

this fact the discussion in regard to the Inquisition furnishes a curious and instructive illustration, well worthy the attention of those, who think and write as if the odor of a roasted heretic were the only sweet-smelling savor in the Spanish clerical nostrils.

Services so eminent and patriotic as those of Gallego could not escape the vengeance of Ferdinand, and upon the return of his Majesty, Don Nicasio was made the victim of a state prosecution which lasted eighteen months, and ended in his imprisonment, for four years, in the Carthusian Convent of Jerez, without even the decent formality of a judicial sentence. From Jerez he was transferred to the Convent of Loreto, in the midst of a wilderness not many leagues from Seville. His Muse, always sluggish, was not greatly quickened by these vicissitudes; but the few poems which saw the light during his confinement are among the best of his productions.

On the return of the liberal party to power, in 1820, Gallego received a distinguished ecclesiastical preferment, of which Ferdinand took the earliest occasion to deprive him, when the wheel again went round. A life of trial and humiliation was the lot of the poet for the next ten years, during which he had an opportunity of tasting the bitterness of that exile shared by so many of his countrymen, and by himself so touchingly described:—

“Otros, gimiendo por su patria amada,
El agua beben de extranjeros rios,
Mil veces con sus lagrimas mezclada.”

To the desire for repose, so natural after so much weary and sad turmoil, is perhaps attributable, in some

degree, the pertinacity with which he has resisted all attempts to bring him again before the world, by the publication of his works.

When Ferdinand died, the road of advancement lay open to Gallego, but he declined to accept various offers of the most honorable character. He consented, nevertheless, to act with Quintana, Lacanal, and Liñan in the preparation of a scheme of public instruction, and was, besides, for some time, a member of the Directory which had that matter in charge. Of later years, he has received the appointment of Senator, and now fills the distinguished station, likewise, of Perpetual Secretary to the Spanish Academy. The exquisite idiomatic purity of his compositions, and the almost oracular reverence in which his critical opinion is held, render the appropriateness of his selection for the last-mentioned post a matter of universal and gratified recognition.

The published poems of Gallego are so few, that only the highest order of excellence could give him the reputation he enjoys. They are chiefly lyrical and elegiac, and remarkable, according to their class, for nobleness and elevation of style and thought, or for refined and plaintive tenderness. His celebrated verses in commemoration of the *Dos de Mayo*,—the consecrated 2d of May, 1808,—the day on which the patriotism and self-sacrifice of Daoiz and Velarde and the enthusiasm and despair of the people of Madrid raised the bloody and at last triumphant standard of resistance to the aggression of the French,—have become as much a portion of the literature which dwells in the popular heart, as the *Marseillaise* in France

or the "Mariners of England." The poem is published throughout the kingdom, as often as the years bring round the proud and mournful anniversary, and so admirable are both its spirit and its execution, that it challenges, at every repetition, not less the admiration of the scholar and the man of taste than the enthusiasm of those who have no canons of criticism but their feelings. Indeed, without entering into any critical analysis, I know no better idea of Gallego's style and merit, in the class of works of which I have spoken, than that which is given by likening him to Campbell. The same loftiness and correctness, — the same purity of taste and grace of expression, — the same trumpet-like capacity to warm the blood, — are conspicuous in both of them. Unfortunately, the reproach for "Soul-animating strains, — alas, too few!" is equally applicable. Gallego has, it is believed, a large number of poems, which are fated to do him only posthumous honor. A friend, writing of his vigorous old age, says that "the request to publish is the only thing to which he is deaf." He is content, no doubt, with the regard and admiration of his contemporaries already won, and is not unwilling to conciliate posterity by a legacy.

It would be hardly fair to leave unnoticed, in this little sketch of two of the veterans of Spanish literature, one who, though somewhat their junior, still belongs, both in age and eminence, to the class which they represent. I refer to Don Francisco Martinez de la Rosa, admitted, I believe, on all hands, to be the most accomplished belles-lettres scholar in the kingdom, and, if not the most prominent in any particular depart-

ment of literature, remarkable, certainly, for his ability and success in almost all. The vicissitudes of his political life and opinions have divided the public sentiment in regard to his talents as a statesman, and as this division has been accompanied with considerable feeling, such as political breaches always involve, it has produced a similar diversity of sentiment in respect to the degree of his excellence as a writer. Neither passion nor party spirit, however, has been able to extinguish, even in his enemies, that respect for his untiring industry and great attainments, which is conceded equally to his personal integrity.

