

1^{re}. D'essayer de rester encore dans l'état où l'on est.

Ce système est évidemment insoutenable. De Tudela à Burgos et à Bilbao il y a plus de 60 lieues. L'ennemi pourra attaquer la gauche de cette ligne avec quarante mille hommes, la droite avec quarante mille hommes, le centre avec des forces égales. Tudela et la Navarre jusqu'à Logroño demandent 25,000 hommes pour être défendues. Burgos ne peut être défendue que par une armée en état de résister aux forces réunis de MM. Blake, Cuesta, qui peuvent présenter 80,000 hommes. Il est douteux que les 20,000 bayonnettes qu'il serait possible de leur présenter puissent les battre complètement. Si le succès est douteux, ces 20,000 hommes seront harcelés par les insurgés, qui pourront alors soulever les trois provinces, les séparer totalement d'avec le corps de gauche et de la France.

2^{de}. Porter le corps du centre et la réserve par Tudela au devant de l'ennemi sur la route de Saragosse, ou sur celle d'Albazan ; on réunirait ainsi 30,000 hommes, on chercherait l'ennemi, et nul doute on le battrait si on le recontrait de ce côté.

Le maréchal Bessières serait chargé d'observer la grande communication de Burgos à Miranda, laisserait garnison dans le château de Burgos, dans le fort de Pancorvo, occuperait l'ennemi, surveillerait les mouvemens des montagnes de Reynosa, les débarquemens possibles de Santander. Sa tâche serait difficile si l'on considère que le défilé de Pancorvo n'est pas le seul accessible à l'artillerie, qu'à trois lieues de là on arrive sur Miranda par une route praticable à l'artillerie, que quelques lieues plus loin l'Ebre offre un troisième passage sur le point de la chaîne qu'il traverse entre Haro et Miranda.

3^{eme}. Laisser le maréchal Moncey à la défense de la Navarre, et se porter avec le corps du centre et la réserve sur Burgos. Réuni au maréchal Bessières on pourroit chercher l'ennemi, et attaquer avec avantage, on marcherait à lui avec trente mille hommes, et on n'attendrait pas qu'il fût réuni avec toutes ses forces. Il serait peut-être possible de donner pour instruction au maréchal Moncey, dans le cas où il serait débordé sur sa gauche, et qu'il ne verrait pas probabilité de battre l'ennemi, de faire un mouvement par sa droite, et se porter par Logroño sur Briviesca, où il se réunirait au reste de l'armée. Dans ce cas, la Navarre s'insurgerait, les communications avec la France seraient coupées, mais l'armée réunie dans la plaine serait assez forte pour attendre les corps qui arrivent de France, et qui seront assez forts pour pénétrer partout. Il serait aussi possible que, dans tous les cas, le maréchal Moncey se maintienne dans le camp retranché de Pampelune ; manœuvrant autour de cette place, il y attendrait le résultat des opérations des deux corps d'armée qui auraient été au devant de l'ennemi dans la plaine de Burgos, et l'arrivée des corps de la grande armée.

4^{eme}. Passer l'Ebre, et chercher à amener l'ennemi à une bataille dans la plaine qui est entre Vitoria et l'Ebre.

5^{eme}. Se retirer, appuyant sa gauche sur Pampelune, et sa droite sur les montagnes de Mondragone.

6^{eme}. Laisser une garnison en état de se défendre pendant six semaines à Pampelune, St. Sébastien, Pancorvo, et Burgos, réunir le reste de l'armée, marcher à la rencontre de l'ennemi sur l'une ou l'autre des grandes communications, le battre partout où on le trouverait, attendre, ou près de Madrid, ou dans le pays où les mouvemens de l'ennemi et la possibilité de vivre aurait porté l'armée, les troupes de France ; on abandonnerait ses derrières, ses communications ; mais la grande armée serait assez forte pour en ouvrir pour elle-même. Et quant à l'armée qui est en Espagne, réunie ainsi elle serait en état de braver tous les efforts, de déconcerter tous les projets de

l'ennemi, et d'attendre dans une noble attitude le mouvement général qui sera imprimé par votre majesté lors de l'arrivée de toutes les troupes dans ce pays.

De tous les projets le dernier paraît préférable; il est plus noble et aussi sûr que le 5^{ème}.

Ces deux projets sont seuls absolument offensifs ou absolument défensifs. On peut les regarder, l'un et l'autre, comme propres à assurer la conservation de l'armée jusqu'à l'arrivée des renforts. Le dernier a sur l'autre l'avantage d'arrêter le progrès de l'ordre nouveau qui s'établit en Espagne; il est plus digne des troupes Françaises, et du frère de votre majesté. Il est aussi sûr que celui de la sévère et honteuse défensive proposée par l'article cinq. Je l'ai communiqué au mar^{al} Jourdan et au mar^{al} Ney, qui l'un et l'autre sont de cet avis. Je ne doute point que les autres maréchaux ne partagent leur opinion.

Au premier Octobre je puis avoir la réponse de V. M., et même avant, puisque je lui ai manifesté cette opinion par ma lettre du 14 Septembre.

Si V. M. approuve ce plan, il sera possible qu'elle n'ait pas de nouvelles jusqu'à l'arrivée des troupes; mais je suis convaincu qu'elle trouvera les affaires dans une bien meilleure situation qu'en suivant aucun des autres cinq projets.

Miranda, le 16 Sept. 1808.

No. VII.

S.

EXTRAITS DES LETTRES DU MAJOR GENERAL AU GENERAL SAVARY, A MADRID.

Bayonne, 12 Juillet, 1808.

Section 1.—J'ai rendu compte à l'empereur, général, de votre lettre du 8. S. M. trouve que vous vous êtes dégarni, de trop de monde à Madrid, que vous avez fait marcher trop de troupes au secours du g^{al} Dupont, qu'on ne doit pas agir offensivement jusqu'à ce que les affaires de la Galice soient éclairées. De tous les points de l'armée, général, le plus important est la Galice, parceque c'est la seule province qui ait réellement conclu un traité avec l'Angleterre. La division de ligne des troupes Espagnoles qui était à Oporto s'est joint à celle qui était en Galice, et enfin par la position de cette province extrêmement près de l'Angleterre. Indépendamment de ces considérations, la position la rend encore plus intéressante; car les communications de l'armée se trouveraient compromises si le maréchal Bessières n'avait pas un entier succès, et il faudrait bien alors reposer toutes vos troupes, et marcher isolément au secours du maréchal Bessières. Encore une fois, général, vous vous êtes trop dégarni de Madrid, et si un bon régiment de cuirassiers, quelques pièces d'artillerie et 1000 à 1200 hommes d'infanterie avaient pu arriver à l'appui du maréchal Bessières, le 14, cela lui aurait été d'un éminent secours. *Qu'importe que Valence soit soumis? Qu'importe que Saragosse soit soumis?* Mais, général, le moindre succès de l'ennemi du côté de la Galice aurait des inconvénients immenses. Instruit comme vous l'étiez des forces du général Cuesta, de la désertion des troupes d'Oporto, &c. . . .

S. M. trouve que pour bien manœuvrer il aurait fallu vous arranger de manière à avoir du 12^e au 15^e 8000 hommes pour renforcer le maréchal Bessières. Une fois nos derrières débarassées, et cette armée de Galice détruite, tout le reste tombe et se soumet de soi-même, &c., &c.

S.

EXTRAIT DE LA LETTRE, &c.

Bayonne, 13 Juillet, 1808.

Section 2.—Nous recevons vos lettres de 9 et du 10, général. L'empereur me charge de vous faire connaître que si le général Gobert était à Valladolid, le général Frère à San Clémente, ayant une colonne dans la Manche; si 300 à 400 convalescens, un bon commandant, 4 pièces de canon, une escouade d'artillerie, et vingt mille rations de biscuit étaient dans le château de Ségovie, la position de l'armée serait superbe et à l'abri de toute sollicitude. La conduite du général Frère ne paraît pas claire. Les nouvelles qu'il a eues du maréchal Moncey paraissent apocryphes. Il est possible que ses 8000 hommes et son artillerie n'aient pas été suffisans pour enlever la ville de Valence. Cela étant, le maréchal Moncey ne l'enleverait pas d'avantage avec 20,000 hommes, parcequ'alors c'est une affaire de canons et de mortiers, &c. &c. . . . *Valence est comme la Catalogne et l'Arragon; ces trois points sont secondaires.* Les deux vrais points importans sont le général Dupont et particulièrement le maréchal Bessières, parceque le premier a devant lui le corps du camp de St. Roche et le corps de Cadiz, et le maréchal Bessières parcequ'il a devant lui les troupes de la Galice et celles qui étaient à Oporto. Le général Dupont a près de 20,000 hommes; il ne peut pas avoir contre lui un pareil nombre de troupes; il a déjà obtenu des succès très marquans, et au pis aller il ne peut être contraint qu'a repasser les montagnes, ce qui n'est qu'un événement de guerre. Le maréchal Bessières est beaucoup moins fort que le général Dupont, et les troupes Espagnoles d'Oporto et de la Galice sont plus nombreuses que celles de l'Andalousie, et les troupes de la Galice n'ont pas encore été entamées. Enfin le moindre insuccès du maréchal Bessières intercepte toutes les communications de l'armée et compromettrait même sa sûreté. Le général Dupont se bat pour Andujar, et le maréchal Bessières se bat pour les communications de l'armée et pour les opérations les plus importantes aux affaires d'Espagne, &c. &c.

S.

EXTRAIT DE LA LETTRE, &c. &c.

Bayonne, 18 Juillet, 1808, à dix heures du soir.

