

altogether. War has been, beyond all question, the bane of Spanish freedom and prosperity, as far back as history records. Foreign or domestic, it has been the perpetual background of the picture. To this eternal strife, more than to despotism in all its varieties and combinations, the decay of the nation is attributable ; for it was this, in fact, which gave to despotism its opportunities, its pretexts, and its arms. Rest, therefore, more than all things else, had grown absolutely indispensable to moral and political regeneration, — even the most partial. Tardy as may have seemed to us the steps of the recent revolution we have traced, they would have been incomparably more tedious and unsteady, but for the peaceful though lethargic years preceding the death of Ferdinand the Seventh. It was then only that the scattered elements of change took form and energy, and were combined.

In view of this necessity, this paramount necessity, of repose to the nation, I have commended, in their turn, the “ Convention ” of Espartero with Maroto, and the subsequent policy of the *Moderado* party. The one produced peace, — the other has undoubtedly preserved it. In considering the wisdom and effect of public measures, the motives and the processes which led to them may well be left out of the account. It may be true that Espartero bribed Maroto, — as his enemies have said, — because he could not overcome the Carlists in fair battle. If so, the money was well laid out, notwithstanding. Narvaez and his compeers and successors may have strengthened the arm of government, not merely to save the nation from anarchy and its results, but because it was their own arm, and its strength was their

strength. Yet if the salvation of the country was in fact the consequence, — if faction and discord were thereby kept down, — if leisure and opportunity were given and secured, for industry and enterprise, and the prosperity and happiness that wait upon them, — what matters it that a constitutional provision, here and there, was, for the moment, ambitiously broken? Prosperous nations — confirmed in their prosperity — can afford to be technical, and may stickle even for abstractions; a prostrate land must have realities, not words. There are situations in which one material blessing may be worth a hundred of the holiest forms. Better, a thousand fold, to Spain, a brief, nay, a usurped dictatorship, with peace, than the nominal triumph of liberalism, with the certainty of reaction and desolation.

Those who see force in these suggestions will not distrust the reality of the good which has already been achieved in Spain, nor despair of the future, because of occasional arbitrary passages, and suspensions or infractions of the fundamental law. A moment's comparison of what is now with what but recently was, and a consideration of the obstacles which have been overcome, and the limited means by which the triumph has been won, will suffice to remove all doubts in regard to the present, and to justify the happiest augury. But the future has its own elements of promise, besides. When it is remembered that almost every man of eminence, in the ruling party and the opposition, has risen from the people, and owes his elevation, not to royal favor, but to the popular institutions which surround the throne, it is scarce possible to conceive an act of such wholesale suicide, as a serious attempt to reëstablish an abso-

lute government. The Queen, as has been said, is without ambition, or dangerous qualities of any sort. The Queen Mother, though, on the contrary, as scheming and ambitious as the blood of Naples can make her, yet, in spite of her large wealth, preëminent position, and talent for intrigue, has never been able to secure a hold upon the popular regard. At this moment, though perhaps the most influential, she is probably the best abused and most thoroughly detested person in Spain. She can act only through her creatures, and they have interests of their own, which forbid their serving her beyond a certain point. As a class, the nobles have no political influence whatever; and as individuals, they are, almost universally, without the talents which could make them dreaded or useful.

But even if politicians and rulers were willing to break down the constitutional system, the first overt act would arouse the people to almost unanimous resistance. The lots of freedom has been tasted, and it cannot readily be stricken from their lips. So long as the more important guaranties are not altogether violated, — so long as the government substantially dedicates itself to the public good, by originating and fostering schemes of public usefulness, — it may take almost any liberties with forms and non-essentials. Much further it will not be permitted to go, and every day diminishes the facility with which it may go even thus far. Every work of internal improvement, which brings men closer together, enabling them to compare opinions with readiness and concentrate strength for their maintenance; every new interest that is built up; every heavy and permanent investment of capital or

