485	55,265	5,537
15th June, 1809.					
42,146	1,699	10,222	406	54,473	5,365

## No. XXXI.

## SECTION I.—STATE OF SPAIN.

*Colonel Kemmis to Sir J. Cradock, December 17, 1808.*

“In consequence of the unfavorable news from Spain, yesterday, the populace in Badajos murdered a Spanish colonel, and one or two more of note.”

*Lieutenant Ellis (an officer employed to gain intelligence) to Colonel Kemmis, Loboá, December 27.*

“The French entered Truxillo yesterday, at eleven o'clock; and from the circumstance of their having reconnoitred the intermediate villages, might be expected to arrive at Merida in two hours after we left it.”

*Colonel Kemmis to Sir John Cradock, Elvas, December 28.*

“Badajos cannot make resistance in any degree, either to check or to stop the progress of the enemy. From the statement made to me last night by the governor, they want *arms, ammunition, and provisions*.”—“The enemy marched into Truxillo on the 26th, at half-past twelve o'clock in the day; but at two on the following morning, a French officer arrived there, and they fell back four leagues.”

*Lieutenant Ellis to Colonel Kemmis, December 28.*

“I proceeded cautiously to Truxillo. The main body of the enemy, six thousand in number, had retired across the bridge of Almaraz, and had not taken the road to Madrid, but had proceeded to Placentia, leaving behind more than half the requisition for money which had been imposed on the town of Truxillo.”

*Mr. Stuart to Sir John Moore, Seville, January 2, 1809.*

“The corps of four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, which had marched from Talavera, and had actually passed the bridge of Almaraz, has fallen back, and is already near Placentia, on its way nothward.”—“The extreme attention of Bonaparte being at this moment directed to the English army, everything which can be collected is opposed to you alone.”

## SECTION II.

*Mr. Stuart to Sir J. Moore, December 27, 1808.*

"You will receive together with this, several letters from Doyle, which describe events in Catalonia *no way differing from what we have witnessed in other parts of Spain*"—"The Junta have established themselves here, and whatever may have been the expectation which their alarm on the road may have induced Mr. Frere to form of their future proceedings, *a culpable relapse into their former apathy* seems susceptible of no other remedies but such as will be much stronger than any Spaniard is likely to adopt."—"Although Caro promised to write every particular of his conversation with you to the Junta, I have hitherto been unable to see his letter. I therefore thought it expedient to put the whole to writing, and, *at the same time, to express my conviction both of the justice and propriety of your whole conduct during the late events, when it was impossible, under any circumstances, to have adopted other determination consistently with the safety of the army committed to your charge.* Though I doubt if this will stop the clamor which has been raised on the subject; and though events have probably since taken place, which may materially change the state of affairs, it may be satisfactory to tell you that Mr. Frere *appears* to enter into the reasons alleged by you, and to feel, in their full force, the motives which induced you to act so cautiously, and to ground no operation on the hope of any effectual support from the Spaniards."

*Ditto, Seville, January 2.*

"The President, Florida Blanca, died two days since, and I was in hopes that the Junta would have availed themselves of this event to make some change in their government. I see, however, little but good disposition, and *am still to look for that energy* in rewarding service and punishing treachery which can alone mend matters."

*Ditto, Seville, January 10.*

"Reding is at *Tarragona*, expecting to be attacked, and possessing a force composed chiefly of peasantry, but of which he certainly cannot command above ten thousand men in a situation to face his opponents at any given point."—"Whittingham arrived here yesterday, last from the Duke of Infantado's headquarters. He assures me the Duke had already twenty thousand men when he *left Cuenca*."—"On the side of *Estremadura*, matters are not going on well: Galluzo, who allowed the enemy to pass the bridges, is here prisoner, and his corps is placed under the command of Cuesta. I cannot say, however, that I see much activity since the change; parties of the enemy cover the country between Madrid and Almaraz, while the corps of six thousand men, which had been pushed forward from Madrid, have, I understand, already passed Placentia, and probably are on the other side of the Puerto, for the purpose of falling on the Salamanca country, and if possible cutting off your communication with Ciudad Rodrigo."