Section 3.—Je reçois, général, vos lettres du 14. L'aide-de-camp du maréchal Moncey a donné à sa majesté tous les détails sur ce qui s'est passé. La conduite du maréchal a été belle. Il a bien battu les rebelles en campagne. Il est tout simple qu'il n'ait pu entrer à Valence; c'était une affaire de mortiers et de pièces de siège. Sa position à San Clémente est bonne, de là il est à même de remarcher sur Valence. Du reste, général, *l'affaire de Valence est une affaire du second ordre, même celle de Saragosse*, qui cependant est plus importante. L'affaire du maréchal Bessières était d'un intérêt majeur pour les affaires d'Espagne, et la première après cette affaire c'est celle du général Dupont, et c'est le moment de laisser le général Gobert suivre la

route. Le maréchal Moncey se repose ; le général Reille marche sur Gérone : ainsi trois colonnes pourront marcher ensemble sur Valence ; le corps du général Reille, celui de Saragosse, et celui du maréchal Moncey, ce qui formera les 20,000 hommes que ce maréchal croit nécessaires. Mais l'empereur, général, trouve que vous avez tort de dire qu'il n'y a rien été fait depuis six semaines. On a battu les rassemblemens de la Galice, de St. Ander, ceux d'Arragon et de Catalogne, qui dans leur aveuglement croyaient qu'ils n'avaient qu'à marcher pour détruire les Français : le maréchal Moncey, les généraux Duhesme, Dupont, Verdier, ont fait de bonne besogne, et tous les hommes sensés en Espagne ont changé dans le fonds de leur opinion, et voient avec la plus grande peine l'insurrection. Au reste, général, les affaires d'Espagne sont dans la situation la plus prospère depuis la bataille de Medina del Rio Seco, &c. &c. Le 14^e et le 44^e arrivent demain ; après demain ils partent pour le camp de Saragosse ; *non pas que ses troupes puissent avancer la reddition, qui est une affaire de canon*, mais elles serviraient contre les insurgés de Valence, s'ils voulaient renforcer ceux de Saragosse. Enfin, si le général Gobert et les détachemens qui sont à moitié chemin pour rejoindre le général Dupont font juger à ce général qu'il a des forces suffisantes pour battre le général Castaños, il faut qu'elles continuent leur direction, et qu'il attaque l'ennemi, s'il croit devoir le faire, &c. &c.

(Cette lettre a été écrite le jour de la bataille de Baylen.)

EXTRAIT DE LA LETTRE, &c.

Bordeaux, 3 Août, 1808.

Section 4.—Les événemens du général Dupont sont une chose sans exemple, et la rédaction de sa capitulation est de niveau avec la conduite tenue jusqu'à cette catastrophe. L'empereur pense qu'on n'a pas tenu compte du vague de la rédaction de l'acte, en permettant que les corps en échellons sur la communication entre vous et le général Dupont aient marché pour se rendre aux Anglais : car on ne doit pas présumer qu'ils aient la loyauté de laisser passer les troupes qui s'embarquent. Comme vous ne parlez pas de cela, on pense que vous avez retiré ces échellons sur Madrid. Après avoir lu attentivement la relation du général Dupont, on voit qu'il n'a capitulé que le lendemain de la bataille, et que les corps des généraux Vedel et Dufour, qui se trouvoient compris pour quelque chose dans la capitulation (on ne sait pourquoi), ne se sont pas battus. Par la relation même du général Dupont, tout laisse penser que l'armée du général Castaños n'était pas à beaucoup près aussi forte qu'on le dit, et qu'il avait réuni à Baylen tout ce qu'il avait de forces. S. M. ne lui calcule pas plus de 25,000 hommes de troupes de ligne et plus de 15,000 paysans. Par la lettre du général Belliard *il paraît que l'ordre est donné de lever le siège de Saragosse*, ce qui serait prémature ; car vous comprendrez qu'il n'est pas possible qu'on ne laisse un corps d'armée, qui couvre Pampelune, et contienne la Navarre, sans quoi l'ennemi peut cerner Pampelune, insurger la Navarre, et alors la communication de France par Tolosa serait coupée, et l'ennemi sur les derrières de l'armée. Supposant l'ennemi réuni à Pampelune, la ville bloquée, il peut se trouver en cinq à six marches sur les derrières de Burgos. L'armée qui assiège Saragosse est donc à peu près nécessaire pour contenir la Navarre, les insurgés de l'Arragon et de Valence, et pour empêcher de percer sur notre flanc gauche ; car si, comme le dit le général Belliard, le général Verdier se porte avec ses troupes à Logroño, en jettant 2000 hommes dans Pampelune, la communication de Bayonne, qu'eut sur le champ interceptée le général Verdier, serait

mieux à Tudela qu'à Logroño. Si le général Castaños s'avance, et que vous puissiez lui livrer la bataille, on ne peut en prévoir que les plus heureux résultats : mais de la manière dont il a marché vis-à-vis du général Dupont, tout donne à croire qu'il mettra la plus grande circonspection dans ses mouvemens. Si par le canal des parlementaires l'on peut établir une suspension d'armes sans que le roi y soit pour rien en apparence, cette espèce d'armistice pourrait se rompre en se prévenant de part et d'autre huit jours d'avance, donnant aux Français la ligne du Duero passant par Almazan pour joindre l'Ebre. Cette suspension d'armes, que les insurgés pourraient regarder comme avantageuse, afin de s'organiser à Madrid, ne nous serait pas défavorable, parcequ'on verrait pendant ce temps l'organisation que prendraient les parties insurgées de l'Espagne, et ce que veut la nation, &c. &c.

LE MAJOR GENERAL AU ROI D'ESPAGNE.

Nantes, 11 Août, 1808.

Section 5.—Sire, le général Savary ni vos ministres Azanza et Urquijo ne sont arrivés : il paraît qu'il y a des rassemblemens à Bilbao d'après les nouvelles que nous recevons. S. M. pense qu'il est important d'y faire marcher le plutôt possible une colonne pour y rétablir l'ordre. V. M. sait que la moitié de Saragosse était en notre pouvoir, et que sous peu on espérait avoir le reste de la ville. Lorsque le général Belliard a donné l'ordre de lever le siège, il eût été à désirer que cet ordre fût conditionnel, comme cela paraissait être l'intention de V. M., ainsi qu'on le voit dans sa correspondance ; c'est à dire, que le siège ne fût levé que dans le cas où l'on n'aurait pas cru être maître de la ville avant cinq ou six jours. Cela aurait présenté des circonstances meilleures ; car si le général Verdier évacue en entier la Navarre et l'Arragon, il est à craindre que la Navarre ne s'insurge, et Pampelune ne tarderait pas à être cernée. J'ai mandé à V. M. que déjà des corps entiers de la grande armée sont en mouvement pour se rendre en poste en Espagne. Les dispositions les plus vigoureuses sont prises de tous côtés, et dans six semaines ou deux mois l'Espagne sera soumise. L'empereur, qui continue à jouir d'une bonne santé, quoiqu'il soit très occupé, part dans une heure pour continuer sa route sur Angers, Tours, et Paris. V. M. doit être persuadée que toutes nos pensées sont sur elle et sur l'armée qu'elle commande.

No. VIII.

LETTER FROM MR. DRUMMOND TO SIR ALEXANDER BALL.

Palermo, July 4th, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR,—His Highness the Duke of Orleans has applied to me to write to you on a subject about which he appears to be extremely interested. I take it for granted that you are acquainted with all the events which have lately happened in Spain. The Duke thinks that the appearance of a member of the house of Bourbon, in that country, might be acceptable to the Spaniards, and of great service to the common cause. In this I perfectly concur with his Highness, and if you shall be of the same opinion you will probably have no objection to send a ship here to carry his Highness to Gibraltar. He himself is exceedingly sanguine. We have letters from London down to the 5th of June. Portugal has followed the example of Spain,

and Lisbon is probably now in other hands. An invitation has been sent to Sir Charles Cotton. (Signed) WILLIAM DRUMMOND.

P. S. Weigh well what is said here, written at the side of the person.

MR. DRUMMOND TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Palermo, July 24th, 1808.

DEAR SIR,—This letter will be delivered to you by his Royal Highness Prince Leopold, second son of the King of the Two Sicilies. This Prince goes immediately to Gibraltar to communicate immediately with the loyal Spaniards, and to notify to them that his father will accept the regency, if they desire it, until his nephew Ferdinand the Seventh be delivered from captivity. Don Leopold and his cousin the Duke of Orleans will offer themselves as soldiers to the Spaniards, and will accept such situations as may be given to them suitable to their illustrious rank. If their visit should not be acceptable to the Spaniards, Don Leopold will return to Sicily, and his Serene Highness the Duke of Orleans will proceed to England. Being of opinion that the appearance of an Infant of Spain may be of the greatest utility at the present crisis, and in all events can hardly be productive of harm, I have urged his Sicilian Majesty to determine upon this measure, which I conceive to be required at his hands, in consequence of the manifesto of Palafox, which you have probably seen. At the distance of 1000 miles, however, we cannot be supposed to be accurately informed here of many circumstances with which you probably may be intimately acquainted; Prince Leopold therefore will be directed to consult with you, and to follow your advice, which I have no doubt you will readily and cheerfully give him. I take the liberty at the same time of recommending him to your care and protection. (Signed) WM. DRUMMOND.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR HEW DALRYMPLE TO LORD CASTLEREAGH.

Gibraltar, August 10th, 1808.

MY LORD,—Last night the Thunderer arrived here, having on board the Duke of Orleans, the second Prince of the Two Sicilies, and a considerable number of noblemen and others, the suite of the latter. As the ship came to anchor at a late hour, I had not the honor of seeing the Duke of Orleans until near ten at night, when he came accompanied by Captain Talbot. The Duke first put into my hands a letter from Mr. Drummond, as the Captain did a despatch from Sir Alexander Ball, copies of which I have the honor to inclose. As the latter seemed bulky, I did not immediately open it, and therefore did not immediately remark that Sir Alexander Ball *did not seem aware* that the Prince of the Two Sicilies was coming down, much less that he meditated establishing his residence at Gibraltar for the avowed purpose of negotiating for the regency of Spain. Of this object the Duke of Orleans made no mystery, and proceeded to arrange the time and manner of the Prince's reception in the morning, and the accommodation that should be prepared for him, suited to his rank, and capable of containing his attendants. I took early occasion first to remark the ill effect this measure might produce in Spain at the moment when the establishment of a central government had become obviously necessary, and would naturally lead to much intrigue and disunion, until the sentiments of the people and the armies (which would naturally assemble for the purpose of expelling the enemy from their territory) should be pronounced.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM LORD CASTLEREAGH TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Downing Street, Nov. 4th, 1808.