industry; every movement that develops and diffuses the public intelligence and energy, — is a bulwark, more or less formidable, against reaction. Nay, every circumstance that makes the public wiser, richer, or better, must shorten the career of arbitrary rule. The compulsion, which was and still is a necessary evil, for the preservation of peace, must be withdrawn, when peace becomes an instinct as well as a necessity. The existence of a stringent system will no longer be acquiesced in, when the people shall have grown less in need of government and better able to direct it for themselves. Thus, in their season, the very interests which shall be consolidated and made vigorous by forced tranquillity will rise, themselves, into the mastery. The stream of power, as it rolls peacefully along, is daily strengthening the banks, which, every day, though imperceptibly, encroach on it. Sir James Mackintosh, in his comment on Burke's splendid apostrophe to Chivalry, has skilfully depicted a similar process and result, in the triumph of commerce and intelligence over the feudal and chivalrous institutions which fostered them into strength and independence. Hero points the same moral, in telling of the "pleached bower,"

"Where honeysuckles, ripened by the sun,  
 Forbid the sun to enter, — like favorites,  
 Made proud by princes, that advance their pride  
 Against that power that bred it!"

While, therefore, I should hardly be surprised at an attempt to assimilate the constitution of Spain, in some sort, to the simpler model of the "Prince-Presidency," I should regard its temporary success as an evil by no means without good. An enlightened despotism could

not easily avoid laying, in the national prosperity, a solid foundation for the final establishment of a permanent free system.

Of the shape which the fundamental institutions of Spain will ultimately take, there is, in one particular, but little room for question. The traditions, and even the prejudices, of the people are monarchical altogether. In practice and from conviction, they regard loyalty as a virtue and a sacred duty. There are really, in Spain, no republicans or democrats; or, at all events, no persons seriously contemplating the establishment of a republic or a democracy. The sense of personal independence is as high and scrupulous there, as it can be anywhere, — not excepting our own country. And there is a republican element, too, in the character and manners of the Spaniards, which I believe exists nowhere else, at the degree in which they possess it. Your American citizen will concede to you, if you ask him to do so, that other people are as good as he. But this is not the principle which he sets chiefly forth, in his life and conversation. It is the reverse of the medal, — it is the conviction, the practical demonstration, that he is as good as other people. He will not deny — he dares not deny — the equality of others with himself; but he goes about always asserting his equality with others. The Spaniard, on the contrary, has a sense of equality, which blesses him who gives as well as him who takes. If he requires the concession from others, he demands it, chiefly and emphatically, through the concessions which he makes to them. There is so much self-respect involved in his respect to others, and in his manifestation of it, that reciprocity is unavoida-

ble. To this, and this mainly, is attributable the high, courteous bearing, which is conspicuous in all the people, and which renders the personal intercourse of the respective classes and conditions less marked by strong and invidious distinctions, than in any other nation with whose manners and customs I am familiar. It is this, perhaps, more than any other circumstance, which has tempered and made sufferable the oppression of unequal and despotic institutions, — illustrating “the advantage to which,” in the words of a philosophic writer, “the manners of a people may turn the most unfavorable position and the worst laws.”

But with this eminently republican temper, the continued loyalty of the Spaniards to their monarch is perfectly compatible. There is no servility in it. It is homage paid to the individual, as identified with an institution. The prince is the embodiment of their nationality, — the representative of past glory and present unity. They rally round the throne, in spite of the frailties or crimes of him who fills it. They are no worshippers of Ferdinand or Isabella, — no martyrs for Carlos, — but liegemen to the person whom they believe to be the rightful monarch of the Spains. It is a matter of great uncertainty, therefore, — and perhaps of great indifference, as affecting the question of freedom, — whether the most perfect system of liberal institutions which the Spaniards may adopt will be without some modification of the monarchical feature.

The political horoscope, in other respects, is not so easy to cast. The general, though perhaps the remote tendency, is, I think, towards a federative monarchy. The relations between Spain and Portugal, and

the feasibility of uniting the whole Peninsula as one nation, were the subjects of frequent and practical discussion, public and private, when I was in Madrid, and have more than once furnished topics of serious diplomatical consideration. It seems difficult, indeed, to understand how such a measure as a Peninsular Union, so forcibly suggested by so many natural circumstances, has been so long deferred, or can continue to be postponed, now that the public good has become so controlling an element in national relations. The doctrine of public policy and morals, called "geographical necessity," has obviously not yet been expounded in Europe, with the same efficacy as among ourselves.

