

this total you deduct some millions for the specie necessary for the circulation of the country, it will

In 1790 there were struck at the mint in Mexico, of hard piastres in gold	622,044
In silver	17,435,644
TOTAL.....	18,057,688

In 1789 there were coined at Lima.....	765,762 piast.
Gold and silver	3,570,000
TOTAL.....	4,335,762

And in 1790, gold as well as silver.... 5,162,240

The same year the mines of Potosi produced 2,204 marks of gold, making 299,249 piastres; and 462,609 marks of silver, with which were coined 3,923,173, which altogether make

4,222,422

Besides, there were coined at Santiago, in Chili, 721,754 piastres of gold, and 146,132 of silver; together

867,886

Summary of the year 1790:

Mexico	18,057,688
Lima	5,162,240
Potosi	4,222,422
Chili	867,886
TOTAL.....	28,310,236

The general statement of the produce of the Spanish American mines was, therefore, in 1790, 28,310,236 piastres; of which there were only 4,020,000 in gold, without reckoning those that have been discovered this year in the vice-royalty of Santa Fe.

be seen that very little remains for fraudulent exportation. It cannot, moreover, be doubted, that

In the same year the vice-royalty of Buenos-Ayres counted 30 gold mines, 27 of silver, 7 of copper, 2 of tin, and 7 of lead; but their product is not known.

(Note of the third edition.)

Second note of the fourth edition.

We have now, in 1805, several additions and modifications to make to the foregoing note. We owe them in a great measure to the politeness of the most interesting of modern travellers, to a gentleman not less estimable for his morals than for the variety of his knowledge, and for his enlightened and indefatigable zeal, I mean M. de Humboldt.

At the time when Spain began to work her mines, and a great while after, she obtained no more than two or three millions of piastres per annum: at present the annual produce may be valued, as well in gold as silver, at thirty-five millions of hard piastres: of these,

Mexico alone gives	twenty-two
Peru	six
New Grenada or Santa Fe	two
Chili	two
Vice-royalty of Buenos-Ayres or Rio de la Plata, containing the famous Potosi,	three

The principal mines of America, then, are those of New Spain, or Mexico: the richest of all is *Guanaxoata*, the name of a city containing 70,000 inhabitants, and which alone produces from 5 to 6 millions of piastres. Then come those of *Zacatecas*, *Catorze*, and *Real del Monte*, the nearest to Mexico, capital of the vice-royalty.

The produce of all these mines of gold and silver has in-

since 1778 there have been exported from Spain for America, more wine, fruit, and manufactured goods than formerly; that many produc-

creased in a prodigious degree during the course of the last century.

In 1700 the produce on an average was	5,000,000 hard piastres:
In 1750	10,000,000
In 1785	19,000,000
In 1796	25,000,000
And now it is	35,000,000

It has been calculated that since the conquest till 1804 the mint at Mexico alone has coined no less than.. 1,920,000,000

What the proportion of gold and silver of this total produce is, will appear from the following.

Mexico, properly speaking, has no gold mines. There is only to the north of this vice-royalty a new colony settled, called *Sonora*, which produces, not in gold from the mines, but in gold dust, to the yearly amount of 700,000 hard piastres.

The mines of Popayan in New Granada, under which name are comprehended those of *Choco*, *Guamoca*, and *Quilichao*, amount to

The mines of Chili produce	2,000,000
Those of Peru (which is hardly credible, judging from their reputation)..	500,000

Total of the produce in gold.. 5,100,000

Therefore more than 30 millions remain for that of the silver mines.

In comparing the two preceding notes, the results of which are not essentially different, we think a precise notion may be formed of the actual produce of all the mines in Spanish America.

tions hitherto unknown come from the Spanish colonies; that those which used to come only in small quantities are now much multiplied, such as tobacco, sugar, coffee; that the culture of sugar in Cuba has been greatly improved, although still far below the prosperity to which it may rise; and lastly, the communication between the mother country and the colonies is become much more frequent: which we may see from this one circumstance. Before the year 1778 the fleet and galleons sailed every three years. Consequently a merchant found not only great difficulty, but was put to great expense, that his ship might be one in the expedition, which admitted of no more than from twelve to fifteen. In the course of 1791 no less than NINETY-NINE sailed from Spain to the colonies.