The first public appearance of Martinez de la Rosa was in the Cortes elected in 1813, under the new constitution. He was sent by his native city of Granada, was an active supporter of the new system, and, though only twenty-five years of age, soon ranked among the most distinguished orators of the Congress. The vindictiveness of Ferdinand was always proportioned to the worth and ability of the rebel. Martinez was accordingly prosecuted with great rigor, but although an opportunity was offered him to abjure his opinions and be free, he preferred incurring the severe penalty of confinement, for ten years, in the state-prison of the *Peñon* in Africa. With the liberal reaction of 1820, his release came, and he went back to Granada, to be welcomed with triumphal arches and returned again to the legislature of the kingdom. Time, however, had begun to produce that change in his opinions, which in the first fervor of his youth and enthusiasm the hope of royal clemency could not precipitate. The constitution of 1812 had ceased to seem to him the per-



fection of government, for which he had once taken it. This change soon disclosed itself in his parliamentary course, and, in the contests between the executive and the legislature, he was generally to be found on the side of ministers. On a memorable occasion in the legislative annals of that epoch, he announced it as his principle, that "*defendiendo al gobierno se defiende tambien la libertad,*"—the defence of government is the defence of liberty also! This, which has been the maxim of his whole subsequent political career, gave at the time great provocation to the liberal party, which he was regarded as deserting, and has fixed him permanently in the public mind as the adherent and advocate of power. He was elevated to the Premiership in 1822, but was compelled, by the pressure of circumstances and of legislative opposition, to resign a post for which he had not practical qualifications or administrative tact. His parliamentary defences, however, of his principles and measures at that time, are among the most masterly and eloquent recorded efforts of the Spanish tribune; and it may be fairly inferred that his reputation, both national and Continental, was of some mark, when Chateaubriand congratulated himself on being Prime-Minister of France, at the same moment that the same high place was filled by Canning in England and Martinez de la Rosa in Spain.

The return of Ferdinand to absolute power drove Martinez into exile. He remained for the most part in Paris, where he formed many distinguished political and literary associations, the former of which contributed no doubt to confirm and fix his maturer and more conservative ideas of government. During his

residence abroad, which continued until 1830, he published many poetical, dramatic, and critical works, some of them of a high order of merit, and none without the marks of scholarship and taste. One of his dramas, written in French, was in the course of representation with great success in Paris, when the revolution of the "three days" broke out. His *Art of Poetry*, — after the fashion of Horace and Boileau, — though in itself fuller of art than poetry, like its illustrious prototypes, was accompanied by a large body of copious and admirable annotations, amounting almost to a critical history of Spanish poetical literature, and displaying, not only a profound and intimate acquaintance with the subject, but all a poet's appreciation of its spirit.

After the death of Ferdinand, the known moderation of Martinez de la Rosa in his political sentiments commended him to the Queen Regent. The *Estatuto Real* (Royal Statute), the first compromise of despotism with the new order of things, was promulgated by an administration over which he presided, and is admitted to have been his individual work. Allusion has already been made to this hybridous constitution, and it is not worth while to analyze its character here. It created a legislature composed of two branches, — the one chosen for life and eminently aristocratic in its nature and functions, — the other a chamber of *procuradores*, to be selected from time to time, and mainly by the *ayuntamientos* or corporations of the cities and towns. As these latter functionaries for the most part were the creatures of the crown, or could at any time be made so, it was felt by the mass of the constitutional party, that the Cortes of the *Estatuto* were little

