

calamity has arisen from the insufficiency of those means which, by a small addition, might have been rendered effective. I maintain, that the object we had in view, (the only honest object . . . the only great object . . . which we could pursue, or hope to obtain by our operations in Spain,) was the expulsion of the French, or, at least, a considerable diminution of their power, with a view to the freedom of the people, and the independence of the Spanish monarchy. This was, certainly, the main object which we ought to have contemplated; the ultimate object of the British nation was, certainly, by the deliverance of the peninsula of Spain, to lay a solid foundation for the establishment of a permanent and honourable peace.

CHAP.
XLIII.
1813.
March.

“What I have contended is, that the efforts we have made have not been equal to the resources of the country; that they have not been such as the magnitude, the infinite importance of the cause demanded, and as the favourableness of the opportunity particularly called for; that we have not made even a faint approximation to the object of the war, the expulsion of the French from the Peninsula; but that the French have been enabled, by our reverses, to consolidate their power in Spain, and to systematize the moral and military subjugation of the country. We ought to have called forth all our resources, . . . and we have made no extraordinary sacrifice; we ought to have strained every nerve at this momentous crisis, . . . and we have remained little better than idle spectators of the fate of Spain. We have been deterred by petty objections; by calculations of expense, which are but as dust in the balance.”

Earl Grey supported the motion for a committee, saying, that the great objects of the campaign had not been realized, but that, on the contrary, there had been a complete failure, . . . a great and lamentable failure; and that it was one of the most important duties of that House, in cases of ill success, to

CHAP. vindicate the interests of the country, by visiting with its
 XLIII. severest censure the causers of the misfortune. Aware as the
 1813. ministers were, he said, of the state of Europe, and knowing,
 as they must have known, the effect that at such a crisis would
 have been produced by a vigorous and decisive effort in the
 Peninsula, it was their bounden duty to have provided Lord
 Wellington with ample means for carrying through his enter-
 prising projects, and crowning them with brilliant and unqua-
 lified success. Nothing had happened which induced him to
 repent of his opinion, that the efforts of the Spanish people
 could alone enable them to withstand the overwhelming power
 of France. This sentiment he had uttered under the supposi-
 tion that no other power would stand up against the French
 Emperor, and that that Emperor would not depart from the
 unity of council and of action, by which his greatest successes
 had been achieved. And, indeed, if with such a commander
 and such an army as ours, and at a time when the army of
 France in the north had met with disasters, greater than which
 never fell upon a host assembled for the purposes of injustice
 and ambition, . . . if under these circumstances we had achieved
 so little in Spain, what would have been the issue, if one tenth
 only of the forces employed against Russia had been turned
 against us? The time had called for exertion, and the exertions
 had failed, . . . failed almost entirely as to their great object: the
 French were left in possession of the best parts of Spain; and
 we had not advanced in any degree, considering the effects of
 the last campaign upon the minds of the Spaniards, to the
 accomplishment of our object. Such was the case, and it called
 loudly for inquiry.

*The Earl of
 Liverpool.*

To these assertions the Earl of Liverpool replied, that the
 campaign which had been thus represented as a failure and a
 defeat, was, in fact, the most brilliant that had been achieved by

British arms in any period of our history. They had been seeking as a great object, that the whole force of Spain should be placed under the command of Lord Wellington, and that object had at length been accomplished. Every exertion that could be made, had been made, for sending out troops to the Peninsula and for supplying them there, and the success of the war was indisputable. Portugal had been rescued from the enemy, and placed in a state of security, and now one-third of Spain was relieved from their presence. Spain and Portugal had set the example which Russia had followed, with the great advantage of having a government in full activity to direct all its strength. The example thus set and thus followed would have an effect among the other nations of Europe, would rouse their spirit, animate their exertions, and teach them in what manner to resist oppression, . . . teach them that an united nation, determined to resist an invader, could not be conquered! . . . Earl Bathurst argued to the same purpose, saying, that something had been effected, if the views of England were what Marquis Wellesley had powerfully described them to be at the beginning of the war in Spain, . . . first, to create a diversion in favour of our allies; secondly, to encourage resistance in other countries, by showing its effects in Spain; and thirdly, to prevent the commercial and military means of that country from falling into the hands of our enemy. Those had been the views of England, those were the views of the present Government, and those views had been forwarded by the last campaign. And Lord Wellington was satisfied with the conduct of the administration during that campaign, . . . a declaration which had not been sought for by the ministers, but which he had voluntarily made.

In these debates, the Whigs manifested the same disposition to magnify our reverses and depreciate our success, and the

CHAP.
XLIII.
1813.

March.

Earl Bathurst.

CHAP. XLIII. same propensity for predicting discomfiture and disgrace which had characterized their conduct during the whole struggle.