The question, then, about the advantages of a free trade is most satisfactory decided.

At first the minister for the Indies thought proper not to extend it to Mexico, which remained eight years subjected to the old way of periodical supply. When he thought himself sufficiently furnished with proofs that he had nothing to fear from a free trade with this vast colony, with which he was better acquainted than any other, he suffered her to participate in 1786 in the advantages of the regulations of 1778, limiting the quantity of goods to be sent there every year to six thousand tons; a ridiculous restriction, which

is one of the numerous proofs of the taste of Galvez for the regulating system.

I have closely observed this ambitious minister. He was extremely laborious, very intelligent, and personally disinterested. He had also some claim to talents for administration. But to these he joined the most repulsive manners and the imperiousness of a vizir. He certainly had the power without incurring the danger attached to that title. Charles III placed an entire confidence in him. This monarch, though truly virtuous, was not exempt from singularities. He looked upon himself as a great soldier, and consequently determined every thing that related to the army and the plans of a campaign. But with respect to other departments, including that of his conscience, he left them blindly to the management of those who were charged with them; and none of his ministers, with an appearance of deference to *superior* intellect in the sovereign, has profited more by this modest cession than Galvez. Marshal *Duras* had known him during his embassy in Spain, and had appointed him solicitor for the French nation, which at Madrid is not an idle appointment, although it has lately been suppressed. This brought him in continual connexion with the French and with their ambassador. We do not perhaps gain by closer acquaintance. Certain however it is, that these multiplied communications with the French nation have not prevented him from conceiving

for her an aversion, which he but awkwardly disguised under protestations of friendship. M. d'Ossun had deserted him. He had advantageously introduced him to the marquis de Grimaldi, who in the year 1763 was appointed minister for foreign affairs, and even to Charles III, whom he had followed from Naples to Madrid. He contributed much to the appointment of Galvez to an important commission in Mexico, where he displayed his domineering and enterprising character, and where the intoxication of power, joined to the fatigue of an extremely active employment, brought on him an illness that was accompanied and followed by several acts of insanity. On his return to Spain his labours were rewarded, and he was avenged for all the charges that had preceded him to Europe by the appointment of minister for the Indies; i. e. by the greatest and most unlimited power that a man, who is not a sovereign, can exercise on the globe. In this place he preserved for M. d'Ossun all the outward marks of gratitude, and for the French nation the language of affection. But he had a rooted jealousy and hatred towards her, of which he has given more than one proof. His despotic temper was irritated by the slightest contradiction. His administration seemed to be the ark of the covenant, which might not be touched with impunity. Every one rash enough to reveal or even to discover the springs of it was odious to him. It was with the greatest reluctance that he forgave Robertson

his work on America. He constantly retarded the translation of it, under pretence that it should not appear unaccompanied by a supplement, in which he (Galvez) would reestablish the truth, from which the English author, otherwise very correct, had too often deviated. He died before he had finished this work, perhaps before he had seriously thought of it. But whenever Raynal's *Histoire philosophique* was mentioned in his presence, he flew into the most violent passion; and I have heard him utter the most horrid imprecations against some Frenchmen who had abused the temporary permission of residing on the coast of Cumana, for the purpose of introducing there some sets of *that infernal work*.

Galvez displayed the same imperious and violent character in all the branches of his vast administration. But it is still a question with enlightened Spaniards, whether he has done more good than evil to the colonies; although great activity and even a strong wish to act for the best cannot be denied him. It is at least certain that although against his inclination, he developed their disposition to independence; and being too eager to prove that an able minister could render them useful to the revenues of the mother country, to which they had for a long time been only a burden, he provoked by an augmentation of taxes, and by the bad choice of his agents, an insurrection which broke out in 1781 in the vice-royalty of Santa Fe. The same causes produced soon after one still more

serious in Peru; and it was only by sanguinary means, and by the punishment of its intrepid leader Tupacamaro, that that insurrection was quelled. And at what time did he choose to sour the minds of the Spanish colonies? The same in which the English colonies shook off the yoke of Great Britain, for grievances perhaps not so heavy. To establish and to collect the new taxes which he had planned, he employed sixteen thousand people, who by their salaries and malversation absorbed the whole produce. In the mean while he boasted with effrontery that he had raised the revenues of the Spanish colonies from five to eighteen millions of piastres, whilst towards the end of his administration government was obliged to send assistance in money (*situados*) to the Philippine islands, to Porto-Rico, St. Domingo, Louisiana, and even sometimes to the Havannah.