But, leaving Portugal out of the question, the Spanish kingdom has more of the federal elements than any nation that I know of in Europe. The provinces, mostly segregated from each other by natural barriers, are quite as much so by their peculiar and respective characters, customs, and laws. The sturdy Biscayan, the Switzer of the Peninsula, is as different, in his personal and provincial characteristics, from the stolid and uncouth Galician, — the industrious, but choleric and selfish Catalan, — the witty, flippant, gallant, bull-destroying Andalusian, — as is the burgher of Amsterdam from the sun-loving Neapolitan. And so of the other provinces. Their forms, prescriptions, ideas, are all different. Their interests are different, — frequently conflicting. Their costumes and dialects are totally distinct. The soil they till, the products they consume, are as the soil and products of remote nations. Some of them are mountaineers, — some dwellers upon boundless plains, — some fishermen, or sailors, or shep-

herds, or manufacturers, or cultivators of the deep green *vegas* that beautify the borders of the sea. Yet, over all, and binding them and all their diversities together, is the iron band of a beloved and time-honored nationality. Catalonians, Biscayans, Asturians, Castilians, — they are all Spaniards. It was this national sentiment which animated and sustained the heroism of their resistance to Napoleon, notwithstanding the local institutions, jealousies, and rivalries which deprived it of unity and concentration.

Nor is the present administrative system of Spain otherwise than favorable to the formation of federal habits and ideas. The general government, as has been seen, presides directly over the foreign relations of the country, and has immediate control of all general and national affairs. Each province, however, has its own civil governor, appointed by the crown; representing, within his sphere, the Minister of *Gobernacion* (the Interior), and in effect the executive ruler of the province. For purposes of consultation, he has his Provincial Council, of three or five persons, likewise nominated by the Queen. The Provincial Deputation, an elective body, to which I have already referred, has duties and powers of a comprehensive and more active nature, — watching over the welfare, regulating the contributions, and developing the resources of the province. Each province, therefore, — thus taking care, in form at least, of its own interests, and in a measure controlling them, — concerned in the assessment and levy of its domestic taxes, — having its wants and wishes represented by its own officers, near the central authority, — is in many respects a separate, though a de-



pendent state. Then, too, there is the municipal feature, the independent action of the *ayuntamiento* within its allotted sphere, — as distinct as that of the provincial authorities within their jurisdiction. In these particulars there is great similarity to the political condition of the American Colonies prior to the Revolution. The ingredients — the rudimental and elementary ideas — of a confederacy are all there, as developed in the beautiful analysis of the subject made by M. de Tocqueville, in his treatise on Democracy in America.

The very existence of these various elements — so suggestive of confederation, and so likely to produce prosperity under and through it — must render it nearly impossible to uphold the present centralized and centralizing system, for any length of time, after the causes of improvement, which are now at work, shall have made it as easy to carry out, as it now is to discover, what the national prosperity demands. The very distinction in provincial characteristics — which would be the main stay of a federal union, constituted to adopt and perpetuate it, as far as useful — is productive only of discord and discontent, where provincial wants and interests are merged, as now, in an absorbing consolidation. Centralization — which, modified by federal institutions, would be a blessing to every part, and communicate to each the vigor of the whole — now crushes, of necessity, what it attempts, unnaturally, to amalgamate. Two things, each, in its sphere, a good, are thus linked together for evil. Two healthful ingredients are combined, by bad chemistry, into a poison. This cannot last, when those who suffer from it grow able to reform it. There can be but one true policy

for a people in such a condition, and that is, to give to the national and the provincial element, each, its appropriate sphere, — to surround the throne, which shall represent the nation, with the guaranties which shall be drawn from prosperous and independent states, confederated to form the one and to defend the other. I am aware that a writer\* — whose opinions on such subjects are more justly entitled to be held oracular, than those of any other reasoner upon government — has pronounced a confederation, “ of all systems, the most complicated, the most difficult : that which demands the greatest development in the intellect of men, the greatest empire of general interests over particular interests, of general ideas over local prejudices, of public reason over individual passions.” Yet the requirements of a confederacy — growing up of itself, and not created by a constituent assembly, — suggested by geographical and natural causes, and arising spontaneously from national circumstances, in their ordinary germination and development — would hardly be so multiform and absolute. The causes which produced, would in such case preserve. It may require art and constant outlay to keep the walls of the Escorial as they came from the hands of the builder ; but the mountain parapets, behind it, have become a changeless part of the nature which formed them.