1813. The feeling with which they continued to regard Buonaparte, notwithstanding his inordinate ambition and his remorseless tyranny, was farther exhibited by Lord Holland, when, upon presenting some petitions for peace, he expressed his trust that ministers entertained no chimerical notions of wresting from France what she had acquired during the last twenty years, nor of humiliating the great prince who now ruled that country; and his willingness to believe that they had not neglected the opportunity which the successes of Russia afforded for opening a negotiation! But they better understood their duty to their allies, and to Europe, and to their country; and being instructed by experience as well as encouraged by sure hope, they spared no efforts now for enabling Lord Wellington to open the ensuing campaign with means which should render success certain. Lord Wellington went to Cadiz at the close of the year, to make arrangements with the Spanish ministers for the co-operation of the Spanish armies. A deputation from the Cortes was sent to compliment him on his arrival; he paid his respects, in consequence, to that assembly; expressed his thanks in a brief and modest speech, for the different marks of honour and confidence which he had received from it; and said, that not the Spaniards alone looked to it with hope, but the whole world was concerned in the happy issue of their vigorous endeavours to save Spain from general destruction, and to establish in that monarchy a system founded upon just principles, which should promote and secure the prosperity of all the citizens, and the greatness of the Spanish nation. In reply, the president complimented him upon his victories, which had been celebrated, he said, like those of the Genius of Good over the Genius of Evil. The Cortes did not now hope or trust

April 2.

Lord Holland.

Lord Wellington goes to Cadiz.

for new triumphs from the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo, they looked upon them as certain; and looked, not only that the Spanish and allied armies under such a leader would drive the French beyond the Pyrenees, but that, if it should be needful, they would pitch their victorious tents upon the banks of the Seine; it would not be the first time that the Spanish lions had trampled on its banks upon the old fleur-de-lys of France.

CHAP.
XLIII.
1813.

April.

It was arranged that 50,000 Spanish troops should be placed at his disposal. The army under Castaños formed part of these; it consisted of what had formerly been called the 5th, 6th, and 7th armies, now comprehended under the name of the fourth: Castaños was to hold also the captaincies-general of the province of Extremadura, Old Castille and Leon, Galicia and Asturias. There was to be an army of reserve in Andalusia under the Conde de Abisbal, and an army of reserve in Galicia. The other armies were that of Catalonia, which was the first; of this Copons held the command: he was also captain-general of that province, and of that part of Aragon which was on the right of the Ebro; the second, which Elio, captain-general of Valencia, Murcia, and New Castille, commanded; and the third (formerly the fourth) under the Duque del Parque, who was also charged with the captaincies-general of Jaen and Granada.

Arrangements for the co-operation of the Spanish armies.

From Cadiz, Lord Wellington repaired to Lisbon. Triumphal arches were erected in all the towns through which he passed, from Elvas to the Tagus. The ships, the troops, and the people of Lisbon, received him with such honours as he deserved; greater could be paid to no man; and there was a general and voluntary illumination during three successive nights. A drama was composed to celebrate his victories, and represented in his presence at the royal theatre of San Carlos, where

Lord Wellington goes to Lisbon.

CHAP. all the boxes were decorated with Angels bearing crowns and
 XLIII. shields, on which the initials of Lord Wellington were inscribed;
 1813. *O Nome*, "the Name," was the title of the piece, and it was precluded
 April. by a hymn in honour of the Prince of Brazil, and the exhibition
 of his portrait under a canopy. The scene then represented the
 Elysian fields, where, in the pitiable style of operatic invention,
 Glory, and Posterity, and Camoens, and the Great Constable,
 Nuno Alvares Pereira, with sundry other Lusitanian worthies,
 recitativèd in praise of Lord Wellington, Lord Beresford, and
 the Portugueze and British armies; and down came Angels and
 Genii presenting illuminated scrolls, inscribed with the names of
 his victories.

*Relaxed
 discipline of
 the Portu-
 gueze army.*

The Portugueze army was, at this time, reproved by Lord Beresford for its want of discipline during the late retreat, in terms not less severe than those of Lord Wellington's letter. Certain officers were suspended for scandalous neglect and total disregard of their duties: and it was stated, that, in every instance, complaints had been made by the commandants of corps or brigades, of inactivity and want of zeal in the officers of all those corps which had suffered extraordinary loss during the retreat. That such losses were occasioned by the negligence of the officers was proved, by the fact, that other corps in the same marches, and under the same circumstances, difficulties, and privations, had none of their men missing; the officers of those corps were named with due praise. Marshal Beresford added, he deemed it important to remind the army, that with all the reasons which he had (and he was happy to say that he had every reason) for praising the conduct of the Portugueze officers, when they were in presence of an enemy, and exposed to fire, valour, nevertheless, was not the only thing needful; firmness and constancy were equally so for supporting the reverses, and fatigues, and privations, to which a military life is subject; and