It must however be allowed that he laboured with success for the revival of the Spanish colonies; that Trinidad, Louisiana, the Philippines, and particularly Mexico, owe to him the beginning of their prosperity.—We shall give a rapid view of what he did for these colonies, or at least show the advantageous change during his ministry.

CHAPTER VIII.

Measures taken with respect to Louisiana. Of the cession of Saint Domingo to France. Recent prosperity of Trinidad. Treaty of the negroes with Spain.

AS soon as Louisiana was ceded by France to Spain*, who had subdued it by the most odious means, the recollection of which will long remain amongst the unfortunate colonists, the court of Madrid thought of adopting some favourable measures to make them forget the yoke.

Since 1768, she exempted from all export duties the goods which that colony received from Spain, and also those she could export, and subjected these to a duty of only four per cent. on their entry into Spain; but as they were chiefly tobacco, indigo, cotton, and particularly furs, and did not find a great sale in the mother country, it was settled that French vessels might come to load

* The retrocession of Louisiana by Spain to France, and the sale which France soon after made of it to the United States, will create a new aspect for this important colony; but a view of what she was before this change of dominion may still be interesting, and we thought we ought not to suppress it.

(Note to the edition of 1805.)

with them at New Orleans, provided they arrived in ballast. This restriction was so often eluded, that the Spanish government felt the necessity of discontinuing it. At the same time it was observed that the furs of the northern part of Louisiana could only be exchanged for French merchandise.

The regulation of 1778 added to the privileges of Louisiana the total exemption of duties on their furs during ten years. In 1782, Pensacola and West Florida having been added to the possessions of Spain in the Gulf of Mexico, it was established that for ten years importations from French ports should be permitted, as also the return of the produce of these two colonies; and that the articles both of import and export should pay no more than six per cent. duty; that even in case of necessity their inhabitants might go to the French West India islands for provisions; that the negroes they could procure from islands in amity should pay no duty of entry. The regulation expressly stipulated that all the foreign goods imported into Louisiana should be consumed there. This restriction has also certainly been evaded; for there have since been so many expeditions made to New Orleans, that the speculators must have been ruined if there was no other marts for disposing of their cargoes than Louisiana.

It was immediately discovered that the regulation of 1782 required some extensions. It should

confine Louisiana, with respect to her trade, to France alone. If we could have provided her with all she wanted, we might have engrossed the produce of the investments made fraudulently by the way of Florida and the north of the Mississippi; and we should at the same time have procured at a low price the indigo, the furs, castor skins, and the other productions of Louisiana. But these people likewise consumed some foreign articles, such as Silesian linens, English checks, tin plates, &c. To engross the whole profit of this new order of things our government should have granted the free transit of these goods, which should then have been embarked in our ports directly for Louisiana. The Spanish minister had intrusted M. Maxent, father-in-law to general Galvez, with the negotiation, of whom the minister of that name had great reason to be proud as a nephew, for the brilliant talents he displayed in the American war. He had prepared for the prosperity of Louisiana by the mildness and wisdom of his administration; and he was afterwards promoted to the vice-royalty of Mexico, but taken away by a premature death from his interesting family and from his country. Our government, blinded by financial views, did not accept the propositions of M. Maxent; and the court of Madrid was obliged to extend the privilege which was before exclusively ours, to several other foreign ports, such as Amsterdam, Ostend, Genoa, &c.

This circumstance, however, did not prevent us from having engrossed almost the whole commerce of Louisiana until the time of the rupture. We even maintained two commissaries in that colony, who watched over the interest of our merchants.

