he entered, and out of which he came, as a politician and a military commander, the foremost man in Europe.

The story has been elsewhere told at length of the outrages and wrongs which drove the Spanish and Portuguese people into a war of extermination with France. I am not going to repeat that story now, my purpose being sufficiently served when I state, that just as the preparations of the British Government were complete, and the South American expedition was about to sail, tidings arrived from the Peninsula which caused an immediate abandonment of the enterprise. One French army had traversed the districts which lie between the Bidassoa and the Douro, and was marching upon Lisbon. Another, after occupying Madrid, and removing Charles the 6th and his family to Bayonne, had proclaimed Joseph Buonaparte King of Spain. Spaniards and Portuguese, but particularly Spaniards, ran everywhere to arms, in order to vindicate the honour of their country, and England was invited by delegates from various provinces to help the people in the contest in which they had embarked. It has been said that so long before as 1805, when the capitulation of Ulm was communicated to him, Mr Pitt, entertaining at Walmer Castle a party of statesmen and military officers, of whom Sir Arthur Wellesley was one, foretold this outbreak. "Our last hope of resistance to Buonaparte is gone," exclaimed one of the guests. "By no means," was Pitt's reply, "we shall have another European coalition against him before long, and Spain will take the lead in it." Then observing that the remark fell dead upon those around him, he went on to say, "I tell you that Spain is the first continental nation which will involve him in a war of partisans. Her nobles are debased and her Government wretched, but the people still retain their sense of honour and their sobriety. Buonaparte will endeavour to tread out these feelings, because they are incompatible with his designs, and I look to that attempt for kindling the sort of war which will not cease till he is destroyed."

Whether this prediction was really uttered or not, the case fell out exactly as here described. It was not the

Spanish Government which opposed itself to France, nor the high spirit of the Spanish nobles which supplied the place of a government. The Spanish people rose of their own accord, finding leaders where they could, and rushed into that war of partisans for which the nature of their country eminently fitted them. The Portuguese followed the example, and both appealed to England for support. The appeal was not made in vain. Every Spaniard and Portuguese, who presented himself as an emissary of the revolt, was well received by the English Government; and arms, ammunition, clothing, and even money, were lavished upon men, of whom very many took care that these good things should not pass out of their hands again except with profit to themselves. Nor was this heedless extravagance considered to be unwise either in or out of the British Parliament. The spectacle of a nation rising in its might took captive the imaginations of all classes of Englishmen. Whatever the Minister proposed in aid of the Spanish malcontents, was assented to with acclamation. Indeed, the Duke of Portland and his colleagues were found fault with only because they did not go as far as the nation desired in sustaining a cause so glorious.

The condition of Portugal at this moment, though bad enough, was probably considered by the mere politician to be less desperate than that of Spain. The King, before he emigrated with his family to Brazil, had provided for the administration of affairs during his absence. Certain grandees of the kingdom, including Count Souza and the Bishop of Oporto, were appointed Regents, and every act performed by the Regency was to be regarded as emanating from the Crown. No provision of the sort was made or could be made in Spain. It was only after he reached Bayonne that Ferdinand VII. became aware of the destiny which awaited him; and the formal deed of abdication which he executed there, transferred to Joseph Buonaparte whatever right of government the retiring monarch could convey. When Spain rose therefore against the intruder, she rose against the only Government then in existence; and her people accepted, what indeed came alone within their reach,

the sway of such persons as by social position or energy of character seemed justified in taking the lead in a great emergency.

Spain was, in former times, a constitutional country. Each province had its Junta or deliberative body, elected like the members of our own House of Commons, to represent the people in Parliament. When the Bourbons came, they set aside these ancient usages, and now nothing but the tradition of them remained. Tradition however, in such a crisis, is of inestimable value, and the absence of a court was atoned for, as if instinctively, by calling into operation these dormant legislative bodies. Juntas arose, no one could tell how, in every province. Arragon, Castile, Catalonia, Estremadura, Galicia, Andalusia, each had its own, which issued decrees in full assurance that they would be respected and obeyed by all, except the adherents of the usurper. It was with these Juntas that the English Government communicated in Spain, as they did with the Regency in Portugal. And till a closer experience proved how little they could be trusted, the English Government reposed in their wisdom and patriotism unbounded confidence.

