

were more than ever unanimous in their abhorrence of the invaders. Tarragona had been betrayed, not conquered: the enemy might congratulate themselves upon their good fortune, not upon victories well contested and fairly won; . . . this was the language of the people. At this crisis, General Luis Lacy arrived upon the coast to take the command: the Duque del Infantado had been talked of for it, and the Catalans wished for him; but the Duke was more in his place at Cadiz; and a fitter commander than Lacy could not at that time have been sent to a charge which might seem so hopeless. Eroles, after a fruitless endeavour to meet him, sent him full information of the state of affairs, and promised to support him in the command whereto he was regularly appointed, with all the personal exertions of which he was capable, and all the influence that he possessed in this his native province. The French were just then endeavouring to cut off the Valencian division, and their movements made the communication difficult between the army and the coast. The remainder of that division, however (reduced to 2400, though not a man had fallen, for they had never faced the enemy), made their way to Arens de Mar, and were there embarked, Eroles detaining the enemy by a feint at Mataro. Lacy then assumed the command of an army which he said was non-existent: "Bad as I expected to find things," said he, "they are infinitely worse; and my only consolation must be, that there is absolutely nothing left for me to lose."

The fortified points which the Catalans still retained were Berga, Montserrate (for this had been made a military post), Figueras, Cardona, and the Seu d'Urgel. Berga was dismantled by Lacy, because he was unable to defend it, and it might have been a useful hold for the French. Orders arrived from Paris to demolish Tarragona, preserving only a redoubt there, to reduce Montserrate, and then prepare to march against the kingdom of Valencia. Suchet was at the same time created a

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marshal of the empire for his services; the massacre at Tarragona was considered as no reproach to him, or the army by which it had been perpetrated. By General Rogniat's advice, the works which surrounded the upper town were preserved, because they might be defended by a thousand men: the other works were destroyed, and the greater part of the artillery removed to Tortosa. Montserrat was then attacked; its former peaceful inhabitants had removed to Majorca, and taken with them in time the treasures of their sanctuary. Great enterprise and activity were displayed in the attack: and the garrison, confiding too much in the natural strength of the mountain, suffered themselves to be surprised from its heights. This was a severe loss to the Catalans; for it was now their chief depot, and they had counted upon its security. The last calamity in this series of misfortunes was the fall of Figueras. When it had been blockaded between four and five months, and all the horses were eaten, the garrison sallied, and attempted to force their way through the besiegers. An aid-de-camp of the governor had deserted and given information of their purpose; the enemy therefore were prepared to receive them; nevertheless they made their way to the *abattis*, formed of trunks of trees, which they found impenetrable; and after three attempts in the course of one day, these gallant men were compelled to capitulate, three sacks of flour being all the provisions which were left. During two preceding days they had employed themselves in destroying whatever could be of use to the enemy. Honourable terms were obtained, and Martinez was made to say in his dispatch to his own Government, that the garrison were treated by the French with the generosity which characterises that nation. That phrase would be rightly understood by the Spaniards. It had been stipulated that they should march out with their baggage, and deliver their arms on the glacis. But no sooner

Fall of
Figueras.

Aug 19.

Base usage
of the pri-
soners taken
there.

had they given up their arms than they were plundered; and they were marched into France in such a state of destitution, that they were indebted for needful covering to the humanity of the towns through which they passed. Eight hundred peasants were among these prisoners. Buonaparte sent them to the hulks at Brest and Rochefort, and there they were compelled to work with the convicts, being distinguished from them only by a dress of different colour, not by any difference in * treatment.

When Figueras had been recovered from the enemy, it was asserted in the Government gazette, that in consequence of that event the French had abandoned Hostalrich and Gerona, and that the English had taken Rosas; so readily did the Spaniards listen even to the idlest rumours of success! The French in like manner believing, or professing to believe, what they wished, gave out upon their recapture of this fortress that the war in Catalonia was ended: so M. Macdonald affirmed in his dispatches; and the vain boast was repeated in the Barcelonan journal, though in that city undeniable proofs of its falsehood were daily and hourly received. One of the most remarkable men whom these troubles had drawn from obscurity into active life was Jose Manso, who at the commencement of the struggle followed the humble occupation of a miller upon a small patrimony of his own, near Barcelona; some French officers, by their outrageous conduct towards him, roused in him a spirit which under hap-

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* One of the first acts of the provisional government upon the overthrow of this tyrant, was to give orders for the liberation of these injured Catalans, and their removal to Spain; considering, they said, that the violence committed upon men, whose only offence was that of having fought in defence of their country, outraged humanity, and the laws which were consecrated by the nations of Europe.