We are told that since the peace its retrocession has been agitated*; that even Spain, who it was thought must object to it, was very much disposed to consent to it; and that the obstacles have arisen on the side of our government, which insisted on the strict execution of the treaty of Bâle. Could it believe that this distant possession in the interior of the Gulf of Mexico, which had formerly cost us so much to provide for in our maritime wars, should have occasioned us nothing but inconvenience? that, our former relations being restored, it could be as useful to us as when it was our own? that in our hands it would have become a source of quarrels between us and our allies, to whom the contraband trade which she would facilitate, is, and will long be, an object of terror? Could it have thought that this acquisition would be incompatible with the good understanding which without doubt we wish to maintain with an enterprising people, with whom it would have been perhaps difficult to be at the same time the ally and the neighbour? Finally, the Lou-

* This was written in 1802.

sianians, who have a long time regretted our dominion, but who have been several years happy under the Spaniards; and who moreover are no longer, as in 1769, a colony of brothers to us, but a kind of people composed of several European nations and attached to their country;—I say, these inhabitants of Louisiana would not perhaps have willingly exchanged their actual situation for the honour of making a part of the French republic. Devoted exclusively to commerce and industry, they have probably more need of tranquillity than of glory.

Louisiana, however, differs very little from what she was when ceded to Spain. Her principal station New Orleans, contained then five or six thousand inhabitants. In 1793 it had not more than eight thousand without counting the negroes, which amounted in all the colony to twenty-five thousand; and the whole of the white population might be estimated at twenty thousand. The great majority are still French. Besides those in the civil and military employments, who are Spaniards, there are few of that nation. The free Americans have established settlements amongst the Natchez, where they have successfully introduced the English mode of culture. Lastly, there are on the right bank of the Mississippi some Germans, who, after the Americans, are the best husbandmen in the colony.

This excepted, the cultivation of Louisiana is very confined; and it is only tobacco and indigo that

have arrived at any perfection. She however has a tolerable exportation; before the rupture with France it might be estimated at 8,400,000 livres per annum. But with the exception of that part of the trade which some greedy governors appropriate to themselves the profit, we are told, goes entirely to foreign merchants, who establish themselves at New Orleans merely to make their fortunes, and who return afterwards to their own country. This is a vexatious circumstance; for it deprives the colony of a capital without which she can undertake nothing, and hinders her from taking advantage of the treasures nature has given her.

These are so striking and so multifarious, that, when known, we are tempted to excuse our forefathers, who were led astray by the deceiving illusions with which the name of Mississippi was surrounded. Take the following sketch.

Louisiana is under one of the finest climates of the earth. She is watered in her greatest extent by a river which adds to the fertility of her soil, and whose vast outlet is favourable to the exportation of her produce.

At the head of these productions should be reckoned *tobacco*, which is much superior to that of Virginia or Maryland. There are exported annually on account of the king of Spain about three millions of pounds, which at ten sous the pound make a sum of a million and a half of livres.

This excellent tobacco the king of Spain might get at half the price, if he would permit the colony of Kentucky to enter into competition with that of Louisiana.

The *indigo* of Louisiana is as good as that of St. Domingo, and consequently much superior to that of Carolina. Before the Spanish war with France, a great quantity was already sent into that country; the annual produce was estimated at five hundred thousand pounds weight, which at 6 livres 10 sous the pound make this article of exportation amount to 3,250,000 livres.

Furs have been for some years the principal object of commerce in Louisiana. From 1765 to 1778, it is calculated that there were annually exported to the amount of about four millions of livres: but this trade is diminished one half from the cause before assigned; for no sooner have the merchants enriched themselves than they disappear, taking with them a capital which is absolutely necessary for the fur trade. The savages with whom it is most profitably carried on are the Missouris, who bring the produce of their hunting to St. Louis, a settlement almost entirely French, and well known in the surrounding country. If Louisiana had more ports, she might derive great profit from the tar and pitch of an excellent quality which the inhabitants collect, particularly in those parts which lie between New Orleans and Mobile.

She has also a great abundance of timber: what is annually exported in masts, planks, &c. is estimated at 800,000 livres. Many small vessels also, and even ships of four hundred tons burden, are built and sold at New Orleans, which are valued as much for strength as cheapness. Their cedars are of the best quality; white, green, and red oaks are abundant, and very tall, large, and close-grained: lastly, the cypress makes very good masts, which form also an article for exportation. Another more considerable is that of planks, pipe-staves, &c. which are sent in great quantities to the Antilles. They construct, one year with another, more than a hundred thousand sugar-casks for the consumption of the Havannah; and they have about fifty two-saw-mills, which are put in motion by the rising of the tide.