## SECTION III.

*Mr. Frere to Mr. Canning, Seville, May 8.*

"Besides the advantages which may be looked for from placing so extensive a command under a person of such tried abilities as General Blake, it is to be hoped that it will put an end to the distractions arising from the

contracted views of those who directed the provincial Juntas, particularly that of Valencia, which have been so embarrassing to his predecessors."

*Ditto, Seville, July 10, 1809.*

"As the devastations which have been committed have, in many instances, deprived the peasants of the means of paying what is due to the proprietors and to the church, a general spirit of resistance to all claims of this kind has begun to show itself."

*Sir John Cradock to Lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808.*

"I much fear that alarm and despondency have gained ground about Badajos and that part of Spain, and that there is so little co-operation in the acts of their several juntas, and such a want of subordination and common consent among the armed bodies to which the defence of the country is intrusted, against such an united force as that of the French, that extreme confusion prevails every where."

*Colonel Kemmis to Sir John Cradock, Elvas, December 30.*

"He (Lieutenant Ellis) has been living with General Cuesta for the last two days,"—"who has assured him that the Spanish troops in Madrid forced their way through the French army; and he expressed great sorrow in adding that, though a Spanish force is often collected, the smallest check disperses them; that in few instances dépôts were provided, and those ill supplied," &c.—"that, such was the dispersion and flight of the Spanish armies, between Badajos and Madrid, there did not remain a single man."

*Colonel Kemmis to Lieut.-Colonel Reynel, Military Secretary to Sir John Cradock, Seville, February 7, 1809.*

"In passing through the Sierra Morena mountains, where nature has done much for the defence of this province, it was painful to observe the pitiful works they were about to throw up. In this whole direction there is but one body that has anything like the appearance of a soldier, viz., dismounted cavalry."

*General Mackenzie to Sir John Cradock, Cadiz, February 9, 1809.*

"The Spaniards here seemed lulled in the most fatal security. They are ignorant of the events in the North of Spain, or will not give credit when they do hear them. Vague reports of the Emperor of Austria's having declared war, and Bonaparte's return to France, gain unlimited credit." . . . "The equipment of the fleet goes on very slowly, though there is no want of exertion now on the part of Admiral Purvis or Mr. Stuart; offers of every assistance are daily made, but they will neither work themselves, nor permit our people to work for them. The preparations of the ships for carrying off the French prisoners go on equally ill."

*Duc d'Albuquerque to Mr. Frere, Talavera, July 31, 1809.*

"During our marches we stop to repose, like flocks of sheep, without taking up any position, so that, if the enemy knew the condition we were in, they would defeat us wherever they attacked us. If, in the evening of the 26th, I had not gone out directly with my division, and succeeded in checking the enemy, the whole army would have dispersed, and all the artillery and baggage which were in the streets of St. Ollalla would have been lost;

and as a proof of what would have happened, had not the enemy, who was within musket-shot, been checked, for many had already thrown away their arms, &c., the commissaries, abandoning more than fifteen hundred rations of bread, the carts occupying and blocking up the streets of the town; and to this, I repeat, we are daily exposed, as we march as if it were on a pilgrimage, without any regard to distance, order, or method, and with the whole parc of artillery, which ought always to remain at the distance of two, three, or more leagues."

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, Merida, September 1, 1809.*

"I am much afraid, from what I have seen of the proceedings of the Central Junta, that, in the distribution of their forces, they do not consider military defence and military operations so much as they do political intrigue and the attainment of trifling political objects."