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pier circumstances might never have been awakened, and he began his honourable warfare against the invaders with only three comrades. By a series of exploits skilfully planned and bravely executed, he had gained for himself a high reputation, which was in no slight degree enhanced by his moral worth; for it might truly be said of him that he was without fear and without reproach. When Manso entered upon this new course of life he was about two or three and twenty years of age, and was so uneducated that he could neither write nor read; but every portion of time that could now be spared from his military duties was devoted to self-improvement, and his progress in this kept full pace with his fortune. At this time he held the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Catalan army; and when Suchet, soon after the fall of Tarragona, was on his way to the capital of the province, he, at the head of a detachment, harassed his march, and succeeded in cutting off some fifty of the enemy and taking six, between Ordal and Molins de Rey; but twelve of his soldiers were taken in these skirmishes, and the French commander ordered some of them to be shot, some to be hanged, and some to be burnt, though they claimed the protection to which they were entitled by the laws of war, and though they threw themselves at his feet and entreated mercy. His orders were executed; some thirty peasants of St. Vicente, Molins de Rey, and Palleja, who were working in the fields, were murdered in like manner; and every woman who fell into the hands of these inhuman troops became their victim. Manso issued a proclamation denouncing these crimes before God and man; and declaring that the right of reprisals which till then he had from humanity forborne to exercise should instantly be enforced, he hung his six prisoners in the immediate vicinity of Barcelona; and gave notice, that every Frenchman who from that hour

fell into his hands should be put to death, till the enemy should have learnt to treat as prisoners of war brave men who were fighting for their country which had been perfidiously invaded, their religion which was insolently outraged, and their king who had been treacherously decoyed into captivity.

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The French asserted also in their journals, that the Junta of Catalonia had fled to Majorca, giving up the principality in despair. The Spanish frigates had indeed run for that island, contrary to orders, carrying with them the archives, and the money, stores, ammunition, and medicines intended for the inland fortresses, and at that time especially needed by them. But the Junta were at their post when Catalonia was left to stand or fall by its own strength, and when without their presence there could have been none to call forth or direct it. In many parts of Spain the provincial Juntas disregarded sometimes, and sometimes counteracted, the orders of the Government; but here the duties of Government devolved upon the Junta. From Solsona they now issued some of those proclamations which contributed so greatly to support the national cause, calling upon their countrymen in the language of hope and heroism and indignation, and exhorting them to rely upon their good cause and their own right arms, and the justice of the Almighty. The Barcelonan journal said that Lacy had fled with the Junta. If they who made this assertion believed it themselves, they were speedily undeceived. That general declared in a proclamation, that if his well founded hope of soon seeing better days should be disappointed, he would die with the last soldier rather than abandon his post: eight days he allowed the dispersed troops for rejoining their colours at the places fixed upon; those who should not then have rejoined were to be pursued as deserters by the civil and military authorities. "Catalans," said he, "the country is in danger, and now more than

*Conduct of
the Junta of
Catalonia.*

*Lacy's pro-
clamation.*

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ever stands in need of your exertions. The Junta and your general are bound to explain to you your situation, because true courage consists not in being ignorant of danger, but in overcoming it. The fall of Tarragona has made that situation critical in the extreme, not desperate. There yet remain to us inextinguishable hatred of oppression and ardent love of independence; . . . there yet remain to us strong-holds and mountains; . . . there remain to us the arms of our numerous and valiant youth for recovering what is lost, and for making the enemy know that the attempt to conquer us is vain. With fewer resources did Pelayo from the mountains of Covadonga begin the deliverance of Spain: and there are not wanting to us chiefs who are determined to follow his glorious example. Great efforts are necessary; let our efforts then be united, and for those who have not spirit to follow this resolution, let them abandon us and join the enemy, that we may know whom to treat as enemies, and whom as friends. The priest, the religioner, the father of a family, every one has wrongs to avenge, every one has much to lose, and our country calls upon all. In all parts the alarum-bell is heard, and wherever there are enemies, there should be Catalans to fight them. War and vengeance must be our only business; and, like our forefathers, let us leave to the women the care of our houses and families!"