Innumerable herds of cattle furnish them meat in abundance, and hides and tallow are become articles of exportation. In fine, if they had opportunities they might export *horses, wax, wool, hemp*, and even *silk*, all of the best quality; not to mention rice, peas, maize, &c. inferior objects of exportation, but which, joined to naval stores, would produce annually about 400 thousand livres. The culture of cotton, which prospered at the time of the cession, appears to have been abandoned since.

The greatest part of this unsettled trade was

carried on before the rupture by French adventurers established in Louisiana, who annually sent to France five or six vessels with indigo, furs, and piastres, also about sixty small craft to St. Domingo, and some to Martinique and Guadaloupe; laden with wood, rice, pulse, pitch and tar, tobacco, and particularly piastres; and these returned with all sorts of European goods, and with negroes.

It is at first sight an inexplicable phænomenon, that a colony so well endowed by nature; a colony on whose account alone the mother country has degraded herself for these thirty years past; a colony which has had the use of these advantages to extend her connexions to a distance, should have made so little progress. It is not a sufficient reason for this strange result, to say that the merchants established in Louisiana, as soon as they have enriched themselves, withdraw, in order to escape the avidity of the governors; and that therefore this colony is deprived of the funds indispensable to an extensive cultivation and to the trade in furs. What! Have all the Spanish governors since 1769 been of so rapacious a disposition, that nothing could escape them but by a precipitate flight? I could produce some proofs to the contrary. What! Are there no Europeans or colonists at all, who, attracted by the beauty of the climate, and by the resources of all kinds which this country presents, would determine on a permanent residence here, in spite of the pre-

tended avidity of the governors!..... And so even the colonists that remained after the cession have not been able to enrich themselves, and acquire such capitals as are indispensable to the prosperity of the colony! How comes it, that a virgin soil, which invites all kinds of culture; a country that produces an infinite variety of trees, some of them as old as the continent; that a country watered all over by one of the finest rivers in the world, whose winding bays interspersed with rocks, put this colony in perfect safety against invasion; I say, How happens it, that a country possessed of all these advantages should not be generally attractive? No doubt some radical vice tarnishes or poisons the source of all this prosperity. Has not the Spanish government the same attraction at a distance which many foreigners find in it in Europe? Or are people repulsed from Louisiana by the traces still fresh of the horrors she experienced in 1769? Or has she not been pardoned for having lent her name to the dazzling chimæras which have been the disgrace of France, and the ruin of a great number of families?

Perhaps it is reserved to liberty to revivify Louisiana at last: not to that precarious liberty which depends on the prejudices of a sovereign or the caprices of a minister; and still less to that liberty which is an offspring of the Furies, and which knows only to destroy; but to that true liberty,

the daughter of reason and experience, which knows how to create and to preserve, and which is now in full activity among the Americans. These seem to be destined to compel Louisiana at last to fulfil the intentions of Nature. Already settled on the borders of the great river which traverses that country, and on smaller rivers received by it, they solicited with a menacing impatience an opening for the abundant produce of their rich cultivation, which the Mississippi, on account of systematic regulations, refused to convey to the ocean. The nature of things must have procured this opportunity sooner or later. They obtained it at last in 1795, through the condescension, though rather dilatory, of the Spaniards.

This measure, decisive of the prosperity of the Americans in the west, must likewise have great influence on that of Louisiana. New Orleans must become an *entrepôt* for their export trade, for the goods she takes in return, and will thus acquire a permanent attraction for speculators. The example of this activity cannot fail to revive all the colony. Spain must also reap advantages from an arrangement the United States have so long solicited. Even the English government applauds it. The Mississippi, say these interpreters, comes from the north-west, whilst the Ohio arrives there from the north-east. Both rivers traverse the most fertile countries in the world, countries which produce a great deal of

wood fit for building houses and constructing mills, such as *oak, fir, elm, walnut, &c.* These woods, moreover, falling down the rivers to their mouths, will find a good market in the British West Indies. These islands would also receive by the same channel, as far as from Pittsburgh, (or Fort Pitt, which is in the same latitude with New York,) corn and iron, which could not be conveyed to them but at a much dearer rate from New York and Philadelphia. In a word, the opening of the Mississippi, by procuring a great supply of corn for the West India islands, will relieve the English from the care of supplying them, and much extend the commerce in the productions of their own industry. Should experience justify the pleasing conjecture of the British ministry, we may say, that the treaty with which the Prince of Peace and Mr. Pinckney terminated, in 1795, a very complex negotiation, that had lasted thirteen years, had this singularity, perhaps unique in the annals of diplomacy, that it was directed against nobody, and had procured advantages for all the world.