"I have great pleasure, however, in assuring you that the measures pursued by you on that delicate and important subject" (the unexpected arrival of Prince Leopold and the Duke of Orleans at Gibraltar) "received his Majesty's entire approbation."

(Signed)

CASTLEREAGH.

No. IX.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO SIR HARRY BURRARD.

Head-quarters, at Laos, August 8th, 1808.

SIR,—Having received instructions from the Secretary of State that you were likely to arrive on the coast of Portugal with a corps of 10,000 men, lately employed in the north of Europe under the orders of Sir John Moore, I now submit to you such information as I have received regarding the general state of the war in Portugal and Spain, and the plan of operations which I am about to carry into execution.

The enemy's force at present in Portugal consists, as far as I am able to form an opinion, of from 16,000 to 18,000 men, of which number there are about 500 in the fort of Almeida, about the same number in Elvas, about 6 or 800 in Peniché, and 16 or 1800 in the province of Alemtejo, at Setuval, &c.; and the remainder are disposable for the defence of Lisbon, and are in the forts of St. Julian and Cascaes, in the batteries along the coast as far as the rock of Lisbon, and the old citadel at Lisbon, to which the enemy have lately added some works.

Of the force disposable for the defence of Lisbon, the enemy have lately detached a corps of about 2000, under General Thomières, principally I believe to watch my movements, which corps is now at Alcobaça; and another corps of 4000 men, under General Loison, was sent across the Tagus into Alemtejo on the 26th of last month, the object of which detachment was to disperse the Portuguese insurgents in that quarter, to force the Spanish corps, consisting of about 2000 men, which had advanced into Portugal as far as Evora from Estremadura, to retire, and then to be enabled to add to the force destined for the defence of Lisbon the corps of French troops which had been stationed at Setuval and in the province of Alemtejo; at all events Loison's corps will return to Lisbon, and the French corps disposable for the defence of that place will probably be about 14,000 men, of which at least 3000 must be left in the garrisons and forts on the coast and in the river.

The French army under Dupont, in Andalusia, surrendered on the 20th of last month to the Spanish army under Castaños; so that there are now no French troops in the south of Spain. The Spanish army of Galicia and Castile, to the northward, received a check at Rio Seco, in the province of Valladolid, on the 14th of July, from a French corps supposed to be under the command of General Bessières, which had advanced from Burgos.

The Spanish troops retired on the 15th to Benevente, and I understand

there has since been an affair between the advanced posts in that neighborhood, but I am not certain of it; nor am I acquainted with the position of the Spanish army, or of that of the French, since the 14th July. When you will have been a short time in this country, and will have observed the degree to which the deficiency of real information is supplied by the circulation of unfounded reports, you will not be surprised at my want of accurate knowledge on these subjects.

It is, however, certain that nothing of importance has occurred in that quarter since the 14th of July; and from this circumstance I conclude that the corps called Bessières' attacked the Spanish army at Rio Seco solely with a view to cover the march of King Joseph Bonaparte to Madrid, where he arrived on the 21st July. Besides their defeat at Andalusia, the enemy, as you may probably have heard, have been beat off in an attack upon Zaragoza, in Aragon, in another upon the city of Valencia; (in both of which it is said that they have lost many men;) and it is reported that, in Catalonia, two of their detachments have been cut off, and that they have lost the fort of Figueras in the Pyrenees, and that Barcelona is blockaded. Of these last mentioned actions and operations I have seen no official accounts, but the report of them is generally circulated and believed; and at all events, whether these reports are founded or otherwise, it is obvious that the insurrection against the French is general throughout Spain; that large parties of Spaniards are in arms: amongst others, in particular, an army of 20,000 men, including 4000 cavalry, at Almaraz on the Tagus, in Estremadura, and that the French cannot carry on their operations by means of small corps, I should imagine, from their inactivity, and from the misfortunes they have suffered, that they have not the means of collecting a force sufficiently large to oppose the progress of the insurrection and the efforts of the insurgents, and to afford supplies to their different detached corps, or that they find that they cannot carry on their operations with armies so numerous as they must find it necessary to employ without magazines.

In respect to Portugal, the whole kingdom, with the exception of the neighborhood of Lisbon, is in a state of insurrection against the French; their means of resistance are, however, less powerful than those of the Spaniards, their troops have been completely dispersed, their officers had gone off to the Brazils, and their arsenals pillaged, or in the power of the enemy, and their revolt under the circumstances in which it had taken place is still more extraordinary than that of the Spanish nation.

The Portuguese may have in the northern part of the kingdom about 10,000 men in arms, of which number 5000 are to march with me towards Lisbon. The remainder, with a Spanish detachment of about 1500 men which came from Galicia, are employed in a distant blockade of Almeida, and in the protection of Oporto, which is now the seat of government.

The insurrection is general throughout Alemtejo and Algarve to the southward, and Entre Minho e Duero and Tras os Montes and Beira to the northward; but for want of arms the people can do nothing against the enemy.

Having consulted Sir C. Cotton, it appeared to him and to me that the attack proposed upon Cascaes-bay was impracticable, because the bay is well defended by the fort of Cascaes and the other works constructed for its defence, and the ships of war could not approach sufficiently near to silence them. The landing in the Passa d'Arcos in the Tagus could not be effected without silencing fort St. Julian, which appeared to be impracticable to those who were to carry that operation into execution.

There are small bays within, which might admit of landing troops, and others to the northward of the rock of Lisbon, but they are all defended by works which must have been silenced; they are of small extent, and but few men could have landed at the same time. There is always a surf on them which affects the facility of landing at different times so materially, as to render it very doubtful whether the troops first landed could be supported in sufficient time by others, and whether the horses for the artillery and cavalry, and the necessary stores and provisions could be landed at all. These inconveniences attending a landing in any of the bays near the rock of Lisbon would have been aggravated by the neighborhood of the enemy to the landing-place, and by the exhausted state of the country in which the troops would have been landed. It was obviously the best plan, therefore, to land in the northern parts of Portugal, and I fixed upon Mondego bay as the nearest place which afforded any facility for landing, excepting Peniché, the landing-place of which peninsula is defended by a fort occupied by the enemy, which it would be necessary to attack regularly, in order to place the ships in safety.

A landing to the northward was further recommended, as it would insure the co-operation of the Portuguese troops in the expedition to Lisbon. The whole of the corps placed under my command, including those under the command of General Spencer, having landed, I propose to march on Wednesday, and I shall take the road by Alcobaca and Obidos, with a view to keep up my communication by the sea-coast, and to examine the situation of Peniché, and I shall proceed towards Lisbon by the route of Mafra, and by the hills to the northward of that city.

As I understand from the Secretary of State that a body of troops under the command of Brigadier-General Ackland may be expected on the coast of Portugal before you arrive, I have written to desire he will proceed from hence along the coast of Portugal to the southward; and I propose to communicate with him by the means of Captain Bligh of the Alfred, who will attend the movements of the army with a few transports, having on board provisions and military stores. I intend to order Brigadier-General Ackland to attack Peniché, if I should find it necessary to obtain possession of that place, and if not, I propose to order him to join the fleet stationed off the Tagus, with a view to disembark in one of the bays near the rock of Lisbon, as soon as I shall approach sufficiently near to enable him to perform that operation. If I imagined that General Ackland's corps was equipped in such a manner as to be enabled to move from the coast, I should have directed him to land at Mondego, and to march upon Santarem, from which station he would have been at hand either to assist my operations, or to cut off the retreat of the enemy, if he should endeavor to make it either by the north of the Tagus and Almeida, or by the south of the Tagus and Elvas; but as I am convinced that General Ackland's corps is intended to form a part of some other corps which is provided with a commissariat, that he will have none with him, and consequently that his corps must depend upon the country, and as no reliance can be placed upon the resources of this country, I have considered it best to direct the General's attention to the sea-coast; if, however, the command of the army remained in my hands, I should certainly land the corps which has lately been under the command of Sir John Moore at Mondego, and should move it upon Santarem. I have the honor to inclose a return of the troops, &c. &c.

(Signed)

ARTHUR WELLESLEY

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO SIR HARRY BURRARD.

Camp at Lugar, 8 miles north of Lerya, August 10, 1808.

SIR,—Since I wrote to you on the 8th inst., I have received letters from Mr. Stuart and Colonel Doyle at Coruña, of which I inclose copies. From them you will learn the state of the war in that part of Spain, and you will observe that Mr. Stuart and Colonel Doyle are of opinion that Marshal Bessières will take advantage of the inefficiency of the Gallician army under General Blake to detach a corps to Portugal to the assistance of General Junot; we have not heard yet of that detachment, and I am convinced it will not be made till King Joseph Bonaparte will either be reinforced to such a degree as to be in safety in Madrid, or till he shall have effected his retreat into France, with which view it is reported that he left Madrid on the 29th of last month.

I conceive, therefore, that I have time for the operations which I propose to carry on before a reinforcement can arrive from Leon, even supposing that no obstacles would be opposed to its march in Spain or Portugal; but it is not probable that it can arrive before the different reinforcements will arrive from England; and as Marshal Bessières had not more than 20,000 men in the action at Rio Seco on the 14th July, I conceive that the British troops, which will be in Portugal, will be equal to contend with any part of that corps which he may detach.

The possibility that, in the present state of affairs, the French corps at present in Portugal may be reinforced, affords an additional reason for taking the position at Santarem, which I apprised you, in my letter of the 5th, I should occupy, if the command of the army remained in my hands after the reinforcements should arrive. If you should occupy it, you will not only be in the best situation to support my operations, and to cut off the retreat of the enemy, but if any reinforcements of the French troops should enter Portugal, you will be in the best situation to collect your whole force to oppose him, &c. &c. (Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

No. X.

ARTICLES OF THE DEFINITIVE CONVENTION FOR THE EVACUATION OF PORTUGAL BY THE FRENCH ARMY.

The generals commanding in chief, &c., &c., being determined to negotiate, &c., &c.

Article 1. All the places and forts in the kingdom of Portugal occupied by the French troops shall be given up to the British army in the state in which they are at the period of the signature of the present convention.

Art. 2. The French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage, they shall not be considered as prisoners of war, and on their arrival in France they shall be at liberty to serve.

