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of King Joseph. The blow which had ruined Austria had destroyed all the hopes of the Spaniards. "Insurrection," said the Frenchman, imitating the style of his Emperor, "insurrection passes away; madness rages and destroys, and then becomes calm; the good alone is permanent. Secure for yourself the glory and the delight of saving a country which ought to be dear to you; join the cause of a good King, who desires not, by a terrible and necessary execution, to reign over ruins and carcasses; and I am authorized to offer you the rank in his armies which you hold among the insurgents."

*Troops sent
from Zارا-
goza against
the Valleys.*

The answer was such as became a man who had done his duty at Zaragoza. "Till the moral strength of the Spaniards and of their government were destroyed," he said, "it was in vain to think of ruining their armies. Neither the supposed victories upon the Danube and in S. Domingo, nor the adhesion of the Emperor Alexander, nor the immense forces which were said to be at Napoleon's command, would break the spirit of Spain or of England, actuated as those countries were by principles of justice and high-minded rectitude." The hope of seducing Renovaes being now no longer entertained, 5000 men were sent against him from Zaragoza; 2000 of these, being reinforced with 500 more at Jaca, proceeded against S. Juan de la Peña; and having, after a long resistance, driven D. Miguel Sarasa from that post, advanced upon the valley of Anso. Plique, with the other 3000, occupied the positions of Salvatierra, Castella Nuevo, and Navascués: 800 from Orbayceta and Pamplona united in the valley of Salazar, and 450 from Lumbier at Zavalza. Their numbers enabled them to move upon more points than the Spaniards could guard; and having entered Salvatierra, where the advanced parties were driven before them, they proceeded next day in four columns, two on the right attacking the heights of Sasi and Virgen de la Peña, the centre by the strait called La

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Foz, and the left by the heights of Mayhia, which divide the jurisdictions of Salvatierra, Navascues, and Burgui. These positions were attacked by 3000 men, and defended only by 600; they were maintained from six in the morning till two hours after mid-day; the French then on the right gained the height at Sasi; and this success would have enabled them to come upon the rear of the Spaniards at the other point. Renovales therefore fell back to the bridge and town of Burgui, from which he was compelled to withdraw as evening began to close, and the enemy then entered and set fire to it. The town of Anso was entered the same day by the first division of the French, after a brave resistance.

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From Burgui, on the following morning, the French in three divisions attacked the Spaniards, the right and left on the heights of Mendivelza and Odieta, the centre upon Bochuela. At all these points they were three times repulsed, some Russian deserters distinguishing themselves greatly on the Spanish side. The mountaineers thought the day their own, till, at noon, they were apprised that the French division from Anso was coming by Garde upon their rear, and already occupied the heights of Puyeta and Muga de Roncal. Renovales then fell back in good order upon the town of Roncal, took up a position there, and maintained it till evening closed. But as the ground there was open enough to give the enemy room for manœuvring, he fell back to the strong ground about Urzainqui, the position where he had before determined that in case of necessity the last stand was to be made. During the night, he was apprized that 4000 men were marching from Oloron upon those valleys, and 800 by way of Salazar. Many of his people had dispersed; those who remained were well nigh exhausted; . . . but he was enabled to demand terms, and capitulate for the valleys, as for a fortified town, in a manner of which there had been no other example

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Renovales
capitulates
for the Val-
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during the war, and to withdraw with those who chose to follow him, for other opportunities of serving their country; . . . more fortunate their future services might be; they could not be more honourable.

The French are said to have lost 500 killed and 800 wounded in these latter actions, and this by their own account. Among the Spanish officers who distinguished themselves were D. Miguel Sarasa, and D. Gregorio Cruchaga, names soon connected with that of Mina, which now first began to be known.