better than a mockery of popular representation. When the decree for the organization of the system was read, the indignation of the liberals against its author knew no bounds. Arguëlles, the coryphæus of the old constitutional *régime*, cried out "Apostasy!" lifting his hands to his head in despair; and even in the first legislature which the ministry convoked under the Statute, there were elements of the most vigorous and determined resistance to it. Martinez had all the oratorical ability and tact which baffle or break down an opposition in debate, but he wanted the strategy and energy to divert or overcome the pressure from without. He was, besides, too scrupulous for a statesman in his country and generation. He expressed opinions because he entertained them, and adopted lines of policy for no better reason than that he believed them to be right. The chances of such a game as politics have become, in all countries, were therefore necessarily against him, and when the defects of his system and the traits of his personal character were added to what a contemporary calls his "excessive rectitude," it is no marvel that his administration was troubled and disastrous. It lasted, however, nearly eighteen months. The equally bad success of those who followed him, under the same system, might, in other circumstances, have relieved him from the charge of being less wise than his fellows; but, unfortunately, he was the author of the system itself, so that, in one shape or the other, he must bear the responsibility of his own reverses and, it may be, of theirs.

Since the repeal of the *Estatuto*, and under the constitutions which have succeeded it, Martinez de la Rosa

has been a member of the Cortes from time to time, and has maintained the parliamentary reputation of his more vigorous years, under all the disadvantages of age and the loss of political prestige. He was a Deputy when I was in Madrid, but was absent, as I have stated, as Ambassador at Rome. A warm and active sympathy with the Head of the Church, in his misfortunes, was certainly both natural and proper in a country so thoroughly and devotedly Catholic as Spain. The virtues of Pius the Ninth entitled him, besides, to veneration and affectionate regard, independent altogether of the homage which was rendered to his ecclesiastical supremacy. He was undoubtedly the pioneer in the liberal movement which has shaken Europe during the last few years, and there can be but little question, that, if he had been left to himself, to conduct with prudence and moderation what he had begun with wisdom and good faith, there would not now be seen the spectacle of a French army keeping watch and ward in the Eternal City. The presence of so distinguished a personage as Martinez de la Rosa, invested with the highest powers and dignities known to diplomatic custom, and following the exiled Pontiff through all the stages of his pilgrimage, was therefore, in every sense, appropriate and worthy of a reverent and generous people. It was nevertheless a striking instance of that perpetual change in men and nations, whereof all history is but the record, that Spain herself, so frequently the victim of foreign intervention, should have sent an army to intervene in the domestic affairs of Rome; and that an individual who had so often denounced the hateful principle, and had himself so suf-

ferred from its operation, should have been the bearer of his country's mandate, to do unto others what she would not that others should do unto her. "For my part," says Montaigne, "I am with much more difficulty induced to believe in a man's consistency than in any other virtue in him; while there is nothing I so readily believe as his inconsistency; and whoso will meditate upon the matter, closely and abstractedly, will agree with me." As to the consistency of nations, not even that universal moralizer thought it worth while to moralize.

Besides the works to which reference has already been made, Martinez de la Rosa has subsequently found leisure for the production of many, both in poetry and prose, and some of them at least are likely to become a permanent portion of the national literature. His most elaborate work in prose-fiction — the historical novel called *Isabel de Solis* — has not been received with general approbation, the better opinion being that it lacks both spirit and invention. The historical biography of Hernan Perez del Pulgar is, however, an admirable specimen of its class, and would, in the judgment of many, be sufficient to make a reputation. Critical opinion, nevertheless, is divided even upon that point, and some have been found to denounce the whole production as a waste of time and labor on a worthless subject, — an attempt to write a chronicle of knightly days, in the obsolete language that belonged to them. Some time back, one of the prominent journals of Madrid was polite and amiable enough to announce, that, in the judgment of its editors, Martinez de la Rosa was little better than a *tonto*, — in plain language, a

fool! I myself was surprised to hear a distinguished political rival say, that he was a flat poet and a dull novelist, with nothing striking about him, but large acquirements and larger vanity! In the mean time, by general consent, at home, he stands among the first of the men of letters of his day, and a recent sketch of his life announces his elevation, abroad, to the high dignity of President of the Institute of France. The balance would seem, under such circumstances, to incline somewhat in his favor, but the amusing diversity of opinion in regard to his literary merits may well serve to illustrate the uncertainty of contemporary fame, and to justify, in a new point of view, the wisdom of the philosopher of old, who said that the fortune of the happiest man alive was like the luck of a wrestler who was still in the ring.

