

ture, but the Christians could not hold it long ; nor is it known by whom it was finally taken from the Mahommedans, nor when, except that it was sometime in the 11th century, .. an uncertainty, which shows how slowly it had risen from its ruins. Indeed, when Oldegar was made archbishop there, in the year 1116, large oak and beech trees were growing in the cathedral. This personage, eminent during his life as a politic prelate and saint militant, and as a worker of miracles after his death, refortified the city, and may be said to have re-founded it.

The ruined and almost desolate city, with all belonging or which ought to belong thereunto, was given to this prelate and his successors in the see, under the Roman church, by the Count of Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer 3: the deed of gift transferring to the archbishop full power of every kind, stipulating only for an alliance offensive and defensive with the Tarragonans. Oldegar, finding that after ten years his means were not sufficient to complete the cathedral, or to defend the city, transferred the grant to be held as a feud under the see to a Norman knight, Rodbert Burdet by name, who had married in that land, and had acquired there considerable possessions and a great name ; but this family, a branch whereof continues to flourish in England, seems to have taken no root in Spain. The tithes both of the sea and land were reserved for the see : . . those of the nuts * alone from the Selva de Avellana are said to have yielded in some years a thousand escudos. Funds for completing the cathedral, the largest and massiest in Catalonia, were raised by a contribution which the Pope imposed upon the suffragan

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*Ordericus
Vitalis,
892, quoted
by Florez,
T. 25.
p. 116.*

*Florez, T.
25. App.
No. v.*

*Ordericus
Vitalis, L.
13, § 5.
Florez, T.
10. App.
ult.*

*Diago.
Condes de
Barcelona,
p. 183.*

* Sixty thousand bushels, from the woods at the foot of the western mountains, were shipped in the year 1775. SWINBURNE.

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Florez, T.
24. 69.

bishops, and by soliciting alms in aid of the work throughout the province; but the city never recovered even a semblance of its former prosperity. Its circumference is now little more than two miles, and the river Francoli, which, when it bore its ancient name of Tulcis, ran close to Tarragona, is now a mile distant from it. War had not been the cause of this improsperity; for after its restoration, the Moors never attempted it; it suffered little in the revolt of the Catalans; and nothing in the Succession war, the English being received there by the inhabitants, and retiring from it after the peace of Utrecht. But at the time when it might otherwise have partaken the improvement which was then general in Spain, the neighbouring town of Reus made an extraordinary advance in industry and opulence, trebling its population in the course of fifteen years; and making Salo its port, it had the effect rather of taking from Tarragona what trade it might have had, than of contributing to it.

When this unexpected war commenced, Tarragona was deemed so little important as a fortress, that its garrison consisted only of fifty men; it was now the only strong place which the Catalans possessed upon the coast, every exertion had been made to strengthen its works, and they who relied upon fortresses regarded it as the last bulwark of Catalonia. The city was crowded with fugitives from the open country and from towns in the enemy's possession; there was a strong garrison; and Tarragona had this advantage above every other place in the province which had yet been besieged, that supplies and reinforcements could at all times be thrown in by sea. Captain Codrington was in the roads with the *Blake*, *Invincible*, and *Centaur*, ready to aid in any way wherein the zeal and intrepidity of British seamen could be rendered available. Under these circumstances, the spirit of the principality being what it was, and Valencia with unexhausted resources close at hand, a

resolution like that of the Zaragozans and Geronans, or an influencing mind like that of Palafox or of Mariano Alvares, would have baffled all the efforts of the enemy; and unity of counsels, with a competent leader in the field, might have rendered the siege fatal to the besiegers. There were men and means in abundance, the inhabitants as well as the garrison were prepared to act or to suffer, neither will nor resolution were wanting; but there was no commanding mind, no harmony of purpose; some hearts were accessible to fear, and some to corruption. This Count Suchet knew, and could calculate as certainly upon confusion and perplexity in their counsels as upon steadiness and method in his own.

He established his head quarters at Reus: the inhabitants of that busy town had been properly rewarded for the inclination which they had shown toward the French; and their hatred toward them now was in proportion to their sufferings and their repentance. Suchet endeavoured to win them over by maintaining strict discipline, and by courting the chief authorities, civil and religious. Expecting also an obstinate resistance, he prepared extensive hospitals with all things necessary to receive his wounded, and made arrangements for removing them without delay from the trenches; measures whereby he deserved and obtained the affections of the soldiery in a greater degree than any other of the French generals in Spain. He pushed the siege with characteristic vigour, and had soon the satisfaction to learn that Campoverde, having been defeated before Figueras in attempting to relieve that fortress, had hastened back to Tarragona by sea with the remainder of his troops, who were more likely to dispirit the garrison by the distrust which they had conceived of themselves and of their commander, than to bring any increase of real strength. Sarsfield remained with one division in the field, and threatened the enemy's line

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Siege of
Tarragona.