if the officers did not yield under such circumstances, the soldiers certainly would not; for no soldier, and especially no Portugueze soldier, ever would be backward in any thing when his officer set him an example; nor would ever commit any fault or manifest any discontent, so long as he saw his officer doing his duty under the same circumstances, and setting him an example of courage, firmness, and constancy. One of the army surgeons had been brought before a court martial for neglecting the sick and wounded under his care, while they were in the hospital at Madrid. He was sentenced to a month's imprisonment, and the loss of a month's pay. Marshal Beresford, in confirming the sentence, expressed his disapprobation of it; a punishment so little in proportion to the crime, he said, was not likely to impress persons who had neither the proper feelings of men, or of Christians; for what could be more horrible, than to see men who had been wounded in the service of their Prince and of their country, or whose health had been broken in that service, neglected by one who had received rank, honour, and pay, for the express intent of making him more attentive in his treatment of them? What could be worse than that such a person should be found preferring his own ease, or interest, or temporary convenience, to his duty towards his God, and his Prince, and his fellow-creatures, and leaving them either to perish through his neglect, or to fall into the hands of the enemy?

The consequences of the retreat were severely felt; in January, more than a third of the British army were on the sick list, fever being the principal disease, which want of clothing had, with fatigue, contributed to produce, and want of cleanliness to propagate. In personal appearance and in clothing, the British troops were at this time much worse than the Portugueze. But supplies of every kind, as well as large reinforcements, were received during the winter, no time being lost, and no care

CHAP.
XLIII.
1813.

January.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1813.

January.

neglected. The infantry had suffered so much from want of cover, that they were now provided with tents, three for each company, and these were borne by the animals which used before to carry the camp kettles, tin kettles being substituted for iron ones, . . . one to six men, and light enough for the men to carry it by turns on their knapsacks. Tents were not thought necessary for the cavalry, because, not being either heated or exhausted so much in their marches, they were better able to stand the cold at night.

*Buonaparte
withdraws
troops from
Spain.*

While the British force in the Peninsula was increased, and the Spanish rendered more available than it had been in any former campaign, that of the French was weakened; the enormous loss which Buonaparte had suffered in Russia, and the obstinate ambition with which he kept large garrisons in the north of Germany, rendering it necessary for him to withdraw troops from Spain. From 10 to 20,000 repassed the Pyrenees; not fewer than 140,000 were still left, . . . good troops, well-officered, and under commanders of high reputation and approved skill. But both officers and men had had their confidence abated; the generals felt that even the resources of the conscription were exhaustible; and as little hope, when they considered the present state of their Emperor's fortunes, could be entertained of subjugating the Spaniards, the object upon which all seemed to be most intent was that of enriching themselves by plunder, while it was still in their power to do so. M. Suchet left scarcely one picture of any value in Valencia, either in the convents, churches, or private houses; and that city was thus deprived of the finest works of Juanes, . . . works, which, precious as they are, were there enhanced in value by the local and religious feeling with which his fellow-citizens regarded the productions of their saintly painter. There and every where contributions were imposed and exacted in a manner which made it apparent that

*Exactions of
the French.*

the Intrusive government treated them now not as subjects who were to be taxed, but as enemies from whom all that could be extorted was to be taken. Their operations on the side of New Castille and Leon were at this time confined to periodical circuits for the purpose of enforcing the payment of contributions. On the side of the Tagus they fortified the right bank of the river, repaired the Puente del Arzobispo, and occupied Almaraz, though they did not restore the bridge there.

Meantime the Spaniards were not idle. Longa surprized General Fromant in the valley of Sedano, when returning to Burgos with the requisitions which he had collected, and with sixty respectable householders whom he was taking away as hostages for the contribution: the hostages were rescued, Fromant with about 700 of his men killed, and nearly 500 taken prisoners. A party of the enemy had entered Bilbao, these also he surprized, and they suffered the loss of 200 men; then making for Salinas de Anaña, which was the strongest hold of the French in that district, he besieged it with 2500 men and five pieces of artillery, and after three days, the remainder of the garrison, consisting of 250, surrendered at discretion. This so dismayed the enemy that they abandoned Nauclares and Armiñon, which he was proceeding to attack, and both fortresses were demolished by his orders. His next object was the Fuerte del Cubo de Pancorbo, a post of importance for its situation, and for the care with which it had been strengthened; here too the garrison were made prisoners and the fort demolished. Caffarelli meantime was vainly besieging Castro, where he suffered some loss, and found it necessary to give up the attempt, that he might check Longa in his career of success. That active partizan was now threatening Breviesca; he eluded Caffarelli and Palombini when they moved against him, and retreating to Zovalina, there to refresh his troops, ordered his retreat so well

CHAP.
XLIII.
1813.

January.

*Longa acts
successfully
against the
enemy.*

Nov. 28.