Art. 3. The English government shall furnish the means of conveyance for the French army, which shall be disembarked in any of the ports of France between Rochefort and L'Orient inclusively.

Art. 4. The French army shall carry with it all its artillery of French

calibre, with the horses belonging thereunto, and the tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun: all other artillery arms, and ammunition, as also the military and naval arsenals, shall be given up to the British army and navy, in the state in which they may be at the period of the ratification of the convention.

Art. 5. The French army shall carry with it all its equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army; that is to say, its military chest, and carriages attached to the field commissariat and field hospital; or shall be allowed to dispose of such part of the same on its accounts, as the commander-in-chief may judge it unnecessary to embark. In like manner, all individuals of the army shall be at liberty to dispose of their private property of every description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers.

Art. 6. The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the generals and other officers of all ranks. It is, however, fully understood that the means of conveyance for horses, at the disposal of the British commanders, are very limited; some additional conveyance may be procured in the port of Lisbon. The number of horses to be embarked by the troops shall not exceed 600, and the number embarked by the staff shall not exceed 200. At all events, every facility will be given to the French army to dispose of the horses belonging to it which cannot be embarked.

Art. 7. In order to facilitate the embarkation, it shall take place in three divisions, the last of which will be principally composed of the garrisons of the place, of the cavalry, the artillery, the sick, and the equipments of the army. The first division shall embark within seven days of the date of the ratification, or sooner if possible.

Art. 8. The garrison of Elvas and its forts, and of Peniché and Palmela, will be embarked at Lisbon. That of Almeida at Oporto, or the nearest harbor. They will be accompanied on their march by British commissaries, charged with providing for their subsistence and accommodation.

Art. 9. All the sick and wounded who cannot be embarked with the troops are intrusted to the British army. They are to be taken care of whilst they remain in this country at the expense of the British government, under the condition of the same being reimbursed by France when the final evacuation is effected. The English government will provide for their return to France, which will take place by detachments of about one hundred and fifty or two hundred men at a time. A sufficient number of French medical officers shall be left behind to attend them.

Art. 10. As soon as the vessels employed to carry the army to France shall have disembarked in the harbors specified, or in any other of the ports of France to which the stress of weather may force them, every facility shall be given to them to return to England without delay, and security against capture until their arrival in a friendly port.

Art. 11. The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, and within a distance of about two leagues from it. The English army will approach within three leagues of the capital, and will be so placed as to leave about one league between the two armies.

Art. 12. The forts of St. Julian, the Bugio, and Cascaes, shall be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the convention. Lisbon and its citadel, together with the forts and batteries as far as the lazaretta or Trafaria on one side, and Fort St. Joseph on the other, inclusively, shall be given up on the embarkation of the 2d division; as shall also the harbor and all armed vessels in it of every description, with their rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition. The fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, Peniché and

Palmela, shall be given up as soon as the British troops can arrive to occupy them. In the mean time, the general-in-chief of the British army will give notice of the present convention to the garrisons of those places, as also to the troops before them, in order to put a stop to all further hostilities.

Art. 13. Commissioners shall be named on both sides to regulate and accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon.

Art. 14. Should there arise doubts as to the meaning of any article, it will be explained favorably to the French army.

Art. 15. From the date of the ratification of the present convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims whatever, of the French government against subjects of Portugal, or any other individuals residing in this country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops, in the month of December, 1807, which may not have been paid up, are cancelled; and all sequestrations laid upon their property, movable or immovable, are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored to the proper owners.

Art. 16. All subjects of France, or of powers in friendship or alliance, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally in this country, shall be protected; their property of every kind, movable and immovable, shall be respected; and they shall be at liberty either to accompany the French army or to remain in Portugal. In either case their property is guaranteed to them, with the liberty of retaining or of disposing of it, and passing the produce of the sale thereof into France, or any other country where they may fix their residence, the space of one year being allowed them for that purpose. It is fully understood that shipping is excepted from this arrangement, only however in as far as regards leaving the port, and that none of the stipulations above mentioned can be made the pretext of any commercial speculations.

Art. 17. No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct during the period of the occupation of this country by the French army; and all those who have continued in the exercise of their employments, or who have accepted situations under the French government, are placed under the protection of the British commanders; they shall sustain no injury in their persons or property: it not having been at their option to be obedient or not to the French government, they are also at liberty to avail themselves of the stipulations of the 16th article.

Art. 18. The Spanish troops detained on board ship, in the port of Lisbon, shall be given up to the commander-in-chief of the British army, who engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French subjects, either military or civil, as may have been detained in Spain without having been taken in battle, or in consequence of military operations, but on occasion of the occurrences of the 29th of last May, and the days immediately following.

Art. 19. There shall be an immediate exchange established for all ranks of prisoners made in Portugal since the commencement of the present hostilities.

Art. 20. Hostages of the rank of field officers shall be mutually furnished, on the part of the British army and navy, and on that of the French army, for the reciprocal guarantee of the present convention. The officer of the British army shall be restored on the completion of the articles which concern the army; and the officer of the navy on the disembarkation of the French troops in their own country. The like is to take place on the part of the French army.

Art. 21. It shall be allowed to the general-in-chief of the French army

to send an officer to France with intelligence of the present convention. A vessel will be furnished by the British Admiral to convey him to Bordeaux or Rochefort.

Art. 22. The British Admiral will be invited to accommodate his excellency the commander-in-chief and the other principal officers of the French army on board ships of war.

Done and concluded at Lisbon this 30th day of August, 1808.

(Signed)

GEORGE MURRAY, Quartermaster-General.
KELLERMANN, le Général de Division.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLES.

Art. 1 The individuals in the civil employment of the army made prisoners either by the British troops or by the Portuguese, in any part of Portugal, will be restored as is customary, without exchange.

Art. 2. The French army shall be subsisted from its own magazines up to the day of embarkation. The garrisons up to the day of the evacuation of the fortresses. The remainder of the magazines shall be delivered over in the usual forms to the British government, which charges itself with the subsistence of the men and horses of the army from the above-mentioned periods till their arrival in France, under the condition of being reimbursed by the French government for the excess of the expense beyond the estimation, to be made by both parties, of the value of the magazines delivered up to the British army. The provisions on board the ships of war in the possession of the French army will be taken on account by the British government, in like manner with the magazines of the fortresses.

Art. 3. The general commanding the British troops will take the necessary measures for re-establishing the free circulation of the means of subsistence between the country and the capital.

Done and concluded at Lisbon this 30th day of August, 1808.

(Signed)

GEORGE MURRAY, Quartermaster-General.
KELLEMAN, le Général de Division.

Ratified, &c. &c.

No. XI.

1st. LETTER FROM BARON VON DECKEN TO THE GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY IN PORTUGAL.

Oporto, August 18, 1808.

SIR,—The Bishop of Oporto having expressed to me his wish to see me in private, in order to make me an important communication, which he desired to be kept secret, I went to his palace last night at a late hour. The Bishop told me that he had taken the government of Portugal in his hands to satisfy the wish of the people, but with the intention to re-establish the government of his lawful sovereign; and he hoped that his Majesty the King of Great Britain had no other point in view in sending troops to this country. After having given him all possible assurance on that head, the Bishop continued that as the Prince Regent, in leaving Portugal, had established a regency for the government of this country during his absence, he considered it his duty to resign the government into the hands of that regency as soon as possible. My answer was, that I had no instruction

from my government on that head, but that I begged him to consider whether the cause of his sovereign would not be hurt in resigning the government into the hands of a Regency which, from its having acted under the influence of the French, had lost the confidence of the nation, and whether it would not be more advisable for him to keep the government until the pleasure of the Prince Regent was known. The Bishop allowed that the Regency appointed by the Prince Regent did not possess the confidence of the people, that several members of it had acted in such a manner as to show themselves as friends and partisans of the French, and that, at all events, all the members of the late Regency could not be re-established in their former power; but he was afraid that the provinces of Estremadura, Alemtejo, and Algarvé would not acknowledge his authority if the British government did not interfere. After a very long conversation, it was agreed that I should inform our ministers with what the Bishop had communicated to me, and in order to lose no time in waiting for an answer, the Bishop desired me to communicate the same to you, expressing a wish that you would be pleased to write to him an official letter, in order to express your desire that he might continue the government until the pleasure of his sovereign was known, for the sake of the operations of the British and Portuguese troops under your command.

The secretary of the Bishop, who acted as interpreter, told me afterwards in private, that the utmost confusion would arise from the Bishop resigning the government at this moment, or associating with people who were neither liked nor esteemed by the nation.

I beg leave to add, that although the Bishop expressed the contrary, yet it appeared to me that he was not averse to his keeping the government in his hands, if it could be done by the interference of our government. I have the honor to be, &c. &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK VON DECKEN, Brig-Gen.

2nd. DITTO TO DITTO.

Oporto, August 22, 1808.

SIR,—Your Excellency will have received the secret letter which I had the honor to send you by Brigadier-General Stuart, on the 18th, respecting the communication of his Excellency the Bishop of Oporto relative to his resignation of the government into the hands of the Regency established by the Prince Regent. In addition to what I have had the honor to state upon that subject, I beg leave to add, that his Excellency the Bishop has this day desired me to make your Excellency aware, in case it might be wished that he should keep the government in his hands until the pleasure of the Prince Regent may be known, that he could not leave Oporto; and the seat of government must in that case necessarily remain in this town. His Excellency the Bishop thinks it his duty to inform you of this circumstance as soon as possible, as he foresees that the city of Lisbon will be preferred for the seat of government, as soon as the British army have got possession of it. If the seat of the temporary government should remain at Oporto, the best method to adopt with respect to the other provinces of Portugal appears to be, to cause them to send deputies to that place for the purpose of transacting business relative to their own provinces; in the same manner as the provinces of Entre Douro y Minho and Tras os Montes now send their representatives. One of the principal reasons why his Excellency the Bishop can only accede to continue at the head of the government under the condition of remaining at Oporto is, because he is persuaded that the

inhabitants of this town will not permit him to leave it, unless by order of the Prince Regent. It might also be advisable to keep the seat of government at Oporto, as it may be supposed that Lisbon will be in a state of great confusion for the first two months after the French have left it. I have the honor to be, sir, &c. &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK VON DECKEN, Brig.-Gen.