*Xavier
Mina.*

Xavier Mina*, the son of a landholder who cultivated his own estate, and was deputy for one of the valleys of Navarre, was a student at Pamplona when the revolution began. He was then in the eighteenth year of his age, and during the earlier part of the war had been confined to his father's house by a severe illness, from which he recovered just after Renovales had been compelled to withdraw from Roncal. A French commander, whose corps was encamped in the neighbourhood, sent a serjeant requiring the father in his capacity as deputy to provide rations for his † men. The serjeant disappeared on the road, and in consequence the house was surrounded at midnight by a detachment of infantry, who had orders to arrest the elder Mina, and bring him to head quarters. The son, however, had time enough

* This account of Xavier Mina differs materially from that which has been published under the title of *The Two Minas and the Spanish Guerillas*, as extracted from the work of a German officer, Captain H. Von Brandt. The German officer, who collected his information in the country, acknowledges that the accounts given upon the spot differ essentially from each other. My statement was derived from Mina himself during his short abode in England. Certainly I have never seen any person whom, from his countenance and manners, I should deem less likely to be given to such company and such courses as in that publication are imputed to him.

† They were to be a pound and a half of bread, ten ounces of meat, and a bottle of wine per day for every man.

to secure his father's escape, and then in his name presented himself to the officer. The French General before whom he was carried threatened him with death, unless the serjeant were produced; but as every thing in that quarter was to be arranged by means of money, Mina obtained his liberty after being detained three days. The party who arrested him had plundered his father's house. This usage, the danger he had escaped, and the injustice of the whole proceeding, roused into full action those feelings which had only been suspended by disease and languor. He provided himself with a musket and cartridge-box, and in that trim presented himself in his own village, and offered to take the command of as many Spaniards as would engage with him in the good work of avenging their country upon its invaders. Twelve adventurers joined him; they took to the near mountains, and there, while they waited an opportunity of action, maintained themselves on his father's sheep.

His first adventure was to surprise a party of seven artillerymen, who were escorting two pieces of cannon and a quantity of ammunition from Zaragoza to Pamplona. This success procured him twenty volunteers. He sent off his prisoners to Lerida, retired again to the mountains, and being informed that a general officer was on the road, travelling with an escort of thirty-four foot and twelve horsemen, he laid an ambuscade for them, in so favourable a spot, that a volley was fired upon the French with sure effect before they had any apprehension of danger. The general was shot in his carriage, some of the escort were made prisoners, and some money fell into Mina's hands. This he immediately distributed among his men, recommending them to send part of it to their families, and retain no more than would be necessary to defray the expenses of their own interment, exposed as they must now continually be to death. The men were thus raised in their own esteem and in that of their

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 XXIII. sented themselves in abundance, attracted by a success which
 1809. was reported every where, with such exaggerations as such tales
September. gather in their way. He received however none but those who
 brought arms, or whom he could supply with the spoils already
 taken from the enemy. His party amounted now to about
 threescore persons, distinguished by a red riband in their hats,
 and a red collar to their jackets.

He proceeded now toward the frontiers of Aragon, where a
 band of fifty robbers were adding to the miseries of that afflicted
 country. These he succeeded in surprising ; the greater number
 were killed on the spot, the rest he sent prisoners to Tarragona.
 Twelve horses were taken from the party, on which he mounted
 some of his men, and armed them with lances ; and every day
 added now to his numbers and his reputation. Rations were
 voluntarily provided for his people wherever they were expected,
 and given as freely at one time, as they were paid for at
 another from the spoils of the enemy. He levied a duty on the
 passes, where a considerable trade in colonial produce was then
 carried on ; the clergy also assisted him from their funds, and
 with these resources he paid and equipped his men, and kept in
 pay also a sufficient number of intelligencers. It was in vain
 that the French made repeated efforts to crush this enterprising
 enemy ; if his troops dispersed upon the appearance or the
 attack of a formidable detachment, it was only to reunite, and
 by striking a blow in some weak point or distant quarter, render
 themselves more formidable than before. General D'Agoult
 was accused of secretly favouring this young adventurer, and
 sending convoys under weak escort, with the intent that he
 should intercept them. Perhaps this suspicion was entertained
 only because he had been a royalist, and therefore may have
 been supposed to abhor at heart the service wherein he was

engaged. An inquiry into his conduct was instituted, and before it was concluded he put an end to his life by poison.