*Lord Wellesley to Mr. Canning, Seville, September 2, 1809.*

"While the intelligence received from Sir Arthur Wellesley, to the date of the 24th instant, continued to furnish irresistible proofs of the failure of every promise or effort made by this government for the immediate relief of our troops, no satisfaction was afforded to me respecting any permanent plan for their future supply."—"The troops of Portugal, which entered Spain, under General Beresford, suffered similar distress, and experienced similar ill-treatment; although the efforts of Portugal, in the cause of Spain, have been as gratuitous as those of Great Britain; and although Spain possesses no claim, of any description, to the aid of a Portuguese army."—"In this calamity, the people of Spain cannot fail to acknowledge the natural consequences of their own weakness, nor to discover the urgent necessity of enforcing a more steady, pure, and vigorous system, both of counsel and action. A relaxed state of domestic government, and an indolent reliance on the activity of foreign assistance, have endangered all the high and virtuous objects for which Spain has armed and bled. It must now be evident that no alliance can protect her from the inevitable results of internal disorder and national infirmity. She must amend and strengthen her government; she must improve the administration of her resources, and the structure and discipline of her armies, before she can become capable of deriving benefit from foreign aid. Spain has proved untrue to our alliance, because she is not true to herself."—"Until some great change shall be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of her armies, no British army can safely attempt to co-operate with the Spanish troops in the territory of Spain."

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## No. XXXII.

### JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK'S CORRESPONDENCE, MSS.

#### SECTION I.—STATE OF PORTUGAL.

*Sir J. Cradock to Sir R. Wilson, Oporto, December 8, 1808.*

"I press this measure" (to move the legion from Oporto to Villa Real) "upon your adoption, for many reasons, &c., &c.; but the more especially

that it will give an impulse to military preparation in general, and tend to eradicate the notion that, since the evacuation of Portugal by the French, the prospect of a future war is at an end."

*Sir J. Cradock to Sir John Moore, December 9, 1808.*

"I have pressed the adoption of such measures as appeared most likely to revive some notion of danger, and the necessity of activity and energy."

*Sir J. Cradock to Lord Castlereagh, December 14, 1808, Lisbon.*

"The inaction of the Regency was apparent at Oporto to a lamentable degree; and, though I saw General Bernadim Freire, I could not gain from him any information as to the state or numbers of the Portuguese troops, where they were stationed, or who commanded them. I apprehend, from his conversation, that the general officers are all of equal authority; and that even seniority had not its usual effect. He concluded his observations to me with the strong expression, 'That, from the evacuation of Portugal by the French, the nation had thought all war at an end.'"

*Sir J. Cradock to Sir John Moore, December 28, 1808.*

"Mr. Villiers and myself have both concurred upon the absolute necessity to arouse and animate the Portuguese to some sense of their situation."

*Colonel Kemmis to Sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 30, 1808.*

"The apathy of the Portuguese is not to be expressed. Their General, Leite, is a most excellent character; a theorist, and, like his countrymen, supine."

*Extract from the Report of Lieutenant Brotherton, (an officer employed to obtain intelligence in the north of Portugal,) February 11, 1809. Headquarters of Romana's army.*

"From the totally defenceless state in which the two northern provinces are left, it will require at least eight days (I speak from authority) to prepare anything like adequate means of defence."

## SECTION II.—LUSITANIAN LEGION.

*Lord Castlereagh to Sir J. Cradock, November 27, 1808.*

"Its formation was proposed by the Chevalier de Souza.—The pay, allowances, and clothing, were settled by the Chevalier de Souza. The former regulated, as I understood, upon the scale of increased pay, which the provisional government of Oporto had adopted for all the troops they were in progress of levying."

*Sir J. Cradock to Lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808.*

"I have considerable doubt if ever they" (the legion) "can be incorporated, with effect and conciliation, with the body of the Portuguese army." "They are viewed with extreme jealousy by the Regency; and the commanding officers of the Portuguese battalion resisted, universally, the allowing a volunteers from their regiments to enter into the legion."

*Sir J. Cradock to Lord Castlereagh, January 19, 1809.*

"The Lusitanian legion continues to give considerable uneasiness, from its peculiar state, under present circumstances."

*Captain Morgan (Lusitanian legion) to Sir J. Cradock, January 19, 1809.*

"Should a retreat be adopted, Sir Robert would not retire to Oporto. *It is the government of a mob, of which he has had too much experience.*"

SECTION III.—PORTUGUESE ARMY.