About that time France demanded from Spain the cession of Louisiana; but the treaty of Bâle was concluded without any mention being made of it; the cession did not take place till some years after. France, as is well known, did not remain long in possession of Louisiana, but sold it in 1803 to the United States; and from that time

a new epoch has commenced in that important colony.

By the treaty of Bâle, which we have just noticed, France was satisfied with receiving from Spain her portion of the island of St. Domingo. That power, in ceding it to us, has made no very painful sacrifices; it was to her of more detriment than advantage. It is known that from the beginning of the last century till 1784 it cost her seventeen millions of hard piastres, and of late years two hundred thousand piastres annually*.

Although she possessed a surface double that of ours, her population at that time amounted not to a hundred thousand souls, in which were included scarcely three thousand negroes for the culture of the soil †. She had scarcely a cultivated spot but what was made so by our run-away negroes. This colony in our hands, and after the return of perfect peace in the West Indies, would be to us of more consequence than all the others together. She has all the valuable productions of the West Indies. She can produce as much tobacco and sugar as Cuba; as much coffee and cotton as our old colony of St. Domingo furnished till

* Moreau de Saint-Méry estimates the annual expense at 1,700,000 livres; whilst 200,000 piastres make hardly one million of livres. But I have reason to believe that my statement is the true one.

† Ten years after, according to Saint-Méry, she contained 100,000 free people, and 15,000 slaves.

lately; better cocoa than even the Caraccas: but all these productions, though indigenous for the most part, are still in this colony in only a small quantity,—after having grown there so abundantly in the sixteenth century, that the cocoa of St. Domingo, for example, sufficed for the consumption of all Spain. There are also two districts very proper for the feed of sheep, and several for horned cattle. The soil is watered in every direction, and extremely variable on its surface. Finally, four of her ports, namely *Saint Domingo*, *Samana*, *Port de Plata*, and *Monte Christi*, would be capable of exporting all her productions.

From this sketch * it will appear, that the new colony we have obtained by the treaty of Bâle is singularly favoured by nature, but that there is still much to be done by art. The advantage to be reaped from it is therefore yet at a distance.

This is all that can be allowed to the declaimers against this acquisition; amongst whom it must be allowed there are some reasoners, who, like

* I thought it advisable to confine myself to this sketch, because there appeared a few years ago at Philadelphia *A Description of the Spanish Part of St. Domingo*, by Moreau de Saint-Méry, which leaves nothing to wish for in regard to that colony; and to give an interesting detail of it, I should be obliged to copy that work, which is equally estimable for its correctness as its sagacity. I am therefore obliged to give here only the general result of what I have been able to learn from good authority, without having been on the spot.

M. Moreau de Saint-Méry in particular, are armed with specious arguments and incontestable facts. We must grant that the French part of St. Domingo from being incorporated with the Spanish part will not derive any great means of defence, nor perhaps great safety for its navigation in time of war; but we cannot agree with them, that the means of subsistence of the old French colony will be thereby diminished. What has happened in this respect, during a century, between the French and Spanish colonists, proves that the supply of the French part with cattle, which are only to be found in the districts possessed by Spain, would have been always precarious, as long as it remained dependent on foreign governors and administrators, connected with whom ours would only have had to expect provisional and imperfect treaties, of which nothing could guaranty the faithful observance, whereas it may be possible to make strict and permanent regulations, which shall at least place our old colony out of the reach of such inconveniencies.

It is in vain that the opposers of the cession of the Spanish part of the colony pretend, that Africa must be exhausted to procure the million of negroes requisite to put her in a state of perfection; that a still greater difficulty would occur in finding the capital necessary for the cultivation of such immense tracts of land, particularly after the horrible commotion which leaves so many disasters



to repair in the old French colony. To this it may be answered, that nothing can oblige the French government to make use of this vast acquisition all at once; that it also appears, the means they indicate, are not the only ones that may be employed for the benefit of the colony: that there are other means of improving a soil which, they agree, offers such great resources: that even whilst the government is occupied in the revival of the colony on a large scale, nothing can prevent the beginning to people it and break it up, by inviting such French families as were almost ruined by the revolution; in short, men from every country, who, to meliorate their circumstances, will always be willing to emigrate. These new colonists, attracted by the beauty of the climate, by the advantages which an incorporation with France holds out to them, by the cheapness with which they may acquire virgin land, would thus clear the way for the prosperity of the country, without its being necessary to *dispeople Africa*, or to drain the national treasury.