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St. Cyr meantime was informed that Marshal Augereau had been appointed to supersede him in Catalonia, and that General Verdier, who had been an old aide-de-camp of Augereau, had already arrived in the Ampurdan to take the command in place of General Reille, and commence the siege of Gerona. The rout at Belchite enabled the enemy to make all their preliminary movements with little other molestation than what the insufficient garrison of that city could give them; and when Verdier encamped before the place, St. Cyr removed from Vich, and took up a position to cover the siege.

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Siege of Gerona commenced.

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CHAPTER XXIV.

SIR A. WELLESLEY ENTERS SPAIN. BATTLE OF TALAVERA,
RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY. DEFEAT OF THE SPAN-
IARDS AT PUENTE DEL ARZOBISPO AND ALMONACID.

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*Victor re-
treats be-
yond the
Tagus.*

THE head-quarters of Marshal Victor, after he returned from his movement in favour of Soult to his former position, were at Truxillo: Cuesta was on his left flank, having his head-quarters at Fuente del Maestro, and his advance at Calemonte on the Guadiana, a league from Merida. The British General had formed a plan for cutting off the enemy's retreat by a movement through Castello Branco and Plasencia to the bridge of Almaraz; this he relinquished, because it did not coincide with Cuesta's opinion, and because he found it impossible to prevail upon that general to choose a secure position, or to concentrate his army, which was distributed with so little judgement in an open country, that if Victor had attacked it, an easier victory might have been obtained than that of Medellin. The French have seldom suffered such opportunities to pass, and Sir Arthur was very apprehensive that the army, which had been raised with such exertions, would be dispersed before he could effect a junction with it. But Victor was content to forego this advantage rather than risk the danger of being cut off from Madrid by such an operation as Sir Arthur had meditated; he broke up, therefore, at the beginning of June, and retreated across the

Tagus at Almaraz; Cuesta followed, without obtaining any advantage over him in his retreat, and sufficiently fortunate that the French Marshal was in too much fear of a better army, to profit by the want of discipline in the Spaniards and the want of skill in their commander.

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When Sir Arthur had given up his original plan, it was concerted that he should join Cuesta at Badajoz. Victor's retreat rendered this unnecessary; it was then agreed that he should advance, as he had at first proposed, by way of Plasencia. The army of La Mancha at this time, consisting of 16,000 foot and 1300 horse, was under Venegas, subject to Cuesta's orders. This was the side on which the French were most exposed; Alburquerque, by one operation, though it had only partially succeeded, had retarded the plans of the enemy for more than a month, and, had he not been withheld by the positive orders of men who were unworthy to control him, there is reason for believing that he would have prevented many of the disasters which afterwards occurred. His patriotism was undoubted; no man, indeed, ever more passionately loved his country: his military talents were of the highest promise; and when these moral advantages concurred, his rank and illustrious family ought to have been considered as circumstances to recommend him, giving him, as they would have done, additional claims to the respect of the army and of the nation. With both he was exceedingly popular, especially among the La Manchans; and having been a successful general, almost the only one who had obtained any success, the soldiers had an opinion of his good fortune as well as of his talents. Mr. Frere, who estimated the Duke as he deserved, was exceedingly desirous that he should have the command in La Mancha, and suggested it to Cuesta. "An army," he said, "which had been torn by factions, thrown into confusion by the successive removal of its officers, and dis-

Alburquerque proposed for the command in La Mancha.

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 encouraged by ill fortune, could have no hope of being speedily re-established and conducted to victory, except by a general who was known to them for his successes, and who was personally popular among them, and in the province wherein he was to act. The Duque de Alburquerque was the only one who united in himself these advantages ; and for the situation which he at present held, Venegas would not be less useful, having always served under General Cuesta, and not only near his person, but immediately under his eyes." Unhappily Cuesta was jealous of the Duke's popularity ; and the Supreme Junta were jealous of his rank and influence. Mr. Frere's advice was rejected, and this may be considered as one cause of the failure of the campaign.

Plan of detaching a Spanish force toward Segovia.

