

habitants absented themselves, because they were partisans of the French, and others from a prudential fear, lest the enemy should return, and again obtain possession of the city.

The French withdrew their garrison from Alba de Tormes, and retired towards the Douro in three columns.. one upon Toro, and the others upon Tordesillas. The allies broke up the next day, following their march, and encamped upon the Guarena. On the morrow Marmont had collected his force, as if with an intention of making a stand on the right bank of that river; his rear was on the hills in front of Alaejos: they moved off before the advanced guard could come up. The allies bivouacked every night in an open country, without a tree to shade them, and where it was necessary to seek for wood at the distance of several miles, the inhabitants frequently using straw for fuel. The enemy continued to fall back toward the Douro, closely followed by one who would let no opportunity escape him. On the 2nd of July their cavalry were on the plain toward Tordesillas, and they had a considerable force of infantry in Rueda; but they were compelled to withdraw from thence, and the town was occupied by the advance of the allied army. On the following day, this part of the army was ordered into the plain, as if with a view of attacking Tordesillas; while the left column, strengthened by the brigades of Generals Bock and Le Marchant, moved on Pollos, where there is a ford. There was some cannonading on the part of the enemy there, and an affair of light troops; and some of the allies passed the river, but they were withdrawn at night: it was then seen that there was no intention of forcing the passage, and orders were given for the distribution of the army. Lord Wellington fixed his head-quarters at Rueda. The French occupied Tordesillas in force: they had a considerable bivouac in the rear of that town, and the bridge there was fortified.

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June 29.

Lord Wellington advances to the Douro.

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*June.**The Douro.*

After the recapture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, Marmont could not be surprised that the forts at Salamanca fell, even if he had known with what scanty means they had been attacked; and as he had not been brought to action, his army took credit to themselves for having braved a superior force. The French had lost much of their confidence in battle against the English, but they still relied upon their skill in manœuvring; and Marmont, knowing that he should soon have the advantage in numbers, availed himself of all the opportunities which the nature of the country afforded him for gaining time. He was in possession of the line of the Douro. That river rises in the Sierra de Orbion, in Old Castille, issuing from a large and deep tarn, high on the mountain: passing the site of Numancia, it comes to Soria, and so to Berlanga, Osma, and Santesteban de Gormas: in this part of its course its banks are remarkable for the jessamine with which they are profusely clothed. Having left Aranda, it passes by the Cistercian monastery of Valbueno, a place denoting by its name the happy circumstances of its position, and where the monks used to account among the goodly things which had fallen to their lot the barbel and trout with which the Douro supplied them. The Pisuerga, having already received the Arlanza and the Carrion, joins it by Simancas; and though it brings the larger body of water to the junction, loses its name there. The Douro then makes for Tor-desillas: for the first ten leagues of its way its course is s. s. w., then westward till it reaches this old city, where it bends to the southward for a few leagues, passing S. Roman de Hornija, the now obscure burial-place of Chindasuintho, one of the most powerful of the Wisigoth kings; then it resumes its western course, waters Toro and Zamora, cities of great name in the Spanish annals, and having collected all the rivers of Leon on its way, enters Portugal. Of all the rivers in the Peninsula, the

Douro has the longest course. From its junction with the Pisuerga, till it receives the Tormes on the frontier of Portugal, it flows through a wide valley, the right bank for the most part skirting the heights. The French were in possession of all the bridges, and from the mouth of the Pisuerga to Zamora there is but one point favourable for passing an army from the left in presence of an enemy: that point is three leagues above Toro, at Castro Nuño, where there is a good ford, a favourable bend in the river, and advantages of ground. There could be little hope, therefore, of striking an efficient blow against Marmont so long as he kept his force concentrated behind the Douro, and it was in his power to cross the river at any of its bridges or fords whenever he might think that opportunity invited.

But the French, according to the barbarous system which Buonaparte pursued, were without magazines, and trusted to their command of the country for subsistence: Marmont therefore had this anxious object to distract his attention; and the Guerrillas were actively employed both upon his flanks and rear in intercepting his supplies, and in occupying troops who would otherwise have reinforced him. Two parties under Sorniel and Bourbon, with 700 cavalry, were on the right; D. Julian Sanches, with 500, on the left; while Porlier displayed his usual activity on the side of Asturias; and Mina and Duran in Navarre and Aragon: on that side their efforts were effectual; but General Bonnet joined him from the north, and increased his force to 47,000 men, thus making it numerically superior to that of the allies. Lord Wellington's situation was at this time an anxious one: he had counted upon the aid which the Galician army might have given him in occupying some of the enemy by besieging Astorga; in that undertaking, however, they were more dilatory than had been intended; and he was now aware that the force intended to cooperate with

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Colonel
Jones's
account of
the war, 2.
100.

Marmont
reinforced
by G. Bon-
net.