The force intended for the conquest of Spanish America was assembled at this time in Cork. The ships were in the harbour ready to receive the men, and Sir Arthur Wellesley was nominated to the command. But so novel an aspect of affairs in Europe induced the Government to pause before proceeding further with the enterprise; and Sir Arthur was invited to come over, and give them the benefit of his advice. When he arrived in London, he found the Ministers undecided whether it would be judicious to land a British soldier in the Peninsula at all. They had been assured by the representatives of the Spanish Juntas that Spain stood in no need of men; that there were Spaniards enough, provided arms and ammunition were supplied them, to drive the invaders beyond the Pyrenees. This was a comfortable doctrine, to which the Cabinet lent a willing ear, but Sir Arthur protested against it. He spoke from his own experience in India of the hopelessness of opposing undisciplined levies to regular troops, and so far prevailed, that it

was settled to attempt with the corps already collected in Ireland, a diversion in favour of the Peninsular patriots. It was impossible to avoid offering the command of that corps to Sir Arthur, but the offer was clogged with conditions, which rendered the acceptance inconvenient if not disagreeable. They insisted on retaining his services in Ireland, and that he should again discharge the duties of his office by deputy. That they intended and desired him to refuse the command, there can be little doubt; but he was too much in earnest to be deterred by trifles. In less than four-and-twenty hours the whole was settled.

It was during this visit to London that the *tête-à-tête* conversation occurred, between Sir Arthur and Mr John Wilson Croker, of which the latter gives an account in the *Quarterly Review*. They had become acquainted in Dublin, where Mr Croker's talents and success at the bar won for him admittance into the best society; and there the foundations were laid of an intimacy which ceased only on Mr Croker's death. Sir Arthur had invited him to dine in Harley-street. He was the only guest, and after the ladies had withdrawn, Mr Croker observing that his host was silent, asked him what he was thinking about. Sir Arthur replied, "To tell you the truth, I was thinking of the French whom I am going to fight. I have never seen them since the campaign in Flanders, when they were already capital soldiers, and a dozen years of successes must have made them still better; they have beaten all the world, and are supposed to be invincible. They have besides, it seems, a new system, which has out-manœuvred and overwhelmed all the armies of Europe; but no matter, my die is cast. They may overwhelm, but I don't think they will out-manœuvre me. In the first place, I am not afraid of them, as everybody else seems to be; and, secondly, if what I hear of their system of manœuvring be true, I think it a false one against troops steady enough, as I hope mine are, to receive them with the bayonet. I suspect that half the continental armies were more than half beaten before the battle began. I, at least, will not be frightened beforehand."

I have no doubt whatever that this reported conversation

is substantially correct. I suspect, however, that Mr Croker's memory was a little at fault in regard to details, for the phraseology is not the Duke's, and the inferences to which it leads would be unsound. The Duke knew better than most men that the only difference then between French and English tactics was this, that whereas the French attacked in column, the English always attacked in line; and that the real resistance to an attack by troops waiting for their adversaries in line comes from the volume of fire with which the column is received. All armies, French as well as English, Russian, German, and Italian, defend a position in line, provided the assailants give them time to deploy. But the English alone have hitherto attacked in line, though I believe that the armies of other nations are beginning in this respect to follow their example. The flourish about receiving the French with the bayonet, and the steadiness required to do so, was not, I will venture to say, Sir Arthur Wellesley's, but Mr Croker's flourish.

Having settled his business in London, and received his final letter of instructions, Sir Arthur Wellesley set off for Cork, where his small and ill-appointed corps had already been embarked. It consisted on paper of 1016 officers and non-commissioned officers, 229 drummers and trumpeters, 9505 rank and file, and 215 troop horses. There were 12 pieces of cannon attached to that corps, not one of them horsed. The cavalry, effective and non-effective, counted only 346 sabres, and one officer of engineers with 11 artificers made up the sum of trained workmen at the General's disposal. The staff which attended him consisted of high-spirited young gentlemen not one of whom had any experience of war; he had neither a commissariat nor a medical establishment to trust to; and a veteran battalion, while it seemed to swell his numbers, served rather to weaken than to strengthen his hands. Hence, after making necessary deductions, he found that the utmost force which he could hope to bring into line would hardly exceed 8000 men. "It certainly was a shabby enough start," he used to say in after-years, "but it was quite of a piece with our military policy at the time. The Government trusted me,

I believe, as much as it trusted anybody, but it had no great faith even in me, as yet, and dreaded nothing so much as throwing a large army ashore on the Continent under the command of a British officer. I must admit, however, that the men were admirable, and admirably drilled. All that they wanted was experience, and that they got by degrees."