3rd.

Oporto, August 28.

SIR,—Your Excellency will have received my secret letters of the 18th and 22d instant relative to the temporary government of this kingdom. His Excellency the Bishop of Oporto has received lately deputies from the province of Alemtejo and the kingdom of Algarve. Part of Estremadura, viz., the town of Leiria, has also submitted to his authority; and it may be therefore said that the whole kingdom of Portugal has acknowledged the authority of the temporary government, of which the Bishop of Oporto is at the head, with the exception of Lisbon and the town of Setubal, (St. Ubes.) Although the reasons why these towns have not yet acknowledged the authority of the temporary government may be explained by their being in possession of the French; yet the Bishop is convinced that the inhabitants of Lisbon will refuse to submit to the temporary government of Oporto, in which they will be strongly supported by the members of the former Regency established by the Prince Regent, who of course will be very anxious to resume their former power. The Bishop in assuming the temporary government complied only with the wishes of the people: he was sure that it was the only means of saving the country; but having had no interest of his own in view, he is willing to resign the authority, which he has accepted with reluctance, as soon as he is convinced that it can be done without hurting the cause of his sovereign, and throwing the country into confusion. There is every reason to apprehend that the inhabitants of the three northern provinces of Portugal will never permit the Bishop to resign the government, and submit to the former Regency. They feel extremely proud of having first taken to arms, and consider themselves as the deliverers and saviors of their country; and as the inhabitants of Lisbon will be as much disinclined to submit to the temporary government of Oporto, a division of the provinces, which will excite internal commotion, will naturally follow, if not supported by your Excellency. It has appeared to me that the best way to reconcile these opposite parties would be in endeavoring to unite the present government at Oporto with such of the members of the former Regency who have not forfeited by their conduct the confidence of the people; and having opened my idea to the Bishop, his answer was, that he would not object to it if proposed by you. I therefore take the liberty of suggesting, that the difficulty above mentioned would be in a great measure removed if your Excellency would be pleased to make it known after Lisbon has surrendered, that until the pleasure of the Prince Regent was known, you would consider the temporary government established at Oporto as the lawful government, with the addition of the four members of the late Regency, who have been pointed out to me by the Bishop as such who have behaved faithfully to their sovereign and country—viz., *Don Francisco Noronha, Francisco da Cunha, the Monteiro Mor, and the Principal Castro*. These members to be placed at the head of the different departments, and to consider the Bishop as the President, whose directions they are to follow—a plan which will meet with the less diffi-

culty, as the President of the former Regency, named by the Prince Regent, has quitted Portugal, and is now in France. The circumstance that Lisbon is now in a state of the greatest confusion will furnish a fair pretext for fixing the seat of the temporary government in the first instance at Oporto, to which place the gentlemen above-named would be ordered to repair without loss of time, and to report themselves to the Bishop. Independent of the reasons which I had the honor of stating to your Excellency in my letter of the 22d instant, why it is impossible for the Bishop to leave Oporto, I must beg leave to add, that, from what I understand, the greater part of the inhabitants of Lisbon are in the French interest, and that it will require a garrison of British troops to keep that city in order. The Bishop of Oporto, although convinced of the necessity of considering Lisbon at present as a military station, and of placing a British commandant and a British garrison there, yet from a desire that the feelings of the inhabitants might be wounded as little as possible, wishes that you would be pleased to put also some Portuguese troops in garrison at Lisbon, together with a Portuguese commandant, who, though entirely under the orders of the British governor, might direct the police in that town, or at least be charged with putting into execution such orders as he may receive from the British governor under that head. If your Excellency should be pleased to approve of this proposal, the Bishop thinks Brigadier Antonio Pinto Bacelar to be the properest officer of those who are now with the Portuguese army to be stationed at Lisbon, and who might also be directed to organize the military force of the province of Estremadura. The Bishop is fully convinced that the temporary government of the country cannot exist without the support of British troops: he hopes that our government will leave a corps of 6000 men in Portugal after the French have been subdued, until the Portuguese troops may be sufficiently organized and disciplined to be able to protect their own government. I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient and humble servant,

FREDERICK VON DECKEN, Brig.-Gen.

No. XII.

[Translation.]

LETTER FROM GENERAL LEITE TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND MOST EXCELLENT SIR,—Strength is the result of union, and those who have reason to be grateful should be most urgent in their endeavors to promote it. I therefore feel it to be my duty to have recourse to your Excellency to know how I should act without disturbing the union so advantageous to my country. The Supreme Junta of the Portuguese government established at Oporto, which I have hitherto obeyed as the representatives of my sovereign, have sent me orders by an officer, dated the 1st instant, to take possession of the fortress of Elvas, as soon as it shall be evacuated. After having seen those same Spaniards who got possession of our strong places as friends, take so much upon themselves as even to prevent the march of the garrison which I had ordered to replace the losses sustained in the battle of Evora, which deprived me of the little obedience that was shown by the city of Beja, always favored by the Spanish authorities; after having seen the Portuguese artillery, which was saved after the

said battle, taken possession of by those same Spaniards, who had lost their own, without being willing even to lend me two three-pounders to enable me to join his Excellency the Monteiro Mor; after having seen the arms which were saved from the destructive grasp of the common enemy made use of by those same Spaniards *who promised much and did nothing*; after having seen a Spanish brigadier dispute my authority at Campo Mayor, where I was President of the Junta, and from whence his predecessor had taken away 60,000 crowns without rendering any account; in a word, after having seen the march of these Spaniards marked by the devastation of our fields, and the country deserted to avoid the plunder of their light troops, I cannot for a moment mistake the cause of the orders given by the Supreme Junta of Oporto. A corps of English troops having yesterday passed Estrémos, on their road to Elvas, knowing that in a combined army no officer should undertake any operation which may be intended for others, thereby counteracting each other, I consulted Lieutenant-General Hierre (Hope), who has referred me to your Excellency, to whom in consequence I send Lieutenant-Colonel the Marquis of Terney, my quartermaster-general, that he may deliver you this letter, and explain verbally everything you may wish to know which relates to my sovereign and the good of my country, already so much indebted to the English nation.

God preserve your Excellency many years.

(Signed) FRANCISCO DE PAULO LEITE, Lieutenant-General.

(Dated) *Estrémos, 16th September, 1808.*

To the most illustrious and most excellent
Sir Hew Dalrymple.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR HEW DALRYMPLE TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
SIR JOHN HOPE.

Head-quarters, Benefico, 25th Sept., 1808.

SIR,—Impediments having arisen to the fulfilment of that article of the convention which relates to the cession of Elvas by the French to the British army, in consequence of the unexpected and unaccountable conduct of the commander-in-chief of the army of Estremadura, in bombarding that place and endeavoring to impose upon the French garrison terms of capitulation different from those which were agreed upon by the British and French generals in chief; and as the British corps sent to take possession of the above fortress, and to hold it in the name of the Prince Regent until reinforced by a body of Portuguese troops, is not of sufficient strength to preclude the possibility of insult, should the General above mentioned persevere in the contemptuous and hostile disposition he has hitherto shown; I have therefore thought it advisable to order the remainder of your division, and General Paget's advanced guard, to cross the Tagus, and to occupy cantonments as near as possible to the place above-mentioned. In the mean time Colonel Graham is gone to Badajos to expostulate with General Galluzzo on the singular and very inexplicable line of conduct he has seen cause to adopt.

No. XIII.

JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF
SIR JOHN MOORE AND OTHER PERSONS.

SECTION I.—RELATING TO WANT OF MONEY.

Sir John Moore to Lord William Bentinck, October 22, 1808.

“Sir David Baird has unfortunately been sent out without money. He has applied to me, and I have none to give him.” . . . “I undertake my march in the hope that some will arrive; if it does not, it will add to the number of a great many distresses.”

Sir John Moore to General Hope, October 22, 1808.

“Baird has sent his aide-de-camp Gordon to me: he is without money, and his troops only paid to September. He can get none at Coruña.”

Sir John Moore to Sir David Baird, October 22, 1808.

“We are in such want of money at this place, that it is with difficulty I have been able to spare 8000*l.*, which went to you in the Champion this day.”

Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, October 27.

“It is upon the general assurance of the Spanish government that I am leading the army into Spain without any established magazines. In this situation nothing is more essentially requisite than money, and unfortunately we have been able to procure very little here.”

Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, November 10, 1808.

“I understand from Sir David Baird that you were kind enough to lend him 40,000*l.* from the money you brought with you from England. We are in the greatest distress for money. I doubt if there is wherewithal after the 24th of this month to pay the troops their subsistence.”

Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, November 24, 1808.

“I am without a shilling of money to pay, and I am in daily apprehension that from the want of it our supplies will be stopped. It is impossible to describe the embarrassments we are thrown into from the want of that essential article.”

Admiral de Courcy to Mr. Stuart, Coruña, October 21, 1808.

“Mr. Frere will have told you that the Semiramis has brought a million of dollars, in order to be at his disposal, besides 50,000*l.* in dollars, which are to be presented to the Marquis of Romana’s army. In the mean time, the British troops remain in their transports at Coruña, uncertain whether they shall be invited to the war, and *without a shilling to pay their expenses.*”

SECTION II.—RELATING TO ROADS.

*Sir John Moore to General Anstruther, at Almcida, dated Lisbon,
October 12, 1808.*

“A division under Beresford is marching upon Coimbra, and a part of it will proceed on to Oporto or not, as information is received from you that

the road from thence to Almeida is or is not practicable. Some officers of the Spanish engineers, employed in the quartermaster-general's department, with commissaries, are sent from Madrid to obtain information on the subjects you will want with respect to roads, subsistence, &c. &c., from Almeida to Burgos."

Sir John Moore to Lord William Bentinck, October 22, 1808.

"Colonel Lopez has no personal knowledge of this part of Spain; but what he has told me accords with other information I had before received, that the great Madrid road was the only one by which artillery could travel; the French brought theirs from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara, but by this it was destroyed." . . . "The difficulty of obtaining correct information of roads, and the difficulties attending the subsistence of troops through Portugal, are greater than you can believe."