*Sir J. Cradock to Sir J. Moore, December 9, 1808.*

"I am sorry to state that I find, as far as my limited observation reaches, the Portuguese army, and every other military concern, *in the worst possible state.*"

*Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, December 18, 1809.*

"I am sure that the state of the Portuguese army is quite misunderstood in England; and that a reliance is placed upon it for the defence of the country that is entirely without foundation. Their" (Portuguese) "ministers will avow this to you after ten minutes' conversation."—"Even of the reduced numbers of their men enrolled, (not amounting to twenty thousand, at the very highest computation,) to make anything out of them, it is necessary to recur to first principles, and give them *officers, arms, clothing, accoutrements, horses, &c.*; and I need not say that money is wanting to effect this; and the ministers positively declare that they have none; and that no collection of their forces can take place, much less a movement to the frontier, without a supply."—"M. Forjas, secretary to the government, in answer to a strong question from me, stated that *their army have not in their possession ten thousand firelocks fit for use.*"

*Sir J. Cradock to Lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808.*

"I am exerting myself to bring to account 'the supposed Portuguese army.'"—"Your lordship will perceive that *I talk of the regulars as if it were a regular force*; but I should be guilty of a deceit, that might lead to bad consequences, if I did not fairly state that *I conceive them to be of no moment at this time.*"

*Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 8, 1809.*

"I am ready to go to the utmost verge of prudence; but *Mr. Frere, when he talks of Portuguese troops and arrangements, really (as I believe you will allow) fait bâtir les châteaux.*"

*Major-General Cotton to Sir J. Cradock, April 7, 1809.*

"I yesterday inspected the Portuguese cavalry."—"This cavalry is unformed, and totally unfit for any sort of service."

*Sir J. Cradock to Lord Castlereagh, February 12.*

"It appears that a report has reached your lordship that a conscription for horses in this country had been attended with great effect, and that above three thousand had been collected. It is, indeed, a matter of serious concern that such *serious misrepresentations* should be transmitted; for it is a well-known fact that many of the Portuguese regiments of cavalry ar:

without horses; and if I am to pursue the subject, their *battalions of infantry are one-half without arms or clothing!* But the total want of all means of regulations for subsistence forms so deplorable a view, in the event of co-operation, that the result, in my opinion, cannot be attended with success. *It is, however, but justice to say, that the disposition of the Portuguese seems well-inclined and faithful to the common cause; and that a very efficient soldiery may be formed under more favorable circumstances."*

*Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, February 27, 1809.*

"I fear that your Excellency is led to entertain a more favorable notion of the efficacy of the Portuguese army than, in any shape, it is entitled to. In short, my opinion is that they want everything that constitutes a respectable force, except about ten thousand English arms. I believe they have no others. Many of their *cavalry regiments are without horses, without swords, pistols, &c. Their battalions are not clothed; and, as to subsistence, they live at free quarters upon the villages where they are stationed.* To take the field with effect, or an assurance of food, seems to me out of the question. Since the first moment of my arrival, I wished to procure the advance of a small Portuguese force to Alcantara; but it has been impossible. It is a matter of serious lamentation that such misrepresentations of the Portuguese force should go home, or reach your Excellency."

*Sir J. Cradock to Lord Castlereagh, April 3.*

"No reliance whatever can be placed upon the Portuguese troops in their present state. *If I said that the whole were ready to mutiny or revolt, I believe I speak General Beresford's sentiments. They will not be commanded by their own officers, and they do just as they please."*

#### SECTION IV.—CONDUCT OF THE REGENCY—TREATMENT OF FRENCH PRISONERS.

*Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 26, 1809.*

"I have hitherto directed that these prisoners should be subsisted at our charge, but I have no authority in this measure; they are *in a most deplorable state, and really are a disgrace to all concerned."*

*Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February 5, 1809.*

"It is absolutely necessary that the Regency should give in an answer about the French prisoners. The whole is an unauthorized heavy charge, for which I give my warrant; and I see no end to the case; and, added to this, *their situation is a reflection upon humanity."*

#### SECTION V.—NEGLECT, DUPLICITY, AND TIMIDITY.

*Colonel Kemmis to Sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 17.*

"Lalyppe, on which the very existence of Elvas depends, has not been supplied with provisions as I have been taught to expect."

*Colonel Kemmis to Sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 25.*

"The great importance of this fort" (Lalyppe) "is well known to the Portuguese; and, therefore, they are jealous, notwithstanding the miserable condition of their troops, and total incapacity to defend the fort, if attacked."