Taking it for granted that a future confederacy is possible in Spain, there can be but little doubt that the wealth and power she would draw from it would make Portugal a suitor for its privileges. If not, the wealth

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\* M. Guizot.

might buy the freedom of the great rivers which pass through Portugal to the Atlantic,—or the power might give to Spain attractive views of “annexation,” which its present uses will scarcely suggest to her. So seriously were plans of the sort which I have indicated broached in the political circles of Madrid, that there were many who believed the formation of a confederacy would be the basis of the next general movement of the people. The increasing tendency toward centralization seemed to be regarded, in all quarters (except among the rulers and their immediate followers), as the leading evil of the times. During the administration of Espartero, the *fueros*, or provincial privileges of the Basque provinces, were to a great extent suppressed. As a piece of national legislation, this was altogether wise, — though the *fueros*, in themselves, were, many of them, relics of the best days of early freedom. With the existence of a federation they would have been eminently compatible; but the obstacles were infinite which they raised in the legitimate path of the existing system, and they were the source of great discontent and much ill blood among the other provinces, which could see no reason why the Basques should be thus preferred. The *Moderados* have carried out this portion of Espartero’s policy, in the main, and the inhabitants of the “Free Provinces,” when I went among them, were in no better predicament than the rest of their countrymen. As a sort of prelude to a federal movement, — a preparation of the public mind for it, — there was a project, when I was in Madrid, to restore to the Basques the most important of their *fueros*, and thus lead the people of the other provinces to insist on similar

concessions. The idea was not a bad one ; but I have seen no evidence of its having been carried out. It was but a means, however, and the end may be attained as readily in other ways.

Whatever may be the ultimate political destiny of Spain, it is certain that the development of her resources, and especially the completion of her great works of internal improvement, must in some measure precede its consummation. There are two obstacles to her entire political prosperity, which are not likely to be removed, till these ends shall have been, to a great extent, accomplished. The one is the *empleomania*, or mania for place, which has already been the subject of remark ; the other, the advantage which the government has over the people, in its greater facilities for prompt communication and action. The first is mainly the result of the few opportunities, hitherto offered, for the profitable exercise of industry and capacity. Until the cause shall have been removed, the evil must continue. But although the desire of advancement in the public service, which springs from lofty aspirations, is self-sustaining, as all things noble are, — hanging, for subsistence, on the favor of the little great, is a calling which few will consent to follow, who have access to any thing worthier. Custom, it is true, may demoralize men, till they feel no humiliation in that or any other sort of mendicancy. Want may sometimes break even the proudest spirits to the degradation of dependence and servility. But the young and earnest — on whom the hopes of nations rest — must loathe such things, at first, though they have no other refuge from starvation. Let channels but be opened for industry and intelligence, — rea-

sonable inducements held out to honest toil, — reputable and remunerative occupation given to the hands or to the mind, — and the throngs which bow in the antechambers, or scowl and plot in the Puerta del Sol, will soon be reduced to the few who are beyond demoralization. It would of course be going too far to say, that, even then, the evil will be eradicated altogether. Our own national experience has sadly failed to demonstrate that the utmost opportunity for the acquisition of pecuniary independence will, of necessity, withdraw men from the pursuit of politics as a trade. But if the good of a diversion be not absolute, it will, at all events, be a good, and Spain is in no case to despise the smallest of these. The evil is certainly that which retards, more than any other, the establishment of a free system, and its uncorrupted economical administration.