Sir John Hope to Sir John Moore, Madrid, November 20.

"I sent Wills of the engineers by Placentia to Salamanca, and before this time I suppose he may have made his report to you of the roads from the Tagus at Almarez and Puente de Cardinal to Salamanca." . . . "Delancy is upon this road, and I have directed him to communicate with you at Salamanca, as soon as possible."

Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, October 27, 1808.

"I am under the necessity of sending Lieutenant-General Hope, with the artillery, &c., by the great road leading from Badajos to Madrid, as every information agreed that no other was fit for the artillery."

Substance of a report from Captain Carmichael Smyth, of the Engineers, 26th December, 1808.

"The country round about Astorga is perfectly open, and affords no advantage whatsoever to a small corps to enable it to oppose a large force with any prospect of success. In retreating, however, towards Villa Franca, at the distance of about two leagues from Astorga, the hills approaching each other form some strong ground; and the high ground in particular in the rear of the village of Rodrigatos appears at first sight to offer a most advantageous position. One very serious objection presents itself nevertheless to our making a stand near Rodrigatos, or indeed at any position before we come to the village of Las Torres (about one league from Bemibre), as the talus or slope of the ground, from Manzanel (close to Rodrigatos) until Las Torres, would be in favor of an enemy, should we be forced at Rodrigatos, and we should be consequently obliged to retreat down hill for nearly two leagues, the enemy having every advantage that such a circumstance would naturally give them.

"From Las Torres to Bemibre the ground becomes more open, but with the disadvantage, however, of the slope being still against us. From Bemibre to Villa Franca there is great variety of ground, but no position that cannot easily be turned, excepting the ground in the rear of Calcavellos, and about one league in front of Villa Franca. This is by far the strongest position between Astorga and Villa Franca. It is also necessary to add, that the position at Rodrigatos can easily be turned by the Foncevadon road (which, before the establishment of the Camina Real, was the high road towards Coruña). This is not the case with the position in front of Villa Franca, as the Foncevadon road joins the Camina Real to Calcavellos in front of the proposed position."

Major Fletcher, Royal Engineers, to Sir John Moore, Betanzos, Jan. 5, 1809.

"I have the honor to report to your Excellency that, in obedience to your orders, I have examined the neck of land between the harbor of Ferrol and the bridge of Puente de Humo. This ground does not appear to possess any position that has not several defects." . . . "I did not find any ground so decidedly advantageous and containing a small space, as to render it tenable for the vanguard of an army to cover the embarkation of the main body." . . . "I should have sent this report much sooner, but found it impossible to procure post-horses until my arrival at Lugo, and since that time I have had very bad ones."

Ditto to Ditto, Coruña, Jan. 6, 1809.

"I am therefore led to suggest, that as Coruña is fortified, riveted, and tolerably flanked (though the ground about it is certainly not favorable), as it could not be carried by a coup-de-main if properly defended, as it contains a great quantity of cover for men, and as, even against artillery, it might make resistance of some days, it may be worth consideration whether, under present circumstances, it may not be desirable to occupy it in preference to the peninsula of Betanzos, should the army not turn off for Vigo."

SECTION III.—RELATING TO EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Oct. 9, 1808.

"At this instant the army is without equipment of any kind, either for the carriage of the light baggage of regiments, artillery stores, commissariat stores, or other appendages of an army, and not a magazine is formed on any of the routes by which we are to march."

Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Oct. 18, 1808.

"In none of the departments is there any want of zeal, but in some important ones there is much want of experience." . . . "I have no hope of getting forward at present with more than the light baggage of the troops, the ammunition immediately necessary for the service of the artillery, and a very scanty supply of medicines."

Sir John Moore's Journal.

"My anxiety is to get out of the ragged roads of Portugal before the rains."

Sir John Moore to Lord Wm. Bentinck, Oct. 22, 1808.

"The season of the year admitting of no delay, there was a necessity for beginning the march, and trusting for information and supplies as we got on; unfortunately, our commissariat is inexperienced, and a scoundrel of a contractor, Mr. Sattaro, has deceived us."

Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore, Oct. 29, 1808.

"The want of provisions for the men and forage for the horses has been one of the most serious obstacles we have had to contend with. Nor do I at present feel at all easy upon that subject." . . . "The horses are suffering very severely, both for want of proper accommodations and food." . . . "From Lord Castlereagh's letter, I was led to expect that every preparation for our equipment had been made previous to our leaving England; I need

hardly say how different the case was, and how much I have been disappointed."

Mr. Stuart to Sir John Moore, November 17, 1808.

"The continued slowness of the Junta is the only explanation I can offer for the want of proper arrangements on the routes for the reception of the English troops."

SECTION IV.—RELATING TO THE WANT OF INFORMATION.

Sir John Moore's Journal, November 28, 1808.

"I am not in communication with any of the (Spanish) generals, and neither know their plans nor those of the government. No channel of information has been opened to me, and I have no knowledge of the force or situation of the enemy, but what, as a stranger, I pick up."

Ditto, Salamanca.

"It is singular that the French have penetrated so far (Valladolid), and yet no sensation has been made upon the people. They seem to remain quiet, and the information was not known through any other channel but that of a letter from the Captain-General of the province to me."

Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore, Astorga, Nov. 19, 1808.

"The local authorities have not only failed in affording us the least benefit in that respect (supplies), but have neglected to give us any kind of information as to the proceedings of the armies or the motions of the enemy."

Ditto, Astorga, 23d November.

"It is clearly apparent how very much exaggerated the accounts generally circulated of the strength of the Spanish armies have been." . . . "It is very remarkable that I have not procured the least intelligence, or received any sort of communication from any of the official authorities at Madrid, or either of the Spanish generals."

Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore, Villafranca, Dec. 12, 1808.

"I also inclose a letter from the Marquis of Romana; you will be fully able to appreciate the degree of reliance that may be placed on the *verbal* communication made to him by the extraordinary courier from Madrid. It was from the same kind of authority that he derived the information he conveyed to me of a *supposed* brilliant affair at Somosierra, which turned out to be an inconsiderable skirmish altogether undeserving of notice."

Colonel Graham to Sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808.

"The deputies sent over knew nothing but just concerning their own provinces, and *pour se faire valoir*, they exaggerated everything; for example, those of the Asturias talked louder than anybody, and Asturias as yet has never produced a man to the army; thus government, with all their wish to get information (which cannot be doubted), fail in the proper means."

Lord Wm. Bentinck to Sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 20, 1808.

"I must at the same time take the liberty of stating my belief, that reliance cannot be placed upon the correctness of information, even if such

information should not be kept back, which does not come through the channel of a British officer. It is the choice of officers rather than the system, that seems to have failed."

Mr. Stuart to Sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 19, 1808.

"In your direct communications with Spanish generals, you must, however, be contented with their version of the state of affairs, which I do not think can always be relied on, because they only put matters in the view in which they wish you to see them."

Ditto, Nov. 29.

"The calculation of force which the Junta hope may be united in the army under your command will be as follows, if no impediment prevents the different corps reaching the points selected for their junction."

		Remarks by Colonel Napier.
British	35,000	They were only 23,500.
La Romana	20,000	. . . only 5000 armed.
San Juan	15,000	Totally dispersed.
Levies from the south, say	10,000	None ever arrived.
	<hr/>	
	80,000	Real total, 28,500.

Lieut. Boothby, Royal Engineers, to Sir John Moore, La Puebla, Jan. 1, 1809.

"I shall consider of any means that may more completely insure the earliest information of the enemy's movements towards this quarter; but the Spaniards are the most difficult people in the world to employ in this way, they are so slow, so talkative, and so credulous."

SECTION V.—RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF THE LOCAL JUNTAS.

Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore, Coruña, Oct. 24, 1808.

"The answer of the supreme government to our application, as read by Mr. Frere last night in the presence of the Junta of this province, is certainly very different from what I expected. Instead of expressing an anxiety to promote our views, and dissatisfaction at the impediments thrown in the way of our measures by the Gallician government, it merely permits us to land here in the event of its being found impracticable to send us by sea to St. Andero, and directs that, if our disembarkation takes place, it should be made in detachments of 2000 or 3000 men each! to be successively pushed on into Castile, without waiting for the necessary equipment of mules and horses."

Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore, Coruña, Nov. 7.

"We have received no sort of assistance from the government."

Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore, Astorga, Nov. 19.

"Had the Spanish government afforded us any active assistance, the state of our equipments would have been much more advanced."

Colonel Graham to Sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808.

"All this, instead of at once appointing the fittest men in the country to be ministers, looks much like private interest and patronage being the objects more than the public good."

Ditto, Tudela, Nov. 9, 1808.

"It is hoped that the Aragonese army will come over to fill it" (the line) "up, but being an independent command, no order has yet been sent. An express went after Palafox, who will return here this morning, and then it is hoped that he will send an order to General O'Neil at Sanguesa to march instantly; and further it is hoped that General O'Neil will obey this order without waiting for one from his immediate chief, Palafox, the Captain-General of Aragon, who is at Zaragoza; at all events, there is a loss of above twenty-four hours by the happy system of independent commands, which may make the difference of our having 18,000 men more or less in the battle that may be fought whenever the French are ready." . . . "Making me compliments of there being no secrets with their allies, they" (the members of the council of war) "obliged me to sit down, which I did for a quarter of an hour, enough to be quite satisfied of the miserable system established by this Junta." . . . "In short, I pitied poor Castaños and poor Spain, and came away disgusted to the greatest degree."

Colonel Graham to Lord W. Bentinck, Centruenigo, Nov. 13, 1808.

"If anything can make the Junta sensible of the absurdity of their conduct, this will. It would indeed have been more felt if a great part of the division had been lost, as might well have happened. But the difficulty of passing so many men with artillery, and in small boats, and the time that would have been required so great, that I can hardly persuade myself these people can be so foolish as ever seriously to have entertained the idea. But with whatever intentions, whether merely as a pretence for assuming the command for the purpose of irritating Castaños; whether from the silly vanity of exercising power, and doing something which, if by great good luck it had succeeded, might have proved what might be done with a more active commander; or whether from a real conviction of the excellence of the scheme,—it must be equally evident to every military man, indeed to every man of common sense, that it is impossible things can succeed in this way; and then the Junta itself interferes, and to worse purpose."