Having seen his troops on board, and fixed a rendezvous with the Commodore, Sir Arthur Wellesley, leaving the fleet behind, set off in the Crocodile frigate for Corunna. He had been desired to communicate with the Junta of Galicia under the persuasion that the French had already sustained a defeat, and that little more was necessary to insure the independence of Spain than that the passes of the Pyrenees should be occupied. But on his arrival at Corunna he found that, with vast enthusiasm of speech, there was no vigour of action in the ruling body. His proffered assistance in men was declined; so after landing stores and money for the use of the patriots, he put to sea again. He rejoined the fleet at Cape Finisterre, where he held a brief conference with the Admiral, Sir Pulteney Malcolm, after which he again took the lead, and found in Mondego Bay, on the coast of Portugal, what appeared to him a convenient place of disembarkation.

The British Government, when it sent out this handful of men from Cork, had formed no specific plans of its own; it could not therefore give to the leader of the expedition any specific instructions. But certain contingencies were assumed as of possible occurrence, and certain eventualities coincident with these contingencies were suggested. Beyond this the Cabinet had not ventured to go, and Sir Arthur felt on quitting Cape Finisterre that he possessed, what above all things he most desired, entire liberty of action.

The Crocodile's anchor was scarcely over the side in Mondego Bay, ere this pleasant delusion vanished. Fresh letters of instruction greeted him, wherein he was informed that His Majesty's Government had enlarged its views, and that the force under his command was to be considered as the mere advanced guard of a larger army. From various quarters,

from Gibraltar, from Sweden, from England, fresh troops were coming, which, when united, would make up 30,000 men. In this army Sir Arthur Wellesley was to serve as the junior of six generals of division. Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Dalrymple, Governor of Gibraltar, was to command in chief. Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Burrard was to be second in command; and Lieutenant-Generals Sir John Moore, the Hon. Alexander Hope, Mackenzie Fraser, and Lord Paget, were all, in command of their respective divisions, to take precedence of Sir Arthur Wellesley. It is not to be supposed that such a communication could be at all agreeable to him who was the object of it. He took it, however, with perfect good humour, as he took every announcement of the will of the Government which he served; and would not allow it to interfere with the arrangements which he had already made. "All that I can say on the subject," he wrote in reply to Lord Castlereagh, "is that whether I am to command the army or not, or even to quit it, I shall do my best to insure success, and you may depend upon it that I shall not hurry the operations, or commence them one moment sooner than they ought to be commenced, in order that I may acquire the credit of success."

Among other contingencies touched upon in the original letter of instructions, was a campaign in Portugal, of which the river Tagus might be the base. It was essential in his opinion to the success of that campaign, that as soon as possible a landing should be effected, and he waited only the coming in of the fleet to commence that operation. The fleet arrived on the last day of July, and the disembarkation began on the first of August. But the means of effecting that difficult purpose were most inadequate, and a succession of heavy gales had left such a surf upon the shore, that the ordinary ship's boats ran great risk of being staved, as one by one they plunged into it. Five days were thus consumed in doing that which, had proper equipments been provided, ought to have been done in one. But the evil was in a great degree compensated by the unexpected arrival, on the 6th, of General Spencer, with a reinforcement of three or four thousand men. On the 7th, therefore, when he passed

his army in review, Sir Arthur found that 12,000 excellent infantry were at his disposal, and that his cavalry and artillery, though few in number, were, in all that affected the equipment and physique of the men, excellent.

An army, to be effective, must, however, consist of more than men. Horses are needed to drag guns; mules or waggons to transport stores; cattle to supply fresh meat; and means of transport for tents and necessary baggage. All these Sir Arthur Wellesley found himself obliged to procure through the instrumentality of a staff to which work of this kind was entirely new. He had, indeed, on his passage to Mondego called at Oporto, and arranged there with the Bishop for a small supply of what was most urgently needed. But he learned at the same time that effective co-operation from the Portuguese themselves was out of the question. Of regular troops there were said to be about 8000, under General don Bernardo Frere, at Lyria. Bands of peasants, the Bishop stated, were gathering round that nucleus; but "the peasants," Sir Arthur writes in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, "have, I believe, no arms, but pikes, and those called regular infantry are composed of individuals belonging to the different corps of the Portuguese army." From a force so constituted, little support could be expected, and little was given. General Frere, after a good deal of consultation and discussion, lent Sir Arthur 1400 of his infantry and 250 of his cavalry, and stood apart with the residue to protect, as he stated, the communications of the English with the coast, after their advance should have begun.