It had at first been doubted whether the French would make any thing more than a show of resistance on this side of Madrid ; and a plan was proposed for menacing their retreat and the rear of the metropolis, by detaching a considerable Spanish corps through the Puerto de Arenas to Avila, Arevalo, and Segovia. Such a movement, it was thought, would compel the enemy either to retreat, or to detach a force of correspondent magnitude ; and thus a material advantage would be afforded to the British army, which, when concentrated, amounted only to 20,000 men. Cuesta had about 38,000, well armed but ill disciplined, and ill clothed also, which, in their state of discipline, was an evil of more consequence than may immediately be obvious. The Intruder, with 9000 of his guards, and the greater part of the garrison of Madrid, had joined Sebastiani in La Mancha, and attempted to bring Venegas to action ; finding this in vain, they left 2000 men to defend Toledo, and prepared to bring their whole disposable force, consisting of about 50,000, against the united Spanish and British armies. But the Spanish army was in such a state, that little could be

expected from its co-operation: a smaller force would, under such circumstances, be of greater assistance, as being more manageable and more likely to follow the example and catch the spirit of their better disciplined allies. If, therefore, a large detachment of these troops, by moving toward Segovia, could draw off a body of the French to watch them, they would render more service by such a diversion than could be expected from them in the field. For this reason such a movement was advised both by Sir Arthur and Mr. Frere; that minister not being deterred from the performance of his duty by the clamour raised against him in England, but delivering his opinion to the British general upon the same footing, he said, as he should have done had he been holding a private conversation with Sir Arthur, and as he should equally have ventured to do had he been residing casually in Spain in a private character. There was another reason which made the Junta wish to see Cuesta's army diminished. A suspicion had for some time prevailed that Cuesta had not forgiven his arrest, and that the same temper which led him to those violent measures whereby he had provoked that act of vigour, would tempt him to take some serious vengeance whenever it was in his power. This, it was thought, was more to be apprehended now than at any former time, because the army which his rival, Blake, commanded, had just at this time been shamefully dispersed, and thus the great obstacle to such a project was removed. The Junta were afraid to supersede Cuesta, even if they knew whom to appoint in his place; and they were afraid even to propose this measure of detaching a part of his army, under a commander of sufficient popularity to oppose his designs: but it was not doubted that if such a measure were proposed by the British General as a military plan, they would joyfully accede to it.

Cuesta was wronged by these suspicions; . . he was obstinate,

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Jealousy entertained of Cuesta.

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 XXIV. and one who, from a sense of duty as well as from natural
 1809. courage, would at any time have laid down his life for the
 service of Spain. Sir Arthur, whose head-quarters were now
 at Plasencia, went to confer with him at Almaraz. Fourteen
 thousand of the Spaniards were at this time stationed at the
 Puente del Arzobispo; the remainder were about two miles
 from the bridge of Almaraz, encamped under the Pass of Mi-
 ravete. Victor had taken up a position upon the Alberche,
 near Talavera. There, Sir Arthur stated his opinion, the enemy
 ought to be attacked by the united force of the allies; but it
 would be desirable to detach a corps of 10,000 towards Avila to
 turn their right: Cuesta approved the proposal, but desired they
 might be British troops. Sir Arthur replied, that the British
 army, to act with advantage, must act in a body; and the
 Spaniards could better spare such a detachment, being indeed
 more numerous than was either necessary for the operations on
 the Alberche, or convenient, considering their state of discipline.
 These representations were lost upon Cuesta, who estimated his
 own importance by the numbers under his command; he re-
 fused to make any large detachment, but offered to send two
 battalions of infantry and a few cavalry to join Sir R. Wilson's
 Portugueze brigade, and march upon Arenas, and thence to
 Escalona, in communication with the left of the British army.
 Had Sir Arthur's advice been followed, it was his intention to
 have recommended Alburquerque to the command; but it was
 the fate of Spain to be almost always deprived of the services of
 this brave and able general by the jealousy of meaner minds.

*He requires
 that the
 passes be
 occupied.*

Sir Arthur proposed also that the Spaniards should occupy
 the passes at Perales and Baños, and thus cut off the communi-
 cation between Victor and the French forces in the north of
 Spain. It was neither known what the amount of that force