*Retreat of
the cavalry
from Cata-
lonia to
Murcia.*

Yet while Lacy held this language, and used at the same time every exertion for collecting the dispersed troops, he was obliged to dismiss a body of cavalry, from utter inability to support them, or even to feed the horses. Brigadier D. Gervasio Gasca commanded this division, which contained twelve superior, and 112 subaltern officers, 922 men, and about 500 horses, the remains of the regiment of Alcantara, the Numancian dragoons, Spanish hussars, *cazadores* of Valencia, and hussars of Granada. They had to make their way through Aragon, into a

free province, and incorporate themselves with the first army they could find. The details of their march show the skill with which the enemy had chosen his positions, so as to give him military command of the country; for near as Valencia was, Gasca was six weeks on the way, and travelled between 700 and 800 miles before he could effect his junction with a Spanish army. He began this perilous retreat on the 25th of July, with his horses in miserable condition for want of food, and without money; getting provisions and information as he could find them, and having no means of procuring either, except such as chance or charity might bestow. At Graus, a small party of the enemy were found, whom they kept in check with a part of their force, while the rest forded the Esera by Barazona. Making long marches, so as to outrun the intelligence of the enemy, they succeeded in passing the rivers Cinca and Gallego without opposition; but when they were in the district of Las Cinco Villas de Aragon, knowing that the French from Barbastro and Huesca were about to collect and cut them off, they made yet longer marches, taking a more devious direction, and moving by night. Notwithstanding these precautions, they were attacked at midnight near the village of Luesia, by what force they knew not, but the fire came from the village, and from a height which commanded the ground over which they were passing. Gasca could not prevent his men from making a precipitate retreat, he had only time to name a place of rendezvous; and while the enemy, who consisted of 1000 foot, and from two to three hundred horse, under the Polish general Chlopiski, hastened to cut them off from the pass of the Gallego, Gasca avoided them by entering Navarre, where he rested three days at Eybar, expecting help from Espoz y Mina to effect the perilous passage of the Ebro. Three parties of that distinguished leader's cavalry came to assist and guide him: their knowledge of

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 XXXVIII. unexpected march to one of the fords of the river; its waters
 1811. were swoln, and they were obliged in some places to swim; the
 August. passage, however, was effected, and immediately Gasca marched
 from four in the afternoon of one day till eight on the following
 morning, that he might get out of reach of the garrisons of
 Tafalla, Caparroso, and Tudela. The danger was now less
 imminent, though still sufficiently great; they made shorter
 marches, varying their direction, according to the intelligence
 they procured of the enemy; and thus, after six weeks of such
 hardships as few people, except the Spaniards, could have sus-
 tained, they joined the army in Murcia by the circuitous way of
 Guadalaxara and Cuenca, having lost upon the road four officers,
 153 men, and 213 horses: the greater part of these men had been
 dispersed in the night route at Luesia; the horses had mostly
 died upon the march.

*State of the
 enemy in
 Catalonia.*

But the Catalans, in circumstances under which almost any
 other people would have despaired, never lost hope; their saying
 was, that now, when the fortified places were lost, the war was
 only begun. And, indeed, deplorable as the state of things was
 for the natives, it was far more so for the invaders: they were
 masters of almost every fortress, but their dominion did not
 extend beyond the walls. They levied contributions upon the
 villages near, and this was all; . . they could only move in large
 detachments, and wherever they moved they were harassed by
 the armed peasantry and the Somatenes. The daily and hourly
 cost of life at which they kept their ground was such, that the
 enemy, who avowed their determination of extirpating half the
 inhabitants in order to intimidate the rest, must have exhausted
 the resources, if not the patience, of France, before such a deter-
 mination could be executed. In the preceding year Suchet had
 dispersed a proclamation, declaring that Great Britain and her

Spanish allies had made peace with France, and acknowledged Joseph Buonaparte as king of Spain. The French now circulated a report that negotiations were going on, and with such probability of success that Talleyrand had been sent to London, and the Emperor himself had gone to the coast for the purpose of expediting the business. But these artifices availed them nothing, for Doyle contradicted their falsehood in addresses which were carried every where and eagerly received, . . . and British ships were still upon the coast, to act wherever opportunity might offer.

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Every success at this time was of great importance in its moral effect. Men are usually alive to hope in proportion as their natures are generous ; and the same cause, which throughout the war rendered it impossible to depress the Spaniards, made them easily elated. Of the patriotic journals which were published in every part of Spain, scarcely a number appeared that did not contain details of some skirmish, some Guerrilla attack, some successful enterprise, or hair-breadth escape, . . . more animating than success in the recital. These things, more even than signal victories, tended to excite a military spirit, when no other advantage accrued from them. But of the advantages which the Catalans at this time obtained, one was of considerable importance. An expedition of Spaniards and English, who in all were but a handful of men, recovered the isles of Las Medas, which had been betrayed to the enemy the preceding year. Colonel Green, the British commissioner, and Baron de Eroles, commanded in this well-planned and well-executed attempt ; and the crew of the Undaunted frigate, Captain Thomas, displayed that zeal and those resources in dragging guns up the rocks, by which British seamen have often made themselves dreaded upon their enemies' shores. They found in the fort four guns, and provisions for three months. Both officers perceived how important it was to retain possession of a place

*Las Medas
recovered
by the Spa-
niards.**Sept. 1.*