There were at this time, it was calculated, about 20,000 French troops in Portugal. In point of fact, there were many more, because the embarkation returns made out some weeks subsequently, showed, that upwards of 26,000 had survived the casualties of the campaign. Of these, five or six thousand were in Alentejo, under General Loison. Five thousand more, under General De la Borde, watched the English from the hills of Cintra; and the rest, after affording garrisons to Almeida and to the forts upon the Tagus, were with Junot himself in Lisbon. It was the obvious policy of

the English General to strike at the nearest of these corps, before it could be joined by the rest: it was equally the policy of General De la Borde to avoid an action, keeping the invaders at the same time in check. The former sought to gain his end by marching along the coast, instead of advancing, as he was expected to do, direct upon Cintra; the latter, who was moving upon Lyria, intending to form a junction there with Loison, found himself thwarted, and halted at Roliça. These events occurred during the 9th and 10th, for the morning of the 9th had dawned before Sir Arthur was in a condition to quit his bivouac; and at two places, called Alcobaça and Obidos, the advanced sentries of the hostile armies came for the first time in view. The French felt that they were not strong enough to hold both posts; they retired, therefore, in the night between the 13th and 14th from Alcobaça, and on the 15th made their first acquaintance with the ring of English rifles. Two companies from the 95th Rifle Brigade and the 60th were directed to dislodge the enemy from Obidos, and the following are the terms in which Sir Arthur describes the manner in which they did their work. "We had yesterday," his letter is dated the 16th, "a little affair of advanced posts, brought on by the over-eagerness of the riflemen in pursuit of an enemy's picquet, in which we lost Lieutenant Bunbury of the 95th killed, and Pakenham slightly wounded; and some men of the 95th and 60th. The troops behaved remarkably well, but not with great prudence."

CHAPTER VI.

ROLIÇA AND VIMEIRO—RETURNS HOME.

THE ring of English rifles and French musketry, in and about Obidos, will long be remembered as the opening of a stern drama which occupied the attention of Europe unintermittingly during six long years. There followed on the 17th the battle of Roliça, which, considered with reference to the numbers engaged, deserves to be spoken of as a mere affair; but which, because of the obstinate valour displayed on both sides, and the moral effect produced by it, holds a conspicuous place in the history of the war in the Peninsula. General De la Borde occupied on that occasion an elevated plateau, of which the conformation was such that it could be turned only by a circuitous march, while its approaches in front were through two steep and narrow defiles. He held it with 5000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and 5 guns, and was attacked by 13,700 infantry, 650 cavalry, and 12 guns. De la Borde fought for two objects; first, in the hope that before the English could dislodge him, General Loison, of whose approach he was aware, would come up; and next, failing tha', contingency, in the confident expectation that, after inflicting severe loss upon the assailants, he should himself be able to get away comparatively unharmed. There is no rule in the art of war which condemned these expectations, yet they came to nothing. Sir Arthur set aside the first by attacking in front, instead of waiting for the completion of his flank movements; and he dissipated the last by the vigour with which the attack was pushed. Though

unable to bring more than 4000 infantry at a time into action, he carried all before him. The French offered a stout resistance; they had been taught to despise the English as soldiers, and waited for them till the bayonets well nigh crossed. But in spite of their bravery and the skill of their leader, who, wounded early in the day, never quitted his saddle, they were driven from one alignment after another, and finally retreated under cover of their cavalry, leaving 600 killed and wounded, and three of their guns, upon the field.

Of the Englishmen who took part in the battle of Roliça few now survive, and these saw, in after-years, many a sterner encounter; yet the impression made upon them by what passed on that memorable 17th of August, never grew faint. It is as vivid at the moment of my writing, as when the shouts of the combatants rang more than half a century ago in their ears. This is not to be wondered at. Putting aside the Brigadiers and a few other officers of rank, not a man in that little army had ever before come under fire; while all, without exception, witnessed then, for the first time, how their chief bore himself in the hour of danger. He is described by such as had the best means of observation, to have been calm, self-possessed, and cheerful throughout. The 16th was devoted to such preparations as the eve of a battle required. He personally reconnoitred the enemy's position; personally explained to each leader of a column what he was expected to do; showed the points on which they were all severally to move, and satisfied himself that his orders were understood. He dined at his usual hour, and chatted with the gentlemen of his staff, and the guests invited to meet them, as if nothing extraordinary were going to happen; and when the morrow came he was early in the saddle, shaved and dressed with the utmost regard to neatness. And here I may as well observe in passing that such was his unvarying custom. At whatever hour he rose, however the coming day was to be spent, he allowed nothing to interfere with this minute attention to his toilet, which, free from the most distant approach to foppishness, early got for him the sobriquet of the *Beau*. His greetings to all who encountered him, as he rode along the line, were kindly and cheerful