Upon the other point little need be said. The government is a vast, connected, organized system, — moved by a single will, and working with rapidity, certainty, and concentration. The people, broken into provinces, — without facility of access to each other, — have no opportunity for the speedy formation or expression of a public or national opinion, — no means whatever of prompt, united action. They can be anticipated and overawed, — kept apart, and crushed in detail. With all needful intelligence and spirit, they cannot bring either to bear, except under the greatest disadvantages. With abundant, but scattered strength, they are unable to concentrate or direct it. The difficulty is chiefly a physical one, and material agencies alone can remove it. When the telegraph shall flash its tidings through the whole land at the same moment, and the

power of steam shall be at the bidding of the spirit which they may awaken, then the people and their rulers will be fairly in the lists, and with an equal sun the wrong must needs go down.

There may be persons to whom the views and anticipations expressed in the foregoing pages will seem too flattering, — the result, perhaps, of partiality for a favorite nation. This impression may not be altogether unfounded. The partiality is not denied, and it may have produced its natural effects. Insensibly too, from dwelling on a subject, the judgment may be moulded to its shapes. “In contemplating antiquities,” says Forsyth, translating from Livy, “the mind itself becomes antique.” The author has endeavored, as far as possible, to guard against this, and, even if unsuccessful, he is persuaded that his opinions have been affected far less by his predilections, than he has found those of many of his predecessors to have been by the prejudices of creed and education. Impartiality is no doubt the philosophic frame of mind, but not the impartiality of indifference; indeed it may be questioned, greatly, whether sympathy is not a necessary element in all capacity for national, as well as other appreciation. Antipathy, at all events, is not a promising one.

But if the author should not be fortunate enough to merit entire coincidence with his opinions, he trusts he has at least established, that Spain should not be coupled, as she usually is, with Austria and Russia, in our popular and daily denunciations of despotism. Surely she deserves, if any nation can, the encouragement and sympathy of the friends of rational liberty.

For half a century — through blood and fire at first, and then through sad oppression and strife, and through the calmer but severer trials of peaceful revolution — she has been indomitably working out her gradual redemption. Her institutions may differ from ours. Her system may be imperfect; her power may, as yet, be far below its ancient scale and that of our present predominance; but the fortitude and perseverance which have gone thus far will go farther,

“ever reaping something new, —

That which they have done but earnest of the things that they shall do.”

If we are devoted to human freedom for its own sake, — whatever be the shape it takes, — it becomes us to welcome a constitutional monarchy which has been reared upon the ruins of a despotism. That monarchy may be devoted, in appearance, rather to the cause of order than the cause of progress; but in Europe order is the road to progress, and there have been, of late, too many unhappy illustrations of the truth, that the worst of despotisms is that which follows an abortive and too hasty effort to be free. All cannot be altogether like ourselves. All need not be, to flourish. To sympathize with none but those who adopt our forms, is to reverence but the reproduction of ourselves, — to forget that which is in us and in our forms, and alone makes them and us what we are.

But whether we give or refuse sympathy, let us at all events do justice. The one is our own, to dispose of as we please, — the other we may not honestly withhold. There is no law by which a man may be compelled to

love his neighbor as himself, but there is legislation on the subject of highway robbery. Spain has the sorest need of her resources, in her toilsome struggle for happiness, development, and freedom. Let us not give it to history to say, that she was compelled to waste the means of her deliverance in defending herself from republican cupidity. Strange as it may appear, to some of our political philosophers, there are such things as right and wrong, and they are not to be measured by the wants and desires of a people, any more than by the ambition and unscrupulousness of a prince. It is easy enough to write state papers, speak speeches, pass resolutions, and invent pretexts, in defence of profitable usurpation. Men of great intellect, and flexible temper or integrity, may be purchased or flattered by temporary popularity, or awed by general opinion and the public will, into the support of any heresy. Great names have never been wanting to sanction, or great abilities to justify, any national iniquity that promised heavy returns. Truth and justice exist, nevertheless, and magnanimity and fair-dealing with the weak are still valued among men. Injustice will survive the best gloss that we can put on it. Campbell could not preclude the verdict of history, by all the lyric splendor of the "Battle of the Baltic." If the annals of the world show any thing, it is that national power, in its utmost duration, is not so lasting as national shame.

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## POSTSCRIPT.