CHAP. him by acting upon the eastern coast was upon so small a scale,
 XLI. that he could place little hope upon it, and no reliance. The
 1812. French suffered at this time nothing for want of magazines or
 means of transport, because they took what they wanted, and
 preyed upon the country. The British Government would not,
 even in an enemy's territories, carry on war upon so inhuman
 and iniquitous a system; but it exposed its army to privations,
 and its general to perplexities and difficulties which might have
 paralysed any weaker mind than Lord Wellington's, by the
 parsimony with which it apportioned his means. When he
 advanced from Salamanca, there were but 20,000 dollars in the
 military chest: the harvest was abundant, but how was bread to
 be obtained without money?..and the same want would be felt in
 bringing his supplies from Ciudad Rodrigo, and other places in
 the rear of that fortress. The very difficulty of removing his
 wounded to the frontier of Portugal was sufficient to deter him
 from seeking an action on the Douro.

*Lord Wel-
 lington re-
 tires before
 him.*

On the 15th and 16th, Marmont concentrated his troops
 between Toro and San Roman: two divisions crossed the bridge
 at Toro on the evening of the 16th, and Lord Wellington moved
 the allies that night to Fuente la Peña and Canizal, intending to
 concentrate them on the Guarena. But it was ascertained next
 day, that during the night the enemy had repassed the bridge,
 and destroyed it after them; then making forced marches to
 Tordesillas, which is six leagues above Toro, crossed again there,
 and early on the morning of the 18th were on the Trebancos.
 Marmont might well applaud himself both for the celerity and
 the skill of these movements: he had marched forty miles; had
 opened his communication with the army of the centre, which
 was then moving from Madrid to support him; and by ad-
 vancing in force on Castrejon he endangered the light and 4th
 divisions, with Major-General Anson's brigades of cavalry, which

there had not been time for calling in. The enemy commenced a very heavy cannonade against the cavalry; they were scattered about in squadrons, and so escaped without much loss; and immediate measures had been taken to provide for their retreat and junction. The troops at Castrejon maintained their post till the cavalry joined them; then they retired in perfect order to Tordesillas de la Orden, and thence to the Guarena, having the enemy's whole army on their left flank or in their rear; and the French getting possession of the heights above that river, before the allies had crossed, brought forty guns to bear upon them, under the fire of which they joined the army on the left bank. Four streams which unite about a league below Canizal, form the Guarena; the French crossed at Castrillo, a little below the junction, and manifested an intention to press upon the left of the allies; with this view they endeavoured to occupy a ridge above Castrillo, but Lieutenant-General Cole's division advanced to meet them with the bayonet; they gave way; the cavalry charged, General Carrier and between 300 and 400 men were made prisoners, and one gun taken. In the course of the day, the allies lost about 100 in killed, 400 wounded, and 50 prisoners; but the check which Marmont received made him more circumspect in his movements.

The allies took up a position for the night on the Guarena, from Castrillo on the left, to beyond Canizal on the right. The enemy occupied the opposite side of the valley with their whole force. Both armies remained quiet till two in the afternoon of the following day, when the French withdrawing all their troops from the right marched by Tarrazona, as if with an intention of turning the right of the allies. Counter-movements were consequently made; the artillery fired at the enemy's advance, and in that dry season the corn took fire in several places, and burnt for a mile in extent. Lord Wellington expected a battle on the

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plain of Vallesa in the morning, and made every preparation for it; the men bivouacked in two lines in order of battle, and stood to their arms at daybreak, ready to receive an attack; but as soon as it was light, the enemy were seen moving in several columns to their left, on Babilafuente; the allies made a correspondent movement to the right: at any moment either commander might have brought on a general action; but it was a game of skill in which they were engaged, not of hazard. Marmont's march was estimated at five leagues, that of the allies at four, being in the inner circle; they moved in parallel lines, frequently within half cannon shot. The enemy encamped that night at Babilafuente and Villamela; the allies at Cabeza Vellosa, the 6th division and a brigade of cavalry being upon the Tormes at Aldea Lengua. On the following day, the French crossed that river by the fords near Alba and Huerta, and moved by their left towards the road leading to Ciudad Rodrigo. In the evening the allies crossed also, part by the bridge at Salamanca, part by the ford of Santa Martha. A dreadful storm came on of thunder and lightning with heavy rain; the different divisions of infantry were seen by the lightning marching to their ground, their muskets reflecting the flashes. The 5th dragoon guards had just got to their ground; many of the men had lain down; their horses were fastened together by their collars for the night, but terrified by the lightning, they set off full gallop and ran over the men, eighteen of whom were hurt; and two and thirty horses were lost, having probably gone to the enemy's lines.