He spoke a few words to Fergusson and Bowes, who commanded the columns appointed to turn the enemy's right and left, and again pointed out the exact spots, on reaching which they were to change their line of march. This done he waited till they were seen to make the turn, and then his skirmishers ran out. While these drove in the French pickets, he himself rode behind the supports, and by and by, when the proper moment came, said in a quiet tone to one of his staff, "Now you may tell Crawford and Nightingale to go on." From the spot where these words were uttered, he surveyed the whole field, and dealt out reinforcements to the troops which were struggling in the defiles, as a skilful dealer distributes his cards at a game of whist. And finally, when he saw the plateau crowned, he put spurs to his horse, galloped to the summit, and made such fresh dispositions as the circumstances required. The perfect coolness with which all this was done, his unfailing good humour, the apparent indifference with which he regarded mistakes, taking care however to correct them, inspired all who were at hand to witness his proceedings, with admiration. It may be truly said that on that day the officers and men of the British army gave him their entire confidence, and we know that they never afterwards withdrew it, even partially. The battle of Roliça lasted a long time. It might be six or seven in the morning when the English began to move; it was three or four in the afternoon before the firing ceased. The men, enfeebled by confinement on board of ship, were quite knocked up, and the Artillery horses, all in wretched condition, could with difficulty drag the guns. As to the cavalry, it never struck a blow. The nature of the country, rugged and broken, kept horsemen in the rear, till the plateau was won; and when they arrived on the table-land, they found themselves inferior in every respect to the French. No pursuit was therefore attempted, but on the ground which they had won the troops lay down and slept.

It is necessary to bear in mind that Sir Arthur laboured at this time under great disadvantages. He had ceased to be the commander-in-chief of an army, and had become the mere leader of an advanced guard. As such he had done

more than most men would have attempted. Not satisfied with making good his own landing, he had fought a successful battle, and ensured thereby a safe debarkation for the corps which were to follow. Tidings of the approach of several of these had already reached him. General Anstruther with 3000 or 4000 men was in the Tagus. Sir John Moore with 10,000 was reported to be in the offing, and Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Burrard might from hour to hour be expected. If all this intelligence, important as it was, had been kept back for four-and-twenty hours, Sir Arthur would have marched on the 18th to Torres Vedras, and cut off the communication of De la Borde and Loison with Lisbon. Under existing circumstances he felt himself constrained to desist from an operation which, however it might have redounded to his own honour, could not fail more or less to embarrass those, to whom the management of the campaign had been entrusted. He contented himself therefore with putting upon paper his own views of what ought to be done, and led his corps to Vimeiro, that it might be at hand to protect the disembarkation of Anstruther's brigade, and to receive Sir Harry Burrard when he should arrive.

Sir Arthur proposed that while the main body of the army, now raised by the arrival of Anstruther to 17,000 men, marched by the coast road, round Torres Vedras to Mafra, Sir John Moore should land at the mouth of the Mondego, and push direct for Santarem. He showed that this double movement would at once turn the enemy's position in front of Lisbon, and cut them off from the only line of retreat upon the road to Elvas. Nor, as he personally explained to Sir Harry Burrard, whom he visited on the 20th on board the frigate, would the operation be attended by any of the inconveniences incident under common circumstances to movements on double lines. Without Sir John Moore Sir Harry was superior to anything that Junot could hope to bring against him. There was no good reason, therefore, why he should hesitate to act on the offensive, particularly when he had it in his power to place a strong corps in the enemy's rear. But to such reasoning Sir Harry was deaf. He did not come to run any risks. He considered a flank

march by a narrow coast road to be dangerous, and preferred waiting for Sir John Moore, whom he had directed to steer for the Tagus. Except when specially called upon so to do, Sir Arthur never entered into arguments with his superiors; he returned, therefore, to the camp at Vimeiro and cancelled the order which had already been issued for moving at daylight on the morrow.