Campo-
verde enters
the city
after a
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from Mora to Reus. This brave and enterprising officer annoyed them on that side; and that part of the besieging army which was encamped on the high and dry level ground at a distance from the Francoli and the Gaya, suffered for want of water, having continually to repair and protect the aqueduct. The most important of the outworks were Fort Francoli, on the left bank of the river to the west of the city, and Fort Olivo: the latter was a new fort, about 400 toises to the north, on ground so high that it could not with safety have been left unoccupied; and this it was deemed necessary to reduce before any attack could be made upon the body of the place. On the part of the enemy's engineers every thing was done which could be expected from a thorough practical knowledge of their destructive art; and so vigorously were their advances resisted by the Spaniards, that the wounded who were carried to the French hospitals are stated by Suchet himself to have been from fifty to threescore daily during the siege of this outwork. The Spaniards estimated them as nearer 300. In one of the sorties General Salme was killed; his body was buried under a part of the aqueduct; his heart embalmed, and deposited under that well known monument which is called the Tomb of the Scipios. Olivo held out till the night of the 29th; nor would it then have been taken had there not been found a wretch wicked enough to sell the blood of his comrades and the interest of his country. The garrison, consisting of 2000, was to be changed that night, the regiment of Illiberia returning into the town, and that of Almeria taking its place: the French presented themselves at the same time with the new garrison, while a false attack was made in another quarter, and entered with them; others found their way through a dry aqueduct, which the Spaniards had neglected either to destroy or properly to secure, and Fort Olivo was thus taken, some 800 Spaniards being made prisoners, and

*Fort Olivo
betrayed.*

more than as many slain. For the information which led to this carnage a price had been bargained, and the money* was paid.

At this time General Senen de Contreras arrived at Tarragona in a frigate from Cadiz. He had distinguished himself when a young man, by abridging the voluminous Military Reflections of the Marquis de Santa Cruz, and was thought to have studied his profession so well that he was sent by Charles III. on a travelling mission, to examine into the military institutions of other countries. On this service he was employed four years, visiting England, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, and in the campaign of 1788 he served against the Turks. In the war against revolutionary France he acted as aid-de-camp to General Urretia in the Pyrenees; and in the present contest had afforded a timely support to the Portuguese in Alemtejo and Algarve, . . . had been in the retreat of the central army, gaining some partial successes in those disastrous days, . . . and afterwards, in some critical situations and some important stations, supported the reputation which he had obtained. He landed now at Tarragona in an inauspicious hour, and had immediately a command entrusted to him at the gate opposite Fort Olivo, where he passed the first unhappy night after his arrival in receiving the fugitives. On the following morning Campoverde assembled his chief officers and the deputies of the superior Junta: it was agreed that an effort for raising the siege should be made in the field; and while the general in chief should be thus employed, Contreras was appointed to command in the city. The danger of the place, and the numerous defects of its incomplete works, were obvious to all military men; and to no one

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General
Contreras.

Contreras
appointed to
command
in the city.

* This, which was suspected at the time, I happen to know.

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*Campo-
verde goes
out to act in
the field.*

more clearly than to the general who now unwillingly took upon himself the charge of defending it. He represented that he was neither acquainted with the troops and officers whom he was to command, nor with the civil authorities with whom he should have to act, nor with the people on whose energetic aid he must rely, nor with the place itself (of which not even a plan could be produced), having, in fact, none of that information which might be considered indispensable for such a command. With this responsibility, however, Contreras was left; and Campoverde departed by sea with his staff, and so many officers (every man seeming to act at his own pleasure), that of the regiments in the garrison only two were left with their own colonels or proper commanders. He issued a proclamation before his departure, promising to return in the course of six or eight days with an army, and make an effort, which was to be seconded by the garrison, for raising the siege. The new commander had no expectation that this promise would be performed; but the garrison and the inhabitants looked with confidence to its fulfilment, . . . for the Spaniards are a hopeful people, and, all circumstances considered, they had on no former occasion had such reasonable ground for hope. They had lost about 3000 men during the siege, which they supposed to be a less loss than the French had sustained, and they could more easily be reinforced. If, indeed, the same means of defence had been resorted to here as in Zaragoza and Gerona, Tarragona, defective as its works were, must have been impregnable: it was secure against famine; it was in no danger of pestilence; and its numbers might always have been kept up. The enemy had broken the aqueduct, expecting to distress the besieged by reducing them to use the brackish water of their wells; but in this he was deceived, for no distress was occasioned by it. The very sight of the English squadron, and the constant communication with it, and its aid