XXII.

STANDING ARMIES. — THE SPANISH ARMY, ITS CONDITION AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE. — IMMENSE NUMBER OF GENERALS. — THE SCIENTIFIC CORPS. — THEIR ORGANIZATION AND MERITS. — THE NAVY, ITS IMPROVEMENT AND PERSONNEL. — ITS ORGANIZATION. — THE CUBAN EXPEDITIONS. — DISCRIMINATING DUTIES UNDER OUR ACT OF 1834. — DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS IN SPAIN, IN CONSEQUENCE. — SANTANDER. — RAILROADS. — THE CANAL OF CASTILE. — COMPETITION.

THE organization of standing armies has always been regarded as a step forward in the civilization of Europe. Not that there is any thing particularly humanizing in horse, foot, and dragoons, of themselves or as an institution, but that, as men, since the days of Cain, have had a proneness to slay their brethren, it was a wise and happy thought to intrust the indulgence of that human weakness to a representative class, educated, equipped, and paid for the purpose, and to leave the rest of society leisure and opportunity for more profitable labor and gentler entertainment. No one needs be told how military establishments, like all other establishments clothed with public power for public

purposes, have habitually, and on principle, used that power for their own. When kings grow into tyrants and priests into stipendiaries, — when republican Representatives resolve the whole task of legislation into making themselves Presidents, or profiting by the President-making of others, — it can be no matter of surprise that the drum and trumpet should have taught no better lesson of conscience and duty.

In Spain the weight of the army in political affairs has been a crying evil, since the very commencement of the liberal system. Its *pronunciamientos* have been always influential, and often omnipotent. Its leaders have found military service — or the rank which they have reached without it — a passport to the highest places of the state. The legislature is full of them, — the ministerial bench is rarely free from them. They are the boldest intriguers, the most open and avowed self-seekers. Where a civilian finds a pretext necessary, a brigadier-general affects none. If the government displeases him, he is indignant and confesses it. He represents an estate of the realm, and he has no hesitation in proclaiming that he will make himself feared, if the rulers will not love him.

Unfortunately, the evil of these things, though very obvious, is of very difficult cure. A nation like Spain, which has been for half a century in constant war, must of necessity have incurred heavy obligations to her soldiery. She has debts of gratitude to be paid in honors, and debts of a more substantial sort to be more substantially satisfied. As a portion of her wars have been dynastic, — and as in many of her political contentions the bayonet has done the duty of the ballot-



box, — the victorious dynasty and the triumphant party have necessarily involved themselves in pledges to their troops, which must for a while not only forbid any serious reduction of the military scale, so far as the officers are concerned, but render it dangerous to resist the demands of popular chieftains.

There are external causes, too, at the present moment, which make it almost impossible for Spain to contract her army and its influence within the proper scope of a constitutional system. Of these, the troubled and uncertain state of Europe is obviously an important one, but the chief obstacle is to be found in the proximity of France and the extent and efficacy of French influence. There seems to be a sort of spiritual or phreno-magnetic *rapport* proclaimed, if not existing, between Spain and her extraordinary neighbor. It has become almost a concession, that, if there is a revolution in France, there must be one in Spain, with or without cause. If there is a reaction at Paris, Madrid straightway becomes reactionary, whether there be or be not any thing to react from. A "crisis" at the one place is almost sure to produce a "crisis" at the other, without the remotest regard to the existence or non-existence of any thing critical. The patient smacks his lips, simply because the mesmerist has a disposition to drink. I have already alluded to the extent of this influence, but chiefly in reference to the absurdities in which it results. Its more serious consequences are quite as numerous. There was a popular outbreak in Madrid after the overthrow of Louis Philippe, merely because Louis Philippe had been overthrown. The government strengthened itself for its own preservation

immediately after that outbreak, as was natural enough ; but the increase of its powers was made a fixed political principle, as soon as it was perceived that in France it had become fashionable to shoot "fraternity." Since the accession of Louis Napoleon to the Prince-Presidency and the Empire, there is no knowing what might happen, were there any body in Madrid who was nephew to an uncle. Indeed, it would not be strange, if, before these reflections should see the light, there were a temporary interruption of the constitutional progress of Spain and the happiness and improvement of her people, by some Gallic harlequinade or other, on the model of the *coup d'état*.