Sir Arthur went to bed not entirely pleased, and had slept some hours when a troop serjeant-major of the 21st Light Dragoons was brought by an aide-de-camp to his bedside. The man was a German. His name was Landsheit, and the reader who is curious to know more about him will find his story told at length in a volume entitled "The Huzzar." Landsheit spoke English but imperfectly, and seemed to Sir Arthur to be a good deal agitated, an imputation which the gallant veteran put from him ever after with high disdain. But agitated or calm, he reported, that patrolling to the front he had encountered a French scouting party, and had reason to believe that the enemy were coming on to the attack. For this, as for every other emergency, Sir Arthur was prepared. His position, though not in a military point of view strong, was sufficiently so to give him confidence, and his outposts were all so placed that surprise was impossible. He dismissed Landsheit, therefore, with a kindly word, laid his head upon the pillow again, and went to sleep. He was up before dawn, and had all his people under arms. In less than an hour the battle began.

How the enemy came on and were repulsed, with what skill Sir Arthur handled his troops in this his first defensive action, and how anxious he was to follow up the victory, these matters are told at length elsewhere. But power had at this time departed from him. Sir Harry Burrard reached the ground while the battle was still raging, and stopped the pursuit, which would have converted the retreat into a rout. The enemy were in consequence enabled to reunite on strong ground at Torres Vedras, while the English stood still. On the 22nd, however, Sir Harry consented to move, and just then a second commander-in-chief arrived to supersede him. Sir Hugh Dalrymple became now the moving

spirit in the camp, and the camp at once acknowledged his influence. On the 23rd General Kellerman came in from the head-quarters of the French army, with proposals to conclude an armistice as a step preliminary to capitulation. The following are the terms in which Sir Arthur speaks of these proceedings. His letter is addressed to Lord Castlereagh:—

"23rd August, 1808.

"My dear Lord,

"You will have heard that one of the consequences of our victory of the 21st has been an agreement to suspend hostilities between the French and us, preparatory to the negotiation of a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French. Although my name is affixed to this instrument I beg that you will not believe that I negotiated it, that I approve of it, or that I had any hand in wording it. It was negotiated by the General himself in my presence and that of Sir Harry Burrard; and after it had been drawn out by Kellerman himself, Sir Hugh Dalrymple desired me to sign it. I object to its *verbiage;* I object to an indefinite suspension of hostilities; it ought to have been for 48 hours only. As it is now, the French will have 48 hours to prepare for their defence, after Sir Hugh will put an end to the suspension.

"I approve of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal, more particularly as it appears to be deemed impossible to move Sir John Moore's corps upon Santarem, so as to cut off the retreat of the French towards Elvas. They could establish themselves in Elvas, Fort La Lippe, Almeida, and Peniché, which places we should be obliged either to blockade or attack regularly in the worst season of the year in Portugal, viz. the months of September and October; and the advance of the army into Spain would be delayed until after that period. It is more for the advantage of the general cause to have 30,000 Englishmen in Spain and 10,000 or 12,000 additional Frenchmen on the northern frontier of Spain, than to have the Frenchmen in Portugal, and the Englishmen employed in the blockade or siege of strong places. If they are to be allowed to evacuate it

must be with their property, but I should have wished to adopt some mode of making the French generals disgorge the Church plate which they have stolen."

Such was the part, and the only part, played by Sir Arthur Wellesley in transactions which were felt in England to have robbed the victorious army of the legitimate fruits of its valour. It went against the grain with him to affix his signature even to the document which suspended hostilities. Indeed his remark to friends who met him, as he returned from executing that task, showed how little he had been satisfied with it. "What are we to do next? Hunt red-legged partridges, I suppose;" an occupation to which the young officers addicted themselves, the birds abounding in the neighbourhood. But further than this he declined to go. Indeed he was neither present when the Commissioners signed the convention, nor did he become acquainted with its contents till the whole were ratified. His manner, moreover, though always respectful, became thenceforth distant towards Sir Hugh Dalrymple, who was sharp-sighted enough to understand that his subordinate, while obeying every order, entertained no great respect for the source whence it emanated. Sir Hugh accordingly endeavoured to get rid of Sir Arthur, by proposing that he should travel to Madrid, and arrange there a plan of combined operations with the Spanish authorities. That proposal, of which he distrusted the sincerity, Sir Arthur contrived to evade, taking care, however, to submit copies of the correspondence to Lord Castlereagh; and the result was that to Lord William Bentinck, and not to him, the Spanish mission was assigned.