on all opportunities, contributed greatly to the confidence which was felt. CHAP.
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Contreras did not partake that confidence; his measures, however, were such as might support it. He established a military police; he formed the inhabitants into companies; and he employed the women in such services as they were capable of performing. On their part, indeed, a spirit was manifested such as the time required: no danger deterred them from administering refreshments to the soldiers at their stations, nor from bearing away the wounded: it was sometimes necessary to restrain their ardour, but on no occasion did it need excitement. The military chest was almost exhausted; the commander replenished it by levying a contribution upon those merchants who had retired to Villa Nueva with their effects. He gave ear to no overtures from the enemy of whatever kind. When Suchet proposed a suspension of hostilities, that the dead might be interred who lay in heaps around Fort Olivo, in sight from the ramparts of the city, even that proposal was rejected; and in that hot season of the year, and on that rocky soil where graves could not be dug, the French, for their own sakes, were compelled as long as the siege continued to consume the slain by fire.

They gave the fort which they had won the name of Salme, from the general who had fallen before it. And now their attacks were directed against Fort Francoli, which they reduced at length to such a state that the commandant found it necessary to abandon it as untenable, destroying such stores as he could not remove. Hitherto there had been no want of firmness in the besieged; but vigour, confidence, and unanimity were wanting among their leaders. Three members of the supreme Junta were in the city, in order that the civil power might through them afford all the aid which the military might require: this they did most unreservedly; but the proposals which they made

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Sarsfield.

*Cataluña
Atribulada,
13.*

*Troops sent
to reinforce
the gar-
rison, and
landed else-
where.*

met with no correspondent consideration, and the soldiers complained of the inaction in which they were kept. When Campoverde first entered the place, it was supposed that he had invested Sarsfield with powers to act for him both as governor-general of the province and commander in the field; but Sarsfield was soon called after him to Tarragona, and remained there after he had departed. This general was one of the best officers in the Spanish service for an inferior command, .. an intelligent, enterprising, intrepid, and honourable man; but he was punctilious and irritable, and thought less of his country and his duty than of his own personal importance, .. differing in this most widely from Eroles, of whose high reputation and higher virtues he was so jealous, that he regarded him with a dislike little short of personal enmity. This same unhappy temper made it impossible for him to act cordially with Contreras. In the field he might have been far more serviceable than in the fortress, for in the field it was that the best service might have been effected, and the French acknowledged and feared his activity as a partisan: but though he kept up that character in the sallies which he directed, his impractical disposition marred all his better qualities. What he did was without consulting the governor; he neither thought it necessary to concert operations with him, nor even to inform him of the results.

Meantime the siege was pressed with the utmost skill and exertions; and on the part of the Spaniards there was as much want of concert and ability without the walls as within. Troops were twice sent from Carthagena to reinforce the place, and both times without arms, so that when they arrived they were useless, there being already 2000 men there more than there were weapons for; and therefore by desire of Contreras they were carried on to Villa Nueva, there to be armed, if Campoverde could arm them, or to take their own course! And on the part

of Campoverde himself there was such uncertainty, such seeming apathy, that the British officers, who were exerting themselves with indefatigable zeal, apprehended the worst consequences from the incapacity which they now perceived in him. O' Donell, now Conde de Bisbal, was not yet sufficiently recovered from his wound to take the field: his services were never more needed than at this time, when there was no lack of means or men, only of hearts and heads to direct them. He consulted, however, with his brother, who had a command in the Valencian army, and in concert with him and Captain Codrington it was agreed that 4000 of the best Valencian troops should be sent in British ships to reinforce the garrison, while the rest of that army should move to the banks of the Ebro, and there, in concert with the Aragonese, threaten Suchet's depôts, the movement which of all others he apprehended most. These troops, under General Miranda, were accordingly embarked at Peñiscola, with written orders to land at Tarragona; the intention being that they should join in a sally, which Captain Codrington thought could not fail of success. Miranda, however, refused to land, protesting that both his written and verbal instructions forbade him to shut himself up in the fortress with his division. This was neither the place nor the time for disputing; and as little good service can be expected from one in whom good will is evidently wanting, the division landed at Villa Nueva, according to Campoverde's desire, that they might join him at Igualada, and act upon the besiegers' flank.

Suchet, meantime, was not without uneasiness: he had already lost 2500 men, including 280 officers; and hitherto the chief advantage which he had gained had been obtained less by force of arms than by corruption. But the feeble irresolution of the Spanish leaders and their ruinous delays gave him time, by which he profited like one who knew its value; and on the

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