Excluding the troops in the colonies, the Spanish army, in actual service in the Peninsula and the adjacent islands, was stated by Sr. Moron, in the Chamber of Deputies, to consist of one hundred and four thousand men. On the first of January, 1849, and throwing out of the calculation all subsequent additions, which were numerous, there were neither more nor less than six hundred and sixty-two general officers, the most of them comparatively recent promotions, distributed through that army ! By the Blue Book of 1850, seventy-nine of these appear to have been lieutenant-generals. The French army, of about five times the number of soldiers, had about one third the number of generals, and the proportion was still smaller in Prussia. In Austria, with more than four times as many men, there were scarcely more than half as many commanders. It is true that the military system of Spain provides for the enrolment and reduction into service, on occasion,

of what is called the *reserva*, or reserved division of the levies, so that the enormous disproportion which the statistics show between the rank and file and their superior officers, ought to be considered with a trifling qualification, on that account. But taking all things into the calculation, — not forgetting the troops in the colonies, or overlooking the necessity of supernumerary promotions, during the progress and at the close of a civil war of protracted duration, — it must be admitted that there is little to redeem the military establishment of Spain from mere absurdity in the particular referred to. Even if the *reserva* were called by circumstances into activity, there is not much in the history of the past to induce the belief, that the opportunity would be taken to make the officers deserve their honors by the laborious discharge of duty. On the contrary, it is more than likely that the occasion would be greedily seized to enlarge the list of *generales*, &c. yet more extensively, and to decorate with new ribbons and crosses, if such could be found, those who had already reached the summit of actual rank.

In his guide-book, published about the middle of 1849, and containing a great deal of useful compendious information, Mellado states that the *empleados* connected with the War Department amounted to about eleven thousand, exclusive of soldiers. It will not thus be deemed at all remarkable that the *presupuesto*, or budget of 1850, should have appropriated nearly sixteen millions of dollars to that branch of the public service. When it is considered that the ordinary provision for the Naval Department, in the same year, reached about three millions and a half, and that a very

large increase in the navy has since been rendered necessary, by the piratical plans which have been agitated in the United States, it will be seen that Spain would have abundant reasons for being represented in the Peace-Congresses.

With whatever truth the contrary may have been said twenty years ago, there can be no question that the Spanish army, at the period of my visit, was in a high state of discipline, and thoroughly instructed in the best improvements of modern military science. The regiments which went to Rome attracted great admiration, although the duty assigned to them afforded but little opportunity for the display of their more substantial qualifications. I saw some of them after their return, and heard ample testimony borne by competent judges, without national bias, to the excellence of their equipment and drill. The garrison of Madrid was composed of a very fine body of men, — both infantry and cavalry, — lithe, active, and strikingly martial in their bearing. I could not help frequently observing, however, among the company officers of the line, a manifest inferiority to the rank and file in soldierlike appearance. It was mainly attributable, I thought, to the comparative youth and immaturity of the captains and lieutenants, some of whom seemed hardly fit to encounter the rudeness of war's alarms. It is still but fair to say, that the worst enemies of the army, as a political engine, were constrained to acknowledge the personal bravery of its officers. It would indeed be hard to find a more gallant band of gentlemen, and it was on that account the more to be regretted that so many of them should be tempted,

by a corrupting political system, to hang upon the favor of a court.

Captain Widdrington* — whose professional pursuits, as well as his long residence and opportunities of observation in Spain, entitle his judgment to great respect — speaks very favorably of the education and attainments of the officers attached to the scientific departments. The period to which he refers was about that of Ferdinand's death, and the improvement which has taken place, since that time, in the preparatory system, would no doubt render his commendation more generally applicable now. Although, however, it is true, as he observes, that the artillery and engineer corps have always been remarkable for the liberality of their political sentiments, and have almost universally encountered the greatest sacrifices in the maintenance of such opinions, it is equally true, that they have habitually refrained, more than any other branches of the army, from intermeddling with the ordinary politics of the country. No doubt the direction of their intellectual occupations has had a good deal to do with this, and there is even more, perhaps, in the fact, that they have intellectual occupation of some sort, without any particular reference to its nature. The mathematics do