Moreover, this great question of the acquisition of the Spanish part of St. Domingo has been discussed by both parties in terms of exaggeration, which disfigures with the intention of embellishing, and of which the event never justifies the predictions. On one side it has been said, that this acquisition will ruin the French colony; the Spanish colonists will retire; the pastures where

they feed their cattle, which the French cannot do without, will be abandoned, or appropriated to agriculture; and the colony will gradually perish in the midst of her plantations of sugar and coffee. Besides, How can a single power guard such a vast extent of coast? What a depopulation of the mother country, which is so much in want of hands! What a false direction given to the capitals, for which she herself has such pressing means of employment!

Those, on the contrary, who amuse themselves with embellishing the future, see the whole colony of St. Domingo attain a degree of prosperity in the space of ten years, of which there never was an example; augmenting the annual returns of our commerce with a hundred and fifty millions, and supplying alone the rest of the universe with colonial productions. Ye patriots, who are so easy to be alarmed, moderate your grief. Ye politicians, who are of opinion that every thing is for the best, renounce your fine dreams. Nothing of what you predict will come to pass. You have seen some expected matches, the partners in which, possessing amiable qualities, an apparent agreeableness, and a mutual affection, inspire a tender interest. On the approach of their union, we exclaim with emotion, What a decisive epoch of their lives! They are going to seal either their *happiness* or *their misery*. We are deceived. They are deceived. They will live together thirty years with-

out having done the one or the other. It will be the same with the acquisition of St. Domingo, and with many more similar connexions, from which you promised yourself great matters, or expected heavy disasters*.

I shall proceed to the other Spanish colonies that owe at least the commencement of their regeneration to the ministry of Galvez.

Trinidad had been for a long time one of those from which Spain derived the least advantage: and yet her situation at the entry of the Gulf of Mexico and near Terra Firma, her salubrity of

* This was our language in 1797. Since that time, the question then agitated is left undecided. The executive directory, without being in haste to organize the government of the new colony, sent to St. Domingo a commissary worthy of confidence, and invested with extensive power. It was the same Roume de Saint-Laurent, of whom we shall say more under the article *Trinidad*. It is well known how circumstances counteracted his zeal: he could not overcome the ascendancy which Toussaint Louverture began already to display. Sent out of the colony by the mandate of this imperious chief, Roume took refuge in the United States. He was still at Philadelphia in the year 10 (January 1802); and whilst waiting the decision of his fate and that of Saint Domingo, he employed himself in the study of the sciences, perhaps more suitable to him than politics. A new prospect, of most happy omen, has recently presented itself for the whole colony.

(Note to the edition of 1803.)

Events more recent than those which we have related will postpone any speculations concerning the Spanish part of St. Domingo to future times.

(Note to the edition of 1805.)

climate, the fertility of her soil, which culture had scarcely touched, the excellence of some of her harbours, might long since have made it a most valuable possession. Galvez, to give life to this paralysed member of the Spanish monarchy, even in the first year of his ministry placed Trinidad under the jurisdiction of the company of the Caraccas. Two years after she was included in the regulation for free trade; and the following year the intendant of the province of the Caraccas, M. d'Avalos, consulted and encouraged by the minister, undertook to people and to cultivate it. He was powerfully assisted by a Frenchman, M. de Saint-Laurent, (known since by the name of M. Roume*,) who, after having resided several years at Grenada, where he had conciliated universal esteem, was come to settle at Trinidad. He knew this island already perfectly well, had connexions in most part of the West Indies, and possessed in the highest degree the gift of inspiring confidence by the frankness of his manner, and his inflexible probity. It was he who was commissioned by M. d'Avalos to procure colonists for Trinidad. He proposed, in order to accomplish it, a regulation, which, without waiting for the approbation of his court, M. d'Avalos caused to be published in the beginning of 1780. Its effect was immediate. In June 1782 there were calcu-

* The person mentioned in the preceding note.

lated to be in Trinidad a hundred and seventy-four families of new colonists, who had brought with them 1085 slaves, and had a great number of plantations as well of sugar as of coffee and cocoa.