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THE changes which have taken place in Spain, since the period to which the body of this volume more particularly refers, do not affect, in the main, the correctness of the sketch which has been given. It may be well, however, to notice the general direction of those which have not been fully adverted to already.

Notwithstanding the very large majority of the *Moderados* in the Cortes chosen in 1850, it became apparent, soon after their session had begun, that the preponderance of the party furnished no guaranty for the permanence of the existing administration. The Count of San Luis had overshot his mark. He had controlled the elections, but could not manage the elect. In December, Bravo Murillo retired from the cabinet, and the dissensions which followed resulted in the resignation of Narvaez himself, and the dissolution of the ministry which he had formed and kept together. His downfall was believed to be the work of Queen Cristina. Recent events seem to indicate his return to power, and it is impossible that such a man can fail, for any length of time, to make his influence felt in one shape or another.

After the retirement of Narvaez, the reconstruction of the council was intrusted to Bravo Murillo, who continued until recently to occupy its presidency. Various cabinet changes and dissolutions of the Cortes have taken place in

the mean time, but the *Moderados* have managed to retain the control of both departments of the government. Neither of the great parties has been without its troubles and schisms. Sr. Pacheco has developed the secret of these, in a single phrase. "Parties," he observes, "which were framed upon public principles, have split upon private interests." The laborers, on both sides, are out of proportion to the harvest, and some of them are fain to turn their reaping-hooks into swords. Among the *Moderados*, the advocates of extreme doctrines have had the ascendancy, as the acts of the government show. The most unfortunate evidence of their predominance is to be found in the restraint imposed on the press. The spirit of the enactments on that subject, lately promulgated and enforced, is almost identical with that which has prevailed for some time past in France. Indeed, upon all subjects, the tone of the Spanish officials and their organs, until the recent change, had grown less and less deferential to the constitution, and more avowedly and openly absolute.

The *Progresistas*, forgetful altogether of the obvious truth, that no opposition can be effective without unity, have been wasting their strength and opportunities, for the most part, in the unprofitable discussion of abstract questions. While they debated as to the degree of rapidity with which progress should advance, they were imperceptibly throwing away the chance and their ability to secure any progress at all. Of late, they appear to have regained their wisdom, and with it their organization and their strength. In the Cortes recently assembled, they had a formidable array of numbers and parliamentary talent. The *Moderado* opposition, too, was full of vigor, ability, and influence, with some of the first names of the nation on its lists. A combination of the opposing elements resulted in the entire defeat of the ministry upon the organization of the Congress of Deputies. Martinez de la Rosa was elected President; but almost his first duty was to announce that the Queen had been pleased to dissolve the Cortes. Before taking this decided step, the government

had submitted to the legislature several projects of constitutional reform, — all of them tending towards a reduction of the popular power, and the assimilation of the Spanish system to that of Napoleon the Third. The fate of measures so unnecessary and absurd was too obvious, in the Cortes as they then stood, and there was no alternative but a dissolution of the cabinet or of the legislature. The next Cortes will assemble in March, 1853. The people will have the views of the reactionists fully before them in the elections, and it can hardly be doubted that the result will strengthen, more than ever, the hands of the liberal constitutional party. Indeed, the news of the dissolution of the Murillo ministry, received as these sheets are going to the press, would seem to indicate that the question is already substantially settled.

But for the proximity of France, and the unavoidable influence of the imperial doctrines and policy, a Spanish cabinet would hardly have ventured, at this day, upon the suggestion of such changes as I have alluded to. So obvious is this, indeed, that the government organ in Paris has felt it necessary to disavow all connection of the Emperor with the matter. There is not a nation in the world which has furnished fewer pretexts than Spain for reactionary legislation. The Spaniards have used the degree of freedom which they have enjoyed, with prudence and extreme moderation. They have committed no excesses, — run wild with no theories, — organized no conspiracies, — invented no infernal machines. They have dedicated themselves, soberly and steadfastly, to the development of their material resources, asking nothing but to be protected, or at all events let alone. They have not required so much as a sham-fight on the Prado, or a single display of fireworks, to keep them in perfect good humor with their rulers and themselves. Even a government confessing itself arbitrary, would therefore be without excuse for interfering with the constitution. How the idea of such a thing could occur to a constitutional cabinet, — composed of men whom the constitutional system had created, — passes all under-

standing. The pernicious influence of the Queen Mother is probably the immediate source of the movement. The progressive tendencies of the people and the unequivocal revolution which old ideas and systems have already undergone, may be trusted to counteract it.