Castaños' Vindication.

"The nation is deceived in a thousand ways; as an example, it is believed that our armies were greatly superior to those of the enemy, reckoning 80,000 men that of the centre, when your excellencies" (the Junta) "knew that it only amounted to 26,000 men." . . . "Madrid possessed money and riches; the noble and loyal inhabitants of that capital wished to give both the one and the other; but whilst the armies were suffering the horrors of famine, naked, and miserable, the possessions and jewels of the good Spaniards remained quiet in Madrid, and they might be soon seized by the tyrant, as they were in the end."

Stuart's Despatch, August 7, 1808.

"No province shares the succors granted by Great Britain, although they may not be actually useful to themselves. No gun-boats have been sent from Ferrol to protect Santander or the coast of Biscay; and the Asturians have in vain asked for artillery from the dépôts of Galicia. The stores landed at Gihon, and not used by the Asturians, have remained in that port and in Oviedo, although they would have afforded a seasonable relief to the army of General Blake. The money brought by the Pluto for Leon, which has not raised a man, remains in the port where it was landed."

Major Cox to Sir Hew Dalrymple, Seville, August 3, 1808.

"I freely confess that I cannot help feeling some degree of apprehension that this great and glorious cause may be ruined by the baneful effects of jealousy and division."

Ditto, August 27.

"The fact is, their" (the Junta of Seville) "attention has been for some time past so much occupied by vain and frivolous disputes, and by views of private interest and advantage, and they seem to have neglected entirely every concern of real importance, and almost to have lost sight of the general interests of the country." . . . "A million of dollars have, I understand, been sent out." . . . "It certainly would not be prudent to intrust so large a sum to the management of the temporary government of a particular province, without having a sufficient security for its proper application. My own opinion is, that the less money which is given to them the better, until the general government is formed. This Junta has shown too evident signs of a wish to aggrandize themselves, and a disinclination to afford those aids to other provinces, which they had it in their power to grant, not to afford just grounds of suspicion, that their boasted loyalty and patriotism have at times been mixed with unworthy considerations of self-interest and personal advantage."

Ditto, Sept. 5.

"By Mr. Duff's present instructions, he would have had no option" (distributing the money), "even though the *iniquitous project of partition*, which your Excellency knows was once contemplated, were still in existence."

Major Cox to Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sept. 7.

"A dispute between the two Juntas" (Seville and Granada), "which had nearly been productive of the most serious consequences, and would probably have ended in open hostility, had it not been prevented by the moderate, but decided, conduct of General Castaños."

Ditto, Seville, Sept. 10.

"The Supreme Junta of Seville have latterly manifested very different views, and, I am sorry to say, they seem almost to have lost sight of the common cause, and to be wholly addicted to their particular interest. Instead of directing their efforts to the restoration of their legitimate sovereign and the established form of a national government, they are seeking the means of fixing the permanency of their own, and endeavoring to separate its interests from those of the other parts of Spain. To what other purposes can be attributed the order given to General Castaños, not to march on any account beyond Madrid? To what the instructions given to their deputy, Don Andrea Miniano, to uphold the authority and preserve the integrity of the Junta of Seville; to distinguish the army to which he is attached by the name of the army of Andalusia; to preserve constantly the appellation, and not to receive any orders but what came directly from this government? And above all, what other motive could induce the strong and decided measure of enforcing obedience to those orders, by withholding from General Castaños the means of maintaining his troops, in case of his refusing to comply with them?" . . . "What has been the late occupation of the Junta of Seville? Setting aside the plans which were formed for augmenting the Spanish army in those provinces, and neglecting

the consideration of those which have been proposed in their stead, their attention has been taken up in the appointment of secretaries to the different departments, in disposing of places of emolument, in making promotions in the army, appointing canons in the church, and instituting orders of knighthood. Such steps as these make their designs too evident."

Captain Carrol to Sir David Baird, Llanes, Dec. 17, 1808.

"This province" (Asturias), "the first to declare war with France, has during seven months taken no steps that I can discover to make arrangements against the event of the enemy's entering the province."
 "What has been done with the vast sums of money that came from England? you will naturally ask. Plundered and misapplied: every person who had or has anything to do with money concerns endeavoring to keep in hand all he can, and be ready, let affairs turn out as they may, to help himself."

General Broderick to Mr. Stuart, Reynosa, 11th Sept., 1808.

"The fact is, the Junta of Galicia thinks that this army having marched to the assistance and protection of these countries, the latter ought to pay the expense, and therefore refuse the supplies, which Blake is unwilling to press."

Lord William Bentinck to Sir Hew Dalrymple, Seville, Sept. 19, 1808.

"Notwithstanding the professions of the Junta, their conduct has evidently fallen short of them, and I think it would be very desirable that more money should not fall into their hands."

Major Coxe to Sir Hew Dalrymple, Seville, 10th and 27th July.

"The proclamation of Florida Blanca was received here some time ago, but was carefully suppressed by the government."

"Other publications, containing maxims similar to those inculcated by the proclamation of Florida Blanca, have appeared, but are suppressed here with equal care."

SECTION VI.—CENTRAL JUNTA.

Mr. Stuart to Mr. Canning, Sept. 26, 1808.

"I have heard of several circumstances since my arrival at Aranjuez, which throw a light upon the conduct of General Cuesta, and, if well founded, go far to prove the existence of projects incompatible with the formation of any regular government in the country. I cannot say they are openly avowed by either party, although the measures of precaution, which the leading members of the Junta have deemed expedient, go far to prove that the whispers which circulate are not altogether without foundation. It is said that the difficulty of forming a Central Junta induced Cuesta to propose to Castaños the establishment of a military power, alleging that, in the present situation of the corps under his command, he would take on himself to prevent the union of the Central Junta, and that his influence with the officers in other parts of Spain would enable him to crush all opposition, by the instant disorganization of the provisional government in the provinces of the kingdom. And I know, indeed, that the movement of Cuesta from Arevola to Segovia gave so much alarm at Madrid, and so fully convinced the public that he was going to carry this design into execution.

that Castaños was formally requested to give orders for the approach of a division to Madrid, to be ready to oppose any act of violence calculated to bias the determination of the persons about to form the government."

Mr. Stuart to Mr. Canning, Oct. 9, 1808.

"I have received the paper (of which I inclose a copy) from the Supreme Junta. Although somewhat startled at the exorbitancy of the demand, I was no less so at the language in which the demand is conveyed, and the conversation I have subsequently had upon the subject. However willing I am to make every possible allowance for the embarrassments of this rising government, and the inexperience or intemperance of many among its members, I cannot but feel that the generosity of Great Britain not only called for some acknowledgment of what has been already done in favor of Spain, but that it likewise might have deserved a petition couched in terms less resembling a military requisition. When it was observed to Mr. de Villar (the author of the note) that the demand for specie much exceeded the means of any country in the world, he said, credit or specie was indifferent, provided they could obtain a part of what was requisite for present services. Mr. de Jovellanos was not so moderate, and *literally* proposed that I should draw bills at once on the treasury for the whole, or at least engage the faith of his Majesty's government by such a promise as should enable them to raise money by anticipation, upon my signature, until the arrival of a British subsidy." . . . "It was seriously demanded also, that the English government should seize the sums which the Prince of Peace and other friends of the French interest *are supposed* to have in the English funds; nor could my explanation, citing several well-known instances to prove the impossibility of such a measure, and the determination to keep inviolable whatever was deposited under the guardianship of the public faith, prevent Mr. de Jovellanos and others from testifying some ill-humor and incredulity at my answer."

Lord William Bentinck to Sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808.

"I am sorry to say that the new government do not seem to proceed with the despatch and energy which the critical situation of the country demands."

Ditto to Sir H. Burrard, Madrid, Oct. 8.

"In my last letter I adverted to the inactivity and apparent supineness which prevailed in the Central Council in regard to the military, as well as to the other business of the other government."

Ditto to Sir John Moore, Nov. 8.

"But it is upon the spot where the exact state of the armies, and the extraordinary inefficiency of the government, whose past conduct promises so little for the future, are known, that the danger must be more justly appreciated." . . . "The most simple order, however urgent the case, cannot be obtained from the government without a difficulty, solicitation, and delay that is quite incredible."

Sir John Hope to Sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 20, 1808.

"It is perfectly evident that they" (the Junta) "are altogether without a plan as to their future military operations, either in the case of success or

misfortune. Every branch is affected by the disjointed and inefficient construction of their government."

Mr. Stuart to Sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 18, 1808.

"Lord William Bentinck, as well as myself, have made repeated representations, and I have given in paper after paper to obtain something like promptitude and vigor; but though loaded with fair promises in the commencement, we scarcely quit the members of the Junta before their attention is absorbed in petty pursuits, and the wrangling which impedes even the simplest arrangements necessary for the interior government of a country." . . . "In short, we are doing what we can, not what we wish; and I assure you we have infamous tools to work with."

Ditto, Seville, Jan. 2, 1809.

"Morla's treason is abused, but passed over; and the arrival of money from Mexico, which is really the arrival of spoil for the French, seems to have extinguished every sentiment the bad views and the desperate state of things ought to have created."

Ditto, Jan. 10, 1809.

"Castaños, Heredia, Castelar, and Galluzzo are all here. These unfortunate officers are either prisoners or culprits, waiting the decision of government on their conduct in the late transactions. If the state of affairs should allow the government to continue in existence, they will probably wait many months, for no determination is to be expected from people who have in no one instance punished guilt or rewarded merit since they ruled the country. The Junta indeed, to say the truth, is at present absolutely null, and although they represent the sovereign authority, I have never witnessed the exercise of their power for the public good."

Mr. Frere to Sir John Moore, Las Santos, Dec. 16, 1808.

"The subject of the ships in Cadiz had not escaped me, but I thought it so *very dangerous* to suggest to the Junta any idea except that of living and dying on Spanish ground, that I avoided the mention of any subject that could seem to imply that I entertained any other prospects."

SECTION VII.—RELATING TO THE PASSIVE STATE OF THE PEOPLE.

Sir John Moore's Journal, Dec. 9, 1808.