However, most of the emigrants on whom M. d'Avalos had counted, waited the formal avowal by the court of Madrid of the privileges they had been promised, before they would come and settle there. Saint-Laurent wrote to Europe in 1783 to forward it. He was not satisfied with his reception by the jealous minister, who wished that every thing should be done by himself, and pardoned with difficulty any improvements not made by his influence. Saint-Laurent demanded for the emigrants, who depended upon his promises, some exemptions incompatible with the laws of the Indies; and the council, the depository of these laws, opposed him with the antiquated rigidity of their principles. Saint-Laurent had personal pretensions to the gratitude of Spain; and he advanced his claim with the dignified firmness of a man who knows not how to demand justice in the same tone that he asks a favour. In short, the fate of Trinidad was decided without his concurrence.

In November 1783 appeared an edict, the effect of which seconded but feebly the progress of this colony to prosperity. It allowed to the new colonists only some of the privileges which

M. Saint-Laurent had considered to be necessary. It permitted them a free trade with France and her West India islands, but obliged them to carry it on in Spanish bottoms. It authorised the importation of negroes necessary for the colony, but not without restrictions. It stipulated only that Trinidad should be considered a mart for those which foreign nations should carry there.

It is well known that Spain for a long time has not been able to do without them for supplying her colonies with negroes. Since the peace of Utrecht, England had been, by the famous treaty of *Assiento*, in possession of this supply; but when the term expired, Spain replaced this very chargeable interposition of the English by a company whose *entrepôt* was established at Porto-Rico. The charter of this company expiring in 1780, Spain attempted to furnish the negroes herself. It was with this view that she obtained by the treaty with Portugal, in 1778, two small islands near the coast of Africa, Annobon and Fernando del Po. But, besides that these islands were ill situated for this commerce, Spain wanted capital, without which it could not be undertaken. She had neither vessels properly constructed for the purpose, nor goods fit for the market, no sailors used to these voyages, nor surgeons who knew how to treat the disorders of the negroes. Therefore she is, and must continue a long time, as to this object, at the mercy of strangers. It was

but very slowly, however, that she became convinced of this truth. She then applied to some individuals, who undertook to procure her a certain number of negroes in a given time. These partial measures being found insufficient, she determined, in 1789, to allow foreigners as well as Spaniards to bring negroes to her colonies of St. Domingo, Cuba, Porto-Rico, and the Caraccas. In February 1791 she confirmed this permission for two years, and extended it to the viceroyalty of Santa-Fe. Towards the end of the year appeared a royal edict, which permitted strangers as well as Spaniards, having purchased negroes wherever they could find them, to disembark them, for the term of six years, at any of the ports of the colonies before mentioned, and also at those of the vice-royalty of Buenos Ayres, with this restriction on foreigners, that their ships touching on the coasts of America should not load with any articles of commerce, even implements of agriculture not excepted, the introduction of which was retained by the Spaniards: for the respect which in modern times the court of Madrid unwillingly shows to freedom of commerce, is always fettered with restrictions and exceptions. The French experienced it particularly on this occasion. They were excluded by the edict from the liberty granted to other foreign nations; and it may easily be guessed why. Governments the most compunctious carry on without repugnance a traffic

the most revolting. The interest and prosperity of their country make it legal in their eyes; but they thought they could gain nothing by the introduction of our principles, which were repulsed in every possible way.

In the meanwhile we were offended at this exception, and our merchants solicited its revocation. I obtained it in May 1792, a time when the court of Spain, in acknowledging my character, seemed for a time to reconcile itself to our revolution. Our minister, however, was not of opinion that this liberty would be of any advantage to us; and pretended that, for the sake of a little money which we might gain by it, our own colonies would be deprived of negroes, as our adventurers would always find it more advantageous to carry them to the Spanish colonies. He was mistaken. The negroes selling dearer in our own than in the Spanish colonies, where their common price was two hundred and fifty piastres, of course ours would have the preference. The English must have profited the most by this liberty which Spain granted to foreigners. Their number of slaves, one year with another, amounted to forty or forty-five thousand, consequently were more than they wanted themselves; whilst ours did not amount to twenty-four thousand.

Besides, the war which soon followed made this permission, which Spain had with so much