It must not be denied, however, that, under the policy of the Murillo cabinets, the prosperity of Spain substantially and steadily advanced. This is especially true in regard to her financial affairs. Nothing practicable was neglected, to secure an economical administration of the government and the faithful collection and disbursement of the public moneys. The measures which were adopted in regard to the debt were statesmanlike and earnest, — indicating a due appreciation of the national responsibility and faith, and a determination to provide, to the extent of the national ability, for the payment of the interest and the gradual extinguishment of the principal.

It would be tedious to enter into a detail of the administrative reforms which the last two years have consummated. One of the principal of these was the suppression of the Department of Commerce, Instruction, and Public Works. The supervision of public education, which was one of the functions of this Department, has passed to that of Grace and Justice. Its remaining duties have been committed to a new department, called the *Ministerio de Fomento*; a title so peculiarly Spanish, that it can hardly be better rendered into English, than as the "Department of Public Encouragement." Agriculture, commerce, manufactures, internal improvements, and the general industry and national resources of the kingdom, are within its very comprehensive scope.

The administrative embarrassments which have been previously alluded to, as resulting from the suppression of the Council of Indies, seem to have suggested the necessity of a Colonial Department, to be called the *Ministerio de Ultramar*. At the last dates from Madrid, the details of its organization had not been promulged; but there appears to be

no doubt of its establishment within a brief period. The magnitude of the colonial interests which are still controlled by Spain, would seem fully to justify the contemplated change. It is to be hoped that the colonial system will be so far modified under its auspices, as to remove all pretext for dissatisfaction with the government of the mother country. In view of the creation of the Department of *Ultramar*, that of *Fomento* seems likely to share the fate of its predecessor, — leaving its functions to be distributed among the other departments. The policy of assigning its important duties to officers whose labors are already sufficiently numerous and ill-performed, may well be doubted; but any permanent arrangement would be preferable to continued variation and experiment.

The *desestanco*, or removal of the government monopoly from salt and tobacco, — a measure of the deepest importance to the public interests, — lately occupied the attention of Sr. Murillo. Whether it was suggested merely as a bid for popularity, or was really contemplated in good faith, must remain in doubt. Little could have been expected from the liberality of an administration which could promulgate such an edict as that recently published in regard to foreigners. “No foreigner,” says its third article, “will be permitted to profess, in Spain, any religion but the Roman Catholic and Apostolic.” Fortunately, there is no obligation imposed on strangers to profess any religion whatever, except in connection with certain legal acts. The article quoted is nothing new in the Spanish law, but it seems wellnigh time for something better. “Of old things,” some “are over old.”

no doubt of the establishment with a view to the  
 acquisition of the original documents which are well preserved in  
 France, would seem likely to justify the contemplated change.  
 It is to be hoped that the original copies will be in the hands  
 of the editor or editors, so to insure all printed editions  
 being alike in substance to the master copy. In the  
 of the nature of the subject, and of the nature of the  
 work, some things in which the list of its contents —  
 having no reference to the French and among the other depart-  
 ments. The policy of making an important list to be  
 one which shows the author's sufficiently numerous and im-  
 portant, will be desired; but any personal or  
 prejudicial would be preferable to continued reticence and  
 concealment.

The absence or removal of the government records  
 from this list is a serious defect of the present edition  
 in the public interest, — but it is beyond the power of the  
 editor. We think it was suggested merely as a bid for per-  
 mission, or was well understood in good faith, must remain  
 in doubt. It is not likely to have been expected from the liberality  
 of an administration which would permit the sale of what is  
 that recently published in regard to the same. The design  
 of "some of the same" will be permitted to be in  
 their own hands, but the French, British, and American  
 authorities there is an objection to be made on account of  
 private and public interest, which is connected with  
 the same legal case. The article should be not only in the  
 French law, but it is not possible to be in the same  
 "This thing" case "is not it"