From that day the tone and temper of the British camp underwent a change. Everywhere, from generals commanding divisions down to private sentinels, there was a sense of mortification and well nigh of anger, which, had the command continued to rest where it then was, must have produced the worst consequences. Sir Hugh Dalrymple was personally unpopular, for which his mode of maintaining discipline sufficiently accounted. He was habitually harsh, stern, and uncivil, both to officers and men. But over and above this, there were

causes of offence of a graver character and more deeply seated. He had been thrust by court favour into the position which he held, after something like a specific promise given to Sir John Moore, that to him the command of the army should be entrusted. This produced, as was natural, great indignation on the part of Moore's friends, and of disquiet to Moore himself, who had more than one confidential conference with Sir Arthur upon the subject, and seems to have been dissuaded by him from applying to be recalled. The consequence was the total loss of harmony in a body, which, till the arrival of the new commander-in-chief, had deserved all the praises which Sir Arthur Wellesley bestowed upon it. On one point, however, there was no difference of opinion. The victor of Roliça and Vimeiro was held in the greatest admiration and respect; and of this a public manifestation was made as soon as it became known that he was about to quit the camp. The officers commanding corps, and the field-officers of the army, agreed to present an address to Sir Arthur, with a request that he would accept at their hands a piece of plate. This was done on the 18th September, through the medium of Colonel Kemmis, the oldest field-officer among them, and accepted by Sir Arthur with all the frankness which formed part of his nature. In two days afterwards, having led his division into Lisbon, and seen the last of Junot's force on board of ship, he himself quitted the seat of war and returned home.

CHAPTER VII.

IN LONDON—IN DUBLIN—IN COMMAND OF A NEW ARMY.

Sir Arthur landed at Plymouth on the 4th of October, his departure from Portugal having been precipitated by the death of Mr Grant, the gentleman who, during his absence, had undertaken to discharge the current business of the Secretary's office in Ireland. He wrote immediately to the Duke of Richmond, who was still Lord-Lieutenant, and announced his intention of presenting himself in Dublin without delay; but found it impossible to carry that design into effect. For the public mind of England was in a state of the highest excitement and indignation, on account of the abortive conclusion, as it was called, of the campaign in Portugal. The Convention of Cintra was stigmatized, not as impolitic only, but iniquitous; and all who were believed to have taken any part in its management were denounced as traitors. Among others Sir Arthur Wellesley came in for no small share of blame. Dalrymple had managed to convey an impression, that it was entirely by Wellesley's advice that he had been guided in the matter, and Wellesley's signature attached to the preliminary treaty was accepted, by the newspapers and the people, as conclusive testimony to the truth of the statement. One word from Sir Arthur in public would have turned the tide and thrown the obloquy upon others; but with rare self-denial he refused to speak or to write it. Still he found it necessary in defence of his own character to remain some days in London, and he did not hesitate in his private correspondence to assign

his reasons for so doing. Subjoined is a specimen of the temper in which this correspondence was carried on.

To the Marquis of Buckingham.

"London, 11th Oct., 1808.

"My dear Lord,

"I assure you that I am most sensible of the friendship and kindness of Lord Temple and yourself, of which I hope to prove myself worthy. My situation is a very awkward one, and I can relieve myself from it only by the result of an inquiry.

"I am accused of being the adviser of persons over whom I had no control and who refused to follow my advice, and am made responsible for the acts of others. The real share which I have had in the transactions,—which, in my opinion, have deservedly incurred the displeasure of the public,—cannot be known till they will be inquired into; and in the mean time Sir Hugh Dalrymple has left the Government and the public so completely in the dark respecting the military expediency of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal, that that part of the question, which is the only one in which I am involved, is as little understood as the rest. I know of no immediate remedy for these difficulties of my situation, excepting patience and temper, and I thank God that the undeserved abuse which has been heaped upon me has not altered the latter.

"In respect to the conduct of my case, I have determined that I will publish nothing, nor will authorize the publication of anything by others. This forbearance is particularly incumbent upon me, as the whole subject must be inquired into. I have also determined that I will not involve others in scrapes because they differed in opinion with me previously to the 22nd of August, notwithstanding that difference of opinion and the alteration of system were the cause of the military expediency of allowing the French to withdraw from Portugal. I am afraid that I shall experience some difficulty in carrying this intention into execution, be-