It was evident from Marmont's manner of manœuvring, that he did not mean to attack the allies, unless at such advantage as might seem to render his success certain; and it seemed not less evident, that by pursuing this system, turning their flank and keeping possession of the heights, he would drive them to the

frontier if they continued to act upon the defensive. All the stores which were at Salamanca were ordered to the rear of the army, and the inhabitants were in the utmost consternation, apprehending, not without good apparent reason, that they should presently be brought under the yoke of the French again. Lord Wellington had placed the troops in a position, the right of which was upon one of two heights called the two Arapiles; and the left on the Tormes below the ford of Santa Martha. The enemy had still a large corps above Babilafuente, on the right of the river; for this reason, the 3rd division and Brigadier-General D'Urban's cavalry were left on the same side at Cabrerizos; and Lord Wellington thought it not improbable, that when Marmont should find in the morning that the allies were prepared for him on the left of the Tormes, he would alter his plan, and manœuvre by the other bank. In the course of the night he was informed that the cavalry and horse-artillery of the army of the north had arrived at Pollos to join Marmont, and that they would effect a junction with him the next day, or the day after at latest. During the night the enemy took possession of Calvarasa de arriba, and of a height near that village called Nuestra Señora de la Peña; the allied cavalry were in possession of Calvarasa de abaxo, which is between three and four miles from the upper village, and nearer the river.

The last night's storm had not cleared the atmosphere, and the morning rose threateningly, in clouds. The French were early in motion, and from the manner in which they marched and countermarched their troops, it was impossible to divine what might be their intention. Soon after daylight, detachments from both armies attempted to gain the yet unoccupied Arapiles hill; but the enemy had been concealed in the woods nearer that point, and their infantry were discovered on the summit when the allies were in the act of advancing to it: their detachment

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CHAP. was also the strongest. By occupying this point they mate-
XLI. rially strengthened their own position, and were the better
1812. enabled to annoy that of the allies. Early in the day, the light
troops of the 7th division and the 4th *caçadores* of General Pack's
brigade were engaged with the enemy on the height of N. Señora
de la Peña, which they gained and kept through the day. But
the possession of the farther Arapiles by the French made it ne-
cessary for Lord Wellington to extend the right of his army to
the heights behind the village of that name, and to occupy that
village with the 4th division under Lieutenant-General Cole.
Doubtful as Marmont's intentions still were, the British com-
mander judged that his objects were on the left of the Tormes,
and therefore he ordered the 3rd division and D'Urban's cavalry
from the other bank, and placed them behind Aldea Tejada.

During these movements the French kept up a heavy can-
nonade and fire of light troops. The day, meantime, had cleared.
Their force was formed in columns of attack in rear of the
Arapiles hill, the left resting upon an extensive wood; thence
they could either by a rapid march interpose between Lord
Wellington and Ciudad Rodrigo, or wait an opportunity for de-
bouching from behind the Arapiles, and separating the corps of
his army. Marmont was too skilful a tactician himself not to
perceive that all his movements were watched by one who well
knew how to counteract them; nevertheless, hoping to deceive
his antagonist, he marched a strong force to the right and
formed columns of attack opposite the 5th division, which was
in rear of the village of Arapiles. Lord Wellington soon per-
ceived that nothing serious was intended by this manœuvre, and
returned to direct the operations of his right, which he now
threw back to that side of the Arapiles, forming nearly a right
angle with that which he had occupied in the morning.
About two in the afternoon the French Marshal perceiving that

his last demonstration had produced no effect, pushed forward his columns rapidly to the left, with the intent of turning the right flank of the allies, and interposing between them and Ciudad Rodrigo. Till now, the operations of the day had induced a belief in the British army that it was intended only to meet manœuvre by manœuvre, and to continue their retreat as soon as it was night. Indeed, the army of the centre with the Intruder at its head was on the way to join Marmont within three days' march, and a considerable body of cavalry and horse artillery was still nearer. But Lord Wellington had anxiously been looking for the opportunity which was now presented him: he was at dinner when information was brought him of this movement which was made under cover of a heavy cannonade, and accompanied with skirmishers in his front and on his flank, and with a body of cavalry who made the British dragoons and light troops give way before them. But the generals of division had either misunderstood or ill executed their commander's intentions, and they weakened their line by dangerously extending it: Lord Wellington at once perceived this; he rose in such haste as to overturn the table, exclaiming, that Marmont's good genius had forsaken him: in an instant he was on horseback, and issued his orders for attack.

The right he reinforced with the 5th division, placing it behind the village of Arapiles, on the right of the 4th, and with the 6th and 7th in reserve. These having taken their stations, he ordered Major-General Pakenham to move forward with the 3rd and General D'Urban's cavalry, and two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons under Lieutenant-Colonel Hervey, in four columns, to turn the enemy's left on the heights, while Brigadier-General Bradford's brigade, the 5th division, under Lieutenant-General Leith, the 4th, under Lieutenant-General Cole, and the cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton, should attack them

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