"In this part the people are passive. We find the greatest difficulty to get people to bring in information."

Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Sahagun, Dec. 23, 1808.

"If the Spaniards are enthusiastic, or much interested in this cause, their conduct is the most extraordinary that was ever exhibited."

Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Astorga, Dec. 31, 1808.

"I arrived here yesterday, where, contrary to his promise, and to my expectation, I found the Marquis la Romana, with a great part of his troops. Nobody can describe his troops to be worse than he does, and he complains as much as we do of the indifference of the inhabitants, his disappointment

at their want of enthusiasm; and said to me in direct terms, that had he known how things were, he would neither have accepted the command, nor have returned to Spain. With all this, however, he talks of attacks and movements which are quite absurd, and then returns to the helpless state of his army and of the country."

Mr. Stuart to Sir John Moore, Nov. 17, 1808.

"The tranquillity of Madrid is truly wonderful."

Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore, Dec. 6.

"Destitute as we are of magazines, and without receiving even a show of assistance, either from the government or inhabitants of the country, who, on the contrary, in many instances, even thwarted our plans and measures, we could not have advanced without exposing ourselves to almost certain destruction."

Sir David Baird to Lord Castlereagh, Astorga, Nov. 22, 1808.

"Major Stuart, of the 95th regiment, who was despatched in front of this place to obtain information, reports that the inhabitants appear perfectly depressed by their losses, and seem to abandon all hope of making a successful resistance."

Captain Carrol to Sir John Moore, Dec. 17, 1808.

"On my arrival at Oviedo all was confusion and dismay; the confidence between the people, the army, and the Junta destroyed." . . . "Is it to be expected that the peasantry can be as hearty in the cause of patriotism as if they were treated with justice?"

Lieut. Boothby to Sir John Moore, La Puebla, Jan. 1, 1809.

"The Spanish soldiers now here (about 700) are merely on their way to the Marquis de la Romana; and as to any neighboring passes, there are no people whom I can call upon to occupy them, or should expect to defend them, however naturally strong they may be, for I see no people who are thinking of the enemy's advance with any sentiments beyond passive dislike, and hopes of protection from God and the English army."

Extract from General Fane's Journal, 1808-9.

"Five hundred and twenty-nine miles of our marches have been in Spain, and notwithstanding all we have read about Spanish patriotism, we have never been joined by *one man*, nor have we seen *one corps in arms*. The people have offered us *no assistance*; while not even a cart or a guide have been to be procured but by *force*, and by that measure we have generally been obliged to obtain our quarters. How our ministers could have been so deceived as to the state of the country is inconceivable."

The Prince of Neufchatel to the Duke of Dalmatia, Dec. 10, 1808.

"The city of Madrid is quite tranquil, the shops are all open, the public amusements are resumed."

General Thouvenot to the Prince of Neufchatel, St. Sebastian, 29th Nov., 1808.

"The successes obtained by the armies of the Emperor, and those which

are also foreseen, begin to make a sensible impression upon the authorities of the country, who become from day to day more affable towards the French, and more disposed to consider the King as their legitimate sovereign."

The Commandant Meslin to the Prince of Neufchatel, Vittoria, 29th Nov., 1808.

"The public feeling is still bad, still incredulous of our successes." . . .
"As to the tranquillity of the country, it appears certain."

Mr. Frere to Sir John Moore, Merida, Dec. 14, 1808.

"A thousand barriers would be interposed against that deluge of panic which sometimes overwhelms a whole nation, and of which at one time I was afraid I saw the beginning in this country." . . . "The extinction of the popular enthusiasm in this country, and the means which exist for reviving it, would lead to a very long discussion."

SECTION VIII.—MISCELLANEOUS.

Lord Collingwood to Sir H. Dalrymple, Ocean, Cadiz, June 23, 1808.

"At Minorca and Majorca they describe themselves to be strong, and having nothing to apprehend. However, they made the proposal for entering into a convention with us for their defence, and in the course of it demanded money, arms, and the protection of the fleet. When, in return for them, it was required that their fleet should be given up to us, to be held for their King Ferdinand, or that a part of them should join our squadron against the enemy, they rejected all those proposals: so that whatever we did for them was to be solely for the honor of having their friendship."

Captain Whittingham to Sir Hew Dalrymple, June 12, 1808.

"12th June. I returned to Xeres at 3 o'clock, A. M. The General sent for me, and requested I would go without delay to Gibraltar, and inform Lieut.-General Sir Hew Dalrymple that he at present occupied Carmona with three thousand men (regulars), having his head-quarters at Utrera, where his regular force would amount to twelve thousand men; that it was not his intention to attempt to defend Seville; that the heavy train of artillery, consisting of eighty pieces, was already embarked for Cadiz, under the pretext that they were wanting for the defence of its works; and that everything was prepared for burning the harness, timbers, &c. &c., of the field-pieces; that he intended to fall gradually back upon Cadiz, if forced to retreat; and that he did not at present desire that any English troops should be landed till their numbers should amount to eight or ten thousand men, lest the ardor of the people should oblige him to commence an offensive system of warfare before the concentration of a considerable Spanish and English force should afford reasonable hopes of success."

Captain Whittingham to Sir Hew Dalrymple, Utrera, June 29, 1808.

"The President approved of the idea, condemned the policy which had led Spain to attempt to establish manufactures by force, and showed clearly that the result had been the loss of a considerable branch of the revenue, the increase of smuggling, and consequently an enormous expense, in the payment of nearly one hundred thousand custom or rather excise officers, distri-

buted about the country, and the ruin of numberless families seduced by the prospect of immediate profit to engage in illicit traffic."

Lord William Bentinck to Sir Hew Dalrymple, Madrid, Oct. 2, 1808.

"A passage of Lord Castlereagh's letter, of which I received from you a copy, instructed you, if possible, to ascertain the intentions of the Spanish government after the expulsion of the French. Though not positively directed by you to ask this information, yet the occasion appeared to make the question so natural, and seemingly of course, and even necessary, that I availed myself of it, and gave to General Castaños, to be laid before Count Florida Blanca, a memorandum of which I inclose a copy, marked A."

Extract from the copy marked A.

"It seems probable, in such case, that no diversion could be more effectual or more formidable to Bonaparte than the march of a large combined British and Spanish army over the Pyrenees, into that part of France where there are no fortified places to resist their passage into the very heart of the country, and into that part where great disaffection is still believed to exist."

No. XIV.

JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN MOORE'S CORRESPONDENCE.

Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Salamanca, Nov. 27, 1808.

"The movements of the French give us little time for discussion. As soon as the British army has formed a junction, I must, upon the supposition that Castaños is either beaten or retreated, march upon Madrid, and throw myself into the heart of Spain, and thus run all risks and share the fortunes of the Spanish nation, or I must fall back upon Portugal." . . . "The movement into Spain is one of greater hazard, as my retreat to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain. I shall be entirely in the power of the Spaniards; but perhaps this is worthy of risk, if the government and people of Spain are thought to have still sufficient energy, and the means to recover from their defeats; and by collecting in the south be able, with the aid of the British army, to resist, and finally repel, the formidable attack which is prepared against them."

Sir John Moore's Journal, Salamanca, Nov. 30, 1808.

"In the night of the 28th I received an express from Mr. Stuart, at Madrid, containing a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle, announcing the defeat of Castaños' army near Tudela. They seem to have made but little resistance, and are, like Blake's, flying; this renders my junction with Baird so extremely hazardous that I dare not attempt it; but even were it made, what chance has this army, now that all those of Spain are beaten, to stand against the force which must be brought against it? The French have eighty thousand in Spain, and thirty thousand were to arrive in twenty days from the 15th of this month. As long as Castaños' army remained there was a hope, but I now see none. I am therefore determined to withdraw the army."

Ditto, Dec. 9.

"After Castaños' defeat, the French marched from Madrid, the inhabitants flew to arms, barricaded their streets, and swore to die rather than submit. This has arrested the progress of the French, and Madrid still holds out: this is the first instance of enthusiasm shown; there is a chance that the example may be followed, and the people be roused; in which case there is still a chance that this country may be saved. Upon this chance I have stopped Baird's retreat, and am taking measures to form our junction whilst the French are wholly occupied with Madrid. We are bound not to abandon the cause as long as there is hope; but the courage of the populace of Madrid may fail, or at any rate they may not be able to resist: in short, in a moment things may be as bad as ever, unless the whole country is animated and flock to the aid of the capital, and in this part the people are passive."

Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Salamanca, Dec. 10, 1808.

"I certainly think the cause desperate, because I see no determined spirit anywhere, unless it be at Zaragoza. There is, however, a chance, and whilst there is that I think myself bound to run all risks to support it. I am now differently situated from what I was when Castaños was defeated: I have been joined by General Hope, the artillery, and all the cavalry (Lord Paget, with three regiments, is at Toro); and my junction with Sir David Baird is secure, though I have not heard from him since I ordered him to return to Astorga."

Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Sahagun, Dec. 12.

"I shall threaten the French communications and create a diversion, if the Spaniards can avail themselves of it; but the French have in the north of Spain from eighty to ninety thousand men, and more are expected. Your lordship may, therefore, judge what will be our situation if the Spaniards do not display a determination very different to any they have shown hitherto."

Sir John Moore's Journal. Sahagun, Dec. 24, 1808.

"I gave up the march on Carrion, which had never been undertaken but with a view of attracting the enemy's attention from the armies assembling in the south, and in the hope of being able to strike a blow at a weak corps, whilst it was still thought the British army was retreating into Portugal; for this I was aware I risked infinitely too much, but something, I thought, was to be risked for the honor of the service, and to make it apparent that we stuck to the Spaniards long after they themselves had given up their cause as lost."

Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Coruña, Jan. 13, 1809.

"Your lordship knows that had I followed my own opinion as a military man, I should have retired with the army from Salamanca. The Spanish armies were then beaten; there was no Spanish force to which we could unite; and from the character of the government, and the disposition of the inhabitants, I was satisfied that no efforts would be made to aid us, or favor the cause in which they were engaged. I was sensible, however, that the apathy and indifference of the Spaniards would never have been believed; that had the British been withdrawn, the loss of the cause would have been imputed to their retreat; and it was necessary to risk this army to convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the