* In a review of the "Glimpses of Spain," the London Athenæum — referring to the favorable notice I had taken of this gentleman's admirable books on Peninsular affairs — was liberal enough to suggest, as the source of my commendation, that no doubt the captain wrote "U. S." after his name! I should be glad if it were true, but as it is not, I must be content with having introduced to the Athenæum an officer of whom the Royal Navy ought to be proud, and an author of whose name it was scarcely reputable in a literary journal to be ignorant.

not fit a man peculiarly for playing *pretendiente*, if the inclination occurs to him ; yet it is not likely to occur to him, if he has the mathematics, or any thing else, in his head, by which he earns an honorable livelihood, with mental improvement and a respectable position. But that the engineers and artillery officers are not politicians generally, is probably owing to the particular organization of those corps, more than to any other cause. Promotion, with them, follows the rigid rule of seniority ; whereas, in the other divisions, he who has friends, male or female, in the palace or about it, rises soonest and most infallibly. The visible good effect of the stricter system ought certainly to suggest to the law-makers the propriety of extending it to the whole military establishment. Promotion, given as the extraordinary reward of extraordinary merit, in the legitimate field of a soldier's duties, is of course an incentive to honorable and just ambition, and elevates the character of the army, while it prejudices no other interest of the state. But where advancement is the prize of ante-chamber servility, political subserviency, or small intrigue, it can have no beneficial public result, military or civil. Numerous instances of its ridiculous and prejudicial consequences were very familiar, when I was in Madrid, to all who knew any thing of public men and political affairs. With us, the habit of looking to military chiefs as political leaders, merely because they have fought battles, is bad enough, no doubt, — and none the less so, because now and then the education and habits of the camp may have developed eminent executive qualities in particular individuals. That must, in spite of exceptions, be in the main a vicious rule,

which regards any thing aside from fitness, in the choice of agents for any purpose. But with us, the soldier, wise or unwise, takes off his spurs when he becomes a political leader. His military career may secure his elevation, but it ends when that begins. General Narvaez, as Prime-Minister, might wear on state occasions, if it pleased him, the uniform of a Captain-General. It would be odd, with us, to see a President inaugurated in epaulettes. As long as the Spanish system lasts, irregularity and uncertainty must be looked for, and constitutional government cannot be said to exist in its purity. Our system will probably give us many bad rulers; but they will be simply inferior Presidents, not dangerous generals.

In the Spanish navy, promotion is likewise dependent upon fixed rules, and the result is identical with that which has already been adverted to, in connection with the scientific corps of the land-service. It is a very rare thing for naval officers to be heard of in association with political intrigues, or, indeed, any thing political; although they are remarkable as a class for their ability, and for the extent of their general, as well as professional attainments. This fact illustrates the political wisdom of their organization, even more decidedly than the same result following the same cause in those divisions of the army to which it is applicable. Until lately, the Spanish navy had been for many years in a state of sad inactivity, and the opportunity for any practical exercise of the scientific acquirements which the routine of the service prescribes, was extremely insignificant. Sailors and naval commanders cannot be made or occupied without ships, and

the disasters of the preceding and the present century had not only destroyed the proud armaments of Spain and exhausted the means of their restoration, but in a great degree broken the spirit which might have repaired her fortunes on the sea. All the temptations which leisure creates were therefore thrown in the way of the officers of the navy. Ambitious, and at the same time capable and well-educated, they had every inducement to seek, in the palace or the halls of legislation, the command which they had no quarter-decks to supply. The influence which countervailed so natural a tendency must have been strong, especially when they beheld field-marshal and generals changing into senators and secretaries all around them, and when there was scarcely a scale of power into which some one did not fling, before their eyes, a sword no heavier than theirs.

I have said, that the necessity of defending her colonies from the aggressive expeditions of our buccaneers has produced a decided augmentation of the Spanish navy within a few years past. In addition to the regular budget for 1850, a million and a half of dollars were appropriated, by special decree, in March of the same year, principally to the construction of steam-ships. Considerable activity had previously been given to the workshops at Ferrol and La Carraca, and the then Secretary, the Marquis of Molins, had devoted himself with considerable energy and enthusiasm to the renovation of his Department and the increase of its efficiency. The same policy has been pursued with constant vigor down to the present time. Liberal and wise appropriations have been

successively granted in furtherance of it. Large purchases for the Spanish arsenals have been made in our own timber-markets. The naval schools have been reorganized; the modern improvements in naval architecture have been studiously consulted; the quiet acquisitions in nautical science, which men like Navarrete had for years been hiving, have found scope for their display and application. The national pride has become enlisted, and the opposition but rivals the government in encouraging and following its suggestions.

Independently, indeed, of the principal cause of all this, which has been mentioned, the increase of the navy was absolutely required by the improving commercial activity and prospects of the kingdom. Not that trade has been doubled, as the navy has been,—but that the military marine was so utterly unequal to the discharge of its proper duties, as to need a complete reorganization, in order to meet the most moderate advance in commerce. Public measures or events are rarely to be regarded in the exclusive light of cause or effect. They are generally both. An increase of naval strength, suggested by an increase of commerce calling for protection, must, in its turn and by the very protection which it affords, give an impulse to commercial development. A commercial marine, upon the other hand, developed by any cause whatever, must not only create and enforce a necessity for the increase of naval power, but must furnish the means of naval growth, in a body of experienced and hardy seamen and in the awakened interest and sympathy of the nation. It may thus turn out, that the attempts of a portion of our floating and licentious population

to enrich themselves at the expense of Spain and her colonies, and of our national good name, may be one means of burnishing once more the rusted trident of the Peninsula, and restoring the goodly trade which once flourished under its guardianship.

There is a portion of our national legislation, in reference to Spain, which shows how important results may sometimes follow from causes apparently wide of them. It perhaps illustrates quite as well the remark just now made, as to the double light in which public measures ought commonly to be regarded. I refer to the matter of "discriminating duties," levied on Spanish vessels from the West Indies, under the act of 1834. The reader may perhaps remember an able and statesmanlike communication on the subject, made by Mr. Secretary Corwin, to Congress, during its last unprofitable session. The act was passed as a measure of retaliation, and would, perhaps, have been sufficiently just, if it had not been unwise. It very soon resulted in excluding Spanish vessels from our ports, and to the extent of throwing the carrying-trade between the United States and the Islands into the hands of our ship-owners, it answered its purpose speedily and bravely. But our legislators seemed to forget that a carrying-trade implies commodities to be carried, as well as vessels to carry them. They lost sight of the fact, that the articles of merchandise which we contributed to the consumption of the Islands could nearly all be purchased elsewhere, and that the advantage which our ports enjoyed, from their proximity, could readily be counterbalanced by custom-house facilities and exemptions, extended to importations in Spanish bottoms.

These facilities and exemptions were in fact afforded. Other nations, wiser than we, were willing to produce and sell, and let the Spaniards themselves carry. The consequence followed, that a large portion of the demand from the Spanish West Indies was diverted to other markets, so that our trade with them is now confined in a great degree to our own products, and to certain ponderous articles of no very great value, which our locality enables us to monopolize in spite of our legislation. The large mass of foreign commodities which we formerly sold them are now purchased by them, directly, from the same sources which furnish our own supplies. Even in the articles which we continue to furnish, the sum of our trade bears no proportion whatever to the immense increase of the West India demand. The benefit, therefore, which our shipping interests may seem to have reaped in some particulars from the measure in question, has been most dearly paid for, by sacrifices which are now too obvious to escape the attention of any political economists, except members of Congress on the eve or in the reaction of a Presidential campaign.

But the result, as it affects the United States, is not the point to which the purposes of this work would make me direct the reader's attention. Driven from our ports, by the onerous duties imposed on them and the vexations with which the imposition was often accompanied, the Spanish ship-owners naturally enough sought their home-markets, whenever the articles required by the colonial trade could be found there. The new demand and opportunity of shipment, in their turn, quickened production and supply. Large quan-